Mind Association

Kolenda on Science and MoralityAuthor(s): Christine NicholsonSource: Mind, New Series, Vol. 69, No. 274 (Apr., 1960), pp. 259-262Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2252074 .

Accessed: 28/06/2014 08:03

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

.

Oxford University Press and Mind Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extendaccess to Mind.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 193.142.30.37 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:03:08 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

KOLENDA ON SCIENCE AND MORALITY

IN his article " Science and Morality " (MIND, April 1958) K. Kolenda has tried to show that moral utterances are sufficiently like scientific utterances to be given the same cognitive status. As a corollary to this, he attempts to explain how the mistaken belief that moral utterances are " non-cognitivist " has arisen. What he says on both these themes is open to serious criticism.

An important feature of Kolenda's main argument is that cognitive utterances require the relating of a particular observation to an appropriate conceptual framework, containing laws, principles and perhaps, in the case of morals, rules. For his purpose, he finds it unnecessary to distinguish between these, and in this I shall follow his procedure.

Kolenda writes, " In relating the observed phenomenon to the features which a conceptual framework formulates, we obtain some new and relevant information about this phenomenon". This, in a limited sense, must be true; we learn at least that the " observed phenomenonl", 0, exemplifies some principle, P, and that it has therefore this quality in common with all other exemplifications of P. But before it deserves to be called " cognitive ", an utterance needs to be informative in other ways than this. To take an absurd example, which nevertheless fulfils Kolenda's criterion: I have a conceptual framework in terms of fairy agencies. This contains, inter alia, the two principles, (A) that all cheese is made by goblins, and (B) that all food made by goblins goes bad if kept too long. If I observe a piece of cheese I can discover, by referring it to a framework, that it (A) is made by goblins, and (B) will go bad if kept too long. If I have sufficient experience, I may add that it has these two qualities in common with gorgonzola, camembert, Stilton, etc.

Mere locatioxn on a framework is not sufficient to give utterances cognitive status. The cognitive status of the framework itself is also relevant. Kolenda writes " . . . we can affirm that a con- ceptual framework itself deserves to be called cogniitive if it helps us to discover or to become aware of some important or interesting features of experience ". The epithets " important " and " interesting " are of primarily subjective significance. Many frameworks will help us to see relationships between phenomena; my goblin frame- work does this. If I find it interesting to interpret things in these terms, does this give my framework cognitive status?

This note is not meant to decide what makes a framework cognitive, but to show that there are differences in the status of scientific and moral utterances arising from difficulties in accepting both the differ- ent frameworks to which they respectively refer. Kolenda seems to think that the choice of one framework rather than another is almost a matter of taste. In his view, " the prescriptive aspect of a con- ceptual framework is a hypothetical imperative ". If you are interested in scientific explanations, use a scientific framework.

259

This content downloaded from 193.142.30.37 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:03:08 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

260 C. NICHOLSON:

Similarly, as he points out, moral frameworks are relevant only if we are interested in the " moral relevance " of actions. The interest must be there before the framework becomes important, and so it is clear that, before we can accept the relevance of a framework of moral rules, we require an " antecedent recognition of the validity of such rules ". According to Kolenda, a farmer may choose to work within an astrological, rather than a scientific, framework. It is true that a farmer could, if he wished, explain all the phenomena connected with his work in terms of the movements of the planets, or, for that matter, of the pleasure and wrath of the gods. What he cannot (logically) do is to accept both a scientific and an astrological framework. (Psychologically, of course, he may hold any number of logically incompatible opinions.) It would be logically inconsistent to accept two frameworks, referring to similar phenomena, and containing contradictory principles. Two points are relevant here. In fact, although we may choose to believe our astrologoical horscopes and to interpret the harvest astrologically, the choice of a framework is not merely a matter of taste. An obvious demand for a farmer to make of his chosen framework is that it should enable him to plan his work by successfully and reliably predicting future events. On this criterion, it will be more rational for him, if he wishes to be a successful farmer, to adopt a scientific framework. The second point is that, just as it would be logically inconsistent to accept two conflicting frameworks in our capacities as farmers, chemists, etc., so it would be logically inconsistent to adopt two conflicting moral frameworks. But the central point at issue in this criticism of Kolenda is that it would be logically inconsistent to accept both a scientific framework and a moral framework which contained conflicting principles.

A difficulty which may also be raised about acceptance of moral rules is that there is little agreement about their content. At present this will be ignored, in order to concentrate on the more general problem concerning the acceptance of any of the many possible frameworks of moral rules.

