Kurt Bayertz - Human Nature - How Normative Might It Be

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 0360-5310/03/2802-131$16.002003, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 131–150 # Swets & Zeitlinger

Human Nature: How Normative Might it Be?

Kurt BayertzDepartment of Philosophy, University of M€uunster, Germany

ABSTRACT

The question of the moral status of human nature is today being posed above all under theinfluence of medical and biotechnological aspects. These facilitate not only an increasingnumber of, but also increasingly far-reaching interventions and manipulations in humans, sothat the perspective of a gradual ‘‘technologization’’ of his physical constitution can no longerbe regarded as merely utopian. Some authors are convinced that this disturbing developmentcan only be halted when an inherent value is (once again) ascribed to human nature. After ashort description of this situation (I), the following paper first examines the difficulties that ariseas regards an adequately precise descriptive definition of human nature (II) and, in a secondstep, the problems posed by the necessity to define the normative status of human nature (III). Ithereby comes to the conclusion that a precise definition of ‘‘human nature’’ is not possible forfundamental reasons, and that only a weak normativity can be warranted.

Keywords: human body, human nature, natural vs. artificial, posthuman body

that the duty of man is the same in respect to

his own nature as in respect to the nature of all

other things, namely not to follow but to amend it.

(Mill, 1874, p. 397)

I. THE TECHNOLOGICAL CONTINGENCY

OF HUMAN NATURE

In the more recent past, nature has become technologically controllable to an

unprecedented degree in human history. This applies to the nature around us,

Address correspondence to: Prof. Dr. Kurt Bayertz, Department of Philosophy, University ofM€uunster, Domplatz 23, 48143 M€uunster, Germany. E-mail: [email protected]

at Bolland Library, U

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in which we live, and ever-increasingly to our own, human nature. Millions of

people (in richer countries) undergo smaller or larger operations, influence

their bodily functions by chemical means, possess artificial implants, or

compensate organic malfunctions with prostheses. A dramatic increase in this

tendency must be reckoned with in the future; in the literature there is already

reference to ‘‘posthuman bodies’’. The idea of reconstructing humanity is no

longer wholly utopian. One can imagine such a reconstruction in two (by no

means alternative) ways: On the one hand through genetic manipulation, and

on the other through the gradual replacement of organs by technical modules.

The first method would be the more conservative because it retains the human

being as a being of ‘‘flesh and blood’’; the second would sever the tie to

organic material and lead to a ‘‘denaturalization’’ of the human being, as

Stanislaw Lem already described in the 1960s (cf. Bayertz, 1994, pp. 70ff).

Whether this will actually become possible is doubtful. But this much is

indisputable: What a human being is, what he can do and how he looks, will in

the future become ever less dependant on default biological facts and ever

more on the progress of medicine and biotechnology. In short: human nature

will become technologically contingent.

Many people are observing this process with considerable discontent.

Although serious interventions are considered by most to be legitimate if they

serve the conservation of life and health, they consider the whole perspective

of a growing technologization of human nature – with the reconstruction of

the human being as its vanishing point – as alarming and threatening. So it is

not surprising that this has led to the consideration of whether human nature

should be awarded a specific moral status, in order to counteract ethically the

trend towards technologization and artificiality at least to some extent. J€uurgen

Habermas is concerned about this in his new book about Die Zukunft der

menschlichen Natur (The Future of Human Nature) and pleads (cautiously) for

its moralization. Similar to the way the threat to external nature has led to the

demand for a return to a pre-modern understanding of nature as being

something inherently valuable (cf. Jonas, 1984), human nature should also

(once again) be attributed an inherent value.

This idea of a specific moral status of human nature has roots deep in the

history of European philosophy, and reaching back into antiquity (I shall be

returning to this later). And although modern times are characterized by a

strong trend towards neutralization, disenchantment and demoralization of

external nature, the unique moral status of human nature, though not left

entirely untouched by this trend, has only rarely been questioned head-on and

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fundamentally: it has to a great extent retained its inherent value (cf. Bayertz,

1994, pp. 116ff). This not only applies to philosophical thinking but also to

everyday moral consciousness. In defiance of all the anti-naturalistic trends

of modern philosophy, ‘‘naturalness’’ is intuitively regarded as a value by

most people. Many who are prepared to surrender external nature to change

and manipulation, would not with the same degree of generosity wish to

allow this in human nature. This unique moral status of human nature is also

expressed in law. Thus, German law leaves it to the individual to decide

what should happen to his body and accepts, for example, the refusal to have a

life-saving operation; thereby it grants the person the right of disposal of his

own body. On the other hand, the penal code, in x228 (formerly x226a),

regards interventions in bodily intactness as punishable bodily harm if they

‘‘offend public decency’’,1 even if the person concerned freely agrees. Other

European legal systems (including those of France, Spain, the UK and the

Netherlands) do not recognize the individual as the owner of his own body,

with which he can do whatever he likes, especially as regards commercial

objectives.2

The idea of an independent moral status of human nature is therefore

linked as much to a philosophical tradition as it is to widespread and in part

legally institutionalized moral intuitions. Nature is thereby seen as a given

fact and in this way it is hoped to achieve an objective point of reference

for normative restrictions as regards the admissibility of biotechnological

interventions on human beings. At a time when (a) everything seems to

be manipulable and technically unrestricted, and in which (b) individual

volition and intent no longer seem to acknowledge any limits, a non-

arbitrary limit to self-manipulation for its own sake is to be established at this

juncture.

