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NEW PUERTO COMMERCIAL AND RICHARD LIM, Petitioners, vs.RODEL LOPEZ AND FELIX GAVAN, Respondents.D E C I S I O NDEL CASTILLO, J.:In order to validly dismiss an employee, he must be accorded both substantive and procedural due process by the employer. Procedural due process requires that the employee be given a notice of the charge against him, an ample opportunity to be heard, and a notice of termination. Even if the aforesaid procedure is conducted after the filing of the illegal dismissal case, the legality of the dismissal, as to its procedural aspect, will be upheld provided that the employer is able to show that compliance with these requirements was not a mere afterthought. This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CAs) June 2, 2005 Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 83577, which affirmed with modification the October 28, 2003 Decision2 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NCR CA No. 034421-03, and the September 23, 2005 Resolution3 denying petitioners motion for partial reconsideration.Factual AntecedentsPetitioner New Puerto Commercial hired respondent Felix Gavan (Gavan) as a delivery panel driver on February 1, 1999 and respondent Rodel Lopez (Lopez) as roving salesman on October 12, 1999. Petitioner Richard Lim is the operations manager of New Puerto Commercial. Under a rolling store scheme, petitioners assigned respondents to sell goods stocked in a van on cash or credit to the sari-sari stores of far-flung barangays and municipalities outside Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. Respondents were duty-bound to collect the accounts receivables and remit the same upon their return to petitioners store on a weekly basis.On November 3, 2000, respondents filed a Complaint4 for illegal dismissal and non-payment of monetary benefits against petitioners with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment in Puerto Princesa City. On November 20, 2000, a conciliation conference was held but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. As a result, the complaint was endorsed for compulsory arbitration at the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC on February 13, 2001.Previously or on November 28, 2000, petitioners sent respondents notices to explain why they should not be dismissed for gross misconduct based on (1) the alleged misappropriation of their sales collections, and (2) their absence without leave for more than a month. The notice also required respondents to appear before petitioners lawyer on December 2, 2000 to give their side with regard to the foregoing charges. Respondents refused to attend said hearing.On December 6, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for three counts of estafa before the prosecutors office against respondents in connection with the alleged misappropriation of sales collections. Thereafter, petitioners sent another set of notices to respondents on December 7, 2000 to attend a hearing on December 15, 2000 but respondents again refused to attend. On December 18, 2000, petitioners served notices of termination on respondents on the grounds of gross misconduct and absence without leave for more than one month. On February 5, 2001, an information for the crime of estafa was filed by the city prosecutor against respondents with the Municipal Trial Court in Puerto Princesa City.In due time, the parties submitted their respective position papers.Labor Arbiters RulingOn August 29, 2002, Labor Arbiter Cresencio G. Ramos, Jr. rendered a Decision5 dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal but ordering petitioners to pay respondents proportionate 13th month pay:WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the above case for illegal dismissal is hereby DISMISSED for being devoid of legal merit. Respondents, however, are directed to pay herein complainants their proportionate 13th month pay for the year 20026 [sic] as follows:(1.) Rodel Lopez - P2,998.67(2.) Felix Gavan - P2,998.67SO ORDERED.7The Labor Arbiter ruled that there is substantial evidence tending to establish that respondents committed the misappropriation of their sales collections from the rolling store business. These acts constituted serious misconduct and formed sufficient bases for loss of confidence which are just causes for termination. The records also showed that respondents were given opportunities to explain their side. Both substantive and procedural due processes were complied with, hence, the dismissal is valid. Petitioners, however, failed to prove that they paid the proportionate amount of 13th month pay due to respondents at the time of their dismissal. Thus, the Labor Arbiter ordered petitioners to pay respondents the same.National Labor Relations Commissions RulingOn October 28, 2003, the NLRC rendered a Decision affirming the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, viz:WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated August 29, 2002 is AFFIRMED en toto.SO ORDERED.8The NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiter that respondents act of misappropriating company funds constitutes gross misconduct resulting in loss of confidence. It noted that respondents never denied that (1) they failed to surrender their collections to petitioners, and (2) they stopped reporting for work during the last week of October 2000. Further, respondents admitted misappropriating the subject collections before the hearing officer of the Palawan labor office during the conciliation conference on November 20, 2000. The NLRC also observed that the investigation on the misappropriation of company funds was not a mere afterthought and complied with the twin-notice rule. Last, it ruled that damages cannot be awarded in favor of respondents because their dismissal was for just causes.Court of Appeals RulingThe CA, in its June 2, 2005 Decision, affirmed with modification the ruling of the NLRC, viz:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the NLRC dated 29 August 20029 is hereby MODIFIED in that private respondents are ordered to pay petitioners nominal damages of P30,000.00 each. The decision is affirmed in all other respect.SO ORDERED.10The appellate court held that it was bound by the factual findings of the NLRC because a petition for certiorari is limited to issues of want or excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the failure of respondents to report for work and their misappropriation of company funds have become settled. These acts constitute grave misconduct which is a valid cause for termination under Article 282 of the Labor Code. While the dismissal was for just cause, the appellate court found, however, that respondents were denied procedural due process. It held that the formal investigation of respondents for misappropriation of company funds was a mere afterthought because it was conducted after petitioners had notice of the complaint filed before the labor office in Palawan. In consonance with the ruling in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,11 respondents are entitled to an award of P30,000.00 each as nominal damages for failure of petitioners to comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing before dismissing the respondents. From this decision, only petitioners appealed.IssuesPetitioners raise the following issues for our resolution:1. Whether x x x the Court of Appeals erred in construing that the investigation held by petitioners is an afterthought; and2. Whether x x x the Court of Appeals erred in awarding the sum of P30,000.00 each to the respondents as nominal damages.12Petitioners ArgumentsPetitioners contend that the investigation of respondents was not an afterthought. They stress the following peculiar circumstances of this case: First, when the labor complaint was filed on November 3, 2000, respondents had not yet been dismissed by petitioners. Rather, it was respondents who were guilty of not reporting for work; Lopez starting on October 23, 2000 and Gavan on October 28, 2000. Second, at this time also, petitioners were still in the process of collecting evidence on the alleged misappropriation of company funds after they received reports of respondents fraudulent acts. Considering the distance between the towns serviced by respondents and Puerto Princesa City, it took a couple of weeks for petitioners representative, Armel Bagasala (Bagasala), to unearth the anomalies committed by respondents. Thus, it was only on November 18, 2000 when Bagasala finished the investigation and submitted to petitioners the evidence establishing that respondents indeed misappropriated company funds. Naturally, this was the only time when they could begin the formal investigation of respondents wherein they followed the twin-notice rule and which led to the termination of respondents on December 18, 2000 for gross misconduct and absence without leave for more than a month.Petitioners lament that the filing of the labor complaint on November 3, 2000 was purposely sought by respondents to pre-empt the results of the then ongoing investigation after respondents got wind that petitioners were conducting said investigation because respondents were reassigned to a different sales area during the period of investigation.Respondents ArgumentsRespondents counter that their abandonment of employment was a concocted story. No evidence was presented, like the daily time record, to establish this claim. Further, the filing of the illegal dismissal complaint negates abandonment. Assuming arguendo that respondents abandoned their work, no proof was presented that petitioners served a notice of abandonment at respondents last known addresses as required by Section 2, Rule XVI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. According to respondents, on November 3, 2000, petitioners verbally advised them to look for another job because the company was allegedly suffering from heavy losses. For this reason, they sought help from the Palawan labor office which recommended that they file a labor complaint. Respondents also contest the finding that they misappropriated company funds. They claim that the evidence is insufficient to prove that they did not remit their sales collections to petitioners. Neither were the minutes of the proceedings before the labor officer presented to prove that they admitted misappropriating the company funds. Respondents add that they did not hold a position of trust and confidence. They claim that the criminal cases for estafa against respondents were belatedly filed in order to further justify their dismissal from employment and act as leverage relative to the subject labor case they filed against petitioners.Our RulingThe petition is meritorious.When the