International Journal of Arts and Sciences 3(8): 343 – 376 (2010)

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The Construction of Political Communication: An Analysis of Substantive and Symbolic Communicative Factors in the 2008 US Presidential Debates Kurt M.L. Beers, City University, London, UK

Abstract: This study constructs an in-depth analysis of the presence of symbolic communication in political rhetoric by examining the 2008 United States (US) Presidential debates between then-Senator Barack Obama of Illinois, and Senator John McCain of Arizona. The study does not test a hypothesis nor does it produce statistics, but rather, considers language, rhetoric, behaviour, consistency of message, image, as well as concepts of ‘symbolic/substantive communication’, and ‘impression management’ in analysing political communication. Focusing specifically on the foreign policy elements discussed in two of the three televised debates, it will provide a focused analysis and a control framework in which specific and accurate conclusions can be derived. The central objective of this dissertation is to determine, through a methodology of ‘conversation analysis’, whether or not the success of political communication is founded upon the substantive, and/or to what extent it also incorporates the symbolic. The research is sourced in, and thereafter elaborates upon many academic readings, including criticism regarding the historic first-ever televised Presidential debate between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon in 1960, linguistic and behavioural theory, as well as more contemporary studies in politics and communication. This dissertation presents conclusions that are clear and comprehensive. Finding, unsurprisingly, that symbolic communication played an essential role in the 2008 US Presidential debates; this research permitted for the discovery of many unpredicted and fascinating (and in many cases, overlooked) conclusions. The research is primarily concerned with how the candidates portrayed themselves, how they were presented to a general public through the media, but also more formatively regarding how ‘the symbolic’ alters and influences meaning, message, content, and delivery. Since Kennedy and Nixon’s pivotal debate, the mediation of image through television and other technologies for the consumption of a general public means that issues of the symbolic and public image remain of increasing importance in the political sphere. This dissertation seeks to affirm the significance of influential-communicative patterns in the political, suggesting that symbolic factors are incorporated to a level that equates, and often supersedes that of the substantive. Introduction It is a generally accepted notion, whether or not its use is completely understood, that symbolic communication is one of the defining characteristics of human interaction. Even with the

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recognition that communication techniques have the ability to alter the intentions of speech, the mysteries of communication often evade classification. How do spoken messages lead to any significant meaning? How are words constructed and sentences misconstrued, resulting in meanings that are misunderstood or manipulated? The objective of this paper is to explore the differences between substantiated, explicit modes of interaction and other unspoken, image or behavioural-based modes through an examination of the relationship between the concepts of symbolic and substantive communication, particularly in the construction of political rhetoric. It has been suggested by Professor Karen Sanders that in 21st century politics, “image-making appears to trump the making and execution of policy: how stories play and how politicians appear to the public matters above all else.” (Sanders, 2009: 41) This and related claims and studies will be explored as integral to the analysis and findings of this research study. The research compiled in this paper takes into consideration the substantive and symbolic factors at play during the 2008 US Presidential debates, focusing specifically on the foreign policy components of (two of) the three televised debates, between then-Senator Barack Obama of Illinois and Senator John McCain of Arizona. It should be noted that during the time this research was conducted Obama had already been elected President; however, it had little bearing on the analysis. This research does not seek to find summative clues as to who would (or would not) be President, but rather endeavours to reveal some of the symbolic and substantive communicative factors that were at play during the Presidential debates. Furthermore, this paper will dissect language construction and its usage as a tool in the realm of communication exclusively through the methodological approach known as ‘conversation analysis’. This technique will be utilized to deconstruct and reconsider the spoken and unspoken interactions of the aforementioned candidates, as well as re-evaluate their behavioural traits and visual demeanour, allowing for the demystification of communicative modes and meanings within the realm of political rhetoric.

Upon assuming the Presidency in January 2009, many political pundits, historians, and researchers suggested that Barack Obama is the most charismatic President since John F. Kennedy – not a small claim to make. Through symbolism and charisma Obama capitalized on voters desire for change, and during the 2008 election a veteran British reporter confirmed that, “Obama’s soaring rhetoric captured the mood of a nation hungry for change,” (Sanders, 2009: 54) His campaign slogan, Yes We Can!, was projected far beyond a cultural catchphrase, becoming representative of an American political zeitgeist. More importantly, this slogan exhibited metonymic and symbolic meaning inherent in the greater concepts that it represents.

The primary motivation of this research does not revolve around the candidates’ campaign fortitude, but rather focuses on (sub)conscious messages that are elevated through their relationship to, and within, a political context. Marking the first ‘modern campaign’, the first televised US Presidential debate took place on September 26, 1960, between then-Vice President Richard M. Nixon, and then-Senator John F. Kennedy. The aftermath of the debate between Nixon and Kennedy proved momentous to the future of politics, suggesting that the success of political messaging is not merely founded upon substantive communication, but that it also incorporates a significant portion of what is referred to as the ‘symbolic’. The New York Times wrote in 1960 that viewers “were intensely [more] interested in the battle of images [during the debate],” to such an extent that the symbolic played a crucial role in defining the 1960 Presidential debate and influencing the election results. (Donaldson, 2007: 120) So strong were

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these tremors, that the lessons learned from the Nixon-Kennedy debate have been applied, in one way or another, by every Presidential candidate since, demonstrating the role symbolic communication plays in shaping media personas that inevitably result in ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. Kennedy heralded such an unprecedented victory over Nixon, in both the symbolic and the substantive, that “[his] image invariably is summoned for review the moment Presidential debates are discussed because candidates crave to be compared to him.” (Kraus, 2000: 230) Since the 1960 debates, political image and symbolic concepts have proliferated in the literature of communication, history, linguistics, and political science.

With the emergence of new media technologies, symbolic communication has garnered an even greater significance in persuading public opinion and securing votes given the highly publicized and increasingly visually dependent nature of political messaging. As a result, the central objective of this research is whether or not the success of political communication is merely founded upon substantive communication, and/or to what extent it also incorporates the symbolic. In referencing the final US Presidential debate of 2008, Kevin Connolly of the BBC wrote that, “The [US Presidential debate] was the most important single showdown in the most expensive campaign in the history of democracy, so it was bound to begin with edgy, cautious manoeuvring and end with rival claims of victory.’1

The findings of this research will determine how symbolic constructions in highly mediated political forms contributes to the study of communication, the practical dissemination of language, and the relevance of the symbolic in a political sphere.

Literature Review: Political Rhetoric, Symbolic and Substantive Communication Today, few events manage to capture the attention of the current American political climate better than a US Presidential election. During campaigns, it is common practice for Presidential candidates to spend millions of dollars advertising, with arguably the most effective and extensive means of self-promotion being the televised debates. These debates – which are vitally situated near the end of the campaign – provide the voting public with an opportunity to witness the candidates’ supposedly candid responses to topical questions in real-time. Participants are given an opportunity to discuss key issues about their respective platforms on prime-time television in an attempt to win the support of voters, and ultimately, the Presidency.

Several key terms and concepts will be introduced in order to equip the reader with the necessary academic idioms and linguistic terminology that will prove essential in understanding the findings of this research. Political rhetoric is a strategy often used within a political sphere and operative in elements of communication. ‘Rhetoric’ refers to a systematic linguistic process defined by persuasion; it may also refer to the strategic and often deceptive use of language, which can otherwise be known in the political and media spheres as ‘spin’. (Corcoran, 1979, 3-13) Many academics believe that political rhetoric is an art-form that manipulates and deceives. Further, rhetoric along with other communicative tactics, such as linguistic devices, abstract

1 BBC – Connolly, Kevin (2008) ‘US rivals spar in first TV Debate’, October 16, 2008 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7639102.stm - Accessed April 8, 2009

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questioning and answering, selective diction and semantics, as well as ‘impression management’ are used to achieve various objectives. The knowledge of ‘substantive’ versus ‘symbolic’ communication is also crucial in providing clarity and a better realization of the conclusions reached. ‘Symbolic communication’ refers to the existence of often sublimate physical and verbal messages that, through their conscious or subconscious delivery, alter the reception and understanding of an expected language construct. (Schwartz/Thompson, 1990: 39-55) Recently (and greatly) influenced by modern mediated technologies, symbolic communication can be deconstructed and studied by identifying and demonstrating how those messages can be used to alter the content of communication. ‘Substantive communication’ by contrast refers simply to the factual content of messages. This is truly the substance of communication presented through a methodical, reflective, and knowledgeable manner, which thereafter has the potential to lead to sustained, focused and engaged interaction. (Sperber/Wilson, 1986: 172-189) Unlike symbolic communication, which relies heavily on subconscious factors, substantive communication concentrates almost exclusively on the content of the message – what is delivered rather than how it is delivered. As authors Kathleen Jamieson and David Birdsell affirm, the political debate “provide[s] viewers with a clearer sense of policy differences.” (1988: 127) They write that the debates benefit the electorate by “revealing candidates’ communicative competence and habits of mind, by augmenting their accountability, by acting as a check on candidate manipulation.” (Ibid: 160) Here the symbolic is often pushed to the foreground by offering a compare and contrast analysis of each candidate in a literal head-to-head format.

