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Knowledge of Causal Connection Is Necessary

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Al-Ghazali'sPhilosophicalTheologyFrankGriffel

Printpublicationdate:2009PrintISBN-13:9780195331622PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:September2009DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331622.001.0001

KnowledgeofCausalConnectionIsNecessary

FrankGriffel(ContributorWebpage)

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331622.003.0008

AbstractandKeywords

Theseventeenthdiscussionofal-Ghazali’sIncoherence(Tahafut)showsthatheremainsuncommittedastowhetherGodcreateseventsintheworldinanoccasionalistwayorbymeansofsecondarycausality.Al-Ghazaliassumesthatneitherrevelationnorastudyoftheworldallowsustosettlethedisputebetweentheoccasionalistsandthosewhoproposesecondarycausality.Ifthatisthecase,whataboutthepropheticalmiracle?ForoccasionalistsitisabreakinGod’shabitandthuswouldprovethatthereisnosecondarycausality.Aclosestudyofal-Ghazali’steachingsonprophecyrevealsthathenolongersharestheAsh’ariteteachingthatprophecyisconfirmedandprovenbytheprophets’performanceofmiracles.Hethinksthesemiraclesareindistinguishablefromsorceryandmagicandcanbeexplainedastheeffectsofnaturalcausesthatareyetunknowntous.Accordingtoal-Ghazali,Goddoesnotbreakhishabit.IntheQur’an(Q33:62,48:23)Goddeclares:“YouwillnotfindanychangeinGod’shabit.”ThisimpliesthatGod’shabits–meaningthelawsofnature–areunchangingandstableandthattheywillnotbe


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suspended.ThelawfulcharacterofGod’sarrangementoftheworld,however,isnotsomethingthatwefindintheworlditself.Al-GhazalistillthinksthatoccasionalismisaviableexplanationofGod’screativeactivity.Thecausemaynothaveanytrueefficacyonitseffect.Inthehumanunderstanding,however,thecausehassuchefficacy.Godcreatedourmindsinawaythattheyalwayssearchforcausesandlookoutfortherulesthatdeterminehowthingsreacttooneanother.Whileal-Ghazaliremainsuncommittedifwhatweconsideracauseistrulyconnectedwithwhatweconsideritseffect,heacknowledgesthatthehumanmindconsidersthereisaconnectionwhichwillneverchange.

Keywords:agnosticism,causalconnections,nominalism,futureevents,conditionsofprophecy,propheticalmiracles,magic,sorcery,logic,ontology

IntheseventeenthdiscussionoftheIncoherence,isthereaconsistentlineofargumentwithregardtocausality?AfterproposinghismostradicalepistemologicalcriticismintheFirstPosition—thatsenseperceptiondoesnotleadtonecessaryjudgments—al-GhazālīpresentsintheSecondandtheThirdPositionstwoalternativestotheAvicennanmodelofmetaphysicsandphysics.IntheFirstApproachoftheSecondPosition,occasionalismiscontrastedwiththedeterministiccosmologyofhisopponents.Al-GhazālīaimstoshowthatacongruentoccasionalistmodelcanbeaviablealternativetoAvicennanmetaphysics.Heimplicitlyclaimsthatthefalāsifacanacceptthismodelandstillcontinuetopursuethenaturalsciences.The“lawsofnature”that,accordingtothefalāsifa,governGod’screationmaybeunderstoodashabitualcoursesofactionsubjecttosuspension,atleastinprinciple.Ourhumanexperience,however,hasshownusthatGoddoesnotfrivolouslybreakHishabit.ThisinsightallowsustoequateGod’shabitwiththelawsofnature,forallpracticalpurposes.Inthenaturalsciences,westudyGod’sactionsandreformulatetheirhabitualcourseintolawsthatwejustifiablyconsider,ifnotnecessary,atleaststable,unchanging,andpermanent.

IntheThirdPosition,al-GhazālīputsupafarlessradicalalternativetoAvicennanmetaphysicsandnaturalsciences.Althoughnotclearlyexplicated,thistheoryappearstobeaslightlyalteredversionofAristotelianphysics.Thisphysicaltheorypostulatesthatinadditiontotherulesoflogic,Godcannotviolatelawsofnaturethatrelyontherelationshipsofimplications.Suchimplicationsareusuallyformulatedindefinitions.Willisdefinedasexistinginabeingthathasknowledge,forinstance,andknowledgeisdefinedasexistinginabeingthathaslife.Godthereforecannotcreatewillinabeingthat(p.176)islifeless.Equally,Godcannot“changethegenera”(qalbal-ajnās),meaningthatHecannottransformamaterialbodyintoanimmaterialbeingandviceversa.Al-GhazālīwascertainlyawarethatthesethreeconditionslimitGod’somnipotencesignificantly.HeherelistswhatcanbeviewedastheunchangeableessenceofGod’screation.Andalthoughthelawsofnaturefromamongthiscoregroupcannotbealteredoncecreationunfolds,GodreservesthepowertoalterothersofHishabits,suchasmakingwaterflowuphillorcreatinglifeinanygivenmaterialobject,suchasastick.

ThesetwoalternativetheoriestoAvicenna’scosmologyframeapassageofroughlytwopages,which,totheAvicennan,formsthemostpersuasivepartoftheseventeenth


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discussion.Inadditiontothesetwoalternativecosmologicaltheories(alternativetoAvicenna’scosmology),al-GhazālīdefendsaslightlymodifiedAvicennanexplanationofcausalconnectionsintheSecondApproachoftheSecondPosition.Here,al-Ghazālīiswillingtoacceptthatchainsofsecondarycausesconnecteveryeventincreationwiththecreativeactivityofthecreator.Inthispartoftheseventeenthdiscussionheclearlyacceptstheexistenceof“natures”(ṭabāʾiʿ).HerequirestheAvicennansimplytoacknowledgethatwelackexhaustiveknowledgeofthefullpossibilitiesofthesenatures.Theymightallowcausalconnectionsthatwehavenotyetwitnessed.Themiraclesreportedinrevelationhavecausesunknowntous.Theyarenottruemiraclesbutmeremarvels.

IntheIncoherence,al-Ghazālīpresentswhatmightbecalledanominalistcriticismofthemodalities,insomesenseacriticismofhumanjudgmentsasawhole.UsingtheparlanceofAvicenna,al-Ghazālīimplicitlyaskswhetherwecanknowthatanygivenobjectthatwewitnessintheoutsideworldispossiblebyitself(mumkinbi-dhātihi)andatthesametimeisnecessitatedbysomethingelse(wājibbi-ghayrihi).Al-GhazālīrejectsAvicenna’sassumptionthatmodalitiesexistintheoutsideworld.ThisrejectiongoestotheheartoftheAvicennanontologythatregardspotentialityasaparadigmthatstrivestoactualizeitself.LikeAvicenna,al-Ghazālīviewshumanknowledgeasaconglomerateofjudgments.1HeagreeswithAvicennathattrueknowledgeiscongruenttotheoutsideworldanddescribesitassuch.ForAvicenna,however,therecanbeonlyonetrueexplanationofanygivenphenomenonintheworld.Truehumanknowledgedescribesthenecessaryandonlywaytheworldisconstructed.Demonstration(burhān)isthebestmeanstoachievesuchcorrectknowledgeabouttheworld.Wheredemonstrationisnotavailable,humanschooselessperfectmeansofacquiringknowledge.Al-GhazālīagreeswithAvicennaontheimperfectnatureofthesemeans.Herealizes,however,thatwheredemonstrationcannotbeachieved,multipleexplanationsarecompossible,thatisoneexplanationmaycoexistwithanotherwithoutneedingtodecidewhichapplies.Theinabilitytodemonstratetheunchangingnatureoftheconnectionbetweencauseandeffectcreatesasituationinwhichmorethanoneexplanationofcausalconnectionsisviable.Onlyanominalistpositiontowardhumanknowledgeallowstheassumptionoftwodifferentexplanationsofagivenprocessascompossible.