requirements of procedural due process are satisfied, the award of nominal damages is improper.At the outset, we note that respondents did not appeal from the decision of the CA which found that, as to the issue of substantive due process, the dismissal was valid because it was based on just causes (i.e., grave misconduct and loss of trust and confidence) due to respondents misappropriation of their sales collections. Thus, the only proper issue for our determination, as raised in the instant petition, is whether respondents were denied procedural due process justifying the award of nominal damages in accordance with the ruling in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission.13In termination proceedings of employees, procedural due process consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him. The requirement of a hearing is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted.14 As we explained in Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company:151avvphi1An employees right to be heard in termination cases under Article 277 (b) as implemented by Section 2 (d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code should be interpreted in broad strokes. It is satisfied not only by a formal face to face confrontation but by any meaningful opportunity to controvert the charges against him and to submit evidence in support thereof.A hearing means that a party should be given a chance to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be taken into account in the adjudication of the controversy. "To be heard" does not mean verbal argumentation alone inasmuch as one may be heard just as effectively through written explanations, submissions or pleadings. Therefore, while the phrase "ample opportunity to be heard" [in Article 277 of the Labor Code] may in fact include an actual hearing, it is not limited to a formal hearing only. In other words, the existence of an actual, formal "trial-type" hearing, although preferred, is not absolutely necessary to satisfy the employee's right to be heard.16In the instant case, the appellate court ruled that there are two conflicting versions of the events and that, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the courts are precluded from resolving factual issues. Consequently, the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC, that petitioners stopped reporting from work and misappropriated their sales collection are binding on the courts. However, the CA found that respondents were denied their right to procedural due process because the investigation held by petitioners was an afterthought considering that it was called after they had notice of the complaint filed before the labor office in Palawan.17 Indeed, appellate courts accord the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC not only respect but also finality when supported by substantial evidence.18 The Court does not substitute its own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible. It is not for the Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses nor substitute the findings of fact of an administrative tribunal which has gained expertise in its specialized field.19However, while we agree with the CA that the labor tribunals factual determinations can no longer be disturbed for failure of respondents to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC, as in fact respondents effectively accepted these findings by their failure to appeal from the decision of the CA, we find that the appellate court misapprehended the import of these factual findings. For if it was duly established, as affirmed by the appellate court itself, that respondents failed to report for work starting from October 22, 2000 for respondent Lopez and October 28, 2000 for respondent Gavan,20 then at the time of the filing of the complaint with the labor office on November 3, 2000, respondents were not yet dismissed from employment. Prior to this point in time, there was, thus, no necessity to comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The mere fact that the notices were sent to respondents after the filing of the labor complaint does not, by itself, establish that the same was a mere afterthought. The surrounding circumstances of this case adequately explain why the requirements of procedural due process were satisfied only after the filing of the labor complaint. Sometime in the third week of October 2000, petitioners received information that respondents were not remitting their sales collections to the company. Thereafter, petitioners initiated an investigation by sending one of their trusted salesmen, Bagasala, in the route being serviced by respondents. To prevent a possible cover up, respondents were temporarily reassigned to a new route to service. Subsequently, respondents stopped reporting for work (i.e., starting from October 22, 2000 for respondent Lopez and October 28, 2000 for respondent Gavan) after they got wind of the fact that they were being investigated for misappropriation of their sales collection, and, on November 3, 2000, respondents filed the subject illegal dismissal case to pre-empt the outcome of the ongoing investigation. On November 18, 2000, Bagasala returned from his month-long investigation in the far-flung areas previously serviced by respondents and reported that respondents indeed failed to remit P2,257.03 in sales collections. As a result, on November 28, 2000, termination proceedings were commenced against respondents by sending notices to explain with a notice of hearing scheduled on December 2, 2000. As narrated earlier, respondents failed to give their side despite receipt of said notices. Petitioners sent another set of notices to respondents on December 7, 2000 to attend a hearing on December 15, 2000 but respondents again refused to attend. Thus, on December 18, 2000, petitioners served notices of termination on respondents for gross misconduct in misappropriating their sales collections and absence without leave for more than a month. As can be seen, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, it cannot be concluded that the sending of the notices and setting of hearings were a mere afterthought because petitioners were still awaiting the report from Bagasala when respondents pre-empted the results of the ongoing investigation by filing the subject labor complaint. For this reason, there was sufficient compliance with the twin requirements of notice and hearing even if the notices were sent and the hearing conducted after the filing of the labor complaint. Thus, the award of nominal damages by the appellate court is improper.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 2, 2005 Decision and September 23, 2005 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP. No. 83577 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The October 28, 2003 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NCR CA No. 034421-03 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.G.R. No. 186209 September 21, 2011UNITED LABORATORIES, INC., Petitioner, vs.JAIME DOMINGO substituted by his spouse CARMENCITA PUNZALAN DOMINGO, ANONUEVO REMIGIO, RODOLFO MARCELO, RAUL NORICO AND EUGENIO OZARAGA, Respondents.D E C I S I O NPEREZ, J.:We are confronted with a curious case of employees demanding the severance of their employment, insisting on the redundancy of their work and thereafter, when the demands went unheeded, crying constructive dismissal by the employer.Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 is the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87502 which granted the petition for certiorari3 filed by respondents Jaime Domingo, Anonuevo Remigio, Rodolfo Marcelo, Raul Norico and Eugenio Ozaraga and reversed the National Labor Relations Commissions (NLRCs) finding that there was no constructive dismissal in three (3) consolidated cases respectively docketed as NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-08-06034-2002, NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-10-08397-2002, and NLRC CASE NO. 00-10-08407-2002. The NLRC decision was an affirmance of the Labor Arbiters dismissal of respondents complaints for constructive dismissal against petitioner United Laboratories, Inc. (Unilab).4 The dispute, which resulted in the unusual resort by the employees to the principle of constructive dismissal, arose from the following facts:Unilab is a prominent domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale, marketing and distribution of pharmaceutical products.Respondents Jaime Domingo, Anonuevo Remigio, Rodolfo Marcelo, Raul Norico and Eugenio Ozaraga were former employees of Unilab assigned to the Distribution Accounting Department (DAD) servicing all the accounting requirements of Unilabs sixteen (16) provincial depotsfourteen (14) distribution centers and two (2) area officesspread nationwide.Sometime in 2001, under a Physical Distribution Master Plan (PDMP), Unilab consolidated its finished goods inventories and logistics activities (warehousing, order processing and shipping) into one distribution center located in Metro Manila. As a result, Unilab closed down its sixteen (16) provincial depots. The job functions of the employees working thereat were declared redundant and their positions were abolished. Unilab gave the redundant employees a separation package of two and a half (2) months pay for every year of service.In the succeeding year, on 7 January 2002, respondents wrote Unilab requesting for their separation or retirement from service under a separation package similar or equivalent to that of the redundant employees in the provincial depots. Respondents referred to this separation package as the Bagong Sibol Program.5 On 9 April 2002, respondents counsel, on their behalf, wrote Unilab reiterating respondents previous request to be separated from service under Unilabs purported Bagong Sibol Program. Particularly, respondents were keen on retiring and receiving 2 months pay for every year of service, and all the other benefits which Unilab had extended to the redundant employees in the provincial depots. The message and sentiment were that "they should likewise be retired under the same redundancy plan or retirement scheme [because] their positions are similarly situated [to] the retired employees of [Unilabs] distribution centers under the principle that things that are alike should be treated alike since they also hold the position of distribution personnel."6 In a letter dated 15 April 2002,7 Unilab denied respondents claims, pointing out that:1. The PDMP is not a retirement program but a cost restructuring measure which resulted in the redundancy of the job functions of the employees working in the provincial depots;2. Unilab has no Bagong Sibol Program, and "independent of