According to political scientist Benjamin Page of North Western University, Presidential debates are of specific interest in that they have the capacity to present symbolic rhetoric under the auspices of substantive communication in a manner unmatched by many other conventional means of political communication. Page, who has authored many articles in the area of public opinion and policy research and the mass media, suggests that the tangible impact ‘the symbolic’ has on voters should not be dismissed or discredited as a powerful tool. In fact, he believes that symbolic factors have the ability to overshadow fact-driven, substantive information, and when combined with a candidate’s smarts can influence voters in a way that translate directly into votes. While a candidate’s platform and policies may remain ambiguous, “information about personal characteristics is relatively cheap and abundant [to obtain] by means of television news clips, speeches, interviews and debates,” and can greatly influence one’s opinion of a candidate. (Page, 1978: 262) He further argues that due to the increase of media technology, Presidential candidates undergo a level of scrutiny previously unmatched. He states further that voters often learn about Presidential candidates only through the media, elevating the candidates’ symbolic and communicative projections to critical importance in shaping the Presidential outcome. Scott Keeter, Director of Survey Research for the Pew Research Center in Washington believes that “this is a function of the visual and actual nature of [television], and is reinforced by the practices of news organizations and personnel that serve to downplay cognitive content. (Keeter, 1987: 345)

It has been advocated that television devalues content in campaign discourse, and specifically, highlights image over substance, indicating the importance the visual plays in political communication. Author Neil Postman writes that, television “does not direct attention to

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ideas...instead, it directs [people] to respond to images, which are holistic, concrete, and simplistic [and that] it rarely matters what anyone says on television.” (Postman, 1988: 18) Keeter continues, “The importance of candidate image – relative to other information – may be greater for voters who depend on television. Television by its nature provides a qualitatively different product. It provides the candidates as a person,” and therefore not as a substantive message. (Keeter, 1987: 345) Politics is about performance, spectacle, and the creation of images, as well as promoting an individual as metonym for a larger context. In the 2008 Presidential debates, Obama and McCain each made use of a repertoire of words, actions and gestures in an effort to consolidate their image for the American people. Through a candidate’s carefully selected and devised patterns of dress, speech, and policy, viewers expect that a certain individual can and will fulfill their expectations, and they can therefore feel comforted by their selected candidate and the ideas that he/she represents.

In the Obama-McCain debates, foreign relations, healthcare, and taxation were repeatedly discussed issues, however, their central messages were frequently overshadowed by symbolic factors, at times relegating the substantive to a secondary position. A viewing audience will often not recall exactly what was said by either Obama or McCain, but rather, the way in which it was said. This schism between the form of the message and its content has become an inevitability of politics ever since the emergence of the ‘home-TV’ in the 1960s. As a consequence, mediated politics have witnessed the downfall of many candidates as a direct result of their inability to adequately communicate their message in a way that takes advantage of the symbolic and the substantive. Thomas Patterson, who conducted a study of media’s impact (during the 1976 election), writes that “when only the voters’ impressions about the candidates’ personalities and leadership capacities are considered, television’s impact is [apparent].” (Patterson, 1980: 143) In his study of the 1960 Nixon-Kennedy debates, public opinion analyst Samuel Lubell systematically interviewed voters during the election and asked two questions: “Did you watch the TV debates?” and “What did you think of them?” His findings found that “overwhelmingly, the majority responded in terms of how the candidates looked and handled themselves rather than about the issues that were argued about.” (Lubell, 1962: 152-153) Furthermore, he established that many of the respondents were “unable to cope with the issues discussed so they settled back and judged the debates as a personality context [between Nixon and Kennedy]. (Ibid: 153) Today, voters appear to be no different; they want their leaders to exude confidence, intelligence, and leadership qualities in a capable and charismatic way. The question remains whether or not charisma is an important attribute in order to be a successful leader - is style indicative of substance? In this regard, Obama was arguably more successful at integrating charisma into his public persona in a similar way that Kennedy was able to skilfully balance the substantive with the symbolic. Although image was not as highly mediated in the mid 20th

century, it can be argued that Kennedy specifically understood the importance of image, and today it is still remembered as a critical component of his victory.

Nixon-Kennedy Debate of 1960: The Importance of the Symbolic

During the 1960 debate, many revolutionary sociological occurrences formed the basis for significant study in the area of communication, indicating the weightiness of the ‘symbolic’ as a communicative tool. The 1960 debate acts as a foundational basis for this paper as one of “the most intensively studied events in the history of communication.” (Clevenger/Parson/Polisky,

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1962: 341) To the detriment of modern-day democracy, voters have come to “focus more on [a candidate’s] presentation and personality than on [the] issues.” (Katz/Feldman, 1962: 218) The Nixon-Kennedy debate was “one of the most significant political events of the twentieth century,” and took on “almost mythical proportions...that both decided an election and changed the course of the nation [and future] political campaigns.” (Donaldson, 2007: 110) Due to their availability before a scrutinizing American public, these debates made political history on national television. National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) Chairman Robert Sarnoff hailed the 1960 debate as “a momentous period for broadcasting, and in the life of the nation.” (Minow/Sloan, 1987: 11) Indeed, these claims were substantiated in a poll conducted by Roper for Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) News. They reported that: “...57 percent of those who voted said that the debate had influenced their opinion. Notably, 6 percent said that their final decision was a result of the debate alone. Of that 6 percent, 72 percent decided to vote for Kennedy and 26 percent for Nixon.” (Ibid: 9) Considering that over 70 million American citizens watched this debate, the numbers are appropriately influential. What this poll helps clarify is perhaps one of the biggest surprises during the Nixon/Kennedy televised debate. The near consensus by radio listeners that Nixon, on almost all accounts, secured a win over Kennedy was a different conclusion than that reached by those who watched the debate on television. The public were divided into two distinct groups: those that watched the debate on television versus those who listened on radio, with each being nearly unanimous in their respective conclusions. Overwhelmingly, viewers (as opposed to listeners) felt that Kennedy won the evening, superseding Nixon. “Among radio listeners, Nixon was judged the winner, but a majority of television viewers felt that Kennedy had won regardless of who they personally favoured.” (Rorabaugh 2009:154) In fact, the Institute of Communication Research of Stanford University conducted different surveys of Democratic and Republican voters who watched the debate on television. Both groups were interviewed before and after the first debate; the study found that both groups clearly favoured Kennedy. When asked who benefited from the debate, 38% of Republicans believed that Democratic opponent Kennedy performed better compared to 14% for their candidate Nixon. Among Democrats this margin grew greater still: 62% of Democrats favoured Kennedy’s performance in contrast to only 8% who thought that Nixon gained the upper hand. What both of these studies demonstrate is that without the symbolic – which in this case was so widely distributed and dominated by television – Nixon appeared to be the winner; however, when symbolic factors and image were introduced into a political context delivered to the public, these outcomes were dramatically reversed.

Pivotal to this claim was the over-all increase in the use of television as a political and sensationalist medium; “In 1952, 31% of a national sample credited TV with bringing them most information about the campaign” whereas, in 1960, that percentage was increased to 60%. (Katz/Feldman, 1962: 193) The debates were hugely affected by the emergence of home-television, forever changing the rules of political communication, placing new importance on candidate image. “By 1960, television had earned its stripes as a fully qualified equal of print and radio as a political reporting medium,” which comingled politics and image into a powerful political force that had not been fully realized until that time. (Mickelson, 1989: 60) With a significantly larger percentage of the population ‘tuning-in’ to their televisions over their radios, Kennedy was able to net himself about two million votes, securing him the Presidency.

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(Rorabaugh, 2009:155) In the end, Kennedy won the election with fewer than 120,000 votes2

Nixon’s televised ‘loss’ versus his supposed radio ‘win’ can be reduced to a number of immediately evident symbolic factors. One observation concluded that “no picture in American politics [told] a better story of crisis [than] Vice-President [Nixon] as he half slouched, his ‘Lazy Shave’ powder faintly streaked sweat, his eyes exaggerated hollows of blackness, his jaws, jowls, and face drooping with strain.” (Donaldson, 2007: 118) One will notice the sole focus on image; the substantive appears completely absent from this telling picture of ‘America in crisis’. Chicago Mayor Richard Daley was infamously quoted, saying “they’ve embalmed [Nixon] before he even died!” (Donaldson, 2007: 118) While Kennedy, looking like a “movie star” (Rorabaugh, 2009: 155) was “well tanned from his open-air campaigning in California...like a young Adonis: tall, thin...and wearing a well-tailored dark suit.” (Donaldson, 2007: 114-5) Kennedy’s image projected so positively on television, he simply appeared ‘Presidential’, confident, and competent in the eyes of the American voting public. Nixon, conversely, “frequently looked off stage [portraying] shiftiness, lick[ing] sweat from his upper lip, [implying] that he could not handle pressure, or nodd[ing] in agreement with his rival…which proved a devastating visual impact, suggesting that an outmatched Nixon had been made to sweat by Kennedy’s shrewd words.” (Rorabaugh, 2009:153-4) Kennedy himself admitted that “TV more than anything else turned the tide.” (Kirkpatrick, 1979: 35)

, proving that his (so-called) televised victory proved tantamount to his Presidential win. Had Kennedy not managed to snag the votes that he did from television viewers – primarily by means of the symbolic – it is a statistically accepted claim that he would never have become the 35th President of the United States.

In their review of the 1960 debates, sociologists Elihu Katz and Jacob Feldman found that the debates “made some issues more salient than others…and effected very few changes of opinions on issues.” (Katz/Feldman, 1962: 203) (italics own) Perhaps more importantly, they concluded that the debates “focused more on presentation and personality than on [political] issues.” (Ibid: 203) For their part, Kennedy and Nixon were equally convinced that the debates played an important role in that election. President Kennedy later observed:

The...television debates between Mr. Nixon and myself have been a great service by the television industry to the American people...While it might have been better to have had … an opportunity for Mr. Nixon and myself to develop our thoughts more fully, we did discuss a wide range of matters, and we did it facing one another. (Kraus, 1977: 3)

Nixon similarly concluded: These face-to-face confrontations viewed by tens of millions of voters were all a radical innovation, that the electorate had a unique opportunity to take the measure of the candidates “under fire,” that the television industry assumed new and far-reaching responsibilities in the public service, and that the specific form and format of the debates unquestionably influenced their impact. (Ibid: 3)

2 BBC – “1960: Narrow Victory for John F Kennedy” http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/9/newsid_3120000/3120396.stm - Accessed July 14, 2009

