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The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by VetonSurroi, a young Kosovar jou rnalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Ko hasoon becam e a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be pub lished daily under thename of Ko ha Ditor. With the kind perm ission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted onhttp://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.

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Koha Digest # 79

EDITORIAL

OHIO'S QUIET SLEEP

by VETON SURROI

I've been to Ohio. In times when Vukovar was resisting, Cincinnati was most preoccupiedwith the exhibition of nude prints of a famous photographer, an exhibition which was banned

by the town officials under the excuse of "protection of morality". Leaves had started fallingon the ground, while the air scented the odour of northern Europe.

I always knew, since childhood, that American distances are a bit more different than theEuropean ones. But, I had forgotten this fact when I drove from Cincinnati to Cleveland. Ireckoned that not more than three hours were needed to go from one larger town to the other.After three hours, I was still riding on the wide highway, with the immobile green pasturesaside, along one permanent and unaltered image of the cows which seemed not to changeeach time I looked to see where I was. Cleveland was some other three green, cow anddisputable prooving of the theory that the closest distance between two points was in fact astraight line, hours away.

I don't doubt that this same transcendental peace struck the Serbian president when he arrived

in Ohio. Even the air base where he is accommodated is a part of the green area adapted forthe needs of the generals who need to rest from war thoughts. It seems that this is preciselythe contradiction, the necessary spiritual contrast in order to initiate thinking in the heads ofthe people gathered in Dayton. The peace of Ohio is a kind of white background for the floodof warring images in Serbia's presidents head. Their confrontation is an internal conflict, awar developing in his inside.

But, Ohio is in America, a place where also pragmatism lives. The calm of the Ohio fields isnot enough to have one confronted with the bestiality of the war memories; what is happeningshould be remembered too. Milosevic, now as an undeclared hostage, must listen not onlyabout the projects which, as world arrangements, should saveguard Croatia and B&H as states

and thus ruin a part of the dream of Greater Serbia, but also to the proofs of the massacre of atleast 3 thousand Srebrenica Muslims (a result of General Mladic's July offensive), theincreased requests to hand over the Serb war criminals and a reminder or two that the processof collecting facts against him as an eventual war criminal has not ended. In order not to havethe still green fields create great illusions, he is now told about the obligation to regulate theminority issues, as the Kosova crisis is called, the status of Sandzak and the position ofVojvodina.

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There is good sleep in Ohio. Especially if you are near the forest and the fields. And you'renot the Serbian president.

INTERVIEW

VOJISLAV KOSTUNICA, Chairman of the Serbian Democratic Party

IT'S TIME FOR ALBANIAN-SERBIAN NEGOTIATIONS

Interviewed by ARBR VLLAHIU

KOHA: After four years of war in Bosnia, there is fear thatnegotiations will not bring an agreement because of the big

concessions the parties in conflict are foreseen to make. Milosevicis optimistic in Dayton. Could you tell us where is his optimismgrounded on?

KOSTUNICA: I believe that there will be, even though there are nosigns for big optimism, a voting in favor of a peaceful agreement,even though the warring parties arrived in Dayton with totallyopposite and maximalist requests. By all means, both parties, alongwith their maximalist requests have also some minimal requests, andthose are the bottom line. There is space between what is wished

for both sides and what is ultimately accepted. After the Genevaand New York negotiations, the basic contours of the peaceful"arrangement", have been determined in a way. What has beendetermined, both in Geneva and New York, will, by all meansinfluence the contents of the agreement to be reached in Dayton,and in a way, it will announce the agreement which, in determinedcircumstances will have to be acceptable for both sides. I don'tthink though, that there should be much space for optimism, but

pessimism neither; simply, one must be realistic. I believe thatafter a war which lasted 4 years, whose final is the bestial andharsh NATO attacks against Serbs in the Serbian Republic, and after

the agreement between the leadership of the RS and Milosevic whichauthorized the Serbian President to be their representative -therefore, grounded on all these elements, and before all the pre-agreement reached in Geneva and New York, peace and reaching a

peaceful agreement could be supposed. I don't believe that thispeaceful agreement will eliminate them all, on the contrary, manycauses, many consequences of war are still present. On the otherhand, if this is judged upon the proverb "you can see a good day inthe morning", then naturally the Geneva and New York agreementsannounce a quite artificial statal-juridical construction. A quite

incoherent statal "construction", a creature which has not manythings in common with the problems known so war in law. But, timewill prove how will this agreement on paper be accomplished in

practice.

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KOHA: Analysts say that this restricted YU-summit, is in fact, thenew AVNOJ.

KOSTUNICA: Yes, not only in Dayton, but also after the meeting in

Geneva, in a way, AVNOJ's borders were determined. Bosnia is and isnot a state, from the outside, it looks like a federal state; fromthe inside, it has many confederacy elements, before all, when itrefers to the decision-making, the veto right, of both units, as itis said in the agreement, of both entities. Therefore, this has

preserved the AVNOJ bases. These two things are hardly conciliating- a unique state from the outside and divided in its interior -this shows what will its fate be in the future. This state will, nodoubt, endure, before all, thanks to the pressure from the outside.In the same way when Bosnia and Herzegovina (which never existed asa state, it existed thanks to the will of a non-democratic regime

installed in ex-Yugoslavia after WWII, a totalitarian regime),would also exist thanks to the force coming from the outside - the

pressure of the international community. I would say it will existas long as this pressure will and as long as the relations in theinternational community don't change. I don't exclude the

possibility that, under the influence of real events and internaltensions, which will undoubtedly exist between all people living inBosnia and Herzegovina, the international community will reconsiderits posture towards B&H. When we refer to the InternationalCommunity, then, naturally, I can't help saying that in this

moment, it is personified by it's strongest member - the USA, whileof the other hand, the largest part of the arrangements about B&His an expression of the present needs of Clinton's Americanadministration.