Al-Ghazālī’snominalistcritiqueofAvicennaisanimportantelementintheunderstandingofhiscosmology.Wemustpointoutthatal-Ghazālīwasnot(p.177) anominalistinthesenseofhiscontemporaryRoscelin(d.c.1120)orWilliamofOckham(d.1347)intheLatinWest.2Thesenominalistsoutspokenlydeniedanyontologicalcoherencebetweenthingsandtheirformal(anduniversal)representationsinourminds.IntheLatindisputeaboutthestatusofuniversals—adisputethatlastedfromthelatethirteenthtotheendofthefourteenthcenturies—thenominalistcriticismwasdirectedagainsttheAristotelianclaimofaneternalandinvariantformallevelofbeingthatshapesboththeindividualthingsintheoutsideworldaswellasourknowledgeofthem.Thisposition,whichisknownasepistemologicalrealism,essentiallymaintainsthatindividualthingsarewhattheyarebecauseofrealexistinguniversals.Theconsistencyofourknowledgewiththeoutsideworldisduetotheontologicalcoherencebetweenthetwo.Humansoulshave


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accesstotheseuniversals,andtheirapprehensionconstitutesourknowledge.IntheLatinWest,Avicennawasoneofthemostimportantproponentsoftherealistposition.

IntheMuslimEast,theparametersofthedisputeonthestatusofuniversalsweredifferent.Here,thenominalistcriticismofAvicennadevelopedfromAshʿariteoccasionalism,asinthecaseofal-Ghazālī.YetnominalistpositionswerenotunknownwithinthediscourseoffalsafaintheEast.Justifyinghispositionthatthemodalitiesexistonlyinmindsandnotintheoutsideworld,al-Ghazālīcitesamoderatenominalistviewtowardhumanknowledgethatwerecurrentamongthefalāsifa.Hetriestopersuadehisphilosophicalreaderstoaccepthispositiononthemodalitiesbycomparingthemtouniversals.Accordingtoviewsheldbythefalāsifathemselves,al-Ghazālīcontinues,theuniversalsarejustconceptsinthemindwithoutreferringobjects(maʿlūmāt)intheoutsideworld.Theuniversalsdonotexistintheoutsideworld:

Whatexistsintheoutsideworld(fīl-aʿyān)areindividualparticularsthatweperceivewithoursensesandnotinourmind.Buttheyare(only)thecause;becausethemindabstractsfromthemintellectualjudgmentsthatareemptyofmatter.Thereforebeingacolor(lawniyya)isasinglejudgment(qaḍiya)inthemind(ʿaql)similartoblacknessorwhiteness.Onecannotconceivethatthereexistsacolorthatisneitherblacknorwhitenoranyotherofthecolors.Inthemindthereexiststheformof“beingacolor”withoutanydetails;andonesaysitisaformanditexistsinthemindsandnotintheoutsideworld.3

Thepositionreferredtohereneedsnotbethatofanominalist.Avicennahimselftaughtthattheperceptionofindividualobjectscannotleadtouniversaljudgments.4Althoughadmittingthatuniversalshavenoexistenceinmatter,theAvicennanopponentstillholdsthattheyexistinarealandimmaterialwayintheactiveintellect,outsideofthehumanmind.Al-Ghazālīusesthisargument,however,toadvanceadistinctlynominalistcritiqueofthepositionthatmodalitiesexistoutsideofthehumanmind.Wewilllaterseehowal-GhazālīmadeproductiveuseofsomenominalisttendencieswithinAvicenna’sœuvre.5

InthemethodologicalintroductiontoTheHighestGoalinExplainingtheBeautifulNamesofGod,al-Ghazālīdevelopsadistinctlynominalisttheoryof(p.178) semanticrelationsthatcombinesAshʿaritenotionswithphilosophicaldistinctions.6Itisalsoapparent,however,thattheinfluenceofAvicenna’srealistepistemologyonhimwassostrongthatheoftenappliestohisownwritingsarealistconceptoftheuniversals.7Whatdistinguishesal-GhazālīfromAvicenna,aswewillseeinthecourseofthisstudy,isthatheremainedontologicallyuncommittedtotheexistenceoftheuniversalsoutsideofindividualhumanminds.Althoughtheuniversalsmayexistasentitiesintheactiveintellect,suchanexistencecannotbedemonstrated.Therealistunderstandingoftheuniversalsmayormaynotbetrue.IntheSecondApproachoftheseventeenthdiscussion,hecounterstherealistpositionwiththeoccasionalistpositionthathumancognitionsaretheimmediatecreationsofGodandareonlycongruentwiththeoutsideworldifGodwillsit.

Someofal-Ghazālī’scriticisminhisIncoherenceofthePhilosopherscenterson


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questioningtheontologicalconnectionbetweentheformalstructureoftheworldandtheformalstructureofourknowledge.Averroes(d.595/1198),forinstance,whosharedAvicenna’srealistepistemology,wassurprisedbyal-Ghazālī’sefforttodefendanoccasionalistpositionwiththeargumentthathumanknowledgemaybecomedisconnectedfromtheworlditaimstodescribe.Thatcannotbethecase,Averroessays,“becausetheknowledgecreatedinusisalwaysinconformitywiththenatureoftherealthing,sincethedefinitionoftruthisthatathingisbelievedtobesuchasitisinreality.”8Yetthisconformity(tabaʿ)ispreciselywhatal-Ghazālīarguesagainst.Sincethereisnoproofofthenecessityoftheconnectionbetweenacauseanditseffect,thereisalsonoproofofthenecessaryconformityofourknowledgewiththeworld.Themerepossibilityofadisconnectbetweenthetwoprovesthatthereisnoformal—andthusnecessary—coherencebetweentheworldandourknowledgeofit.

InalaterpassageoftheIncoherence,al-Ghazālīcommentsonwhathedoesintheseventeenthdiscussion.Thiscommentappearsinthetwentiethdiscussionofthebook,onthesubjectofcorporealresurrectionintheafterlife.Thefalāsifaarguethataresurrectionofbodiesisimpossible,asitnecessitatestheimpossiblefeatoftransformationofsubstances,suchasirontransformingintoagarment.Inhisresponse,al-GhazālīrefershisreadersbacktotheSecondApproachoftheSecondPositionintheseventheenthdiscussion,inwhichheclaimstohavealreadydiscussedthisproblem.Hearguesthattheunusuallyrapidrecyclingofthematterofthepieceofironintoapieceofgarmentisnotimpossible.IntheSecondApproachoftheSecondPosition,al-Ghazālīhadarguedthatthematterthatmakesupapieceawoodmaychangeinotherthanitsknownandusualwayfromastickintoaserpent.“Butthisisnotthepointatissuehere,”al-Ghazālīcontinues;therealquestioniswhethersuchatransformation“occurspurelythrough[divine]powerwithoutanintermediary,orthroughoneofthecauses.”9Thequestioncannotbeputmorebluntly:doesGodcreatesuchtransformationsmono-causally—inaccordwithanoccasionalistworldview—orbymeansofsecondarycausality?