I suggest that one reason why philosophers have shown reluctance to regard moral utterances as cognitively equal to scientific utterances is that the latter imply a breach of the causal principle frequently invoked by the former. Kant's dictum that " ought implies can " is undeniable, although there is more than one interpretation of the "can " Kant was, I think, right in seeing a genuine conflict between some of the principles invoked in support of scientific and moral utterances. (In passing, we may note the dangers in speaking, as Kolenda does, of" science "and "morality ". Generally agreed definitions of either would be hard to find. Are " scientific utterances " utterances made by scientists-fallible beings-or utterances about laboratory experiments, or what? The emotive overtones and contemporary prestige of " science " decrease its suitability for use, without careful definition, in philosophical dis-

This content downloaded from 193.142.30.37 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:03:08 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

KOLENDA ON SCIENCE AND MORALITY 261

cussion.) Moral responsibility requires the difficult notion of at least some degree of freedom from antecedent determining causes. Unless we dismiss the problem of free will as a pseudo-problem (as we may), we have to face a contradiction here. By referring utter- ances to a framework, we may add to our information, but the position of some moral sceptics is that of refusing to accept the framework within which moral utterances are made. One of the sceptic's chief arguments, if he agrees that moral responsibility presupposes freedom, is often that scientists-particularly in the light of recent progress in psychology and the social sciences-promise to offer causal explana- tions of our motives and actions, as well as of physical phenomena. As Kolenda's opening paragraph implies, if moral and scientific utterances cannot both be cognitive, it is the former which will be regarded as non-cognitive. His view is that if there are sufficient similarities between moral and scientific utterances, this will " justify us in regarding moral utterances as cognitive " Like our moral sceptic, he sees no question here of having to justify the cognitive claims of scientific utterances.

The task of one who wishes to establish utterances as cognitive is to justify not only the utterances, but also their conceptual framework. Their reference to an almost arbitrarily selected framework may be interesting, but does not help to decide their status. The similarity Kolenda suggests-that both scientific and moral utterances refer to conceptual frameworks-proves nothing about the status of the latter unless the framework itself is recognised as cognitive. One of the problems confronting the moral philosopher is that of reconciling the moral prerequisite of freedom with the deterministic framework of many scientists and philosophers. If the principles of the two frameworks conflict, as prima facie they appear to do, either one or both must be modified, or one must be abandoned. To solve this problem requires great labour. This note attempts only to indicate its significance.

A subsidiary intention of Kolenda's article is to show, again by drawing a parallel between " science and morality ", how moral utterances have come to be regarded as " non-cognitivist ". His view is that scientific, like moral, frameworks, have their prescriptive aspect, and there is, as we have seen, no question about the cognitive status of scientific utterances. He argues that laws are not less cognitive because they are prescriptive, although emphasis on the prescriptive aspect of scientific laws has led critics (e.g. Toulmin) to claim that such an interpretation " creates the impression that the laws do not really have anything to do with nature, but only with the conduct of scientists ". By analogy, he thinks, it has seemed that " imperatival " theories of morals made moral utterances refer, not to actions, but to an agent-" his feelings, wishes, or attitudes ".

All this completely overlooks a major difference between scientific and moral laws. Whereas, for the former, the feelings of scientists

This content downloaded from 193.142.30.37 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:03:08 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

262 C. NICHOLSON: KOLENDA ON SCIENCE AND MORALITY

are irrelevajit, tlle latter have esseiitially to do not onily with actions, but with the agents performing them. In this area of experience, it is legitimate to refer to motives as well as to actions. " Moral life", says Kolenda, " needs conceptual frameworks in terms of which the moral worth of actions can be determined". Moral worth, however, is also an attribute of moral agents. If I borrow a book, I ought to return it. However, if I return it in order to gain access to its owner's study, so as to steal his silver cigarette-box, my action (evenifitsulteriorpurposeisfrustrated) has no moral worth. Kolenda errs in supposing that by focusing attention on the agent, we have thereby made our ethics subjective and non-cognitivist. Some theories of ethics, concentrating on feelings, attitudes, and wishes, do this. But it is iiot their being prescriptive which makes such theories subjective. The greatest of the " imperatival " theories- that of Kant-stresses that to have moral worth an action must not only be in accordance with the moral law, but must be performed because it is in accordance with the moral law. Motives are relevant, but this does not in itself make moral laws non-cognitive. To justify moral utterances as cognitive partly on the grounds that scientific laws, too, are prescriptive and yet not concernied with the motives of scientists, misses a crucial feature of the former. In investigating the similarities between scientific and moral utterances, Kolenda seems to have overlooked some extremely relevant dissimilarities.

CHRISTINE NICHOLSON

This content downloaded from 193.142.30.37 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 08:03:08 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions