LAB REL - Cases Outline V

7/27/2019 LAB REL - Cases Outline V

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G.R. No. 152322 February 15, 2005

ERNESTO C. VERCELES, DIOSDADO F. TRINIDAD, SALVADORG. BLANCIA, ROSEMARIE DE LUMBAN, FELICITAS F. RAMOS,MIGUEL TEAO, JAIME BAUTISTA and FIDEL ACERO, asOfficers of the University of the East EmployeesAssociation, petitioners,vs.BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS-DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

AND EMPLOYMENT, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR ANDEMPLOYMENT-NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, RODEL E.DALUPAN, EFREN J. DE OCAMPO, PROCESO TOTTO, JR.,ELIZABETH ALARCA, ELVIRA S. MANALO, and RICARDOUY, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision1

andResolution2 rendered by the Court of Appeals, dated 24 October

2001 and 15 February 2002, respectively.

The Facts

Private respondents Rodel E. Dalupan, Efren J. De Ocampo,Proceso Totto, Jr., Elizabeth Alarca, and Elvira S. Manalo aremembers of the University of the East Employees Association(UEEA). On 15 September 1997, they each received a Memorandumfrom the UEEA charging them with spreading false rumors andcreating disinformation among the members of the said association.They were given seventy-two hours from receipt of the Memorandum

to submit their Answer.3

The acts of the respondents allegedly fall under General Assembly

Resolution No. 4, Series of 1979, to wit:

1. Circulating false rumors about the progress of the

negotiations for collective bargaining;

2. Creating distrust or loss of trust and confidence of

members in the Association;

3. Creating dissension among the members;

4. Circulating false rumors about the work of the Association

or sabotaging the same;

5. Withholding from the Association and/or members materialinformation as to their rightful entitlement to benefits and/or

money claims;

6. Acting as a spy against the Association or divulging

confidential matters to persons not entitled thereto;

7. Such other offenses, which may injure or disrupt the

functions of the Association.4

Through a collective reply dated 19 September 1997, privaterespondents denied the allegations. Thereafter, on 23 September

1997, they sent a letter dated 22 September 1997 to the Chairmanand Members of UEEAs Disciplinary Committee, informing them thatthe Memorandum of 15 September 1997 was vague and withoutlegal basis, therefore, no intelligent answer may be made by them.

They likewise stated that any sanction that will be imposed by thecommittee would be violative of their right to due process.5

The Disciplinary Committee issued another Memorandum, dated 24September 1997, giving the respondents another seventy-two hoursfrom receipt within which to properly reply, explaining that the

collective reply letter and supplemental answer which were earliersubmitted were not responsive to the first Memorandum. Their failurewould be construed as an admission of the truthfulness and veracity

of the charges.6

On 01 October 1997, the respondents issued a denial for the secondtime, and inquired from the Disciplinary Committee as to whether

they were being formally charged.7

On 09 October 1997, Ernesto Verceles, in his capacity as presidentof the association, through a Memorandum, informed Rodel


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Dalupan, et al., that their membership in the association has been

suspended and shall take effect immediately upon receipt thereof.Verceles said he was acting upon the disciplinary committees findingof aprima facie case against them.8 Respondent Ricardo Uy also

received a similar memorandum on 03 November 1997.9

On 01 December 1997, a complaint10 for illegal suspension, willful

and unlawful violation of UEEA constitution and by-laws, refusal torender financial and other reports, deliberate refusal to call general

and special meetings, illegal holdover of terms and damages wasfiled by the respondents against herein petitioners Ernesto C.Verceles, Diosdado F. Trinidad, Salvador G. Blancia, Rosemarie DeLumban, Felicitas Ramos, Miguel Teao, Jaime Bautista and FidelAcero before the Department of Labor and Employment, National

Capital Region (DOLE-NCR).

A few days after the filing of the complaint, i.e., on 10 December1997, a resolution11 was passed by UEEA which reads as follows:

R E S O L U T I O N

WHEREAS, the Association has gone thru a most arduous, difficult,and trying times in working to obtain the best terms and conditions of

employment for its members, specifically for the period 1992 to 1996;

WHEREAS, said difficulties are in the form of near strikes, cases withthe Department of Labor and Employment and its agencies, as wellas with the Supreme Court;

WHEREAS, the general membership (has) shown exceptionalpatience and perseverance and generally (had) demonstrated fulltrust and confidence in the Association officers and accordinglyapproved the manner and/or actions undertaken in pursuing saiddifficult task of arriving at a most beneficial agreement for the general

membership;

NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved as it is hereby resolved that:

. . .

b) the general membership reiterate its loyalty to the Association and

commends the Association officers for their effort expended in

working for the benefit of the whole membership.

APPROVED.

Manila. 10 December 1997.

On 22 November 1999, a decision12 was rendered by RegionalDirector Maximo B. Lim, adverse to petitioners, the dispositive portion

of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent[s] [are] hereby

ordered:

1. to immediately lift suspension imposed upon the

complainants;

2. to hold a general membership meeting wherein they(respondents) make open and available the

unions/associations books of accounts and other documentspertaining to the union funds [and] thereby explain the

financial status of the union;

3. to regularly conduct special and general membershipmeetings in accordance with the unions constitution and by-

laws;

4. to immediately hold/conduct an election of officers in

accordance with the unions constitution and by-laws.

Accordingly, the claims of complainants for damages [are] herebyordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

However, within ten (10) days upon receipt of this Order, thecomplainants are hereby directed to submit a written report whether

or not the respondents had complied with this Order.

The petitioners appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations of theDepartment of Labor and Employment (BLR-DOLE). During thependency of this appeal, or on 07 April 2000, an election of officers


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was held by the UEEA. The appeal, however, was dismissed for lack

of merit in a Resolution13 dated 22 September 2000, the decretal

portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of meritand the decision dated 22 (November) 1999 of Regional Director

Maximo B. Lim, DOLE-NCR, is AFFIRMED.

Meanwhile, Resolution No. 8, Series of 2000, was passed by the

UEEA, wherein the members allegedly reiterated their support andapproval of the acts and collateral actions of the officers.14

A Motion for Reconsideration15 was filed by the petitioners with the

BLR-DOLE, but was denied in a Resolution16dated 15 January 2001.

A special civil action forcertiorari17 was thereafter filed before theCourt of Appeals citing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction. In a Resolution18 dated 22 February 2001, theCourt of Appeals dismissed the petition outright for failure to complywith the provisions of Section 1, Rule 65 in relation to Section 3, Rule

46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. A Motion forReconsideration19 was filed which was granted in aResolution20 dated 24 April 2001, thus, reinstating the

petition.1awphi1.nt

On 24 October 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered aDecision21 dismissing the petition, the dispositive portion of whichreads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIEDDUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncementas to costs.

A Motion for Reconsideration22 was thereafter filed by the petitioners.In a Resolution23 dated 15 February 2002, the Court of Appeals

modified its earlier decision. The decretal portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of this court is MODIFIED.The 22 September 2000 and 15 January 2001 resolutions of the BLR

insofar as they affirmed the part of the 22 November 1999 decision ofthe Regional Director of DOLE-NCR ordering the immediate holding

of election are HEREBY ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. All the otheraspects of the assailed Resolutions are AFFIRMED.

Not satisfied, the petitioners filed a petition for review

on certiorari24 before this Court.

The Issues

The petitioners raise the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS REVERSIBLE ERROR INTHE COURT OF APPEALS UPHOLDING THE DOLE-NCR

AND BLR-DOLE DECISIONS BASED ONLY ON THE

COMPLAINT AND ANSWER;

2. WHETHER OR NOT IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR

THE COURT OF APPEALS TO HOLD THE ELECTION OFAPRIL 7, 2000 AS INVALID AND A NULLITY;

3. WHETHER OR NOT IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO

UPHOLD BLR-DOLES FINDING THAT THE SUSPENSIONWAS ILLEGAL; and

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED NON-HOLDING OFMEETINGS AND ALLEGED NON-SUBMISSION OFREPORTS ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC, AND WHETHERTHE DECISION TO HOLD MEETINGS AND SUBMITREPORTS CONTRADICT AND OVERRIDE THE

SOVEREIGN WILL OF THE MAJORITY.25

The Courts Rulings

We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.

First Issue: was the court a quo correct in upholding the DOLE-NCR

and BLR-DOLE decisions based only on the complaint and answer?