Boththesetwoviewsarepossibleforus(kilāhumāmumkinānʿindanā)(…)[Intheseventeenthdiscussionwestated]thatthe(p.179) connectionofconnectedthingsinexistenceisnotbywayofnecessitybutthroughhabitualevents,whichcanbedisrupted.Thus,theseeventscomeaboutthroughthepowerofGodwithouttheexistenceoftheircauses.Thesecond[view]isthatwesay:Thisisduetocauses,butitisnotaconditionthatthecause[here]wouldbeonethatiswell-known(maʿhūd).Rather,inthetreasuryofthingsthatareenactedby[God’s]powertherearewondrousandstrangethings,onehasn’tcomeacross.Thesearedeniedbysomeonewhothinksthatonlythosethingsexiststhatheexperiencessimilartopeoplewhodenymagic,sorcery,thetalismanicarts,[prophetic]miracles,andthewondrousdeeds[donebysaints].10

Thesolutional-GhazālīchoseintheseventeenthdiscussionofhisIncoherenceisthoroughandwellreasoned,andwewilldiscussmanyofitsimplicationsinthischapter.Onerealizeshowcarefullyal-Ghazālīhadcraftedandconsideredthispositionwhenoneseesthatal-Ghazālīmaintainedthispositionthroughoutallhislaterworks.Allthroughhis


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lifeal-GhazālīremainedultimatelyundecidedastowhetherGodcreatesmono-causallyandarrangesdirectlyineachmomentallelementsofHiscreation,orwhetherGodmediatesHiscreativeactivitybymeansofsecondarycauses.Al-Ghazālīacceptedbothexplanationsasviableexplanationsofcosmology.

TheDisputeoveral-Ghazālī’sCosmologyIna1988article,BinjaminAbrahamovattemptedtodetermineal-Ghazālī’spositiononcausalityinworkswrittenaftertheIncoherenceofthePhilosophers.GiventhattheIncoherenceisaworkofrefutationinwhichtheauthorhimselfadmitsthathisargumentsmaynotrepresenthisrealopinion,11Abrahamovassessedal-Ghazālī’steachingsfromworksconsideredclosertohisactualteachings.TheseworksincludeTheRevivaloftheReligiousSciences,TheBookoftheForty,andal-Ghazālī’scommentaryontheNinety-NineNobleNames.Abrahamovconcludedthatinthesethreeworks,al-Ghazālīuseslanguagethatassumesthatcausesdohaveefficacyonotherthings.Tobesure,itisGodwhocreatesthecausesandmaintainsandregulatestheirinfluences.Yetintheseworks,al-Ghazālīsuggeststhattheinfluenceofcausesisindeedrealandnotjustanillusion.Onceputintoplace,thecausesleadtoeffectsthatarethemselvesdesiredbyGod.Abrahamovalsonotedthatinafourthworkofal-Ghazālī,TheBalancedBookonWhat-To-Believe,theauthoruseslanguagethatisdistinctlyoccasionalist.HerehemaintainsthatGodshouldberegardedastheimmediatecreatorofeachindividualeventandthatifHesowished,HecouldbreakHishabitualpatternsofcreationandsuspendwhatwepostulateasthelawsthatgoverncreation.GiventhatthoseworksimplyingacausaltheorywerewrittenafterTheBalancedBook,Abrahamovsuggeststhatal-Ghazālīchangedhismind“butpreferredtoconcealhistrueopinionbycontradictinghimself.”12Inthisanalysis,AbrahamovfollowsLeoStraussinhisexegesisofMaimonides(p.180)(d.601/1204).StraussclaimedthatwhenmedievalauthorssuchasMaimonidesuse“consciousandintentionalcontradictions,hiddenfromthevulgar,”theywishedtocompeltheirreaders“totakepainstofindouttheactualmeaning,”whichwasoftentheonethatappearsleastfrequentlyintheirwritings.13

TheapparentcontradictionobservedbyAbrahamovhadbeenearliernotedbyW.H.T.Gairdnerina1914article.Gairdnerobservedthatwhereasinsomeofhisworks,al-GhazālīexplainsGod’screativeactivitybymeansofsecondarycausality,creationmediatedbyothercreatedbeings,inotherworks,heemploysexplanationsthataredistinctlyoccasionalist.Gairdnersuggestedthatal-Ghazālīhadpublishedtwodifferentsetsofteachings,oneinworkswrittenfortheordinarypeople(ʿawāmm)andadifferentsetofteachingsinworksthatwerewrittenforanintellectualelite(khawāṣṣ).Whetheral-GhazālīconsideredthesetwoteachingstobeequallytruewasforGairdnerthe“Ghazālīproblem.”14GairdnersupportedhisviewwithquotationsfromIbnṬufayl(d.581/1185–86)andAverroes,claimingthattheyhadbeenbotheredbytheverysameproblem.Gairdner’sarticleencouragedthewidespreadassumptionintwentieth-centuryresearchthatinworkssuchasTheNicheofLights,al-Ghazālītaughtan“esoteric”theology,whileinworkssuchashisautobiographyorTheBalancedBook,heaccommodatedhisteachingstotheexpectationofthetargetaudienceandtaughtoccasionalism.15


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In1992,RichardM.Frankpresentedthemostthoroughstudyofal-Ghazālī’scosmologytodate.16LikeAbrahamov,FrankbasesthebulkofhisanalysisontheworksTheHighestGoalinExplainingtheBeautifulNamesofGod,TheBookofForty,andseveralbooksoftheRevival.FrankalsoincludesTheNicheofLights,RestrainingtheOrdinaryPeoplefromtheScienceofKalām,andTheBalancedBookonWhat-to-Believe,andwasthusabletocoveralmostthewholeGhazaliancorpus.Frankclaimsthatcontrarytocommonopinion,al-Ghazālīteaches(1)thattheuniverseisaclosed,deterministicsystemofsecondarycauseswhoseoperationisgovernedbythefirstcreatedbeing,an“angel”(or“intellect”)associatedwiththeoutermostsphere;(2)thatGodcannotinterveneintheoperationofsecondarycauses,celestialorsublunary;and(3)thatitisimpossiblethatGodhaswilledtocreateauniverseinanyrespectdifferentfromthisoneHehascreated.17Godgovernstheuniversethroughintermediaries,andHecannotdisrupttheoperationofthesesecondarycauses.Frankconcludedthatwhereasal-Ghazālīrejectedtheemanationismofal-FārābīandAvicenna,forinstance,hisowncosmologyisalmostidenticaltothatofAvicenna.Earliercontributionstotheacademicdebate,Frankpointsout,hadalreadyestablishedthatal-GhazālīacceptedsomeofAvicenna’steachingswhilerejectingothers:“Whatwehaveseenonacloserexaminationofwhat[al-Ghazālī]hastosayconcerningGod’srelationtothecosmosasitscreator,however,revealsthatfromatheologicalstandpointmostofthetheseswhichherejectedarerelativelytameandinconsequentialcomparedtosomeofthoseinwhichhefollowsthephilosopher.”18

UnlikeGairdnerorAbrahamov,Frankdoesnotproposethatal-Ghazālīpresentstwodifferentkindsofteachingsindifferentworks.Herejectsthedivisionofal-Ghazālī’sworksintoesotericandexoteric.19Al-Ghazālī’sviews(p.181) oncausalityinTheBalancedBookonWhat-to-Believe,forinstance,donotdifferfromthoseinhiscommentaryonGod’sNinety-NineNobleNamesorinTheNicheofLights.Frankimplicitlyacknowledgesthatal-Ghazālīusedbothcausalistandoccasionalistlanguageinhisworks.Thecontradictionsthatwerenotedbyearlierreaders,however,existonlyontheleveloflanguageanddonotreflectsubstantivedifferencesinthought.Whenal-Ghazālīusesoccasionalistlanguage,Frankclaims,hesubtlyaltersthetraditionalistlanguageoftheAshʿariteschool,makingitclearthathedoesnotsubscribetoitsteachings.Thus,althoughal-Ghazālī’slanguageinsuchworksasTheBalancedBookoftenreflectsthatofthetraditionalistAshʿaritemanuals,histeachingseveninthatworkexpresscreationbymeansofsecondarycausality.20

Frank’sideaswerenotunopposed.MichaelE.Marmurainparticular,whoinanumberofearlierarticleshadarguedthatal-Ghazālīwasanoccasionalist,21rejectedthesuggestionthatal-GhazālīacceptedefficientcausalityamongGod’screatures.22OtherinterpreterssuchasWilliamL.CraighadfollowedMarmuraintheiranalysisandhadmaintainedthatal-Ghazālī“didnotbelieveintheefficacyofsecondarycauses.”23ReactingtoFrank’ssuggestion,Marmuraconcededthatal-Ghazālīmakesuseofcausalistlanguage,“sometimesinthewayitisusedinordinaryArabic,sometimesinamorespecificallyAvicennian/Aristotelianway”andthatthisusageoflanguageisinnovativefortheAshʿariteschooldiscourse.24YetinallmajorpointsofMuslimtheology,al-GhazālīheldpositionsthatcloselyfollowedonesdevelopedearlierbyAshʿaritescholars,suchasthe


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possibilityofmiracles,thecreationofhumanacts,andGod’sfreedominallmattersconcerningthecreationoftheuniverse.25InMarmura’sview,al-Ghazālīneverdeviatedfromoccasionalism,althoughhesometimesexpressedhisopinionsinambiguouslanguagethatmockedphilosophicalparlance,likelytolurefollowersoffalsafaintotheAshʿariteoccasionalistcamp.