the PDMP, there is no redundancy program or other severance scheme open [for] application by any employee;"3. The only existing and official early retirement program of Unilab is provided for in Article IV, Section 2, in relation to Article V, Section 2, of the United Retirement Plan (URP);4. "At the time of the PDMP implementation, [respondents] were not assigned to the provincial depot centers performing provincial, [decentralized], distribution functions;" and5. "At present, [respondents] positions are not redundant, i.e., superfluous, or in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the business."Quite relevantly, in the first half of 2002, Unilab implemented a Shared Services Policy (SSP) which consolidated and centralized all accounting functions of the UNILAB Group of Companies, its affiliates and subsidiaries, under the Finance Division of Unilab. Essentially, accounting services and requirements of the UNILAB Group of Companies, were merged into a single pool, and performed in Unilabs main office. After the closure of the provincial depots, respondents were transferred and re-assigned to the accounting work pool pursuant to the SSP.Respondents, along with four (4) other co-employees, Rosemarie F. Cortez, Exequiel B. Sioson, Wilfredo M. Tumalad, and William C. Obedencia, filed three complaints for constructive dismissal, nonpayment/underpayment of separation pay, damages and attorneys fees against Unilab, which were eventually consolidated. As it turned out, the denial of their request for retirement covered by a higher retirement package rankled on respondents.Interestingly, while their cases were pending before the NLRC, and thereafter while on petition for certiorari before the CA, Cortez and respondents Domingo and Remigio remained working at UNILAB. In fact, the three remained employed at UNILAB until their actual separation therefrom: they received monies as full retirement benefits and as settlement of all their claims against Unilab.On 14 July 2003, the Executive Labor Arbiter dismissed respondents complaints for lack of merit:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the instant complaints for utter lack of merit. [UNILAB], however, is directed to pay the Remaining Complainants, namely: Rosemarie F. Cortez, Jaime A. Domingo, Anonuevo S. Remigio and William Obedencia their separation pay equivalent to one and one-half (1&1/2) months salary for every year of service.8 Dissatisfied, respondents, along with Cortez, appealed to the NLRC. However, on March 30, 2004, the NLRC denied the appeal and affirmed the Labor Arbiters dismissal of the complaints.Posthaste, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the NLRC. Meanwhile, after respondents petition was submitted for resolution, Unilab, with respondents Remigio and Cortez, separately, arrived at an amicable settlement. Remigio, in particular, received the amount of Four Million Seventy Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety Seven Pesos and Eighty Seven Centavos (P4,077,897.87) from Unilab as full settlement and payment of all his claims; he signed a Quitclaim9 in favor of Unilab.Not surprisingly, Unilab received a Motion for Leave of Court to Withdraw as Petitioner separately filed by Cortez and Remigio. The motions were similarly worded and filed by the same counsel on Cortezs and Remigios behalf.The reversal by the CA of the NLRC resulted in the ruling that respondents were constructively dismissed. The CA disposed of the case, thus:WHEREFORE, the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is GRANTED.The assailed RESOLUTIONS DATED MARCH 30, 2004 AND AUGUST 31, 2004 of [the] NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE.[Petitioner] UNITED LABORATORIES, INC. is ORDERED:1. To cause the immediate reinstatement of [respondents] JAIME A. DOMINGO, EUGENIO P. OZARAGA, RODOLFO R. MARCELO, RAUL C. NORICO, and ANONUEVO S. REMIGIO to their former positions or to substantially equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights and other benefits;2. If reinstatement is no longer possible, to pay JAIME A. DOMINGO, EUGENIO P. OZARAGA, RODOLFO R. MARCELO, RAUL C. NORICO and ANONUEVO S. REMIGIO their separation pay, the amount of which shall be computed on the basis of the United Laboratories, Inc. Computation of Separation Benefit;3. To pay full backwages to JAIME A. DOMINGO, EUGENIO P. OZARAGA, RODOLFO R. MARCELO, RAUL C. NORICO and ANONUEVO S. REMIGIO, computed from the time of the abolition of [Unilabs] Distribution Accounting Department up to the finality of this Decision without qualification or deduction;4. To pay 10% of the total award as attorneys fees.Costs of suit to be paid the [petitioner] (sic).10 Oddly, despite a motion to withdraw as petitioner signed by Remigios counsel, the CA did not drop him as petitioner.Unilab filed separate motions: a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 2, 2008 and a Motion for Inhibition dated July 7, 2008, both pointing out that Remigio should have been dropped as petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 87502 given his motion to withdraw as petitioner. Naturally, Unilab likewise alleged that the CA decision is contrary to law and not supported by the evidence.In a Resolution dated 28 January 2009, the CA promptly dismissed Unilabs motions:EXCEPT FOR THE FIRST GROUND, [PETITIONER] APPARENTLY REITERATE[S] MATTERS ALREADY ADDRESSED AND PASSED UPON IN THE DECISION DATED JUNDE 16, 2008. AS SUCH, WE REJECT THEM AND REITERATE THE DECISION.ANENT THE FIRST GROUND, WE HAVE NO RECORD OF THE SO-CALLED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO WITHDRAW AS PETITIONER SUPPOSEDLY FILED BY ANONUEVO S. REMIGIO. THE FIRST TIME WE ARE INFORMED OF THE MOTION IS VIA THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, THEREFORE, THE FIRST GROUND OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS UNWARRANTED AND SHOULD BE DENIED FOR THAT REASON.IITHE MOTION FOR INHIBITION, BEING APPARENTLY WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES AS NOW INDICATED, IS DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT.11 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari positing the following issues:I.THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT INCLUDED REMIGIO IN THE DECISION EVEN IF HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS A PARTY (WITH ABANDONMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST PETITIONER) AND HIS QUITCLAIM HAVE BEEN PRESENTED BEFORE IT.II.THE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSAL OF THE DECISION OF BOTH THE NLRC AND THE LABOR ARBITER ON THE MATTER OF RESPONDENTS ALLEGED CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL WAS ARBITRARY AND RUNS COUNTER TO WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE.III.THE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSAL OF THE DECISION OF BOTH THE NLRC AND THE LABOR ARBITER ON THE MATTER OF WHETHER RESPONDENTS NORICO, MARCELO AND OZARAGA WERE FORCED TO RESIGN WAS HIGHLY SPECULATIVE AND RUNS COUNTER TO WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE.IV.THE COURT OF APPEALS DIRECTIVE FOR [UNILAB] TO PAY RESPONDENTS SEPARATION PAY IN THE SAME WAY IT PAID ITS REDUNDATED EMPLOYEES HAS UTTERLY NO LEGAL BASIS.V.THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO BOTH SEPARATION PAY AND RETIREMENT PAY NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROVISIONS OF [UNILIABS] RETIREMENT PLAN TO THE CONTRARY IS A DIRECT VIOLATION OF WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER. IRONICALLY, [UNILABS] RETIREMENT PLAN IS THE VERY SAME PLAN WHICH THIS HONORABLE COURT EARLIER SUSTAINED AS VALID.12 Respondents filed two Comments dated 20 May 200913 and June 8, 2009,14 respectively, signed by two different counsels. In the expanded Comment dated 8 June 2009, one of respondents counsel, Romulo Macalintal, manifested that Remigio has executed an Affidavit declaring under oath that he did execute a quitclaim in favor of Unilab and no longer intends to pursue his case against it. Albeit belatedly, Atty. Macalintal clarified that the Comment he has filed is only for respondents Domingo, Marcelo, Norico and Ozaraga.On 13 August 2009, a different counsel for respondents filed a Manifestation with Motion to Substitute a Party15 informing the Court of the death of respondent Domingo and the substitution of Domingos wife, Carmencita Punzalan Domingo, as respondent in this case.Preliminarily, regarding the CAs refusal to drop Remigio as petitioner and its categorical declaration of the inexistence of a Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Petitioner filed by Remigios counsel, we have checked the records and found that one of respondents counsels, Atty. Alexander Versoza, on behalf of Remigio, indeed filed a Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Petitioner with the CA.16 In fact, attached to the motion in question is a Quitclaim executed by Remigio in favor of Unilab, which Remigio does not disavow. Thus, the CA was mistaken in not dropping Remigio as petitioner contrary to his motion.The disingenuousness of Remigios counsel is not lost on this Court. We note that this peripheral issue could have been easily settled if respondents counsel, Atty. Versoza, forthwith acknowledged the existence of this Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Petitioner he had filed before the CA and had served on Unilab. We likewise note that Atty. Macalintal who has been co-counsel from the time of the filing of the complaints before the NLRC, only belatedly and reluctantly admitted that Remigio has signed a Quitclaim in favor of Unilab. By that time, the issue had reached us, unnecessarily.Respondents counsels ought to be reacquainted with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the Court. Specifically, Rule 10.01: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.We will here review the factual conclusions of the CA which are contrary to those of the administrative tribunal. The conflict in findings is a first signal that a further review may be needed. This is so because, as we have long held in a number of cases, factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, which are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind the Court when supported by substantial evidence.17 Such that, while our well-entrenched holding is that this Court is not a trier of facts,18 we can go to the rule exceptions culled from jurisprudence on rule application, among such exception being that the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.19 We so reach a conclusion in this case different from that of the appellate court.Two facts relevant to the issues at hand were not given enough deserved importance by the CA:1. The Physical Distribution Master Plan (PDMP) of