KOHA: Do you believe this is an imposed peace by the Americans, andon the other hand, do you believe that the presence of theAmericans is a sign of division of spheres of interest in theBalkans?

KOSTUNICA: Not in the sense its presence had after WWII. Things are

different now, there is a new structure of the internationalcommunity which is not bipolar as it used to be, in which the

position of the former Soviet Communist empire has weakenedquite.

KOHA: You just said that the American plan foresees Bosnia as astate of three entities; on one hand the Muslim-Croat Federation,meanwhile on the other side, the Serbian Republic. After theCroatian Army's "Storm", Knin fell. Does this mean an end to theidea "all Serbs within one state", i.e., the idea on "Greater

Serbia"?

KOSTUNICA: I believe this is an idea the Belgrade regime neverbelieved in really, and on the other hand, it is not an idea

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supported by the democratic opposition. From the democraticpublic's point of view in Serbia, the moment Croatia and Sloveniaseceded and afterwards when Bosnia was recognized, the issue of theself-determination of the Serbian people was opened, for the

Serbian people was threatened because the other people of theformer Yugoslavia had achieved this right. Personally I think therewas another way to discuss this right, diplomatically, withnegotiations, by leading another politics of the media and other

political actions, different from the ones applied by the Belgraderegime. But this rights does in fact exist, and this idea issupported by objective western analysts, as is Charles Calhamer, in"New York Times". But, Calhamer adds one thing to this: "Serbs inCroatia had more reasons to fear, and this fear was grounded on thefate of their ancestors during WWII in times of the NDH(Independent State of Croatia)". There is an undisputable right of

the Serbian people for self-determination, an issue which needed tobe discussed, a kind of dialogue which wouldn't make the internalborders created by the Communist regime in 1943 become the existingborders. The biggest mistake was to have recognized thesecessionist republics before the peaceful negotiations ended. Thisis something that the first mediator of the ICFY, Lord Carrington,admitted. It is not by chance that the participants in the Yugoslavcrisis are more or less directly responsible. All of them hurriedto give explanations about the events in 1990 and 1991 in theirmemoirs, Genscher, Carrington, Baker... We all know that memoirs

appear after a considerable time has passed, following a historicaldistance. There is no doubt that a number of these officials, fullof authority in their countries and the international community,are more and more conscious of the harmful decisions to recognizethe former Yugoslav republics in their AVNOJ borders. This meansthat the decision should have been sought in another direction.

Normal Serb viewpoint would imply negotiations and some kind ofcorrections of the existing administrative borders.

KOHA: Kosova is coming to be considered as one of the biggestproblems wince the former Yugoslav crisis was opened. Serbs are

determined in their posture, Albanians in theirs. Do you thinkthere could be war in Kosova?

KOSTUNICA: I believe that this war which exploded outside Kosova,even though Kosova was one of the focus of crisis which precededall the rest, this war now is calming down, offering some peacefuland constitutional arrangements with little rights for Serbs andnot very promising for peace, which will be accepted by all

parties. This war which is being established where there has beenwar announces that there are not many chances to have war where

there has not been any war. Grounded on all facts, having in mindthe posture of the international community, the policy of theBelgrade regime so far, the politics of the Albanians from Kosmet,

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I believe that this conflict, in its worst variant, will be evaded,and there will be a kind of negotiations, whose frames areundefined in my opinion, which will represent a posture which ismore or less presented to the public by all western countries. The

problem of Kosovo and Metohija must by all means be solved by notquestioning the territorial integrity of Serbia. Therefore, this isa frame which will be used to find solutions for Kosovo andMetohija, for the position of the Albanian national minority, but,naturally this is only the beginning because, simply, the relationsin Kosovo and Metohija are not new, they go way back severaldecades. We must by all means face the fact, when the arrangementis sought, that several decades ago, almost half a century, therewere more Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija than there is now, and thatthere has also been some ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Kosovo andMetohija. Concretely, after the Albanian occupation of Kosovo and

Metohija, during WWII, several hundreds of thousands of Serbs wereexpelled from the area of Kosovo and Metohija and the Communistregime then prohibited their return, even though in 1948, Serbsmade 27% of the population. Now, there are less than 9% of Serbs inKosovo and Metohija, meaning three times less than in '48 andwithout any doubt, ethnic cleansing took place, harming the Serbs.