Marmuradoesnotassumethatal-Ghazālīexpresseddifferentopinionsabouthiscosmologyindifferentworks.InresearchpublishedsinceFrank’s1992study,MarmurafocusesonTheBalancedBookandtriestoprovethatatleasthere,al-Ghazālīexpressesunambiguouslyoccasionalistpositions.26UsingapassageintheIncoherence,Marmuraassumesthisworktobethe“sequel”tothatworkofrefutation,inwhichal-Ghazālī“affirmsthetruedoctrine.”27ForMarmura,theBalancedBookisthusthemostauthoritativeworkamongal-Ghazālī’swritingsontheology.LikeFrank,heclaimsthataclosereadingofallofal-Ghazālī’stextswillfindnocontradictionsonthesubjectofcosmology.Marmuraacknowledgesthatal-GhazālīusescausalistlanguagethatascribesagencytocreatedobjectsintheRevival,intheIncoherence,intheStandardofKnowledge,andinotherworks.Yetsuchlanguageisusedmetaphorically,justaswemightsay“firekills”withoutassumingthatithassuchagencyinrealterms.28Rather,thecausallanguagemustbereadinoccasionalistterms.29Al-Ghazālī’suseofsuchwordsas“cause”(sabab)or“generation”(tawallud)isonlymetaphorical,Marmuraclaims.ThesetermsarecommonlyusedinArabic,and“itwouldbecumbersometohavetokeeponsayingthatthisismetaphoricalusage,orthatthereferenceistohabitualcausesandsoon.”30LikeFrank,(p.182) MarmuraisawareofthesignificantextenttowhichAvicenna’sthoughthasshapedal-Ghazālī’stheology.Marmuraseesinal-Ghazālī“aturningpointinthehistoryoftheAshʿariteschoolofdogmatictheology(kalām).”31HeadoptsmanyofAvicenna’sideasandreinterpretstheminAshʿariteterms.Althoughal-Ghazālī’sexpositionofcausalconnectionsoftendrawsonAvicenna,thedoctrinethathedefendsisAshʿariteoccasionalism.32

BothFrankandMarmuradenythepossibilitythatal-Ghazālīshowedanyuncertaintyormayhavebeeninanywayagnosticaboutwhichofthetwocompetingcosmologicaltheoriesistrue.33Frankbemoansal-Ghazālī’sfailuretocomposeacomplete,systematicsummaryofhistheology.34Healsobelievesthattherewasnonotabletheoreticaldevelopmentorevolutioninal-Ghazālī’stheologybetweenhisearliestworksandhislast.ThistheologyistheoneFrankhadcharacterizedinhisCreationandtheCosmicSystem,anditis,inFrank’sview,“fundamentallyincompatiblewiththetraditionalteachingoftheAshʿariteschool.”35Rejectingthislastconclusion,Marmuradoesagreethatal-Ghazālīheldonlyonedoctrineoncosmologyandcausation.MarmuradiscussesthepassagefromthetwentiethdiscussionintheIncoherencewhereal-Ghazālīadmitsthat“boththesetwoviewsarepossibleforus.”36MarmuraarguedthattheevidencefromtextssuchasTheBalancedBookonWhat-to-BelieveandsometextualexpressionsintheIncoherenceleadtotheassumptionthatal-GhazālīwascommittedonlytohisfirstcausaltheoryfromtheSecondPositionoftheseventeenthdiscussion,theoccasionalistone.The“secondcausaltheory”—thatis,theonefromtheSecondApproachoftheSecondPosition,whichacceptstheexistenceofnaturesandassumesthatcausalrelationsarenot


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suspendedwhenGodcreatesthemiracles—hasbeenintroducedmerelytowintheargumentthatallmiraclesreportedinrevelationarepossible;al-Ghazālīwasnotcommittedtoit.37

RecentlyJonMcGinnisproposedanexplanationthatreconcilesthetextualevidenceprovidedbyFrankandMarmuratosupporttheirmutuallyexclusiveclaims.McGinnisbelievesthatal-GhazālīdevelopedanintermediatepositionbetweentraditionalAshʿariteoccasionalismandthefalāsifa’stheoryofefficientcausality.Foral-Ghazālī,causalprocessesexist,accordingtoMcGinnis,buttheyareimmediatelydependentuponadivine,oratleastangelic,volitionalact.Acauseisonlysufficientforitseffecttooccur,accordingtoMcGinnis’sinterpretationofal-Ghazālī,whensuchahighervolitionalactimmediatelyactualizesthecause.Causeandeffectreacttowhatmightbeunderstoodastheirnatures—thusallowinghumanstopredicttheirreactions—butthesenaturesareonlypassivepowersthatdonotdevelopanyagencyorefficientcausalitybythemselves.Godoravolitionalagentmustactualizetheirpassivepowers.Thisvolitionalagentistherealagentorefficientcauseofthecausalconnection.Theactualizationisimmediateandcannotbemediatedbyachainofsecondarycauses,forinstance.AccordingtoMcGinnis,al-GhazālīrejectedboththeoccasionalistpositionofclassicalAshʿarismaswellasthesecondarycausalityofthefalāsifaanddevelopedathirdviewthatcombineselementsofthesetwo.38

(p.183) FiveConditionsforCosmologicalExplanationsintheIncoherenceWhenMichaelE.Marmuraconsideredthesuggestionthatal-Ghazālīmightactuallyhaveheldtwodifferentexplanationsofcosmologyascompossible,hesaw“nocompellingreasonortextualindicationforbelievingthatheiscommittingtheerrorofthinkingthattheyare.”39Occasionalismandsecondarycausalityaremutuallyexclusive,Marmuraargues;onedeniescausalefficacywhiletheotheraffirmsit.Assumingcompossibilityinthiscase,however,doesnotassumethataneventiscausedbothbyaninner-worldlyefficientcauseandalsoimmediatelybyGod.Ratheritmeans—asal-GhazālīhasputitseveraltimesintheseventeenthdiscussionoftheIncoherence—thatGodisthecreatoroftheevent“eitherthroughthemediationoftheangelsorwithoutmediation.”40AlthoughGod’scontroloveralleventsinthisworldisunquestioned,thewayHeexertsthiscontrolisleftopen.

Still,onemightask,giventhatoccasionalismandsecondarycausalityaresodifferent,howcouldal-GhazālīpositthattheyofferequallyconvincingtheoriesofGod’screativeactivity?InhisIncoherence,al-GhazālīdevelopedcertainconditionswithwhichanyoccasionalistandcausalisttheorymustcomplyinordertoexplainadequatelybothphenomenaintheworldandGod’screativeactivityaslearnedfromrevelation.Theseconditionsarenowhereclearlylistedorspelledout,yettheycanbeinferredmostlyfromtheSecondPositionoftheseventeenthdiscussion.There,al-Ghazālītriestoconvincehisreadersthataproperlyconceivedoccasionalistpositionaswellasaproperviewofsecondarycausalityeachleadtoacceptingthepropheticalmiraclesofrevelation.

