Kuwaiti National Security and the u.s.-kuwaiti Strategic Relationship After Saddam Pub788

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KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITYAND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGIC

RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM

W. Andrew Terrill

September 2007

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as dened

in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in thepublic domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United StatesCode, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted.

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*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not

necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of the Department of theArmy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report iscleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This work has beneted greatly from the comments and suggestionsthat friends and colleagues provided on earlier drafts. Space andprivacy limitations prevent me from acknowledging everyone, butsome individuals deserve my special gratitude. I would particularlylike to thank Professor Mary Ann Tetreault of Trinity University in San

Antonio, Texas, for detailed and exceptionally helpful comments basedon her deep understanding of Kuwaiti issues. Sarah E. Womer provideda number of useful and insightful comments that allowed me to benetfrom her strong understanding of the region and previous time in Kuwait.Lieutenant Colonel Robert Friedenberg of the U.S. Embassy in Kuwaitwas an indispensable source of support and assistance on my 2006 and2007 visits. He has been an especially helpful and informed source ofinsight, contacts, and information based on his long and valuable serviceto the United States in Kuwait and elsewhere in the Middle East. I wouldalso like to thank Mary J. Elias and U.S. Army War College ProfessorSteven Metz for valuable suggestions and insights. I need to further thank

Mary for some early assistance on this project when she was my researchassistant at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College beforemoving on to increased responsibility elsewhere. I would also like tothank former Kuwaiti information minister, Dr. Saad Bin Tiah, forallowing me to speak at his diwaniya on two separate occasions whereI had the opportunity to subject my views to the critique of informedKuwait audiences. I also owe a special thanks to Major General (retired)Saber M. al Suwaidan of the Kuwaiti Air Force for his willingness to meetwith me on numerous occasions and share many valuable insights, as wellas the stories that accompany an exceptionally interesting life. My friend,Colonel Ahmad Hashem of the Kuwait Army, was another valuablesource of insight on Kuwait during the year he spent at Carlisle Barracksas a student at the U.S. Army War College. Finally, I would especially liketo thank Major General Khalid Jarrah al Sabah of the Kuwaiti Army fortaking time from his extremely busy schedule to discuss Kuwait securityissues with me. Despite this help, all errors of facts, opinions, judgment,or speculation are absolutely and entirely my own.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army WarCollege, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244.


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FOREWORD

The United States has found no shortage ofdifculties in recent years as it has moved forwardin implementing its security policies toward theMiddle East and especially the Persian/Arabian Gulf.Security threats resulting from an Iraq in turmoil andan assertive Iran are near the top of U.S. concernsabout its future security. Efforts to deal with terrorismand to encourage and support the efforts of regionalstates to stem the rise of violent terrorist groups arealso important. Kuwait, while a small country with alimited population, nevertheless has many of the sameconcerns as the United States in that part of the world.While Kuwait cannot act as a major regional power, itcan nevertheless still serve as a valuable ally, whose

contributions to regional security and democratizationshould not be overlooked. These contributions centeron strategic geography, economic strength, and awillingness to host U.S. forces that is long-standing ina region where such actions can sometimes be seen ascontroversial.

In this monograph, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill providesa comprehensive and nuanced examination of Kuwaitdefense and security issues including a considerationof the importance of the current security relationshipwith the United States. He approaches this task bycarefully documenting historical and ongoing securitythreats to Kuwait. Of special importance, Dr. Terrillconsiders the history of difculties seen in Iraqi-Kuwaiti history and illustrates in detail how Kuwaits

problems with Iraq which culminated with SaddamHussein are much larger and more complex than theruthlessness of one individual. Dr. Terrill outlines the


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ongoing territorial tension between Iraq and Kuwaitsince before the later country was independent, as

well as the various Kuwaiti attempts to control Iraqidemands through diplomacy, regional consensus, andforeign aid. Dr. Terrill also examines the historical basisfor Iraqs claims against Kuwait noting that they haveno serious legal basis, but also noting that many Iraqisappear to be open to the idea that all or part of Kuwaitshould belong to Iraq. Kuwaits current relations withpost-Saddam Iraq are not without notable problems,and the Kuwaitis look at their northern neighbor withgreat uncertainty. Iraq will continue to be of concernto both Kuwait and the United States in forthcomingyears, and cooperation between the United States andKuwait will be valuable in addressing Iraq-relatedproblems. Kuwait, moreover, has the double difcultyof facing expected critical problems from either a

strong, nationalistic Iraq or an Iraq that has collapsedinto anarchy.

Dr. Terrill also considers how an assertive Iran isinteracting with Kuwait at the present time and how thetwo nations have a historic pattern of widely uctuatingrelations. While Kuwait and Iran are currentlysupercially friendly to each other, they neverthelesshave strong conicting interests. In particular, Iranis not pleased with the close U.S.-Kuwait militaryrelationship and would like to replace U.S. inuence inthe Gulf with its own. Kuwait, conversely, feels the needto maintain open and friendly relations with its muchlarger neighbor to limit Iranian intrigue and to assuageKuwaiti Shiites who view the Islamic Republic withsome warmth. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti leadership

knows not to trust Iranian intentions and is sometimesappalled by Tehrans assertive rhetoric. Kuwaitis, likethe other Gulf Arabs, are deeply disturbed about the


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Iranian move to acquire nuclear capabilities, whichthey view as an environmental and security threat. Nor

would Kuwaitis like to see the United States departfrom the Gulf and thereby remove the most seriouscountervailing inuence to Iranian dominance.

Turning to the issue of terrorism, Dr. Terrill notesthat Kuwait has shown considerable exibility inmanaging actual and potential problems. The Kuwaitishave been especially effective in managing groups suchas the Peninsula Lions who have sought to overthrowthe Kuwaiti government and have also attemptedto kill U.S. troops stationed in Kuwait. This Kuwaitigovernmental dexterity needs to continue. Shouldfuture problems develop between Kuwait and Iran orsouthern Iraqi Shiite radicals, Kuwait must respondto those problems in ways that do not alienate its ownlarge Shiite minority. A crisis in Kuwaits Sunni-Shiite

relations would be a catastrophic setback to the region,since Kuwait currently is universally viewed as havingthe best Sunni-Shiite relations of any Arab Gulf statecontaining large elements of both communities.

Finally, on the issues of reform and democracy,Dr. Terrill notes the ongoing efforts at Kuwaitipolitical modernization and inclusiveness. Kuwaitrepresents an important example to the region ofa partial democracy that is expanding and furtherentrenching democratic approaches and proceduresto contemporary problems. Such moves are not easy,and backsliding is always possible. Nevertheless, theKuwaiti approach illustrates the potential of the kindof evolutionary reform that too often fails to interestpolitical theorists and journalists examining the region

since such occurrences are much less dramatic thanviolent regime change and revolution, both of whichare processes that do not carry an automatic default topost-revolutionary democracy.


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The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offerthis monograph as a contribution to the national secu-

rity debate on this important subject as our nation con-tinues to grapple with a variety of problems associatedwith the U.S. presence in the Middle East. This analysisshould be especially useful to U.S. military strategicleaders as they seek to address the complicated interplayof issues related to Middle Eastern security in what ourlocal allies would see as a politically acceptable andconstructive manner. Some of the historical analysisparticularly regarding Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations will alsohelp U.S. leaders place current issues and perceptionsin a larger context that may help them work withKuwait and other Arab allies. It is hoped that this workwill benet ofcers of all services visiting Kuwait orthe larger Gulf region, and that it will contribute tostrengthening the U.S.-Kuwait relationship.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute


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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

W. ANDREW TERRILL joined the Strategic StudiesInstitute (SSI) in October 2001, and is the GeneralDouglas MacArthur Professor of National SecurityAffairs. Prior to his appointment, he served as a MiddleEast nonproliferation analyst for the InternationalAssessments Division of the Lawrence LivermoreNational Laboratory (LLNL). In 1998-99, Dr. Terrillalso served as a Visiting Professor at the U.S. Air WarCollege on assignment from LLNL. He is a formerfaculty member at Old Dominion University in Norfolk,Virginia, and has taught adjunct at a variety of othercolleges and universities. He is a retired U.S. ArmyReserve lieutenant colonel and Foreign Area Ofcer(Middle East). Dr. Terrill has published in numerous

academic journals on topics including nuclearproliferation, the Iran-Iraq War, Operation DESERTSTORM, Middle Eastern chemical weapons, andballistic missile proliferation, terrorism, and commandooperations. Since 1994, at U.S. State Departmentinvitation, Dr. Terrill has participated in the MiddleEastern Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS)Track 2 talks, which are part of the Middle East PeaceProcess. He also served as a member of the militaryand security working group of the Baker/HamiltonIraq Study Group throughout its existence in 2006. Dr.Terrill holds a B.A. from California State PolytechnicUniversity and an M.A. from the University ofCalifornia, Riverside, both in Political Science. He alsoholds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Claremont

Graduate University, Claremont, California.


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SUMMARY

The U.S.-Kuwait military relationship has beenof considerable value to both countries since at least1990. This alliance was formed in the aftermath of Iraqileader Saddam Husseins brutal invasion of Kuwaitand the U.S. decision to free Kuwait with militaryforce in 1991. Saddams later defeat and removal frompower in 2003 eliminated an important rationale for thealliance, but a close look at current strategic realities inthe Gulf suggests that Kuwait remains an importantU.S. ally. It is also an ally that faces a number of seriousnational security concerns in the turbulent post-Saddam era, some of which will require both Kuwaitisand Americans to rethink and revise previous securityapproaches, particularly to meet the shared goals of

reducing terrorism and regional instability.Since its independence in 1961, Kuwait has

struggled to manage a number of difcult challengesrelated to protecting its citizens and its territoryfrom the predatory designs of large and dangerousneighbors. The most menacing neighbors have beenIraq and Iran. While Iran has proven a threatening andsubversive enemy on key occasions, Iraq is even moreproblematic. Kuwait has maintained a long and oftenextremely difcult relationship with Iraq, and a seriesof Iraqi governments have either pressured Kuwait forterritorial concessions or suggested that Kuwait is a lostprovince of Iraq. Additionally, within Kuwait a widelyheld belief is that large, if not overwhelming, portionsof the Iraqi public share this viewpoint. Iraq-Kuwait

tensions are therefore unlikely to disappear in theaftermath of Saddams trial and execution. Iraq, evenwithout Saddam, is often viewed as a danger to Kuwait


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given this history, and ongoing Kuwaiti concerns aboutIraq underscore the need for continuing U.S.-Kuwait

security ties. Furthermore, both Kuwait and the UnitedStates fear a rise in region-wide terrorism and sectarianviolence resulting from the current civil strife in Iraq,as well as other factors. Should Iraqis sectarian strifereach new levels of intensity, it is important that it doesnot spread to other nations such as Kuwait. Kuwaitidiplomacy and security planning must seek ways tominimize the impact of the Iraq civil war in ways thatdo not cause the vast majority of loyal Kuwaiti Shiitesto become alienated from their government.

Kuwait must also cope with a newly-empoweredIran which has at least partially lled the Gulf powervacuum created by Iraqs political crisis. Kuwait, asa small country, has little desire to offend a majorregional power such as Iran, and has occasionally

sought Iranian support in its dealings with Iraq. GoodKuwaiti relations with Iran are often viewed with favorby signicant elements of Kuwaits Shiite communityand therefore can be viewed as supporting Kuwaitinational unity. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti leadershipfears Iranian interest in domination of the Gulf andis especially opposed to Iranian efforts to compel theUnited States to withdraw its military forces from theregion. For that reason, Kuwait and Iran will neverfully trust each other. Moreover, the Kuwaitis, likeother Gulf Arabs, are deeply concerned about theIranian nuclear program, although they also opposeU.S. military strikes against Iran, fearing that they willbe placed in the middle of an intense cycle of regionalviolence. Kuwait would probably view such strikes

as an appalling breech of faith unless all diplomaticand economic options for dealing with the crisis werethoroughly explored and exhausted rst.


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The United States also has a vested interest inregional political reform and ongoing democratization

in Kuwait. Beyond being a valuable strategic ally, Ku-wait has also shown a commitment to expanding de-mocracy in an evolutionary way that supports U.S. aspir-ations for both stability and more inclusive governmentwithin the region. Kuwaitis have a long-standingdemocratic tradition that they have attempted to blendwith the continued authority of a ruling monarchy thathas been in power since the 1750s. The existence of thismonarchy and the history of democratic expressionare key components of the Kuwaiti national identity.Additionally, Kuwaitis may be especially concernedabout maintaining their democratic image abroadbecause of their continuing need for internationalsupport against potential enemies. Kuwait is clearlythe most democratic country among the Gulf Arab

states, and the Kuwait democratization effort servesas an important if still incomplete example to theregion. Kuwaiti democratization has shown particularvitality over the last year, and the United States needsto continue supporting such efforts to ensure that theyare not ephemeral. The United States must also remainaware that democracy and moderation are not the samething, and that elections in Kuwait have empowered anumber of Islamists who appear deeply unsympatheticto U.S. goals for the region.

This monograph notes that the United States can, ifinsufciently careful, neglect the Kuwaiti relationshipand fail to adequately consult the leadership and takeKuwaiti interests into account. Kuwaitis have thepotential to become more jaded and less cooperative

in their relations with the United States if they viewthemselves as taken for granted or dealt with assubordinates. The United States has a long history


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of resentful allies carefully measuring the degreeof cooperation they will give in return for security

guarantees. There is no need for this to occur withKuwait. Moves to strengthen U.S.-Kuwait relationsthus become important and may become especiallyvital if setbacks in Iraq eventually prompt a U.S.withdrawal under less than optimal conditions. Strongefforts should be made to prevent sectarian warfare inIraq from spreading to Kuwait under such scenarios.Such efforts may require a great deal of new andcreative thinking by both Kuwaitis and Americans asthe threat of a conventional Iraq attack has now beenovershadowed by the dangers of spillover from anIraqi civil war, new and deadlier terrorism, and large-scale subversion.


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KUWAITI NATIONAL SECURITYAND THE U.S.-KUWAITI STRATEGIC

RELATIONSHIP AFTER SADDAM

Kuwait cannot overcome the basic strategic reality that itis a small country with immense wealth with the wrongneighbors.

Anthony H. Cordesman1

We fear civil wars. We fear that the situation in Iraq [will]slide into a civil war.

Ahmad al Fahd al SabahChief, Kuwaiti National Security Service2

February 13, 2007

Introduction.

Kuwait has been a close military partner of theUnited States since a U.S.-led military coalitionliberated it from the iron grip of Iraqi occupation in1991. The U.S.-Kuwait relationship since that time hasbeen consolidated as an important alliance for bothcountries. Although Kuwait is a small country, it is alsostrategically located and supports ongoing securityrelations with the United States. The importance ofKuwaits strategic position can be expected to increaseas the United States reduces its presence in post-Saddam Iraq but still seeks to inuence events thereand throughout the Gulf region. Kuwaits strategicimportance also increased following the U.S. decisionto remove its combat forces from Saudi Arabia in

2003.3 Additionally, Kuwait rests upon approximately10 percent of the worlds known oil reserves and isexpanding its efforts to explore for natural gas, making


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it a vital economic ally. More recently, and also ofinterest to the United States, the Kuwaiti experience

is emerging as an especially important ongoingexperiment in democratic institution-building and theexpansion of democratic practices. This approach togovernance is being implemented in ways that supportU.S. goals for increased democratization of the region,although elections have also helped to empower someextremely conservative Islamists, such as members ofthe Kuwaiti Islamic Constitutional Movement, which isthe political arm of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood.4

In April 2003 the United States and Kuwait reachedan important milestone in their national securityrelationship due to the ouster of Iraqi President SaddamHussein in a U.S.-led military invasion of Iraq. FromKuwaits 1991 liberation until Saddams ouster frompower in 2003, Kuwaiti fear of Baathist Iraq decisively

inuenced virtually all of that countrys majorforeign and defense policy decisions. The removal ofSaddam is consequently a signicant developmentfor the strategic situation in the Gulf in general andmost especially for Kuwait. More than just a hostileand dangerous tyrant, Saddam was viewed by mostKuwaitis as an archenemy. In large part, these viewswere a direct result of the 1990-91 Iraqi occupation ofKuwait in which Saddam ruled by torture, fear, andexecution. Nevertheless, his standing as Kuwaitsprimary enemy had other aspects to it. He came topower and remained Iraqs undisputed leader despitethat countrys previous vulnerability to recurringcoups. As dictator, Saddam was able to maintain powerthrough a wide array of rewards and sanctions directed

at the Iraqi population. Part of his system of controlwas to avenge every slight to both punish his enemiesand more importantly to deter potential foreign and


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domestic plotters from moving against him. Revengefor Saddam was a fundamental aspect of practical

governance that helped him maintain his unyieldingdomination of the Iraqi military and population.Consequently, in the 1991-2003 time frame, Saddamwas widely viewed as harboring hopes that he wouldeventually be able to punish and perhaps destroyKuwait for its unwillingness to accept Iraqi rule andits ability to rouse the world against the Iraqi dictatorin 1990-91. Saddams removal from power in March2003 eliminated this personality-specic aspect ofKuwaits Iraq policy and provided at least a temporaryrespite from the terror generated by a known enemy.His execution by hanging in 2006 was greeted withundisguised joy in Kuwait.5

Yet, despite an enormous sense of relief, Kuwaitsnational security problems have not disappeared with

Saddams removal and death on the gallows. Rather, theend of his dictatorship has created new and extremelyserious national security challenges for Kuwait. Iranhas viewed Saddams replacement with a weak anddivided Iraqi government as an opportunity to expandits political inuence throughout the Gulf in waysthat are potentially threatening to Kuwait. Moreover,a variety of alternative Iraqi political futures concernKuwait, and whatever future Iraq eventually nds willoccur only after a prolonged period of instability andviolence that could well involve Kuwait. Additionally,Kuwaitis are concerned about an expansion of terrorismin the Gulf due to increased regional sectarianism andradicalism that may emerge as a by-product of Iraqifactional and intercommunal warfare. All of these

problems are of special concern to the United States aswell, and addressing them effectively is vital to bothnations.


