Labor Cases Batch 2

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 98107. August 18, 1997]

BENJAMIN C. JUCO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated March 14, 1991, which reversed the Decision dated May 21, 1990 of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of respondent National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds.

On March 25, 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the Department of Labor.

On September 17, 1977, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case.[1]

Petitioner then elevated the case to the NLRC which rendered a decision on December 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter.[2]

Dissatisfied with the decision of the NLRC, respondent NHC appealed before this Court and on January 17, 1985, we rendered a decision, the dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the case before it for lack of jurisdiction is REINSTATED.”[3]

On January 6, 1989, petitioner filed with the Civil Service Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory injunction.[4]

On February 6, 1989, respondent NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the case.[5]

On April 11, 1989, the Civil Service Commission issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It ratiocinated that:

“The Board finds the comment and/or motion to dismiss meritorious. It was not disputed that NHC is a government corporation without an original charter but organized/created under the Corporate Code.

Article IX, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides:

‘The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the government, including government owned and controlled corporations with original charters.’ (underscoring supplied)

From the aforequoted constitutional provision, it is clear that respondent NHC is not within the scope of the civil service and is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this board. Moreover, it is pertinent to state that the 1987 Constitution was ratified and became effective on February 2, 1987.

WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction, the instant complaint is hereby dismissed.”[6]

On April 28, 1989, petitioner filed with respondent NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent NHC.[7]

On May 21, 1990, respondent NLRC thru Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed from his employment by respondent as there was evidence in the record that the criminal case against him was purely fabricated, prompting the trial court to dismiss the charges against him. Hence, he concluded that the dismissal was illegal as it was devoid of basis, legal or factual.

He further ruled that the complaint is not barred by prescription considering that the period from which to reckon the reglementary period of four years should be from the date of the receipt of the decision of the Civil Service Commission promulgated on April 11, 1989. He also ratiocinated that:

“It appears x x x complainant filed the complaint for illegal dismissal with the Civil Service Commission on January 6, 1989 and the same was dismissed on April 11, 1989 after which on April 28, 1989, this case was filed by the complainant. Prior to that, this case was ruled upon by the Supreme Court on January 17, 1985 which enjoined the complainant to go to the Civil Service Commission which in fact, complainant did. Under the circumstances, there is merit on the contention that the running of the reglementary period of four (4) years was suspended with the filing of the complaint with the said Commission. Verily, it was not the fault of the respondent for failing to file the complaint as alleged by the respondent but due to, in the words of the complainant, a ‘legal knot’ that has to be untangled.”[8]

Thereafter, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the dismissal of the complainant as illegal and ordering the respondent to immediately reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority rights with full back wages inclusive of allowance and to his other benefits or equivalent computed from the time it is withheld from him when he was dismissed on March 27, 1977, until actually reinstated.”[9]

On June 1, 1990, respondent NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[10]

The primordial issue that confronts us is whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code.

Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and /or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Hence,

Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided:

"The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of government-owned and controlled corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations x x x.”

The 1973 Constitution, Article II-B, Section 1(1), on the other hand provided:

“The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.”

Although we had earlier ruled in National Housing Corporation v. Juco,[11] that employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the said Constitution now provides:

“The civil service embraces all branches, subdivision, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporations with original charter.” (Article IX-B, Section 2[1])

In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor Relations Commission,[12] we had the occasion to apply the present Constitution in deciding whether or not the employees of NASECO are covered by the Civil Service Law or the

Labor Code notwithstanding that the case arose at the time when the 1973 Constitution was still in effect. We ruled that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in place at the time of the decision. Furthermore, we ruled that the new phrase “with original charter” means that government-owned and controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general incorporation stature and a subsidiary of the National Investment Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is excluded from the purview of the Civil Service Commission.

We see no cogent reason to depart from the ruling in the aforesaid case.

In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is a government owned corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation.[13] Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under act 1459, the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in recent case of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. National Housing Corporation,[14] where we held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, we also held that the workers or employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employee’s organization and that there is no impediment to the holding of a certification election among them as they are covered by the Labor Code.

Thus, the NLRC erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the rule now is that the Civil Service now covers only government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.[15] Having been incorporated under the Corporation Law, its relations with its personnel are governed by the Labor Code and come under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission.

One final point. Petitioners have been tossed from one forum to another for a simple illegal dismissal case. It is but apt that we put an end to his dilemma in the interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC in NLRC NCR-04-02036089 dated March 14, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 21, 1990 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-75038 August 23, 1993

ELIAS VILLUGA, RENATO ABISTADO, JILL MENDOZA, ANDRES ABAD, BENJAMIN BRIZUELA, NORLITO LADIA, MARCELO AGUILAN, DAVID ORO, NELIA BRIZUELA, FLORA ESCOBIDO, JUSTILITA CABANIG, and DOMINGO SAGUIT, petitioners, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) and BROAD STREET TAILORING and/or RODOLFO ZAPANTA, respondents.

Balguma, Macasaet & Associates for petitioners.

Teresita Gandionco Oledan for private respondents.

NOCON, J.:

A basic factor underlying the exercise of rights and the filing of claims for benefits under the Labor Code and other presidential issuances or labor legislations is the status and nature of one's employment. Whether an employer-employee relationship exist and whether such employment is managerial in character or that of a rank and file employee are primordial considerations before extending labor benefits. Thus, petitioners in this case seek a definitive ruling on the status and nature of their employment with Broad Street Tailoring and pray for the nullification of the resolution dated May 12, 1986 of the National Labor Relations Commissions in NLRC Case No. RB-IV- 21558-78-T affirming the decision of Labor Arbiter Ernilo V. Peñalosa dated May 28, 1979, which held eleven of them as independent contractors and the remaining one as employee but of managerial rank.

The facts of the case shows that petitioner Elias Villuga was employed as cutter in the tailoring shop owned by private respondent Rodolfo Zapanta and known as Broad Street Tailoring located at Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. As cutter, he was paid a fixed monthly salary of P840.00 and a monthly transportation allowance of P40.00. In addition to his work as cutter, Villuga was assigned the chore of distributing work to the shop's tailors or sewers when both the shop's manager and assistant manager would be absent. He saw to it that their work conformed with the pattern he had prepared and if not, he had them redone, repaired or resewn.

The other petitioners were either ironers, repairmen and sewers. They were paid a fixed amount for every item ironed, repaired or sewn, regardless of the time consumed in

accomplishing the task. Petitioners did not fill up any time record since they did not observe regular or fixed hours of work. They were allowed to perform their work at home especially when the volume of work, which depended on the number of job orders, could no longer be coped up with.

From February 17 to 22, 1978, petitioner Villuga failed to report for work allegedly due to illness. For not properly notifying his employer, he was considered to have abandoned his work.

In a complaint dated March 27, 1978, filed with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor, Villuga claimed that he was refused admittance when he reported for work after his absence, allegedly due to his active participation in the union organized by private respondent's tailors. He further claimed that he was not paid overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for work done on rest days and holidays, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay.

Petitioners Renato Abistado, Jill Mendoza, Benjamin Brizuela and David Oro also claimed that they were dismissed from their employment because they joined the Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU). Petitioners Andres Abad, Norlito Ladia, Marcelo Aguilan, Nelia Brizuela, Flora Escobido, Justilita Cabaneg and Domingo Saguit claimed that they stopped working because private respondents gave them few pieces of work to do after learning of their membership with PSSLU. All the petitioners laid claims under the different labor standard laws which private respondent allegedly violated.

On May 28, 1979, Labor Arbiter Ernilo V. Peñalosa rendered a decision ordering the dismissal of the complaint for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal and other money claims except petitioner Villuga's claim for 13th month pay for the years 1976, 1977 and 1980. The dispositive portion of the decision states as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent Broad Street Tailoring and/or Rodolfo Zapanta are hereby ordered to pay complainant Elias Villuga the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT PESOS AND SIXTY-SIX CENTAVOS (P1,248.66) representing his 13th month pay for the years 1976, 1977 and 1978. His other claims in this case are hereby denied for lack of merit.

The complaint insofar as the other eleven (11) complainants are concerned should be, as it is hereby dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 1

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the questioned decision in a resolution dated May 12, 1986, the dispositive portion of which states as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is, as it is hereby AFFIRMED, and the appeal dismissed. 2

Presiding Commissioner Guillermo C. Medina merely concurred in the result while Commissioner Gabriel M. Gatchalian rendered a dissenting opinion which states as follows:

I am for upholding employer-employee relationship as argued by the complainants before the Labor Arbiter and on appeal. The further fact that the proposed decision recognizes complainant's status as piece-rate worker all the more crystallizes employer-employee relationship the benefits prayed for must be granted. 3

Hence, petitioners filed this instant certiorari case on the following grounds:

1. That the respondent National Labor Relations Commission abused its discretion when it ruled that petitioner/complainant, Elias Villuga falls within the category of a managerial employee;

2. . . . when it ruled that the herein petitioners were not dismissed by reason of their union activities;

3. . . . when it ruled that petitioners Andres Abad, Benjamin Brizuela, Norlito Ladia, Marcelo Aguilan, David Oro, Nelia Brizuela, Flora Escobido, Justilita Cabaneg and Domingo Saguit were not employees of private respondents but were contractors.

4. . . . when it ruled that petitioner Elias Villuga is not entitled to overtime pay and services for Sundays and Legal Holidays; and

5. . . . when it failed to grant petitioners their respective claims under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 925, 1123 and 851. 4

Under Rule 1, Section 2(c), Book III of the Implementing Rules of Labor Code, to be a member of a managerial staff, the following elements must concur or co-exist, to wit: (1) that his primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies; (2) that he customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent judgment in the performance of his functions; (3) that he regularly and directly assists in the management of the establishment; and (4) that he does not devote his twenty per cent of his time to work other than those described above.

Applying the above criteria to petitioner Elias Villuga's case, it is undisputed that his primary work or duty is to cut or prepare patterns for items to be sewn, not to lay down or implement any of the management policies, as there is a manager and an assistant manager who perform said functions. It is true that in the absence of the manager the assistant manager, he distributes and assigns work to employees but such duty, though involving discretion, is occasional and not regular or customary. He had also the authority to order the repair or resewing of defective item but such authority is part and parcel of his function as cutter to see to it that the items cut are sewn correctly lest the defective nature of the workmanship be attributed to his "poor cutting." Elias Villuga does not participate in policy-making. Rather, the functions of his position involve execution of approved and established policies. InFranklin Baker Company of the Philippines v. Trajano, 5 it was held that employees who do not participate in policy-making but are given ready policies to execute and standard practices to observe are not managerial employees. The test of "supervisory or managerial status" depends on whether a person possesses authority that is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but one that requires use of independent judgment. In other words, the functions of the position are not managerial in nature if they only execute approved and

established policies leaving little or no discretion at all whether to implement said policies or not. 6

Consequently, the exclusion of Villuga from the benefits claimed under Article 87 (overtime pay and premium pay for holiday and rest day work), Article 94, (holiday pay), and Article 95 (service incentive leave pay) of the Labor Code, on the ground that he is a managerial employee is unwarranted. He is definitely a rank and file employee hired to perform the work of the cutter and not hired to perform supervisory or managerial functions. The fact that he is uniformly paid by the month does not exclude him from the benefits of holiday pay as held in the case ofInsular Bank of America Employees Union v. Inciong. 7 He should therefore be paid in addition to the 13th month pay, his overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, and service incentive leave pay.

As to the dismissal of the charge for unfair labor practices of private respondent consisting of termination of employment of petitioners and acts of discrimination against members of the labor union, the respondent Commission correctly held the absence of evidence that Mr. Zapanta was aware of petitioners' alleged union membership on February 22, 1978 as the notice of union existence in the establishment with proposal for recognition and collective bargaining negotiation was received by management only an March 3, 1978. Indeed, self-serving allegations without concrete proof that the private respondent knew of their membership in the union and accordingly reacted against their membership do not suffice.

Nor is private respondent's claim that petitioner Villuga abandoned his work acceptable. For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for dismissal, there must be a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Mere absence is not sufficient, it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. 8 At any rate, dismissal of an employee due to his prolonged absence without leave by reason of illness duly established by the presentation of a medical certificate is not justified. 9 In the case at bar, however, considering that petitioner Villuga absented himself for four (4) days without leave and without submitting a medical certificate to support his claim of illness, the imposition of a sanction is justified, but surely, not dismissal, in the light of the fact that this is petitioner's first offense. In lieu of reinstatement, petitioner Villuga should be paid separation pay where reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time or because of the realities of the situation. 10 But petitioner should not be granted backwages in addition to reinstatement as the same is not just and equitable under the circumstances considering that he was not entirely free from blame. 11

As to the other eleven petitioners, there is no clear showing that they were dismissed because the circumstances surrounding their dismissal were not even alleged. However, we disagree with the finding of respondent Commission that the eleven petitioners are independent contractors.

For an employer-employee relationship to exist, the following elements are generally considered: "(1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct." 12

Noting that the herein petitioners were oftentimes allowed to perform their work at home and were paid wages on a piece-rate basis, the respondent Commission apparently found the second and fourth elements lacking and ruled that "there is no employer-employee relationship, for it is clear that respondents are interested only in the result and not in the means and manner and how the result is obtained."

Respondent Commission is in error. The mere fact that petitioners were paid on a piece-rate basis is no argument that herein petitioners were not employees. The term "wage" has been broadly defined in Article 97 of the Labor Code as remuneration or earnings, capable of being expressed in terms of money whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece or commission basis. . . ." The facts of this case indicate that payment by the piece is just a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the relation. 13 The petitioners were allowed to perform their work at home does not likewise imply absence of control and supervision. The control test calls merely for the existence of a right to control the manner of doing the work, not the actual exercise of the right. 14

In determining whether the relationship is that of employer and employee or one of an independent contractor, "each case must be determined on its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be considered." 15Considering that petitioners who are either sewers, repairmen or ironer, have been in the employ of private respondent as early as 1972 or at the latest in 1976, faithfully rendering services which are desirable or necessary for the business of private respondent, and observing management's approved standards set for their respective lines of work as well as the customers' specifications, petitioners should be considered employees, not independent contractors.

Independent contractors are those who exercise independent employment, contracting to do a piece of work according to their own methods and without being subjected to control of their employer except as to the result of their work. By the nature of the different phases of work in a tailoring shop where the customers' specifications must be followed to the letter, it is inconceivable that the workers therein would not be subjected to control.

In Rosario Brothers, Inc. v. Ople, 16 this Court ruled that tailors and similar workers hired in the tailoring department, although paid weekly wages on piece work basis, are employees not independent contractors. Accordingly, as regular employees, paid on a piece-rate basis, petitioners are not entitled to overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday/rest day and service incentive leave pay. Their claim for separation pay should also be defined for lack of evidence that they were in fact dismissed by private respondent. They should be paid, however, their 13th month pay under P.D. 851, since they are employees not independent contractors.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the assailed decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by awarding —

(a) in favor of petitioner Villuga, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay and separation pay, in addition to his 13th month pay; and

(b) in favor of the rest of the petitioners, their respective 13th month pay.

The case is hereby REMANDED to the National Labor Relations Commission for the computation of the claims herein-above mentioned.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-69870 November 29, 1988

NATIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION (NASECO) AND ARTURO L. PEREZ, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE THIRD DIVISION, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MANILA AND EUGENIA C. CREDO, respondents.

G.R. No. 70295 November 29,1988

EUGENIA C. CREDO, petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL SERVICES CORPORATION AND ARTURO L. PEREZ, respondents.

The Chief Legal Counsel for respondents NASECO and Arturo L. Perez.

Melchor R. Flores for petitioner Eugenia C. Credo.

PADILLA, J.:

Consolidated special civil actions for certiorari seeking to review the decision * of the Third Division, National Labor Relations Commission in Case No. 11-4944-83 dated 28 November 1984 and its resolution dated 16 January 1985 denying motions for reconsideration of said decision.

Eugenia C. Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), a domestic corporation which provides security guards as well as messengerial, janitorial and other similar manpower services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its agencies. She was first employed with NASECO as a lady guard on 18 July 1975. Through the years, she was promoted to Clerk Typist, then Personnel Clerk until she became Chief of Property and Records, on 10 March 1980. 1

Sometime before 7 November 1983, Credo was administratively charged by Sisinio S. Lloren, Manager of Finance and Special Project and Evaluation Department of NASECO, stemming from her non-compliance with Lloren's memorandum, dated 11 October 1983, regarding certain entry procedures in the company's Statement of Billings Adjustment. Said charges alleged that Credo "did not comply with Lloren's instructions to place some corrections/additional remarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustment; and when [Credo] was called by Lloren to his office to explain further the said instructions, [Credo] showed resentment and behaved in a scandalous manner by shouting and uttering remarks of disrespect in the presence of her co-employees." 2

On 7 November 1983, Credo was called to meet Arturo L. Perez, then Acting General Manager of NASECO, to explain her side before Perez and NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs in connection with the administrative charges filed against her. After said meeting, on the same date, Credo was placed on "Forced Leave" status for 1 5 days, effective 8 November 1983. 3

Before the expiration of said 15-day leave, or on 18 November 1983, Credo filed a complaint, docketed as Case No. 114944-83, with the Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region, Ministry of Labor and Employment, Manila, against NASECO for placing her on forced leave, without due process. 4

Likewise, while Credo was on forced leave, or on 22 November 1983, NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs deliberated and evaluated a number of past acts of misconduct or infractions attributed to her. 5 As a result of this deliberation, said committee resolved:

1. That, respondent [Credo] committed the following offenses in the Code of Discipline, viz:

OFFENSE vs. Company Interest & Policies

No. 3 — Any discourteous act to customer, officer and employee of client company or officer of the Corporation.

OFFENSE vs. Public Moral

No. 7 — Exhibit marked discourtesy in the course of official duties or use of profane or insulting language to any superior officer.

OFFENSE vs. Authority

No. 3 — Failure to comply with any lawful order or any instructions of a superior officer.

2. That, Management has already given due consideration to respondent's [Credo] scandalous actuations for several times in the past. Records also show that she was reprimanded for some offense and did not question it. Management at this juncture, has

already met its maximum tolerance point so it has decided to put an end to respondent's [Credo] being an undesirable employee. 6

The committee recommended Credo's termination, with forfeiture of benefits. 7

On 1 December 1983, Credo was called age to the office of Perez to be informed that she was being charged with certain offenses. Notably, these offenses were those which NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs already resolved, on 22 November 1983 to have been committed by Credo.