Acceptingthemiraclesreportedinrevelationisthefirstofthesefiveconditions.Itisnot,however,al-Ghazālī’sonlyconcerninthesepassages.Heputsdrasticwordsinthe


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mouthofhisopponentwhenhemakeshimcriticizeoccasionalism’sindeterminism.Anoccasionalistworldviewforfeitsthepossibilityofmakinganyassumptionsaboutwhatiscurrentlyhappeninginplacesthatarenotsubjecttoourimmediatesenseperception,aswellasforeventsinthefuture.Asal-Ghazālīportrayshisphilosophicaladversarysaying,occasionalismleadstotheassumptionof“hideousimpossibilities”(muḥālātshanīʿa)thatdestroynotonlythepursuitofthenaturalsciencesbutalsoanycoherentunderstandingoftheworld.41Al-Ghazālī’sexamplesarenotchosen—oradopted—withouthumor,andhisreadersareclearlylefttoenjoytheoccasionalistpositionasanobjectofridicule.

Creatingacoherentunderstandingoftheworldthatallowsassumptionsorevenprecisepredictionsaboutwhatisnotimmediatelywitnessedandwhatwillhappeninthefuturewasaclearconcernofal-Ghazālīanditisthesecondconditiononourlist.Hewouldnothaveacceptedanoccasionalistexplanationofcosmologythatviolatesthiscriterion.TwoothercriteriaforhiscosmologycanbetakenfromotherpartsoftheIncoherence.Attheendofthatwork,al-Ghazālīcondemnsthreepositionsasunbelief(kufr).Twoofthethreepositionsthathecondemnsconcerncosmologicaltheories,namely,that(p.184) theworldiseternalandthatGoddoesnottakenoteofindividualsbutonlyknowsclassesofbeings.Sincethesepositions“donotagreewithIslaminanyrespect,and(…)noneoftheMuslimgroupsbelievesinit,”42anycosmologicalexplanationacceptabletoal-Ghazālīmust—inareverseconclusion—acknowledgethattheworldiscreatedintimeandthatGodknowsallHiscreationsbothuniversallyandasindividuals.

Finally,afifthconditioncanbegatheredfromthepagesoftheIncoherence.IntheFirstPositionoftheseventeenthdiscussion,al-Ghazālīdeniesthatfirecouldbeeithertheefficientcauseortheagent(fāʿil)ofthecotton’scombustion.Fireisinanimateandhasnoaction.43ThisargumentrefersbacktothethirddiscussionoftheIncoherence,inwhichal-GhazālīcriticizesAvicennaandhisfollowersfortheirviewsonGod’swill.Itistrue,hesays,thatthefalāsifaclaimGodisthemaker(ṣāniʿ)oftheworldaswellasitsagentorefficientcause(fāʿil).Inordertobeanagentorefficientcause,however,oneneedstohavebothawillandafreechoice(murīdmukhtār).“Wesaythatagent(fāʿil)isanexpression[referring]toonefromwhomtheactproceedstogetherwiththewilltoactbywayoffreechoice(ikhtiyār)andtheknowledgeofwhatiswilled.”44Here,thefalāsifadisagreeandsaythatanybeingcanbeanagent(fāʿil)aslongasitistheproximateefficientcauseofanotherbeing.Fireastheproximateefficientcauseofthecotton’scombustionmaybecalleditssecondaryagent.45

Al-Ghazālīstronglyobjectsandrefusestoaccepttheterminologyofthefalāsifa.Heinsiststhattheword“action”isellipticalfor“voluntaryaction”sinceaninvoluntaryactionisinconceivable.46Thedisagreementisfundamentalanditsimplicationsarefar-reaching.Inadditiontobeingtheefficientcauseofanotherthing,anagentmustthusfulfillthreeotherconditions.Heorshemust(1)havewilloravolition(irāda),(2)haveachoice(ikhtiyār)betweenalternativeactions,and(3)knowwhatiswilled.47IntheIncoherence,al-Ghazālīgivesthestrongimpressionthathumansandotheranimatedbeingssuchasthecelestialspherescanbeconsideredagents.LaterinhisBalancedBook,al-Ghazālīclarifiesthatalthoughhumansmayfulfillthetwofirstconditions,thatis,volitionandfree


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choice,thelastconditioncannotapplytohumanssincetheydonothaveafullknowledgeofwhatiscreatedwhentheyact.48Inhisautobiography,al-Ghazālīsaysclearlythatthecelestialobjects,forinstance,havenoaction(fiʿl)bythemselves,astheyareallsubjecttoGod’scommandwhoemploysallofnatureaccordingtoHiswill.49Thesameistrueforhumans,whoaresubjecttoGod’swillandlackthisfullknowledge.ThathumansarenotagentsandthatGodistheonlyagentintheuniverseareprominentmotifsintheBalancedBookaswellasintheRevival.Al-Ghazālī’spositionintheIncoherencemustbeconsidereddialectical,aimingtoconvincethefalāsifaoftheratherlimitedpositionthatinanimatebeingscanneverbeconsidered“agents.”50

IntheIncoherence,al-Ghazālīdoesnotpresentanythingthatmightbeconsideredaphilosophicalargumentastowhyherejectsthetechnicallanguageofthefalāsifaonthisparticularpoint.51Hesimplyreferstothecommonusageoftheword“action,”seeminglyjustdisagreeingoverthechoiceoflanguage.Al-GhazālīpreferstousetheArabicwordfāʿilaccordingtothemeaningithasinMuslimtheologyoveritsmeaningfortheAristotelianphilosophers.52(p.185) Amongthemutakallimūn,however,languageusagewasacommonlyusedtoolforestablishingkalāmdoctrines.Unlikeinfalsafa,wheretheterminologywasoftenbasedonArabicexpressionsconstructedtoparallelGreekwords,theMuʿtaziltesestablishedearlythehabitofinvokingcommonusageofArabictosupportdistincttheoreticalpositions.53TheAshʿaritesweretheheirstotheMuʿtazilitesinthisapproach.TheirunderlyingideaseemstobethatlanguageandtheparticularrelationshipbetweenwordsandtheirreferringobjectsareGod’screations.ThistheoryisparticularlytrueforArabic,thelanguagechosenbyGodforHisrevelation.RelyingonreferentialrelationshipsthatarenotsanctionedbycommonusagenotonlyiserroneousbutalsoistamperingwiththebondthatGodcreatedbetweenHimselfandhumansthroughcreatingalanguagethatisusedbybothsides.

Al-Ghazālīaccusesthefalāsifaofobfuscationandofusinglanguagethataimstocreatetheimpression(talbīs)thattheirGodisatrueagent.YettheyimplicitlyrejectthispositionbecausetheydenyHiswillandfreechoice.Inreality,thefalāsifateachthatGod“acts”outofnecessity,whichmeansforal-GhazālīthatGoddoesnotactatall.Thephilosophers’GoddiffersfromadeadpersononlyinasmuchasHehasself-awareness.54WhenthephilosopherssaythatGodisthemaker(ṣāniʿ)oftheworld,theymeanitonlyinametaphoricalsense.55InhisIncoherenceofthePhilosophers,al-GhazālīridiculesAvicennaforattemptingtoascribeawilltoGodwhilestilldenyinganactivedesireordeliberationonGod’spart.56Thisusage,al-Ghazālīsays,isapurelymetaphoricaluseoftheword“will,”anditundulystretchesitsestablishedmeaning.Al-GhazālīcriticizesAvicenna’steachingsaseffectivelybeingadenialofthedivineattributeofwill.57IntheThirdPositionoftheseventeenthdiscussion,inwhichal-GhazālīdiscussesrulesthatnotevenGodcanviolateinHiscreation,heclarifies,“weunderstandby‘will’theseekingaftersomethingthatisknown(ṭalabmaʿlūm).”Therefore,therecanbenowillwherethereisnodesire.58

Foral-Ghazālī,theconceptofdivinewill(irāda)onGod’spartexcludesHisactingoutofnecessity.59AllthroughtheIncoherence,al-GhazālīmaintainsthatGodcreatesasafree


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agent(mukhtār)ratherthanoutofthenecessityofHisnature.Intotal,therearethusfiveconditionsforcosmologicalexplanationsthatcanbegleanedfromtheIncoherence.Anyviableexplanationofcosmology:

1.mustincludeanactofcreationfromnothingatsomepointintime;2.mustallowthatGod’sknowledgeincludesallcreaturesandallevents,universallyandasindividuals;3.mustaccountforthepropheticalmiraclesthatarerelatedinrevelation;4.mustaccountforourcoherentexperienceoftheuniverseandmustallowpredictionsoffutureevents,meaningthatitmustaccountforthesuccessfulpursuitofthenaturalsciences;and5.musttakeintoaccountthatGodfreelydecidesaboutthecreationofexistencesotherthanHim.