II. DIFFICULTIES WITH ‘‘HUMAN NATURE’’

The first step towards such a normative concept of human nature must consist

of as accurate as possible a definition of what we are to understand by this

definition. Even if no absolute precision can be expected, it is obvious that the

definition can only fulfil its practical function – to deliver a criterion for the

differentiation between legitimate and illegitimate biotechnological interven-

tions – if it allows an adequately distinct demarcation between what is

humanly ‘‘natural’’ and what is ‘‘unnatural’’.

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A. What Does ‘‘Nature’’ Mean?Before we turn to this problem, we should remind ourselves that the

difficulties in formulating the general concept of ‘‘nature’’ are notorious in

philosophy. Although we all believe we know intuitively what is ‘‘natural’’

and what is not, closer scrutiny causes considerable difficulties. (1) These start

with our tendency to regard nature as constant and unchanging, although the

sciences have long since taught us that this impression is merely the result of

an observational perspective that is limited in time; for instance, ‘‘ecological

balances’’ are – when observed within evolutionary time periods – a rather

fleeting phenomenon. (2) We also encounter difficulties on the semantic level.

Various theorists have pointed out the ambiguity of the concept of nature, e.g.,

John Stuart Mill (1874, pp. 374f, 401). More than a century earlier, David

Hume had already stressed that the content of the concept of nature changes

depending on the opposite concept proposed respectively. ‘‘‘Nature’ means

something different when the concept is used as the opposite of ‘miracle’, to

‘what is unusual’ or to ‘what is artificial’’’ (1739, p. 475). Further opposite

concepts can easily be found and each time the meaning of ‘‘nature’’ changes;

we will encounter further examples in this paper. (3) Finally, the demarcation

between that which is ‘‘natural’’ and that, which is ‘‘artificial’’ is also

problematic on the ‘‘ontological’’ level. Jacques Monod has made it clear in

clear-cut considerations that no distinction can be made between natural and

artificial objects on the basis of their characteristics, in particular their

structural or functional features (Monod, 1970, Chapter 1). Only when we

know the history of an object can we classify it as either ‘‘natural’’ or

‘‘artificial’’. We have to know whether or not it is man-made.

One might believe that both difficulties as regards human nature can be

solved easily. On the semantic level we will here take ‘‘natural’’ as the

opposite concept of ‘‘artificial’’, and human nature as therefore being the

entirety of characteristics the human being possesses without his own

contribution. So it is natural for him to have skin, whereas skin colourings

(through cosmetics or tattoos) are artificial; it is part of our nature for us to

have a heart, but pacemakers are not natural. In a word: the ‘‘nature of the

human being’’ is identical with his body, i.e., with the outer figure and the

inner functions of the biological species homo sapiens.3 This interpretation

seems adequate for several reasons: (a) it corresponds to our intuition, since

we associate a physical being with the concept ‘‘human’’. When we ask

ourselves what unites all human beings with one another, the physical body is

a much greater possibility than their way of thinking or life form, which can

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differ considerably both historically and culturally. (b) The human body is part

of nature in its entirety: historically it is the product of evolution, is subject to

the laws of nature and is bound to external nature as regards the fulfilment of

its needs. (c) And finally, in the present context, it is about the ethical

evaluation and limitation of biotechnological actions; these directly target the

human body (even where they – indirectly – target the mind).

Starting from this definition, the second difficulty appears to be easy to

solve, since we already know which changes we make to ourselves or undergo.

And that means: Since we know how our body is made without our

contribution, we know our ‘‘nature’’.

B. ‘‘Natura Naturata’’ or ‘‘Natura Naturans’’?However, this last point is not as straightforward as it might seem. Let us first

consider specific individuals. We do not have to reflect for long to recognize

that the existence of each of those individuals did not, of course, come about

‘‘without (human) contribution’’; sexual intercourse is a human action and

without this action nobody would exist. Let us further reflect on the human

species as a whole. If we do not restrict ourselves to a specific point in time,

but instead consider longer development phases of the species, then the

characteristics of the human being turn out to be the product of human

activity – at least in part. Thus, the permutation of the gene pool is influenced

by manifold actions (migration, war, segregation, love, marriage, prison or

death sentence, celibacy, etc.). It would be hard to imagine any kind of social

behaviour or legal verdict that had no genetic consequences (cf. Medawar,

1959, Chapter 4).

Here, a central problem in the distinction between the ‘‘natural’’ and the

‘‘artificial’’ is being addressed, that Monod had also overlooked. When we

classify external objects as natural or artificial on the basis of knowing their

history, we do so on condition that we are not considering the human being

and his behaviour as a part of nature. Only when we make a firm distinction

between the human being and nature can we say: ‘‘that which happens without

human contribution is natural, (whereas) that which happens with human

contribution is artificial!’’ But exactly this distinction is by no means absolute;

it arises out of a particular perspective and disappears when we take up a

different one. Let us look more closely at this:

(a) From the parochial viewpoint of a determinate individual or a determinate

generation, the human body is regarded as a predetermined (matter of)



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fact; it is ‘‘nature’’ in the sense of natura naturata. The distinction

between the ‘‘natural’’ and the ‘‘artificial’’ is certainly plausible and

meaningful in this context: that which is found is ‘‘natural’’, (whereas)

that which has been changed is ‘‘artificial’’.