In Perez's office, and in the presence of NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs, Credo was made to explain her side in connection with the charges filed against her; however, due to her failure to do so, 8 she was handed a Notice of Termination, dated 24 November 1983, and made effective 1 December 1983. 9 Hence, on 6 December 1983, Credo filed a supplemental complaint for illegal dismissal in Case No. 11-4944-83, alleging absence of just or authorized cause for her dismissal and lack of opportunity to be heard. 10

After both parties had submitted their respective position papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence in support of their claims and defenses, on 9 May 1984, the labor arbiter rendered a decision: 1) dismissing Credo's complaint, and 2) directing NASECO to pay Credo separation pay equivalent to one half month's pay for every year of service. 11

Both parties appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which, on 28 November 1984, rendered a decision: 1) directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position, or substantially equivalent position, with six (6) months' backwages and without loss of seniority rights and other privileges appertaining thereto, and 2) dismissing Credo's claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages. As a consequence, both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration, 12 which the NLRC denied in a resolution of 16 January 1985. 13

Hence, the present recourse by both parties. In G.R. No. 68970, petitioners challenge as grave abuse of discretion the dispositive portion of the 28 November 1984 decision which ordered Credo's reinstatement with backwages. 14 Petitioners contend that in arriving at said questioned order, the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding that: 1) petitioners violated the requirements mandated by law on termination, 2) petitioners failed in the burden of proving that the termination of Credo was for a valid or authorized cause, 3) the alleged infractions committed by Credo were not proven or, even if proved, could be considered to have been condoned by petitioners, and 4) the termination of Credo was not for a valid or authorized cause. 15

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 70295, petitioner Credo challenges as grave abuse of discretion the dispositive portion of the 28 November 1984 decision which dismissed her claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages and limited her right to backwages to only six (6) months. 16

As guidelines for employers in the exercise of their power to dismiss employees for just causes, the law provides that:

Section 2. Notice of dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 5. Answer and Hearing. — The worker may answer the allegations stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.

Section 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor. 17

These guidelines mandate that the employer furnish an employee sought to be dismissed two (2) written notices of dismissal before a termination of employment can be legally effected. These are the notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.

Likewise, a reading of the guidelines in consonance with the express provisions of law on protection to labor 18(which encompasses the right to security of tenure) and the broader dictates of procedural due process necessarily mandate that notice of the employer's decision to dismiss an employee, with reasons therefor, can only be issued after the employer has afforded the employee concerned ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.

In the case at bar, NASECO did not comply with these guidelines in effecting Credo's dismissal. Although she was apprised and "given the chance to explain her side" of the charges filed against her, this chance was given so perfunctorily, thus rendering illusory Credo's right to security of tenure. That Credo was not given ample opportunity to be heard and to defend herself is evident from the fact that the compliance with the injunction to apprise her of the charges filed against her and to afford her a chance to prepare for her defense was dispensed in only a day. This is not effective compliance with the legal requirements aforementioned.

The fact also that the Notice of Termination of Credo's employment (or the decision to dismiss her) was dated 24 November 1983 and made effective 1 December 1983 shows that NASECO was already bent on terminating her services when she was informed on 1 December 1983 of the charges against her, and that any hearing which NASECO thought of affording her after 24 November 1983 would merely be pro forma or an exercise in futility.

Besides, Credo's mere non-compliance with Lorens memorandum regarding the entry procedures in the company's Statement of Billings Adjustment did not warrant the severe penalty of dismissal of the NLRC correctly held that:

... on the charge of gross discourtesy, the CPA found in its Report, dated 22 November 1983 that, "In the process of her testimony/explanations she again exhibited a conduct unbecoming in front of NASECO Officers and argued to Mr. S. S. Lloren in a sarcastic and discourteous manner, notwithstanding, the fact that she was inside the office of the Acctg. General Manager." Let it be noted, however, that the Report did not even describe how the so called "conduct unbecoming" or "discourteous manner" was done by complainant. Anent the "sarcastic" argument of complainant, the purported transcript 19 of the meeting held on 7 November 1983 does not indicate any sarcasm on the part of complainant. At the most, complainant may have sounded insistent or emphatic about her work being more complete than the work of Ms. de Castro, yet, the complaining officer signed the work of Ms. de Castro and did not sign hers.

As to the charge of insubordination, it may be conceded, albeit unclear, that complainant failed to place same corrections/additional remarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustments as instructed. However, under the circumstances obtaining, where complainant strongly felt that she was being discriminated against by her superior in relation to other employees, we are of the considered view and so hold, that a reprimand would have sufficed for the infraction, but certainly not termination from services. 20

As this Court has ruled:

... where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. It is not only because of the law's concern for the working man. There is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on the wage-earner. 21

Of course, in justifying Credo's termination of employment, NASECO claims as additional lawful causes for dismissal Credo's previous and repeated acts of insubordination, discourtesy and sarcasm towards her superior officers, alleged to have been committed from 1980 to July 1983. 22

If such acts of misconduct were indeed committed by Credo, they are deemed to have been condoned by NASECO. For instance, sometime in 1980, when Credo allegedly "reacted in a scandalous manner and raised her voice" in a discussion with NASECO's Acting head of the Personnel Administration 23 no disciplinary measure was taken or meted against her. Nor was she even reprimanded when she allegedly talked 'in a shouting or yelling manner" with the Acting Manager of NASECO's Building Maintenance and Services Department in 1980 24 or when she allegedly "shouted" at NASECO's Corporate Auditor "in front of his subordinates displaying arrogance and unruly behavior" in 1980, or when she allegedly shouted at NASECO's Internal Control Consultant in 1981. 25But then, in sharp contrast to NASECO's penchant for ignoring the aforesaid acts of misconduct, when Credo committed frequent tardiness in August and September 1983, she was reprimanded. 26

Even if the allegations of improper conduct (discourtesy to superiors) were satisfactorily proven, NASECO's condonation thereof is gleaned from the fact that on 4 October 1983, Credo was given a salary adjustment for having performed in the job "at least [satisfactorily]" 27 and she was then rated "Very Satisfactory" 28as regards job performance, particularly in terms of quality of work, quantity of work, dependability, cooperation, resourcefulness and attendance.

Considering that the acts or omissions for which Credo's employment was sought to be legally terminated were insufficiently proved, as to justify dismissal, reinstatement is proper. For "absent the reason which gave rise to [the employee's] separation from employment, there is no intention on the part of the employer to dismiss the employee concerned." 29 And, as a result of having been wrongfully dismissed, Credo is entitled to three (3) years of backwages without deduction and qualification. 30

However, while Credo's dismissal was effected without procedural fairness, an award of exemplary damages in her favor can only be justified if her dismissal was effected in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.31 A judicious examination of the record manifests no such conduct on the part of management. However, in view of the attendant circumstances in the case, i.e., lack of due process in effecting her dismissal, it is reasonable to award her moral damages. And, for having been compelled to litigate because of the unlawful actuations of NASECO, a reasonable award for attorney's fees in her favor is in order.

In NASECO's comment 32 in G.R. No. 70295, it is belatedly argued that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to order Credo's reinstatement. NASECO claims that, as a government corporation (by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary wholly owned by the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which in turn is a government owned corporation), the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. In support of this argument, NASECO cites National Housing Corporation vs. JUCO, 33 where this Court held that "There should no longer be any question at this time that employees of government-owned or controlled corporations are governed by the civil service law and civil service rifles and regulations."

It would appear that, in the interest of justice, the holding in said case should not be given retroactive effect, that is, to cases that arose before its promulgation on 17 January 1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated, because under the same 1973 Constitution ,but prior to the ruling inNational Housing Corporation vs. Juco, this Court had recognized the applicability of the Labor Code to, and the authority of the NLRC to exercise jurisdiction over, disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in government owned or controlled corporations, among them, the National Service Corporation (NASECO).<äre||anº•1àw>

34

Furthermore, in the matter of coverage by the civil service of government-owned or controlled corporations, the 1987 Constitution starkly varies from the 1973 Constitution, upon which National Housing Corporation vs. Juco is based. Under the 1973 Constitution, it was provided that:

The civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the Government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. ... 35

On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution provides that:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter. 36 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the situations sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution and expressed by the Court in the National Housing . Corporation case in the following manner —

The infirmity of the respondents' position lies in its permitting a circumvention or emasculation of Section 1, Article XII-B of the constitution. It would be possible for a regular ministry of government to create a host of subsidiary corporations under the Corporation Code funded by a willing legislature. A government-owned corporation could create several subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporations would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and the regulations of the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restrains of the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all government-owned or controlled corporations could be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorporations under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such corporations in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed to exist. 37

appear relegated to relative insignificance by the 1987 Constitutional provision that the Civil Service embraces government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter; and, therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does not include government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled corporations under the general corporation law.

The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission also shed light on the Constitutional intent and meaning in the use of the phrase "with original charter." Thus

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas) Commissioner Romulo is recognized.

MR. ROMULO. I beg the indulgence of the Committee. I was reading the wrong provision.

I refer to Section 1, subparagraph I which reads:

The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

My query: Is Philippine Airlines covered by this provision? MR. FOZ. Will the Commissioner please state his previous question?

MR. ROMULO. The phrase on line 4 of Section 1, subparagraph 1, under the Civil Service Commission, says: "including government-owned or controlled corporations.' Does that include a corporation, like the Philippine Airlines which is government-owned or controlled?

MR. FOZ. I would like to throw a question to the Commissioner. Is the Philippine Airlines controlled by the government in the

sense that the majority of stocks are owned by the government?

MR. ROMULO. It is owned by the GSIS. So, this is what we might call a tertiary corporation. The GSIS is owned by the government. Would this be covered because the provision says "including government-owned or controlled corporations."

MR. FOZ. The Philippine Airlines was established as a private corporation. Later on, the government, through the GSIS, acquired the controlling stocks. Is that not the correct situation?

MR. ROMULO. That is true as Commissioner Ople is about to explain. There was apparently a Supreme Court decision that destroyed that distinction between a government-owned corporation created under the Corporation Law and a government-owned corporation created by its own charter.

MR. FOZ. Yes, we recall the Supreme Court decision in the case of NHA vs. Juco to the effect that all government corporations irrespective of the manner of creation, whether by special charter or by the private Corporation Law, are deemed to be covered by the civil service because of the wide-embracing definition made in this section of the existing 1973 Constitution. But we recall the response to the question of Commissioner Ople that our intendment in this provision is just to give a general description of the civil service. We are not here to make any declaration as to whether employees of government-owned or controlled corporations are barred from the operation of laws, such as the Labor Code of the Philippines.

MR. ROMULO. Yes.

MR. OPLE. May I be recognized, Mr. Presiding Officer, since my name has been mentioned by both sides.

MR. ROMULO. I yield part of my time.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Trenas). Commissioner Ople is recognized.

MR. OPLE. In connection with the coverage of the Civil Service Law in Section 1 (1), may I volunteer some information that may be helpful both to the interpellator and to the Committee. Following the proclamation of martial law on September 21, 1972, this issue of the coverage of the Labor Code of the Philippines and of the Civil Service Law almost immediately

arose. I am, in particular, referring to the period following the coming into force and effect of the Constitution of 1973, where the Article on the Civil Service was supposed to take immediate force and effect. In the case of LUZTEVECO, there was a strike at the time. This was a government-controlled and government-owned corporation. I think it was owned by the PNOC with just the minuscule private shares left. So, the Secretary of Justice at that time, Secretary Abad Santos, and myself sat down, and the result of that meeting was an opinion of the Secretary of Justice which 9 became binding immediately on the government that government corporations with original charters, such as the GSIS, were covered by the Civil Service Law and corporations spun off from the GSIS, which we called second generation corporations functioning as private subsidiaries, were covered by the Labor Code. Samples of such second generation corporations were the Philippine Airlines, the Manila

Hotel and the Hyatt. And that demarcation worked very well. In fact, all of these companies I have mentioned as examples, except for the Manila Hotel, had collective bargaining agreements. In the Philippine Airlines, there were, in fact, three collective bargaining agreements; one, for the ground people or the PALIA one, for the flight attendants or the PASAC and one for the pilots of the ALPAC How then could a corporation like that be covered by the Civil Service law? But, as the Chairman of the Committee pointed out, the Supreme Court decision in the case of NHA vs. Juco unrobed the whole thing. Accordingly, the Philippine Airlines, the Manila Hotel and the Hyatt are now considered under that decision covered by the Civil Service Law. I also recall that in the emergency meeting of the Cabinet convened for this purpose at the initiative of the Chairman of the Reorganization Commission, Armand Fabella, they agreed to allow the CBA's to lapse before applying the full force and effect of the Supreme Court decision. So, we were in the awkward situation when the new government took over. I can agree with Commissioner Romulo when he said that this is a problem which I am not exactly sure we should address in the deliberations on the Civil Service Law or whether we should be content with what the Chairman said that Section 1 (1) of the Article on the Civil Service is just a general description of the coverage of the Civil Service and no more.

Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. ROMULO. Mr. Presiding Officer, for the moment, I would be satisfied if the Committee puts on records that it is not their intent by this provision and the phrase "including government-owned or controlled corporations" to cover such companies as the Philippine Airlines.

MR. FOZ. Personally, that is my view. As a matter of fact, when this draft was made, my proposal was really to eliminate, to drop from the provision, the phrase "including government- owned or controlled corporations."

MR. ROMULO. Would the Committee indicate that is the intent of this provision?

MR. MONSOD. Mr. Presiding Officer, I do not think the Committee can make such a statement in the face of an absolute exclusion of government-owned or controlled corporations. However, this does not preclude the Civil Service Law to prescribe different rules and procedures, including emoluments for employees of proprietary corporations, taking into consideration the nature of their operations. So, it is a general coverage but it does not preclude a distinction of the rules between the two types of enterprises.

MR. FOZ. In other words, it is something that should be left to the legislature to decide. As I said before, this is just a general description and we are not making any declaration whatsoever.

MR. MONSOD. Perhaps if Commissioner Romulo would like a definitive understanding of the coverage and the Gentleman wants to exclude government-owned or controlled corporations like Philippine Airlines, then the recourse is to offer an amendment as to the coverage, if the Commissioner does not accept the explanation that there could be a distinction of the rules, including salaries and emoluments.

MR. ROMULO. So as not to delay the proceedings, I will reserve my right to submit such an amendment.

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDING OFFICE (Mr. Trenas) Commissioner Romulo is recognized.

MR. ROMULO. On page 2, line 5, I suggest the following amendment after "corporations": Add a comma (,) and the phrase EXCEPT THOSE EXERCISING PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas). What does the Committee say?

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

MR. MONSOD. May we have a suspension of the session?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas). The session is suspended.

It was 7:16 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

At 7:21 p.m., the session was resumed.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas). The session is resumed.

Commissioner Romulo is recognized.

MR. ROMULO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am amending my original proposed amendment to now read as follows: "including government-owned or controlled corporations WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS." The purpose of this amendment is to indicate that government corporations such as the GSIS and SSS, which have original charters, fall within the ambit of the civil service. However, corporations which are subsidiaries of these chartered agencies such as the Philippine Airlines, Manila Hotel and Hyatt are excluded from the coverage of the civil service.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas). What does the Committee say?

MR. FOZ. Just one question, Mr. Presiding Officer. By the term "original charters," what exactly do we mean?

MR. ROMULO. We mean that they were created by law, by an act of Congress, or by special law.

MR. FOZ. And not under the general corporation law.

MR. ROMULO. That is correct. Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. FOZ. With that understanding and clarification, the Committee accepts the amendment.

MR. NATIVIDAD. Mr. Presiding officer, so those created by the general corporation law are out.

MR. ROMULO. That is correct: 38

On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is the Constitution in place at the time of decision thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord

relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter.

Dr. Jorge Bocobo, in his Cult of Legalism, cited by Mr. Justice Perfecto in his concurring opinion in Gomez vs. Government Insurance Board (L-602, March 31, 1947, 44 O.G. No. 8, pp. 2687, 2694; also published in 78 Phil. 221) on the effectivity of the principle of social justice embodied in the 1935 Constitution, said:

Certainly, this principle of social justice in our Constitution as generously conceived and so tersely phrased, was not included in the fundamental law as a mere popular gesture. It was meant to (be) a vital, articulate, compelling principle of public policy. It should be observed in the interpretation not only of future legislation, but also of all laws already existing on November 15, 1935. It was intended to change the spirit of our laws, present and future. Thus, all the laws which on the great historic event when the Commonwealth of the Philippines was born, were susceptible of two interpretations strict or liberal, against or in favor of social justice, now have to be construed broadly in order to promote and achieve social justice. This may seem novel to our friends, the advocates of legalism but it is the only way to give life and significance to the above-quoted principle of the Constitution. If it was not designed to apply to these existing laws, then it would be necessary to wait for generations until all our codes and all our statutes shall have been completely charred by removing every provision inimical to social justice, before the policy of social justice can become really effective. That would be an absurd conclusion. It is more reasonable to hold that this constitutional principle applies to all legislation in force on November 15, 1935, and all laws thereafter passed.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the challenged decision of the NLRC is AFFIRMED with modifications. Petitioners in G.R. No. 69870, who are the private respondents in G.R. No. 70295, are ordered to: 1) reinstate Eugenia C. Credo to her former position at the time of her termination, or if such reinstatement is not possible, to place her in a substantially equivalent position, with three (3) years backwages, from 1 December 1983, without qualification or deduction, and without loss of seniority rights and other privileges appertaining thereto, and 2) pay Eugenia C. Credo P5,000.00 for moral damages and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees.

If reinstatement in any event is no longer possible because of supervening events, petitioners in G.R. No. 69870, who are the private respondents in G.R. No. 70295 are ordered to pay Eugenia C. Credo, in addition to her backwages and damages as above described, separation pay equivalent to one-half month's salary for every year of service, to be computed on her monthly salary at the time of her termination on 1 December 1983.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, J., is on leave.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., in the result.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 142981. August 20, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CARMELITA ALVAREZ, appellant.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In illegal recruitment, mere failure of the complainant to present written receipts for money paid for acts constituting recruitment activities is not fatal to the prosecution, provided the payment can be proved by clear and convincing testimonies of credible witnesses.