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Nixon’s 1952 “Checkers” Speech While mindful of the focus of this paper, it is necessary to reference Nixon’s celebrated 1952 ‘Checkers’ television address, which occurred eight years before the 1960 Presidential debates. While facing the threat of being dropped as Eisenhower’s Vice-Presidential running mate, Nixon turned to the relatively untested medium of television to appeal to the American people. He felt this was his best and perhaps only opportunity to “clear the record” and counter the allegations against him regarding a private expense fund that was designed strictly for his personal use. (Mickelson, 1989: 56) In an attempt to save his spot on the Eisenhower ticket Nixon became “his very own writer, producer, director, and actor,” and spoke directly to the American people through television as a new political medium. Luckily, for Nixon, he received an overwhelmingly positive response; this venture was so effective that it even killed any lingering doubt in Eisenhower’s mind that Nixon should be dropped from the ticket. “The speech furnished a striking demonstration that under the right circumstances, television was capable of galvanizing a whole country.” (Ibid: 56) The ‘Checkers’ speech was broadcast to “the largest [American] audience that had (to that point) tuned in to a political program.” (Ibid: 57) As a result, this short-term victory gave Nixon a skewed perception of both his communication prowess and television ability, fostering a self-created belief that he was much more media savvy than he actually was. This false security may have contributed to his lack of preparation for the first Presidential debate later on, unintentionally strengthening Kennedy’s position. Jamieson and Birdsell explain that the stakes at risk in today’s Presidential debates “require the nominees to break from the mind-numbing rituals of campaigning [to] confront the strengths of their opponents’ positions and the weaknesses of their own.” (1988: 154) While Kennedy opted to take a three day break to prepare for the debate, Nixon continued campaigning right up to five hours before the debate. The aftershocks of the Nixon-Kennedy debate were felt so deeply that Nixon “wanted no part of debate in 1968 nor in 1972, and it was not until 1976 when incumbent President Gerald Ford agreed to meet challenger Jimmy Carter in two direct confrontations” that Presidential debates would once again become a regular staple in American political campaigns. (Mickelson, 1989: 122) Television: Intimacy, Image, Influence and Theatre Since the institutionalization of the debates in American Presidential campaigns, candidates have learned to use television to their advantage as a politically and theatrically advantageous tool. Author Tom Rosenstiel writes that politicians “have learned to use television to communicate directly to the American people...making politics a more intimate and direct transaction between the [candidates] and people in their living room.” (Rosenstiel, 1994: 91) This intimacy, however, is a perceived reality; although an awareness of familiarity and closeness is generated through television, the relationship between the viewer and the candidate is almost entirely artificial. In many cases, the viewer has little or no personal knowledge of the candidate apart from what is learned through the holistic-image presented through the manipulative screen of television. In the book Televised Presidential Debates: Advocacy in Contemporary America, authors Susan Hellweg, Michael Pfau and Steven Brydon suggest, “television fosters a perception of intimacy.”

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(Hellwag/Pfau/Brydon,.1992:.75) Television viewers have come to depend on visual messages that offer a legitimization of personal contact between viewer and communicator, enabling the viewer to react more intimately to the message. The very nature and scale of television allows for the illusion of close contact with a source. Professor Joshua Meyrowitz points out that even the size of the figure within the television frame causes a heightened perception of facial cues, inflections, and a perceived intimate access between viewer and the individual in question. (Meyrowitz, 1986: 257) Others, like author Barry Brummett, have observed that “the small screen allows television to focus on the interpersonal: close-up shots are more successful on the television screen than they would be on the cinema screen,” inviting a candidate into one’s home and personal space. (Brummett, 1988: 210-211) Of course, certain individuals are more media-savvy and appear more natural on-screen than others, and there are no objectively defined rules on how to capitalize one’s self and message ‘on-screen’. In one experimental study done as a retrospective assessment of candidate influence, Professor Akiba Cohen finds that certain politicians use television more effectively than others. (Cohen, 1976: 29-35) A revelation that is in itself unsurprising, seeing that each candidate brings with them a symbolic style unto their own, forcing them to curtail their weaknesses in order to fit the mould of television and maximize their delivery. In his findings, Professor William Adams writes that reliance on television was beneficial to Kennedy in the 1960 debates and the election, which perhaps says as much about Kennedy’s political stance as it does about his presence as an ‘actor’. (Adams, 1983: 161-87) Kennedy and his wife, Jacqueline, exuded a Hollywood-esque glamour, (during the campaign and particularly once he was President,) and Kennedy himself seemed most keenly aware of his savvy on-screen presence. Murray Edelman, one of the first to develop the notion of ‘symbolic politics’, believes that symbolic forms of communication serve an illustrative function, projected through the political sphere. He claims that symbolic communication blurs the line of political authenticity by making it difficult to differentiate between political acts that are rooted in the substantial, from political acts that are masked as theatre. In Presidential debates, lines are rehearsed, policy positions are focus-tested, and even the tiniest physical movements are aimed to be controlled in order to promote an image of security, charisma, and leadership. In many instances, viewers are subjected to political performances predicated on acting – not dictated by the candidates’ substantial, ideological, or professional agendas - and requiring candidates to adjust the idiosyncrasies of their communication techniques to suit the biases of television. Professor Sanders agrees with Edelman when she writes that communication “as a symbolic enterprise comes to shape the very conduct of politics [and that] symbolic acts and imagery are vital.” (Sanders, 2009: 51) Sanders implies that the highly mediated reality of debates, elections, policy announcements, and everything political has become so centralized on ‘image’ that symbolic politics have become detached from what voters, the media, and politicians have come to accept as normal. Edelman writes:

The patterned nature of so much of the publicized political process provides a revealing clue to the function of political spectacle...it is dramaturgy rather than policymaking. Like drama, it is constructed to be presented to a public. (Edelman, 1985: 210)

Both Edelman and Sanders state that political acts are regularly contrived in a way that seeks to maximize the benefit and deepen the impact by using rhetoric and spin to influence voters and

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viewers. Candidates are aware that in order to be successful, the branding and rebranding of oneself they must undergo is a part of the theatrical game of politics.

Sociologist Erving Goffman has worked extensively with ‘impression management’, particularly regarding how this technique is used to influence people. Impression management refers to the goal-directed, conscious or unconscious process by which individuals attempt to influence the perceptions others have of them, by regulating and controlling information and social interaction. (Goffman, 1959: 208-212) This theory suggests that the ‘performer’ must act with expressive responsibility in controlling any number of minor, inadvertent actions, or ‘unmeant gestures’, that work counter analogously to one’s intentions. Goffman’s theory embodies symbolic aspects of communication in day-to-day life by personifying the communicative world of political rhetoric and theatre. It also suggests that there are two regions that one performs, the ‘front region’ where the performance is given, and the ‘back region’ where feelings are suppressed but still occasionally manage to appear. Often, one’s activities within the ‘front region’ represent certain standards like politeness and decorum, through which people maintain moral conduct within society in a socially accepted manner. (Goffman, 1969: 150) In contrast, the ‘back region’ is where individuals knowingly contradict the actions carried out in the front region. Impression management provides an explanation of how people interact with one another in daily life, but more importantly, how they develop subconscious physical and verbal mechanisms to express the feelings that conflict with the ‘front’. Furthermore, impression management can include such things as dress, movement, presentation, vocal volume, physical gestures, facial indicators, and both major and minor emotional expressions. (Ibid: 73) Goffman concludes that individuals naturalize and often learn to capitalize on manipulative tactics that can influence the conduct of those around them by learning to control their impression management. Goffman suggests that “people usually have the ability to control and monitor their bodily performances in order to facilitate social interaction.” (Shilling, 2003: 73) He maintains that symbolic communication works to maintain the flow and integrity of social roles. Sanders believes that “Goffman’s [theory] points to features of human action common to all of us [and] we all engage to some degree...in image-making [which] has now become a central activity of politics.” (Sanders, 2009: 42)

The Importance of Language

The importance of language in the context of verbal communicative tools is equally important. Language becomes a critical component in analyzing the linguistic and semantic tactics utilized during the Presidential debates, an operative factor present in the symbolic and impression management. Concepts, statements, and claims can be closely examined and disassembled through conversation analysis and an awareness of the components and theories that formulate patterns of speech, diction, and word choice. Accordingly, Ferdinand de Saussure’s Structuralist approach (Culler, 1986) and Jacques Derrida’s techniques of Deconstruction have both been employed throughout this paper in order to analyze the language schemes and patterns used throughout the Obama-McCain debates. In addition, the relationships and complexities between language and symbolic communication have been evaluated comparatively in order to highlight similarities and differences with respect to their effect on the symbolic. According to author Susan Onega, the aim of Structuralism is to “gain a comprehensive view of the social and institutional relations existing between individuals and between institutions, with a view to

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establishing the overall structure of society at large.” (Onega, 2006: 259) A Structuralist outlook believes that language is a man-made, circulatory construct, both arbitrary and in-flux, in which meaning is never concrete. Language therefore initiates slippage by preventing people from fully grasping meaning; an individual who exhibits mastery of language and linguistic techniques can translate this knowledge into a veritable weapon. (Bloomfield, 1933: 14) In a political context, such analytical tools can disclose the presence of commentary with substance and meaning, and that which maintains its style but is bereft of substance. The related technique of Deconstruction, as first employed by Jacques Derrida, brings to light instability and contradictions inherent within any given text through ‘close-reading’. Derrida concludes that language carries vast inconsistencies resulting in the loss of substance, meaning and framework, and also that word choice and structure in any given text often collapse upon themselves. (Derrida, 2000). Analyzing language through a Structuralist/Deconstructionist approach proves that sentences themselves often remain vague, evasive and content-limited. In this manner, statements can often misrepresent, be bereft of commitment, and in some cases avoid truths entirely. (Harris, 1987) As this paper will demonstrate, at various times throughout the debates, both Obama and McCain employed linguistic methods that allowed them to circumvent the issues at hand by relying on rhetoric, language schemes, and carefully moderated word-choice, triumphing stylistic tactics over substantiated claims. This research utilizes these techniques in order to come to conclusions regarding the symbolic factors inherent in political substantive communication. Findings and Discussion: The 1960 US Presidential Debates The Nixon-Kennedy debate of 1960 provides a framework by which to consider the 2008 debates between Obama and McCain. As the premiere televised debate made available for public consumption and uniquely co-sponsored and moderated by each of the major networks, ABC, CBS and NBC, it marked the establishment of the ‘modern campaign’. This historic debate “drew audiences in excess of 70 million…for the first time, voters were given the opportunity to see both candidates on one platform at the same time on all three networks.” (Mickelson, 1989: 60) The format consisted of each candidates’ eight minute opening statement, followed by a question-and-answer session that lasted about forty minutes, concluding with closing statements. Re-evaluating the Nixon-Kennedy debate in a contemporary context proved paramount to understanding the recurrence of symbolic communication in mediated politics. For the first time, viewers witnessed firsthand aspiring Presidential candidates engaging in direct head-to-head discussion; however, the power that symbolic communication and impression management could have over a mass audience proved – albeit subconsciously – just as significant. The ramifications of symbolic factors were so powerful, with aftershocks resonating as deeply, that Presidential candidates avoided participating in televised debates for nearly two decades. “It was 16 years before major party candidates for the Presidency could again be convinced to face each other before television cameras.” (Mickelson, 1989: 122) Above all, this aversion to real-time, personality-driven, and arguably sensationalistic media provides evidence for the magnitude that the symbolic has on the characteristically fickle American political climate....................................