Whatwouldanoccasionalistexplanationthatfulfillsthesefivecriterialooklike?Anyoccasionalistcosmologyeasilyfulfillscriteria1,2,3,and5.Inthe(p.186) Incoherence,al-Ghazālīpointsoutthatawronglyconceivedoccasionalismviolatesthefourthcondition,thatofthepredictabilityoffutureevents.Aslongasonecannotdiscountthatbookscouldbeturnedintoanimals,forexample,thereisnowaythatanoccasionalistexplanationcanalloworevensupportthepursuitofthenaturalsciences.Thefourthcriterionisfulfilled,however,iftheoccasionalistassumesthatGoddoesnotmakesuddenadhocdecisionsaboutwhattocreatenext.IntheIncoherence,suchaconvictionisbolsteredbythepremisethatGod’sactionsarestrictlyhabitual.Absurditiessuchastheonementionedabovewillnothappen,becausetheyareknowntohaveneverhappenedinthepast.WebuildourknowledgeofGod’shabitfrompastoccurrencesthatwewitnessedourselvesandthatothershavereportedtous.ThisknowledgeenablesustodetectandformulatestablepatternsinGod’shabit.

Still,thereisnoguaranteethatanomnipotentGodwillnotfrivolously—orratherpurposefully—breakHishabit.TheoccasionalistbelieverfirmlytrustsinGod(tawakkala)thatHewillnotturnhislibraryintoananimalzoo.ThisisoneofthelowerdegreesoftrustinGod,writesal-Ghazālīinthethirty-fifthbookofhisRevivaloftheReligiousSciences.There,hecomparestheoccasionalistbelieverwhohastrustinGodtosomeoneinvolvedinalegaldisputeincourt.Theclaimantputshisconfidenceinwinningthecaseinthehandsofalegalattorney(wakīl).60Theclientsoftheattorneyarewellfamiliarwithhishabitsandhowhiscustomaryproceduresfollowregularlyaftereachother(ʿādātuhuwa-ṭṭirādsunanihi).Theclaimantisfamiliar,forinstance,withtheattorney’scustomtorepresenthisclientswithoutcallingthemaswitnesses.Theattorneydefendshisclientsjustonthebasisofwhattheyhavewrittendowninafile(sijill).Iftheclientiswellfamiliarwiththishabitofhisattorneyandifhetrulytrustshim,hewillassumethattheattorneywilltrytoresolvethecasebasedsolelyonthefileandthattheattorneywillnotcalluponhimincourt.Theclientwillthusplanaccordingly,preparingacomprehensivefiletohandtheattorneywhilealsoknowingthathisattorneywillnotaskhimtotestifyincourt.Hecansitcalmlyandtrustinglyandawaittheoutcomeofthecase:

Whenheentrusts[hisaffairs]tohim[scil.theattorney],histrustiscomplete


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(tamām)whenheisfamiliarwithhis[attorney’s]customarydealingsandhishabitsandwhenheactsaccordingtowhattheyrequire(wāfinbi-muqtaḍāhā).61

TrustinGod,therefore,requiresactinginaccordwithGod’shabitualorderofevents.“YouunderstandthattrustinGoddoesnotrequireonetogiveupanykindofplanning(tadbīr)oraction.”62Rather,itrequiresarrangingone’slifepatternstomatchwhatweknowisGod’shabit.SomeonewhoisconvincedofoccasionalismandwhohastrustinGod,forinstance,doesnotneedtokeepthewindowsofhislibraryclosedsimplybecausehemightfearthathisbooksmaybeturnedintobirdsandflyaway.Suchaprovisionisunwarranted,givenwhatweknowaboutGod’shabits.

(p.187) DeterminationbyanUnchangingDivineForeknowledgeYettherearehigherdegreesoftrustinGod(tawakkul)thatprovidethebelieverwithdeepercertaintyaboutthestrictlyhabitualcharacterofGod’sactions.TheselevelsoftrustarealreadyhintedatintheseventeenthdiscussionoftheIncoherence.There,intheFirstApproachoftheSecondPosition,inwhichal-Ghazālīaimstopresentoccasionalismasaviableexplanationofphysicalprocesses,hesuggeststhatalleventsintheworldhavealreadybeendeterminedbyGod’sforeknowledge.Insuchanoccasionalistuniverse,propheticalmiraclescanindeedbecreated:GoddisruptsHishabitualcourseofactionandadaptstheknowledgeofthewitnessestoHisdisruptedcourseofaction.Itseemsthatinthisoccasionalistuniverse,Godisnotboundbyanything.Yethereal-Ghazālīthrowsinathought:

Thereis,therefore,nothingthatpreventsathingfrombeingpossiblewithinthecapacitiesofGod[but]thatitwillhavealreadybeenpartofHispriorknowledgethatHewillnotdoit—despiteitbeingpossibleatsomemoments—andthatHewillcreateforustheknowledgethatHedoesnotdoitinthatmoment.63

IfGodhasapre-knowledgeofalleventsthataretobecreatedinthefuture,thatpre-knowledgenotonlylimitshowHewillactuponHiscreationbutalsodeterminesallHisfutureactions.

Theideaofadivineforeknowledgethatdeterminescreationwasexpressedmoststronglyinthegenerationafteral-GhazālīinoneofthecreedsthatIbnTūmarttaughttohisAlmohadfollowers.IbnTūmartfoundeloquentwaysofexpressingGod’spriordeterminationofevents:“Themeansofliving(arzāq)havealreadybeenallocated,theworkshavebeenwrittendown,thenumberofbreathshavebeencounted,andthelifespans(ajāl)havebeendetermined.”64ChaptertwelveinIbnTūmart’sCreedoftheCreator’sDivineUnity(Tawḥīdal-Bāriʾ)isevenmoreexplicit:

Everythingthatisprecededby[God’s]decision(qaḍāʾ)andHisdetermination(qadar)isnecessaryandmustbecomeapparent.Allcreatedthingscomeoutof(ṣādira)HisdecisionandHisdetermination,andtheCreatormakesthemappearaccordingtohowHedeterminedtheminHiseternity(fīazaliyyatihi).[Theyfollowoutofhisdecree]withoutadditionordiminishing,withoutalterationofwhathasbeendetermined,andnochangeofwhathasbeendecided.Hegeneratesthem


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withoutanintermediaryandwithoutbestowingthemtoacause(ʿilla).Hehasnocompanioninhisoriginatingactivity(inshāʾ)andnoassistantinmaking[things]exist(ījād).65

IbnTūmartclearlyimaginesanoccasionalistuniverseinwhichGod“generateswithoutanintermediaryandwithoutbestowing[Hiscreations]toacause”(awjadahālābi-wāsiṭawa-lāli-ʿilla).Yetifallfuturebreathsarecounted,the(p.188) futurecontingenciesinsuchauniversearelimitedtowhatisalreadyknowntoGod.God’seternalforeknowledgehasalreadydeterminedthecourseoftheworld.