Unilab whereby it consolidated the warehousing and distribution of the finished goods of the sixteen (16) provincial centers into one distribution center in Metro Manila; and2. The Shared Services Policy (SSP) which centralized all accounting services of Unilab into one pool at its main office.These plan and policy had company wide application and effect. As earlier pointed out, the PDMP resulted in the closure of sixteen (16) provincial depots while the SSP consolidated under the Financial Division of Unilab all the accounting services in the UNILAB group of companies, affiliates and subsidiaries. Quite plainly, while the plan and policy resulted in the personnel movement that included respondents, they were not conceptualized and implemented by Unilab for the sole purpose of easing the respondents out of the companys employ, or as the CA underscored, to decrease the "merit rating" of respondents. The CA did not dispute the uniform findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the PDMP was a "cost restructuring strategy program" and that the SSP was a "recognized management prerogative." Indeed, the legitimacy of Unilabs plan and policy was not questioned by the respondents. It was the implementation of the management projects that respondents complained about. They wanted to avail of the separation package for employees declared redundant because of the PDMP. They refused their transfer to the centralized Financial Division as planned under the SSP. When they were not included among those considered as redundant employees, they wanted their transfer to the Financial Division declared as "constructive dismissal," and Unilab pronounced liable for damages and attorneys fees, aside from non-payment of separation pay.The primary facts of respondents employment are enough to support the submission of Unilab that the CA was wrong in reversing the NLRCs conclusion that there was no "constructive dismissal." Respondents were accountants or were performing accounting functions all assigned to the Distribution Accounting Department (DAD) servicing the accounting requirements of distribution centers such as Unilabs sixteen (16) provincial depots. The closing of the provincial depots did not result in the abolition of respondents position as accountants. While they had assignments pertaining to the provincial depots, they did not perform goods distribution or warehousing functions. They were accountants and their work as such was appropriately covered by the SSP that transferred all accounting functions to the Finance Division of Unilab.The concept of constructive dismissal is inapplicable to respondents. Constructive dismissal is a derivative of dismissal without cause; an involuntary resignation, nay, a dismissal in disguise.20 It occurs when there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely as when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee leaving the latter with no other option but to quit.21 In turn, dismissal without cause is prohibited because of the Constitutional security of tenure of workers.Thus, it is stated in Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution that:xxx [Workers] shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. xxxThe Labor Code describes as basic policy the workers security of tenure. Thus:ART. 3. Declaration of basic policy The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between worker and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and humane conditions of work.ART. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.It should be remembered, however, that the entitlement of workers to security of tenure is correlative to the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments.22 The rights are measured each in relation to the other.In one section under the same title of Article XIII, the Constitution mandates that "all workers shall be entitled to security of tenure" and commands at the same time in the same way, that the State shall recognize the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth. Such that, in this jurisdiction, we recognize that management has a wide latitude to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including the freedom to transfer and reassign employees according to the requirements of its business. The right of employees to security of tenure does not give them vested rights to their positions to the extent of depriving management of its prerogative to change their assignments or to transfer them.23 Managerial prerogatives, on the other hand, are subject to limitations provided by law, collective bargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play and justice.24 Simply put, security of tenure from which springs the concept of constructive dismissal is not an absolute right. It cannot be pleaded to avoid the transfer or assignment of employees according to the requirements of the employers business. Such transfer or assignment becomes objectionable only when it is not for "reasonable returns on investments," and for "expansion and growth" which are constitutionally recognized employers rights, but is sought merely as a convenient cover for oppression. No such thing transpired in the instant case. We cite with favor the uniform ruling of the NLRC and the labor arbiter:It is not disputed that Unilab instituted a cost restructuring strategy program called the Physical Distribution Master Plan (PDMP) which resulted in the closure of [Unilabs] provincial depots nationwide sometime in March 2002. As a necessary consequence of the closure of [Unilabs] provincial depots, the positions affected were became redundant and were declared to be so. Thus, the personnel affected by the redundancy were separated from the service and paid a generous separation pay, i.e., 2.5 months pay for every year of service.It is likewise not disputed that complainants Cortez, [respondents] Domingo, Marcelo, Norico, Ozaraga, and Remigio were all accountants and/or performing accounting functions who, with the sole exception of complainant Cortez and prior to the implementation of the PDMP, were all assigned to the Distribution Division. Also not disputed is the fact that [Unilab] came up with its Shared Services Policy where accounting services within the Unilab group of companies were pooled and consolidated under [Unilabs] Finance Division.According to [respondents] Domingo, Remigio, Norico, Marcelo and Ozaraga, they were in effect constructively dismissed after the closure of [Unilabs] provincial depots. They claim that the job or work subsequently assigned to them were either menial or servile or they were never given new assignments at all. This Office is not convinced.Records will reveal that [respondents] Domingo, Remigio, Norico, Marcelo and Ozaraga as accountants or employees performing accounting functions were affected by the Shared Services Policy of the Company. Thus, after the provincial depots were closed down, they were reassigned to [Unilabs] Finance Division to service the accounting requirement of the Unilab group of companies. Thereafter, [respondents] Norico, Marcelo and Ozaraga voluntarily resigned while respondentns Domingo and Remigio remained with [Unilab].This Office notes that [respondents] were transferred to the Finance Division on account of the Shared Services Policy of [Unilab]. In San Miguel v. NLRC, it was held that the abolition of departments or positions in the company is one of the recognized management prerogatives. Likewise, in Castillo v. NLRC, the Supreme Court reiterated the long standing rule that it is the prerogative of the employer to transfer and reassign employees for valid reasons and according to the requirements of its business. There is therefore nothing irregular or illegal in the transfer of [respondents] to the Finance Division after [Unilab] came up with its Shared Services Policy.25 That the respondents were indeed not constructively dismissed is supported by substantial evidence.First. The CAs ruling easily unravels because three (3) of the complainants before the NLRC, including herein respondents Domingo and Remigio, even while their petition for certiorari was pending before the CA, remained employed at UNILAB. In those instances, there was actually no dismissal to speak of.Most recently, The University of the Immaculate Concepcion v. National Labor Relations Commission26 iterated that a crucial element in a finding of constructive dismissal is a cessation of employment relations between the parties.A claim of involuntary resignation or being left with no choice but to quit presupposes an employee actually quitting or resigning. But not all respondents quit: Domingo stayed on with Unilab until his retirement while Remigio, and even complainant Cortez, although they eventually settled with Unilab, never resigned.Plainly, respondents Domingo and Remigio, even Cortez, cannot claim that their employment circumstances with Unilab were so unbearable and left them with no other option but to quit.Second. As regards respondents Marcelo, Norico and Ozaraga, the ruling of the labor tribunals that the three voluntarily resigned and were not constructively dismissed is again, and also, supported by substantial evidence.To substantiate its finding that Noricos, Marcelos and Ozaragas resignations were involuntary, the CA pointed out that Marcelo and Ozaraga had children who were still studying, and, obviously had "great need for continued employment." Moreover, the CA finds incredulous respondents reasons for resigning: Marcelo to venture into business and Ozaraga to pay off his mounting debt. For the CA, their resignations forego a steady income from continued employment and, therefore, inconsistent with a voluntary resignation.The reasoning of the CA is specious and pure conjecture.It is not unheard of that employees who have opted for early retirement have used the windfall therefrom to start their own business and to pay off their debts. The trade off with having a "steady income" and "continued employment" is to be their own boss or to turn over a new leaf, free from debt. We can likewise surmise, as the CA has so easily done, that Ozaraga would have been buried deeper in debt if he expected to pay it off with only his "steady income." In any event, the CAs vaguely drawn theory as to the impetus for respondents resignations can be easily debunked by similarly plausible reasons. It is indeed apropos, to once more refer to the correlation between the workers right to security of tenure and the right of enterprise to reasonable returns on investment. The right of enterprise in the case at bar was exercised by Unilab through the PDMP which resulted in the abolition of the provincial depots but did not erase the respondents accounting functions that, in the same manner that the