(b) On the other hand, if we regard nature from the perspective of a

distant observer, then it appears to be an evolving system and the

human being is a – particularly active – part of this system; he

influences many elements of this system, including his own body, with

his behaviour. So there is no reason to view the changes he makes to

this body as less ‘‘natural’’ than the changes which, for example, birds

make to their environment through nest-building. If one proceeds from

a (‘‘holistic’’) picture of nature as a system embracing human beings

and developing historically, then we are taking the classical concept

of ‘‘nature’’ as a natura naturans as our starting point. Within this

concept, a differentiation between ‘‘natural’’ and ‘‘artificial’’ is clearly

pointless.

This consideration shows that the difference between ‘‘natural’’ and

‘‘artificial’’ is dependent on the perspective. Herein lies the decisive cause

of the inevitable failure of every principal and universal differentiation

between them (this does not rule out that selective and specific differences

between them can be possible and meaningful).

Although I consider this to be a central argument, the friends of human

nature will not give way to it. They will argue that it is based on the ambiguity

of the concepts ‘‘contribution’’, ‘‘action’’ and ‘‘product of action’’ used by me.

Undeniably, every individual is the product of the (sexual) ‘‘action’’ of his

parents, but not in the same sense as a house is the product of the builders’

actions. Whereas the subjects in the latter case influence every stage of the

house-building by their actions, in the former they merely initiate a

development which then ensues independently: the growth of an embryo into

a child and adult is not ‘‘manufacturing’’ and does not depend upon the wishes

and intentions of the parents. This is similar to exerting influence on the gene

pool. Here, we may not be dealing with organic growth, but the result of the

action is nevertheless not induced intentionally, but results from activities

pursued by participants with totally different aims. Therefore, changes to the

gene pool are, although anthropogenic, nevertheless in a special sense

‘‘natural’’: as side-effects, they do not result from human intentions but from

natural causal laws.

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Two points must be asserted against this reply. I only wish to mention the

first one, without going into detail. Namely, that the reply imputes a distinct

difference between the manufacture or production (e.g., of a house) on the one

hand, and the simple kick-off of a process which then continues spontaneously

(e.g., the procreation of a child) on the other. But in fact we are concerned

here – again – only with a difference in degree. On the one hand, we have

processes that can be steered closely by the human being (and have to be, if

they are to have the desired success); on the other, we have processes that

proceed relatively ‘‘autonomously’’ when they have once been initiated. In

both cases we are concerned with the gradual blending of elements of human

intention, planning and steering on the one hand, and true to nature, spon-

taneous, autonomous mechanisms on the other. ‘‘Natural’’ and ‘‘artificial’’ are

therefore not divided by a barrier, but united through a spectrum.

C. Artificial by NatureThe second point is more important. The reply reduces the pair of terms,

‘‘natural’’ – ‘‘artificial’’ to the pair of terms ‘‘spontaneous’’ – ‘‘intentional’’.

Apart from the fact that this confirms the ambiguous, alluring character of the

concept of nature, this shift in meaning is not implausible. At least it solves

one problem: On this basis we can regard as ‘‘nature’’ or ‘‘natural’’ the

unintentional repercussions that human action has on human nature, and

confine the predicate ‘‘artificial’’ to those changes made intentionally by

human beings to their nature. For instance, the changes to the human gene

pool which occur as side-effects in social institutions would then change

nothing of the ‘‘naturalness’’ of the gene pool, whereas targeted interventions

on the germline would. But this gain would not be very far-reaching, as the

following considerations will show.

To simplify, we can distinguish between two different kinds of human

characteristics or capabilities. One kind is those the human being shares with

other parts of nature or with other living creatures; the other is those

characteristics and capabilities which only the human being possesses and

which therefore distinguish him as a specific creature. The latter includes

above all human beings’ capacity for reason and speech and the capacities for

intentional action, responsibility, etc., which arise from it. It is precisely

because the capabilities belonging to the second group are, as a whole, those

which define the human being as a specific creature, that they have frequently

been identified with ‘‘human nature’’ in the history of philosophy. David

Hume discusses in his Treatise of Human Nature exactly these characteristics



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and capabilities: knowledge, passions such as pride and humility, and morals;

the human body is at most mentioned in passing.4 We are talking here about

another new concept of ‘‘human nature’’, and so as not to fall into total

conceptual confusion, we should perhaps speak here of ‘‘human essence’’

rather than ‘‘human nature’’. This distinction is meaningful above all, because

with its help it will become possible to express conceptually the dialectic

tension that is typical for human beings: On the one hand, the human being is

indissolubly bound up with his body, but on the other hand he is not identical

with his body, but is different from it.5 Whereas we can say of an animal that it