The Case

Before us is an appeal from the January 28, 2000 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 93, in Criminal Case No. Q-94-58179. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises, the court finds the accused CARMELITA ALVAREZ guilty of Illegal Recruitment committed in large scale constituting economic sabotage. Accordingly, the court sentences her to serve [the] penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine [of] P100,000.00. She is further ordered to indemnify the following complaining witnesses in the amounts indicated opposite their names:

Arnel Damian P 16,500.00Joel Serna P 18,575 plus US$50.00Antonio Damian P 6,975.00 plus US$50.00

Roberto Alejandro P 47,320.00”[2]

The July 18, 1994 Information[3] was filed by State Prosecutor Zenaida M. Lim. It charged Carmelita Alvarez with “illegal recruitment committed in large scale,” under Article 13(b) in relation to Articles 38(a), 34 and 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as follows:

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/142981.htm#_edn3



“That sometime between the period from November, 1993 to March, 1994, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit the herein complainants, namely: JESUS G. ESMA, JR., JOEL G. SERNA, ARNEL C. DAMIAN, ANTONIO C. DAMIAN, RUBEN F. RIOLA, LORETA S. BOLOTAOLA, EDGAR R. BARCENAS, DENO A. MANACAP, JERRY NEIL D. ABANILLA, ROBERTO ALEJANDRO, ESTER S. BONDOC and JOSEPHINE LOMOCSO as contract workers in Taiwan for and in consideration of the sum ranging from P12,300.00 to P48,600.00, as placement and processing fees, and x x x which the complainants delivered and paid to herein accused the said amount, without said accused first having secured the necessary license or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.”[4]

On arraignment, appellant, assisted by Atty. Donato Mallabo, pleaded not guilty.[5] After trial in due course, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision.

The FactsVersion of the Prosecution

The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as follows:

“Arnel Damian is one of the complainants in the case at bar. He testified that he was introduced to appellant by Reynaldo Abrigo, who was then the boyfriend of Teresita Gonzales (daughter of appellant Carmelita Alvarez) at appellant’s house in 25-B West Santiago St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. During said meeting, appellant convinced complainant that if he could produce [t]wenty-[f]ive [t]housand [p]esos (P25,000.00), he would be deployed to Taiwan as a factory worker and would be receiving a salary of $600.00.

“On December 27, 1993, complainant gave appellant [t]welve [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred [p]esos (P12,500) for which he was issued a receipt (Exhibit A) with the words ‘FOR PROCESSING FEE’ written therein by appellant herself. Aside from the processing fee, complainant also gave appellant [t]wo [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred [p]esos ([P]2,500.00) for medical expenses and one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500.00) for the passport, but was not issued a receipt for said payments.

“According to complainant, while waiting for the results of his medical examination, he received a call informing him that appellant was arrested. Becoming suspicious, complainant then went to the Philippine Overseas and Employment Administration (POEA) to verify whether appellant had a license to recruit. As per Certification



issued by the POEA on June 1, 1994, he found out that appellant was not licensed to recruit. Realizing that appellant would never be able to send complainant to Taiwan, he filed a complaint against appellant with the POEA.

“On cross-examination, complainant clarified that Reynaldo Abrigo did not actually introduce him to appellant, but merely gave appellant’s address and telephone number. Thereafter, complainant went to appellant’s house together with Ruben Riola and Michael Lumahan. In addition, complainant stated under cross-examination that appellant told him that according to the medical examination results, complainant was unfit to work. Consequently, he demanded the return of his money but appellant failed to do so.

“Antonio Damian is also one of the complainants in the case at bar. He testified that he is the brother of Arnel Damian and that when his brother failed the medical examination, his brother Arnel immediately demanded from appellant the return of the processing fee. However, appellant could not return the money to him anymore. Instead, appellant asked Arnel to look for another applicant in order to save the processing fee. For which reason, Arnel asked his brother Antonio to apply in his stead. During his first meeting with appellant on January 4, 1994, complainant Antonio Damian was asked to pay [t]wo [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred [p]esos (P2,500.00) for medical examination. Subsequently, he also gave [n]ine [h]undred [p]esos (P900.00) for insurance; [s]eventy-[f]ive [p]esos (P75.00) for Pre-departure Orientation Seminar; [f]ifty [d]ollars ($50.00) as part of the processing fee; and [t]hree [t]housand [f]ive [h]undred [p]esos (P3,500.00) for the birth certificate. All of these were personally given to appellant but no receipts were issued by appellant. As with all the other complainants, appellant promised Antonio that he would work as factory worker in Taiwan and that he would receive a salary of [t]wenty-[f]ive [t]housand [p]esos (P25,000.00). After waiting for two (2) months, Antonio learned that appellant was arrested. Hence, he filed his complaint with the POEA against appellant.

“Joel Serna came to know of appellant also through Reynaldo Abrigo. He met appellant at her house at 25-B West Santiago St., San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City on February 8, 1994. Like the others, Joel was promised employment in Taiwan as factory worker and was also asked to pay various fees. Appellant gave him a list of the fees to be paid which included: Processing fee – P12,500.00; Medical examination –P2,395.00; Passport – P1,500.00; Visa fee - $50.00; and Insurance – P900.00. Appellant’s telephone number was also included in said list. According to complainant Joel, said list was personally prepared by appellant in his presence. Complainant Joel paid the various fees but was never issued any receipt for said payment despite demands from appellant. Upon learning that appellant was

arrested for illegal recruitment, he went to the POEA and filed his complaint against appellant.

“Roberto Alejandro testified that Onofre Ferrer, a provincemate, informed him that there were applicants needed for the job in Taiwan. On March 6, 1994, both of them went to appellant’s house where complainant Roberto was told by appellant that she had the capacity to send him to Taiwan but he must first undergo medical examination.

“Later, when Roberto was informed that he passed the medical examination, appellant told him to bring [f]orty [t]housand [p]esos (P40,000) as processing fee and other documentary requirements. A receipt was issued by appellant for the payment of said amount.

“On March 9, 1994 appellant advised him to pay an additional [f]ive [t]housand (P5,000.00) which he personally delivered to appellant on March 11, 1994. A receipt was also issued by appellant for said amount.

“After three (3) months of waiting and follow-up without any positive results, complainant filed his complaint against appellant with the POEA.

“David Umbao was presented on rebuttal by the prosecution and testified that on June 1, 1994, an entrapment operation was conducted against Carmelita Alvarez where Jerry Neil Abadilla and an agent by the name of Conchita Samones gave appellant the amount of P5,000.00 with a P500.00 bill marked as payment for the ‘renewal of the promise’ of deployment. After appellant took the money, she was immediately apprehended. Two witnesses were present during the entrapment operations, one from the barangay and one from the homeowner’s association. The affidavit of arrest setting out the details of the entrapment operation and the arrest was collectively executed by the entrapment team.”[6] (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

In her Brief,[7] appellant submits her own version of the facts as follows:

“CARMELITA ALVAREZ testified that sometime in 1991, she met Director Angeles Wong at the Office of the Deputy Administrator of the POEA, Manuel Quimson, who happened to be her ‘compadre’. Sometime in November 1993, Director Wong called her about a direct-hire scheme from Taiwan which is a job order whereby people who want to work abroad can apply directly with the POEA. The said director told her that there were six (6) approved job orders from Labor Attache



Ellen Canasa. Seeing this as a good opportunity for her son, Edelito Gonzales, who was then a new graduate, she recommended him and his son’s friends, namely, Reynaldo Abrigo, Renato Abrigo and two others surnamed Lucena, for employment. Unfortunately, Director Wong called off the scheduled departure because the quota of workers for deployment was not met. To remedy the situation, she approached Josephine Lomocso and a certain recruiter named Romeo Dabilbil, who also recommends people to Director Wong with ready passports. When the thirty (30) slots needed for the direct-hiring scheme were filed up, Director Wong set the tentative schedule of departure on February 23, 1994. In view of the said development, Mr. Dabilbil contacted the recruits from Cebu who even stayed at her (Conchita’s) place in Capiz Street, Del Monte, Quezon City for three (3) days to one (1) week while waiting to be deployed. On the night of their scheduled departure and while they were having their despidida party, Director Wong sent a certain Ross to inform them that a telex was received by him informing him (Director Wong) that the factory where the recruits were supposed to work was gutted by a fire. She was later advised by Director Wong to wait for the deployment order to come from Taiwan. While the people from Cebu were staying in her house waiting for development, the accused even advised them to file a complaint against Mr. Dabilbil before the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission at Camp Crame. Surprisingly, she was also arrested for illegal recruitment on May 31, 1994 and thereafter learned that on June 1, 1994, the Damian brothers filed a complaint against her before the POEA. After her apprehension, the accused further testified that there was some sort of negotiation between her lawyer, Atty. Orlando Salutandre, and the apprehending officer, Major Umbao, regarding her release. According to her, if she [would] be able to raise the amount of [t]hirty [t]housand [p]esos (P30,000.00), Major Umbao [would] not anymore refer her for inquest, but would only recommend her case for further investigation and then she would be released. Since she failed to raise the said amount, she was brought to the inquest fiscal.

“REYNALDO ABRIGO testified that it was Director Angeles Wong who was actually recruiting workers for deployment abroad because of a certain document which Alvarez showed to them bearing the name of the said POEA Official.

“EDELITO GONZALES’ testimony merely corroborated the testimony of defense witnesses Carmencita Alvarez and Reynaldo Abrigo.

x x x x x x x x x

“SUR-REBUTTAL EVIDENCE:

“MARITES ABRIGO testified that while she was in the living room and her mother, accused Carmelita Alvarez, was in her room inside their house on May 31, 1994, a

group of persons arrived and asked where her mother was. After telling them that her mother was inside her room resting, a certain Major Umbao, together with some other persons, went straight to her mother’s room and knocked on the door. When her mother opened it and peeped through the opening of the door, they immediately grabbed her. She was not able to do anything also, other than to tell them that she has to consult first her lawyer. When her mother was brought to the POEA office she was told that they have to produce P30,000.00.”[8] (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court accorded full credibility to the prosecution witnesses. It held that complainants had not been impelled by ill motives in filing the case against appellant. They all positively identified her as the person who, without the requisite license from the government, had collected from them processing and placement fees in consideration of jobs in Taiwan.

The trial court was convinced that appellant had deceived complainants by making them believe that she could deploy them abroad to work, and that she was thus able to milk them of their precious savings. The lack of receipts for some amounts that she received from them did not discredit their testimonies. Besides, her precise role in the illegal recruitment was adequately demonstrated through other means.

Further affirming her illegal recruitment activities was the entrapment conducted, in which she was caught receiving marked money from a certain Jerry Neil Abadilla, to whom she had promised a job abroad.

Her defense that she merely wanted to provide jobs for her son-in-law and his friends was rejected, because she had subsequently retracted her allegation implicating Director Wong of the POEA in her illegal recruitment activities. As she victimized more than three (3) persons, the RTC convicted her of illegal recruitment committed in large scale.

Hence, this appeal.[9]

Issue

Appellant submits this lone assignment of error:

“The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellant Carmelita Alvarez guilty beyond reasonable doubt for illegal recruitment in large scale.”[10]

More specifically, appellant questions the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence showing the following: (1) that she engaged in acts of illegal recruitment enumerated in Article 38 of the Labor Code, (2) that she was not licensed to recruit, (3) that she




received money from complainants despite the absence of receipts, and (4) that her acts constituted illegal recruitment in large scale.

This Court’s Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Main Issue:Bases for Her Conviction

Appellant denies that she engaged in any act of illegal recruitment and claims that she only recommended, through Director Wong of the POEA, her son-in-law and his friends for a direct-hire job in Taiwan.

We disagree. Prior to the enactment of RA No. 8042, the crime of illegal recruitment was defined under Article 38(a) in relation to Articles 13(b) and 34 and penalized under Article 39 of the Labor Code. It consisted of any recruitment activity, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Code, undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. It is committed when two elements concur: (1) the offenders have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) the offenders undertake either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34.[11]

Under Article 13(b), recruitment and placement refers to “any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers[;] and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.” In the simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed when a person, who is not authorized by the government, gives the impression that he or she has the power to send workers abroad.[12]

It is clear from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that appellant recruited them. On direct examination, Arnel Damian testified thus:

“Q When was that when Reynaldo Abondo introduced you to the accused?

A Last week of November. I cannot remember the exact date.

Q Where were you when you were introduced to the accused?

A At 25 V. West Santiago St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, in the house of Mrs. Alvarez.

x x x x x x x x x

Q When you arrived at that place, whom did you see?

A Mrs. Alvarez.



Q What happened during your first meeting.

A We were recruited by her.

Q What did she tell you?

A That if we could come up with the amount of P25,000.00 but she was only asking for P12,500.00 as processing fee.

Q What else did she tell you?

A That we were to act as replacement of three persons who backed out.

Q Did she tell you where were you going?

A We were told to go to Taiwan as factory worker.

Q Did she tell you how much salary will you receive?

A $600.00.”[13]

Appellant had also recruited for a similar job in Taiwan, Joel Serna who testified as follows:

“Q Will you please inform the Hon. Court why do you know Carmelita Alvarez?

A I came to know her when her daughter became the girlfriend of my friend and I was told that she is recruiting workers for Taiwan.

Q After knowing that she was recruiting workers for Taiwan, what did you do, if any?

A I inquired from her and I was assured that the employment was not fake and I was told to pay a processing fee.

Q When you said ‘kanya or her’ to whom are you referring to?

A Carmelita Alvarez.

Q Do you still remember when was that?

A February 8, 1994.

Q Where did you meet?

A In her house at No. 25-B West Santiago St., SFDM, Quezon City.

Q What other things did she told you, if there was any?

A I would subject myself to a medical examination and after this, I would give her a processing fee.

Q What was the purpose of that processing fee?

A So I could leave immediately for Taiwan.

Q Why are you going to Taiwan?

A I need a job.

Q If you give Mrs. Alvarez the processing fee, she will help you to go to Taiwan?

A Yes, sir.”[14]



Antonio Damian, brother of Arnel, also testified to the same effect.

“ATTY. DIGNADICE:

Q Will you please tell this Hon. Court the circumstances why you came to know Carmelita Alvarez?

A I met Carmelita Alvarez on January 4, 1994.

COURT: (to the witness)

Under what circumstances did you happen to know her?

A I went to her house.

ATTY. DIGNADICE:

Q Why did you go to her house?

A Because I applied to her for work abroad.

Q Why did you apply for work abroad to her?

A Because of a brother who applied to her but failed the medical examination.

x x x x x x x x x

Q Arnel Damian applied for work abroad with Carmelita Alvarez?

A Yes, sir.

Q Was he able to leave for abroad?

A No, sir.

Q Why?

A Because he failed the medical examination.

x x x x x x x x x

Q What happened next after that?

A Because my brother failed with the medical examination, Carmelita Alvarez cannot return the processing fee in the amount of P12,000.00 so she told my brother to look for another applicant.

ATTY. DIGNADICE:

Q Did your brother look for another applicant as his replacement?

A He asked me to take my place to save the P12,000.00.”[15]

Roberto Alejandro testified that appellant had also told him she could send him to Taiwan to work.

“Q When you reached that place whom did you see there?

A Mrs. Alvarez.

Q And what happened during that first meeting?

A She told me that she has the capacity of sending to Taiwan.”[16]



More telling is Ruben Riola’s testimony on appellant’s specific acts constituting illegal recruitment.

“Q Can you tell the Hon. Court what transpired with that first meeting of yours with Carmelita Alvarez at Capiz District?

A When I got there, I was with two companions, because we were replacements of the three others who backed out. We were asked by the mother if we were the friends of her daughter and son-in-law who is from the church?

Q What was your answer?

A I said yes.

Q Was there anything that transpired during that meeting?

A We were asked by her if we were interested to work as Factory workers in Taiwan.

Q What was your answer, if any?

A We said we are interested if it is true.

Q After knowing that you are interested to work as factory worker in Taiwan, what did Carmelita Alvarez do if there was any?

A We were shown a document stating that such person was receiving $600.00 salary.

x x x x x x x x x

Q After knowing that you will be receiving the same amount if you work as factory worker in Taiwan, what did you do, if any?

A We were told to immediately pay the processing fee.

Q Who told you to pay the processing fee?

A Mrs. Carmelita Alvarez.

Q This processing fee is for what?

A So that she could process the papers with the POEA, for the facilitation with the POEA[,] so that we could be included in the first batch.”[17]

“Q What happened on that date after paying the tax of P1,500.00.

A We were promised to leave on February 23, 1993.

Q Will you please elaborate more on the promise, what kind of promise was it, if you could remember?

A That would be the latest date that we could leave for Taiwan.

Q Would you somehow remember the words of Carmelita Alvarez?

x x x x x x x x x

A ‘Na papaalisin niya kami’.

x x x x x x x x x

Q Why did you celebrate a ‘dispededa’?


A Because we were about to leave.

Q Who told you?

A Carmelita Alvarez.

x x x x x x x x x

Q Why were you celebrating this party?

A Because we will be leaving the following day.”[18]

Furthermore, appellant committed other acts showing that she was engaged in illegal recruitment. Enumerated in People v. Manungas Jr.[19] as acts constituting recruitment within the meaning of the law were collecting pictures, birth certificates, NBI clearances and other necessary documents for the processing of employment applications in Saudi Arabia; and collecting payments for passport, training fees, placement fees, medical tests and other sundry expenses.[20]

In this case, the prosecution proved that appellant had received varying amounts of money from complainants for the processing of their employment applications for Taiwan. Arnel Damian paid to appellant P12,500 for the processing fee,[21] P2,500 for the medical fee and P1,500 for his passport.[22] Serna paid P12,000 for the processing fee,[23] P3,000 for his birth certificate and passport, [24] P75 for a “Departure and Orientation Seminar,”[25] P900 for the insurance fee and $50 for his visa. [26] Antonio Damian paid P2,500 for the medical fee,[27] P900 for the insurance, P75 for the “Pre-Departure and Orientation Seminar” (PDOS) fee, $50 for the processing fee and P3,500 for his birth certificate.[28] Roberto Alejandro paid P40,000 for the processing fee[29] and P5,000 for the insurance.[30] Riola paid P1,900 for his passport, P12,500 for the processing fee, P900 for the insurance fee, P75 for the PDOS fee, P1,500 for the insurance and $50 for travel tax.[31]

The trial court found complainants to be credible and convincing witnesses. We are inclined to give their testimonies due consideration. The best arbiter of the issue of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is the trial court. When the inquiry is on that issue, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter was in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. Its finding thereon will not be disturbed, unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, may affect the result of the case.[32] We find no cogent reason to overrule the trial court in this case.

No License

Appellant denies that she engaged in acts of recruitment and placement without first complying with the guidelines issued by the Department of Labor and Employment. She contends that she did not possess any license for recruitment, because she never engaged in such activity.

We are not persuaded. In weighing contradictory declarations and statements, greater weight must be given to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than to the denial of the defendant.[33] Article 38(a) clearly shows that illegal recruitment

















is an offense that is essentially committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. A non-licensee means any person, corporation or entity to which the labor secretary has not issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement; or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the labor secretary. [34] A license authorizes a person or an entity to operate a private employment agency, while authority is given to those engaged in recruitment and placement activities.[35]

Likewise constituting illegal recruitment and placement activities are agents or representatives whose appointments by a licensee or holder of authority have not been previously authorized by the POEA.[36]

That appellant in this case had been neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment was certified by Veneranda C. Guerrero, officer-in-charge of the Licensing and Regulation Office; and Ma. Salome S. Mendoza, manager of the Licensing Branch -- both of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.[37] Yet, as complainants convincingly proved, she recruited them for jobs in Taiwan.