logistic activities at the provinces were centralized in Metro Manila, were consolidated under the Finance Division of Unilab under its SSP. Absent a showing that the PDMP and the SSP were illegal or meant to defeat respondents security of tenure, we cannot uphold their proposition that they must, like those in the provincial distribution centers, also be considered redundant employees. Respondents, who are accounting employees, cannot refuse their assignment to the Finance Division. As we have delared on more than one occasion:Certainly, the Court cannot accept the proposition that when an employee opposes his employers decision to transfer him to another work place, there being no bad faith or underhanded motives on the part of either party, it is the employees wishes that should be made to prevail. On the basis of the qualifications, training and performance of the employee, the prerogative to determine the place or station where he or she is best qualified to serve the interests of the company belongs to the employer.27 As a final point, the allegations of respondents and the factual findings of both the labor tribunals and the appellate court bring to the fore respondents obvious position that they have the option to claim redundancy as reason for severing their employment from Unilab.From the start, respondents insisted that Unilab has unjustifiably refused to grant them the same separation package granted to the redundant employees in the provincial depots. Respondents demanded that this higher separation package be applied for their retirement as they are "similarly situated" with the redundant employees. Respondents wished for the cessation of their employment, specifying, however, their availment of retirement benefits equivalent to the separation package of the redundant employees. Effectively, respondents were exercising their right to terminate their employment, invoking a hodgepodge of provisions from the Unilab Retirement Plan, Unilabs purported Bagong Sibol Program, and the Labor Code.Respondents are laboring under a cloud of confusion. Retirement and redundancy, while both resulting in the cessation of employment relations, are two entirely different things. Significantly, the Labor Code divides Book 6 on Post Employment into two titles: Title 1 on Termination of Employment and Title II on Retirement from the Service. Specifically, Article 283 of the Labor Code lists redundancy as an authorized cause for the employer to terminate an employee, while Article 287 thereof provides for the retirement from the service of an employee, thus:ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of the operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one month pay or to at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or to at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.ART. 287. Retirement. Any employee retirement may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.In case of retirement, the employees shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining, and other agreement: Provided, however, the employees retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreement shall not be less than those provided herein.In the absence of retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service , a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half (1/2) month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.1wphi1xxxxxxViolation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and subject to the penal provisions under Article 288 of this Code.Petitioner has an elaborate Retirement Plan that lists all possible benefits for retiring and resigning employees, and, significantly to this case, a separate article on involuntary separation due to redundancy.28 The requirements for, and the benefits from, the several and different manners of termination of employment are, naturally, also distinct and different. The employees cannot mix and match rights and obligations which are set and settled by law or agreement of the parties. This is particularly evident in this case where respondents demanded either the redundancy of their services in the face of the employees continuing need for such services, or the benefits from redundancy upon their retirement or resignation. The demand cannot be honored.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87502 is SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-08-06034-2002, NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-10-08397-2002, and NLRC CASE NO. 00-10-08407-2002 is REINSTATED. No costs.G.R. No. 186614 February 23, 2011NATIONWIDE SECURITY AND ALLIED SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, vs.RONALD P. VALDERAMA, Respondent.R E S O L U T I O NNACHURA, J.:Petitioner Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. (petitioner) appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the December 9, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104966, and the February 24, 2009 Resolution2 denying its reconsideration.Respondent Ronald Valderama (Valderama) was hired by petitioner as security guard on April 18, 2002. He was assigned at the Philippine Heart Center (PHC), Quezon City, until his relief on January 30, 2006. Valderama was not given any assignment thereafter. Thus, on August 2, 2006, he filed a complaint for constructive dismissal and nonpayment of 13th month pay, with prayer for damages against petitioner and Romeo Nolasco.Petitioner presented a different version. It alleged that respondent was not constructively or illegally dismissed, but had voluntarily resigned. Its version of the facts was summarized by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in this wise:[Petitioner] x x x averred that [respondent] has committed serious violations of the security rules in the workplace. On January 31, 2004, he was charged with conduct unbecoming for which he was required to explain. Months after, he and four (4) other co-security guards failed to attend a mandatory seminar. For this, he was suspended for seven (7) days. On June 5, 2004, [respondent] displayed his discourteous and rude attitude upon his superior. He said to him in a high pitch of (sic) voice, "ano ba sir, personalan ba ito, sabihin mo lang kung ano gusto mo." On June 8, 2004, [petitioner] required him to explain why no disciplinary action should be meted against him.Again, on January 22, 2005, seven security guards, including [respondent], were made to explain their failure to report for duty without informing the office despite the instruction during their formation day which was held a day before. On January 31, 2006, Roy Datiles, Detachment Commander, reported that [respondent] confronted and challenged him in a high pitch and on top of his voice rudely showing discourtesy and rudeness. Being his superior, Datiles recommended the relief of [respondent] in the detachment effective January 31, 2006. By order of the Operations Manager, he was relieved from his post at the Philippine Heart Center. He was directed to report to the office. On February 10, 2006, he got his cash bond and firearm deposit. Despite his voluntary resignation, [petitioner] sent him a letter through registered mail to report for the office and give information on whether or not he was still interested for report for duty or not. [Respondent] did not bother to reply. Neither did he report to the office.3After due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision, viz.:This office is of the view that [respondent] was constructively dismissed. [Petitioners] defense that [respondent] voluntarily resigned on February 10, 2006 is unsubstantiated (Annex "G"). What appears on record is the pro-forma resignation dated 04 October 2004 (Annex "D") long before this complaint was filed. It is a basic rule in evidence that the burden of proof is on the part of the party who makes the allegation. [Petitioner] failed to discharge the burden.The general rule is that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with resignation. The Supreme Court in Shie Jie Corp. vs. National Federation of Labor, G.R. No. 153148, July 15, 2005, held:"By vigorously pursuing the litigation of his action against petitioner, private respondent clearly manifested that he has no intention of relinquishing his employment which is, wholly incompatible [with] petitioner[]s assertion, that he voluntarily resigned."In Great Southern Maritime Services Corp. vs. Acua, G.R. No. 140189, Feb. 28, 2005, it was ruled that the execution of the alleged "resignation letters cum release and quitclaim" to support the employers claim that respondents voluntarily resigned is unavailing as the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with resignation.Further it is significant to note that [respondent] was even required by [petitioner] to undergo a "Re-Training Course" conducted from February 20, 2006 to March 1, 2006 (Annex "F"). It is not only absurd but unbelievable that [respondent] who according to [petitioner] voluntarily resigned on February 10, 2006 and yet participated in the said "Re-Training Course" after his alleged resignation.In this case, [respondent] was not posted since he was relieved from his post on January 30, 2006 until the filing of the instant complaint on August 2, 2006 or for a period of more than six (6) months. In Valdez vs. NLRC, 286 SCRA 87, the Supreme Court held that, "However, it must be emphasized that such temporary activity should continue for six months. Otherwise, the security agency concerned could be held liable for constructive dismissal.This office is in accord with [respondents] argument that the letter sent to the latter to report for work is an absurdity considering [petitioners] claim that [respondent] voluntarily resigned. x x x.4The LA disposed thus:WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring [respondent] to have been constructively dismissed. [Petitioner is] ordered to reinstate [respondent] to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits. Further, [petitioner] Nationwide Security & Allied Services, Inc. is ordered to pay [respondent] the following monetary awards[:]1. Backwages (see computation) 148, 125.002. Prop. 13th Month Pay1/06 - 1/30/06 = 97 mo.P450 x 30 x 1/12 x .97 1,091.25TOTAL AWARD 149,216.25x x x xSO ORDERED.5On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision. It declared that respondent was neither constructively terminated nor did he voluntarily resign. As such, respondent remained an employee of petitioner. The NLRC thus ordered respondent to immediately report to petitioner and assume his duty. It also deleted the award of backwages and the order of reinstatement by the LA for lack of basis.6The NLRC decreed that:WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED deleting the award