Petitioners contend that the complaint filed by the privaterespondents in DOLE-NCR was a mere recital of bare, self servingand unsubstantiated allegations. Both parties did not submit positionpapers, and the DOLE-NCR resolved the case based only on the


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complaint and answer. Also, by failing to submit a reply to the

answer, private respondents, in effect admitted the petitionerscontroversion of the charges.26 They further argue that the privaterespondents did not exhaust administrative remedies and that therequirement of support by at least 30% of the members of theassociation pursuant to Section 1, Rule XIV, Article I, DepartmentOrder No. 9 of DOLE, was not complied with.27

Private respondents, on the other hand, assert that the records show

that despite their failure to submit their position papers, theynonetheless moved that the case be resolved by DOLE-NCR basedon the complaint, answer and available exhibits or annexesintegrated with the aforesaid pleadings.28 The principle of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies that would warrant thedismissal of the case should not operate against them because theywere deprived of their right to due process when they wereindefinitely suspended without the benefit of a formal charge which issufficient in form and substance.29 The respondents also point outthat the thirty percent (30%) support requirement pursuant to Section1, Rule XIV, Article I, Department Order No. 9, is not applicable tothem because their complaint was primordially predicated on theirsuspension while the rest of the causes of action were mere collateral

consequences of the principal cause of action.30

It is worthy to note that the BLR-DOLE, in its Resolution dated 22September 2000, underscored the negligence of herein petitionersnot only in the submission of their pleadings but also in attending thehearings called for the purpose.31 Even the Court of Appeals, in its

decision, made this observation, thus:

It is apparent, however, that petitioners were to blame for theirpredicament. They repeatedly failed to appear in a series of

conferences scheduled by the DOLE-NCR, asked for resetting ofhearings, and requested for extension of time to file its answer.Hence, when they again did not attend a hearing on a date theythemselves asked for, private respondents (complainants therein)moved for the submission of the case based on their complaint,

position paper and annexes attached thereto.

When DOLE-NCR directed the parties to submit their respectiveposition papers, petitioners again moved for extension of time to filethe same. When another notice was given to the parties to comply

with the directive, petitioners prayed for another extension of time.

(Private respondents, however, reiterated their earlier motion to havethe case resolved based on available pleadings.) After six (6) monthsor so, petitioners finally filed not their position paper but their

answer.32

The Court of Appeals was justified in upholding the DOLE-NCR and

BLR-DOLE decisions based on the complaint and answer. Wecannot accept petitioners line of reasoning that since no position

papers were submitted, no decision may be made by the adjudicatingbody. As ruled by Regional Director Maximo B. Lim in his decision,the complaint and the answer thereto were adopted as the partiesposition papers. Thereafter, the case shall be deemed submitted for

resolution.33

Labor laws mandate the speedy disposition of cases, with the leastattention to technicalities but without sacrificing the fundamentalrequisites of due process.34 The essence of due process is simply anopportunity to be heard.35 In this case, it cannot be said that therewas a denial of due process on the part of the petitioners because

they were given all the chances to refute the allegations of the privaterespondents, and the delay in the proceedings before the DOLE-NCR

was clearly attributable to them.

The argument that there was failure to exhaust administrativeremedies cannot be sustained. One of the instances when the rule ofexhaustion of administrative remedies may be disregarded is whenthere is a violation of due process.36 In this case, the respondentshave chronicled from the very beginning that they were indefinitelysuspended without the benefit of a formal charge sufficient in formand substance. Therefore, the rule on exhaustion of administrative

remedies cannot squarely apply to them.

On the matter concerning the 30% support requirement needed toreport violations of rights and conditions of union membership, asfound in the last paragraph of Article 241 of the Labor Code,37 welikewise cannot sanction the petitioners. We have already made ourpronouncement in the case ofRodriguez v. Director, Bureau of LaborRelations38 that the 30% requirement is not mandatory. In this case,the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa,39 held

in part:


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The respondent Directors ruling, however, that the assent of 30% of

the union membership, mentioned in Article 242 of the Labor Code,was mandatory and essential to the filing of a complaint for anyviolation of rights and conditions of membership in a labororganization (such as the arbitrary and oppressive increase of uniondues here complained of), cannot be affirmed and will be reversed.The very article relied upon militates against the proposition. It statesthat a report of a violation of rights and conditions of membership in alabor organization maybe made by "(a)t least thirty percent (30%) of

all the members of a union orany member or members speciallyconcerned." The use of the permissive "may" in the provision at oncenegates the notion that the assent of 30% of all the members ismandatory. More decisive is the fact that the provision expresslydeclares that the report may be made, alternatively by "any memberor members specially concerned." And further confirmation that theassent of 30% of the union members is not a factor in the acquisitionof jurisdiction by the Bureau of Labor Relations is furnished by Article226 of the same Labor Code, which grants original and exclusive

jurisdiction to the Bureau, and the Labor Relations Division in theRegional Offices of the Department of Labor, over"all inter-union and

intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arisingfrom or affecting labor management relations,"making no referencewhatsoever to any such 30%-support requirement. Indeed, theofficials mentioned are given the power to act "on all inter-union andintra-union conflicts (1) " upon request of either or both parties" as

well as (2) "at their own initiative."

Second Issue: was the election held on 07 April 2000 valid or anullity?

This issue arose from the fact that the original decision of the DOLE-NCR dated 22 November 1999, ordered petitioners, among other

things, to "immediately hold/conduct an election of officers . . ."Petitioners, it must be recalled, appealed from the DOLE-NCRdecision to the BLR-DOLE. During the pendency of the appeal,

however, an election of officers was held on 07 April 2000.Subsequently, the BLR-DOLE affirmed the decision of the DOLE-NCR, but with the pronouncement that ". . . the supposed electionconducted on (07) April 2000 is null and void and cannot produce

legal effects adverse to appellants."40

The petitioners contend that since the election was held on 07 April

2000, and the original complaint before the DOLE-NCR was filed on01 December 1997, the former could not have been the subject of thecomplaint. There was, according to petitioners, reversible error in theBLR-DOLEs adding to the DOLE-NCRs decision, the nullification ofthe 07 April 2000 election. The BLRDOLE should have limited itselfto affirming, modifying or setting aside and canceling the provisionsof the dispositive portion of the DOLE-NCRs decision which wassubject of the appeal. The election was held because the term of the

petitioners (extended for five years under Republic Act No. 671541 )expired on 07 April 2000. As amended by Republic Act 6715,

paragraph (c) of Article 241 of the Labor Code now reads:

(c) The members shall directly elect their officers in the local union,as well as their national officers in the national union or federation towhich they or their local union is affiliated, by secret ballots at

intervals of five (5) years.

It just so happened that the holding of the election coincided with the

DOLE-NCR decision.42

The private respondents, in answer to this, point out that the 07 April2000 election, as appearing in the 22 September 2000 Resolution of

the BLR-DOLE, was set aside not on the flimsy reason that there wasno complaint to invalidate it, but due to the appeal of the petitionersquestioning the BLR-DOLEs order. The appeal effectivelysuspended the effect of the DOLE-NCR Regional Directors order forthe immediate holding of election of officers in accordance with the

unions constitution and by-laws.43

On this matter, the Court of Appeals made the following observation:

Consequently, the Regional Director of DOLE-NCR erred in orderingthe immediate holding of election of officers of UEEA, and the Bureauof Labor Relations (BLR)-Department of Labor and Employment,insofar as it affirmed this particular order, committed an act

amounting to grave abuse of discretion.

Nonetheless, despite of this finding, the election of UEEA officers on7 April 2000 cannot acquire a semblance of legality. First, it wasconducted pursuant to the aforesaid (erroneous) order of the


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Regional Director as manifested by the petitioners. Second, it was

purposely done to pre-empt the resolution of the case by the BLRand to deprive private respondents their substantial right toparticipate in the election. Third, petitioners cannot be allowed to takean inconsistent position to later on claim that the election of 7 April2000 was held because it was already due while previously declaringthat it was made in line with the order of the Regional Director, for

this would go against the principle of fair play.