ThenotionthatGodknowsfutureeventsappearsalreadyintheQur’an.SeveralversesmentionthatGoddetermineseveryhuman’slifespan(ajal)andtimeofdeath(Q6:2,11:3,14:10,16:61,etc.).Atdeath,GodexecutesHispredetermineddecisionand“callshome”(tawaffā)theperson(Q39:42).Likethetimeofdeath,themeansofliving(or:sustenance,rizq)areallocatedtothehumanindividuals(Q11.6,89:16,13:26).Finallythereisthemoregeneralidea,expressedinverses9:51and57:22oftheQur’an,thatnothingwillhappentohumansthathasnotbeenrecordedbyGod.Inthepropheticalḥadīth,themotifofdivinepredeterminationisevenstrongerthanintheQur’an.Al-Bukhārīdocumentsanumberofversionsofapropheticalsayingthatteachesthatwhilethechildisstillinthewomb,Goddeterminesfourcharacteristicsforhimorher:thesex,theperson’sredemptionorruinintheafterlife,thesustenance(rizq),andthelifespan.66OtherpropheticalḥadīthsreferdirectlytoGod’spre-knowledgeofsomefutureevents.Onepropheticalsayingstates:“FiftythousandyearsbeforeGodcreatedtheheavensandtheearth,Hewrotedownthemeasureofthecreatures(maqādīral-khalāʾiq).”67

Inparticular,thenumerousQur’anicversesonthesetlifespan(ajal)ofahumanhaveproducedmuchtheologicalspeculation.DoesamurderoverrideGod’sdeterminationandcutshorttheappointedlifespanofthevictim,oristhemurdererratherthemeansbywhichGodmakeshisdeterminationcometrue?68Isonlythehumantimeofdeathpredetermined,ordoeseveryeventhaveitspredeterminedtime?Indeed,theQur’andoessaythat“everynationhasitslifespan”(li-kullummaajal,Q7:34).

EarlySunniMuslimtheologycentersonoppositiontoMuʿtazilism,whichstressedhumanfreedomratherthantheinvariablepredeterminationoftheirtimeofdeath.69Sunnitheologians,therefore,founditeasytoacceptpredestinarianpositions.Al-Ashʿarī,forinstance,believedthateverythingthatcomesintobeingisnecessarilythewillofGod;Godnotonlywillsthetimeofaperson’sdeathbutalsothewayitcomesabout.Thesameistrueforaperson’ssustenance(rizq)and—thissubjectbecameconnectedtothisdiscussioninkalāmliterature—theprices(asʿār)ofthings.70Al-Ashʿarī’sunderstandingofGod’sknowledgeclearlyincludesanelementofforeknowledge.Hetaughtthat“Godwillsthecomingintoexistenceofthethingaccordingtohowdivineknowledgeprecedesit(māsabaqabihial-ʿilm);andHewillswhatisknown[toHim]tocomeintoexistence,andwhatfailstobeknown[toHim]nottocomeintoexistence.”71Foral-Ashʿarī,however,thesubjectofdivineforeknowledgeissomewhatofasideissueinthedebatewiththeMuʿtazilaaboutwhetherGodwillstheworld’smischiefandharm(sharr).Fromhisteachingsonothersubjects,itisclearthatal-Ashʿarīdidnotbelieveinauniversal


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predeterminationofeventsrecordedinGod’sforeknowledge.72

TheNishapurianAshʿaritesmakestrongerstatementsaboutGod’sforeknowledge,whichgraduallyleadtowardthedirectionofuniversalpredestination.InhisCreed,al-IsfarāʾīnīrequireshisfollowerstobelievethatGod’s(p.189) knowledge“comprisestheobjectsofknowledgeinawaythatHealwaysknewallofthemincludingtheir(accidental)attributesandtheiressences.”73HiscolleagueʿAbdal-Qāhiral-BaghdādīclarifiestherelationshipbetweenGod’sforeknowledgeandHiswill:whateverGodknowswillhappenisexactlywhatHewillstohappen.God’sknowledgerepresentsthedecisionsofHiswill:“WhateverGodwantstocomeintoexistencewillcomeintoexistenceatthetimethathewantsittohappen(…).”74

ThesubjectofdivineforeknowledgewasnotoneofthemajorthemesinearlyAshʿariteliterature.Theirnotion,however,didattractthecriticismofMuʿtazilitessuchasal-Kaʿbī(d.319/931),whorealizedthatadmittingdivineforeknowledgedestroyshumanfreewillandquestionsGod’sjustice.75Intheearlypartofthefifth/eleventhcentury,hisMuʿtazilitecolleagueAbūl-Ḥusaynal-BaṣrīarguedagainstthedeterminismofSunnitheologians.Thesetheologians—mostprobablyAshʿarites—arequotedassaying,“Whatthedivineknowledgeknowswilloccurcannotpossiblynotoccur,”and“thedivineknowledgethatathingwillnotexistnecessitatesthatitwillnotexist.”76Abūl-Ḥusaynal-Baṣrī’slengthyrefutationindicatesthatthispositionwasthesubjectofalivelydebatebetweentheAshʿaritesandtheirMuʿtaziliteadversaries.

BecauseknowledgeisoneofthedivineattributesthatresidesinHisessence,allAshʿaritesmakethestatementthatGod’sknowledgeexistsfrompasteternity(qadīm)whilehumanknowledgeisgeneratedintime.77Al-Juwaynīdrawsthefullconsequencesofthisstatement.HispositionondivineknowledgeappearstorespondtoMuʿtaziliteandphilosophicalobjections.AvicennapostulatedthatifGod’sknowledgeispre-eternal,(qadīm),itcannotsimplychangewitheachnewcreation.78Al-Juwaynīagrees,teachingthatchangingknowledgeisacharacteristicofhumans,whoseknowledgeadaptstoachangingreality.Toassume,however,thatGod’sknowledgeoftheworldislikehumanknowledgeandcontains“cognitions”or“piecesofknowledge”(ʿulūm)thatgenerateintime(ḥāditha)isimplausible.ItalsoviolatestheconsensusoftheMuslimscholars,al-Juwaynīsays,evenamountingtoleavingIslam.79Thepre-eternalcharacterofGod’sknowledgeimpliesthatGod’sknowledgeneverchanges.Itcontainsallfutureobjectsofknowledge,includingthe“time”whentheywillberealized.

Anadversarymaycomeandsay,al-Juwaynīassumes,thatinHiseternity(fīazalihi),Godhadtheknowledgethattheworldwillonedaybecreated.Oncetheworldhasbeencreatedandcontinuestoexist,therewasanewanddifferentobjectofknowledge.TheopponentholdsthatGod’sknowledgeandawarenessoftheexistenceoftheworldhasadaptedtothisnewreality.Thisopponentmaintainsthattherearenewcognitions(ʿulūm)inGod’sknowledgeeverytimethereischange.Al-Juwaynīcategoricallyrejectsthislineofthinking:

Wesay:TheCreatordoesnotacquireanewawareness(ḥukm)thatdidnotexist


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before.Therearenosuccessive“states”(aḥwāl)forHimbecausethesuccessionofstateswouldimplyforHimwhatisimpliedbythesuccessionofaccidentsinabody.TheCreatorisqualifiedashavingonlyonesingleknowledgethatextendstoeternityin(p.190) thepastandinthefuture.ThisknowledgenecessitatesforHimanawarenessthatencompassesallobjectsofknowledgewithalltheirdetails.TheCreator’sknowledgedoesnotincreaseinnumberwhentheobjectsofknowledgebecomemore.[Thisisnotlikeinthecaseof]thosecognitionsthatcomeaboutintime,whichbecomemorenumerouswhentheobjectsofknowledgebecomemorenumerous.TheCreator’sknowledgedoesnotbecomemorenumerouswhentherearemoreobjectsofknowledgeandequallyitdoesnotbecomenewwhentheybecomenew.80

WhensomeonelearnsthatZaydwillarrivetomorrow,al-Juwaynīexplains,hedoesnotrequireanewcognitionaboutZayd’sarrivaloncehehasarrived.Heknewthatallalong,strictlyspeaking.TheuncertaintyofZayd’sactionpriortoitsactualization,however,requiresushumanstoformanewcognitiononceZaydhasarrived.InGod’sknowledgeofHisownactions,however,thereisnosuchuncertainty.KnowingthatZaydwillarriveatacertaintimeisidenticaltoknowingtherealizationofthisevent;nomodificationofGod’sknowledgeisneededwhentheeventisactualized.