Absence of Receipts

Appellant contends that the RTC erred when it did not appreciate in her favor the failure of Complainants Serna and Antonio Damian to present, as proofs that she had illegally recruited them, receipts that she had allegedly issued to them.

We disagree. The Court has already ruled that the absence of receipts in a case for illegal recruitment is not fatal, as long as the prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonial evidence that accused-appellant has engaged in illegal recruitment.[38] Such case is made, not by the issuance or the signing of receipts for placement fees, but by engagement in recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority.[39]

In People v. Pabalan,[40] the Court held that the absence of receipts for some of the amounts delivered to the accused did not mean that the appellant did not accept or receive such payments. Neither in the Statute of Frauds nor in the rules of evidence is the presentation of receipts required in order to prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment cases. Such proof may come from the testimonies of witnesses.[41]

Besides, the receipts issued by petitioner to Arnel Damian and Roberto Alejandro already suffice to prove her guilt.[42]

Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale

Since only two complainants were able to show receipts issued by appellant, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove illegal recruitment in large scale.

We disagree. The finding of illegal recruitment in large scale is justified wherever the elements previously mentioned concur with this additional element: the offender commits the crime against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.[43] Appellant recruited at least three persons. All the witnesses for the prosecution categorically testified that it was she who had promised them that she could arrange for and facilitate their employment in Taiwan as factory workers.











As for the defense that appellant had only referred complainants to Director Wong, her public apology and retraction[44] belied her denials. After examining the transcripts, we concur with the RTC that her averment that she was being prosecuted for her refusal to give grease money to Major Umbao in exchange for her freedom does not disprove the fact that she was caught in flagrante delicto in an entrapment operation.

We find appellant’s conviction for the crime charged sufficiently supported by evidence; therefore, it should be sustained.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), and Carpio, JJ., concur.Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 140067-71. August 29, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NENITA MARIA OLIVIA GALLARDO (at large), and REMEDIOS MALAPIT, accused,

REMEDIOS MALAPIT, accused-appellant.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Remedios Malapit and Nenita Maria Olivia Gallardo were charged with one (1) count of illegal recruitment committed in large-scale, three (3) counts of estafa, and one (1) count of simple illegal recruitment before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3.[1] The Informations read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 15320-R (Illegal Recruitment Committed in Large Scale) [2]

The undersigned (Public Prosecutor) accuses NENITA MARIA OLIVIA GALLARDO and REMEDIOS MALAPIT of the crime of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT COMMITTED IN LARGE SCALE, defined and penalized under Article 13(b) in relation to Article 38(b), 34, and 39 of P.D. No. 442, otherwise known as the New Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by P.D. No. 1693, 1920, 2018 and R.A. No. 8042, committed as follows:

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/aug2002/140067_71.htm#_edn2



That during the period from January 1997 to June, 1997, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise employment as contract workers in Canada, to the herein complainants, namely: Rommel Suni, Myrna Castro, Marilyn Mariano, Bryna Paul Wong, Mary Grace Lanozo, Ana Liza Aquino, Marie Purificacion Abenoja, Florence Bacoco and Lorna Domingo, without said accused having first secured the necessary license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.

Criminal Case No. 15323-R (Estafa) [3]

That in March 1997 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one MARILYN MARIANO by way of false pretenses, which are executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, as follows; to wit: the accused knowing fully well that he/she they is/are not authorized job recruiters for persons intending to secure work abroad convinced said Marilyn Mariano and pretended that he/she/they could secure a job for him/her abroad, for and in consideration of the sum of P36,500.00, when in truth and in fact they could not; the said Marilyn Mariano deceived and convinced by the false pretenses employed by the accused parted away the total sum of P36,500.00, in favor of the accused, to the damage and prejudice of the said Marilyn Mariano in the aforementioned amount of THIRTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P36,500.00), Philippine Currency.


That on June 6, 1997 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one MARIE PURIFICACION ABENOJA by way of false pretenses, which are executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, as follows, to wit: the accused knowing fully well that he/she they is/are not authorized job recruiters for persons intending to secure work abroad convinced said Marie Purificacion Abenoja and pretended that he/she/they could secure a job for him/her abroad, for and in consideration of the sum of P36,500.00, when in truth and in fact they could not; the said Marie Purificacion Abenoja deceived and convinced by the false pretenses employed by the accused parted away the total sum of P36,500.00 in favor of the accused, to the damage and prejudice of the said Marie Purificacion



Abenoja in the aforementioned amount of THIRTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P36,500.00), Philippine currency.

Criminal Case No. 15570-R (Illegal Recruitment) [5]

The under signed (Public Prosecutor) accuses NENITA MARIA OLIVIA-GALLARDO and REMEDIOS MALAPIT of the crime of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT, defined and penalized under Article 13(b) in relation to Article 38(b), 34, and 39 of Presidential Decree No. 442, otherwise known as the New Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by R.A. No. 8042, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of June, 1997, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise employment as contract worker in Canada, to the herein complainant ARACELI D. ABENOJA, without said accused having first secured the necessary license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.


That on or about the 11th day of June, 1997 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating & mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one ARACELI D. ABENOJA by way of false pretenses, which are executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, as follows; to wit: the accused knowing fully well that he/she/they is/are not authorized job recruiters for persons intending to secure work abroad convinced said Araceli D. Abenoja and pretended that he/she/they could secure a job for him/her abroad, for and in consideration of the sum of P35,000.00, when in truth and in fact they could not; the said Araceli D. Abenoja deceived and convinced by the false pretenses employed by the accused parted away the total sum of P35,000.00 in favor of the accused, to the damage and prejudice of the said Araceli D. Abenoja in the aforementioned amount of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P35,000.00), Philippine currency.

Only accused-appellant Remedios Malapit was brought to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Her co-accused, Nenita Maria Olivia Gallardo, remained at large.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded “not guilty” to all charges. The five (5) cases were consolidated and tried jointly.



Marie Purificacion Abenoja and Marilyn Mariano met accused-appellant at her beauty parlor in Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City. Marie met accused-appellant sometime in January 1997 through her friend, Florence Bacoco. A month later, Marilyn was introduced to accused-appellant by Grace Lanozo, a fellow nurse at the PMA Hospital.

Marie claims that accused-appellant enticed her to apply for work as a caregiver in Canada. Accused-appellant showed her a piece of paper containing a job order saying that Canada was in need of ten (10) caregivers and some messengers. Accused-appellant also promised her that she will be receiving a salary of CN$2,700.00 (Canadian Dollars) and will be able to leave for Canada in a month’s time. Heeding accused-appellant’s guaranty, Marie eventually applied for the overseas job opportunity.

On June 6, 1997, accused-appellant introduced Marie to co-accused Nenita Maria Olivia-Gallardo in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. On the same day, Marie submitted herself to a physical examination and personally handed to Gallardo a partial payment of P18,000.00, for which the latter issued a receipt.[7] Marie made another payment in the amount of P52,000.00, for which accused-appellant issued a provisional receipt.[8] This amount included the placement fee of her sister, Araceli Abenoja, who became interested in the opportunity to work abroad. Accused-appellant issued to Marie the receipt[9] for Araceli in the amount of P35,000.00, signed by Gallardo.

Three months lapsed without any news on Marie’s deployment to Canada. Her sister, Araceli, had already left for work abroad through the efforts of their other town-mate. The weekly follow-ups made by Marie to accused-appellant pertaining to her application and that of Araceli’s were to no avail. Accused-appellant just promised Marie that she will return her money. Realizing that she had been hoodwinked, Marie decided to file a complaint against the accused-appellant and Gallardo with the National Bureau of Investigation. She no longer verified the authority of both accused-appellant and Gallardo in recruiting workers overseas because she was told by Gallardo that she is a direct recruiter.[10]

Marilyn Mariano, on the other hand, was told by accused-appellant that she was recruiting nurses from Baguio City and was looking for one more applicant to complete the first batch to fly to Canada. After giving her all the information about the job opportunity in Canada, accused-appellant encouraged her to meet Gallardo. Not long after, Grace Lanozo accompanied her to meet Gallardo at the latter’s house in Quezon City.

Gallardo required her to undergo a medical check-up, to complete her application papers within the soonest possible time and to prepare money to





defray the expenses for her deployment to Canada. Upon the instruction of accused-appellant, Marilyn paid a total amount of P36,000.00 to Gallardo, which was evidenced by a receipt. Of this amount, the P1,500.00[11] was for her medical check-up, P20,000.00[12] for processing of papers and P15,000.00[13] for her visa.

Marilyn was further made to accomplish a form, prepared by both accused-appellant and Gallardo, at the residence of accused-appellant in Baguio City. Thereafter, she was informed that the processing of her papers abroad shall commence within the next three months. She was also made to attend a meeting conducted by both accused-appellant and Gallardo at the former’s house in Baguio City, together with other interested applicants.

After three months of waiting with no forthcoming employment abroad, Marilyn and the other applicants proceeded to the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency, Regional Administrative Unit, of the Cordillera Administrative Region in Baguio City, where they learned that accused-appellant and Gallardo were not authorized recruiters. [14] Marilyn confronted accused-appellant about this, whereupon the latter assured her that it was a direct hiring scheme. Thereafter, Marilyn reported accused-appellant and Gallardo to the NBI. [15]

After trial on the merits, accused-appellant was found guilty of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa on three (3) counts. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Remedios Malapit GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt with the crimes of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, and Estafa in three (3) counts, and she is hereby sentenced as follows:

1. To suffer Life Imprisonment at the Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City in Criminal Cases Nos. 15320-R and 15770-R for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale; to pay a Fine to the Government in the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos; and to pay private complainants, Marie Purificacion Abenoja, the amount of Thirty Five Thousand (P35,000.00) Pesos; Araceli Abenoja also the amount of Thirty Five Thousand (P35,000.00) Pesos; and Marilyn Mariano, the amount of Thirty Six Thousand Five Hundred (P36,500.00) Pesos, all amounts with legal interest.

2. To suffer Imprisonment at the same Institution from Six (6) Years, Five (5) Months, and Eleven (11) Days as Minimum to Seven (7) Years, Eight (8) Months, and Twenty (20) Days as Maximum of Prision Mayor for each Estafa case in Criminal Cases Nos. 15323-R, 15327-R, and 15571-R.

3. To pay costs of suit.[16]

Accused-appellant is now before us on the following assignment of errors:







I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PROSECUTION SUCCEEDED IN PROVING THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PROSECUTION SUCCEEDED IN PROVING THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THREE COUNTS OF ESTAFA.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 15570-R AND 15571-R FOR ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE RESULTING FROM THE FAILURE OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS TO APPEAR AND SUBSTANTIATE HER COMPLAINT.

IV

GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT COMMITTED ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING HER OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE.

Accused-appellant maintains that she did not commit any of the activities enumerated in the Labor Code on illegal recruitment in connection with the applications of the private complainants. It was Nenita Maria Olivia Gallardo who convinced and promised private complainants employment overseas. It was also Gallardo who received and misappropriated the money of private complainants. Accordingly, she cannot be convicted of estafa.

We do not agree.

Illegal recruitment is committed when two (2) essential elements concur:

(1) that the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers, and

(2) that the offender undertakes any activity within the meaning of “recruitment and placement” defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.[17]

Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as:

Any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising


for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

In the case at bar, the first element is present. Nonette Legaspi-Villanueva, the Overall Supervisor of the Regional Office of the POEA in Baguio City, testified that per records, neither accused-appellant nor Gallardo were licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment in the City of Baguio or in any part of the Cordillera Region.

The second essential element is likewise present. Accused-appellant purported to have the ability to send Marie Purificacion Abenoja, Araceli Abenoja and Marilyn Mariano for employment abroad through the help of her co-accused Gallardo, although without any authority or license to do so. Accused-appellant was the one who persuaded them to apply for work as a caregiver in Canada by making representations that there was a job market therefor.[18] She was also the one who helped them meet Gallardo in order to process their working papers and personally assisted Marie, Araceli and Marilyn in the completion of the alleged requirements.[19] Accused-appellant even provided her house in Baguio City as venue for a meeting with other applicants that she and Gallardo conducted in connection with the purported overseas employment in Canada.[20] Accused-appellant, therefore, acted as an indispensable participant and effective collaborator of co-accused Gallardo, who at one time received placement fees[21] on behalf of the latter from both Marie and Araceli Abenoja. The totality of the evidence shows that accused-appellant was engaged in the recruitment and placement of workers for overseas employment under the above-quoted Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. Hence, she cannot now feign ignorance on the consequences of her unlawful acts.

Accused-appellant’s claim that the other private complainants in Criminal Case No. 15320-R, for illegal recruitment in large scale, have executed their individual affidavits of desistance pointing to Gallardo as the actual recruiter, deserves scant consideration. The several Orders[22] issued by the trial court show that the dismissal of the complaints of the other private complainants were based on their failure to substantiate and prosecute their individual complaints despite due notice.*

The foregoing notwithstanding, the existence of the adverted affidavits of desistance does not appear in the records of this case and, thus, may not be given any probative weight by this Court. Any evidence that a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must be formally offered by him, otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.[23] Evidence not formally offered before








the trial court cannot be considered on appeal, for to consider them at such stage will deny the other parties their right to rebut them. [24] By opting not to present them in court, such affidavits of desistance are generally hearsay and have no probative value since the affiants thereof were not placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.[25] The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence that has not been formally offered is to afford the other party the chance to object to their admissibility.[26]

All told, the evidence against accused-appellant has established beyond a shadow of doubt that she actively collaborated with co-accused Gallardo in illegally recruiting the complainants in this case. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the private complainants in this case would not have been induced to apply for a job in Canada were it not for accused-appellant’s information, recruitment, and introduction of the private complainants to her co-accused Gallardo.

Likewise untenable are accused-appellant’s claims that she did not represent herself as a licensed recruiter,[27] and that she merely helped complainants avail of the job opportunity. It is enough that she gave the impression of having had the authority to recruit workers for deployment abroad. In fact, even without consideration for accused-appellant’s “services”, she will still be deemed as having engaged in recruitment activities, since it was sufficiently demonstrated that she promised overseas employment to private complainants.[28] Illegal recruitment is committed when it is shown that the accused-appellant gave the private complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.[29] To be engaged in the practice and placement, it is plain that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether locally or abroad.[30]

Undoubtedly, the acts of accused-appellant showed unity of purpose with those of co-accused Gallardo. All these acts establish a common criminal design mutually deliberated upon and accomplished through coordinated moves. There being conspiracy, accused-appellant shall be equally liable for the acts of her co-accused even if she herself did not personally reap the fruits of their execution.

While accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment, we do not agree with the trial court that the same qualifies as large scale.

Accused-appellant’s conviction of the illegal recruitment in large scale was based on her recruitment of Marie Purificacion Abenoja and Marilyn Mariano, private complainants in Criminal Case No. 15320-R, and Araceli Abenoja,








private complainant in Criminal Case No. 15570-R. It was error for the trial court to consider the three private complainants in the two criminal cases when it convicted accused-appellant of illegal recruitment committed in large scale. The conviction of illegal recruitment in large scale must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons, whether individually or as a group. In People v. Reichl, et al.,[31] we reiterated the rule we laid down in People v. Reyes[32] that:

x x x When the Labor Code speaks of illegal recruitment “committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group,” it must be understood as referring to the number of complainants in each case who are complainants therein, otherwise, prosecutions for single crimes of illegal recruitment can be cumulated to make out a case of large scale illegal recruitment. In other words, a conviction for large-scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group. (Underscoring ours)

Accused-appellant likewise assails the decision of the trial court in Criminal Cases Nos. 15570-R and 15571-R for simple illegal recruitment and estafa, respectively, saying that these two criminal cases should have been dismissed for lack of evidence. The only evidence presented in these cases was the testimony of Marie Purificacion Abenoja, Araceli Abenoja’s sister, on her alleged payment of the placement fees for Araceli’s application. By Araceli’s failure to testify, she failed to prove the facts and circumstances surrounding her alleged recruitment and the person accountable therefor.

We are not persuaded. In People v. Gallarde,[33] we held:

Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The prosecution is not always tasked to present direct evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence does not necessarily absolve an accused from any criminal liability. Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence, provided that the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person,i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.

The rules on evidence and precedents sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence, as long as the following requisites are present: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and

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(3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.

The circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when scrutinized and taken together, leads to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant and co-accused Gallardo conspired in recruiting and promising a job overseas to Araceli Abenoja. Moreover, Marie Purificacion Abenoja had personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the charges filed by her sister, Araceli, for simple illegal recruitment and estafa. Marie was privy to the recruitment of Araceli as she was with her when both accused-appellant and Gallardo required Araceli to undergo physical examination to find out whether the latter was fit for the job abroad. [34] Accused-appellant even admitted that she was the one who introduced Marie and Araceli to Gallardo when they went to the latter’s house.[35] Marie was the one who shouldered the placement fee of her sister Araceli.[36]

Furthermore, the private complainants in this case did not harbor any ill motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant and Gallardo. Accused-appellant failed to show any animosity or ill-feeling on the part of the prosecution witnesses which could have motivated them to falsely accuse her and Gallardo. It would be against human nature and experience for strangers to conspire and accuse another stranger of a most serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings.[37] As such, the testimony of private complainants that accused-appellant was the person who transacted with them, promised them jobs and received money therefor, was correctly given credence and regarded as trustworthy by the trial court.

In sum, accused-appellant is only guilty of two (2) counts of illegal recruitment. Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8042 [38] otherwise known as the “Migrant Workers Act of 1995,” any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine of not less than two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

The provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law are applicable, as held in People v. Simon:[39]

It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that “if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.” We hold







that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be said that the “offense is punished” under that law.

Guided by the foregoing principle, accused-appellant shall be made to suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P200,000.00, for each count of illegal recruitment.

The Court likewise affirms the conviction of accused-appellant for estafa on three (3) counts. It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under the Revised Penal Code, Article 315, paragraph 2(a). As we held in People v. Yabut:[40]

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that one’s acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.

The prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant was guilty of estafa under the Revised Penal Code, Article 315 paragraph (2) (a), which provides that estafa is committed:

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

The evidence is clear that in falsely pretending to possess the power to deploy persons for overseas placement, accused-appellant deceived Marie, Araceli and Marilyn into believing that the recruitment would give them

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greener opportunities as caregivers in Canada. Accused-appellant’s assurance constrained the private complainants to part with their hard-earned money in exchange for a slot in the overseas job in Canada. The elements of deceit and damage for this form of estafa are indisputably present. Hence, the conviction of accused-appellant for three (3) counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. 15323-R, 15327-R and 15571-R should be upheld.

Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused found guilty of estafa shall be sentenced to:

x x x The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; x x x.

In applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we had occasion to reiterate our ruling in People v. Ordono [41] in the very recent case of People v. Angeles,[42] to wit:

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be “that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed” under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be “within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense.” The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.

Similarly, in People v. Saulo,[43] we further elucidated on how to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law for the charge of estafa:

Since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower in degree is prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.

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In fixing the maximum term, the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time, each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period, as follows —

Minimum Period: From 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months and 10 days

Medium Period: From 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months and 20 days

Maximum Period: From 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years

pursuant to Article 65, in relation to Article 64, of the Revised Penal Code.

When the amounts involved in the offense exceeds P22,000, the penalty prescribed in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, although the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years.

In Criminal Case No. 15323-R, Marilyn Mariano testified that upon instruction of accused-appellant she gave accused Gallardo a total of P36,500.00.

In Criminal Case Nos. 15327-R and 15571-R, Marie Purificacion Abenoja testified that she gave the amounts of P18,000.00 and P52,000.00 to accused Gallardo and accused-appellant. Out of the amount of P52,000.00, P35,000.00 was intended to answer for the placement fee of her sister Araceli Abenoja, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 15571-R. The remaining P17,000.00 formed part of the balance of Marie’s placement fee. Accordingly, accused-appellant shall be criminally liable for the amount of P35,000.00 in Criminal Cases No. 15327-R and P35,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 15571-R.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 15320-R, accused-appellant Remedios Malapit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Illegal Recruitment only, and is sentenced to suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P200,000.00.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 15323-R, accused-appellant Remedios Malapit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer a prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as

minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, and is ORDERED to indemnify Marilyn Mariano the amount of P36,500.00.

(3) In Criminal Case No. 15327-R, accused-appellant Remedios Malapit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer a prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, and is ORDERED to indemnify Marie Purificacion Abenoja the amount of P35,000.00.

(4) In Criminal Case No. 15570-R, accused-appellant Remedios Malapit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Illegal Recruitment and is sentenced to suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P200,000.00.

(5) In Criminal Case No. 15571-R, accused-appellant Remedios Malapit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer a prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as maximum, and is ORDERED to indemnify Araceli Abenoja the amount of P35,000.00

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 115338-39. September 16, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LANIE ORTIZ-MIYAKE accused-appellant.

D E C I S I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale in the Regional Trial Court of Makati on a complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. In addition, she was indicted for estafa by means of false pretenses in the same court, the offended party being Elenita Marasigan alone.

The information in the charge of illegal recruitment in large scale in Criminal Case No. 92-6153 reads as follows:

That in or about the period comprised from June 1992 to August 1992, in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of

this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, falsely representing herself to have the capacity and power to contract, enlist and recruit workers for employment abroad did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously collect for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to the following persons, to wit: 1) Rosamar del Rosario; 2) Elenita Marasigan; 3) Imelda Generillo, without first securing the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, thus amounting to illegal recruitment in large scale, in violation of the aforecited law. [1]

The information in the charge for estafa in Criminal Case No. 92-6154 alleges:

That in or about or sometime in the month of August, 1992, in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of false pretenses executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, falsely pretending to have the capacity and power to send complainant Elenita Marasigan to work abroad, succeeded in inducing the latter to give and deliver to her the total sum of P23,000.00, the accused knowing fully well that the said manifestations and representation are false and fraudulent and calculated only to deceive the said complainant to part with her money, and, once in possession thereof, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, apply and convert the same to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Elenita Marasigan, in the aforementioned amount of P23,000.00. [2]

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges and the cases were tried jointly in Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

Of the three complainants in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale, Marasigan was the only one who testified at the trial. The two other complainants, Generillo and Del Rosario, were unable to testify as they were then abroad.

Marasigan testified that she was a 32 year-old unmarried sales representative in 1992 when she was introduced to appellant by her co-complainants. [3] Appellant promised Marasigan a job as a factory worker in Taiwan for a P5,000.00 fee. At that time, Marasigan had a pending application for overseas employment pending in a recruitment agency. Realizing that the fee charged by appellant was much lower than that of the agency, Marasigan withdrew her money from the agency and gave it to appellant. [4]

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Marasigan paid appellant P5,000.00, but she was later required to make additional payments. By the middle of the year, she had paid a total of P23,000.00 on installment basis. [5]Save for two receipts, [6] Marasigan was not issued receipts for the foregoing payments despite her persistence in requesting for the same.

Marasigan was assured by appellant that obtaining a Taiwanese visa would not be a problem. [7] She was also shown a plane ticket to Taiwan, allegedly issued in her name. [8] Appellant issued Marasigan a photocopy of her plane ticket, [9] the original of which was promised to be given to her before her departure. [10]

Marasigan was never issued a visa. [11] Neither was she given the promised plane ticket. Unable to depart for Taiwan, she went to the travel agency which issued the ticket and was informed that not only was she not booked by appellant for the alleged flight, but that the staff in the agency did not even know appellant.

Later, Marasigan proceeded to the supposed residence of appellant and was informed that appellant did not live there. [12] Upon verification with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), it was revealed that appellant was not authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. [13] Marasigan wanted to recover her money but, by then, appellant could no longer be located.

The prosecution sought to prove that Generillo and Del Rosario, the two other complainants in the illegal recruitment case, were also victimized by appellant. In lieu of their testimonies, the prosecution presented as witnesses Lilia Generillo, the mother of Imelda Generillo, and Victoria Amin, the sister of Del Rosario.

Lilia Generillo claimed that she gave her daughter P8,000.00 to cover her application for placement abroad which was made through appellant. [14] Twice, she accompanied her daughter to the residence of appellant so that she could meet her; however, she was not involved in the transactions between her daughter and appellant. [15] Neither was she around when payments were made to appellant. Imelda Generillo was unable to leave for abroad and Lilia Generillo concluded that she had become a victim of illegal recruitment.

The prosecution presented Victoria Amin, the sister of Rosamar Del Rosario, to show that the latter was also a victim of illegal recruitment. Victoria Amin testified that appellant was supposed to provide her sister a job abroad. She claimed that she gave her sister a total of P10,000.00 which was intended to cover the latter’s processing fee. [16]













Victoria Amin never met appellant and was not around when her sister made payments. She assumed that the money was paid to appellant based on receipts, allegedly issued by appellant, which her sister showed her. [17] Del Rosario was unable to leave for abroad despite the representations of appellant. Victoria Amin claimed that her sister, like Marasigan and Generillo, was a victim of illegal recruitment.

The final witness for the prosecution was Riza Balberte, [18] a representative of the POEA, who testified that appellant was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment, POEA certificate certification. [19]

Upon the foregoing evidence, the prosecution sought to prove that although two of the three complainants in the illegal recruitment case were unable to testify, appellant was guilty of committing the offense against all three complainants and, therefore, should be convicted as charged.

On the other hand, appellant, who was the sole witness for the defense, denied that she recruited the complainants for overseas employment and claimed that the payments made to her were solely for purchasing plane tickets at a discounted rate as she had connections with a travel agency. [20]

She denied that she was paid by Marasigan the amount of P23,000.00, claiming that she was paid only P8,000.00, as shown by a receipt. She further insisted that, through the travel agency, [21] she was able to purchase discounted plane tickets for the complainants upon partial payment of the ticket prices, the balance of which she guaranteed. According to her, the complainants were supposed to pay her the balance but because they failed to do so, she was obliged to pay the entire cost of each ticket.

The evidence presented by the parties were thus contradictory but the trial court found the prosecution’s evidence more credible. On December 17, 1993, judgment was rendered by said court convicting appellant of both crimes as charged. [22]

In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower court adopted a previous decision of Branch 78 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque as a basis for the judgment. Said previous decision was a conviction for estafa promulgated on July 26, 1993, [23] rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 74852-53, involving the same circumstances in the instant case, wherein complainants Generillo and Del Rosario charged appellant with two counts of estafa. This decision was not appealed and had become final and executory.

In thus convicting appellant in the illegal recruitment case, the decision therein of the Regional Trial Court stated that the facts in the foregoing estafa








cases were the same as those in the illegal recruitment case before it. It, therefore, adopted the facts and conclusions established in the earlier decision as its own findings of facts and as its rationale for the conviction in the case before it. [24]

In Criminal Case No. 92-6153, the Makati court sentenced appellant to serve the penalty of life imprisonment for illegal recruitment in large scale, as well as to pay a fine ofP100,000.00. Appellant was also ordered to reimburse the complainants the following payments made to her, viz.: (a) Marasigan, P23,000.00; (b) Generillo, P2,500.00; and (c) Del Rosario, P2,500.00.

In the same judgment and for the estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 92-6154, the Makati court sentenced appellant to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs.

In the instant petition, appellant seeks the reversal of the foregoing judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati convicting her of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa. Specifically, she insists that the trial court erred in convicting her of illegal recruitment in large scale as the evidence presented was insufficient.

Moreover, appellant claims that she is not guilty of acts constituting illegal recruitment, in large scale or otherwise, because contrary to the findings of the trial court, she did not recruit the complainants but merely purchased plane tickets for them. Finally, she contends that in convicting her of estafa, the lower court erred as she did not misappropriate the money paid to her by Marasigan, hence there was no damage to the complainants which would substantiate the conviction.

We uphold the finding that appellant is guilty but we are, compelled to modify the judgment for the offenses she should be convicted of and the corresponding penalties therefor.

Appellant maintains that her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale is erroneous. It is her view that in the prosecution of a case for such offense, at least three complainants are required to appear as witnesses in the trial and, since Marasigan was the only complainant presented as a witness, the conviction was groundless.

The Solicitor General also advocates the conviction of appellant for simple illegal recruitment which provides a lower penalty. The Court finds the arguments of the Solicitor General meritorious and adopts his position.


The Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as “x x x any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not x x x.” [25]

Illegal recruitment is likewise defined and made punishable under the Labor Code, thus:

Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. -

(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. x x x.

(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.

x x x Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

Art. 39. Penalties. -

(a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) shall be imposed if Illegal Recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein;

x x x

(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title found violating any provision thereof or its implementing rules and regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than eight (8) years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more than P100,000.00, or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court. x x x[26]

During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the “Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,” was passed increasing the penalty for illegal recruitment. This new law, however, does not apply to the instant case because the offense charged herein was committed in 1992, before the effectivity of said Republic Act No. 8042. Hence, what are applicable are the aforecited Labor Code provisions.



It is evident that in illegal recruitment cases, the number of persons victimized is determinative. Where illegal recruitment is committed against a lone victim, the accused may be convicted of simple illegal recruitment which is punishable with a lower penalty under Article 39(c) of the Labor Code. Corollarily, where the offense is committed against three or more persons, it is qualified to illegal recruitment in large scale which provides a higher penalty under Article 39(a) of the same Code.

The position of the Solicitor General is that the conviction of appellant should be merely for the lesser offense of simple illegal recruitment. He submits that the Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale because the conviction was based on an earlier decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque where appellant was found guilty of estafa committed against Generillo and Del Rosario.

It is argued that the Makati court could not validly adopt the facts embodied in the decision of the Parañaque court to show that illegal recruitment was committed against Generillo and Del Rosario as well. Illegal recruitment was allegedly proven to have been committed against only one person, particularly, Elenita Marasigan. Appellant, therefore, may only be held guilty of simple illegal recruitment and not of such offense in large scale.

He further submits that the adoption by the Makati court of the facts in the decision of the Parañaque court for estafa to constitute the basis of the subsequent conviction for illegal recruitment is erroneous as it is a violation of the right of appellant to confront the witnesses, that is, complainants Generillo and Del Rosario, during trial before it. He cites the pertinent provision of Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled:

x x x

(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot, with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

x x x

It will be noted that the principle embodied in the foregoing rule is likewise found in the following provision of Rule 130:

Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. - The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

Under the aforecited rules, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of confrontation. Such right has two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of cross-examination; and, second, to allow the judge to observe the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. [27]

This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness who has already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay rule. [28] The previous testimony is made admissible because it makes the administration of justice orderly and expeditious. [29]

Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated in the decision of the Parañaque trial court does not fall under the exception to the right of confrontation as the exception contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions or judgments.

In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the testimonies made by complainants Generillo and Del Rosario in the previous estafa case. Instead, what was offered, admitted in evidence, and utilized as a basis for the conviction in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale was the previous decision in the estafa case.

A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was previously convicted of a crime. [30] It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said previous decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.

As earlier stated, the Makati court’s utilization of and reliance on the previous decision of the Parañaque court must be rejected. Every conviction





must be based on the findings of fact made by a trial court according to its appreciation of the evidence before it. A conviction may not be based merely on the findings of fact of another court, especially where what is presented is only its decision sans the transcript of the testimony of the witnesses who testified therein and upon which the decision is based.

Furthermore, this is not the only reason why appellant may not be held liable for illegal recruitment in large scale. An evaluation of the evidence presented before the trial court shows us that, apart from the adopted decision in the previous estafa case, there was no other basis for said trial court’s conclusion that illegal recruitment in large scale was committed against all three complainants.

The distinction between simple illegal recruitment and illegal recruitment in large scale are emphasized by jurisprudence. Simple illegal recruitment is committed where a person: (a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Articles 34 and 38 of the Labor Code; and (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. [31] On the other hand, illegal recruitment in large scale further requires a third element, that is, the offense is committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group. [32]

In illegal recruitment in large scale, while the law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons. This Court agrees with the trial court that the evidence presented sufficiently proves that illegal recruitment was committed by appellant against Marasigan, but the same conclusion cannot be made as regards Generillo and Del Rosario as well.

The testimonies of Generillo’s mother, Lilia Generillo, and Del Rosario’s sister, Victoria Amin, reveal that these witnesses had no personal knowledge of the actual circumstances surrounding the charges filed by Generillo and Del Rosario for illegal recruitment in large scale. Neither of these witnesses was privy to the transactions between appellant and each of the two complainants. The witnesses claimed that appellant illegally recruited Generillo and Del Rosario. Nonetheless, we find their averments to be unfounded as they were not even present when Generillo and Del Rosario negotiated with and made payments to appellant.

For insufficiency of evidence and in the absence of the third element of illegal recruitment in large scale, particularly, that “the offense is committed against three or more persons,” we cannot affirm the conviction for illegal



recruitment in large scale. Nonetheless, we agree with the finding of the trial court that appellant illegally recruited Marasigan, for which she must be held liable for the lesser offense of simple illegal recruitment.

Appellant’s defense that she did not recruit Marasigan but merely purchased a plane ticket for her is belied by the evidence as it is undeniable that she represented to Marasigan that she had the ability to send people to work as factory workers in Taiwan. Her pretext that the fees paid to her were merely payments for a plane ticket is a desperate attempt to exonerate herself from the charges and cannot be sustained.

Furthermore, no improper motive may be attributed to Marasigan in charging appellant. The fact that Marasigan was poor does not make her so heartless as to contrive a criminal charge against appellant. She was a simple woman with big dreams and it was appellant’s duplicity which reduced those dreams to naught. Marasigan had no motive to testify falsely against appellant except to tell the truth. [33]

Besides, if there was anyone whose testimony needed corroboration, it was appellant as there was nothing in her testimony except the bare denial of the accusations. [34] If appellant really intended to purchase a plane ticket and not to recruit Marasigan, she should have presented evidence to support this claim. Also, in her testimony, appellant named an employee in the travel agency who was allegedly her contact person for the purchase of the ticket. She could have presented that person, or some other employee of the agency, to show that the transaction was merely for buying a ticket. Her failure to do the foregoing acts belies her pretensions.

The Court likewise affirms the conviction of appellant for estafa which was committed against Marasigan. Conviction under the Labor Code for illegal recruitment does not preclude punishment under the Revised Penal Code for the felony of estafa. [35] This Court is convinced that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant violated Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code which provides that estafa is committed:

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

The evidence is clear that in falsely pretending to possess power to deploy persons for overseas placement, appellant deceived the complainant into




believing that she would provide her a job in Taiwan. Her assurances made Marasigan exhaust whatever resources she had to pay the placement fee required in exchange for the promised job. The elements of deceit and damage for this form of estafa are indisputably present, hence the conviction for estafa in Criminal Case No. 92-6154 should be affirmed.

Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused found guilty of estafa shall be sentenced to:

x x x The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos x x x. [36]

The amount involved in the estafa case is P23,000.00. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the maximum period of the foregoing basic penalty, specifically, within the range of imprisonment from six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years.

On the other hand, the minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that provided by law, without considering the incremental penalty for the amount in excess of P22,000.00. [37] That penalty immediately lower in degree is prison correccional in its minimum and medium periods, with a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. On these considerations, the trial court correctly fixed the minimum and maximum terms of the indeterminate sentence in the estafa case.

While we must be vigilant and should punish, to the fullest extent of the law, those who prey upon the desperate with empty promises of better lives, only to feed on their aspirations, we must not be heedless of the basic rule that a conviction may be sustained only where it is for the correct offense and the burden of proof of the guilt of the accused has been met by the prosecution.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. 92-6153) and estafa (Criminal Case No. 92-6154) is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:

1) Accused-appellant is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple illegal recruitment, as defined in Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended. She is hereby



ordered to serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P100,000.00.

2) In Criminal Case No. 92-6154 for estafa, herein accused-appellant is ordered to serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years ofprision mayor, as maximum, and to reimburse Elenita Marasigan the sum of P23,000.00.

In all other respects, the aforestated judgment is AFFIRMED, with costs against accused-appellant in both instances.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.


Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 121179 July 2, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ANTONINE B. SALEY a.k.a. ANNIE B. SALEY, accused-appellant.

VITUG, J.:

The case before the Court focuses on the practice of some "illegal recruiters" who would even go to the extent of issuing forged tourist visas to aspiring overseas contract workers. These unsuspecting job applicants are made to pay exorbitant "placement" fees for nothing really since, almost invariably, they find themselves unable to leave for their purported country of employment or, if they are able to, soon find themselves unceremoniously repatriated. This Court once described their plight in a local proverb as being "naghangad ng kagitna, isang salop ang nawala." 1

In this appeal from the 3rd March 1995 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, 2appellant Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie B. Saley, seeks a reversal of the verdict finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of eleven counts of estafa

punishable under the Revised Penal Code and six counts of illegal recruitment, one committed in large scale, proscribed by the Labor Code.