is his body, we have to say of the human being that he has a body. This is

demonstrated by the fact that human beings can, under certain circumstances,

disassociate themselves from their bodies. A Platonist can look upon his body

as the prison of his soul, a transsexual can have the feeling that he is ‘‘in the

wrong body’’, and an old man can be disgusted by the frailty and infirmity of

his body. In the history of philosophical and religious thinking, but also in

everyday life, there are countless examples that human nature is not only the

precondition of all human subjectivity, but also its boundary (cf. Bayertz, 1994,

pp. 204ff). Because human nature lags not just on the odd occasion behind the

needs and ideals surfacing in the human being, and because it also imposes

painful limits on the likewise growing hopes and ideals – that is of course the

reason why human nature is again and again degraded to ‘‘mere flesh’’, and is

regarded as something that has to be surmounted, oppressed or at the very least

put in its place.

With this, we now face a decisive question. If we distinguish between

‘‘human nature’’ on the one hand and the ‘‘human essence’’ (as being the

epitome of all humanly specific characteristics and capabilities) on the other,

then we have to face the quandary as to whether we should regard the ‘‘human

essence’’ as part of his ‘‘nature’’ or not. Let us now consider the two possible

answers to this question:

Either: We separate the ‘‘human essence’’ from his nature. In the history of

philosophical thinking, reason, language and morals counted and count as that

which distinguishes the human being from the animal and from nature; and as

such they cannot themselves be ‘‘natural’’. However, as rational as this

interpretation is in some respects, in others it has disagreeable consequences.

We then have to say that reasonable deliberation and behaviour, or linguistic

communication are ‘‘artificial’’ and ‘‘unnatural’’; this is not only linguistically

irritating, but also factually problematic. The upshot is a temptation to ascribe

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these characteristics and capabilities to a higher, transcendental world and to

regard their association with human ‘‘nature’’ as defilement which must be got

rid off as soon as possible: Only when we have freed ourselves of our body can

we become identical with our ‘‘essence’’. No particular acumen is needed to

recognize that such a way of looking at things offers no good basis for granting

human nature a moral status. Exactly the opposite is the case. The an-

thropological dualism of which European philosophical and religious thinking

is so readily accused, has its origins in just this way of looking at things.

Or: We see the human ‘‘essence’’ as part of human nature; rational thinking,

intentional behaviour and morals are then exactly what denotes human

‘‘nature’’. ‘‘Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has

determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel. . .’’, writes Hume

appropriately (1739, p. 183). If one starts out from this premise, it will not be

possible to label as ‘‘unnatural’’ the results of rational thinking and intentional

behaviour. The influence of human beings on both external and their own

nature would thus have to be regarded as the consequence of their very nature.

In fact, we can observe that people do not leave their bodies untouched, but

work on, change and cultivate them. Decisive for this were and are aesthetic

motives (hair-cutting, tattooing), religious laws (circumcision) and medical

needs (medicines, amputations). It can be deduced from the fact that such

interventions did and do not count as morally illegitimate, but partly even as

laws, that the human body is perceived not just as ‘‘nature’’, but invariably

also as ‘‘culture’’. The distinction between ‘‘nature’’ and ‘‘culture’’ seems as

regards the human being and his body to be not only pragmatically difficult to

define, but fundamentally vague. This insight is, of course, not new. Various

representatives of 18th century Scottish philosophy had, in a completely

different context, already pointed out the hopelessness of all attempts to

identify a ‘‘natural state’’ of the human being.6 And in the last century,

Hellmuth Plessner characterized the ‘‘Law of natural artificiality’’ as the first

of three basic anthropological laws (Plessner, 1928, pp. 383ff).

III. JUSTIFYING THE MORAL STATUS OF HUMAN NATURE

In the results of these deliberations it should not be denied that to speak of a

‘‘nature of the human being’’ is meaningful in some respects and under certain

conditions. But one cannot completely brush aside the realization that it is



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misleading on a basic philosophical level. It is a characteristic of the ‘‘nature’’

of a human being that he is not only (as are animals) subject to evolutionary

change, but changes himself; in this respect he is ‘‘by nature artificial’’.

Nevertheless I will suspend these findings in the following part of the paper

and assume that we have found an adequately precise definition of the term.

But we would not have then reached our target, since this was not of a

theoretical, but of a practical kind. It was about the question as to whether a

normative status can (or even must) be ascribed to human nature. We therefore

have to ask with which arguments such a status can be justified.

A. Human Nature as Basis of PersonalityAn initial possibility is to derive the normative status of human nature from its

close connection with the human person. Immanuel Kant’s argumentation

took this line, for example. Because the body not only belongs to human life

by chance, it’s condition is sine qua non, and because we cannot imagine life

without a body, and the use of freedom is only possible through the body, and

the body is part of our self – Kant deduced from this that our body is not

subject to our free will and that we do not own it, and therefore we have no

right to do what we want with it (1775, pp. 160f, 170ff, 178ff). Similarly,

Hegel derives the moral status of the human body from its inseparable

connection with the human person (1821, x48). The value of human nature is

here an indirect or derivative value, which ensues from two assumptions: (1)

The human person has an inherent value; (2) the human person has his basis in

human nature.

Habermas’ considerations are evidently along these lines when he speaks of

‘‘the insignificant, normative interplay between the morally necessary and

legally guaranteed inviolability of the individual and the inaccessibility of the

natural modus of his bodily personification’’ (2001, p. 41). It is not human

nature ‘‘as such’’ which, according to Habermas, must be protected – he is

explicitly against its ‘‘re-sacralization’’ – but human nature as the basis of a

specific self-image of the human species as a whole. He fears that genetically

manipulated individuals will not see themselves as people with, above all,

equal rights compared with their fellow human beings, and (fears) that they

have also forfeited the chance to see themselves as autonomous authors of

their own lives. With that, foundations would be weakened, upon which the

idea of the human being as a free and responsible being rests as much as the

ideals of legal equality and political liberty. The realization of eugenic

strategies (even if they were of a liberal rather than an authoritative kind)

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could therefore ‘‘change the entire structure of our moral experience’’ (2001,

p. 54), so that in consequence ‘‘we could no longer see ourselves as ethically

free and morally equal living beings oriented to norms and reasons’’ (2001,

p. 74). Without going into details of Habermas’ considerations here, I will

confine myself to two short remarks. Firstly, these considerations are based on

empirical assumptions about the consequences of technical genetic manip-

ulations, which could be accurate, but are not necessarily so. It is at the very

least undecided whether these consequences will actually materialize, and a

number of things could be said which could cast doubt upon them. Secondly,

Habermas shifts the question from an individual to a collective level which he

calls ‘‘genus-ethical’’ (‘‘gattungsethisch’’). This is certainly plausible on the

analytical level, since it would be like a miracle of the possibility of genetic

self-change of the human species were without effects on the collective self-

image. On the normative level, however, this shift is problematical, because it

implies a subordination of specific individuals and their wishes and interests to

abstract ideas and theories which, moreover, will never be accepted uniformly

by all individuals.

What would be the consequences of attributing construed moral value to

human nature? In answering this question we should observe two different

cases. The first concerns the manipulation of the nature of other persons. It is

surely indisputable that such a construed value suffices to protect the bodily

integrity of individuals from the interventions of others. ‘‘Violence inflicted

on my body by others is violence inflicted on me’’ as Hegel (ibid.) remarked

briefly and to the point. This applies not only to direct and intended harm, but

also to the risks – e.g., from medical or biotechnological interventions – to

which we are exposed. Higher safety standards must of necessity be applied to

such interventions on human beings than to other interventions on nature. All

manipulations which harm an individual or expose him to the risk of such

harm are therefore inadmissible. However, what would be the case in (future

perhaps possible) manipulations that are risk-free and do not inflict such harm

on the manipulated individual? Here one should include ‘‘improvements’’ on

human nature, for example through interventions on the germline. Since such

interventions have to be carried out without the informed consent of the

respective individuals, they are legitimate only when they are indubitably in

the interests of these individuals, so that subsequent consent to them can be

taken as forthcoming. The only interventions for which that can be assumed

with certainty are those with therapeutic (or preventive) targets (cf. Bayertz,

1994, pp. 311ff; Habermas, 2001, pp. 109, 119). But this means that inasmuch



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the autonomy of the manipulated individuals is not restricted or rendered

impossible by the respective interventions, a construed value would not speak

against changes to human nature. A construed value of human nature would,

while drastically restricting the legitimate scope of eugenic strategies, not

prohibit all eugenic strategies.

The second case concerns the self-manipulation of individuals, i.e.,

manipulations of human nature which are carried out with the permission or

on the instructions of the respective person. Kant took this for granted: no

one has the right to do what he pleases with his body (cf. 1797, xx 5ff).

Today we are much more reticent as regards ‘‘duties to one’s self.’’ A

certain paternalism can possibly be justified by the (derivative) value of

human nature as regards risky medical interventions, especially when the

respective risks are entered into lightly and without adequate information.

Such paternalism should, however, remain closely limited for two reasons.

Firstly, it would be contradictory to allow risky action generally, but to

make restrictions where it is claimed in a medical context: Whoever risks

his life by smoking or riding a motor-bike, must also be allowed to do it by

having operations, amputations or transplantations.7 The second reason

arises from the fact that we have attributed only a derivative value to

human nature. Its value arises from its connection to the person concerned.

But it would not be consistent to defend the value of the human nature

against exactly that person from whom this value emanated in the first

place. If persons are themselves valuable, then the needs and wishes of

these persons are also fundamentally valuable and must be respected. The

body is a precondition both of the life of a person and also of his good life.

Aristotle had already pointed out that not only external goods such as

nourishment and clothing belong to a good life, but also various bodily

attributes such as beauty or health (NE 1098b, 1099b). In point of fact, the

quality of individual life is to a considerable extent determined by factors

which depend directly or indirectly from the natural constitution of the

respective individual. And it follows from this that, on the one hand, this

constitution possesses an evaluative dimension for the respective person, but

on the other hand, this constitution can, as we saw earlier, become the

cause of the person’s discontentedness and unhappiness in not just a few

situations. We must regard as legitimate for these situations any efforts by

the person concerned to adapt his nature to his needs and wishes. If

somebody nowadays tries to improve his well-being through piercing or

tattooing, he might in future try transplantations or implantations. In short:

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If any restrictions at all for the behaviour of the person involved can be

deduced from the derivative value of human nature, then they are probably

very weak ones.