of backwages and order of reinstatement. [Respondent] is directed to report immediately and [petitioner is] ordered to accept him. [Petitioner is] also ordered to pay his 13th month pay in the amount of P1,091.25 as ordered in the Decision.SO ORDERED.7Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied it on June 11, 2008.Respondent went to the CA via certiorari. On December 9, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision8 setting aside the resolutions of the NLRC and reinstating that of the LA. In gist, the CA sustained respondents claim of constructive dismissal. It pointed out that respondent remained on floating status for more than six (6) months, and petitioner offered no credible explanation why it failed to provide a new assignment to respondent after he was relieved from PHC. It likewise rejected petitioners claim that respondent voluntarily resigned, holding that no convincing evidence was offered to prove it. The CA found it odd that respondent attended the re-training course conducted by petitioner from February 20, 2006 to March 1, 2006, if respondent indeed resigned on February 10, 2006. The CA, therefore, ruled against the legality of respondents dismissal and sustained the LAs award of backwages and order of reinstatement in favor of respondent.The CA decreed, thus:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 27 March 2008 and 11 June 2008 of the National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division) in NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00-08-06365-06; NLRC CA NO. 051626-07 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 29 November 2006 of Labor Arbiter Enrique L. Flores, Jr. is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against [petitioner].SO ORDERED.9Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on February 24, 2009.10Hence, this appeal by petitioner faulting the CA for sustaining respondents claim of constructive dismissal.The appeal lacks merit.In cases involving security guards, a relief and transfer order in itself does not sever employment relationship between a security guard and his agency. An employee has the right to security of tenure, but this does not give him a vested right to his position as would deprive the company of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where his service, as security guard, will be most beneficial to the client. Temporary "off-detail" or the period of time security guards are made to wait until they are transferred or assigned to a new post or client does not constitute constructive dismissal, so long as such status does not continue beyond six months.11The onus of proving that there is no post available to which the security guard can be assigned rests on the employer, viz.:When a security guard is placed on a "floating status," he does not receive any salary or financial benefit provided by law. Due to the grim economic consequences to the employee, the employer should bear the burden of proving that there are no posts available to which the employee temporarily out of work can be assigned.12Respondent claims that he was relieved from PHC on January 30, 2006; thereafter, he was not given a new assignment. Petitioner, on the other hand, asserts that respondent refused to report to petitioner for his reassignment. Otherwise stated, petitioner claims that respondent abandoned his job.The jurisprudential rule on abandonment is constant. It is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts. To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intent, manifested through overt acts, to sever the employer-employee relationship.13In this case, petitioner failed to establish clear evidence of respondents intention to abandon his employment. Except for petitioners bare assertion that respondent did not report to the office for reassignment, no proof was offered to prove that respondent intended to sever the employer-employee relationship.Besides, the fact that respondent filed the instant complaint negates any intention on his part to forsake his work. It is a settled doctrine that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the charge of abandonment, for an employee who takes steps to protest his dismissal cannot by logic be said to have abandoned his work.14Similarly, we cannot accept petitioners argument that respondent voluntarily resigned.Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of theexigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether, he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment.15In Mobile Protective & Detective Agency v. Ompad16 and Mora v. Avesco Marketing Corporation,17 we ruled that should the employer interpose the defense of resignation, it is incumbent upon the employer to prove that the employee voluntarily resigned. On this point, petitioner failed to discharge the burden.Petitioner was also firm in asserting that respondent voluntarily resigned. Oddly, it failed to present the alleged resignation letter of respondent. We also note that, in its March 24, 2006 letter,18 petitioner required respondent to report at its office for reassignment. It strains credulity that petitioner would require respondent to report for reassignment if the latter already tendered his resignation effective February 10, 2006.Petitioner capitalizes on the withdrawal of the cash and firearm bonds by respondent. It contends that the withdrawal of bonds sufficiently proved respondents intention to terminate his employment contract with petitioner. In support of its argument, petitioner cited Roberta Gaa v. Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. and Romeo Nolasco,19 which declared that cash bond and firearm bond are never withdrawable for as long as the security guard intends to remain an employee of the security agency.Petitioners reliance on Gaa is misplaced. We note that the declaration that cash bond and firearm bond are never withdrawable for as long as the security guard intends to remain an employee of the security agency was made by the NLRC.20 Although this Court affirmed the NLRC in a Minute Resolution dated September 26, 2007,21 still, the said NLRC ruling cannot be considered a binding precedent that can be invoked by petitioner in its favor.As explained by this Court in Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue:22It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution, our dismissal of the petition was a disposition of the merits of the case. When we dismissed the petition, we effectively affirmed the CA ruling being questioned. As a result, our ruling in that case has already become final. When a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure to comply with formal and substantive requirements, the challenged decision, together with its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained. But what is its effect on other cases?With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the same parties, it constitutes res judicata. However, if other parties or another subject matter (even with the same parties and issues) is involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent. Thus, in CIR v. Baier-Nickel, the Court noted that a previous case, CIR v. Baier-Nickel involving the same parties and the same issues, was previously disposed of by the Court thru a minute resolution dated February 17, 2003 sustaining the ruling of the CA. Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the previous case "ha(d) no bearing" on the latter case because the two cases involved different subject matters as they were concerned with the taxable income of different taxable years.Besides, there are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions between a minute resolution and a decision. The constitutional requirement under the first paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution that the facts and the law on which the judgment is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly applies only to decisions, not to minute resolutions. A minute resolution is signed only by the clerk of court by authority of the justices, unlike a decision. It does not require the certification of the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute resolutions are not published in the Philippine Reports. Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of a decision. Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or principles of law which constitute binding precedent in a decision duly signed by the members of the Court and certified by the Chief Justice.Accordingly, since petitioner was not a party in G.R. No. 148680 and since petitioner's liability for DST on its health care agreement was not the subject matter of G.R. No. 148680, petitioner cannot successfully invoke the minute resolution in that case (which is not even binding precedent) in its favor.Furthermore, the filing of the complaint belies petitioners claim that respondent voluntarily resigned.lavvphil As held by this Court in Valdez v. NLRC:23It would have been illogical for herein petitioner to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Resignation is inconsistent with the filing of the said complaint.Indubitably, respondent remained on "floating status" for more than six months. He was relieved on January 30, 2006, and was not given a new assignment at the time he filed the complaint on August 2, 2006. Jurisprudence is trite with pronouncements that the temporary inactivity or "floating status" of security guards should continue only for six months. Otherwise, the security agency concerned could be liable for constructive dismissal.24 The failure of petitioner to give respondent a work assignment beyond the reasonable six-month period makes it liable for constructive dismissal. The CA was correct in sustaining respondents claim.If there is a surplus of security guards caused by lack of clients or projects, the security agency may resort to retrenchment upon compliance with the requirements set forth in the Labor Code. In this way, the security agency will not to be held liable for constructive dismissal and be burdened with the payment of backwages.Under Article 27925 of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges; to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances; and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.26 Therefore, the CA committed no reversible error in sustaining the LAs award of backwages and ordering respondents reinstatement.