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The Structure of the Kuwaiti Political System.

Kuwait has a citizen population of just over onemillion. Most Kuwaitis are Sunni Muslims, but there isalso a large minority of Shiites that has been estimatedto include 25-30 percent of the citizen population.6There is also a mostly noncitizen Iranian community,which is estimated at around 60,000 residents.Approximately 900,000 foreign private sector workersand another 450,000 foreign domestic workers are alsoin Kuwait.7 Members of these last two groups are almostnever granted Kuwaiti citizenship, and under mostcircumstances they will never have the opportunity toapply. Additionally, Kuwait has around 90,000 bidoons,stateless individuals who live in that country but donot have paperwork indicating that they are eligible forKuwaiti citizenship.8 Most of the bidoons deeply desire

Kuwaiti citizenship, and many feel a strong sense ofinjustice that it has been denied to them.9

The Kuwaiti political system is dynamic andcomplex, but at present it is clearly the most democraticapproach to governance within the Gulf. Accordingto political scientist Jill Crystal, The one historicalgift geography gave the tribes of the Gulf before oilwas a gift of default: an outward orientation.10 Thismore cosmopolitan understanding of the world hasled to a continuing conict between traditional andmodern values in Kuwaits political culture. Mary AnnTetreault, another leading scholar on Kuwait, elaborateson this situation by suggesting that, [p]olitical life inKuwait oscillates between traditional monarchy andoligarchic democracy.11 In this regard, Kuwaitis often

refer to their country as a constitutional monarchy andstress that Kuwait has a democratic tradition, whileadmitting that their country does not follow a Western-


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style model of government due to the dominant roleof the ruling family in the countrys governance. The

other important component of the political system isthe National Assembly (often called the parliament),which was created by the 1962 Constitution and servesas the legislative arm of the government. As will bediscussed below, this body has been a vital institutionwith a turbulent history since it was formed shortlyafter Kuwaits 1961 independence.

Kuwaits ruling Sabah family has been in powersince the mid-1700s, although there have often beenformal and informal curbs on the familys authorityto govern. Foreign policy was the responsibility ofthe British under a protectorate relationship that wasapplied to Kuwait from 1899 until 1961. Other curbson the ruling family were a direct result of the internaldistribution of power within the emirate. Kuwaitis,

throughout their history, have shown respect for thespecial historical role and leadership of the Sabah family,while frequently rejecting the concept of absolutist rule.12Kuwait also developed a strong system of consultationand consensus in part due to the inuence of the localmerchant class and also because of the leveling effectsof pre-oil poverty. In the early 20th century, successfulKuwaiti merchants, upon whom the economy rested,usually considered themselves the social equals of theruling family, and they often successfully demandedto be treated that way. The power of the merchantslater faded as oil wealth strengthened the autonomyof the ruling family and allowed them to gain furtherpopular support through the provision of increasinglylavish government services.

Prior to its 1961 independence, Kuwait hadongoing experience with various quasi-democraticinstitutions, and the establishment of the 1962 Kuwaiti


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Constitution was widely viewed as continuing andcodifying indigenous Kuwaiti values of democracy

and consultation. Newly-independent Kuwaitis didnot regard democracy as imported or imposed fromabroad.13 Rather, many citizens viewed it as indigenousand important. Previous experiments in pluralismincluded various advisory councils to the emir, some ofwhich were quite assertive.14 Moreover, on November1, 1960, elections took place for the rst time in Kuwaitihistory. These were for the position of mukhtar, akind of local leader in each of Kuwaits villages andmunicipalities. Every Kuwaiti citizen male over age21 had the right to participate.15 Another strong andviable democratic pillar is the diwaniya. The diwaniya isa Kuwaiti custom whereby friends and acquaintancesgather to discuss various, often political, subjects,sometimes with particular speakers, and with dinner for

those attending. In recent years, these gatherings havesometimes been covered by the press.16 Traditionally,only men attend diwaniyas, but this situation now seemslikely to change since women were granted the right tovote and hold ofce in 2006 (see below). As womenbecome more involved in political life as a result oftheir newly-established rights, it is expected that eithermixed gender or parallel diwaniyas for women willbecome more important to Kuwaiti political life.

On November 11, 1962, Emir Abdullah al Salimal Sabah signed the newly created constitution, thusbecoming the rst constitutional monarch in the Gulf.17The Kuwaiti Constitution specied that successionto the position of emir is limited to members of theSabah family who are descendents of Emir Mubarak al

Sabah, known as Mubarak the Great (1896-1915). EmirMubarak broke with the Ottoman Empire in 1899 andis considered to be the founder of modern Kuwait. The


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monarchy also has an unusual tradition of successionwhich, when called upon, makes direct father-to-son

succession unlikely. Tradition, but not the Constitution,stipulates that an effort should be made to alternatethe position of emir between members of the two mainbranches of the Sabah family. These branches are the Jabir branch and the Salim branch, which trace theirlineage back to separate sons of Emir Mubarak. After aserious 2005 succession crisis, the ruling family decidedthat this approach would not be used in empoweringthe current leadership.18 Sheikh Sabah al Ahmad alSabah, the current emir, appointed Sheikh Nawaf alAhmad al Jabir al Sabah, his younger brother as crownprince, thus seemingly ignoring the long-standingprinciple of alternating succession.19 Both the currentemir and crown prince belong to the Jabir branch ofthe royal family. An earlier change that now appears

to be increasingly institutionalized is the separationof the ofces of the crown prince and prime minister.Previously, both ofces were held by one individual. Inthe aftermath of the most recent succession, the ofcesremained separated, at least for the time being.

The prime minister presides over the constitution-ally-established unicameral National Assemblywhich both Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis often referto as the parliament. Kuwait held its rst nationallegislative elections in 1963, and the existence of theparliament remains a continuing source of pride formost Kuwaitis. There is, however, an ongoing conictbetween those Kuwaitis who seek a strong and viableparliament providing oversight of the ruling familyspublic policy, and those who would prefer to see it

reduced to a rubber stamp and democratic ornamentto impress foreign countries, such as the United States,that publicly support global democratic development.


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This division has sometimes had regional implicationsas the often confrontational Kuwaiti style of politics

has occasionally scandalized neighboring states withmore powerful and traditional monarchies. Such statesoccasionally view Kuwait as a worrisome example fortheir own population.20

The Kuwaiti parliament and the democratic processin Kuwait have also experienced serious setbacks.The royal government suspended parliament from1976 until 1981 and then again from 1986 until 1992.According to the Constitution, such suspensions arelegal if they are followed by new elections within 60days, a provision which was ignored in each of thesecases. The parliament was briey suspended again in1999 over problems resulting from misprints in freecopies of the Koran published by the state.21 Anotherbrief suspension occurred in 2006. Both of these later

suspensions were constitutional since they werefollowed by elections in the allotted time frame.

Kuwaits parliament includes 50 directly electedmembers, but their inuence is diluted by the Cabinet,which is appointed by the emir and must include at leastone elected member of the Assembly. Each memberof the 15-person cabinet has a vote in the parliament.Additional cabinet ministers may be appointed fromthe assembly, but there is no requirement for thegovernment to do so beyond the one constitutionally-stipulated position. The government thus beginsany political debate with a virtually automatic 15-vote advantage. This edge has been useful and evendecisive to the government on a number of occasionssuch as the July 2006 reelection of incumbent speaker

of the assembly, Jassem al Khora, over his challenger,Ahmed al Saddoun, in a 36-28 vote.22 Political partiesare illegal in Kuwait, although political blocs exist


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and function under the guise of associations, culturalgroups, and other fronts.