B. Inherent Value?Whoever is not happy with this result and wishes to put tight restrictions on

control over human nature will thus not be satisfied with a derivative value,

but will attempt to prove an inherent value of human nature. Such a value

would be characterized in that it is inherent to human nature ‘‘in itself’’,

independent of what any individual or all humans accept as valuable. It is

obvious that with this postulation one takes on a considerable onus of proof:

not only because such postulations need to be justified, but also because this

value is supposed to enable the individual’s freedom of action with respect to

his own body to be restricted. In the following I will briefly differentiate and

discuss five possible arguments in favour of an inherent value of human

nature, whereby these five arguments should not be seen as being mutually

incompatible; as a rule several of them may be used jointly.

(1) The religious argument. A first possibility consists of seeing human nature

as being created by God and deriving its inherent value from this. One

could also speak of the ‘‘sanctity’’ of human nature. This argument meets

with several difficulties, of which I would here like to mention only one. It

rests on preconditions which are not generally recognized in pluralistic

societies and while indeed being able to form the basis of private or group

morals, it is not suitable as a basis for public, generally binding morals.

(2) The realistic argument. One can start out from an inherent value of

human nature as a given fact which needs or can be awarded no further

justification: Whoever ‘‘sees’’ human nature with the right eyes will

recognize this value. This approach is certainly familiar from the

history of ethical thinking. Samuel Clarke, Richard Price and Ralph

Cudworth represented it in the 17th and 18th centuries (however not

especially with regards to human nature), as well as British intuitionists

and German representatives of ‘‘Wertethik’’ like Max Scheler and

Nicolai Hartmann in the 20th. As Christine Koorsgaard has shown, this

position is based on the attempt to end a possible regression of the

ethical question to ever more and ever ‘‘deeper’’ reasoning ‘‘by fiat’’:

‘‘Having discovered that he needs an unconditional answer, the realist

straightaway concludes that he has found one’’ (Korsgaard, 1996,



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p. 33). In a word: This is not about an argument, it is only about an

assertion.

(3) The intuitive argument. Since such an assertion is insufficient, one can

try to support it by reference to widely disseminated intuitions. It was

pointed out at the beginning that in the moral common sense, human

nature does not count as normatively neutral in the same way as external

nature does. Specific physical characteristics – above all health and

beauty – have always been regarded as independent values. The problem

with intuitions, however, is that they diverge strongly. Some want to

preserve human nature as it is, others may be fascinated by the idea of

reconstructing it and do not see any value in its present structure. They

dream of ‘‘posthuman bodies’’ and are eager to go ahead with producing

them. It is not clear whether this intuition lays the foundation for a

derivative or an inherent value. There is much to support the first variant;

health and beauty are seen as values because they increase the chances of

a good life for the respective individual; this is also how physical

attributes were understood by Aristotle. But even if we presume that the

inherent value of human nature is founded upon the reference to its

intuitive value, that would not amount to much as far as the normative

power of this value is concerned. Moral common sense considered

human nature to be valuable, but in no way to be sacrosanct and invi-

olable. We regard very far-reaching interventions into human nature –

amputations, heart transplants, brain surgery, sex changes – as morally

legitimate insofar as they serve the mitigation of human suffering. That

means: Even when we are prepared to award human nature (inherent?)

value, this does not imply that this value is the only one we accept. There

are situations in which we consider it justifiable to subordinate the value

of the integrity of human nature to the value of the alleviation of

suffering. Even an inherent value of human nature could not justify an

absolute blockade of legitimate medical action, since it could be outdone

by other values at any time.

(4) The metaphysical argument. The idea of an inherent value of nature is not

a new invention. It was recognized in many pre-modern world views,

including ancient philosophy. Nearly all of the more recent concepts of a

revaluation of nature – whether external or human – is oriented on the

model of antiquity, even when it concedes that a clear-cut revival is not

possible. Let us therefore take a brief look at the antique understanding of

nature, insofar as it is relevant in the present context.

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The starting point for antiquity was the idea of a cosmos, i.e., the

concept of a finite, self-contained and orderly world in which every

process had its predetermined goal and every thing its predetermined

place. In Plato’s late dialogue Timaeus, for example, the whole world is

viewed as a single, uniform living being with a meaningful soul. In such a

world organism the individual parts do not live unrelated along side each

other, but form a functional, hierarchical system. The term ‘‘cosmos’’

therefore defines a meaningful organization, in which it was not possible

to stringently separate facts and values from each other: Every part

influences the whole and therefore is valuable. This also applies to human

beings. The human being, just like any other being, has a special place in

the cosmos and from this place ensues his life’s goal. The models of

successful human life designed in the various ancient ethics all have their

support in metaphysical anthropology, which in its turn was part of

cosmology (cf. Korsgaard, 1996, pp. 1–5). In the ‘‘classical’’ theories of

Plato and Aristotle, the connection was drawn between anthropology and

ethics by means of the famous ergon argument (Plato, Rep. 352; Aristotle,

NE 1097b), according to which a human being can only lead a good life if

he realizes and cultivates his own specific potentials – his rationality – in

the best possible way. The insight into his own nature that the human

being gains, and its place in the whole of nature, therefore has the same

significance as the insight into how one should live.