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104966 are AFFIRMED.G.R. No. 161596 February 20, 2013ROBERTO BORDOMEO, JAYME SARMIENTO and GREGORIO BARREDO, Petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, and INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., Respondents.D E C I S I O NBERSAMIN, J.:As an extraordinary remedy, certiorari cannot replace or supplant an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, like an appeal in due course. It is the inadequacy of a remedy in the ordinary course of law that determines whether certiorari can be a proper alternative remedy.The CaseThe petitioners implore the Court to reverse and set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on May 30, 2003 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65970 entitled Roberto Bordomeo, Anecito Cupta, Jaime Sarmiento and Virgilio Saragena v. Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment and International Pharmaceuticals, Inc., dismissing their petition for certiorari by which they had assailed the Order2 issued on July 4, 2001 by Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), to wit:WHEREFORE, the Order of this Office dated March 27, 1998 STANDS and having become final and having been fully executed, completely CLOSED and TERMINATED this case.No further motion shall be entertained.SO ORDERED.3and the CAs resolution promulgated on October 30, 2003, denying their motion for reconsideration.In effect, the Court is being called upon again to review the March 27, 1998 order issued by the DOLE Secretary in response to the petitioners demand for the execution in full of the final orders of the DOLE issued on December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991 arising from the labor dispute in International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (IPI).AntecedentsIn 1989, the IPI Employees Union-Associated Labor Union (Union), representing the workers, had a bargaining deadlock with the IPI management. This deadlock resulted in the Union staging a strike and IPI ordering a lockout.On December 26, 1990, after assuming jurisdiction over the dispute, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres rendered the following Decision,4 to wit:WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, decision is hereby rendered as follows:1. finding the IPI Employees Union-ALU as the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of ALU including sales personnel;2. dismissing, for lack of merit, the charges of contempt filed by the Union against the IPI officials and reiterating our strict directive for a restoration of the status quo ante the strike as hereinbefore discussed;3. dismissing the Unions complaint against the Company for unfair labor practice through refusal to bargain;4. dismissing the IPI petition to declare the strike of the Union as illegal; and5. directing the IPI Employees Union-ALU and the International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to enter into their new CBA, incorporating therein the dispositions hereinbefore stated. All other provisions in the old CBA not otherwise touched upon in these proceedings are, likewise, to be incorporated in the new CBA.SO ORDERED.5Resolving the parties ensuing respective motions for reconsideration or clarification,6 Secretary Torres rendered on December 5, 1991 another ruling,7 disposing thus:WHEREFORE, in the light of the forgoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:1. Dismissing the motions for reconsideration filed by the International Pharmaceutical, Inc. and the Workers Trade Alliance Unions (WATU) for lack of merit;2. Ordering the International Pharmaceutical Inc. to reinstate to their former positions with full backwages reckoned from 8 December 1989 until actually reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other benefits the "affected workers" herein-below listed:1. Reynaldo C. Menor2. Geronimo S. Banquirino3. Rogelio Saberon4. Estefanio G. Maderazo5. Herbert G. Veloso6. Rogelio G. Enricoso7. Colito Virtudazo8. Gilbert Encontro9. Bebiano Pancho10. Merlina Gomez11. Lourdes Mergal12. Anecito Cupta13. Prescillano O. Naquines14. Alejandro O. Rodriguez15. Godofredo Delposo16. Jovito Jayme17. Emma L. Lana18. Koannia M. Tangub19. Violeta Pancho20. Roberto Bordomeo21. Mancera Vevincio22. Caesar Sigfredo23. Trazona Roldan24. Carmelita Ygot25. Gregorio Barredo26. Dario Abella27. Artemio Pepito28. Anselmo Tareman29. Merope Lozada30. Agapito Mayorga31. Narciso M. Leyson32. Ananias Dinolan33. Cristy L. Caybot34. Johnnelito S. Corilla35. Noli Silo36. Danilo Palioto37. Winnie dela Cruz38. Edgar Montecillo39. Pompio Senador40. Ernesto Palomar41. Reynante Germininano42. Pelagio Arnaiz43. Ireneo Russiana44. Benjamin Gellangco, Jr.45. Nestor Ouano (listed in paragraphs 1 & 9 of the IPI Employees Union- ALUs Supplemental Memorandum dated 6 March 1991)3. Ordering the International Pharmaceutical Inc. to reinstate to their former positions the following employees, namely:a. Alexander Abogandab. Pacifico Pestanoc. Carlito Torreganod. Clemencia Pestanoe. Elisea Cabatingan(listed in paragraph 3 of the IPI Employees Union-ALUs Supplemental Memorandum dated 6 March 1991).No further motions of the same nature shall be entertained.8IPI assailed the issuances of Secretary Torres directly in this Court through a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 103330), but the Court dismissed its petition on October 14, 1992 on the ground that no grave abuse of discretion had attended the issuance of the assailed decisions.9 Considering that IPI did not seek the reconsideration of the dismissal of its petition, the entry of judgment issued in due course on January 19, 1994.10With the finality of the December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991 orders of the DOLE Secretary, the Union, represented by the Seno, Mendoza and Associates Law Office, moved in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board in DOLE, Region VII on June 8, 1994 for their execution.11On November 21, 1994, one Atty. Audie C. Arnado, who had meanwhile entered his appearance on October 4, 1994 as the counsel of 15 out of the 50 employees named in the December 5, 1991 judgment of Secretary Torres, likewise filed a so-called Urgent Motion for Execution.12After conducting conferences and requiring the parties to submit their position papers, Regional Director Alan M. Macaraya of DOLE Region VII issued a Notice of Computation/Execution on April 12, 1995,13 the relevant portion of which stated:To speed-up the settlement of the issue, the undersigned on 7 February 1995 issued an order directing the parties to submit within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the Order, their respective Computations. To date, only the computation from complainants including those that were not specifically mentioned in the Supreme Court decision were submitted and received by this office.Upon verification of the Computation available at hand, management is hereby directed to pay the employees including those that were not specifically mentioned in the decision but are similarly situated, the aggregate amount of FORTY-THREE MILLION SIX HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIVE AND 87/100 PESOS (P43,650,905.87) involving NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (962) employees, in the manner shown in the attached Computation forming part of this Order. This is without prejudice to the final Order of the Court to reinstate those covered employees.1wphi1This Order is to take effect immediately and failure to comply as instructed will cause the issuance of a WRIT OF EXECUTION.14In effect, Regional Director Macaraya increased the number of the workers to be benefitted to 962 employees classified into six groups and allocated to each group a share in the P43,650,905.87 award,15 as follows:GROUPNO. OFEMPLOYEESTOTAL CLAIM

Those represented by Atty. Arnado15P4,162,361.50

Salesman9P6,241,535.44

For Union Members179P6,671,208.86

For Non-Union Members33P1,228,321.09

Employees who ratified the CBA642P23,982,340.14

Separated Employees84P1,365,136.84

TOTAL962P43,650,905.87

On May 24, 1995, Assistant Regional Director Jalilo dela Torre of DOLE Region VII issued a writ of execution for the amount of P4,162,361.50 (which covered monetary claims corresponding to the period from January 1, 1989 to March 15, 1995) in favor of the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado,16 to be distributed thusly:171. Barredo, Gregorio P278,700.102. Bordomeo, Roberto P278,700.103. Cupta, Anecito P278,700.104. Delposo, Godofredo P278,700.105. Dinolan, Ananias P278,700.106. Jayme, Jovito P278,700.107. Lozada, Merope P278,700.108. Mayorga, Agapito P278,700.109. Mergal, Lourdes P278,700.1010. Pancho, Bebiano P278,700.1011. Pancho, Violeta P278,700.1012. Rodriguez, Alejandro P278,700.1013. Russiana, Ireneo P263,685.1014. Tangub, Joannis P278,700.1015. Trazona, Rolsan P275,575.10TOTAL P4,162,361.50On June 5, 1995, Assistant Regional Director dela Torre issued another Writ of Execution for the amount of P1,200,378.92 in favor of the second group of employees. Objecting to the reduced computation for them, however, the second group of employees filed a Motion Declaring the Writ of Execution dated June 5, 1995 null and void.On July 11, 1995, IPI challenged the May 24, 1995 writ of execution issued in favor of the 15 employees by filing its Appeal and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order in the Office of then DOLE Undersecretary Cresenciano Trajano.18On December 22, 1995,19 Acting DOLE Secretary Jose Brillantes, acting on IPIs appeal, recalled and quashed the May 24, 1995 writ of execution, and declared and considered the case closed and terminated.20Aggrieved, the 15 employees sought the reconsideration of the December 22, 1995 Order of Acting DOLE Secretary Brillantes.On August 27, 1996, DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing granted the Motion for Reconsideration,21 and reinstated the May 24, 1995 writ of execution, subject to the deduction of the sum of P745,959.39 already paid pursuant to quitclaims from the award of P4,162,361.50.22 Secretary Quisumbing declared the quitclaims executed by the employees on December 2, 3, and 17, 1993 without the assistance of the proper office of the DOLE unconscionable for having been entered into under circumstances showing vitiation of consent; and ruled that the execution of the quitclaims should not prevent the employees from recovering their monetary claims under the final and executory decisions dated December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991, less the amounts received under the quitclaims.Aggrieved by the reinstatement of the May 24, 1995 writ of execution, IPI moved for a reconsideration.23On September 3, 1996, and pending resolution of IPIs motion for reconsideration, Regional Director Macaraya issued a writ of execution in favor of the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado to recover P3,416,402.10 pursuant to the order dated August 27, 1996 of Secretary Quisumbing.24 Thereafter, the sheriff garnished