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2008 Debate Formats

The first debate of the 2008 US Presidential campaign between Obama and McCain took place on September 26th, at the University of Mississippi, Missouri, exactly 48 years after the Nixon-Kennedy debate was broadcast in Chicago, Illinois in 1960. The debate, which received a television viewing audience of 52.4 million viewers,3 was 90-minutes in length, and both candidates stood at podiums for its duration. Each candidate was questioned in turn, given a two-minute response window, followed by five minutes of open discussion led by a moderator. The focus of the first debate was foreign policy, and national security, and it was moderated by Jim Lehrer of Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). The second debate, which took place on October 7th, in Belmont, Tennessee, was moderated by Tom Brokaw of NBC and also lasted 90 minutes. It covered a broad range of topics including domestic and foreign policy. The viewership of this debate tolled 63.2 million4

and took on a ‘town hall’ forum, in which the candidates were questioned by noncommittal voters who were carefully selected by the Gallup Organization to include an equal number of Republican, Democratic, and Independent voters. In addition, Brokaw had the discretion to include questions that had been previously submitted online. The candidates were given two-minute response windows followed by a one-minute open discussion for each question......

Evaluating Candidate Responses

Throughout the 2008 Presidential debates, each Obama and McCain demonstrated specific, respective symbolic behavioural patterns and semantic traits. Both candidate’s select use of diction, rhetoric, and repetition became distinguishable and definable, thus providing ample material to deconstruct, compare, and contrast their differences and similarities. What seems immediately evident when approaching the debates is how Obama’s policy positions are articulated with more clarity and assertion than McCain’s. From the inception of the debate, Obama’s statements personalized political situations and insinuated the gravity of foreign policy issues, and furthermore emphasized the singular responsibility he felt as an aspiring Presidential candidate. His responses were consistently direct and focused, and upon closer examination even appear to hold more substantiated weight than McCain’s. One such instance in the first debate sees Obama making the following statement regarding his position on Iraq: “I stood up and opposed this war at a time when it was politically risky to do so, because I said that not only did we not know how much it was going to cost, what our exit strategy might be, how it would affect our relationships around the world, and whether our intelligence was sound, but also because we hadn’t finished the job in Afghanistan.” (italics own)5

3 Data acquired from Nielsen Media Research

Obama’s feat is making use of an active voice to communicate his message and personalize his claim: “I stood up…[I] opposed this war.” In one sentence, he unifies related issues by using ‘hook-words’ that remind voters of cost, political strategy, global relations, intelligence, and ‘Iraq’ in relation to ‘Afghanistan’. By stating that he opposed the war at a time when such a move was “politically risky”, Obama situates himself as a forward and pragmatic thinker, taking courageous but well-informed chances against certain political consensuses that were generally accepted by a majority of politicians at the time. Furthermore, his statement suggests foresight and a long-term

4 Data acquired from Nielsen Media Research 5 Missouri Presidential debate of September 26, 2008 official debate transcript, Pg 13

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view, illustrating cognizance of the effects that political moves made today have on future generations. McCain’s reply to the same question, however, is markedly less effective: “The next President of the United States is not going to have to address the issue as to whether we went into Iraq or not. The next President of the United States is going to have to decide how we leave, when we leave, and what we leave behind. That is the decision of the next President of the United States.”6

McCain was similarly vague in a number of his replies, issuing characteristically defensive responses, and exhibiting what appeared to the external viewer as nervousness or doubt. In many instances, McCain failed to elaborate his points beyond what appeared to be scripted responses or rehearsed ‘talking points’. He often made use of key-words at opportune moments and failed to divulge information beyond immediate, superficial catchphrases, such as: “Osama bin Laden and General Patraeus have one thing in common that I know of, they both said that Iraq is the central battleground.”

While Obama uses the personal voice to address the question and its solution, suggesting that he - and only he - can provide the answer to these global problems, McCain does not assume personal responsibility in his response. On the contrary, led by the external pronoun ‘the next President of the United States’, McCain inadvertently implies that he himself is not certain which candidate should be the next President, suggesting that it could be either him or Obama, but not explicitly referring to himself. In comparison to Obama’s unitary and authoritative use of “I”, McCain’s externalized voice weakens the portrayal of leadership he aims to project. Additionally, while Obama’s reply appears to tackle the issue of Iraq head-on and provide a direction to a solution, McCain’s response further circumvents responsibility: stating that the next President is “not going to have to address the issue [why]” but will be responsible for dealing with the aftermath. McCain presents himself as a candidate who relies on an ideology that favours a ‘clean-up’ mentality, as opposed to Obama’s approach, which (at least superficially,) seems to take charge of the issues in question. Lastly, McCain’s repetition of the term “the next President of the United States” gives the impression of being less a stylistic choice but more to do with ‘buying himself time’, coming across as hesitant, or as having uncertainty in his answers and lack of a consolidated Presidential plan.

7 This particular statement offers no new information worthy of debate, nor does McCain present any tactical strategies, concrete solutions, or conclusions beyond a simple, fear-inducing tag-line of which apparently only ‘he knows.’ McCain’s often unclear and evasive foreign policy responses seem surprising given his long record of military service (recognized by the Purple Heart and the Distinguished Flying Cross), and his record on both the Armed Services and Homeland Security Senate Committees.8

6 Ibid, Pg. 13

As Sanders writes, “politics...is about performance, spectacle, the use of symbol and ritual, the creation and management of images.” (Sanders, 2009: 41) Obama accomplished the disciplined propagation of his appearance by managing his symbolic actions, even down to the microcosmic utterances, their emphasis, and their usage, whereas McCain failed to capitalize on these impressions in the same comprehensive manner. Further examples that probe beneath this surface evidence become

7 Official transcript of the Missouri 2008 US Presidential debate, September 26, 2008, Pg. 16 8 Senator John McCain Official Website: http://mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=AboutSenatorMcCain.Biography - accessed July 12, 2009

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more evident as one examines specific aspects and parts of speech used by both candidates throughout the debates. Diction and Word Count

Recalling Rapley’s theory that the minutiae of language should not be looked at singularly but rather as a collection of vaguely related practices, the singular utterances of both candidates’ speech can be deconstructed and analysed as formative and telling parts of a greater whole. During the debates, both Obama and McCain’s respective styles of verbal delivery, including rhythm, volume, articulation, and other vocal aspects, assumingly employed to capitalize on their oral strengths, offers much insight into the make-up of their symbolic communication. Each candidate’s diction is of particular interest by representing effectual parts of a larger contextual and symbolic whole. McCain, for instance, used larger words than Obama, and repeated a greater subset of words throughout the first debate. Furthermore, words like “afraid”, “serious”, “fragile”, “badly”, were all unique to McCain, and Obama did not use any of these words in the debate. Although these words have been removed from their original context, they are comparatively negatively connoted, and can be seen to invoke anxiety and tint McCain’s responses with a general sense of political caution. Instead, Obama opted for more positively connoted ‘power-words’, like “recognize”, “strategic”, “solve”, “invest”, and “agree”, which were words that McCain failed to use altogether. In light of Goffman’s theory of ‘impression management’, words exhibit the power to reflect directly upon the individual who adopts them as part of his/her spoken vocabulary, skewing the overall tone of spoken dialogue and even altering one’s perception of the individual in question. In the political debates, the differences between positively and negatively connoted words can be catastrophic, exhibiting the authoritative capacity to swing voters and influence opinions – a powerful symbolic and rhetorical tactic when properly used. McCain’s regular and repeated use of ‘scare-words’ with negative connotations may have been an intentional part of his election strategy, in much the same way that it was for President Bush and his “War on Terror”.9 In the second debate, McCain displayed continued use of scare-words, such as “nuclear”, “fought” and “Petraeus” [US General], which were avoided by Obama10

9 The White House:

, assumingly because of the negative undertones. Often disguised through subtlety and rhetoric, McCain’s preference emphasizing scare-words was evident. Can it be posed that McCain wanted to capitalize on the fears of the American public and their generalized lack of knowledge regarding specifics in relation to foreign policy? If this was McCain’s strategy, it may have proven ultimately unsuccessful as a result of a general American public growing tiresome of the decidedly Republican-conservative agenda that viewed foreign policy as a patriotic ‘call-to-arms’, in which McCain, when considered in regard to impression management, appears not entirely dissimilar from Bush. Obama’s more constructive approach to foreign policy, reform, and domestic issues might therefore reflect a percentage of the American public that had grown disenchanted by an antagonistic strain of American politics and policy. By maximizing use of ‘power-words’, Obama successfully maintained control of impression management attaching himself to concepts of hope, change, and reform. In the second debate, two words that Obama emphasized were “think” and “important” in relation to the enormity of the decision that confronted voters. McCain once again relied heavily on “nuclear” but also on the word “friends”

http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060216-11.html - June 10, 2009 10 While Obama made use of “nuclear” in the first debate, he avoided using it completely in the second debate.

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as well as instances of “America”, “American” and “Americans”, both of which may have been an attempt to use more patriotic words in order to appeal to voters by reminding them of their mutual bond under a national umbrella. Perhaps “friends” was used to appeal to the younger voter, whereas instances of “America” could have been a deliberate patriotic address to war veterans. His diction seems to refrain from appearing overly partisan, as though he is speaking not just to Republicans but to a general populous, which could have been an attempt to reach independent voters.