Appellant was indicted in eleven separate informations for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(1), of the Revised Penal Code. The cases (naming the complainants and stating the amounts therein involved) include: (1) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 3 (Francisco T. Labadchan — P45,000.00); (2) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414 (Victoria Asil — P33,000.00); (3) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415 (Cherry Pi-ay — P18,000.00); (4) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426 (Corazon del Rosario — P40,000.00); (5) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428 (Arthur Juan — P24,200.00); (6) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644 (Alfredo C. Arcega — P25,000.00); (7) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646 (Brando B. Salbino — P25,000.00); (8) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647 (Mariano Damolog — P25,000.00); (9) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649 (Lorenzo Belino — P25,000.00); (10) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651 (Peter Arcega — P25,000.00) and (11) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652 (Adeline Tiangge — P18,500.00).

Except for the name of the offended party, the amount involved and the date of the commission of the crime, the following information in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652 typified the other informations for the crime of estafa:

That in or about the month of December, 1991, and sometime prior to or subsequent thereto, at Buyagan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS and by means of deceit through false representations and pretenses made by her prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud said ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS, by then and there representing herself as a duly authorized or licensed recruiter for overseas employment, when in truth and in fact she was not, thereby inducing the said ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS to give and deliver to her the total amount of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P18,500.00), Philippine Currency, for placement abroad and after having received it, she appropriated and misappropriated the same for her own use and benefit and despite-repeated demands made upon (her) to return the same, she refused, failed, neglected, and still refuses, fails and neglects to comply therewith, all to the damage and prejudice of ADELINE TIANGGE y MARCOS in the total sum aforesaid.

Contrary to law. 4

For the violation of Article 38, in relation to Article 39, of the Labor Code, five separate informations were also instituted against appellant on various dates. These cases (with the names of the complainants) include: (1) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396 (Francisco T. Labadchan); (2) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413 (Cherry Pi-ay); (3) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1416 (Victoria Asil); (4) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1425 (Corazon del Rosario) and (5) Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1427 (Arthur Juan). The typical information in these indictments read:

That sometime in the month of April, 1991 and subsequent thereto at Buyagan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly recruit one ARTHUR JUAN for overseas employment, by then and there ably misrepresenting herself as a duly authorized or licensed recruiter when in truth and in fact she fully knew it to be false but by reason of her said misrepresentations which were completely relied upon by Arthur Juan, she was able to obtain from the latter the total amount of TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P24,200.00), Philippine Currency, all to the damage and prejudice of Arthur Juan in the total sum aforesaid.

Contrary to Law. 5

The information in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large scale under Article 38, paragraph 1, of Presidential Decree No. 442 (Labor Code), as amended, filed on 16 April 1993, read:

That in or about the months of August and September, 1992, in the Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly recruit the following: PETER ARCEGA, LORENZO BELINO, MARIANO DAMOLOG, FIDEL OPDAS, BRANDO B. SALBINO, DEMBER LEON and ALFREDO C. ARCEGA for overseas employment, by then and there misrepresenting herself as a duly authorized or licensed recruiter when in truth and in fact she was not and by reason of her said misrepresentation which was completely relied upon by the said complainants whom she recruited, either individually or as a group amounting to illegal recruitment in large scale causing economic sabotage, she was able to obtain and received from them the aggregate total amount of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P175,000.00), Philippine Currency, all to the damage and prejudice of the foregoing complainants in the total sum aforesaid.

Contrary to law. 6

Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges of illegal recruitment and estafa. The criminal cases filed were raffled off to two (2) branches of the Regional Trial Court of Benguet; later, however, the cases were consolidated at the instance of the prosecution.

Parenthetically, appellant jumped bail pending trial but she was soon arrested by agents of the Criminal Investigation Service ("CIS").

The Evidence for the Prosecution. —

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 and Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1396

Francisco Labadchan, a 25-year-old employee in the Navy Base in Pacdal, Baguio City, was introduced to appellant by Crispin Perez. In September 1991, the two went to the house of Conchita Tagle at Kilometer 3, La Trinidad, Benguet, who was known to be recruiting workers for abroad. After Labadchan had expressed interest in applying for a job in Korea, Tagle told Labadchan to prepare P45,000.00, P30,000.00 of which was to be paid that month and the balance of P15,000.00 before his departure for abroad. Labadchan paid Tagle the amount of P30,000.00 on 23 September 1991. Appellant, in turn, received that amount when she went to La Trinidad to "brief" him. She told Labadchan that his flight would be on the 9th of October 1991 and that he should have paid by then the balance of P15,000.00 of the fees. He paid Tagle the P15,000.00 balance on 05 October 1991. When he requested her to make a receipt, Tagle included the amount in the old receipt for the P30,000.00 previously given. Appellant handed over to Labadchan some papers to fill up and gave last-minute instructions before she boarded a green-colored aircraft.

On 08 October 1991, Labadchan and his wife went to Manila and stayed, as so instructed by Tagle, at the Prince Hotel near the terminal of the Dangwa bus company in Dimasalang, Manila. There, he met other people, among them, his co-complainant Arthur Juan. In the morning of 09 October 1991, Labadchan and the others were told to go to the airport with Tagle, where appellant was supposed to give the travel papers including passports and plane tickets for Korea. At the airport, however, appellant told the group that their flight had been re-scheduled for 11 October 1991. Labadchan returned to Baguio City.

On 11 October 1991, Labadchan returned to the airport only to be told this time, however, that his passport was still with the Department of Foreign Affairs. Appellant told her husband to accompany Labadchan to the Foreign Affairs office. When Labadchan received the passport, he saw that while his picture appeared on it, the passport was made out in the name of a person from Negros Occidental. Labadchan had to imitate the signature on the passport just so he could get it. Back at the airport, he was allowed inside the terminal but only to be later sent out because the ticket he had was one intended for passage from Korea and not to Korea. Asserting that he and company were mere "chance passengers," appellant sent them all home with a promise that another departure date would be set. She also took back the "show money" of US$1,000.00.

Appellant would repeatedly schedule a departure date but nothing tangible came out of her assurances. Finally, Labadchan was able to get appellant to promise that the money he had given her would be refunded. When this promise neither materialized, Labadchan finally reported the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"). In that office, appellant executed a promissory note stating that she would return the amount of P46,500.00, which included the amount of P1,500.00 allegedly used for getting a passport, to Labadchan. 7


Victoria Asil, a 40-year-old housewife from Imelda Village, Roxas Street, Baguio City, heard from her elder sister, Feling Derecto, that appellant was recruiting workers for abroad. During the second week of January 1992, she, along with her husband Gabriel, went to appellant's house in Buyagan, La Trinidad. Appellant assured her that she could have a job in a factory in Korea. Appellant asked for an advance fee of P25,000.00 of the P40,000.00 agreed fee. Victoria gave appellant the "advance fee" on 13 January 1992 at her (Victoria's)

shop in Shopper's Lane, Baguio City which appellant acknowledged by issuing a receipt for the amount. She told Victoria to be at appellant's house in Buyagan after three weeks.

When Victoria went to appellant's house as so directed, appellant told her that her flight had been postponed supposedly because prior applicants had to be accommodated first. Victoria met appellant seven more times only to be ultimately told that the latter had been allegedly "fooled" by the "main office" in Manila. Appellant, nevertheless, demanded an additional P5,000.00 from Victoria so that she could leave on 18 April 1992. Victoria gave appellant the amount of P5,000.00 at her shop on 31 March 1992 for which appellant gave a corresponding receipt.

When on 18 April 1992 still "nothing happened," Victoria demanded from appellant a refund. Appellant gave her an "advance" of P15,000.00. An acknowledgment receipt with appellant's signature affixed thereon would evidence that payment. Appellant, however, failed to return the rest of the promised refund. 8

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1413 and Criminal Case No 92-CR-1415

Cherry Pi-ay, a 26-year-old nursing student from Acop, Tublay, Benguet, was visited once in March 1991 by appellant who encouraged Cherry to apply for work in a textile or a plastic factory in Korea with a monthly salary of US$800.00. Appellant told Cherry that the moment she would pay the amount of P45,000.00, she could be deployed in Korea. Cherry prepared her bio-data and gave it to appellant at the latter's residence during the first week of April 1991.

Cherry was able to leave the country on 04 July 1991 after having paid the total amount of P45,000.00. Appellant told her that a certain Ramil would meet her at the airport in Korea. When she arrived, a Filipina, named Marlyn, instead met her. Marlyn introduced herself as appellant's friend and accompanied Cherry to a certain house owned by a Korean. There, Cherry met, among other compatriots, Corazon del Rosario and Jane Kipas. Cherry soon realized that she was not going to have a job in the factory promised by appellant. Instead, she was made to work for the Korean applying rugby on and folding leather jackets. About a month later, men from the Korean Immigration accosted her and the others. Brought in for questioning by Immigration officials, Cherry and her companions were informed that they were illegal workers. After the investigation, Cherry and her group were allowed to go but on 08 August 1991, all were deported.

Back to the Philippines, the deportees were assured by appellant that they would get a refund of their money. Cherry executed a sworn statement narrating her experience in Korea. 9

Ayson Acbaya-an, Cherry's "boyfriend" who later was to become her husband, corroborated Cherry's testimony that appellant first received P18,000.00 from Cherry. Thereafter, appellant also received P27,000.00 from Cherry, fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) of which amount came from him. In both instances, appellant signed receipts for the payments. The receipts were among Cherry's papers confiscated in Korea. 10


Corazon del Rosario, a 34-year-old housemaid from 48 Happy Homes, Baguio City, had known appellant, an acquaintance, since 1980. One day in December 1990, she happened to chance upon appellant at a PLDT telephone booth in Kilometer 4, La Trinidad, Baguio City. Appellant, representing herself to be an authorized recruiter, tried to persuade Corazon to work abroad. Corazon showed interest. From then on, appellant would visit Corazon in her brother's house in Kilometer 4. Ultimately, appellant was able to convince Corazon that, for a fee of P40,000.00, she could be sent to Korea. Corazon gave appellant the amount of P15,000.00. She paid the balance of P25,000.00 in May 1991. The payments were both made in the presence of Cherry Pi-ay and Jane Kipas. Appellant issued the corresponding receipts for these amounts.

Corazon took the flight for Korea on 28 June 1991. Appellant had instructed Corazon, upon landing in Korea, to call up a certain Ramil. At the airport, Corazon, including her companions among them Jane Kipas, kept on dialing the number but each time only a Korean woman would answer the call. Later, that evening, a certain Marlyn, who introduced herself as appellant's friend, took them to a hotel. There, Marlyn took their "show money" of US$1,000.00. The group stayed overnight in the hotel and the following morning, a Korean took them to a house proximately two hours away by car from the airport. For about a month, they did nothing but apply rugby on leather jackets, for which they were not paid, until a policeman arrived and took all ten of them to the airport. All that the immigration and airport personnel would tell them was that they should be thankful they were only being repatriated home. Immigration and airport authorities confiscated everything that they had.

At home, appellant promised to return Corazon's money. Not having received the promised refund, Corazon went to the CIS stationed at Camp Dangwa where, on 28 July 1992, she executed her sworn statement. 11

Avelina Velasco Samidan, a friend of Corazon and in whose house the latter would stay whenever she was in Baguio, corroborated the testimony of Corazon that she gave to appellant the amount of P15,000.00, ten thousand pesos of which amount Corazon borrowed from Avelina, and that some time in April 1991, Corazon withdrew P25,000.00 from the bank which she likewise paid to appellant. 12


Arthur Juan, a 30-year-old farmer from Dumulpot, Tublay, Benguet, first met appellant in her house at Buyagan, La Trinidad, Benguet, when he, together with Maxima Gomez, Tirso Gomez and Francisco Labadchan, went to see appellant who was said to be recruiting workers for Korea. Juan promptly submitted his bio-data form after being told that he could work in a factory in Korea at US$400.00 a month. Appellant quoted a processing fee of P40,000.00. Juan initially paid the amount of P6,500.00 in April 1991. On 09 October 1991, the scheduled date of the flight, Juan went to the airport and gave appellant another P15,000.00; the final balance of the fees were, by their agreement, to be remitted to appellant on a salary deduction basis. Appellant then told Juan that he could not leave on that day (09 October 1991) because the airplane was already full. Appellant took back Juan's passport, telling Juan that he should be able to depart in a few days. Appellant, however, kept on rescheduling the flight for about five more times until it became clear to Juan that he had been deceived. Juan paid out a total amount of P24,200.00, including the

US$100.00 that would have been his pocket money, to appellant. The latter executed receipts for the amounts.

Juan executed a sworn statement narrating the unfortunate incident. 13

In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1652

Adeline Tiangge, a 43-year-old housekeeper from Bangao, Buguias, Benguet, learned that appellant was recruiting workers for abroad. Adeline, accompanied by her sister, went to see appellant at her house in Buyagan some time in December 1991. There were others, like her, who also went to see appellant. When she produced the required identification pictures and P1,500.00 for passport processing, appellant told Adeline that she could be a factory worker in Korea with a monthly salary of US$350.00. Appellant agreed to be paid by Adeline the additional P35,000.00 balance by installment. The first installment of P17,000.00 was paid on 15 February 1992, evidenced by a receipt signed by "Antonine Saley," with the remaining P18,000.00 being payable before getting on her flight for abroad.

Adeline waited in Baguio City for word on her departure. Adeline, together with some other applicants, thrice went to appellant's office at the Shopper's Lane to check. She also went to Dimasalang, Manila, in front of the Dangwa terminal, for a like purpose. Appellant informed her that she just had to wait for her flight. Adeline, exasperated, finally demanded a refund of the amount she had paid but appellant merely gave her P100.00 for her fare back toBenguet. 14

— 0 —

The sum of the evidence, infra., in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large scale had been submitted to likewise constitute the evidence to establish the People's case, respectively, in —

Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644

Alfredo Arcega, a 42-year-old hotel employee from 16 Q.M. Subdivision, Baguio City, heard from a former co-worker, Fidel Opdas, that appellant was recruiting workers for overseas employment. Interested, he, in the company of his nephew, Peter Arcega, went to appellant's house in Buyagan, La Trinidad. There, he met job applicants Dembert Leon, Mariano Damolog and Brando Salbino. Appellant assured the group that they could get employed in Taiwan for a monthly salary of P12,000.00 to P15,000.00. She told them that the processing and placement fees would amount to P40,000.00 each. Arcega and his companions agreed.

On 17 August 1992, Arcega paid appellant P10,000.00 in Dimasalang, Manila. Appellant issued a cash voucher for the amount. She told Arcega to just wait "for the results." On 30 September 1992, appellant asked Arcega for another P15,000.00 which amount he paid. With him at the time were his nephew Peter Arcega, as well as Dembert Leon, Mariano Damolog, Lorenzo Belino and Brando Salbino. Appellant issued a receipt and affixed thereon her signature. Appellant told Arcega that with the payment, his employment abroad was assured. She stressed, however, that the balance of P15,000.00 should be paid before

his departure for Taiwan. After following up the matter with appellant in October 1992 and then in December 1992, he finally gave up. Arcega went to the POEA office in Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, and when he learned that appellant had pending cases for illegal recruitment, he also filed his own complaint and executed an affidavit before Atty. Justinian Licnachan. 15


Brando Salbino, a 36-year-old resident of East Quirino Hill, Baguio City, used to be a "forester" of the DENR. In July 1992, he met appellant at her Buyagan residence after his brother-in-law, Fidel Opdas, had said that she was recruiting workers for abroad. Appellant told him that she could help him get employed in Taiwan with a P12,000.00 monthly salary. Salbino submitted various documents required by appellant. On 11 August 1992, Salbino paid appellant the amount of P10,000.00 at her Dimasalang "temporary office" so that, according to her, his travel papers could be processed. The payment was receipted. On 30 September 1992, he paid her another P15,000.00, for which appellant again issued an acknowledgment receipt.

Appellant told Salbino to merely wait in Baguio City. When she failed to show up, he went to appellant's house in Buyagan to verify. She was not there. The following week, he went to Manila with Fidel Opdas hoping to see her. Appellant's where abouts could not be determined. Having failed to locate her, Salbino and his companions went to the POEA office in Magsaysay, Baguio City. It was at the POEA office that they were to learn that appellant was not in the list of licensed recruiters. He, along with the others, then executed an affidavit-complaint before Atty. Licnachan. 16


Mariano Damolog, a 33 year-old farmer from 26 P. Burgos Street, Baguio City, went to appellant's residence in Buyagan in July 1992 when informed by Fidel Opdas, his co-worker at the MIDO Restaurant, that appellant was recruiting workers for Taiwan. Appellant herself later told Damolog that she was licensed to recruit workers. He forthwith applied for a position at a factory in Taiwan with a salary of between US$400.00 and US$500.00 a month. He, after being required to pay a processing fee, paid the amount of P10,000.00 to appellant at her Manila office. Appellant gave him a cash voucher. Damolog was then supposed to just wait in Baguio City for a telegram.

When he did not receive word from appellant, Damolog went to Manila to see what had happened to his application. Appellant was again told to simply stand by in Baguio City. After several days, Opdas, who had meanwhile gone to Manila, told Damolog to see appellant in Manila. In Manila, appellant told Damolog to sign a bio-data form for "screening purposes." Like Peter Arcega, Fred Arcega, Brando Salbino and Lorenzo Belino, he was also asked to pay another P15,000.00. The group went back to Baguio City to raise the amount of P15,000.00 each. On 30 September 1992, he, together with Fred and Peter Arcega, Brando Salbino and Lorenzo Belino, returned to Manila. Damolog handed over his P15,000.00 to appellant who issued an acknowledgment receipt, signed by "Annie Saley" which, according to appellant, was her name. Appellant assured him that he would be among the first to go to Taiwan by December 1992.

December 1992 came but no word was received prompting Damolog and his companions to repair to appellant's house in Buyagan. She was not home. Damolog proceeded to Manila where appellant told him to wait a few more days. When still "nothing happened," Damolog and his companions went to the POEA office where Atty. Licnachan issued a certification stating that appellant was not authorized to recruit workers. Damolog and his companions filed a joint affidavit-complaint executed before Atty. Licnachan 17 against appellant.


Lorenzo Belino, a 37-year-old farmer from Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet, was in Manila in August 1992 looking for employment. Fidel Opdas, a companion in his trip to Manila, mentioned that perhaps appellant could help. Belino saw appellant who then told him about the prospect of getting employed in Taiwan. Appellant invited him to see her on 20 September 1992 in Buyagan.

On the appointed date, Belino found Mariano Damolog, Fidel Opdas, Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon, Alfredo Arcega and Peter Arcega already in appellant's residence in Buyagan. Appellant asked P10,000.00 from each of them if they wanted her to be "responsible for representing" them to get themselves employed in Taiwan with a monthly income of P15,000.00. When the group agreed, appellant made them fill up and sign a bio-data form. Appellant also made them understand that they would each have to pay her the total amount of P40,000.00, P10,000.00 of which was to be forthwith paid and the balance to be paid as and when everything would have been arranged for their flight to Taiwan.