the amount of P3,416,402.10 out of the funds of IPI with China Banking Corporation, which released the amount.25 Hence, on September 11, 1996, the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado executed a Satisfaction of Judgment and Quitclaim/Release upon receipt of their respective portions of the award, subject to the reservation of their right to claim "unsatisfied amounts of separation pay as well as backwages reckoned from the date after 15 March 1995 and up to the present, or until separation pay is fully paid."26Notwithstanding the execution of the satisfaction of judgment and quitclaim/release, Atty. Arnado still filed an omnibus motion not only in behalf of the 15 employees but also in behalf of other employees named in the notice of computation/execution, with the exception of the second group, seeking another writ of execution to recover the further sum of P58,546,767.83.27Atty. Arnado filed a supplemental omnibus motion for the denial of IPIs Motion for Reconsideration on the ground of mootness.28In the meanwhile, the employees belonging to the second group reiterated their Motion Declaring the Writ of Execution dated June 5, 1995 null and void, and filed on May 15, 1996 a Motion for Issuance of Writ, praying for another writ of execution based on the computation by Regional Director Macaraya.On December 24, 1997,29 Secretary Quisumbing, affirming his August 27, 1996 order, denied IPIs Motion for Reconsideration for being rendered moot and academic by the full satisfaction of the May 24, 1995 writ of execution. He also denied Atty. Arnados omnibus motion for lack of merit; and dealt with the issue involving the June 5, 1995 writ of execution issued in favor of the second group of employees, which the Court eventually resolved in the decision promulgated in G.R. No. 164633.30The employees represented by Atty. Arnado moved for the partial reconsideration of the December 24, 1997 order of Secretary Quisumbing. Resolving this motion on March 27, 1998, Acting DOLE Secretary Jose M. Espaol, Jr. held as follow:31WHEREFORE, Our Order dated December 24, 1997, is hereby AFFIRMED.The Motion for Reconsideration/Amend/Clarificatory and Reiteration of Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution dated January 12, 1998, filed by six (6) salesmen, namely, Geronimo S. Banquirigo, Reynaldo C. Menor, Rogelio Enricoso, Danilo Palioto, Herbert Veloso and Colito Virtudazo as well as the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification filed by Salesman Noli G. Silo, are hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The June 5, 1995 Writ of Execution is now considered fully executed and satisfied.The Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by Roberto Bordomeo and 231 others, is likewise DENIED, for lack of meritSO ORDERED.32Records reveal, however, that Virgilio Saragena, et al. brought to this Court a petition for certiorari to assail the December 24, 1997 and March 27, 1998 Orders of the Secretary of Labor (G.R. No. 134118). As stated at the start, the Court dismissed the petition of Saragena, et al. on September 9, 1998 for having been filed out of time and for the petitioners failure to comply with the requirements under Rule 13 and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 33 The entry of judgment was issued on December 7, 1998.In the meanwhile, on July 27, 1998, Atty. Arnado filed a Motion for Execution with the DOLE Regional Office,34 demanding the following amounts from IPI, to wit:For Roberto Bordomeo and 14 others P4,990,401.00The rest of complainants 33,824,820.41Total P 38,815,221.41Again, on September 22, 1998, Atty. Arnado filed a Motion for Execution with the Regional Office.35 This time, no monetary claims were demanded but the rest of the complainants sought to collect from IPI the reduced amount of P6,268,818.47.Another Motion for Execution was filed by Atty. Arnado on July 6, 1999,36 seeking the execution of the December 26, 1990 order issued by Secretary Torres and of the April 12, 1995 notice of computation/execution issued by Regional Director Macaraya.Ultimately, on July 4, 2001, DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas issued her Order37 affirming the order issued on March 27, 1998, and declaring that the full execution of the order of March 27, 1998 "completely CLOSED and TERMINATED this case."Only herein petitioners Roberto Bordomeo, Anecito Cupta, Jaime Sarmiento and Virgilio Saragena assailed the July 4, 2001 order of Secretary Sto. Tomas by petition for certiorari in the CA (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65970).38On May 30, 2003, the CA rendered its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65970,39 to wit:It is worthy to note that all the decisions and incidents concerning the case between petitioners and private respondent IPI have long attained finality. The records show that petitioners have already been granted a writ of execution. In fact, the decision has been executed. Thus, there is nothing for this Court to modify. The granting of the instant petition calls for the amendment of the Court of a decision which has been executed. In this light, it is worthy to note the rule that final and executory decisions, more so with those already executed, may no longer be amended except only to correct errors which are clerical in nature. Amendments or alterations which substantially affect such judgments as well as the entire proceedings held for that purpose are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. (Pio Barreto Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 360 SCRA 127).This Court in the case of CA GR No. 54041 dated February 28, 2001, has ruled that the Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated December 24, 1997 and March 27, 1998 have become final and executory. It may be noted that the said orders affirmed the earlier orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated December 22, 1995 and August 27, 1996 granting the execution of the decision in the case between petitioners and IPI.x x x xWHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and is DISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.40The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,41 but the CA denied the motion on October 30, 2003.42Hence, they commenced this special civil action for certiorari.The petitioners hereby contend that:THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED CONTRARY TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT:A. HELD THAT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS (WHICH MERELY SEEKS FULL EXECUTION OF DOLE FINAL JUDGMENTS 26 DECEMBER 1990 AND 5 DECEMBER 1991 WOULD AMEND SAID FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS.B. FAILED TO IMPLEMENT THE SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE SET IN PDCP VS. GENILO, G.R. NO. 106705, THAT SIMILARLY SITUATED EMPLOYEES HAS THE RIGHT TO PROVE THEIR ENTITLEMENT TO THE BENEFITS AWARDED UNDER FINAL JUDGMENTS.C. HELD THAT THE QUESTIONED JUDGMENTS HAD BEEN EXECUTED WHEN THE RESPONDENTS THEMSELVES ADMIT THE CONTRARY.D. HELD THAT DOLE SECRETARY DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN SHE REFUSED TO FULLY EXECUTE THE 1990 AND 1991 DOLE FINAL JUDGMENTS AND ISSUE CORRESPONDING WRITS OF EXECUTION.The petitioners submit that of the six groups of employees classified under the April 12, 1995 notice of computation/execution issued by Regional Director Macaraya, only the first two groups, that is, the 15 employees initially represented by Atty. Arnado; and the nine salesmen led by Geronimo S. Banquirigo, had been granted a writ of execution. They further submit that the May 24, 1995 writ of execution issued in favor of the first group of employees, including themselves, had only been partially satisfied because no backwages or separation pay from March 16, 1995 onwards had yet been paid to them; that the reduced award granted to the second group of employees was in violation of the April 12, 1995 notice of computation/execution; that no writ of execution had been issued in favor of the other groups of employees; and that DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas thus committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to fully execute the December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991 orders.In its comment, IPI counters that the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for being an improper remedy, the more appropriate remedy being a petition for review on certiorari; that a petition for review on certiorari should have been filed within 15 days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, as provided in Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 45; and that the petition must also be outrightly dismissed for being filed out of time.IPI contends that the finality of the December 24, 1997 and March 27, 1998 orders of the DOLE Secretary rendered them unalterable; that Atty. Arnado had already brought the December 24, 1997 and March 27, 1998 orders to this Court for review (G.R. No. 134118); and that the Court had dismissed the petition for having been filed out of time and for the petitioners failure to comply with Rule 13 and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.RulingWe dismiss the petition for certiorari.Firstly, an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to be taken to this Court within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order raising only questions of law, was the proper remedy available to the petitioners. Hence, their filing of the petition for certiorari on January 9, 2004 to assail the CAs May 30, 2003 decision and October 30, 2003 resolution in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65970 upon their allegation of grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA was improper. The averment therein that the CA gravely abused its discretion did not warrant the filing of the petition for certiorari, unless the petition further showed how an appeal in due course under Rule 45 was not an adequate remedy for them. By virtue of its being an extraordinary remedy, certiorari cannot replace or substitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, like an appeal in due course.43We remind them that an appeal may also avail to review and correct any grave abuse of discretion committed by an inferior court, provided it will be adequate for that purpose.It is the adequacy of a remedy in the ordinary course of law that determines whether a special civil action for certiorari can be a proper alternative remedy. We reiterate what the Court has discoursed thereon in Heirs of Spouses Teofilo M. Reterta and Elisa Reterta v. Spouses Lorenzo Mores and Virginia Lopez,44 viz:Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effec