What may at first seem to be a minor factor in the debates, especially when compared to more evident symbolic factors, is the calculation of words used. In the Missouri debate, the time allowance for each of the candidates was equally controlled, and it is unsurprising that each candidate used approximately the same number of words. However, Obama managed 7,529 words, 7% more than McCain’s 7,043 – 486 words more than McCain in the same amount of allotted time. Through a rudimentary breakdown, (assuming a commonly accepted speaking pace of 120-150 words per minute when spoken aloud at a comfortable pace,)11 one is able to extrapolate that Obama secured an astonishing 3.36 minutes of speech above McCain during the debate.12 The second debate saw fewer words used overall, (13,485 vs. 14,572), with Obama contributing 7,031 to McCain’s 6,354, an incongruence of 677 words or 8.9%, and allotting him an astounding total of approximately five minutes more of speaking time than McCain.13 With regard to notions of speech delivery, Professional speech coach Joan Detz assures that “talking a bit fast is better than talking a bit slow. Why? Speed projects charisma. Slowness projects lethargy and can frustrate listeners.” (Detz, 1991: 34). While both Obama and McCain can be considered well spoken individuals, Obama comes across assertive and confident. In the first debate Obama averaged greater than 167 words per minute, whereas McCain averaged greater than 157 words per minute. In the second debate, Obama surpassed 156 words per minute and McCain trailed behind, with an average of 140 words per minute.14, 15

Detz states that “President John F. Kennedy was a notoriously fast talker – often topping 200 words per minute.” (Ibid: 34). Obama’s reputation as ‘the most charismatic President since JFK’ may have something to do with – among other factors – his slightly (but consistently) higher volume of word delivery per minute than McCain.

What these preliminary findings suggest is that Obama made use of more positively connoted diction and a more concise delivery, found through both word choice and statistic calculation. Ironically, while McCain used larger words than Obama, his command of the English language

11 Detz, Joan (1991), “Can You Say a Few Words? How to Prepare and Deliver.” (New York: New York: St Martin’s University Press) 12 This equation was resolved as such: Obama spoke approximately 500 words more than McCain in the same allotted time. The average speaking pace is 120-150 words/minute, which can be estimated to be 135 words/minute. Obama’s additional 486 was divided by 135 = 3.6 minutes. The fraction 0.600 minutes, when multiplied by 60 (sec/min) results in 36 seconds. 13 The average speaking pace is 120-150 words/minute, which can be estimated to be 135 words/minute. Obama’s 677 was divided by 135 = 5.01 minutes. 14 This calculation was arrived at by dividing the number of words by 45 minutes, assuming that each Obama and McCain spoke for half of the debate’s 90 minute duration. However, in reality, this word/minute count is an underestimation given that the moderator and questions would have consumed a portion of the overall time. 15 These numbers were obtained by simply counting the words of each candidate spoken in the two official transcripts of the first and second debate.

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seemed to surface short next to the oratory skills of his opponent. What one is able to extrapolate from such an examination is that these simple but telling indicators played a role in determining not only a victor of the debates, but of the Presidential campaign at large. The summative factors which determine concepts of symbolic communication and impression management are similarly able to underscore one’s objectives. In a political context, where the importance and implication of each idea, statement, phrase, and word is heightened and dissected ad infinitum, these subconscious factors can result in major ends. The qualitative and quantitative components of language will be further disseminated in regard to their particular use, before engaging in the visual nature of symbolic communication in the following sections. The Absence of Iraq

Just as the symbolic can influence the substantive, so too can form dictate content. In terms of topics discussed throughout both debates, foreign policy reigned supreme. In this portion of the research, Obama and McCain’s respective Afghan and Russian foreign policy approaches underwent a comparative analysis that included comparing sentences, highlighting inconsistencies, and detecting contradictions in the arguments made. This systematic and qualitative approach deconstructed the content of each candidate’s speech in order to acquire tangible results through a manageable and accurate subset of considered factors. Despite the numerous contentious issues regarding America’s engagement in world affairs, and with nearly half of the first debate dealing with foreign policy,16 Afghanistan and Russian remained the only two countries topically discussed in both debates. Afghanistan was most heavily debated at 28%, followed by Iran and Iraq at 27% and 26% respectively, and Russia at 19%. The second debate saw marked differences, with 67% dealing with domestic issues and 33% with foreign policy,17 in which Israel, Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and peacekeeping were discussed. Afghanistan featured less prominently at 9%; peacekeeping (previously not discussed) at 30%, Pakistan at 28%, Russia at 17%, and Israel at 16%.18

Reduced to little more than a footnote in the second debate, ‘Iraq’, was almost always only referenced in conjunction with Afghanistan, signalling a marked shift in the debate’s direction. In fact, the word ‘Iraq’ was mentioned a mere 13 times in the Tennessee debate (compared to 37 times in Missouri).19

16 A striking 48%, a percentage achieved by counting the number of sentences that were discussed about domestic issues versus those that were discussed about foreign policy.

The absence of Iraq is itself a telling symbolic aspect that manages to control the topical content of the debate from its outset. Why it was avoided, since it reigned as such an influential matter during the election, is of peculiar interest. Consistently rated as one of the most important voter questions of the campaign, a Gallup opinion poll conducted of 1,625 Americans three months before the election showed that 44% of respondents felt issues surrounding Iraq were “extremely important”, ranking ahead of healthcare, terrorism, taxes and

17 This percentage was also achieved by counting the number of sentences that were discussed about domestic issues versus those that were discussed about foreign policy. 18 These numbers were obtained by simply counting the sentences of each candidate on each of the foreign policy matters raised during the first and second debate. 19 As has been previously discussed, the third debate was altogether void of foreign policy matters.

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immigration.20 CNN asserted “the Iraq war [was] perhaps the most important foreign policy issue of the 2008 election.”21 At a time when the American electorate was potentially the most polarized it has been in recent history, each candidate’s stance on Iraq war heightened foreign policy issues to a determining component of many voters’ decisions. Voters disagreed on pivotal questions surrounding foreign policy, and Obama and McCain presented polarized positions regarding this issue, making its omission all the more curious. 22

Iraq’s absence may be explained as stemming from Obama and McCain’s well established (and readily available) and starkly contradictory positions on the matter. Possibly, omitting Iraq from the latter debates allowed for the discussion of other areas where the candidates’ positions were not so clearly defined or understood by the general public. The CDP may have felt that Iraq would have monopolized the debate time, and that further discussion on the issue was superfluous, that other topics should be made known, and that the first debate’s discussion should exist as an officiated standpoint for the public.......

Analysing Statement Consistency Analysing statement and content consistency regarding foreign policy is integral in providing a better understanding of each candidate’s substantive positions. This portion of the research isolates Afghanistan and Russia, based on their recurrence in the debates, in order to allow for the establishment of a control framework in order to examine the symbolic factors that resurface through the scope of the substantive. While symbolic communication implies a manipulative or deceptive tactic, examining consistent substantive content allows for the scrutiny of other factors that surface between more strictly regimented parameters. Neither candidate touted policy positions that differed from debate to debate; they remained disciplined in their message and true to their policy positions. Disclosing consistency in substantive content highlights credible platform issues but also makes clear the numerous symbolic insinuations, trends, and undertones supplanted upon the substantive to help solidify each candidate’s views.

In the first debate, Obama makes the following statement: “We are seeing a major offensive taking place – Al Qaeda and Taliban crossing the border and attacking our troops...” In the second debate he alleges that “bases and outposts [in Afghanistan] are now targets for more aggressive Afghan-Taliban offenses.”i Through this and other statements that carry between debates and do not fluctuate in terms of content or position, Obama demonstrates a consistent and repeated message that presents a different approach to matters than his opponent, situating himself as the alternative. In both debates, Obama makes statements that he met personally with President Karzaiii

20 Gallup: Newport, Frank:

to remind the Afghan leader of his responsibilities to his country and to a global perspective. “We have to press the Afghan government to make certain that they are actually working for their people,” he stated. In the second debate, he repeated this particular comment adding that he discussed necessary issues with Karzai “in order [for Karzai] to gain

http://www.gallup.com/poll/108331/obama-has-edge-key-election-issues.aspx - accessed June 2, 2009 21 CNN “Iraq” http://edition.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/issues/issues.iraq.html - accessed July 23, 2009 22 America.gov “Election 2008 Issues – Iraq” http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/March/20080307131621liameruoy0.4348108.html - accessed June 15, 2009

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popular support.” In both instances, Obama reiterates the fact that he communicated with the Afghan President directly to discuss matters of interest to both countries. This could have been a purposeful and symbolic attempt by Obama to refute McCain’s claim that he was inexperienced and unknowledgeable about foreign affairs. By raising and repeating this issue, Obama links himself to critical matters occurring worldwide and particularly in Afghanistan, in an attempt to present himself as fully prepared to engage. His statements are carefully worded and succinct, as though ready to engage on a larger scale but wary of overstepping his (at that point, limited) authority as a Presidential candidate. Still, Obama demonstrates courtesy, knowledge, and a personal and professional engagement in global matters.

McCain’s substantive consistency, however, specifically draws upon symbolic aspects that attempt to negate Obama’s experience: “What [Obama] doesn’t understand [is that] it’s got to be a new strategy, the same strategy that [he] condemned in Iraq.” McCain reiterates that Obama’s strategy to withdraw troops from Afghanistan on a gradual basis was the wrong approach, which he claims was proven by the significant decrease in the Iraqi insurgence shortly after additional American troops were sent to Iraq. In the Senate, McCain aggressively advocated this measure, and during the debates, he reminded voters that this approach (which turned out favourably in Iraq) would also be the right course to pursue in Afghanistan. In the second debate, McCain draws attention to Obama’s miscalculation, stating once again that “Senator Obama said [the strategy in Iraq] wouldn’t work, couldn’t work [and he] still fails to admit that he was wrong...” And in relation to Israel and Iran, McCain reminds viewers once again of Obama’s preferred methods, stating that “Senator Obama without precondition wants to sit down and negotiate…without precondition”23

as if diplomacy was such a horrendous act for any leader to partake. The symbolic is herein still at play: for all his substantive consistency and foresight in political matters, McCain’s address maintains an air of arrogance, perhaps with the intention of reminding the American public of his military knowledge, experience, and success – and consequently, of Obama’s lack thereof.