Thus, while the BLR was wrong in affirming the order of the RegionalDirector for the immediate holding of election, it was right in nullifyingthe 7 April 2000 UEEA election of officers. It was simply improper forthe petitioners to implement the said order which was then one of thesubjects of their appeal in the BLR. To hold otherwise would be todispossess the BLR of its inherent power to control the conduct of theproceedings of cases pending before it for resolution.44

Based on the prevailing facts of this case, we affirm the foregoingfindings of the court a quo. We cannot hold the election of 07 April2000 valid as this would make us condone an iniquitous act. Saidelection was perceptibly done to hinder any resolution or decisionthat would be made by BLR-DOLE. The Regional Director indeedordered the immediate holding of an election in its Order dated 22November 1999. The records show that the petitioners questionedthis order of the Regional Director before the BLR-DOLE by way ofappeal,45 and yet, they conducted the election, allegedly because itwas due under Republic Act No. 6715. Why this was done by thepetitioners escapes us. But as rightfully observed by the BLR-DOLE:

. . . Indeed, it is obvious that the general membership meeting andelection of officers was done purposely to pre-empt our resolution ofthis case and, more importantly, the participation of appellees in the

election. This cannot be tolerated.46

Third Issue: was the indefinite suspension of the private respondentsillegal?

We rule in the affirmative.

The petitioners posit the theory that the records do not support the

findings of the BLR-DOLE that no investigation was conducted

making the suspension illegal because of lack of due process.

It is best to remind the petitioners that this Court, as we have held ina long line of decisions, is not a trier of facts.47 The instant case is apetition for review on certiorari48 where only questions of law may be

raised. The exceptions49 to this rule find no application here. Thisbeing the case, the findings of fact of the DOLE-NCR and the BLR-

DOLE as affirmed by the Court of Appeals to the effect that noinvestigation was conducted, shall not be disturbed. As properly heldby the court a quo:

Petitioners have failed to show that the findings of facts andconclusions of law of both the DOLE-NCR and BLR-DOLE were

arrived at with grave abuse of discretion or without substantialevidence. A careful review of the pleadings before Us reveals that thedecision and resolutions of the concerned agencies were correctly

anchored in law and on substantial evidence.50

Fourth Issue: is the non-holding of meetings and non-submission ofreports by the petitioners moot and academic, and whether thedecision to hold meetings and submit reports contradict and override

the sovereign will of the majority?

We do not believe so.

This issue was precipitated by the Court of Appeals decision affirmingthe order of DOLE Regional Director Maximo B. Lim for thepetitioners to hold a general membership meeting wherein they makeopen and available the unions/associations books of accounts andother documents pertaining to the union funds, and to regularly

conduct special and general membership meetings in accordancewith the unions constitution and by-laws.51 It is to be recalled that theprivate respondents, when they filed a complaint before the DOLE-NCR also complained of petitioners refusal to render financial and

other reports, and deliberate refusal to call general and specialmeetings.

Petitioners do not hide the fact that they belatedly submitted theirfinancial reports and the minutes of their meetings to the DOLE. The


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issue of belatedly submitting these reports, according to the

petitioners, had been rendered moot and academic by their eventualcompliance. Besides, this has been the practice of theassociation.52 Moreover, the petitioners likewise maintain that thepassage of General Assembly Resolution No. 10 dated 10 December1997 and Resolution No. 8, Series of 2000, following the applicationof the principle that the sovereign majority rules, cured any liabilitythat may have been brought about by their belated

actions.531awphi1.nt

As found by the Court of Appeals, the financial statements for theyears 1995 up to 1997 were submitted to DOLE-NCR only on 06February 1998 while that for the year 1998 was submitted only on 16March 1999.54 The last associations meeting was conducted on 21April 1995, and the copy of the minutes thereon was submitted toBLR-DOLE only on 24 February 1998.

The passage of General Assembly Resolution No. 10 dated 10December 1997 and Resolution No. 8, Series of 2000,55 whichsupposedly cured the lapses committed by the associations officersand reiterated the approval of the general membership of the actsand collateral actions of the associations officers cannot redeem thepetitioners from their predicament. The obligation to hold meetingsand render financial reports is mandated by UEEAs constitution andby-laws. This fact was never denied by the petitioners. Their eventualcompliance, as what happened in this case, shall not release them

from the obligation to accomplish these things in the future.

Prompt compliance in rendering financial reports together with theholding of regular meetings with the submission of the minutesthereon with the BLR-DOLE and DOLE-NCR shall negate anysuspicion of dishonesty on the part of UEEAs officers. This is not

only true with UEEA, but likewise with other unions/associations, asthis matter is imbued with public interest. Undeniably, transparency inthe official undertakings of union officers will bolster genuine trade

unionism in the country.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision andResolution of the Court of Appeals subjects of the instant case, are

affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. 85333 February 26, 1990

CARMELITO L. PALACOL, ET AL., petitioners,vs.

PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of LaborRelations, MANILA CCBPI SALES FORCE UNION, and COCA-COLA BOTTLERS (PHILIPPINES), INC., respondents.

Wellington B. Lachica for petitioners.

Adolpho M. Guerzon for respondent Union.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Can a special assessment be validly deducted by a labor union fromthe lump-sum pay of its members, granted under a collectivebargaining agreement (CBA), notwithstanding a subsequentdisauthorization of the same by a majority of the union members?

This is the main issue for resolution in the instant petition forcertiorari.

As gleaned from the records of the case, the pertinent facts are asfollows:

On October 12, 1987, the respondent Manila CCBPI Sales ForceUnion (hereinafter referred to as the Union), as the collectivebargaining agent of all regular salesmen, regular helpers, and reliefhelpers of the Manila Plant and Metro Manila Sales Office of therespondent Coca-Cola Bottlers (Philippines), Inc. (hereinafter referredto as the Company) concluded a new collective bargainingagreement with the latter. 1 Among the compensation benefitsgranted to the employees was a general salary increase to be givenin lump sum including recomputation of actual commissions earned

based on the new rates of increase.

On the same day, the president of the Union submitted to theCompany the ratification by the union members of the new CBA andauthorization for the Company to deduct union dues equivalent toP10.00 every payday or P20.00 every month and, in addition, 10% by

way of special assessment, from the CBA lump-sum pay granted to

the union members. The last one among the aforementioned is the

subject of the instant petition.

As embodied in the Board Resolution of the Union dated September29, 1987, the purpose of the special assessment sought to be leviedis "to put up a cooperative and credit union; purchase vehicles and

other items needed for the benefit of the officers and the generalmembership; and for the payment for services rendered by union

officers, consultants and others." 2 There was also an additionalproviso stating that the "matter of allocation ... shall be at thediscretion of our incumbent Union President."

This "Authorization and CBA Ratification" was obtained by the Unionthrough a secret referendum held in separate local membership

meetings on various dates.3

The total membership of the Union wasabout 800. Of this number, 672 members originally authorized the10% special assessment, while 173 opposed the same.

4

Subsequently however, one hundred seventy (170) members of the

Union submitted documents to the Company stating that althoughthey have ratified the new CBA, they are withdrawing ordisauthorizing the deduction of any amount from their CBA lump sum.

Later, 185 other union members submitted similar documentsexpressing the same intent. These members, numbering 355 in all(170 + 185), added to the original oppositors of 173, turned the tide infavor of disauthorization for the special assessment, with a total of

528 objectors and a remainder of 272 supporters.5

On account of the above-mentioned disauthorization, the Company,being in a quandary as to whom to remit the payment of thequestioned amount, filed an action for interpleader with the Bureau of

Labor Relations in order to resolve the conflicting claims of theparties concerned. Petitioners, who are regular rank-and-fileemployees of the Company and bona fide members of the Union,filed a motion/complaint for intervention therein in two groups of 161and 94, respectively. They claimed to be among those unionmembers who either did not sign any individual written authorization,or having signed one, subsequently withdrew or retracted their

signatures therefrom.


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Petitioners assailed the 10% special assessment as a violation of

Article 241(o) in relation to Artic le 222(b) of the Labor Code. Article

222(b) provides as follows:

ART. 222.Appearances and Fees.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) No attorney's fees, negotiation fees

or similar charges of any kind arisingfrom any collective bargainingnegotiations or conclusion of thecollective agreement shall be imposedon any individual member of thecontracting union; Provided, however,that attorney's fees may be chargedagainst union funds in an amount to beagreed upon by the parties. Anycontract, agreement or arrangement ofany sort to the contrary shall be null

and void.