Who can vote is also an important issue in Kuwaitipolitics. For most of Kuwaits history, the right to votewas denied to women, recently naturalized citizens,and members of the armed forces.23 Kuwaiti womenreceived equal political rights in 2005, including therights to vote and run for ofce, through an amendmentto the election law. They voted in national legislativeelections for the rst time in June 2006 when theyofcially represented 57 percent of the electorate.24Previously, women had voted in the April 2006 localelections.25 Following this reform, the parliament isseeking to expand the franchise to military personneland lower the voting age from 21 to 18.26 Both moves arecontroversial, with a number of active duty and retiredmilitary ofcers opposing extending the franchise to

the armed forces, due to a fear of politicization andstrongly-held views on the meaning of nonpoliticalmilitary professionalism. Nevertheless, the search forreform and greater government accountability hasbeen a recurring theme of Kuwait politics which hasreached a particularly important stage in recent yearsand is examined in more detail later. Additionally,for purposes of this monograph, it is important tounderstand that Kuwaitis maintain a strong senseof national identity and patriotism. Kuwait is not anarticial state, nor does it lack a legitimate indigenouspolitical structure.

The Nature of Iraqi Claims against Kuwait.

Kuwait has faced numerous actual and potentialenemies throughout its existence and has been forcedto develop strategies to identify its most dangerousadversaries at any particular time and then respond to


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them. Scholar and former senior Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) ofcial Graham Fuller has stated that

prior to the 1990 Iraqi invasion, Kuwait maintaineda rotating enemies list of countries seeking todominate, overthrow, or subvert the government.27According to Fuller, this list has at times included Iraq,Iran, Egypt (under President Nasser), and even SaudiArabia and Syria.28 In more contemporary times, SaudiArabia has been an ally rather than an enemy, althougha radical change in the Saudi government could leadto existential danger for Kuwait. Syria currently haslimited ability and no clear interest in subvertingthe government of Kuwait. In recent years, the mostdangerous adversaries Kuwait has faced are Iran andespecially Saddam Husseins Iraq. Unfortunately, Iraq-Kuwait relations have been so dominated by the gureof Saddam Hussein in recent years that it is possible to

lose sight of the larger trends and problems, which aresignicant. Moreover, it is often easy to assume thatSaddams departure from the scene is the beginning ofan inevitable upward trend in Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations.Such developments are by no means assured.

While Kuwait has maintained historic differenceswith a number of nations, only Iraq has a history ofintermittent but nevertheless overt challenges to theright of the Kuwaiti state to exist as a sovereign entity.There are several key reasons for this antagonism.Kuwait has an approximately 120-mile land borderwith Iraq, and Kuwaiti territory severely limits Iraqiaccess to the sea. Iraqs quasi-landlocked status hasbeen a source of frustration and resentment to a varietyof Iraqi regimes, and this situation becomes especially

problematic for Baghdad when difculties exist withIran, with which it shares the Shatt al Arab waterway.Perhaps not surprisingly, under these circumstances,


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there are some key historical instances where Iraqileaders have claimed all or part of Kuwait. These events

will be examined later. At this point, it is important tohighlight that the case for Iraqi ownership of Kuwait,for reasons noted below, is not based on any validinterpretation of history or international law, althoughit is often viewed as credible by Iraqi writers, politicians,and probably many ordinary Iraqi citizens.

Iraqi claims to Kuwait are based upon Kuwaitsformer status as a qaza (lesser district or dependency)of the vilayet (province) of Basra under the OttomanEmpire. Since Basra is now part of Iraq, various Iraqileaders have asserted that past links between the twoareas serve as a basis for claims that Kuwait is a partof their territory. Unfortunately for these same leaders,such assertions do not capture the actual nature ofOttoman-Kuwaiti relations. According to historian

Frederick F. Anscombe, who has conducted extensivearchival research using Ottoman documents, Kuwaitwas not integrated with or dependent upon OttomanBasra. Moreover, Ottoman ofcials in Basra werequick to express their unhappiness about this situationduring the period of Ottoman sovereignty. Kuwaitipossession of the best port in the area was a continuingirritation to Basra ofcials who complained thatKuwait was independently ruled by sheikhs, and notproper ofcials.29 This historical research suggeststhat during the Ottoman period, Kuwait was not ruledfrom the territory included in present day Iraq, and itsstatus as a qaza was administrative convenience ratherthan a working relationship. Ottoman ofcials inBasra wanted control of Kuwait and were disgruntled

that they did not have it. To the extent that they weresubordinate to any other authority, Kuwaiti rulerswere subordinate to the Sultan in Istanbul. In contrast


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to Iraq, modern Turkey has unequivocally renouncedsovereignty over the Arab countries that were once

part of the Ottoman Empire.30

Just as important, Kuwait severed its politicalties to the Ottoman Empire in 1896 and asserted thisindependence by concluding a treaty with the UnitedKingdom in 1899. The driving force behind this changewas Emir Mubarak the Great, who was able to bargainwith the British for some signicant concessions inexchange for the protectorate relationship that bothsides sought. The United Kingdom (UK)-Kuwaitagreement, which was initially secret, included writtenguarantees that the UK would intervene with militaryforce should Kuwait be attacked by a foreign power.The Kuwaitis also received some British nancialsupport and placed their foreign and defense policiesin UK hands. The demise of the Ottoman Empire in

1918 led to an increasingly public relationship betweenKuwait and the UK, with British forces occasionallybeing used to protect the Kuwaitis from attacking tribalenemies in the 1920s and 1930s.31

Finally, and perhaps most importantly in assessingthe validity of Iraqi territorial claims, Kuwait has avastly different political culture and history than Iraq.Kuwaiti nationalism has sometimes been describedas more developed and nuanced than that of Iraq,and Kuwaiti citizens do not view themselves as alost province of Iraq. Historical claims of one stateseeking to absorb another seldom outweigh the willof the population, even in much more compelling andlegally valid instances than the Iraq-Kuwait case.32 Inthis regard, Kuwaits ties with the UK did not interfere

with the continuing development of an indigenouspolitical culture or distinct Kuwaiti national identityvastly different from that of Iraq. The British were


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primarily concerned with supporting and protectingtheir trade route to India and ensuring that no other

external powers attempted to displace their inuencein Kuwait. So long as these goals were met, they usuallydid not bother to interfere with Kuwaiti internal politicsor political development.33

The Looming Threat: Iraqs Long-standingInterest in Kuwait.

Iraqi interest in Kuwait predates the later countrysindependence going back to the era when both nationshad special relations with the British. Iraq was createdfrom the unication of three Ottoman provinces in 1920and was made a British mandate until 1932. It was alsoplaced under the governance of key members of theHashemite family, which had supported the British

military during World War I, and continued to ruleIraq until 1958. The discovery of oil in Kuwait in 1937-38 (and suspicions that it existed prior to that time)seems to have led to a strong upsurge in Iraqi interestin the future of the emirate and may have been the basisfor later calls to annex Kuwait by Iraqi governmentleaders.34 Although oil was not to be exploited untilafter World War II, Kuwait was beginning to showreal economic potential, which was of interest to theIraqis.

Hashemite calls for Kuwaiti unication with Iraqare closely associated with Iraqs second monarch, KingGhazi ibn Faisal. Ghazi became king in 1933 followingthe death of his father, King Faisal. According to HannaBatatu, a leading historian of this era of Iraqi history,

Ghazi had little experience in governance and nopolitical understanding.35 He did, however, havestrong anti-imperialist views as well as a predatory


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interest in Kuwait. King Ghazi made public statementsdemanding the annexation of Kuwait and attempted to

incite Kuwaitis against the al Sabah family through histirades made from a private radio station maintainedin his Baghdad palace.36 No serious consequencesresulted from these broadcasts, and King Ghazis 1939death in an automobile accident led to a respite in Iraqiclaims against Kuwait. Ghazis death also led to anupsurge in Arab nationalist speculation that the kinghad really been murdered by the British for opposingan array of their interests.37 There were also suspicionsthat British plots against Ghazis life might have beenabetted by veteran Iraqi politician Nuri al Said. Thetwo Iraqi leaders were known to detest one anotherfor a variety of personal as well as political reasons.38Nevertheless, as late as January 1939, the Britishopposed the removal of Ghazi from the throne when

they were apprised of maneuverings by Nuri to doso.39 The exact circumstances of Ghazis death remaincontroversial, and the conspiracy theories remainunproven. Although the Kuwaitis were in no positionto inuence these events, it is difcult to imagine thatGhazis death was a cause of sadness for them.