Often, McCain’s patronizing attitude towards Obama, particularly in regard to his lack of foreign policy experience, positions him as the only candidate suited to deal with global and foreign policy issues. Yet the legitimization of confidence that McCain purported in assuming the role as the next President was perhaps the ultimate source of his downfall: “We will win this [war] and we [will not] come home in defeat and dishonour…” (italics own) he triumphantly states, followed by a moment of self-sabotage: “[but we will] probably have to go back if we fail.”iii It is impossible to dismiss the irony buried in the inherent hypocrisy of McCain’s statement: while his conviction is made clear, the clause “if we fail” brings his own uncertainty of the situation into focus. An attentive voter might pick up on such insecurity, even concluding that McCain’s previous gains and successes may have had more to do with chance and causation than outright political or military know-how. While Obama pushed to relieve most troops, he did not outright oppose the consideration of increasing the number of troops if necessary, preferring to “use all the tools at [America’s] disposal to prevent [nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists],”24

23 Official transcript of the Tennessee US Presidential Debate, October 7, 2008, Pg. 28

maintaining a ‘war if necessary – but not necessarily war’ approach, which differed

24 Official transcript of the Tennessee US Presidential Debate, October 7, 2008, Pgs. 28, 29

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from McCain’s strategy that advocated increasing troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan, irrespective of the consequences.

Approaches to Russia also became a source of contentious discussion. Obama advocated an approach that had to be “re-evaluated” and “more strategic”, demonstrating an alternative to the Bush administration’s hard-handed style. In Missouri he stated: “I warned the [Bush] Administration that [it made no sense to have] Russian peacekeepers in Georgian territory,” his opposition to Bush’s approach made clear. And in Tennessee: “the situation in Georgia was unsustainable because…Russian peacekeepers [were in] territories that were under dispute.”iv Above all, what surfaces in these statements is Obama’s – not so covertly symbolic – refutation of McCain’s rigid position which echoed that of the Bush Administration. Throughout the debates, McCain continually established himself as less receptive to productive diplomatic solutions, exhibiting an aggressive attitude toward Russia, and specifically toward Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Obama took a conciliatory approach by advocating cooperation with Russia on a range of important issues, including nuclear disarmament, global warming, energy, and Iran's nuclear ambitions, but McCain reiterated a decidedly harsher stance. “I don’t believe we’re going to go back to the Cold War,”v he acknowledges, perhaps in order to alleviate some of the misconceptions he seemed to generate throughout his campaign. The very act of mentioning a Cold War resorts to a scare-tactic to remind people of what he believes America’s political future might hold if improperly governed, playing on the ignorance of those who are cognizant of terminology – terms like nuclear, Cold War, KGB, and even Holocaust – but not of their logistical possibility, let alone historical accuracy. Continuing to use negatives in lieu of positives, further fear-mongering regarding Russia managed to surface in both debates. McCain uses spin rooted in fear when repeating (almost verbatim) the line: “I looked into Putin’s eyes, and I saw three letters, a K a G and a B.”vi

Issuing a rhetorical attempt to remind voters that Putin is a former-member of Soviet Union intelligence, but also to imply the magnitude of the issues at stake, affirm the fact that the next President must have an in-depth understanding of America-Russia relations, and finally, also have the fortitude to meet head-on with a former KGB operative. Throughout all of this, however, McCain appears to desire to situate himself as a sensationalistic, real-life ‘James Bond’ going head-to-head with the world’s super-villains but resistant to most approaches that would prioritize diplomacy over antagonism. McCain is all-too eager to warn of another Cold War, (or later, another Holocaust,) presenting worst-case scenarios as possibilities within his would-be Presidency, whereas Obama never even supposes that American global relations under his Administration could be strained to this extent.

It is unsurprising that McCain’s authoritarian approach did not reflect the views of the international community, a notion bolstered given Obama’s global popularity that surpassed the bounds of America and thereafter transposed itself internationally. The lack of flexibility in a majority of McCain’s international plans portrayed a hard-line and regimented individual, possibly detracting knowledgeable voters from what appeared to be a kamikaze approach to foreign policy. He continued to reiterate claims that made him appear more and more of a contradiction to a wholesome Obama, who became increasingly linked to the growing international conception that situated him as a generational hero. Granted, such a phenomenological claim has much to do with Obama’s substantive outlook, which favoured fostering international relations, improving global affairs, and working toward mutual solutions, but also is deeply rooted in Obama’s impression management tactics. He occupied a host of

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signifiers that McCain could never have embodied, based not only on platform and policy but on symbolic aspects like age, personality, and race. Obama himself became quickly overshadowed by what he symbolized, even being superseded by the symbolic interplay of ‘Obamamania’.

The Symbolic and Performative

Apart from visual and symbolic constituents, many minor, telling, and unspoken clues propagated through the candidates’ actions and behavioural communication, as perhaps the most obvious – yet easily overlooked – aspect of formative symbolic communication. The candidates’ physical engagement with the audience, their general body language, their minute motor movements, and even their attire play a role in the successful delivery of their respective substantive political message. Edelman explains how “politics like religion, love, and the arts is a theme that people cannot leave alone: not in their behaviour, or in their talk, or in their writing of history.” (Edelman, 1985: 1). Candidates perform under public scrutiny in a political arena that approaches (and often surpasses) celebrity status, creating a pressure to project an image that fulfills the expectation of how a leader should present him/herself. Although it may seem trivial, the physical appearance of a candidate is integral to the success of the message delivered. Recalling Nixon’s debate faux-pas in 1960, in which the pasty-faced candidate ‘blended in’ to the background because of the light color of his suit, dress is situated as one of the most immediately noticeable aspects of visual symbolic communication. While this does not imply that – particularly in this instance – it may be the most revealing aspect, it nevertheless provides a continued and detailed exploration of a visual symbolic analysis. Both men dressed in a typical fashion for the political stage: Obama dressed in the characteristic ‘power-suit’ – black suit, white dress shirt, and red tie, accessorized by an American flag pin on his lapel. McCain dressed similarly, in a navy blue suit, light blue shirt, and stripped red and white tie. However, it seems odd that McCain chose to forgo the American flag lapel pin, a minor but symbolic accessory of patriotism after the September 11th attacks. In the second debate, Obama dressed similarly, but with a solid light blue tie, and McCain wore a black suit, white shirt and striped red tie. Worth mentioning is the fact that McCain wore a red tie in both debates, which is also the colour of the Republican Party, perhaps symbolising, through a codified color scheme, his political standing. Could Obama’s dress have signified a slight break from tradition? By wearing a red tie in the first debate and a blue tie in the second, his outfit may have reflected a less partisan style and modern way of presenting himself as the Democratic nominee, without appearing as part of the ‘old boys club’ through traditional and regimented dress.

More importantly than dress, however, is the behaviour demonstrated by each candidate. Former Presidential Advisor David Gergen, who served Presidents Nixon, Ford, Regan, and Clinton, characterised McCain’s visual nature and behaviour, stating that his performance in the debates made him “become more and more the angry, older candidate.”25

25 CNN: Presidential Debate Report Card:

Such characterizations – especially if propagated by media – can be detrimental to a candidate’s success, demonstrating and to some degree legitimizing, why candidates concentrate so strongly on maintaining a positive symbolic image in the eyes of the public. Although McCain often appeared characteristically stiff, he exhibited certain behavioural traits that can be considered attempts to

http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/07/debate.reportcard/index.html - June 1, 2009

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project a thoughtful and warmer image. It was previously mentioned how he regularly began his answers by addressing the audience as “dear friends”, seemingly projecting a personal connection to ordinary Americans in an effort to be viewed as ‘in touch’ with real people. A further example of McCain’s attempt to humanize his campaign can be seen in his belabouring of the ‘Joe the Plumber’ story.26, 27

The difference in McCain’s approach versus Obama’s has to do with the symbolic nature of his substantive delivery. Obama appeared at ease while ‘performing’ on stage, whereas McCain was never able to fully overcome his own reserved constitution in order to surpass a performance that felt contrived, even awkward. It comes as no surprise that Obama, throughout the campaign, demonstrated more showmanship than the majority of his opponents, including Hillary Clinton, who was endlessly lambasted as a poor Presidential choice based on her propagation in the media as being ‘too serious’ and even ‘heartless’. McCain may have been instructed by his image-advisors to ‘up-the-ante’ in order to compete with Obama’s sensationalistic persona, but which at times worked contrarily to his own steadfast image: his attempts at emotion and humour regularly felt stifled and fabricated. McCain was unable to ‘work the system’ of contemporary media and political acting, particularly when the hype surrounding Obama took lift-off and did not settle. To state that McCain was a poor ‘actor’ does not imply that he would have been a poor President; perhaps the revelations regarding image say more about Obama’s superior on-screen presence and tactically advantageous use of television and media, inevitably commenting on society’s desire to consume image and envelop personalities – political and otherwise – in spectacle. Like the old adage that states, any publicity is good publicity, McCain (for better or worse) failed to generate any lasting sensationalistic buzz surrounding his campaign and persona. The greatest exception being his announcement of Governor Sarah Palin as his Vice-Presidential running mate. For the first and almost only time, McCain’s campaign witnessed (and initially benefitted) from a plethora of positive media attention and public interest in both Palin and McCain. Yet Palin, who initially demonstrated a similar sensationalism as Obama, failed to live up to the hype and expectation. Once the investigation of Palin’s substantive qualities revealed a candidate generally unfit for the job of Vice President, the hype dissipated: Palin was criticized as ‘all style, no substance’. As Professor Imre Szeman of the University of Alberta states, “if there is no substance behind the style, you can become a joke pretty quickly.”

Used to illustrate those individuals who would suffer under Obama's tax plan, Joe (as an archetype) came up an astounding 25 times during the ninety minute debate, 13 mentions occurring in the first ten minutes. While this story appeared initially effective, it quickly became overused and its intent sourly diminished, drawing attention to McCain’s performance as overly orchestrated and uncomfortably performative.