On the other hand, Article 241(o) mandates that:

ART. 241. Rights and conditions of membership in a

labor organization.

xxx xxx xxx

(o) Other than for mandatory activities

under the Code, no specialassessments, attorney's fees,

negotiation fees or any otherextraordinary fees may be checked offfrom any amount due to an employee

without an individual writtenauthorization duly signed by theemployee. The authorization shouldspecifically state the amount, purpose

and beneficiary of the deduction;

As authority for their contention, petitioners cited Galvadores v.

Trajano,6

wherein it was ruled that no check-offs from any amountdue employees may be effected without individual writtenauthorizations duly signed by the employees specifically stating the

amount, purpose, and beneficiary of the deduction.

In its answer, the Union countered that the deductions not only have

the popular indorsement and approval of the general membership,but likewise complied with the legal requirements of Article 241 (n)

and (o) of the Labor Code in that the board resolution of the Unionimposing the questioned special assessment had been dulyapproved in a general membership meeting and that the collection of

a special fund for labor education and research is mandated.

Article 241(n) of the Labor Code states that

ART. 241. Rights and conditions of membership in a

labor organization.

xxx xxx xxx

(n) No special assessment or other extraordinary feesmay be levied upon the members of a labororganization unless authorized by a written resolutionof a majority of all the members at a generalmembership meeting duly called for the purpose. Thesecretary of the organization shall record the minutesof the meeting including the list of all memberspresent, the votes cast, the purpose of the specialassessment or fees and the recipient of suchassessments or fees. The record shall be attested to

by the president;

Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz ruled in favor of petitioners in an orderdated February 15, 1988 whereby he directed the Company to remitthe amount it had kept in trust directly to the rank-and-file personnelwithout delay.

On appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations, however, the order ofthe Med-Arbiter was reversed and set aside by the respondent-Director in a resolution dated August 19, 1988 upholding the claim of


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the Union that the special assessment is authorized under Article 241

(n) of the Labor Code, and that the Union has complied with the

requirements therein.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners allege that the respondent-Director committed a graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction whenshe held Article 241 (n) of the Labor Code to be the applicable

provision instead of Article 222(b) in relation to Article 241(o) of thesame law.

According to petitioners, a cursory examination and comparison ofthe two provisions of Article 241 reveals that paragraph (n) cannotprevail over paragraph (o). The reason advanced is that a specialassessment is not a matter of major policy affecting the entire unionmembership but is one which concerns the individual rights of union

members.

Petitioners further assert that assuming arguendo that Article 241(n)

should prevail over paragraph (o), the Union has nevertheless failedto comply with the procedure to legitimize the questioned specialassessment by: (1) presenting mere minutes of local membershipmeetings instead of a written resolution; (2) failing to call a generalmembership meeting; (3) having the minutes of three (3) localmembership meetings recorded by a union director, and not by theunion secretary as required; (4) failing to have the list of members

present included in the minutes of the meetings; and (5) failing topresent a record of the votes cast. 7 Petitioners concluded their

argument by citing Galvadores.

After a careful review of the records of this case, We are convinced

that the deduction of the 10% special assessment by the Union wasnot made in accordance with the requirements provided by law.

Petitioners are correct in citing the ruling of this Courtin Galvadores which is applicable to the instant case. The principle"that employees are protected by law from unwarranted practices thatdiminish their compensation without their known edgeand consent" 8 is in accord with the constitutional principle of the

State affording full protection to labor.9

The respondent-Union brushed aside the defects pointed out by

petitioners in the manner of compliance with the legal requirementsas "insignificant technicalities." On the contrary, the failure of theUnion to comply strictly with the requirements set out by the lawinvalidates the questioned special assessment. Substantialcompliance is not enough in view of the fact that the specialassessment will diminish the compensation of the union members.Their express consent is required, and this consent must be obtainedin accordance with the steps outlined by law, which must be followed

to the letter. No shortcuts are allowed.

The applicable provisions are clear. The Union itself admits that bothparagraphs (n) and (o) of Article 241 apply. Paragraph (n) refers to"levy" while paragraph (o) refers to "check-off" of a specialassessment. Both provisions must be complied with. Underparagraph (n), the Union must submit to the Company a writtenresolution of a majority of all the members at a general membershipmeeting duly called for the purpose. In addition, the secretary of theorganization must record the minutes of the meeting which, in turn,must include, among others, the list of all the members present as

well as the votes cast.

As earlier outlined by petitioners, the Union obviously failed to complywith the requirements of paragraph (n). It held local membershipmeetings on separate occasions, on different dates and at variousvenues, contrary to the express requirement that there must be ageneral membership meeting. The contention of the Union that "thelocal membership meetings are precisely the very general meetingsrequired by law" 10 is untenable because the law would not havespecified a general membership meeting had the legislative intent

been to allow local meetings in lieu of the latter.

It submitted only minutes of the local membership meetings whenwhat is required is a written resolution adopted at the generalmeeting. Worse still, the minutes of three of those local meetings heldwere recorded by a union director and not by the union secretary.The minutes submitted to the Company contained no list of themembers present and no record of the votes cast. Since it is quiteevident that the Union did not comply with the law at every turn, theonly conclusion that may be made therefrom is that there was novalid levy of the special assessment pursuant to paragraph (n) of

Article 241 of the Labor Code.


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Paragraph (o) on the other hand requires an individual written

authorization duly signed by every employee in order that a specialassessment may be validly checked-off. Even assuming that thespecial assessment was validly levied pursuant to paragraph (n), andgranting that individual written authorizations were obtained by theUnion, nevertheless there can be no valid check-off considering thatthe majority of the union members had already withdrawn theirindividual authorizations. A withdrawal of individual authorizations isequivalent to no authorization at all. Hence, the ruling

in Galvadores that "no check-offs from any amounts due employeesmay be effected without an individual written authorization signed by

the employees ... " is applicable.

The Union points out, however, that said disauthorizations are notvalid for being collective in form, as they are "mere bunches ofrandomly procured signatures, under loose sheets of paper."

11The

contention deserves no merit for the simple reason that thedocuments containing the disauthorizations have the signatures ofthe union members. The Court finds these retractions to be valid.There is nothing in the law which requires that the disauthorization

must be in individual form.

Moreover, it is well-settled that "all doubts in the implementation andinterpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code ... shall be resolvedin favor of labor."

12And as previously stated, labor in this case refers

to the union members, as employees of the Company. Their meredesire to establish a separate bargaining unit, albeit unproven,cannot be construed against them in relation to the legality of thequestioned special assessment. On the contrary, the same may evenbe taken to reflect their dissatisfaction with their bargaining

representative, the respondent-Union, as shown by thecircumstances of the instant petition, and with good reason.

The Med-Arbiter correctly ruled in his Order that:

The mandate of the majority rank and file have (sic) tobe respected considering they are the ones directlyaffected and the realities of the high standards ofsurvival nowadays. To ignore the mandate of the rankand file would enure to destabilizing industrial peaceand harmony within the rank and file and the

employer's fold, which we cannot countenance.

Moreover, it will be recalled that precisely union dues

are collected from the union members to be spent forthe purposes alluded to by respondent. There is noreason shown that the regular union dues being nowimplemented is not sufficient for the alleged expenses.Furthermore, the rank and file have spoken inwithdrawing their consent to the special assessment,believing that their regular union dues are adequatefor the purposes stated by the respondent. Thus, the

rank and file having spoken and, as we have earliermentioned, their sentiments should be respected.

Of the stated purposes of the special assessment, as embodied inthe board resolution of the Union, only the collection of a special fundfor labor and education research is mandated, as correctly pointedout by the Union. The two other purposes, namely, the purchase ofvehicles and other items for the benefit of the union officers and thegeneral membership, and the payment of services rendered by unionofficers, consultants and others, should be supported by the regularunion dues, there being no showing that the latter are not sufficient to

cover the same.

The last stated purpose is contended by petitioners to fall under thecoverage of Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code. The contention isimpressed with merit. Article 222 (b) prohibits attorney's fees,negotiations fees and similar charges arising out of the conclusion ofa collective bargaining agreement from being imposed on anyindividual union member. The collection of the special assessmentpartly for the payment for services rendered by union officers,consultants and others may not be in the category of "attorney's fees

or negotiations fees." But there is no question that it is an exactionwhich falls within the category of a "similar charge," and, therefore,

within the coverage of the prohibition in the aforementioned article.There is an additional proviso giving the Union President unlimiteddiscretion to allocate the proceeds of the special assessment. Such a

proviso may open the door to abuse by the officers of the Unionconsidering that the total amount of the special assessment is quiteconsiderable P1,027,694.33 collected from those union memberswho originally authorized the deduction, and P1,267,863.39 fromthose who did not authorize the same, or subsequently retracted theirauthorizations.