On 23 September 1992, Belino paid appellant the amount of P10,000.00 at her Dimasalang office. Appellant issued a cash voucher therefor. Belino returned to Baguio City. Five days later, Belino went down to Manila after appellant had sent word that he had to come to Manila. On 30 September 1992, Belino paid in Manila the amount of P15,000.00 demanded by appellant. Appellant signed her name as "Annie Saley" on the receipt. Appellant informed Belino that he should wait for her telephone call regarding the schedule of his flight. He waited but when no calls came, Belino and Opdas decided to visit appellant in her house in Buyagan. Appellant asked to be given until January to deploy them in Taiwan. February 1993 came, and still there was no news from appellant. In March 1993, Belino and others, namely, Fidel Opdas, Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon and Alfredo Arcega, 18 decided to file a complaint against appellant with the POEA in Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, where their sworn statements were taken.


Peter Arcega, a 27-year-old cashier from 317 Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City, also paid the amount of P10,000.00 to appellant for a promised job overseas. A cash voucher was signed by appellant to acknowledge the payment. Peter, subsequently, also paid the amount of P15,000.00 to appellant for which the latter issued a receipt signed by "Annie Saley." He was among those who signed the affidavit-complaint before the POEA.

Testifying in Criminal Case No. 93-CN-1645, 19 as a corroborative witness, Dembert Leon, a 25 year-old unemployed from 52-F Tandang Sora Street, Baguio City, said that he, desiring

to get an employment abroad, likewise went to see appellant at her residence in Buyagan. Accompanied by Fidel Opdas, Leon was told by appellant to complete the necessary papers, including his bio-data, barangay clearance, ID and NBI clearance. Leon applied to be a factory worker in Taiwan. He was assured a monthly salary of P12,000.00, but first, appellant told him, he should commit to pay a placement fee of P40,000.00 of which amount P10,000.00 had to be paid forthwith. Leon paid and a cash voucher, dated 08 September 1992, was issued by appellant. On 30 September 1992, he paid appellant another P15,000.00 for which another acknowledgment receipt was issued. The remaining P15,000.00 was agreed to be paid at the airport before his flight to Taiwan. No further word came from appellant. Finally, in December 1992, when he and the others called her up, appellant informed them to wait until January 1993. January came and still nothing happened. In March 1993, Leon and the others went to the POEA office to lodge a complaint against appellant. 20

Jose B. Matias, an Attorney II at the POEA Regional Station Unit in Baguio City, received a request for verification on whether or not appellant was a licensed recruiter. In response, he advised that appellant was not authorized to recruit "in the City of Baguio and in the region" from 1989 "to the present." Atty. Matias issued a certification to that effect.

— 0 —

The Case for the Defense. —

The defense posited the theory that appellant merely assisted the complainants in applying for overseas employment with duly accredited travel agencies for and from which she derived a commission. 21

According to the 37-year-old appellant, she used to be the liaison officer of the Friendship Recruitment Agency from 1983 to 1986. In that capacity, she would submit to the POEA "contracts for processing job orders for applicants" and assist applicants prior to their departure at the airport. When the licensed agency closed in 1986, she went to Baguio where she engaged in the purchase and sale of vegetables and flowers. Even then, however, she would not hesitate extending help to applicants for overseas employment by recommending licensed agencies which could assist said applicants in going abroad. She named the Dynasty Travel and Tours and the Mannings International as such licensed agencies. She had, in the process, been able to help workers, like Cherry Pi-ay, Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan and Francisco Labadchan to name some, sent abroad. 22

Cherry Pi-ay was able to leave for Kuwait. In 1991, Cherry went to see her again, this time asking for assistance in getting an employment in Korea. She accompanied Cherry to the Dynasty Travel and Tours in Manila that enabled her to get a tourist visa to Korea. Appellant herself later gave Cherry her tourist visa. For Cherry's visa and plane ticket, appellant received from Cherry P15,000.00 and US$250.00. Appellant issued a receipt therefor and delivered the amounts to the Dynasty Travel and Tours which, in turn, issued her a receipt. The CIS men who arrested her in Manila confiscated that receipt. In August 1991, Cherry came back and asked her to look for another travel agency saying she did not like the work she had in Korea. 23

Norma Bao-idang, a former client of the Friendship Recruitment Agency, introduced Corazon del Rosario to appellant. Since the agency had already been closed, appellant referred Corazon to Mannings International in Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila. Corazon was able to leave for Abu Dhabi where she worked as a domestic helper. In 1991, Corazon again sought appellant's assistance in getting an employment in Korea. Appellant introduced her to Dynasty Travel and Tours which, in turn, helped Corazon get a tourist visa for Korea. She did ask for P15,000.00 and US$250.00 from Corazon but these amounts, being for Corazon's ticket and hotel accommodation, were turned over to Dynasty Travel and Tours. She also knew that Corazon was able to leave for Korea because she herself handed over to Corazon her tourist visa and ticket. Appellant received P2,000.00 from Dynasty Travel and Tours by way of commission. She was also issued a receipt by that travel agency showing that she had turned over to it the amounts received from Corazon but the CIS men took the receipts and other documents from her. When Corazon returned home in 1991 after going to Korea, she again sought appellant's help in looking for a travel agency that could assist her in going back to that country. 24

Appellant came to know Arthur Juan through a vegetable vendor named Maxima Gomez. He asked her for help in securing a tourist visa. Appellant was able to assist him and others, like Francisco Labadchan, Tirso Gomez and Romeo Balao, by referring them to the Dynasty Travel and Tours. Appellant asked from them the amounts of P15,000.00 and US$250.00 which she turned over to the travel agency. Again, she was issued a receipt by that agency but that, too, was confiscated by the CIS agents who arrested her. Of the men who sought her help in going abroad, seven "were able to leave." The others had been re-scheduled to leave but they failed to arrive at the airport.

Labadchan and Juan met appellant during the first week of January 1993. She gave them back the plane ticket and the amount of US$250.00 so that they could ask for a refund from the travel agency. The next time she saw Labadchan was at the NBI office when NBI Director Limmayog invited her for questioning. Appellant tried her best to look for a job for Labadchan but the transaction she had with Fast International failed to push through. 25

Appellant helped Victoria Asil secure a tourist visa. The latter's sister was a former client at the Friendship Recruitment Agency who was able to work in Saudi Arabia in 1985. She introduced Victoria to the Dynasty Travel and Tours. Appellant asked Victoria to advance P15,000.00 and US$250.00 for her ticket and hotel accommodation. Victoria gave appellant the amount, and the latter issued corresponding receipts. She turned over the amount to the travel agency which, in turn, issued a receipt to appellant. The CIS, however, confiscated all the documents in her attache case. 26 Appellant was able to process Victoria's visa for Korea but when someone informed the latter that she could have a visa for Taiwan, Victoria opted to change her destination. Appellant told Victoria that her visa and ticket for Korea had already been obtained but Victoria insisted on a refund of her money. Appellant returned to her P15,000.00 that was supposed to be the amount to be exchanged into dollars for her "show money." Victoria issued a receipt for the amount but appellant entrusted it to her former lawyer. Appellant handed over the plane ticket to Victoria. 27

Mercedes Quimson (Kimson) introduced appellant to Adeline Tiangge. When Adeline said that she was interested in securing a tourist visa for Korea, appellant took her to the Dynasty Travel and Tours. Appellant asked from Adeline the amount of P17,000.00 for her

plane ticket. Appellant was able to buy a plane ticket and to get a passport for Adeline. The latter, however, later said that she was no longer interested in going to Korea and that her passport application should, instead, be "diverted to Hongkong." In fact, Adeline was able to leave for Hongkong. Adeline filed a case against appellant because when Adeline sought a refund from Dynasty Travel and Tours, the agency only gave her P5,000.00 or just a half of the P10,000.00 she wanted. 28

Fidel Opdas was appellant's client at the Friendship Agency who was able to leave for Saudi Arabia. He asked her if she could find a job for him in Taiwan. When appellant told him that she knew someone who could help, Opdas brought along Mariano Damolog. Appellant introduced them to Marites Tapia and Carol Cornelio of Dynasty Travel and Tours who told Opdas and Damolog to submit the necessary documents for their application for work in Taiwan. In May 1993, Opdas returned with Brando Salbino who also talked to Marites and Carol. Opdas submitted to appellant the documents required by Marites and Carol. Appellant, in turn, gave the papers to Marites and Carol. When, later, Opdas went to see appellant, he brought along Dembert Leon and Lorenzo Belino. Appellant requested Opdas to accompany the two to Marites and Carol with whom they discussed what would be necessary "for their application for Taiwan. Still later when Opdas came back with Peter and Alfredo Arcega to see appellant, she again referred them to Marites and Carol. The job applicants each gave appellant P10,000.00 which the latter turned over to Marites and Carol. The two gave her receipts but these were in the same attache case that was seized by the CIS agents and never returned. The group subsequently withdrew their applications although it was only Opdas who received a P15,000.00 refund. 29

In a bid to prove that CIS agents indeed took away her attache case containing documents that could bail her out of the charges, appellant presented Danilo A. Deladia, one of the three policemen who arrested her. Equipped with a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Luis Dictado of Branch 8, the policemen went to the house of appellant's cousin at 2320-B San Antonio, Sampaloc, Manila at 3:00 p.m. of 25 August 1993. According to Deladia, however, they did not get anything from appellant because their mission was only to arrest her. At the counter intelligence branch of the CIS, he did not even hear appellant requesting for the return of a brief case. 30 Apparently because of what had turned out to be Deladia's adverse testimony, the defense presented George Santiago who claimed to be at the boarding house when appellant was arrested. Santiago said that he had allowed the CIS agents to enter the boarding house. Santiago did not see what might have happened in appellant's room but what he did see was that when the agents all came out, they had with them an attache case. Santiago, accompanied by his cousin Atty. Lomboan, went to the CIS in Camp Crame where one of the men asked P50,000.00 for the release of appellant. Santiago did not see any brief case in the office but one of the men told them that they would "produce" appellant and the attache case if they could "produce" the amount of P50,000.00. 31

On cross-examination, however, Santiago admitted that the P50,000.00 was meant for "bonding purposes" and that they did not make a formal request for the release of the brief case. 32

The defense next attempted to shift, albeit unsuccessfully, the responsibility for the crime from appellant to Maritess and Carol. Presented at the witness stand was Oscar Gaoyen, a

30-year-old farmer, who testified that appellant had failed to assist him in going to Korea to work "because it was difficult." While following up his application in Manila, he met Marites and Carol in front of the Dangwa station in Dimasalang and he was told that they knew someone who could "transfer his application to Taiwan." He said that even after he had paid appellant P50,000.00, nothing happened constraining him to file charges against her. Appellant returned P15,000.00 of the money to him. 33

Appellant filed, before the trial court could promulgate its decision, a "Motion to Reopen Trial" with an urgent motion to defer promulgation on the ground of newly discovered evidence. 34 In its order of 03 March 1995, the trial court, noting that the "newly discovered evidence" consisted of affidavits of desistance of seven complainants, found no merit in the motion. It held that "presentation of the same does not give valid ground for possible amendment of the decision as the private complainants had already testified." It agreed with the prosecutor that "the affidavits of desistance only (had) the effect of satisfying the civil liability." 35

The Judgment of the Trial Court. —

On 03 March 1995, the trial court rendered its decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. It found implausible appellant's claim that she was merely an agent of Dynasty Travel and Tours and/or Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio. If what she claimed were true, said the court, appellant could have presented her principals; instead, that failure exposed her to the "adverse inference and legal presumption that evidence suppressed would be adverse if produced." It also found "hard to believe," the "self-serving" claim of appellant that her brief case, supposedly containing receipts of her remittances to the travel agencies, was confiscated by the CIS and remained unaccounted for. The trial court concluded:

In fine, accused gave the distinct assurance, albeit false, that she had the ability to send the complainants abroad for work deployment, thereby employing false pretenses to defraud them. This was despite her knowing very well that she was not legally authorized. The complainants willingly parted with their money in the hope of overseas employment deceitfully promised them by the accused. What makes matters worse is that these amounts given to the accused come from hard-earned money, or worse, could have been borrowed from money lenders who have no qualms about collecting usurious interest rates. Complainants who faithfully relied on the accused did not hesitate to painstakingly raise or even beg or borrow money just so they could give a decent future to their families even to the extent of leaving them for far-off lands. But now, all their dreams are gone, their hopes shattered. Some may not have even been able to pay back what they borrowed nor recoup their losses. Now, more than ever, their future appears bleaker. But this time, a glimmering light appears at the end of the tunnel as the Court steps in to lay down the iron fist of the law so as to serve the accused a lesson, a bitter one, with the hope that those who are trekking or those who are about to trek the same pilfered path that the accused took will reconsider their pursuits before it would be too late, and in the end, this form of fraud which invariably victimizes the poor will forever be stopped. 36

All given, the trial court then decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in all the above-mentioned cases, the Court finds accused Antonine B. Saley, also known as Annie B. Saley, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the corresponding crime as charged in the informations and hereby sentences her in each case, except in Criminal Case NO. 93-CR-1645 where an indeterminate sentence is not applicable, to suffer an indeterminate sentence for the duration hereunder given, and to pay the costs, as well as the damages due the private complainants, to wit:


Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM and to pay Francisco T. Labadchan P45,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.


Imprisonment from Three (3) Years, Six (6) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Seven (7) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day ofprision mayor as MAXIMUM and to pay Francisco T. Labadchan P45,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.


Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM and to pay Cherry Pi-ay P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.


Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Victoria As-il P15,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.


Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Cherry Pi-ay P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.


Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM and to pay Victoria As-il P15,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.


Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM and to pay Corazon del Rosario P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.


Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Seven (7) Months and Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision mayor as MAXIMUM and to pay Corazon del Rosario P20,000.00 for moral damages, plus costs.


Imprisonment from Four (4) Years as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years as MAXIMUM and to pay the costs.


Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay the costs.


Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Alfredo C. Arcega P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.


To suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. She shall also pay Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) each to Peter Arcega, Lorenzo Belino, Mariano Damolog, Brando Salbino, Dembert Leon and Alfredo Arcega for actual damages, plus costs.


Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Brando B. Salbino P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.


Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Mariano Damolog P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.


Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Lorenzo Belino P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.


Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Peter Arcega P25,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.


Imprisonment from One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of prision correccional as MINIMUM to Five (5) Years, Five (5) Months and Eleven (11) Days ofprision correccional as MAXIMUM and to pay Adeline Tiangge y Marcos P17,000.00 for actual damages, plus costs.

With respect to accused Conchita Tagle in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-CR-1396 and 92-CR-1397, let these cases be sent to the files without prejudice to their revival as soon as she shall have been arrested and brought to the jurisdiction of this Court.

In order that Conchita Tagle may not escape the clutches of the law, let Alias Warrants of Arrest issue addressed to the PNP Chief of Police, La Trinidad, Benguet and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila

and in Baguio City. Further, the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID), Manila is ordered to include her name in the its Hold-Departure List.

SO ORDERED. 37

Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision asserting that the trial court had erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the complaining witnesses and in finding her guilty of the crimes charged despite the "failure" of the prosecution to fully establish the elements of the crimes beyond reasonable doubt. 38 Finding no merit in the motion, the trial court, on 03 April 1995, denied a reconsideration of its decision. 39 The following day, appellant filed a notice of appeal. 40 The trial court gave due course to the appeal on 17 April 1995. 41

The Instant Appeal. —

Appellant continues to profess before this Court her innocence of the accusation. She reiterates her assertion that the trial court has erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the complaining witnesses and in finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the various offenses she has been charged with by the prosecution. 42 She avers that her transactions with the complainants have been "limited to her assisting them secure their respective travelvisa specifically for tourist" and that "her assistance to them (has been) only to refer them to travel agencies" such as the Dynasty Travel and Tours and the Mannings International. She insists that she has remitted the amounts solicited from the complainants to the travel agencies, or to Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio, earning only the commissions "for bringing in clients interested in getting tourist visas." 43

At the outset, it might be explained that this appeal involves the conviction of appellant not only for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale for which the penalty of life imprisonment is imposed but also for other offenses for which lesser penalties have been meted by the trial court upon appellant. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over ordinary appeals in criminal cases directly from the Regional Trial Courts when the penalty imposed isreclusion perpetua orhigher. 44 The Rules of Court, allows, however, the appeal of criminal cases involving penalties lower thanreclusion perpetua or life imprisonment under the circumstances stated in Section 3, Rule 122, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus —

(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed but involving offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death or life imprisonment is imposed shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this Section.

In giving due course to the notice of appeal filed by appellant, the trial court has directed that the "entire records of the seventeen cases" should be forwarded to this Court. 45 It might be observed that this appeal, which has been assigned only one docket number, involves cases, although spawned under different circumstances could be said to somehow be linked to the incident giving rise to the case for illegal

recruitment in large scale. The cases have thus been correctly consolidated and heard jointly below. The appeal made directly to this Court of the seventeen cases, each of which incidentally should have been assigned a separate docket number in this Court, is properly taken.

Art. 38 (a) of the Labor Code considers illegal any recruitment activity "undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority." Recruitment is defined by Article 13, paragraph (b), of the same Code as referring —

. . . to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur:

1) That the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and

2) That the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34. 46

Any person who commits the prohibited acts enumerated in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code shall be liable under Article 38(a) thereof. 47 The proviso in Article 13(b) "lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement." 48 The article also provides that recruitment includes the act of referral or "the act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer or bureau." 49

The Court agrees with the trial court that appellant, indeed, violated the law against illegal recruitment.

The prosecution was able to prove by overwhelming evidence that appellant did represent herself as being in a position to get for the aspiring overseas contract workers good-paying jobs abroad. Appellant was thus able to demand and receive various amounts from the applicants. The latter would then be briefed by appellant on the requirements for employment overseas. Appellant herself testified, thus:

Q From 1986 when separated from Friendship Recruitment Agency and before you were put to jail did you have any occupation?

A Yes, sometimes we brought vegetables and flowers to Manila for resale.

Q Aside from buying and selling vegetables down in Manila did you have any other source of income?

A Sometimes I helped some applicants who are interested to go abroad and asked if I know some agencies who can assist them to go abroad.

Q Were you able to assist some people to look for an agency to assist them to go abroad?

A Yes, sir.

Q Were you being paid when you assist these people applying for overseas employment?

A Yes, sir.

Q By whom?

A The travel agencies give me some amount of commission.

Q What are the names of these agencies which you know?

A Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings International.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Do you know also if this Dynasty Travel and Tours and Mannings International is duly licensed by the government to recruit applicants abroad?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you have any document to prove that it is registered?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where is that?