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26 Guardian, “Who Is Joe the Plumber? Aka Joe Wurzelbacher.” October 16, 2008.

Alternately, Hillary Clinton, who can be considered a political-foil to Palin as ‘substance over style’, would not be accused of being substantively ill-equipped for the job of (Vice) President or her current role as Secretary of State. Obama accomplished both the substantive and the symbolic throughout the campaign and the debates, emphasizing the importance of this reciprocal relationship within the communicative political sphere.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/oct/16/uselections2008-johnmccain-barackobama-debate-joe-the-plumber - July 3, 2009. 27 Although the third debate was not analyzed, it was felt necessary to mention the overwhelming presence of Joe that occurred in debate three. 28 Diebel, Linda, Toronto Star “Would-Be Power couple unplugged.” September 20, 2009 http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/698304

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As McCain fell short of capitalizing on the symbolic in both of the debates, public opinion began to dissipate accordingly. During the Iraq portion of the first debate, McCain habitually lapsed into a noncommittal, frozen look, as though he was lost in thought or detached from the debate proceedings. Furthermore, many of his responses lacked assertion, and he often seemed unfocused, at times nervous, visibly agitated and easily flustered, and ultimately less self-assured than his rival. Other times, he stumbled over words, interrupted Obama, gathered his thoughts at uncomfortable lengths, or asked to have certain questions repeated, causing him to appear unprepared and unfocused. In a curious and seemingly purposeful move, McCain avoided looking at Obama for the duration of the first debate. This aversion to addressing his opponent became increasingly awkward (and presumably evident to viewers) when comments and questions he directed at Obama were unaccompanied by eye contact. When addressing the moderator, however, McCain exhibited eye contact, facial expressions, and other visual-verbal forms of communication typically expected during interaction. McCain’s strange behaviour when addressing Obama can be interpreted a number of ways: it may have been an attempt to remain focused throughout the debate; conversely, it may have been an attempt to frustrate his opponent by never fully engaging with him; lastly, it could have simply been that Obama intimidated McCain – as failure to look someone in the eye can indicate. In any regard, McCain’s lack of communicative interaction comes across as a failure to exhibit common courtesy to his opponent, and seems a disservice to the experienced and respected persona he was attempting to portray. At one point when Obama was speaking, McCain must have been unaware that they were sharing a split screen, and can be seen frowning and squinting, as though in disagreement with Obama’s statements. Symbolic signs such as these could extend the impression that he was less assured than Obama, lending to an explanation that he was feeling threatened or outplayed by his younger opponent.

An isolated event in the second debate sees McCain referring to Obama as “that one”, sharply pointing in Obama’s direction but failing to look at him. This cringe-worthy referral presents a condescending-McCain, eking close to racial insinuation and causing a mild media backlash as a result of its discriminatory undertones. Certain media sources suggested that McCain was attempting to draw negative attention to Obama’s success solely as a result of his ‘otherness’.29

Obama, however, directly addressed and looked at McCain throughout the debate, frequently calling McCain by his first name, “John”, and speaking with an assertive tone and clarity of voice in addressing his opponent as an equal, and a familiar. As a result of these simple

Throughout the debates, McCain refrained from engaging with Obama on a first name basis, possibly reflecting his traditional conservative mannerisms based on his age and beliefs, and further adding to his persona as a stiff, formal and withdrawn. But McCain’s insistence of using ‘Obama’ over ‘Barack’ manifests on a much larger symbolic scale: considering the global significance the name Obama began to generate, like Coca-Cola, Madonna, or Trump, it seems strange that McCain would insist on its usage. “Obama” became a global catch phrase for the late 21st century, metonymically signifying a number of connotations that register far greater than merely to that which it refers, including hope, opportunity, change, the bringing of a new era, and the ‘American Dream’. Each time McCain uttered the name of his competitor viewers were reminded of the insinuations the name Obama held, and also that McCain was not Obama, and did not bring with him the same promise.

29 Huntington Post, “That One, McCain Calls Obama in Debate”, October 7, 2008

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measures, Obama appeared more professional, candid, likeable, and comfortable onstage. He regularly addressed the camera, the moderator, and the in-house audience, engaging with potential voters in a relaxed and convivial manner that McCain was unable to accomplish. Obama accompanied spoken points with physical gestures and movements, nodding his head in approval or disagreement and smiling at the camera. His generally unwavering composure throughout his interactions with the moderator and McCain seemed natural and uncontrived, never (overly) orchestrated or distracting, which is something that seemed increasingly difficult for McCain to overcome. Yet at times, Obama too seemed nervous and uncertain, periodically rocking back and forth on his feet when responding to questions, which inadvertently became a detraction from what he was saying, subconsciously directing attention to areas of his physicality, proving that even Obama, for all of his strengths, was not without his flaws, errs, and symbolic miscalculations. However, when considered against his opponent, Obama’s performances begin to emerge as continually superior on nearly every level.

By the conclusion of the first debate McCain started to appear more resolute in both presence and message. During discussion about Iraq, McCain became impassioned by the topic, remaining in control and coming across as prepared and knowledgeable on the subject. By making regular use of his hands to emphasize points, and tapping his index finger on the podium, McCain evoked a newfound and previously unseen confidence. For the first (and only) time in the debate Obama looked frustrated in an exchange with McCain concerning what Dr. Henry Kissinger may or may not have said regarding the facilitation of a face-to-face meeting between the President of the United States and the President of Iran.30

McCain’s confrontation caused Obama, who typically kept his cool composure, to become visibly agitated and discomforted. McCain accused Obama of dishonesty regarding Kissinger’s foreign policy views as pertaining to Pakistan, reminding Obama that he had been friends with Kissinger for over thirty years, forcefully and successfully driving the impression that McCain was better equipped to engage in matters of foreign affairs, while portraying a positive impression that he was capable of dealing with important matters of foreign policy. When Obama became noticeably annoyed, McCain became outright assertive, lifting his arms into the air and raising his voice in an impassioned engagement that he had, until then, failed to demonstrate. For the first time in the debate, McCain rose to fulfill the challenges of leadership and confidence. For a period, McCain transformed himself from a passive competitor into an aggressive and determined rival. Unfortunately for McCain, his fervency provided a short-lived indication of his capabilities and may have been seen by a general public as ‘too little, too late’, and it was not until the second debate that McCain truly gained the momentum needed to compete on a symbolic level.

In the second debate in Tennessee, certain aspects of McCain’s performance changed dramatically, particularly in terms of his engagement with the audience. This debate’s town-hall format witnessed the disappearance of podiums, which were replaced by stools and accompanying side tables in the center of an elevated platform. The candidates were surrounded by audience members in a semi-circular fashion, and given a hand-held microphone that allowed them to move about freely. McCain took advantage of the format of this debate, using its structure and relaxed atmosphere to his benefit, maximizing its physical layout as well as

30 Official Transcript of the Missouri 2008 US Presidential Debate 2008: http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2008a.html - June 10, 2009

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interacting with audience members and questioners in a concerned and convivial manner. McCain demonstrated a very different image from the reserved and detached portrayal seen in the first debate, appearing confident and relaxed as he walked around the stage, interacting with audience members, stopping only to emphasize points and reinforce policy positions. It is unknown whether McCain was instructed to become more ‘human’ and interactive for this debate by his advisors, or perhaps he felt simply more at ease in the less formal ‘town-hall’, enabling him to deliver his message with greater ease. McCain’s behaviour here, particularly in consideration of his previous performance, might suggest that he is a less talented public speaker than Obama, and more comfortable relating to the ‘average Joe’ on a more personal level. The pinnacle of McCain’s newfound confidence was best exhibited with a question he received from retired Navy chief, Terry Shirley. The question: “If, despite your best diplomatic efforts, Iran attacks Israel, would you be willing to commit US troops in support and defense of Israel? Or would you wait on approval from the United Nations Security Council?” Yet the question problematically presupposes a last-ditch effort, in which ‘diplomatic efforts’ are exhausted, and provokes an antagonistic answer as the right, and only answer. As a retired Navy Chief, Shirley is someone who can be respected for his service, but that does not make him an authority in the given area nor does it substantiate his question. Nevertheless, McCain patted Shirley on the back, shook his hand, and thanked him for his military service – a noticeable change from the introverted candidate seen in Missouri – and spoke calmly, sincerely, and maintained eye contact. Although melodramatic, McCain demonstrated warmth and compassion, two attributes that were absent from his previous debate performance. His reply, however, is problematic and characteristically vague: he verifies the ‘strike first, think later’ outlook presupposed by Shirley’s question by answering, “…we obviously would not wait for the United Nations Security Council.” Ensuring a proposed unilateral and renegade approach to foreign affairs, which (although perceived as answering Shirley’s question with a no-nonsense bravado,) leads to the creation of enemies and at worst, the provocation of war. What the answer affirms is that a McCain Administration would operate without regard for, and independent of, the international community. In a move that seems decidedly characteristic of McCain, he concluded his retort by stating: “At the end of the day, my friend…you know what it’s like to serve, and what it’s like to sacrifice, but we can never allow a second Holocaust to take place”vii

, recalling many of his symbolic and rhetoric strategies, including relying on scare-words in order to relay concepts to a general public.

Unlike McCain, Obama was unpredictably less mobile and interactive than in Missouri, which may have been a strategic move. Possibly, the format of the second debate lent itself less favourably to his oratory style. However, it should not be concluded that because Obama was less interactive with the audience that he was outperformed by McCain. In fact, a national poll conducted by CNN/Opinion Research Corporation found that 675 surveyed Americans concluded that Obama won the Tennessee debate by a margin of 54%, compared to 30% for McCain.31

31 CNN, October 8, 2008, “Obama Picks Up Second Debate Win, Poll Says”

The same poll indicated that Obama was a more likeable candidate by a margin of 2-to-1 (65% versus 28%). Perhaps Obama, who remained on stage, appeared less frenetic and more poised than McCain to a television audience, managing to exude the continued qualities of a collected, elegant, and polished leader. While McCain played directly to the audience,

http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/08/debate.poll/index.html - June 14, 2009

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comprised of 150 uncommitted voters,32

Obama appeared to remain focused on the exponentially larger television viewing audience – a weighty consideration given that over 63 million American voters tuned in to this debate. Recalling the Nixon-Kennedy debate of 1960, in which a large discrepancy existed between radio listeners versus television viewers, what the CNN Opinion poll appears to prove is that regardless of Obama’s symbolic and substantive actions, and even if some viewers suggested that McCain outperformed him in the second debate, Obama appeared the better candidate inclusive of all of the factors discussed. While McCain did, in fact, outperform himself in this debate, the poll indicates that he failed to outperform, nor was he able to match, the symbolic and/or substantive content of his opponent. As the findings of this paper suggest, throughout the debates, Obama reigned superior in both substantive and symbolic communication. According to the public, McCain failed to win the debates, suggesting not only that Obama’s substantive content played a major role in influencing voters, but that it outmatched McCain’s on every level, ultimately resulting in his Presidential victory.