13The former amount had already been remitted to

the Union, while the latter is being held in trust by the Company.


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The Court, therefore, stakes down the questioned special

assessment for being a violation of Article 241, paragraphs (n) and

(o), and Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Orderof the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated August 19,1988 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, while the order of the

Med-Arbiter dated February 17, 1988 is reinstated, and therespondent Coca-Cola Bottlers (Philippines), Inc. is hereby ordered to

immediately remit the amount of P1,267,863.39 to the respectiveunion members from whom the said amount was withheld. Nopronouncement as to costs. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. 171153 September 12, 2007

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNIONPHILIPPINETRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION(SMCEUPTGWO), petitioner,vs.

SAN MIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES UNIONPAMBANSANG DIWA NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO(SMPPEUPDMP), respondent1.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the RevisedRules of Court, petitioner SAN MIGUEL CORPORATIONEMPLOYEES UNION-PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERALWORKERS ORGANIZATION (SMCEU-PTGWO) prays that thisCourt reverse and set aside the (a) Decision2 dated 9 March 2005 ofthe Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66200, affirming the

Decision

3

dated 19 February 2001 of the Bureau of Labor Relations(BLR) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) whichupheld the Certificate of Registration of respondent SAN MIGUELPACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES UNIONPAMBANSANGDIWA NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (SMPPEUPDMP); and (b)the Resolution4 dated 16 January 2006 of the Court of Appeals in thesame case, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the

aforementioned Decision.

The following are the antecedent facts:

Petitioner is the incumbent bargaining agent for the bargaining unit

comprised of the regular monthly-paid rank and file employees of thethree divisions of San Miguel Corporation (SMC), namely, the SanMiguel Corporate Staff Unit (SMCSU), San Miguel BrewingPhilippines (SMBP), and the San Miguel Packaging Products(SMPP), in all offices and plants of SMC, including the Metal Closureand Lithography Plant in Laguna. It had been the certified bargaining

agent for 20 years from 1987 to 1997.

Respondent is registered as a chapter of Pambansang Diwa ng

Manggagawang Pilipino (PDMP). PDMP issued Charter CertificateNo. 112 to respondent on 15 June 1999.5 In compliance withregistration requirements, respondent submitted the requisitedocuments to the BLR for the purpose of acquiring legalpersonality.6 Upon submission of its charter certificate and otherdocuments, respondent was issued Certificate of Creation of Local orChapter PDMP-01 by the BLR on 6 July 1999.7 Thereafter,respondent filed with the Med-Arbiter of the DOLE Regional Officer in

the National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR), three separate petitions forcertification election to represent SMPP, SMCSU, and SMBP.8 Allthree petitions were dismissed, on the ground that the separate

petitions fragmented a single bargaining unit.9

On 17 August 1999, petitioner filed with the DOLE-NCR a petitionseeking the cancellation of respondent's registration and its droppingfrom the rolls of legitimate labor organizations. In its petition,petitioner accused respondent of committing fraud and falsification,and non-compliance with registration requirements in obtaining itscertificate of registration. It raised allegations that respondent violatedArticles 239(a), (b) and (c)10 and 234(c)11 of the Labor Code.

Moreover, petitioner claimed that PDMP is not a legitimate labororganization, but a trade union center, hence, it cannot directly createa local or chapter. The petition was docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-

9908-007-IRD.12

On 14 July 2000, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Maximo B. Limissued an Order dismissing the allegations of fraud andmisrepresentation, and irregularity in the submission of documents byrespondent. Regional Director Lim further ruled that respondent is

allowed to directly create a local or chapter. However, he found thatrespondent did not comply with the 20% membership requirement

and, thus, ordered the cancellation of its certificate of registration andremoval from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations.13 Respondentappealed to the BLR. In a Decision dated 19 February 2001, it

declared:

As a chartered local union, appellant is not required to submitthe number of employees and names of all its memberscomprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargainingunit where it seeks to operate. Thus, the revocation of its

registration based on non-compliance with the 20%


14/37

membership requirement does not have any basis in the

rules.

Further, although PDMP is considered as a trade unioncenter, it is a holder of Registration Certificate No. FED-11558-LC issued by the BLR on 14 February 1991, whichbestowed upon it the status of a legitimate labor organization

with all the rights and privileges to act as representative of itsmembers for purposes of collective bargaining agreement. On

this basis, PDMP can charter or create a local, in accordancewith the provisions of Department Order No. 9.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,

the decision of the Regional Director dated July 14, 2000,canceling the registration of appellant San Miguel Packaging

Products Employees Union-Pambansang Diwa ngManggagawang Pilipino (SMPPEU-PDMP) is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Appellant shall hereby remain in the roster

of legitimate labor organizations.14

While the BLR agreed with the findings of the DOLE Regional

Director dismissing the allegations of fraud andmisrepresentation, and in upholding that PDMP can directly create a

local or a chapter, it reversed the Regional Director's ruling that the20% membership is a requirement for respondent to attain legalpersonality as a labor organization. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motionfor Reconsideration with the BLR. In a Resolution rendered on 19June 2001 in BLR-A-C-64-05-9-00 (NCR-OD-9908-007-IRD), theBLR denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed its Decisiondated 19 February 2001.15

Invoking the power of the appellate court to review decisions of

quasi-judicial agencies, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals aPetition forCertiorariunder Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66200. The Court ofAppeals, in a Decision dated 9 March 2005, dismissed the petition

and affirmed the Decision of the BLR, ruling as follows:

In Department Order No. 9, a registered federation or nationalunion may directly create a local by submitting to the BLRcopies of the charter certificate, the local's constitution and by-laws, the principal office address of the local, and the names

of its officers and their addresses. Upon complying with the

documentary requirements, the local shall be issued acertificate and included in the roster of legitimate labororganizations. The [herein respondent] is an affiliate of aregistered federation PDMP, having been issued a chartercertificate. Under the rules we have reviewed, there is noneed for SMPPEU to show a membership of 20% of theemployees of the bargaining unit in order to be recognized as

a legitimate labor union.

x x x x

In view of the foregoing, the assailed decision and resolution

of the BLR are AFFIRMED, and the petition is DISMISSED.16

Subsequently, in a Resolution dated 16 January 2006, the Court ofAppeals denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the

aforementioned Decision.

Hence, this Petition forCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Revised Rules

of Court where petitioner raises the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULINGTHAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS NOT REQUIRED TOSUBMIT THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AND NAMES OFALL ITS MEMBERS COMPRISING AT LEAST 20% OF THEEMPLOYEES IN THE BARGAINING UNIT WHERE IT

SEEKS TO OPERATE.

The present petition questions the legal personality of respondent as

a legitimate labor organization.

Petitioner posits that respondent is required to submit a list ofmembers comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining

unit before it may acquire legitimacy, citing Article 234(c) of the LaborCode which stipulates that any applicant labor organization,association or group of unions or workers shall acquire legalpersonality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges grantedby law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the

certificate of registration based on the following requirements:


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a. Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;

b. The names of its officers, their addresses, the principaladdress of the labor organization, the minutes of theorganizational meetings and the list of the workers who

participated in such meetings;

c. The names of all its members comprising at least twentypercent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit

where it seeks to operate;

d. If the applicant union has been in existence for one or moreyears, copies of its annual financial reports; and

e. Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of theapplicant union, minutes of its adoption or ratification and the

list of the members who participated in it.17

Petitioner also insists that the 20% requirement for registration ofrespondent must be based not on the number of employees of a

single division, but in all three divisions of the company in all theoffices and plants of SMC since they are all part of one bargainingunit. Petitioner refers to Section 1, Article 1 of the CollectiveBargaining Agreement (CBA),18 quoted hereunder:

ARTICLE 1

SCOPE

Section 1. Appropriate Bargaining Unit. The appropriatebargaining unit covered by this Agreement consists of allregular rank and file employees paid on the basis of fixedsalary per month and employed by the COMPANY in itsCorporate Staff Units (CSU), San Miguel Brewing Products(SMBP) and San Miguel Packaging Products (SMPP) and indifferent operations existing in the City of Manila and suburbs,including Metal Closure and Lithography Plant located atCanlubang, Laguna subject to the provisions of Article XV ofthis Agreement provided however, that if during the term of

this Agreement, a plant within the territory covered by thisAgreement is transferred outside but within a radius of fifty

(50) kilometers from the Rizal Monument, Rizal Park, Metro

Manila, the employees in the transferred plant shall remain inthe bargaining unit covered by this Agreement. (Emphasissupplied.)