A Mannings International is a licensed agency and Dynasty Travel and Tours is licensed to issue tickets for applicants to go abroad.

Q You said that Dynasty Travel and Tours is licensed to issue tickets for applicants going abroad what do you mean by applicants going abroad?

A Those applicants to work as a contract worker and who are ready to leave for abroad and they are being issued tickets.

Q Were you actually able to help or assist some overseas worker-applicants?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you remember some of them?

A Cherry Piay, Corazon del Rosario, Arthur Juan, Francisco Labadchan and others." (Emphasis supplied.) 50

Appellant at one point claimed that she had helped complainants only in acquiring for them plane tickets and tourist visas. On cross-examination, however, she admitted that she had made referrals of job applicants to recruitment agencies. 51 She evidently knew all along that the persons she was dealing with were applicants for employment abroad.

The law requires that the above activities of appellant should have first been authorized by the POEA. 52 Rule II, Book II, of the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment provides:

Sec. 11. Appointment of Representatives. — Every appointment of representatives or agents of licensed agency shall be subject to prior approval or authority of the Administration.

The approval may be issued upon submission of or compliance with the following requirements:

a. Proposed appointment or special power of attorney;

b. Clearances of the proposed representative or agent from NBI;

c. A sworn or verified statement by the designating or appointing person or company assuming full responsibility for all acts of the

agent or representative done in connection with the recruitment and placement of workers.

Approval by the Administration of the appointment or designation does not authorize the agent or representative to establish a branch or extension office of the licensed agency represented.

Any revocation or amendment in the appointment should be communicated to the Administration. Otherwise, the designation or appointment shall be deemed as not revoked or amended.

The claim that appellant did not categorically represent herself as a licensed recruiter, or that she merely helped the complainants secure "tourist visas," could not make her less guilty of illegal recruitment, 53 it being enough that he or she gave the impression of having had the authority to recruit workers for deployment abroad. 54

The fact that, with the exception of the cases involving Cherry Pi-ay and Corazon del Rosario, only the complainant in each of the cases, have testified against appellant in the illegal recruitment cases does not thereby make the case for the prosecution weak. The rule has always been that the testimony of witnesses is to be weighed, not that the witnesses be numbered, and it is not an uncommon experience to have a conclusion of guilt reached on the basis of the testimony of a single witness. 55 Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness has perjured himself or that his observations have veered from the truth. 56

The absence of receipts to evidence payment to an indictee in a criminal case for illegal recruitment does not warrant an acquittal of the accused, and it is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's cause. As long as the prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonial evidence that the accused has involved himself in an act of illegal recruitment, a conviction for the offense can very well be justified. 57

Altogether, the evidence against appellant has established beyond any discernible shadow of doubt that appellant is indeed guilty of illegal recruitment on various counts. Being neither a licensee nor a holder of authority to recruit, appellant must suffer under Article 39(c) of the Labor Code the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more than P100,000.00 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court. In imposing the penalty, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the application of the circumstances that could modify the criminal liability of an accused cannot be considered, these provisions being inapplicable to special laws. 58

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 59 whenever the offense is punishable by a special law, the court shall impose on the accused an indeterminate sentence, "the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." 60Accordingly, in imposing the penalty of four (4) years to six (6) years on appellant for each of the five cases of illegal recruitment, the trial court has acted correctly.

Illegal recruitment is committed in large scale if it is perpetrated against three or more persons "individually or as a group." Its requisites are that: (1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities as so defined by law, (2) the same person does not have a license or authority to do that, and (3) the questioned act is committed against three or more persons. 61 The prosecution has been able to successfully show that, for a fee, appellant, not being authorized to recruit workers for abroad, did so in Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645 against seven complainants. For this offense, Article 39(a) of the Labor Code imposes the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). This penalty was thus likewise aptly meted out upon appellant by the trial court.

Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the punishment of the offender for estafa. Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense where criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction while estafa is malum in se which requires criminal intent to warrant conviction. 62 Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the offense (estafa) are that (1) the accused has defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. 64 Clearly, these elements have sufficiently been shown in the cases under review.

The penalty for the crime is prescribed by Article 315, first to fourth paragraphs, of the Revised Penal Code as follows:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;

3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means: . . . .

In the case of People vs. Gabres, 65 the Court has had occasion to so state that —

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be "that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed" under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed" for the offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.

The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law accords with the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision correccionalmaximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months . . . . 66

The Court reiterates the above rule, however, in fixing the maximum term, the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum period to prision mayor minimum period should be divided into "three equal portions of time," each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period; hence —

Minimum Period Medium Period Maximum Period

From 4 years, 2 months From 5 years, 5 months From 6 years, 8 months

and 1 day to 5 years, and 11 days to 6 years, and 21 days to 8 years

5 months and 10 days 8 months and 20 days —

in consonance with Article 65, 67 in relation to Article 64, 68 of the Revised Penal Code.

When the amount involved in the offense exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty prescribed in Article 315 of the Code "shall be imposed in its maximum period," adding one year for each additional P10,000.00 although the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed 20 years. The maximum penalty should then be termed as prision mayor or reclusion temporal as the case may be. In fine, the one year period, whenever applicable, shall be added to the maximum period of the principal penalty of anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.

Accordingly, with respect to the cases of estafa filed by the complainants who individually charged appellant with illegal recruitment, the applicable penalties would, respectively, be, as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397 where appellant defrauded Francisco T. Labadchan in the amount of P45,000.00, two years for the additional amount of P23,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayorminimum (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years). As such, aside from paying Labadchan the amount of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages, the Court deems it proper to sentence appellant to the indeterminate penalty of three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccionalmedium to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor medium.

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, appellant defrauded Victoria Asil in the amount of P15,000.00. Hence, aside from paying Victoria Asil the amount of P15,000.00 by way of actual damages, appellant shall also suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional medium to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum.

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415 where appellant defrauded Cherry Pi-ay in the amount of P18,000.00, appellant, besides paying Cherry Pi-ay that amount by way of actual damages, shall also suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum.

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426 where appellant defrauded Corazon del Rosario in the amount of P40,000.00, appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional medium to seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum.

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428 where appellant fraudulently solicited the amount of P24,200.00 from Arthur Juan, appellant shall pay him actual damages in that amount and shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days (imposed by the court a quo) of prision correccionalminimum period to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum.

In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652 where appellant defrauded Adeline Tiangge the amount of P18,500.00, appellant shall pay her the same amount as actual damages and shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum.

In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1645, the prosecution has successfully established its case against appellant for illegal recruitment in large scale. Evidently banking on her reputation in the community as a job recruiter, appellant was able to make the seven complainants believe that they could land various jobs in Taiwan. Confident of her assurances, each complainant parted with P25,000.00 for supposed processing and placement fees.

It would appear that of the seven complainants for illegal recruitment in large scale, only five 69 of them filed separate charges of estafa against appellant. Accordingly, appellant was only and could only be held liable for five counts of estafa arising from the charge of illegal recruitment in large scale. Since appellant collected the amount of P25,000.00 from each of the five (5) victims, she must be held subject to the penalty in its maximum period orprision mayor in its minimum period (not any higher on account of the fact that the amount in excess of P22,000.00 provided for by Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is less than P10,000.00). 70 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no attending circumstances, appellant shall bear, the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional medium as minimum penalty to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum as maximum penalty for each offense. In addition, appellant should pay the five (5) victims the amount of P25,000.00 each as actual damages.

The actual damages awarded here shall be subject to diminution or cancellation should it be shown that appellant had already paid the complainants.

WHEREFORE, the Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment, illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modifications hereunder specified, and only to the extent thereof, in the following cases:

1) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1397, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional medium period as MINIMUM, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor medium period as MAXIMUM and to pay Francisco T. Labadchan the amount of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages.

2) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1414, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Victoria Asil the amount of P15,000.00 by way of actual damages.

3) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1415, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM.

4) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1426, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional medium period as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM.

5) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1428, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM.

6) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1644, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Alfredo Arcega the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.

7) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1646, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Brando Salbino the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.

8) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1647, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Mariano Damolog the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.

9) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1649, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Lorenzo Belino the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.

10) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1651, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Peter Arcega the amount of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages.

11) In Criminal Case No. 92-CR-1652, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum period as MINIMUM, to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum period as MAXIMUM and to pay Adeline Tiangge the amount of P17,000.00 by way of actual damages.

The awards of damages in Criminal Cases No. 92-CR-1396, No. 92-CR-1413, No. 92-CR-1416, No. 92-CR-1425, and No. 92-CR-1427, all for illegal recruitment, as well as No. 93-CR-1645 for illegal recruitment in large scale, except for the award of P25,000.00 by way of actual damages to Dember Leon (no estafa case having been instituted), are DELETED, either because similar awards have already been provided for by the trial court, or for insufficiency of proof, in the estafa cases aforenumbered.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125903. November 15, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ, and CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ, accused.

ROMULO SAULO, accused-appellant.

D E C I S I O N

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Accused-appellant, together with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz, were charged with violation of Article 38 (b) of the Labor Code [1] for illegal recruitment in large scale in an information which states –

CRIM. CASE NO. Q-91-21911

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ and CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ, of the crime of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE (ART. 38(b) in relation to Art. 39(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by P.D. No. 2018, committed as follows:

That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, by falsely representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and recruit workers for employment abroad, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to LEODEGARIO MAULLON, BENY MALIGAYA and ANGELES JAVIER, without first securing the required license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, in violation of said law.

That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the same was perpetrated against three (3) persons individually or as [a] group penalized

under Articles 38 and 39 as amended by PD 2018 of the Labor Code (P.D. 442).

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

In addition, accused were charged with three counts of estafa (Criminal Case Nos. Q-91-21908, Q-91-21909 and Q-91-21910). Except for the names of the complainants, the dates of commission of the crime charged, and the amounts involved, the informations[3] were identical in their allegations –

CRIM. CASE NO. Q-91-21908

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ AND CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ of the crime of ESTAFA (Art. 315, par. 2 (a) RPC), committed as follows:

That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, by means of false pretenses and/or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one BENY MALIGAYA, in the following manner, to wit: on the date and in the place aforementioned, accused falsely pretended to the offended party that they had connection and capacity to deploy workers for overseas employment and that they could secure employment/placement for said Beny Maligaya and believing said misrepresentations, the offended party was later induced to give accused, as in fact she did give the total amount of P35,000.00, Philippine Currency, and once in possession of the said amount and far from complying with their commitment and despite repeated demands made upon them to return said amount, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to defraud, misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party in the aforementioned amount and in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him. Meanwhile accused Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz have remained at large.

During trial, the prosecution sought to prove the following material facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes:

Benny Maligaya, having learned from a relative of accused-appellant that the latter was recruiting workers for Taiwan, went to accused-appellant’s house in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, together with Angeles Javier and Amelia de la Cruz, in order to discuss her chances for overseas employment. During that meeting which took place sometime in April or May, 1990, accused-appellant told Maligaya that she would be able to leave for Taiwan as a factory worker once she gave accused-appellant the fees for the processing of her documents. Sometime in May, 1990, Maligaya also met with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz at their house in Baesa, Quezon City and they assured her that they were authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to recruit workers for Taiwan. Maligaya paid accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz the amount of P35,000.00, which is evidenced by a receipt dated May 21, 1990 signed by accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21908). Seeing that he had reneged on his promise to send her to Taiwan, Maligaya filed a complaint against accused-appellant with the POEA.[4]

Angeles Javier, a widow and relative by affinity of accused-appellant, was told by Ligaya, accused-appellant’s wife, to apply for work abroad through accused-appellant. At a meeting in accused-appellant’s Quezon City residence, Javier was told by accused-appellant that he could get her a job in Taiwan as a factory worker and that she should give him P35,000.00 for purposes of preparing Javier’s passport. Javier gave an initial amount of P20,000.00 to accused-appellant, but she did not ask for a receipt as she trusted him. As the overseas employment never materialized, Javier was prompted to bring the matter before the POEA.[5]

On April 19, 1990, Leodigario Maullon, upon the invitation of his neighbor Araceli Sanchez, went to accused-appellant’s house in order to discuss his prospects for gaining employment abroad. As in the case of Maligaya and Javier, accused-appellant assured Maullon that he could secure him a job as a factory worker in Taiwan if he paid him P30,000.00 for the processing of his papers. Maullon paid P7,900.00 to accused-appellant’s wife, who issued a receipt dated April 21, 1990 (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Thereafter, Maullon paid an additional amount of P6,800.00 in the presence of accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz, which payment is also evidenced by a receipt dated April 25, 1990 (Exhibit B in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Finally, Maullon paid P15,700.00 to a certain Loreta Tumalig, a friend of accused-appellant, as shown by a receipt dated September 14, 1990 (Exhibit C in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Again, accused-appellant failed to deliver on the promised employment. Maullon thus filed a complaint with the POEA.[6]

The prosecution also presented a certification dated July 26, 1994 issued by the POEA stating that accused are not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21911).[7]

In his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he was also applying with Amelia de la Cruz for overseas employment. He asserts that it was for this reason that he met all three complainants as they all went together to Amelia de la Cruz’ house in Novaliches, Quezon City sometime in May, 1990 in order to follow up their applications. Accused-

appellant flatly denied that he was an overseas employment recruiter or that he was working as an agent for one. He also denied having received any money from any of the complainants or having signed any of the receipts introduced by the prosecution in evidence. It is accused-appellant’s contention that the complainants were prevailed upon by accused-appellant’s mother-in-law, with whom he had a misunderstanding, to file the present cases against him.[8]

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of three counts of estafa and of illegal recruitment in large scale. It adjudged:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Romulo Saulo:

A. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Beny Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the said amount is fully paid, with costs against the said accused.

B. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00 with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the said amount is fully paid, with costs against said accused.

C. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code as amended, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00 with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the said amount is fully paid, with costs against said accused.

D. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale as defined and punished under Article 38 (b) in relation to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, and this Court sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).

Being a detention prisoner, the accused Romulo Saulo shall be entitled to the benefits of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The Court finds no merit in the instant appeal.

The essential elements of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined in Art. 38 (b) of the Labor Code and penalized under Art. 39 of the same Code, are as follows:

(1) the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers, as defined under Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code;

(2) accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, whether locally or overseas; and

(3) accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.[10]

Under Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers to “any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.”

After a careful and circumspect review of the records, the Court finds that the trial court was justified in holding that accused-appellant was engaged in unlawful recruitment and placement activities. The prosecution clearly established that accused-appellant promised the three complainants - Benny Maligaya, Angeles Javier and Leodigario Maullon – employment in Taiwan as factory workers and that he asked them for money in order to process their papers and procure their passports. Relying completely upon such representations, complainants entrusted their hard-earned money to accused-appellant in exchange for what they would later discover to be a vain hope of obtaining employment abroad. It is not disputed that accused-appellant is not authorized[11] nor licensed[12] by the Department of Labor and Employment to engage

in recruitment and placement activities. The absence of the necessary license or authority renders all of accused-appellant’s recruitment activities criminal.

Accused-appellant interposes a denial in his defense, claiming that he never received any money from the complainants nor processed their papers. Instead, accused-appellant insists that he was merely a co-applicant of the complainants and similarly deceived by the schemes of Amelia and Clodualdo de la Cruz. He contends that the fact that Benny Maligaya and Angleles Javier went to the house of Amelia and Clodualdo de la Cruz in Novaliches, Quezon City, to get back their money and to follow-up their application proves that complainants knew that it was the de la Cruz’ who received the processing fees, and not accused-appellant. Further, accused-appellant argues that complainants could not have honestly believed that he could get them their passports since they did not give him any of the necessary documents, such as their birth certificate, baptismal certificate, NBI clearance, and marriage contract.

Accused-appellant’s asseverations are self-serving and uncorroborated by clear and convincing evidence. They cannot stand against the straightforward and explicit testimonies of the complainants, who have identified accused-appellant as the person who enticed them to part with their money upon his representation that he had the capability of obtaining employment for them abroad. In the absence of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.[13]

The fact that accused-appellant did not sign all the receipts issued to complainants does not weaken the case of the prosecution. A person charged with illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the testimonies of the complainants, if found to be credible and convincing.[14] The absence of receipts to evidence payment does not warrant an acquittal of the accused, and it is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s cause.[15]

Accused-appellant contends that he could not have committed the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale since Nancy Avelino, a labor and employment officer at the POEA, testified that licenses for recruitment and placement are issued only to corporations and not to natural persons. This argument is specious and illogical. The Labor Code states that “any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.”[16] Corrolarily, a nonlicensee or nonholder of authority is any person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked, or canceled by the POEA or the Secretary. [17] It also bears stressing that agents or representatives appointed by a licensee or a holder of authority but whose appointments are not previously authorized by the POEA fall within the meaning of the term nonlicensee or nonholder of authority.[18] Thus, any person, whether natural or juridical, that engages in recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority shall be penalized under Art. 39 of the Labor Code.

It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason for this is that illegal recruitment is

a malum prohibitum, whereas estafa is malum in se, meaning that the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction in the former, but is required in the latter.[19]

The elements of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2 (a), of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the accused has defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by deceit, and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.[20] The trial court was correct in holding accused-appellant liable for estafa in the case at bench. Owing to accused-appellant’s false assurances that he could provide them with work in another country, complainants parted with their money, to their damage and prejudice, since the promised employment never materialized.

Under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of estafa is as follows:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

xxx xxx xxx

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. Since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower in degree is prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.

In fixing the maximum term, the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time, each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period, as follows –

Minimum Period : From 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months and 10 days

Medium Period : From 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months and 20 days

Maximum Period : From 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years

pursuant to Article 65, in relation to Article 64, of the Revised Penal Code.

When the amounts involved in the offense exceeds P22,000, the penalty prescribed in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, although the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years.[21]

Accordingly, the following penalties shall be imposed upon accused-appellant:

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded Benny Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, one year for the additional amount of P13,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum. Thus, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum.[22]Accused-appellant shall also pay Benny Maligaya P35,000.00 by way of actual damages.

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Angeles Javier P20,000.00 by way of actual damages.

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum.[23] Accused-appellant shall also pay Leodigario Maullon P30,400.00 by way of actual damages.

In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911) and pursuant to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, accused-appellant shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).

WHEREFORE, the March 6, 1996 Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the following modifications:

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded Benny Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, one year for the additional amount of P13,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for in Article 315 shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum. Thus, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Benny Maligaya P35,000.00 by way of actual damages.

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate

penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Angeles Javier P20,000.00 by way of actual damages.

In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Leodigario Maullon P30,400.00 by way of actual damages.

In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911) and pursuant to Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, accused-appellant shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Labor Cases Batch 2

Documents

Transcript of Labor Cases Batch 2