Discussion

Whether or not the symbolic truly overshadows the substantive remains unclear; neither concept is qualitatively measurable and therefore remains at the discretion of the researcher and the reader to conclude exactly to what extent the symbolic plays in political communication. At times, it appears strikingly evident that one factor can supersede the other. In light of further examination of the symbolic and the substantive, the differences in distinguishing between the two become clear, further enabling one to extrapolate findings and draw conclusions. The symbolic, for instance, plays a major and influential role; its presence appears constant throughout political rhetoric and communication – yet its very nature dictates its codification as sublimate within the substantive. While it is often possible to isolate one from the other, it becomes more difficult within a mediated forum, such as a Presidential debate, where image and persona are paramount and the unification of both communicative aspects are inextricably and purposefully bound. It has been argued in this paper, for instance, that Obama proved markedly superior than McCain at not only using, but also embedding symbolic aspects in his substantive content and delivery in a manner that was more effective, less contrived, and prolonged throughout each debate.

In a greater context, this research sought to deconstruct and examine the language and behaviour of each candidate at microcosmic and macrocosmic levels, taking into consideration minute details such as diction and word count, while looking at the more encompassing linguistic notions of sentence structure, consistency, repetition, and thereafter, the exhibited behavioural modes. Limiting the scope of this research to foreign policy in the first two debates proved necessary in attaining manageable and accurate results, and using these findings to clarify the endless, fluctuating, and unstable constructions of message and meaning. By considering each constituent as a critical contributing part to a larger whole, it allows for a thorough examination of the broader concept of political communication. The conclusions arrived upon through this research find that the symbolic plays a pivotal and over-arching role in language, image portrayal, and political rhetoric. Above all, this paper aims to prove the relevance and need for continued study in the fields of language and communication, particularly in the political sphere.

32 According to Editor-in-Chief Frank Newport of Gallup Organization

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US Presidential debates, due to their highly mediated nature and endless dissemination to a global audience, their reliance on image in the delivery of content, and their lasting and profound effects on an international scale, will prove to be a historically relevant, ever evolving, and content-rich area of study. Conclusion As the research and findings of this paper have asserted, symbolic communication plays a pivotal and central role in verbal and non-verbal communication. Particularly in the highly-mediated field of the political, symbolic factors have the power to create strong public statements, generational movements, and even determine the winners and losers of political battle. This paper set out to differentiate between the presence and interaction of substantiated, explicit modes of communication and other image-based, behavioural modes – and specifically, the presence and predominance of both in the 2008 Presidential debates. The prevailing research objective was to determine whether or not political communication and success included the symbolic – and if so, precisely how and to what degree did the symbolic constitute itself in the greater communicative mechanism of the political.

Furthermore, understanding language as impermanent and in-flux, from each microcosmic utterance to a greater encompassing whole, has been emphasized as vitally important in modern day interaction, assuming a formative, persuasive, and at times detrimental role when used in the political sphere. Inclusive of the expansive constructs of language, other practical approaches in communication, political science, sociology, cultural studies, and behavioural psychology were considered and many relevant thinkers and critics in these fields introduced. The concepts and ideas explored therein were then employed throughout this paper in both generalized and case-specific investigation.

It is a generally accepted notion that politics incorporates an element of performance and spectacle into its constitution; however, to what literal extent the symbolic operates in this sphere remains unknown. Throughout this paper, it was found that the symbolic, as formed and propagated through the media, plays an omnipresent and fundamental role in shaping political communication, altering candidate message and image, and even determining consequential political matters. Initially evidenced in the Nixon-Kennedy debate of 1960, and the real-life ramifications and consequences thereafter witnessed on the fate of American politics, the symbolic had never before been considered such a crucial element of political communication. As the political symbolic experienced increasing widespread dissemination through the emergence of television, the modernized campaign was introduced for consumption to an American public. Analysis of Obama and McCain’s debate performances in the 2008 campaign provides a number of simple, yet significant factors that may have ultimately contributed to Obama’s Presidential victory. An examination of each candidate’s diction and semantics proved overwhelmingly, that McCain relied on ‘scare-words’ and fear-mongering tactics in order to assert the need for America to vote for the type of leader he sought to portray. Conversely, Obama’s reliance on ‘power-words’ was directly reflective of his constructive and diplomatic approach to foreign policy, his presence on an international stage, and a campaign message that was generally accepted as optimistic. Proving that even the most minute factors and singular

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utterances can, and do, have profound effects when considered in a greater context, comprising and varying tone, inflection, meaning, and message of general speech.

A further analysis of statement and content consistency allows for a controlled and therefore measurable account of the substantive aspects in Obama and McCain’s respective messages. Isolating debate topics of Afghanistan and Russia, and examining consistency of candidate statements presented a manageable subset of factors from which to extrapolate accurate and informative research results. McCain’s authoritarian and often Bush-like approach to international relations only served as a backdrop to expose his conservative nature and a tendency to depict Obama as inexperienced and ill-prepared. Obama, however, took advantage of recurrent foreign policy topics to demonstrate his constructive views regarding Afghanistan and Russia, coming across as a more diplomatic, positive, and globally-inclusive leader than McCain. The actions and behaviour of each candidate were equally telling. Their engagement with the audience, body-language, interaction with one another, and over-all performance demonstrated a larger set of symbolic factors that inevitably contributed to the ultimate success or failure of their message as presented to a wider (inter)national public.

The goal of this research was to differentiate, analyze, determine, and legitimize the presence of the symbolic in political rhetoric and communication in the 2008 US Presidential debates. This motivation led to a detailed and case-specific inquiry regarding whether or not political communication is grounded only in the substantive and/or if it also incorporates the symbolic. What the research concludes is unsurprising: that the symbolic plays an integral role in the substantive content of political communication. For example, one finds no rational causal answers behind Kennedy’s unexpected (and televised) win over Nixon – as it was primarily predicated on symbolic factors – whereas Nixon, like McCain, was unable to compete with the symbolic showmanship of his opponent. Nor is there a summative or logical explanation behind a current cultural zeitgeist that places Obama as a generational hero. What becomes most apparent is that this research triggers a number of related questions posed for the reader’s consideration.

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Appendix of Statements

i First debate (Obama): “We had the highest fatalities among US troops this past year than at any time since 2002. And we are seeing a major offensive taking place – Al Qaeda and Taliban crossing the border and attacking our troops in a brazen fashion. They are feeling emboldened.”

Second debate (Obama): “Gen. McKiernan, the commander in Afghanistan right now, is desperate for more help because our bases and outposts are now targets for more aggressive Afghan – Taliban offenses.” ii First debate (Obama): “We have to press the Afghan government to make certain that they are actually working for their people...and I’ve said this to President Karzai.”

“Second debate (Obama): We’re also going to have to work with the Karzai government, and when I met with President Karzai, I was very clear that, “You are going to have to do better by your people in order for us to gain the popular support that’s necessary.” iii First debate (McCain): “We will win this [war] and we won’t come home in defeat and dishonour and probably have to go back if we fail.”

Second Debate (McCain): “We will succeed and we will bring our troops home with honour and victory and not in defeat.” iv First debate (Obama): “So back in April, I warned the administration that you had Russian peacekeepers in Georgian territory. That made no sense whatsoever.”

Second debate (Obama): “You know, back in April, I put out a statement saying that the situation in Georgia was unsustainable because you had Russian peacekeepers in these territories that were under dispute.” v First debate (McCain): “I don’t believe we’re going to go back to the Cold War. I am sure that that will not happen.”

Second debate (McCain): “I don’t think that – we’re not going to have another Cold War with Russia.” vi First debate (McCain): “I looked into Putin’s eyes, and I saw three letters, a “K”, a “G,” and a “B.” And their aggression in Georgia is not acceptable behaviour.”

Second debate (McCain): “I said I looked into his eyes and saw three letters, a “K,” a “G” and a “B”. He has surrounded himself with former KGB apparatchiks.” vii McCain’s full response to retired Navy Chief Terry Shirley: “Well, thank you, Terry. And thank you for your service to the country. I want to say, everything I ever learned about leadership I learned from a chief petty officer. And I thank you, and I thank you, my friend. Thanks for serving. Let -- let -- let me say that we obviously would not wait for the United Nations Security Council. I think the realities are that both Russia and China would probably

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pose significant obstacles. And our challenge right now is the Iranians continue on the path to acquiring nuclear weapons, and it's a great threat. It's not just a threat -- threat to the state of Israel. It's a threat to the stability of the entire Middle East. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, all the other countries will acquire them, too. The tensions will be ratcheted up. What would you do if you were the Israelis and the president of a country says that they are -- they are determined to wipe you off the map, calls your country a stinking corpse? Now, Sen. Obama without precondition wants to sit down and negotiate with them, without preconditions. That's what he stated, again, a matter of record. I want to make sure that the Iranians are put enough -- that we put enough pressure on the Iranians by joining with our allies, imposing significant, tough sanctions to modify their behaviour. And I think we can do that. I think, joining with our allies and friends in a league of democracies that we can effectively abridge their behaviour, and hopefully they would abandon this quest that they are on for nuclear weapons. But, at the end of the day, my friend, I have to tell you again, and you know what it's like to serve, and you know what it's like to sacrifice, but we can never allow a second Holocaust to take place.”