Petitioner thus maintains that respondent, in any case, failed to meetthis 20% membership requirement since it based its membership on

the number of employees of a single division only, namely, theSMPP.

There is merit in petitioner's contentions.

A legitimate labor organization19 is defined as "any labor organizationduly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, andincludes any branch or local thereof."20 The mandate of the LaborCode is to ensure strict compliance with the requirements onregistration because a legitimate labor organization is entitled tospecific rights under the Labor Code,21 and are involved in activitiesdirectly affecting matters of public interest. Registration requirementsare intended to afford a measure of protection to unsuspectingemployees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night

unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or use the labororganization for illegitimate ends.22 Legitimate labor organizations

have exclusive rights under the law which cannot be exercised bynon-legitimate unions, one of which is the right to be certified as theexclusive representative23 of all the employees in an appropriatecollective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.24 Theacquisition of rights by any union or labor organization, particularlythe right to file a petition for certification election, first and foremost,depends on whether or not the labor organization has attained the

status of a legitimate labor organization.25

A perusal of the records reveals that respondent is registered with theBLR as a "local" or "chapter" of PDMP and was issued CharterCertificate No. 112 on 15 June 1999. Hence, respondent was directlychartered by PDMP.

The procedure for registration of a local or chapter of a labor

organization is provided in Book V of the Implementing Rules of theLabor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 9 which tookeffect on 21 June 1997, and again by Department Order No. 40 dated17 February 2003. The Implementing Rules as amended by D.O. No.


16/37

9 should govern the resolution of the petition at bar since

respondent's petition for certification election was filed with the BLR

in 1999; and that of petitioner on 17 August 1999.26

The applicable Implementing Rules enunciates a two-fold procedurefor the creation of a chapter or a local. The first involves the affiliationof an independent union with a federation or national union or

industry union. The second, finding application in the instant petition,involves the direct creation of a local or a chapter through the

process of chartering.27

A duly registered federation or national union may directly create alocal or chapter by submitting to the DOLE Regional Office or to the

BLR two copies of the following:

(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or nationalunion indicating the creation or establishment of the

local/chapter;

(b) The names of the local/chapter's officers, their addresses,

and the principal office of the local/chapter; and

(c) The local/chapter's constitution and by-laws; Provided,That where the local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is thesame as that of the federation or national union, this fact shall

be indicated accordingly.

All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certif iedunder oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of thelocal/chapter and attested to by its President.28

The Implementing Rules stipulate that a local or chapter may be

directly created by a federation ornational union. A duly constitutedlocal or chapter created in accordance with the foregoing shallacquire legal personality from the date of filing of the complete

documents with the BLR.29 The issuance of the certificate ofregistration by the BLR or the DOLE Regional Office is not theoperative act that vests legal personality upon a local or a chapterunder Department Order No. 9. Such legal personality is acquiredfrom the filing of the complete documentary requirements

enumerated in Section 1, Rule VI.30

Petitioner insists that Section 3 of the Implementing Rules, as

amended by Department Order No. 9, violated Article 234 of theLabor Code when it provided for less stringent requirements for thecreation of a chapter or local. This Court disagrees.

Article 234 of the Labor Code provides that an independent labororganization acquires legitimacy only upon its registration with the

BLR:

Any applicant labor organization, association or group ofunions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall beentitled to the rights and privileges granted by law tolegitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate

of registration based on the following requirements:

(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;

(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principaladdress of the labor organization, the minutes of theorganizational meetings and the list of the workers who

participated in such meetings;

(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twentypercent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit

where it seeks to operate;

(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or

more years, copies of its annual financial reports; and

(e) Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the

applicant union, minutes of its adoption or ratification, and thelist of the members who participated in it. (Italics supplied.)

It is emphasized that the foregoing pertains to the registration of anindependent labor organization, association or group of unions or

workers.

However, the creation of a branch, local or chapter is treateddifferently. This Court, in the landmark case ofProgressiveDevelopment Corporation v. Secretary, Department of Labor andEmployment,31 declared that when an unregistered union becomes a


17/37

branch, local or chapter, some of the aforementioned requirements

for registration are no longer necessary or compulsory. Whereas anapplicant for registration of an independent union is mandated tosubmit, among other things, the number of employees and names ofall its members comprising at least 20% of the employees in thebargaining unit where it seeks to operate, as provided under Article234 of the Labor Code and Section 2 of Rule III, Book V of theImplementing Rules, the same is no longer required of a branch, localor chapter.32 The intent of the law in imposing less requirements in

the case of a branch or local of a registered federation or nationalunion is to encourage the affiliation of a local union with a federationor national union in order to increase the local union's bargaining

powers respecting terms and conditions of labor.33

Subsequently, in Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Trajano34 where thevalidity of Department Order No. 9 was directly put in issue, thisCourt was unequivocal in finding that there is no inconsistency

between the Labor Code and Department Order No. 9.

As to petitioner's claims that respondent obtained its Certificate ofRegistration through fraud and misrepresentation, this Court findsthat the imputations are not impressed with merit. In the instant case,proof to declare that respondent committed fraud andmisrepresentation remains wanting. This Court had, indeed, onseveral occasions, pronounced that registration based on false andfraudulent statements and documents confer no legitimacy upon alabor organization irregularly recognized, which, at best, holds on to amere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances, the labororganization, not being a legitimate labor organization, acquires no

rights.35

This Court emphasizes, however, that a direct challenge to the

legitimacy of a labor organization based on fraud andmisrepresentation in securing its certificate of registration is a seriousallegation which deserves careful scrutiny. Allegations thereof shouldbe compounded with supporting circumstances and evidence. Therecords of the case are devoid of such evidence. Furthermore, thisCourt is not a trier of facts, and this doctrine applies with greater forcein labor cases. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, such as the BLR, which have acquired expertisebecause their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally

accorded not only great respect but even finality.36

Still, petitioner postulates that respondent was not validly and

legitimately created, for PDMP cannot create a local or chapter as it

is not a legitimate labor organization, it being a trade union center.

Petitioner's argument creates a predicament as it hinges on thelegitimacy of PDMP as a labor organization. Firstly, this line ofreasoning attempts to predicate that a trade union center is not a

legitimate labor organization. In the process, the legitimacy of PDMPis being impugned, albeit indirectly. Secondly, the same contention

premises that a trade union center cannot directly create a local orchapter through the process of chartering.

Anent the foregoing, as has been held in a long line of cases, the

legal personality of a legitimate labor organization, such as PDMP,cannot be subject to a collateral attack. The law is very clear on this

matter. Article 212 (h) of the Labor Code, as amended, definesa legitimate labor organization37 as "any labor organization dulyregistered with the DOLE, and includes any branch or localthereof."38 On the other hand, a trade union center is any group ofregistered national unions or federations organized for the mutual aidand protection of its members; for assisting such members incollective bargaining; or for participating in the formulation of socialand employment policies, standards, and programs, and is dulyregistered with the DOLE in accordance with Rule III, Section 2 of theImplementing Rules.39

The Implementing Rules stipulate that a labor organization shall bedeemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date ofissuance of its certificate of registration. Once a certificate ofregistration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot besubject to collateral attack.40 It may be questioned only in anindependent petition for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of

Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules. The aforementionedprovision is enunciated in the following:

Sec. 5. Effect of registration. The labor organization orworkers' association shall be deemed registered and vestedwith legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificateof registration. Such legal personality cannot thereafter besubject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in anindependent petition for cancellation in accordance with these

Rules.


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PDMP was registered as a trade union center and issued

Registration Certificate No. FED-11558-LC by the BLR on 14February 1991. Until the certificate of registration of PDMP iscancelled, its legal personality as a legitimate labor organizationsubsists. Once a union acquires legitimate status as a labororganization, it continues to be recognized as such until its certificateof registration is cancelled or revoked in an independent action forcancellation.41 It bears to emphasize that what is being directlychallenged is the personality of respondent as a legitimate labor

organization and not that of PDMP. This being a collateral attack, thisCourt is without jurisdiction to entertain questions indirectly

impugning the legitimacy of PDMP.