This is a moment which should be taken into account. Second, is thefact that the Albanian side is requesting at least the territorialautonomy, with quasi-statal elements, which could become an object

of the decision for the secession of Kosovo and Metohija. Nationalminorities have the right to be protected, they have a right to beprotected from any discrimination or assimilation, but according tothe standards which are valid in the world, they have no automaticright to gain territorial autonomy. I believe that the issue of thenational minorities is being solved wrongly the sole moment it

becomes territorialized. These are some problems which will bepresented during negotiations which, sooner or later, should takeplace and solved, I hope, in a constitutional arrangement forSerbia and within Serbia. When it comes to the internationalcommunity, the OSCE above all, the problem of human rights in

Serbia is reduced in the problems of the deprivation of theAlbanians from their rights. I believed that this is a veryrestricted posture, and that it is a mistake to reduce the issue ofhuman rights to the problem of the Albanian minority. I would saythat the Serb majority has been deprived of its rights, I amreferring to the position of the majority of the Serbian populationwhich in the 1993 elections voted in favor of the non-Socialist

parties. When one speaks of human rights in Serbia, all rightsshould be mentioned, including those of the majority of the Serbian

people denied by the authoritarian regime, and naturally, the

proportion of the rights of the Albanians which are questioned.

KOHA: Albanians claim that they were victims of ethnic cleansingafter WWII, in the fifties, sixties, seventies and nineties. The

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claim is that hundreds of thousand of people left under pressure.On the other hand, Albanians consider the autonomy as something outof date, that the '74 constitution doesn't exist, as the formerstate doesn't exist either. This is not what is requested for

Kosova.

KOSTUNICA: The other side should be heard too, but accusations ofethnic cleansing coming from Albanians are out of the question. Iwould add something else. The Albanian national minority in Serbiahas had University education in its language for 30 years. Show meone state in the world, not counting the Scandinavian countries,where national minorities could study in their language and at thesame time claims that it was subjected to ethnic cleansing. Thethings seem to be more complicated, and right now we are facing twocomplicated points of view: the Albanian - territorial autonomy

within the '74 Constitution framework is unacceptable, on the otherhand, the official Serbian posture of the Belgrade regime which,with some verbal cosmetics, would accept such a solution, becauseSerbia would preserve it's integrity. On the third side, we havethe posture of the international community, the leading westernforces which consider that the solution should be found within theexisting borders of Serbia, i.e. Yugoslavia. These are some of thecoordinates where the solution could be found. I believe that the

posture of the international community is really important to solvethe issue of the Albanian minority in Kosova and Metohija. If there

us some kind of determination to safeguard the integrity of Serbiaand the FRY then it should be counted on as a framework for thesolution of this issue. When it refers to Serbia, Kosovo andMetohija, the relations between Serbs and Albanians, I believe thatanother issue is very serious. It is serious matter which should besolved by Serbs with consensus - between those who are and who arenot in power. First there must be a Serb-Serb dialogue and thenstart an Albanian-Serb dialogue. The authoritarian Milosevic regimein Serbia and Milosevic himself are not willing to have theseconversations, and this could be an introduction to the furtherinstability in the relations between the government and the

opposition, between the Serbs and Albanians in Serbia.

KOHA: Albanians consider that Serbs are to blame for theinterruption of the negotiations. Nothing has changed in Kosova sofar; Albanians prove that there is too much repression and genocideagainst them; education is outside its premises for the fifth yearin a row; tens of thousands to Albanians were dismissed.

KOSTUNICA: Those problems exist. There were some attempts by theSerbian side to solve some of these problems, especially education.

In 1992, the conversations took place, abroad, and then wereinterrupted. The answer should not be sought in one of the otherside, but we must not forget one fact, an essential one, that theAlbanian side wanted to have these negotiations by ignoring the

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existence of the state of Serbia. Thus, the Albanian side excludeditself from negotiations which lead to its exclusion from the

political life, the elections, and public life, which subsequentlymakes finding new solutions more difficult. Let's take for example,

the totally different policy of another national minority in Serbiaand FRY, the Hungarian national minority. A totally differentposture, with their participation in elections and local organs,they made the normalization of relations possible. The position ofthe Hungarian minority is also interesting for another reason:regardless of the nature of the regime in Serbia, the present oneor the one ten years ago, as a national minority, they have biggerrights than their conationals in Rumania or Slovakia. Same as

before the communist regime fell. If these issues could be solvedfor the Hungarian national minority, then why shouldn't the samecase be with the Albanian national minority. It is clear that the

Albanians chose a different posture, other means of struggle andthese means have made their position more difficult as well as thechance to find a possible democratic solution.

KOHA: Serbian opposition parties often repeated that Albanians werewrong not to participate in the elections in Serbia and Yugoslavia.According to you, does the mistake rely on the fact that theopposition was not helped to come to power or was it somethingelse?

KOSTUNICA: It relies on the fact that the Albanian nationalminority exists in Serbia, that its number is large and that,naturally, in order to solve its question justly and establish thedemocratic rule in Serbia, the Albanian minority must participatein the elections. It is important to establish a democratic orderin one state, and it is hard to do it if a part of the population,almost all members of the national minority refuse to participatein the elections. Some other states, whose democratic character isnot questioned at all, reacted wit radical moves in similaroccasions, however Belgrade's regime didn't do this. When I say"some states", then I refer to Greece which, when some national

minorities refused to participate in elections, threatened toreduce some of their rights (not issuing them personal documents,

passports, etc.), and thus assured the basic participation inelections. There was no such action here. Milosevic's regime ischaracteristized by the fact that it postpones the solution of the

problems. Thus, this issue too was postponed. Serbs, the poorestpart of its population are also in a very difficult situation inKosovo and Metohija under the repressive regime which exists downthere, which, maybe affects Albanians - but also Serbs. Maybe itaffects the poorest Serbian layers even more. Simply, Albanians

constructed their own economy along with their parallel state. Ina way, they can survive, while the position of the Serbs down thereis much more serious.

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EDUCATION

TWO PROGRAMS OF NATIONAL UNITY!

by ASTRIT SALIHU / Prishtina

Albanian students can go to the library too find two books for thesame subject, and have not even notes for 80% of their othersubjects. Thus happened with the History book for the fifth gradeof elementary school and the book of Albanian Language andLiterature for the ninth grade. Two books of Albanian Literaturewere published this year, that of Shefqet Riza "The History ofAncient Albanian Literature I", and Sabri Hamiti's "AlbanianLiterature I".

The disputable fact in both publications is the publisher: theInstitute for the Publication of School Text-Books and AuxiliaryMeans of the Republic of Kosova. How is it possible to publish twotext books for the same subject?

The public was informed about this event by daily "Bujku". However,not all the facts were published, and everything becomes clear assoon as we address the Institute: they confirmed the statement

published on 24 October 1995 ("Only one national text-book is to beused"), in regard to both books, in which it is stated that the

Institute has sponsored only Hamiti's book, a text which isgrounded on the curricula prepared for the first year of highschool. According to this statement, it comes out that Shefqet Rizais a falsifier and a simple profiteer who publishes a school texton his private initiative. But this problem seems to be so, only ifthings are percieved through the black/white techniques.Shefqet Riza's text was authorized by the Institute, and the proofwas also presented to the press which didn't transmit them as awhole.

Why does then the Institute give up on the book it adopted itself?

Maybe this could be only one of the questions to be asked when twodifferent books appear for the same subject. The reasons, it seems,can be only supposed.

But, to come out in public with the information that one of thetexts - Sabri Hamiti's in this case - is a unique national textwhich is also being used in Albania, must be documented. Thisshould be corroborated with the proof on the adoption of thecurricula by the Ministry of Education of Albania. Regardless ofthe evaluation of the quality of this book.

Based on the "Literature curricula for general high schools"adopted by the Ministry of Education of Albania in 1992 and,grounded on the curricula applied in Kosova, it comes out that we

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don't apply the unique curricula. The differences in the contentsare evident. Thus the text declared to be a "unique national text"is elaborated based on a totally different currifrom

Albania's. If the Ministry of Education of Albania has adoptedanother curricula than the one in 1992, then the least expectedwould be to have the public informed about that, and thus eliminateall dilemmas and unacceptable qualifications for a text book. Evenif it is or it is not unique.

This can't be found. Neither in the official communique of theInstitute, nor in the reply of the Institute's editor in chief,Xhevat Syla. He says: "Sabri Hamiti's book is a unique nationaltext, and the only one published with the permission of theInstitute, therefore any other book is considered to be a private

publication". Asked who gave the consent for the publication ofHamiti's book, Syla replies: "The Ministry of Education of theRepublic of Kosova". We don't know whether the Ministry can givethe consent - it is usually done by determined commissions and beevaluated by the revisors. But, let's suppose that this was done bythe commission which was created to elaborate a unique program.Whether this has been achieved or not - there are no preciseanswers.

If we compare this text to the one published in Albania in 1992,

then it comes out that the programs are completely different. Thepart elaborated in Sabri Hamiti's book is foreseen for the secondyear of high school and not the first one, as foreseen in Kosova.A unique national text which is elaborated pursuant to a uniquenational program should be valid on both sides of the border, andfor the same grade, right?

Evidencing these facts which try to reveal the real situation arenot done aiming at devaluating any of the books. Sabri Hamiti's

book is not disputed - as a book it is, it doesn't lose it's valueif it is not "unique" for the whole divided people - but these

qualifications should come based on facts and precisely. What ismore, it should be evaded that the other book - Shefqet Riza's - bedeclared a profiteer's book, published on his private initiativeand nobody's consent.

Simply, the reasons of the misunderstanding and unclarified thingsmust be sought in the violation of the procedures and the badfunctioning of our educational institutions.

Somewhere, in the chain of the administrative procedures we have an

interrupted ring. Which one is it: the Institute, the Teachers'Association, the Pedagogical Institute of Kosova - remains to beclarified by exact information provided by these institutions.

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MACEDONIA

MACEDONIA'S ST. PETER

by SELADIN XHEZAIRI / Shkup

The OSCE High Commissioner for Minorities, Max Van Der Stoel,visited Shkup once again last week, but this time invited by theMacedonian government. Besides the conversation with the Ministerof Interior "in resignation", Lubomir Frckovski and the Minister ofEducation, Emilija Simoska, the high official of this high European

body also met with the representatives of the Albanian politicalparties. The main topics of discussion were the inter-ethnicrelations, while the issue of the superior education and thelegalization of the University of Tetova was given a special

attention, as the Albanian party claims.

The evaluation of some domestic and international circles thatMacedonia can't finance three Universities, was qualified by thePDP representatives as unacceptable, because the Albanians too are

paying taxes, and they also contribute to the budget, whichautomatically entitles them to use funds from the budget. The PDPrepresentatives stressed that if the main obstacle for thefunctioning of the University in Albanian is money, then the statehas two solutions: to reduce the number of Universities in

Macedonia to two, but not harming the Albanians; or, have theUniversity of Tetova financed for some time by the Albanianpopulation until Macedonia becomes economically strong, says thePDP, and it is further stressed that Van der Stoel has promised to

put all his efforts to solve this very sensitive issue, because itsnon-solution would create completely unnecessary tensions inMacedonia. In this direction, it is completely indicative thatimmediately after the departure of Stoel from Shkup, his assistantsvisited "Sveti Kliment Ohridski University" in Manastir (Bitola),meanwhile the independent and private TV stations in Tetova keepadvertising rentals of "rooms for students". The average price per

bed is around 100 DEM...

And still referring to inter-ethnic tensions, there are claims thatthe establishment of the University of Tetova is one of the reasonswhich influenced its escalation. On Friday, in the UniversityLibrary of Shkup, the promotion of "Conflicts - what are they andhow to solve them?" of Dr. Violeta Petroska - Beshka, took place.This book was qualified as the first handbook on how to solve theconflicts, published both in Macedonian and Albanian and sponsored

by "Search for Common Ground" for Macedonia. The executive director

of this foundation, Dr. Eran Fraenkel and the author herself, haveexpressed their hope that the "capabilities offered in this workwould help the open communication which would lead towards thecreation of bigger trust and the de-escalation of the possibility

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need for these kind of journalists", said Krova's MP, SaliRamadani...

DOSSIER

JUSUF ZEJNULLAHU: THE SUSPENSION OF KOSOVA'S BODIES WAS THE END OFYUGOSLAVIA (II)

by YLBER HYSA /Prishtina

KOHA: This was the time when the creation of first parties, afterthe declared pluralism in Markovic's Yugoslavia started. The firstorganizations of the kind were created in Kosova. Were there any

particular difficulties to register them and what was yourrelation, that of the Government, to this - what were thesuggestions of the Serbian government in this respect?

ZEJNULLAHU: There was great concern. Especially having in mind thefact that we haven't considered the Alternative outside the createdreality. We said that they have the influence, they are there andthat we should establish a dialogue with them. We have consideredthat they were no "separatists or nationalists" because they hadthe support of the majority of the people - and the people couldn't

be nationalistic, in the negative sense of the word. This posturewas hard as it was even verbally, can you imagine how was itotherwise?

KOHA: While in office, you met with the Alternative leaders,including Ibrahim Rugova himself. Was there a coordination ofactions, or were those contacts about a specific problem? Did theSerbian organs know about this, and how were they reacting?

ZEJNULLAHU: This issue was not mentioned especially. But inpractice, not only that Serbia was upset, but there were also some

radical orientations which were quite concrete, as was the issue ofthe arrests... This mood was not only oriented against ourAlternative but against Yugoslavia in general. I didn't subjugateto these influences. Even, on one occasion, we had preparedourselves to meet the Alternative. The day was set. And this wasthe reason why the Federal Minister of Justice, Vlado Kambovski,had come. Our orientation was not to threaten the parties, but tooffer them a possibility to say what they thought, counting on therole and the importance they had. The meeting never took place,

because it was practically blocked. The warning, of course, came

from Serbia's organs, which protested to Markovic. Some politicalcircles in Kosova also supported this reaction, and the visit ofthe federal minister remained within the frame of the meeting withthe government of Kosova. It was evaluated that it would be better

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not to celebrate the meeting now, but do it some other time.

KOHA: Did you contact the Alternative?

ZEJNULLAHU: We had no direct contacts then. But, there wereindirect contacts, which were conditioned by a special problem,created by special causes and events. In fact, I believe that wehad same orientations. We had expressed our opinion about thealternative, but also about the independent trade-union. It wasimportant to me that they were representing the workers. This ishow the trade-union got legalized, as a part of a broaderalternative...

KOHA: And what was your posture towards the media?

ZEJNULLAHU: We were absolutely against censorship. But, maybe, wewere not that present in them. We requested our postures andstatements to be transmitted correctly, and not to be deformed.Maybe the truth about the censorship on us will sound strange, aswas the case of our problematic visit to the Tubes Factory inFerizaj, and the idea was not to present us as "radicals". Anotherinteresting episode was that when the news were edited on the TV,the sequences were tied up in the way that we were shown

participating in a joint meeting with the people we had splitwith... and it wasn't true, we weren't there. The purpose was to

show the "unity" of the executive power with the Party, whichdidn't exist, in fact.

KOHA: Were there any chances to have free elections in Kosova then?

ZEJNULLAHU: No! There were opinions that if I resigned along withthe whole government, there would be conditions for the creation ofa transitory government, and I read this idea which seems to havecome from the alternative.

The elections were not disputable in Croatia in Slovenia, but when

it came to us, the situation was so complicated that there were noconditions to have people organize free elections. I could also saythat the parties were not defined much then. Therefore, thetendency to have the elections could have easily ended with actionswe were already used to. In principle, we were in favor of freeelections, and there are documents to prove this. We had alsostated that the people should elect its leadership. If youremember, I told this the students in the huge meeting in front ofthe students' restaurant, when a big tragedy was expected to happenin Kosova. That is when we established dialogue with the students.

Then, as premier, I asked for all programs and requests ofpolitical parties and associations, a thing asked from all in theFederation, meanwhile I was being told that these are programs

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which will bring evil. In fact, I can say that there was nothingconcrete about "what do Albanians want". At least, no one had

presented the requests openly, and in a defined way. The firstrequests actually came from the students in the meeting I just

mentioned. These were requests for free elections, the lifting ofthe extraordinary measures, the halt to repression and violence,etc. These requests were published in "Rilindja" the next day, andwe sent them to the Federation.

KOHA: Is it true that you were invited to visit the USA by theAmerican State Department? Has any of the foreign delegationsapproached or contacted you directly?

ZEJNULLAHU: Since the beginning of 1990, a clear conflict betweenthe executive power and the Party was becoming evident. This was

noticed here and abroad too. When Markovic came back from the USA,where he actually got the OK to go ahead with the reformations, inthe talks with President Bush, he presented two requests: thedemocratization of life in general - reformation, privatization,market economy, etc. and, the democratization of life in Kosova,stressed as necessary with a special emphasis on the latestarrests. The federal diplomatic channels got a message from theState Department: a Kosova Albanian official should visit the USA.Further on, it was said that preferably, this should be JusufZejnullahu. I started preparing myself, knowing that this can be a

very important visit. However, in times of my preparations, thesituation in Kosova grew so serious with the mortal victims inMalisheva and other parts that, in fact, this made my departureimpossible.

KOHA: You met with Milosevic several times during this period. Whatwere his postures in relation to Kosova. How do you qualify him asa personality and politician?

ZEJNULLAHU: I can't say that I met him, I rather would say that Iworked with him for almost two years. This happened because of the

post I was holding. We usually met in joint meetings and theindividual ones regarding a special problem, but also other

problems. Our relations were correct, without any superiorityelements from his side, and this is why, maybe, we could talk aboutmany issues openly. I can say that our conversations were difficultand that we had many misunderstandings. The conversations ended inJune 1990, and since then I have not had any contact with him. Iwould not want to comment anything about his person...

KOHA: In June '90, the situation in Kosova changes. This becomes

evident in the joint meeting of the governments of Kosova andSerbia on June 9, 1990, when many disagreements erupt. Were youconscious of the measures that Serbia would undertake and suspendall Kosova organs?

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ZEJNULLAHU: The situation was clear. Our position was clear evenbefore this meeting. We were resisting the pressure imposed bySerbia, and we were also struggling to evade any conflicts as muchas possible. As far as I remember the meeting was not organized

upon our request. We were willing to keep some contacts in order tocalm down our respective people. We were determined to respect theConstitution of Kosova, despite the fact that the Constitution had

been changed, many things were unacceptable for us. We refused tomerge the Electric Company, the PTT, the Railway Company with thoseof Serbia, and we refused the curricula too. On the other hand, theSerbian organs didn't manage to accomplish all they had planned todo in Kosova, and this is why this meeting was convened, "todiscuss issues of importance for both governments". I thought itsuitable, however, I knew what was going to be discussed there. Myintroductory statement lasted one hour and a half, and I told them

what our postures were, loud and clear. I asked for thedemocratization of the life in Kosova, the legalization of the

political parties; the organization of free and multi-partyelections; the preservation of the autonomy of Kosova wasn't to bedisputed; that police methods should be eradicated and that theyshouldn't serve for the solution of the problems; the requests ofthe Albanians needed to be fulfilled...

The essence of the meeting was that we should accept the policy ofSerbia towards Kosova. We, in principle, knew what the policy was

like, and we couldn't accept it. We told them that we couldn'taccept the constitutional changes which converted us practicallyinto a region, and we told them that it was unacceptable for us notto be constituent of the federation.

The meeting was difficult and it lasted 20 hours. It clearlystressed our diametrally opposite postures. This is where weredefinitively split. We didn't manage to agree, and we didn't accepttheir five ultimatums. Three days later, the Serbian authorities

published their communique, and so did we. This was the moment whenthe government of Kosova also split on national grounds.

KOHA: The July 2 Declaration changed many aspects of the life inKosova, which defined the political will of the Kosova Albanians.How would you describe the period from the proclamation of theDeclaration and the Constitution of Kaanik? Were you informedabout what was happening?

ZEJNULLAHU: The circumstances were very interesting. The Parliamenthad set its session to take place on July 2 after a big crisis ofthis body in which I was acting as mediator. Asked by the MPs, I

arranged a meeting with Markovic for them. We agreed with Serbiatoo, that the meeting should continue, And the agreement was thatthe meeting continues on 2 July. But, by surprise, the doors of theParliament were closed on this day. The allegations were that the

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meeting had not been called by the Speaker, Bozovic, but by me,which in a way was true. But, Bozovic's masters knew this and sodid he. I received the MPs, for our doors were not closed. In thecreated conditions, the session took place outside the building and

the declaration was adopted. From then on, nothing was going to beas it used to...

KOHA: How is it possible that the doors of the building wereclosed, who ordered this and was there any influence on the police?

ZEJNULLAHU: The meeting was supposed to take place in the usualbuilding. It seems that a couple of days earlier, Bozovic informedthe MPs that the meeting was postponed, but since the MPs knewabout the original date, they thought that Bozovic's move was afraud. When they came, the MPs found themselves before the closed

doors and the police who were telling them that there is nomeeting. There was no police intervention, and the order came fromthe Speaker, Bozovic. I was against this decision and so I told theMPs who came to see me. In fact, I also asked the administration ofthe Parliament to open the doors, but they wouldn't listen.

KOHA: Theoretically, could you have influenced the Kosova police tofree the building?

ZEJNULLAHU: No, because this was not in the competence of the

police. The people or the building weren't endangered, nothingviolent had happened. The order came from the administration of theParliament, I asked even the Federation to intervene, because thecreated situation could cause a serious problem.

KOHA: In September 1990, you flee Kosova. Later came the changes inthe Government in exile. What were your relations to the political

parties in Kosova and how would you describe the situation afteryou left the country?

ZEJNULLAHU: Three days later, on 5 July, the decision on the

suspension of our bodies came. We considered this to be a coup. Themost symptomatic thing was that there were no reactions from theFederation. It reacted only later with a statement. The Presidencyof Yugoslavia didn't react either. The Republics and Vojvodina wereinert, and were not conscious then, that this act also suspendedthe Federation! Yugoslavia ceased to exist that very day!

I informed the Federal Government about this. It had interruptedall contacts with us, and we couldn't understand why. We told themthat no decision of the Federal Government was valid, for the

suspension of one constituent made all decisions worthless. Thecircles who were happy with the ruin of Yugoslavia, were also happyabout what happened in Kosova. Practically, this created the creditto accuse Serbia that it was ruining the Federation and that there

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was no logic in continuing with this statal association besidesit...

KOHA: Were you conscious that the 2 July and 7 September events

could lead to the situation you are just describing?

ZEJNULLAHU: We were conscious of this, and we were also told so. Wewere told, "if what we think is not accomplished, we will take overKosova". Our decision was not disputable at all, even though as a

politician and a leader I wouldn't have wanted to have everythingsolved thus. But, we had no other way out. We weren't ready to actotherwise...

KOHA: Following these events, you fled Kosova. Later, theGovernment changed. What happened?

ZEJNULLAHU: After the suspension, my position and that of the othermembers of the cabinet was very difficult. We were absolutelyfollowed by the police. The situation became very serious, manyarrests took place, and we were also summoned to "informativetalks", etc. We still considered ourselves as legitimate and I

believe that the alternative and the people perceived us thus.However, we couldn't act. We just evaluated the situation. I waswriting letters to the republics and Vojvodina, the Federation, theinternational bodies. At one stage, by chance, some of us were

abroad. Two other members of the government were arrested and thearrest warrant was issued for the rest of us. This is how weremained abroad.

(to be continued)

ECONOMY

WEALTH AS AN ECOLOGIC BOMB

by IBRAHIM REXHEPI / Prishtina

Academician Minir Dushi states that many years ago, there werepreliminary conversations with "Otto Gold" of Switzerland, aboutKosova leasing a piece of its land with at least one billion tonsof coal in reserve, i.e. for the extraction of 40 millions tons ofcoal a year, to that company. The idea was to construct seven blocsof electric power plants with the power of 600 MWh each, in orderto provide the whole of Central Europe with electricity. The Swiss

were even willing to move the railway station from Fush Kosov,just to exploit the land. But, this initiative was neveraccomplished. On the other hand, Nexhat Daci, member of the KosovaAcademy of Sciences and Arts (KASA) says that the exploitation of

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coal used to produce electricity is polluting Kosova's air, waterand soil.

Within the wish for rapid development, which would be grounded on

natural and human resources, there is the fear from pollution.Right now, in the situation when everything in the hands of Serbsand Montenegrins, there can't be even thoughts of capitalinvestments in this direction, but there are also no clearorientations for the future either.

Dr. Ekrem Beqiri, professor at the Mining and Metallurgy Facultyelaborates the evaluations on the coal reserves so far. He uses theevaluations made by Hrvoje Pozar, who claims that Kosova has some7,1 billion tons of coal, then Belgrade "Energoprojekt's"estimation of 10,3 billion tons and the evaluation of the late

Kosovan economist, Ismet Gusia, about the 12 billion tons of coalin reserve. This means that the difference between the minimal andthe maximum amount presented in 70%. According to this analysis,and taking the highest estimation, then each citizen of Kosova hasabout 1.377 tons of coal, meanwhile the world's average is tentimes smaller, and the European about 181 tons per inhabitant.These relations most clearly speak of the wealth Kosova has inthese reserves, which are the poorest quality, in terms ofkilocalories.

Regardless of these differences, the truth is that Kosova has largeamounts of coal. Academician Dushi says that in 276 squaredkilometers, comprising Kosova and Dukagjin basins, there are 8,4

billion tons of coal, while the reserves are also found in other 6squared kilometers in Drenica (Sknderaj and Gllogovc). Thesereserves make possible the production of at least 100 million tonsof coal a year. But, the present capacities of production in Bardh(Bellaevc) and Dobrosell are 16,6 million tons, a never extractedamount, because the capacities are used 50%. This is the base usedfor the functioning of the Electric Power Plant with the installing

power of 1,400 MWh, then the Coal Dryer with the capacity of 600

thousand tons a year, Gasification with 480 metric tons, andtechnical vapor for other chemical products. This was also the

basis for the eventual construction of new power plants, for boththe needs of the former Yugoslavia and some European states.

Knowing that Kosovan coal can't stand more than 50 kilometers longtransportation, its consumption was supposed to be done in the

place it was extracted, which means that with these newinvestments, Kosova would "gain" new ashes deposits, for the coalcontains 21% of this disposal. If 100 million tons of coal are used

to produce energy in one year, then there would be some 21 millionstons of ashes remaining. Whose right is it to leave this hugeamount of ashes to the coming generations, asks Nexhat Daci.

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Since coal is poor, and since its extensive use can harm theenvironment, the future development of Kosova can be grounded onthe reserves of minerals and lead and zinc, which with theapplication of an adequate technology wouldn't endanger the

environment. Academician Dushi claims that around 42 million tonsof lead and zinc ore have been located; 24,7 million tons arelocated in the "Trepa" mines, then 10,5 millions of tons inKishnica and Argjentina (as Pjetr Bogdani names Novobrda) and6,34 million tons in Kopaonik and Leposaviq mines. With a projectedexploitation and without discovering new reserves, these minescould work for the following 20 years. But, Kosova has otherundiscovered reserves, as Dr. Ekrem Beqiri says that the reservesare somewhere around 89 million tons. The discovered reserves allowthe extraction of 2,5 million tons a year.

Even though the exploitation was not as planned in the period 1971-1990, the production was relatively good, and extremely good whencompared to the results of the past five years, which is proven bythe poor performance of "Trepa". According to the statements ofthe Serbian managers controlling the combine, in the four years itwas kept closed, it has not produced one gram of metal. If themaximum would be used, then the reserves of the metal wouldimpoverish, for the flotation in the First Tunnel has a capacity ofone million tons a year, that in Badovc - 1,2 million tons, inLeposaviq - 440 thousand tons. On the other hand, there is capacity

to produce 100 thousand tons of lead a year, 194 tons of silver,122 tons of bismuth, 686 kilos of gold, 310 tons of antimony. Zincelectrolysis produces two metals: 50 thousand tons of zinc and 200tons of cadmium. However, the truth is that such a high level of

production was never achieved.

According to Dr. Beqiri, Kosova has reserves of about 22 types ofminerals, which don't include gold, silver, cadmium, bismuth, etc.which are extracted with the other metals, as well as raw materialswhich are not so extended, as is uranium, which can also be ofstrategic importance. There is also quite big reserves of the

nickel ore and non-metals, as magnesite, for example. Thus, it hasbeen ascertained that the Golesh and ikatova mines have some 24million tons of nickel ore while Gllogovc's "Ferronikel" has thecapacity to produce some 12 thousand tons of clean nickel and some500 tons of cobalt.

Non-metals, i.e. the reserves of magnesite, are mainly concentratedin Golesh, Strezovc and Dubovc. The first two mentioned are activemines, while the third one is not being used, for the reserves havefinished. The general reserves in Golesh are 2,4 million tons. But,

be it because of the high concentration of the sillicium dioxide orbecause of the bad exploitation conditions, the reserves arereduced, and only one million tons remain for exploitation.Strezovc has enormous reserves, some 5,5 million tons, but these

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two mines have been under the control and exploitation of"Magnohrom" from Kraljevo, and this is why they have not producedgood economic effects.

Not analyzing at all the potentials Kosova' agriculture has, aswell as other branches of economy, the mentioned reserves aloneare enough to come to the conclusion that this is the reason whyKosova is occupied by Serbia. Serbia without Kosova would be very

poor in minerals. We should stress again that the large companies,"Trepa", "Ferronikel" and the Electric Company were the first onesto be placed under emergency measures, meanwhile in thetransforming process, they became state property. This means thatthey are administered by the Serbian state which controls thereserves and the refinishing capacities. Regardless of the factthat there is no production right now, nor exploitation, Serbia is

still counting on better times to come, which could produce itmaterial profit with the sale of the ore or its refinishing. Forillustration sake we would mention an ascertainment made by Dr.Beqiri, who says that the producing potential that waters and the

power plants have, and under the supposition that a KWh of electricenergy would be exported at 0,20 US$, then it comes out that untilthe year 2180 Kosova would realize an accumulation of 57 billiondollars. Therefore, Serbia is conscious of this. Even, it isinteresting to say that the first explorations in this sense aremade by people or institutions from Belgrade, which makes us

conclude that Serbia has quite some analyses about the producingcapacities Kosova has.

Kosova has been exploited always. According to some analyses madeearlier, then it comes out that the relation between the moneyinvested by Kosova and that coming from the Federation Fund and theother sources is 9:1. On the other hand, the incorporation of the

phenomenon of migration of the active working force, the turnoverof goods and customs, this disproportion grows even more, to reach16:1. This means that Kosova paid 16 dinars and it received onlyone dinar, states in one of his works Dr. Hilmi Troni.

Not making a deeper analysis of the level of pollution Kosova issuffering, we would only emphasize some of the evaluations made byAcademician Daci. He says that there are around 1 million tons oflead rust left behind, same as 50 thousand tons of slime comingfrom zinc electrolysis, 700 thousand of tons of ferrous oxides,that flotations in Zvean, Badovc and Leposaviq have thrown 35thousand of tones of garbage and the power plants have produced 28millions tons of ashes, an amount rising at 1,6 million tons peryear. Even though these disposals contain metals, there were no

mention of their recycling. The large concentration of all thesedisposals in such a small geographical area as Kosova, these allrepresent a real ecological bomb!

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Are there any solution for these ecological time bombs?

Academician Daci mentions two options: the clean coal technologies,which are very expensive or, saving electricity. The Japanese

conservation policy would serve as an example. Between 1973 and1987 the GNP increased 72,1%, while the energetic masses increasedonly 4,3%, which means that the energetic consumption for a GNPunit actually increased some 36,2% during this period.