Kuwait, in partial reaction to Ghazis earlierthreatening behavior, continued to reach out to theIraqis during its later years as a British protectorate in aneffort to establish normal relations and thereby reducethe danger of Iraqi subversion or military action againstit. In March 1952, the Kuwaiti ruler visited Baghdad asa guest of the Hashemite government, where he hopedto improve relations between the two countries to thepoint that Iraq would no longer question Kuwaits

right to exist as a separate, independent state.40 Thisvisit went well and gave the Kuwaitis some hope forbetter relations. Unfortunately, in early 1958 the Iraqi


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monarchy again indicated how quickly Baghdadsgoodwill could dissipate when Kuwait was viewed as

insufciently supportive of Iraqi priorities. At this time,Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al Said became especiallyinterested in encouraging Kuwait to become part of aprojected union of Jordan and Iraq in what was calledthe Arab Union.41 This effort was designed by theIraqi and Jordanian monarchies to help to limit theEgyptian propaganda victory resulting from the 1958Egyptian/Syrian union into one country, the UnitedArab Republic (UAR). The Baghdad governmentwas then engaged in a bitter, losing struggle for Arableadership with President Gamal Abdul Nasser ofEgypt, and the Egyptian merger with Syria helpedNasser to consolidate his already lofty image as a pan-Arab hero.42 The Arab Union scheme was designed tonegate some of the propaganda value of the formation

of the UAR, while building a foundation for aconservative, anti-Nasser Arab bloc.

The 1958 Iraqi revolution destroyed the Baghdadmonarchy and ended plans for the union with Jordan,thereby halting the pressure on Kuwait to associateitself with this effort. During the early stages of theuprising, key members of the royal family, includingthe young king, were massacred at the palace. PrimeMinister Nuri al Said, the consummate symbol of theold regime, was killed in the street by an Iraqi AirForce sergeant, while attempting to ee the country.43After burial, his body was disinterred by an angrycrowd and dragged through the streets, hanged, tornto pieces, and nally burned.44 While this revolutionended the Iraqi monarchys pressure on Kuwait, it also

set the stage for a new and more threatening encounterwith a much more dangerous regime. The leader ofthe Iraqi revolutionaries who became prime minister


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after the Hashemites fall was Brigadier Abdul KarimQassim, an erratic and unpredictable army ofcer who

was to emerge as one of Kuwaits most threateningenemies, just as the small emirate was preparing forindependence.

On June 19, 1961, the Anglo-Kuwaiti Treaty of 1899was terminated and replaced by a treaty of friendshipin which the UK acknowledged Kuwaiti independence.Six days later, Prime Minister Qassim pounced on thesituation by stating that Kuwait was an integral partof Iraq and that the UK had declared an oil well astate by granting Kuwait full independence.45 TheIraqis declared the 1899 agreement between Britainand Kuwait illegal on the grounds that Kuwait didnot have the right to end its relationship with theOttoman Empire or Iraq as a successor sovereign.While Qassim did not clearly threaten an immediate

military invasion, some of his public statements wereso confusing and contradictory that it was difcult todiscern how he planned to unify Kuwait with Iraq andwhat the Iraqi militarys role was to be in implementingsuch a unication.46 More ominously, June pressreports stated that Iraqi troops had moved towardsthe frontier. These reports were later discredited, butthe prudent path at the time was to treat the danger ofinvasion as serious.47

As the crisis unfolded, it is possible that Qassim mayhave believed that average Kuwaitis sought liberationfrom the rule of the Sabahs and hoped that Kuwaitwould be unied with Iraq. It is not clear how theIraqi leader might have arrived at this belief, althoughthe late 1950s were a heyday of Arab unity rhetoric,

and Qassims own hatred of the Iraqi monarchymight have led him to believe that such beliefs wereubiquitous throughout the Middle East. One senior


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Iraqi army ofcer, on his own initiative, contacted aKuwaiti friend in Beirut during the crisis in order to

ascertain the correctness of Qassims assumption.48

Hewas told that Kuwait was viewed as a distinct countryby its citizens who had no interest in becoming partof Iraq.49 The Iraqi colonel considered this answersurprising and quickly conveyed it to Qassim.50 There isno evidence that Qassim was prepared to be receptiveto this information, but no evidence that he made anyeffort to look into the matter more deeply, either.

In the face of the Iraqi threat, the Kuwaiti govern-ment sought British military assistance, and the UKresponded with Operation VANTAGE, the deploy-ment of 8,000 troops in or near Kuwait along withsupporting air units.51 This was a serious deterrent forceat the time. The size of the Iraqi army was then around60,000 troops, although most of these were far from rst

rate. Iraq was further undergoing the difcult processof transitioning from Western to Soviet weapons andequipment. Moreover, Iraqs already limited ability toconduct a military invasion was quickly complicatedby domestic problems. Just as Qassim was attemptingto present a credible threat to Kuwait, Iraqs Kurds,who had initially welcomed the new Iraqi regime,were increasingly at odds with Baghdad over theissue of Kurdish autonomy. When Qassim issued hisclaim to Kuwait, many Kurdish leaders saw this as anopportunity to rollback government authority in theKurdish regions of northern Iraq.52 By September 1961,Iraqi military forces were in open conict with Kurdishmilitias, and Iraqi Air Force units were bombingKurdish villages. The new military requirements of

a Kurdish rebellion enormously complicated anypotential invasion of Kuwait.

The Kuwaitis, for their part, were uneasy aboutrelying on British troops for their protection, since


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this dependency harmed their countrys claim to haveemerged from a colonial relationship. In addition

to seeking military protection from an outsideinvasion, Kuwait also sought world recognition as anindependent, sovereign state. A major pillar of thisgoal was achieved when Kuwait was unanimouslyaccepted for membership in the Arab League on July 20, 1961.53 Iraq, the only state opposing thisaction, made the surprising blunder of not havinga representative present for the proceedings thatallowed Kuwait to join the League.54 Had the Iraqisattended these meetings, they should have been ableto prevent Kuwaiti membership since the acceptanceof new members is supposed to be unanimous underArab League rules. Kuwait was, however, blocked inits efforts to join the United Nations (UN). The Sovietscontended that Kuwait remained a British colony in all

but name due to the British military presence. Moscowcorrespondingly vetoed Kuwaiti membership in theUN until October 1963 after the death of Qassim andthe establishment of a new and more constructive Iraqi-Kuwaiti relationship. While the Soviets had based theirobjections to Kuwaiti UN membership on the issue ofBritish inuence, the primary reason for their actionswas to support their ally in Baghdad.55 In additionto being anti-Western, Qassim usually had excellentrelations with the large and important CommunistParty of Iraq.56

Kuwait responded to these difculties by seekingan Arab League military force which would politicallyovershadow although not actually replace the Britishmilitary deterrent. This action would clear the way for

Kuwaiti UN membership and wider global acceptance.Egypts President Nasser strongly supported theconcept of an Arab League force for Kuwait due to


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an ongoing Egyptian rivalry with Iraq over Arableadership. The Arab League eventually deployed

around 3,300 troops to protect Kuwait. Around 1,200troops were from the UAR and another 1,200 were sentfrom Saudi Arabia. Jordan, which bore a special grudgeagainst the Qassim government, sent a contingentof 300 troops as part of the force to protect Kuwait.57Other nations contributing troops included Sudanand Tunisia. President Nasser withdrew the Egyptiancontingent in December 1961 following a coup inDamascus, ending the union between Egypt andSyria. An additional unstated reason for the Egyptianwithdrawal may have been that Nasser took offenseupon hearing of an interview where the Kuwaiti emirstated that he actually relied basically on the Britishfor protection.58 Jordanian and Saudi troops werewithdrawn in January 1963, and the remainder of the

Arab League forces left on February 19, 1963, by whichtime the crisis appeared to have subsided.59

Iraqi Prime Minister Qassim was overthrown andexecuted in a military coup on February 8, 1963. He wasreplaced by a new military junta of Arab nationalist andBaathist conspirators led by Colonel Abdul Salam Arif.Qassims death offered some immediate opportunitiesfor Kuwaiti-Iraqi reconciliation, although it remaineduncertain if the new Iraqi government would bereceptive to improved relations. From a practical pointof view, the new regime would have had at least asmany problems invading Kuwait as the old one. TheKurdish rebellion in northern Iraq had continued topresent a serious threat to the central governmentas various Kurdish parties joined forces to demand

autonomy from Iraqs central government. Whilethis ghting was punctuated with a series of truces,it was still a central concern for the Iraqi government.


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Moreover, and perhaps almost as serious, Iraq hadnow embarked upon its second military coup since

independence. This action indicated an increasingpoliticized military that had twice overcome anyreservations about taking control of the government.Such a situation substantially escalated the potentialfor new coup plotters to seize the governmentusing rationales similar to those already in power.The collapse of a taboo against coups can becomea staggering problem for military professionalism.Under these circumstances, the best Iraqi army unitswere needed for regime protection, and the militaryremained subject to continuing vetting and purgingwhich undermined military efciency and morale.

While Kuwaitis were not convinced that the Iraqithreat should be viewed as an eccentricity of only oneman, Qassims execution did provide the emirate with

a chance to redene relations with Iraq. Timing wasimportant to this effort. The possibility that the Arifgovernment would either consolidate its power or in-ict a decisive defeat on the Kurds presentedKuwait with signicant strategic concerns about theemergence of a re-energized and focused Iraqi threat.Consequently, the Kuwaitis took advantage of thechange in governments to seek improved relationswith Baghdad and to try to establish normal bilateralrelations. In particular, the government made it knownthat it was willing to provide Iraq with nancial aid asa way to defuse ongoing difculties.60 This approachseemed to yield signicant dividends for bothcountries as the Kuwaitis and Iraqis quietly negotiateda long-term loan for Baghdad. Iraq correspondingly

recognized Kuwait as an independent country onOctober 4, 1963.61

After the 1963 coup and Qassims death, Iraqsapproach to Kuwait shifted from demands for total


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annexation to an interest in border modications andadjustments. When Kuwaits emir visited Baghdad

in March 1965, he was asked to relinquish Bubiyanand Warba islands which Iraq claimed it required fornational security. The emir refused, but the Kuwaitisdid provide Iraq with a continuing ow of foreign aidand made other economic concessions which helped tolimit their problems with Baghdad.62 If Iraq could notobtain the islands outright, the new Iraqi leadership wasespecially interested in leasing Warba and at least partof the larger island of Bubiyan as a way of mitigatingIraqs nearly landlocked status. The Kuwaitis stronglyresisted these overtures in the belief that such an Iraqipresence would evolve into a permanent occupation ifBaghdad was ever allowed such a foothold. Iraq wasunable to press its claims as it remained interested inKuwaiti aid and also fell victim to a series of internal

coups, eventually leading to a Baath party governmentin 1968. This government included Saddam Hussein,who built and consolidated his power until he publiclyestablished himself as undisputed leader in 1979.

Against this background, another important inci-dent occurred in March 1973 when Kuwaiti and Iraqitroops became engaged in a border clash at an Iraqimilitary installation inside Kuwait at al Samita.63 TheIraqi soldiers had been stationed within Kuwaititerritory since 1969 with the passive acceptance of theKuwaiti government on the grounds that this presencewas a temporary response to Iraqi problems with Iran.In March 1973, Baghdad attempted to expand thispresence and perhaps make it permanent leading toa skirmish in which two Kuwaiti troops and one Iraqi

soldier were killed. Kuwait responded to the incursionby declaring a state of emergency, closing the border,and recalling its ambassador to Iraq. The Iraqi foreign


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minister then made matters worse by declaring thatthe whole of Kuwait is disputed territory.64 He also

reiterated the Iraqi interest in Warba and Bubiyan,stating, We are not taking them from Kuwait; ratherwe are giving up Kuwait for the sake of the twoislands.65 The Iraqi belief that they remained entitledto the whole of Kuwait thus never seemed far from thesurface and kept coming out in times of Iraqi-Kuwaitistress, regardless of what government was in power inBaghdad.

Relations between Iraq and Kuwait improvedsignicantly following the July 1977 visit of the Kuwaitidefense minister to Baghdad. When the Iran-Iraq warbegan in September 1980, Iraqi interest in Warba andBubiyan increased dramatically due to the militaryrequirements of the ongoing conict. The Kuwaitisresisted this pressure, but did support the Iraqi

war effort in a variety of signicant ways includingmassive nancial aid to Baghdad. In 1989, after thewar had ended, the Kuwaiti Crown Prince visitedBaghdad where he expected that the issue would beless divisive because of Iraqs strong support duringthe war.66 TheIraqis, however, displayed no gratitudeand immediately began demanding an Iraqi role in thedisposition of the islands. Later, in an Arab Leaguemeeting in Baghdad in May 1990, Saddam demandeda number of Kuwaiti concessions, including theleasing of the two islands to Iraq.67 Relations with Iraqcollapsed as Saddam prepared to resolve his differencewith Kuwait by invasion.

Kuwait Security Policies and Relations with

the United States before the 1990 Iraqi Invasion.

The looming invasion threat of 1990 raised impor-tant questions about how Kuwait was prepared to


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guarantee its sovereignty and protect its borders priorto the attack. Iraq, as has been seen, posed a danger to

Kuwait even prior to Kuwaiti independence, while anumber of other regional states also presented serioussecurity concerns. Normally, a small state attemptingto protect itself from large regional neighbors seeks todo so through alliances and where possible through thedevelopment of indigenous military capabilities. Theability to develop such capabilities will be examinedlater, but this has always been limited due to Kuwaitssmall population base. Alliances are a more complexmatter.

When Kuwait became independent in June 1961,the United States, which had maintained a consulatethere since October 1951, formally upgraded itsrepresentation to that of an embassy.68 Nevertheless, ashas already been noted, the UK, not the United States,

was Kuwaits most important ally in the early yearsof that countrys independence. The United States wasinterested in commercial relations with the emirate butplayed no serious role in defending Kuwait duringthis time frame. In the years between 1961 and 1990,relations between the United States and Kuwait wereusually normal and sometimes good, although neverspecial. The Kuwaitis wanted to avoid the chargeof being overly supportive of Western rather thanArab regional interests. The strong and vociferoussupport that Kuwait gave the Palestinians also led thegovernment to condemn the pro-Israeli policies of theUnited States.69Kuwait continuously sought to polish itsArab nationalist credentials through strong support ofthe Palestinian guerrilla organizations and by allowing

Palestinians preferential entry to Kuwait as noncitizenworkers. Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat launched hisFatah movement from Kuwait in the late 1950s, and


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the Kuwaitis gave him nancial support from at leastthe mid-1960s until 1990 when he betrayed them by

siding with Saddam Hussein in the 1990-91 conict.70

The Arab Leagues strong support for Kuwait inthe 1961 crisis may also have helped to ensure thatthe government maintained its consistent hard line onthe Arab-Israeli conict. In June 1967, Kuwait, as wellas a variety of other Arab states, briey suspendedoil deliveries to the United States and the UK due tothe support these countries provided to Israel in theJune 1967 War.71 Just prior to that conict, Kuwait alsoannounced that it was sending troops to ght besidethe other Arab states.72 These troops never saw combatsince the war was short and decisive, ending in therapid defeat of Arab military forces. Additionally, thesmall size of the Kuwaiti military meant that such acontribution would have been primarily symbolic.

There were, however, limits to Kuwaiti support forArab nationalist causes, and Kuwait would not allowthem to get in the way of more serious national securityconcerns. In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeliwar, Kuwait refused to sever diplomatic relationswith Washington or London despite the urgings of anumber of Arab states to do so.73

Kuwait and the United States became more inter-ested in working together as a result of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war when both countries feared an overwhelm-ing Iranian victory. For reasons to be discussed later,Kuwait initially maintained strict neutrality in thisconict but later began to provide economic, logistical,and diplomatic support to Iraq. As Kuwaiti supportfor Baghdad grew, so did difculties with Tehran. By

summer 1986, the Iranians responded by escalatingtheir attacks on Kuwaiti vessels in the Gulf. In December1986, the Kuwaitis privately requested that the vessels


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be allowed to y the American ag and thereby beplaced under the protection of the U.S. Navy. The

request was formalized in January 1987 and Kuwaits11 supertankers were placed under the U.S. ag.74During the escort operations, the Kuwaiti governmentpaid some of the fuel costs for U.S. ships and aircraftinvolved in the effort.75 Iranian attacks against Kuwaitiships ended.

At the beginning of the 1990 Iraq-Kuwait crisis butprior to the invasion, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Statefor Middle East Affairs John Kelly was asked about U.S.defense obligations to Kuwait during a congressionalhearing. He responded that the United States had noformal obligations to Kuwait, despite the reagging ofKuwaiti tankers in 1987.76 The reagging, he explained,was a discrete agreement that did not carry any largerimplications for defending the emirate. This answer

was merely a factual response to a specic questionabout U.S. legal obligations rather than a statementof policy. Nevertheless, Saddam heard an Arabictranslation of the response within a few minutes of thestatement being made, and was obviously encouraged.Kuwait, at this point, had reason to deeply regret thelack of formal security ties with major global powers.

The Iraqi Invasion, Operation DESERT STORM,and the Emergence of the U.S.-Kuwaiti Alliance.

The August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait wasa dening moment in that countrys history. Shortlybefore the invasion, Saddam accused Kuwait of wagingan economic war on Iraq. The Iraqi dictator claimed that

Kuwait was cheating on its Organization of PetroleumExporting Countries (OPEC) oil production quota andwas thereby ooding the international oil market with


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cheap oil. Such actions, according to Baghdad, playeda critical role in reducing the price that Iraq was able to

obtain for its oil. Saddam also claimed that Kuwait wasslant drilling into Iraqi oil elds, and then stealingIraqi oil along the Kuwaiti border.77 While Kuwaitwas almost certainly involved in oil overproduction,it was not the worst violator of OPEC quotas, andSaddam had clearly over-dramatized the inuence ofKuwaiti actions on the Iraqi economy.78 Additionally,no evidence exists that Kuwait was involved in slantdrilling into Iraqi oil elds.

The leadership, for its part, did not seem tocomprehend the danger Kuwait faced from Iraqi troopsmassed on the border. Many other Arab leaders, such asSaudi Arabian ambassador to the United States PrinceBandar, also believed that Saddam was merely exinghis military muscles to intimidate the Kuwaitis into

nancial concessions while not planning to invade.79

Kuwaiti leaders may have believed that the $13-20billion they supplied to Iraq during the war with Iranhad purchased them some good will. More gravely,they may have fundamentally misunderstood thecriminal nature of Saddams personality and regime.Kuwaitis may also have felt that high-level efforts atArab mediation would calm the situation. EgyptianPresident Mubarak and Saudi King Fahd were fullyengaged in an effort to reach a diplomatic compromisebetween Iraq and Kuwait. As a result of what seemed tobe diplomatic progress, the emir stood down the armyto avoid provoking Saddam. Until the last minute, theKuwaitis seemed to have believed Saddam could havebeen bought off. So far as they were concerned, it was

only a question of price.80Saddams forces invaded Kuwait on August 2,

1990, and rapidly brushed aside disorganized Kuwaiti


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resistance. By the end of the day, Kuwait had been fullyconquered, and Saddam, through his dominance of

the Iraqi and Kuwaiti economies, controlled one-fthof the worlds known oil reserves. Iraqi spokesmendeclared that the invasion had occurred in responseto pleas from Kuwaiti revolutionaries for support inestablishing a new and free government. This storyquickly fell at, and no Kuwaitis of any stature wereprepared to cooperate with the Iraqis. While Saddamat rst appointed a puppet government, he rapidlychanged his mind and annexed Kuwait on August8. After Kuwait was annexed, members of the Iraqi-appointed Kuwaiti government disappeared frompublic view. Their leader, Colonel Ala HusseinAli, was not someone Kuwaitis or members of theworld community had ever heard of, and his actionsdid nothing to bolster the legitimacy of the invasion.

The annexation was widely perceived as even moreillegitimate than the installation of a puppet governmentand declared null and void by the UN Security Council.Tellingly, some informed commentators suggested thatmost ordinary Iraqis believed that Kuwait was part ofIraq, and they supported Saddams decision to seizethe small country.81

Saddam apparently believed that he could obtainworldwide acceptance or at least tolerance for theinvasion, perhaps with a minimum of trouble. Kuwaitwas small and often unpopular since its vast wealth wasoften a source of jealousy and resentment to the poorercountries of the Arab World, despite an expansiveforeign aid program carried out by the Kuwait Fundfor Arab Economic Development (KFAED).82 Saddam

further maintained that he would be a better and moreauthentically Arab custodian of Kuwaits oil wealththan the Kuwaitis would be. Saddams self-image asa man of action in command of a powerful emerging


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regional power was buttressed by the additionalresources he seized from Kuwait. Saddam hoped that

those Arabs who were looking for a champion wouldlook towards him, and see his increased power asserving those seeking to confront Israel and the West.Indeed, some leftist Arab commentators respondedto these events by suggesting that a cash-registercoalition had been put together to destroy Arab andIraqi power, with the liberation of Kuwait serving as aconvenient excuse.83

The Iraqi dictator also seemed to believe thatdeposing the monarchy would be widely acceptedin Kuwait or that there would at least be a signicantminority of anti-Sabah Kuwaitis willing to work withthe Iraqi occupation forces. Unfortunately for Saddam,Kuwaiti nationalism turned out to be a more seriousfactor than he had expected. Iraqi efforts to co-opt some

of the more vocal opposition members of parliamentfailed even though this body had been suspendedby the Kuwaiti government in 1986, creating a cleargrievance in the eyes of many Kuwaiti legislators andtheir supporters. No prominent Kuwaitis were willingto ally themselves with the invaders, thus infuriatingthe Iraqi dictator. Kuwaits Shiite community was alsouncooperative and hostile, despite grievances that theyheld concerning government discrimination. Saddamscontinuing inability to nd prominent Kuwaiti supportwas a serious setback, since a denunciation of Sabahrule by such people may have initially added somecredibility to his otherwise transparent claims that hewas liberating Kuwait. In an unpleasant surprise forSaddam, nationalism was proving to be a powerful

force. Moreover, Kuwaitis were clearly indicatingthat they were united in their opposition to Iraqi ruleregardless of the disagreements that they might have


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among themselves on political issues. This approachwas consolidated in October 1990 when the emir met

with Kuwaiti opposition groups in Jedda, Saudi Arabia,and they agreed to present a united front against Iraqiaggression. Around 1,200 Kuwaiti oppositionistsattended this meeting, where the emir promised torestore parliament and expand political participationin the government. Both sides would work together togain international political support for the liberation ofKuwait.84

Kuwaitis remained uncertain about the prospectsthat the world community would take meaningful stepsto rollback the Iraqi aggression against their country.U.S. political and military leadership was unitedbehind the need to protect Saudi Arabia from Iraq, butthere appeared to be much more uncertainty aboutthe need to invade and liberate Kuwait. It was by no

means certain that the United States would be willingto commit itself to a military solution to the occupation,and it was doubtful that any other approach wouldwork. It also remained to be seen if the United Stateswas interested in reinstating the Sabah ruling familyrather than some Kuwaiti opposition gures. PresidentGeorge H. W. Bushs This will not stand statement ofAugust 5, 1990, staked out the Presidents anger, but nothis approach. Yet, even as the situation was becomingmore complicated, Saddam increasingly foreclosedsome of his own options for leaving Kuwait without awar against the U.S.-led coalition. The Iraqi leader wasespecially unwilling to withdraw from Kuwait after hemade signicant territorial concessions to Iran in orderto be able to move his troops away from the Iranian

border and into the Kuwaiti theater of operations.85Saddams intransigence meant that President Bushwas not faced with any subtle or reasonable soundingproposals that may have split the coalition.


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Kuwaits wealth was systematically plundered, andthe Iraqi military also engaged in gratuitous vandalism

and destruction of the Kuwaiti infrastructure. Iraqiforces conducted summary executions and madeextensive use of torture against any Kuwaitis showingresistance, and against Kuwaitis at random as a wayof terrorizing the population into submission. Much ofthe violence against Kuwaitis and the large numbersof reported murders and rapes may have appeared tobe as much the fault of the Iraqi army as of SaddamHussein.86 Some Iraqi soldiers may have hated theKuwaitis because of their wealth and opportunities,which contrasted greatly with the years of Iraqideprivation and suffering during the 1980-88 warwith Iran. Supplementing random violence, spec-ial Iraqi military units appeared to have been assignedthe task of ensuring that the occupation quickly

broke the Kuwaitis will to resist incorporation intoIraq. Saddam may have been attempting to eradicatethe concept of a separate Kuwaiti identity, and hemay have been personally angered over the Kuwaitiunwillingness to play the role he had scripted for themas grateful subjects who wished to be reunited with theIraqi homeland.

Saddam also remained unconvinced that theAmericans would attack him for the sake of Kuwait.A constant theme in the Iraqi media was that theAmericans could not cope with the demands of a longwar such as he expected that a new Iraq conict couldbecome.87 Additionally, the Iraqi dictator may havewondered how much the United States cared aboutwho ruled Kuwait so long as cheap oil continued to

ow from the region and so long as other U.S. regionalallies such as Saudi Arabia were protected and placedoff limits to any further predatory inclinations by


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Saddam. The dictator strongly indicated that Kuwaitwas a special case, and Iraqi history seemed to indicate

a pattern of interest in Kuwait that was not matchedby territorial aspirations elsewhere (except along theIranian border). Kuwaitis could perhaps be forgiven forbeing uncertain that the United States would confrontrather than accommodate the dictator.

The U.S. congressional decision to authorizepotential military action against Iraq by President Bushwas a close series of votes that may have failed had itnot been for a nal U.S. effort at a diplomatic solution inGeneva that was not accepted by the Iraqis. The Senatevote to authorize military action passed by a narrow 52-47 margin, while the House passed a similar measureby a much stronger vote of 250 to 183.88 The war beganon January 17, 1991, with a prolonged air campaignfollowed by 100 hours of ground combat in which the

Iraqis were defeated and driven from Kuwait. Later,when Iraqi Army units surrendered en mass to the U.S.-led coalition forces, many Iraqi soldiers claimed thatthey never believed in the war. As suggested earlier,this is not a claim that is subject to easy conrmationor denial. During the occupation, Saddam hanged anIraqi colonel who was widely believed to have beenhelping the Kuwaiti resistance, indicating some level ofhumanity by a high ranking military ofcer in Kuwait.89Additionally, some Kuwaitis reported other instancesof collaboration of Iraqi soldiers with Kuwaitis underoccupation.90

As they prepared to retreat, Iraqi forces set 732 oilwells on re. Some observers suggested that the torchingof the Kuwaiti oil elds was done for military reasons

such as the effort to obscure troop movements. TheIraqis would have been especially interested in maskingtroop movements from overhead aircraft and mounted


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a ground counterattack against U.S. forces from the oilelds. Nevertheless, the oil well res had virtually no

tactical effect. The counterattack was quickly defeated,and aircraft operations were not seriously disrupted bythe smoke. It is also possible that the Iraqis had someeconomic motives in seeking to destroy the Kuwaiti oilindustry to help enable Baghdad to continue selling oilafter the war. A nal possibility was that the operationwas carried forward in revenge against the Kuwaitisfor gaining U.S. help to best the Iraqi dictator. Thisrevenge-oriented aspect of Saddams personality is, aspreviously noted, one of the reasons he was able to riseto the top of the unforgiving Iraqi political system andthen maintain himself in power.

Additionally, Saddams suspected hatred forKuwaitis was further reected in his decision to returnall Western and Saudi prisoners of war under the

provisions of the 1991 ceasere, while claiming thatIraq was unable to account for a number of Kuwaitiprisoners.91 The Iraqis admitted taking prisoners fromKuwait back to Iraq but claimed to have lost track ofthem during the post-war Shiite uprising in southernIraq.92 Later, after Saddam was ousted in April 2003,the remains of around 250 Kuwaitis were recoveredat various sites in Iraq. Post-mortems established thatthey had been the victims of summary execution bybeing shot in the head.93 The search for the remains ofother captives has continued since that time, but theKuwaitis have suggested that they are disappointedwith the results of this effort.94

After the war, Kuwaitis were deeply disappointedthat Saddam managed to continue in power despite

several apparently serious attempts by Iraqi militaryofcers to overthrow him in the early 1990s.95 UNsanctions were maintained on the regime from 1990-


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2003, and the regime was treated as an internationaloutcast by a number of states throughout that time.

Later, in 1995, military ofcers afliated with thelarge and important Dulaim tribal federation revoltedagainst Saddams rule, but the dictator was able thesuppress the uprising and executed 120-130 ofcersassociated with it.96

The Evolution of the Kuwaiti Militaryand Its Capabilities.

The 1990 Iraqi invasion left an indelible mark onKuwaiti attitudes about the countrys vulnerability. Itled the Kuwaitis to conclude a 1991 military securityagreement with the United States and defensecooperation agreements with a number of otherpowerful countries. It also led to an effort to expand

and improve the Kuwaiti military. Yet, Kuwait hasfaced and will continue to face a number of difcultieswith national defense. As a small nation with a limitedcitizen population, the Kuwaitis have often had seriousproblems maintaining a formidable military that canserve as even a partial deterrent to the countrys largerneighbors. This has created something of a cycle inKuwaiti attitudes toward national security issues. Intimes of crisis or a looming threat, Kuwait has expandedits military, although it has never been strong enoughto deter or defeat aggression from a major regionalpower without signicant outside help. Until the1990 invasion, Kuwait preferred to address nationalsecurity threats through diplomacy and efforts to playoff rival powers against each other. It did not take the

route of attempting to transform itself into a small butwell-armed and mobilized society (such as Israel orCuba) that could exact a costly price on any potentialinvader.


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The Kuwaiti leadership also had importantreasons for opposing a strong military even if it was

able to overcome the structural problems inhibitingsuch development. In this regard, Kuwait becameindependent at a time when several key Arabmonarchies had recently been overthrown by militarycoups. Egypts King Farouk had been ousted by a freeofcers coup in 1952, and the Hashemite monarchyin Iraq had been overthrown in 1958. Jordan managedto put down several nearly successful coup attempts,and many commentators at that time assumed that theJordanian monarchys chances for survival were poor. 97In this environment, the idea of becoming an ArabSparta, always anathema to Kuwaitis, seemed evenmore unacceptable. Whether because of these concernsor for other reasons, Kuwait is not known to have everfaced a serious military coup attempt throughout its

history. Expansion of the military and a more forcefulmobilization of the society for war clearly had itsthreatening aspects for the Kuwaiti leadership as wellas for the population.

Ongoing attempts to improve military capabilitiesdid, of course, exist despite Kuwaitis understandablelack of interest in a militarized society. In 1969 Kuwaitbegan defense cooperation with France, including anumber of signicant contracts for military equipmentand weapons. These included small arms; artillery; andGazelle, Puma, and Super Puma helicopters.98 Manpowerproblems remained a constant concern during this timeframe, and enlisted ranks were impossible to ll withoutnoncitizen bidoon and foreign Arab soldiers, includingPalestinians. In 1978 Kuwait moved to strengthen

its army by introducing conscription, which lastedin various forms until it was indenitely suspendedin the 1990s.99 Young Kuwaiti males were supposed


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to serve 2 years in the military, except for universitystudents who were slated to serve 1 year. The practice

was introduced because the Kuwaiti military couldnot support its manpower needs through volunteers,although so many Kuwaitis obtained exemptions thatconscription was reduced to a hollow shell.100 A varietyof other opportunities, especially commercial ones,make a military career less appealing than it would bein other societies. Moreover, prior to the 1990 invasion,Kuwaits military was composed of about 12,000personnel. Saddam had a million-man battle-hardenedmilitary.

The Kuwaiti Armed Forces never had a chanceagainst the large columns of invading Iraqi troops.Kuwaiti forces were not organized well for defenseand were quickly overwhelmed by massive numbersof Iraqi troops. Some instances of especially heroic

resistance, nevertheless, did occur, particularly amongcombat aircraft pilots who bombed the advancingIraqi forces, and in some cases were shot downresisting the invaders.101 Likewise, a Kuwaiti armoredbrigade fought very well near the Jahra ridge.102 Later,as it became important for government legitimacyand public relations to suggest to the world that theKuwaiti military had made a decent stand againstthe invaders, the reported valor of the emirs half-brother, Sheikh Fahd al Ahmad, became signicant.Sheikh Fahd was the commander of an elite airborneregiment who stayed behind to lead his unit andwas subsequently killed in battle.103 Extremely heroicaccounts of his last days and hours have emerged asrecounted by an Iraqi deserter who claims to have been

an eye witness. This ex-soldier claims that the Sheikhled his soldiers gallantly against the much larger forceof Iraqis and personally killed several enemy soldiers.


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Many Kuwaitis emphatically believe this story and areinspired by it, while others have expressed doubt.104

Clearly, this is how Kuwaits leaders and defendersought to have acted, but beyond that, events becomevery difcult to verify.105

After liberation by a U.S.-led international coalitionin 1991, the Kuwaitis had to develop a new approachto national security that addressed many of the sameproblems that they had encountered in the pre-war eraand now included an array of additional difculties.While the Kuwaitis did not plan or expect to defendtheir country alone, they nevertheless needed to makeit clear they would do their share of the ghting inany future conict as an important part of alliancemaintenance. Thus, Kuwait faced the task of rebuildingits army and air force to the point that it couldcontribute more effectively to the national defense of

the country. In doing so, the Kuwaitis did not wish tobe seen as asking their allies to make sacrices that theywere unprepared to make themselves. Additionally,rebuilding and improving the Kuwaiti military afterthe war was a staggering challenge. Kuwaits wartimelosses complicated the pre-war readiness problemsassociated with limited human resources. Kuwaitsmilitary infrastructure was intensively bombed bycoalition forces during the war since Iraqi troops wereusing Kuwaiti bases.106

Kuwaiti military rebuilding goals were exception-ally ambitious, especially given the staggering natureof their wartime losses. The bulk of Kuwaits weaponsand military equipment were lost, destroyed, or stolendriving the Iraqi invasion and its aftermath. Some

combat aircraft and limited supplies of land forcesequipment were saved in the retreat to Saudi Arabia.Otherwise, the Kuwaitis were essentially starting


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over in efforts to equip their forces. Military spendingwent from 12 percent of the national budget to 42

percent in the rst year after liberation.107

While thisdramatic jump reected start-up costs and was notsustained, it signaled Kuwaits commitment to builda military that could much more effectively defendagainst Iraqi aggressi

Kuwaiti National Security and the u.s.-kuwaiti Strategic Relationship After Saddam Pub788

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