Corollarily, PDMP is granted all the rights and privileges appurtenantto a legitimate labor organization,42 and continues to be recognizedas such until its certificate of registration is successfully impugnedand thereafter cancelled or revoked in an independent action for

cancellation.

We now proceed to the contention that PDMP cannot directly createa local or a chapter, it being a trade union center.

This Court reverses the finding of the appellate court and BLR on this

ground, and rules that PDMP cannot directly create a local or

chapter.

After an exhaustive study of the governing labor law provisions, both

statutory and regulatory,43

we find no legal justification to support theconclusion that a trade union center is allowed to directly create a

local or chapter through chartering.Apropos, we take this occasion toreiterate the first and fundamental duty of this Court, which is to applythe law. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and

apply the law does not include the power to correct by reading intothe law what is not written therein.44

Presidential Decree No. 442, better known as the Labor Code, was

enacted in 1972. Being a legislation on social justice,45 the provisionsof the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules have been subject to

several amendments, and they continue to evolve, considering thatlabor plays a major role as a socio-economic force. The Labor Codewas first amended by Republic Act No. 6715, and recently, byRepublic Act No. 9481. Incidentally, the term trade union centerwas

never mentioned under Presidential Decree No. 442, even as it was

amended by Republic Act No. 6715. The term trade union centerwasfirst adopted in the Implementing Rules, under Department Order No.9.

Culling from its definition as provided by Department Order No. 9,a trade union centeris any group of registered national unions or

federations organized for the mutual aid and protection of itsmembers; for assisting such members in collective bargaining; or for

participating in the formulation of social and employment policies,standards, and programs, and is duly registered with the DOLE inaccordance with Rule III, Section 2 of the Implementing Rules. 46 Thesame rule provides that the application for registration of an industry

or trade union center shall be supported by the following:

(a) The list of its member organizations and their respectivepresidents and, in the case of an industry union, the industrywhere the union seeks to operate;

(b) The resolution of membership of each memberorganization, approved by the Board of Directors of such

union;

(c) The name and principal address of the applicant, thenames of its officers and their addresses, the minutes of itsorganizational meeting/s, and the list of member organizations

and their representatives who attended such meeting/s; and

(d) A copy of its constitution and by-laws and minutes of itsratification by a majority of the presidents of the memberorganizations, provided that where the ratification was donesimultaneously with the organizational meeting, it shall be

sufficient that the fact of ratification be included in the minutesof the organizational meeting.47

Evidently, while a "national union" or "federation" is a labororganization with at least ten locals or chapters or affiliates, each ofwhich must be a duly certified or recognized collective bargainingagent;48 a trade union center, on the other hand, is composed of agroup of registered national unions or federations.49


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The Implementing Rules, as amended by Department Order No. 9,

provide that "a duly registered federation or national union" may

directly create a local or chapter. The provision reads:

Section 1. Chartering and creation of a local/chapter. A dulyregistered federation or national union may directly create alocal/chapter by submitting to the Regional Office or to the

Bureau two (2) copies of the following:

(a) A charter certificate issued by the federation or nationalunion indicating the creation or establishment of the

local/chapter;

(b) The names of the local/chapter's officers, their addresses,

and the principal office of the local/chapter; and

(c) The local/chapter's constitution and by-laws; provided thatwhere the local/chapter's constitution and by-laws is the sameas that of the federation or national union, this fact shall be

indicated accordingly.

All the foregoing supporting requirements shall be certif iedunder oath by the Secretary or the Treasurer of thelocal/chapter and attested to by its President.50

Department Order No. 9 mentions two labor organizations either of

which is allowed to directly create a local or chapter throughchartering a duly registered federation or a nationalunion.Department Order No. 9 defines a "chartered local" as a labororganization in the private sector operating at the enterprise level thatacquired legal personality through a charter certificate, issued by aduly registered federation or national union and reported to the

Regional Office in accordance with Rule III, Section 2-E of theseRules.51

Republic Act No. 9481 or "An Act Strengthening the Workers'Constitutional Right to Self-Organization, Amending for the PurposePresidential Decree No. 442, As Amended, Otherwise Known as theLabor Code of the Philippines" lapsed52 into law on 25 May 2007 andbecame effective on 14 June 2007.53 This law further amends the

Labor Code provisions on Labor Relations.

Pertinent amendments read as follows:

SECTION 1. Article 234 of Presidential Decree No. 442, asamended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the

Philippines, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

ART. 234. Requirements of Registration. Afederation, national union or industry ortrade unioncenteror an independent union shall acquire legal

personality and shall be entitled to the rights andprivileges granted by law to legitimate labororganizations upon issuance of the certificate of

registration based on the following requirements:

(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;

(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, theprincipal address of the labor organization, theminutes of the organizational meetings and the list of

the workers who participated in such meetings;

(c) In case the applicant is an independent union, thenames of all its members comprising at least twentypercent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining

unit where it seeks to operate;

(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for oneor more years, copies of its annual financial reports;

and

(e) Four copies of the constitution and by-laws of theapplicant union, minutes of its adoption or ratification,

and the list of the members who participated in it.

SECTION 2. A new provision is hereby inserted into the Labor

Code as Article 234-A to read as follows:

ART. 234-A. Chartering and Creation of a LocalChapter. A duly registered federation or nationalunion may directly create a local chapter by issuing acharter certificate indicating the establishment of the


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local chapter. The chapter shall acquire legal

personality only for purposes of filing a petition forcertification election from the date it was issued acharter certificate.

The chapter shall be entitled to all other rights andprivileges of a legitimate labor organization only upon

the submission of the following documents in additionto its charter certificate:

(a) The names of the chapter's officers, their

addresses, and the principal office of the chapter; and

(b) The chapter's constitution and by-laws: Provided,That where the chapter's constitution and by-laws arethe same as that of the federation or the nationalunion, this fact shall be indicated accordingly.

The additional supporting requirements shall be certifiedunder oath by the secretary or treasurer of the chapter and

attested by its president. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 234 now includes the term trade union center, butinterestingly, the provision indicating the procedure for chartering orcreating a local or chapter, namely Article 234-A, still makes no

mention of a "trade union center."

Also worth emphasizing is that even in the most recent amendmentof the implementing rules,54 there was no mention of a trade unioncenter as being among the labor organizations allowed to charter.

This Court deems it proper to apply the Latin maxim expressio unius

est exclusio alterius. Under this maxim of statutory interpretation, theexpression of one thing is the exclusion of another. When certainpersons or things are specified in a law, contract, or will, an intention

to exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. If a statutespecifies one exception to a general rule or assumes to specify theeffects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects areexcluded.55 Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters,it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to othermatters.56 Such is the case here. If its intent were otherwise, the law

could have so easily and conveniently included "trade union centers"

in identifying the labor organizations allowed to charter a chapter orlocal. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excludedtherefrom, and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended orreflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placedtherein.57 The rule is restrictive in the sense that it proceeds from thepremise that the legislating body would not have made specificenumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict itsmeaning and confine its terms to those expressly

mentioned.58

Expressium facit cessare tacitum.59

What is expressedputs an end to what is implied. Casus omissus pro omisso habendusest. A person, object or thing omitted must have been omitted

intentionally.

Therefore, since under the pertinent status and applicableimplementing rules, the power granted to labor organizations todirectly create a chapter or local through chartering is given to afederation or national union, then a trade union center is withoutauthority to charter directly.

