Korean War•at end WWII Korea

occupied by both Soviet and American forces, divided by 38th parallel

•both Syngman Rhee (South) and Kim Il-sung (North) sought to unify the country under their respective regimes

•following a policy change in 1950 Stalin decided to give his support to Kim Il-sung

•Stalin’s support for a North Korean move on the South was based on the assumption that the U.S. would not intervene

•Stalin also encouraged Ho Chi Minh in his struggle against the French in Indochina

•U.S. quickly responded to the North’s invasion across the 38th parallel supported by a U.N. resolution

•early military setback was reversed by MacArthur’s landing of troops at Inchon

•soon American forces had crossed into North Korea

•Chinese leader Mao Zedong now came to the aid of the North Koreans

•as American forces advanced on the Yalu River the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army attacked

•American and South Korean forces retreated

•Truman rejected proposals to use atomic weapons in Korea

•the war would remain limited to the Korean peninsula

•MacArthur’s disagreement with this decision led to his removal by Truman

•the war ended with an armistice in July, 1953

•Korea remained divided

•communism had, in part, been contained

•a wider war had been avoided

Atomic Weapons

•development of atomic weapons altered the military and political equation

•Truman recognized significance of new situation - old rules did not apply

•civilians, not military, would control development and use of nuclear weapons

•Stalin had undertaken a program to rapidly build an atomic bomb - completed by Aug. 1949. He rejected the Baruch Plan

•American possession of the Bomb may have influenced his response to the Berlin Airlift of 1948

•like Truman, Stalin saw atomic weapons as opening the door to total annihilation

•in Korea military considerations argued against using atomic weapons

•use of such weapons against China might inevitably lead to Soviet invasion of western Europe

•by early 1951 U.N. forces were counterattacking, so making a resort to use of nuclear weapons less likely

•despite opposition from some scientists - including Oppenheimer - Truman decided to proceed with the development of a hydrogen bomb

•Truman recognized problems associated with using the bomb, but judged that the U.S. must have it “if only for bargaining purposes with the Russians”

•first American test, November, 1952; first Soviet test August, 1953

•level of destruction associated with new weapon confirmed principle taught by Clausewitz - wars were fought to achieve political ends and must be limited

•Eisenhower initiallyinitially reluctant to see the validity of this position

•BRAVO - an American test in 1954 forced political leaders to rethink the use of nuclear weapons

•BRAVO was 750 times the size of the Hiroshima bomb - massive radioactive fallout

•Churchill changed his position and recognized the new “equality in annihilation”

•Soviet leaders shared assessment

•Eisenhower’s policy on the use of nuclear weapons, while recognizing their devastating effects, argued that the U.S. should prepare for an all-out nuclear war

•Henry Kissinger, in contrast, favored a policy of “ flexible response”

•nuclear weapons could be a tool of “diplomacy and warfighting”

•Soviet advances - first intercontinental ballistic and Sputnik developed in 1957 - cause for concern in U.S.

•new Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev shared Eisenhower’s views on nuclear weapons, but his personality and political situation were very different

•Khrushchev’s policy shaped by Soviet fears of weakness vis a vis American nuclear capability

•Soviet shortcoming in long-range bombers, numbers and accuracy of missiles

•Khrushchev threatened Britain and France with “rocket weapons” during Suez Crisis. Their withdrawal mistakenly attributed to Khrushchev announcement

•Khrushchev “threats”, yet he also embraced policy of “peaceful coexistence”

•in 1958 he announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing

•more belligerent attitude adopted in relation to the question of West Berlin

•Khrushchev believed Berlin was the Achilles heel of the West”

•in November 1958 Khrushchev demanded that the western Allies withdraw their troops from West Berlin

•Eisenhower and Khrushchev met in September 1959, but nothing substantive was agreed

•the U-2 spy plane incident, May 1961, led to further strains in U.S./Soviet relations

•relations deteriorated with the Bay of Pigs attempted invasion of Cuba, April 1961 and Soviet backing for the building of the Berlin Wall, August 1961

•the Soviets put the first man in earth orbit and resumed nuclear weapons testing

•Kennedy, however, confident of American superiority in nuclear weaponry - “We have a second strike capability.......”

•Khrushchev’s growing concern about the plight of Cuba and the need to spread the revolution to other parts of Latin America led him to the decision to deploy missiles in Cuba

•Kennedy viewed missile deployment as a “provocative change in the status quo”

•Soviets had deployed both intermediate and short-range missiles

•Khrushchev saw it rather differently - Soviets doing little more than “giving them a little of their own medicine”

•Missile Crisis resolved when Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba and promised, secretly, to remove missiles from Turkey

•realization by Superpowers of threat posed by possession of nuclear waepons

•following the Cuban Missile Crisis Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, was given the task of rethinking American strategic policy on the use of nuclear weapons

•rejecting his initial option of targeting only military centers, “no cities” doctrine, McNamara proposed adoption of a strategy - MAD -“Mutual Assured Destruction”

•both sides now accepted “open skies” policy; agreements followed: Limited Test Ban Treaty 1963 - no nuclear tests in atmosphere. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,1968

•Strategic Arms Limitation Interim Agreement 1972 - restriction on numbers of ballistic missiles

•Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 1972 banned defenses against long-range missiles