The modern interpretation of the human, as it has been shaped since the

Renaissance, vastly distinguishes itself from this picture. This interpreta-

tion states on a cosmic level that nature is not an organized cosmos but an

interminable aggregate of facts and processes without inherent meaning;

and on the anthropological level, that the human being is not a part of

nature in an ethically relevant way: whereas the behaviour of all other

living creatures is defined by exterior facts and inner determinants, the

human being is not rigid. In Pico della Mirandola’s famous speech about

the dignity of the human being (1496), this is expressed unequivocally and

almost the entire subsequent anthropology followed him in this. Various

ideas and ideals, which can be regarded as constitutive for modern

consciousness, have developed on this anthropological basis. But the

central idea is freedom. Insofar as the human being is not tied by nature to

a particular place in the world or to a particular life form, he can (and

must) decide these for himself. The emphatic concept of freedom of

modern times is expressed in the conviction that the human being himself



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can decide who and what he is. This notion of the human being’s self-

creation relates to two levels: (a) Firstly, to the individual level. Not

only humans in general, but basically every individual has the possibility

of choosing various alternatives. And this possibility is a value – perhaps

the highest of all – and as such earns not only respect but also protection.

(b) Secondly, it relates to the generic level. If the human being can

make something of himself as a species, then that means he is involved

(or at least has the possibility of thus being) in a process of progress

and perfection. This involves the human being as the creator of his morals.

In a world in which a human being has no stipulated place or plan, he

can and must give himself the moral laws of his action. As everybody

knows, it was Kant who made this idea of autonomy the basis of his

ethics.

We can see from this brief sketch that the key terms of modern times

named, and likewise the ensuing concepts of individuality and human

dignity have their basis in an understanding of external nature as a merely

factual, not meaningfully and valuably structured connection, and human

nature as something open and normatively noncommittal. To put it more

bluntly: without a ‘‘materialistic’’ world view no freedom, no self-

creation, no autonomy, no individuality and no human dignity. It is

difficult to see how these ideas – and not just as regards the technical

manipulation of the physical body – can be maintained if the underlying

conception of nature is surrendered. The return to a strict normativity of

human nature would involve drastic restrictions to the human being’s

scope of behaviour in every area of activity. If the highest life targets can

be foreseen from the natural order, then they are no longer available for

rational choice. He who does not follow these objective targets, behaves

irrationally and (morally) wrongly. This then leaves only the choice

between one right life form and many wrong ones; we would no longer

have a choice between different right life forms. That was also Plato’s

view (Rep. 445 und 544). In a word: A strong concept of freedom and

individuality is not compatible with a strong concept of a ‘‘nature of the

human being.’’

(5) The functional argument. An important argument – which, incidentally, is

repeatedly brought forward as regards the moral status of external nature –

consists of the suggestion that only the recognition of such an inherent

value and the categorical behavioural limits resulting from it can offer

adequately safe protection of the integrity of human nature and of persons.

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That is to say, if (according to the argument) this integrity is repeatedly

treated as a problem of selective weighing up of attributes, then this

must lead to gradual, progressive attrition; for in each individual case

some or other selective, plausible reasons can be found to replace or

improve this or that part of human nature by technical means. In the

end this would, by way of a sequence of – individual – justifiable

interventions, lead to an effect that possibly nobody intended: the

abolition of human nature.

The description underlying this argument could in the long run actually

prove to be empirically accurate. However, is it for that reason already

valid as an ethical argument? Firstly, it is noticeable that this argument

assumes what it wants to prove: That this abolition of human nature is

morally wrong. Only when the inherent value of this nature has already

been recognized or intuitively presumed, will a morally negative

judgement on the gradual replacement of nature through technology be

reached. This should already be enough to invalidate this argument. But

secondly, in addition, this argument contains a curious deduction from the

‘‘should’’ to the ‘‘is’’. From the dictum that human nature should be

conserved the deduction is made that it has an inherent value. Here the

naturalistic fallacy is being drawn in reverse.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

1. The question of the moral status of human nature is being posed today

under the influence of the progress in modern medicine and biotechnology.

This facilitates not only an increasing number of, but also increasingly far-

reaching interventions and manipulations in the human, so that the

perspective of a gradual technologization of his physical constitution can

no longer be regarded as merely utopian. Some authors are convinced that

this disturbing development can only be halted when an inherent value is

(once again) ascribed to human nature.

2. However, this idea is burdened by considerable problems. Firstly, attempts

at a descriptively precise distinction between ‘‘natural’’ and ‘‘artificial’’

meet with difficulties. These difficulties are not merely semantic or

epistemic, but of an ‘‘ontological’’ nature: they are inherent to the object.

However, an adequately precise demarcation is essential, if the term

‘‘human nature’’ is to carry out a normative orienting function. If that



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which belongs or does not belong to human nature remains vague, then the

legitimacy of certain biotechnological manipulations will also remain

vague. The more precisely we try to define and delineate ‘‘human nature’’,

the more hopelessly do we get entangled in paradoxes and dilemmas. The

difference is therefore only useful on the intuitive everyday level, but not

for ethical judgement.

3. A second complex of difficulties is to be found as regards the scope and

rationale of the normative content of human nature. This is certainly

relevant if one claims an inherent value of human nature and represents

a kind of moral realism. Such a strong interpretation is above all

attractive to those who stipulate absolute limitations to human behaviour

and seek to protect the inviolability of human nature even from the

respective individual. On closer scrutiny, however, it becomes apparent

that for the justification of this interpretation preconditions must be set,

which are not compatible with other basic values – above all with

freedom and autonomy: The stronger we make the normativity of human

nature, the narrower the limits to self-determination become. The price

we would have to pay for a normatively strong definition of human

nature is therefore very high.

4. One can also support the idea of a normative status of human nature in a

weak variant. Human nature has here a prima facie value, which derives

from its close association to the respective person. Such an interpretation

would lead to the possibilities of modern biotechnology being dealt with in

a careful and cautious manner and perhaps even justify mild paternalism

towards the respective individuals. Beyond this, it would show certain

intuitive, well-founded ideals of ‘‘naturalness’’ to be elements of a good

life and a prerequisite of human flourishing. It is conceivable that under the

influence of increasing artificiality a growing number of individuals

‘‘convert’’ to a normatively profound view of human nature and are guided

by it in the medical decision-making pertaining to themselves. It is,

however, questionable whether such a change in values (a) can be rationally

‘‘compelled’’ by philosophical arguments and (b) legitimately be made

binding for everybody. In any case, this weak variant does not establish an

absolute limit to biotechnological activity. Therefore it cannot be ruled out

that diverging forms of handling biotechnology develop, which in the long

term, lead to a new type of human being, one that is only a distant reminder

of the current homo sapiens. It is not evident which moral arguments could

be brought against this.

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5. Nevertheless, such moral limits do arise where the nature of other humans

is manipulated. This is unavoidably the case in all types of technical

interventions in human reproduction. The moral problem here does not

consist of the ‘‘nature’’ of these future humans being changed, but of these

changes being difficult to reconcile with their autonomy. The idea of a self-

made change in humanity by genetic means therefore meets with much

narrower moral limits as, for instance, the production of man-machine-

hybrids (insofar as this production complies with the autonomous wish of a

competent person).

NOTES

1. This curious paragraph is in practice only rarely applied; it is criticised in some commen-taries and considered unconstitutional.

2. Also cf. in this context the more recent publications of Ten Have and Welie (1998), andCherry (1999).

3. I will not deal specifically with the possibility that would seem rather obvious under cur-rent conditions, i.e., identifying human nature with the genome or germline. The sameconsiderations as are developed in following would basically apply.

4. ‘‘Human nature being compos’d of two principal parts, which are requisite in all its actions,the affections and understanding. . .’’ (Hume, 1739, p. 493). Similarly, Arthur Lovejoy in hisReflections on Human Nature (1961) gives an historical account of the conceptions held –chiefly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – of the desires which motivate humanbehavior. ‘‘Human nature’’, therefore is not defined as ‘‘human body’’, but as ‘‘motivatingdesires’’, etc.

5. Hellmuth Plessner made this difference between the human being and his body to a centralpoint of his anthropology under the notion ‘‘eccentricity’’ (1928, pp. 360–65).

6. To quote only two appropriate passages: ‘‘We speak of art as distinguished from nature; butart itself is natural to man. He is in some measure the artificer of his own frame, as well as ofhis fortune, and is destined, from the first age of his being, to invent and contrive’’ (Ferguson,1767, p. 10) ‘‘. . .and if we rightly consider the matter, we shall find, that our nature is chieflyconstituted of acquired habits, and that we are much more creatures of custom and art than ofnature. It is a common saying, that habit (meaning custom) is a second nature. I add, that it ismore powerful than the first, and in a great measure destroys and absorbs the original nature:for it is the capital and distinguishing characteristic of our species, that we can make our-selves, as it were, over again, so that the original nature in us can hardly be seen; and it iswith the greatest difficulty that we can distinguish it from the acquired’’ (Burnet, 1773, p. 25).

7. I will not here go into the argument that risky, but not therapeutically prescribedinterventions are not ethically acceptable because they offend the ‘‘spirit’’ or ‘‘essence’’of medicine. The essentialist interpretation of medicine on which it is based itself needsjustification, and I cannot see what form such a justification could take if it does not in someway refer to ‘‘human nature’’ and its value. But that would entail taking on board theessentialist argument which would have to be proven.



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REFERENCES

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Burnet, J. (1773/1974). Of the origin and progress of language. Vol. I. Reprint, Hildesheim,New York: Georg Olms.

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Korsgaard, Ch.M. (1996). The sources of normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Lovejoy, A.O. (1961). Reflections on human nature. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press.Medawar, P. (1959). The future of man. London: Methuen & Co.Mill, J.St. (1874/1969). Nature. In: Essays on ethics, religion and society, (Collected Works of

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Kurt Bayertz - Human Nature - How Normative Might It Be

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