The ruling of this Court in the instant case is not a departure from the

policy of the law to foster the free and voluntary organization of astrong and united labor movement,60 and thus assure the rights ofworkers to self-organization.61 The mandate of the Labor Code inensuring strict compliance with the procedural requirements forregistration is not without reason. It has been observed that theformation of a local or chapter becomes a handy tool for thecircumvention of union registration requirements. Absent theinstitution of safeguards, it becomes a convenient device for a smallgroup of employees to foist a not-so-desirable federation or union on

unsuspecting co-workers and pare the need for wholeheartedvoluntariness, which is basic to free unionism.62 As a legitimate labor

organization is entitled to specific rights under the Labor Code andinvolved in activities directly affecting public interest, it is necessarythat the law afford utmost protection to the parties

affected.63 However, as this Court has enunciated in ProgressiveDevelopment Corporation v. Secretary of Department of Labor andEmployment, it is not this Court's function to augment therequirements prescribed by law. Our only recourse, as previouslydiscussed, is to exact strict compliance with what the law provides as

requisites for local or chapter formation.64


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In sum, although PDMP as a trade union center is a legitimate labor

organization, it has no power to directly create a local or chapter.Thus, SMPPEU-PDMP cannot be created under the more lenientrequirements for chartering, but must have complied with the morestringent rules for creation and registration of an independent union,

including the 20% membership requirement.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated09 March 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 66200

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Certificate of Registration ofSan Miguel Packaging Products Employees UnionPambansangDiwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino is ORDERED CANCELLED, andSMPPEU-PDMP DROPPED from the rolls of legitimate labororganizations.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. 132400 January 31, 2005

EDUARDO J. MARIO, JR., MA. MELVYN P. ALAMIS and USTFACULTY UNION, petitioners,vs.GIL GAMILLA, DUPONT ASERON and JUSTINOCARDENAS, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the Decision1 ofthe Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43701,2 setting aside theorder and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the

lower court.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Sometime in May 1986, the UST Faculty Union (USTFU) entered into

an initial collective bargaining agreement with the University of SantoTomas (UST) wherein UST undertook to provide USTFU with a free

office space at Room 302 of its Health Center Building.3

On 21 September 1996, the officers and directors of USTFUscheduled a general membership meeting on 5 October 1996 for theelection of the union officers. However, respondent Gamilla andsome faculty members filed a Petition4 with the Med-Arbitration Unitof the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) seeking to stop

the holding of the USTFU election.5

Meanwhile, on 2 October 1996, Rev. Fr. Rodel Aligan, O.P.,

Secretary General of the UST, issued a Memorandum to the Deans,Regents, Principals and Heads of Departments regarding the holding

of a faculty convocation on 4 October 1996.6

On 4 October 1996, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin issued atemporary restraining order (TRO) in Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001, enjoining the holding of the election of the USTFU officers anddirectors. However, denying the TRO they themselves sought,Gamilla and some of the faculty members present in the 4 October

1996 faculty convocation proceeded with the election of the USTFU

officers. On the other hand, the scheduled election for 5 October

1996 did not push through by virtue of the TRO.7

In the succeeding week, on 11 October 1996, petitioners filed withthe DOLE a petition for prohibition, injunction, with prayer forpreliminary injunction and temporary restraining order,8 seeking to

invalidate the election held on 4 October 1996.

Two months later, on 4 December 1996, UST and USTFU,represented by Gamilla and his co-officers, entered into a collectivebargaining agreement (CBA) for a period of five (5) years from 1 June1996 up to 31 May 2001. The CBA was ratified on 12 December

1996.9

In another front, the Med-Arbiter issued a TRO dated 11 December1996, enjoining Gamilla and his fellow officers to "cease and desistfrom performing any and all acts pertaining to the duties and

functions of the officers and directors" of USTFU.10

On 27 January 1997, at around eleven in the morning (11:00 a.m.),respondents Gamilla, Cardenas and Aseron, with some otherpersons, served a letter of even date on petitioners Mario andAlamis, demanding that the latter vacate the premises located atRoom 302, Health Center Building, USTthe Office of USTFU.However, only the office messenger was in the office at the time.After coercing the office messenger to step out of the office, Gamilla

and company padlocked the door leading to the unions office.11

On 5 February 1997, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Manila a Complaint12 for injunction and damages with aprayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order over

the use of the USTFU office.

At the 11 February 1997 hearing on the application for TRO beforethe trial court, respondents through a consolidated motion to dismisssought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of forum-shopping and prayed that the trial court suspend the application forinjunctive relief until it shall have resolved the motion todismiss.13l^vvphi1.net


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On the same date, Med-Arbiter Falconitin rendered a

decision,14 declaring the 4 October 1996 election and its results nulland void ab initio. The decision was appealed to the Bureau of LaborRelations which affirmed the same.15 Respondents brought thematter to this Court via a special civil action forcertiorari.16 The Courtpromulgated its decision,17 dismissing the petition on 16 November1999.

On 3 March 1997, the RTC issued the assailed order,18 to wit:

WHEREFORE, upon plaintiffs filing a bond in the amountof P50,000.00, let a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issuerequiring defendants their representatives and agents or other

persons acting in their behalf to remove the padlocks on the door ofthe UST Faculty Union office located at Room 302, Health Center

Bldg., UST, Espaa, Manila and to refrain from preventing/disturbing

in any manner whatsoever the plaintiffs in entering the said premises.

In the meantime, defendants are hereby ordered to submit their

answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof.

On 5 March 1997, after petitioners as plaintiffs therein had posted therequisite bond, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary mandatory

injunction.19

On 19 March 1997, respondents filed a Petition forCertiorari20 beforethe Court of Appeals, claiming that the orders dated 3 and 5 March1997 were void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction and on the ground thatthey were issued in violation of due process of law.21 The Court ofAppeals stated that the basic issue of the case was whether the RTCof Manila had jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No.97-81928.22 It agreed with respondents disquisition that petitioners

cause of action in the complaint before the trial court is inextricablylinked and intertwined with the issue of who are the legitimate officersof the USTFU, which issue was then being litigated before the DOLE.The appellate court held that Civil Case No. 97-81928 and Case No.

NCR-OD-M-9610-016 appear to be the same, with the observationthat the civil case merely "grew out" from the labor case. It also cited

the prohibition against the issuance of injunction in any case involvingor growing out of a labor dispute, unless otherwise provided bylaw.23 It added that it would have been more appropriate for the RTCto determine whether it had jurisdiction over the subject case before

issuing the assailed orders.24 The dispositive portion of the decision

reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition ishereby GRANTEDand the assailed order (dated March 3, 1997)and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (dated March 5,1997) SET ASIDEand the respondent judge orderedto DISMISS Civil Case No. 97-81928.

SO ORDERED.25 (Emphasis in the original.)

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration26 was denied. Hence, thispetition.

Petitioners assert that the RTC has jurisdiction to decide Civil CaseNo. 97-81928, as the determination of the legality and propriety ofpadlocking the doors of the USTFU office and preventing the free andunhampered ingress to and egress from the said premises, asalleged in the complaint, are matters incapable of pecuniaryestimation.27 Moreover, they claim that the civil case was premisedon causes of action belonging to the USTFU which are to be resolvednot by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statutes.They stress that the causes of action involve a tortious act and thecorresponding claim for damages that are both governed by the civil

law and fall under the jurisdiction of regular courts.28

Petitioners add that not all controversies involving members of thesame union are to be decided by the labor tribunal. They add that inthe instant case, the pendency of the labor case should not militateagainst the civil case they filed since the criminal and civil aspects ofa violation of Article 241 of the Labor Code29 can be litigatedseparately and independently from the administrative aspect of a

breach of the rights and conditions of membership.30

Anent the ruling of the Court of Appeals on the wr it of injunctionissued by the trial court, petitioners state that Art. 254 of the LaborCode31 on prohibition against injunctions is not applicable to theinstant case since the controversy cannot be categorized as a labordispute. They argue that the injunction was called for considering thatthey "have rights to be protected and preserved," which however,


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"were violated, invaded and trampled upon" by respondents through

the acts complained of.32

Petitioners claim that respondents were not denied their day in courtwhen the trial court did not resolve the issue of jurisdiction beforeproceeding with the hearing on the application for injunctive order.According to them, respondents were given the chance to present

their evidence in support of their opposition to the injunction andTRO, but respondents chose not to avail of this opportunity.33

Lastly, they add that respondents Gamilla, Cardenas and Aseron hadno right to act for and in behalf of the USTFU for the followingreasons, to wit: Gamillas claim to the USTFU presidency was

declared non-existent by the labor tribunals; Cardenas was the chiefof the security force in the university and not a faculty member; and,

Aseron was a Barangay Chairman and not a member of the USTfaculty.34 Thus, petitioners claim that USTFU was improperly includedas petitioner in the petition35 before the Court of Appeals.

Accordingly, petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred and

gravely abused its discretion when:

I. It ruled that the regional trial court had no jurisdiction over Civil

Case No. 97-81928;

II. It ruled that Civil Case No. 97-81928 is a labor dispute cognizable

by the DOLE;

III. It granted the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 43701, setaside the orders issued by the trial court, and ordered the dismissal

of the civil case;

IV. It ruled that Art. 254 of the Labor Code is applicable to the mattersinvolved in Civil Case No. 97-819

LAB REL - Cases Outline V

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