Accordingtoal-Juwaynī,God’sknowledgeoftheworldistimeless.Itcontainsa“before”and“after”butdoesnotfollowthecourseofeventsaccordingtothepatternsofpast,present,andfuture.Thoseeventsthatarecurrentlyinthepastaretoberealizedbeforethosethatarecurrentlyinthefuture.Godknowspreciselythesuccessionofevents.Heknowswhathashappenedinthepast,justasHeknows—withthesameamountofdetail—whatwillhappeninthefuture.Hisknowledgeexistsinatimelessrealm—“inHiseternity,”asal-JuwaynīandIbnTūmartsay—outsideourhumancategoriesofpastandfuture.SincetherearenoobstaclestowhateverGodwills,HisknowledgeistheresultofHiswill.Thetwoare,however,notidentical,nordoesGod’sknowledgedetermineHiswill.God’swillandHisknowledgedonotconsistofsmallerunitsthatcouldbecalledvolitionsorcognitions.Godhasoneeternalwillaswellasoneeternalknowledge.81

DivineForeknowledgeintheRevivalofReligiousSciencesAl-Ghazālīsubscribedtoal-Juwaynī’sunderstandingofGod’sknowledgeassingleandall-encompassing.InapassagethatappearsintheBookoftheFortyandintheshortcreedatthebeginningofthesecondbookintheRevival,al-GhazālīusescolorfullanguagetoillustratethatGodknowseveryspeckontheearthandintheheavens(cf.Q10:61):

InthedarkestnightGodknowsthecrawlingofthepantheronthesolidrockandHesensesthemovementofthedust-motesintheair.Heknowswhatishiddenandwhatisapparent.Heisawareoftheinnermostthoughts,themovementofideas,andthesecretfearsthroughaknowledgethatispre-eternal(qadīm)andeverlasting(p.191) (azalī)andHewillcontinuetobecharacterizedbythisknowledgeinalleternity.Hisknowledgeisnotrenewedandinitsessencedoesnotadapttotheundoing[ofearlierarrangements]ortorelocation.82


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IfGod’sknowledgeisnotrenewedbythechangingofevents,itfollowsthatithasadetailedanddeterminingforeknowledgeofthefuture.Intheseveralcreedsthatal-Ghazālīwroteduringhislifetime,hewassomewhatcarefulnottomentiontooopenlythatGodpredeterminesallfutureevents.HeisprobablymostexplicitinabrieflistofarticlesoffaithatthebeginningofthesecondbookinhisRevival.There,hesays:

God’swillisaneternalattributethatHehas,whichsubsists(qāʾima)withinHisessence(dhāt)asoneofHisattributes.ByvirtueofitHeiscontinuouslydescribedassomeonewhowillsinHiseternity(fīazalihi)theexistenceofthethingsintheirmoments(fīawqātihā)thatHehasdetermined.TheyexistintheirmomentsasHewillsitinHiseternitywithoutoneofthemcomingbeforeorafter[Hewillsit].Rather,theyoccurinaccordancewithHisknowledgeandHiswillwithoutchangeoralteration(minghayrtabaddulwa-lātaghayyur).Hehasarranged(dabbara)thethingsnotbymeansofasequenceofthoughts[thatHehas]andnordoesHewaitfora[specific]time.Therefore,onethingdoesnotdistractHimfromanother.83

ThispassageseemstohavebeenoneoftheinspirationsforIbnTūmart’screed.

Yet,althoughal-Ghazālīrequiresbeliefindivineforeknowledge,hedoesnotexplicitlysaythatGod’swill“inHiseternity”predeterminesfutureeventsinthisworld,suchasthenumberofbreathsthatahumanwilltakeduringhisorherlifetime.InhisLetterforJerusalem,whichfollowsafewpagesafterthispassage,heisevenlessexplicitonthissubject.Ondivineknowledge,hejustsaysthatGod’suniversalknowledgeisevidentinthedetailedarrangement(tartīb)ofeventhesmallestthingsincreation.Godpavestheway(raṣṣafa)fortheexistenceofeverything.84Hethenslipsintoanelaborateargumenttakenfromoneofal-Juwaynī’swritings.Al-Ghazālī’smasterissaidtohaveusedit,accordingtoal-Murtaḍāal-Zabīdī,againsttheMuʿtaziliteal-Kaʿbī.Al-KaʿbīclaimedthatifGodhadadetailedforeknowledgeoffutureevents,itwouldmakeHiswillredundant.Al-Ghazālīthenreproducesal-Juwaynī’srebuttal,targetingal-Kaʿbī’saccusationthatfortheAshʿaritesGod’sknowledgeisthesameasHiswill.Al-Ghazālī’scounterargumentdeniesal-Kaʿbī’shypothesisthatathingcomesintobeingatthetimewhenGod’sforeknowledgeforeseesit,ratherthanatthetimewhenHiswillwilledit.Ifthathypothesisweretrue,al-Ghazālīresponds,onecouldalsosaythatGod’sforeknowledgewouldmakeHispowerredundantwereHetoforeseesomethingbeforeenactingit.Rather,al-GhazālīaimstocorrectthisperceptionbysayingthatwhereasGod’spowerencompassesallpossiblecreations,HiswilldirectsHispowertoenactoneofthepossibleactionsandpreventsthealternativesfromhappening.85Inthe(p.192) Revival,however,hefailstoclarifytheroleofdivineforeknowledgeinthisprocess.HecoversthissubjectinTheBalancedBookonWhat-to-BelieveinalongchapteraboutGod’swillanditsrelationshiptoHisomnipotenceandHisforeknowledge.86Thereheaddsthatdivineforeknowledgeisnotsufficienttoreplacethewill,because“divineknowledgefollowsthatwhatisknown”(al-ʿilmyatbaʿual-maʿlūm),meaningthatthedecisionsofthedivinewilldeterminethecontentsofthedivineknowledge.“Whatisknown”(al-maʿlūm)tothedivineknowledgearethedivineactsthatGod’swillhaschosentoactualizefromamongalltheactspossibleforGod’spower.Theforeknowledgedoesnotaffectthisdecision.Thedivineattributeof


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willdecidesamongequallypossiblealternatives.Theattributeofknowledgeistrueto(ḥaqqa)thedivinewillandtakesaccountofthisdecision;al-Ghazālīsaysit“attachesitself”(yataʿallaqubi-)tothedecision.87

Althoughal-GhazālīdiscussessomeofthedoctrinalproblemsofdivineforeknowledgeinhiskalāmtextbookandinthesecondbookoftheRevivalonthecreedofIslam,hehardlyeverexplainsitspracticalconsequencesforsuchsubjectsascosmologyorhumanactions.88ThisisparticularlytrueoftheotherbooksoftheRevivalthatareconcernedwithrectifyinghumanactions(muʿāmalāt),inwhichdivineforeknowledgeisonlymentionedinbriefreferences.DivinepredestinationandforeknowledgearevariouslyreferredtoasGod’s“eternalpower”(al-qudraal-azaliyya),God’s“eternaljudgment”(ḥukmazalī),orGod’s“eternalwill”(irādaazaliyya),89yetitisneverexplainedwhatthe“eternal”standsforandwhatimplicationithasonGod’screation.Thereasonforal-Ghazālī’sreluctancetogivehisreadersadetailedaccountofGod’sforeknowledgeisdidactic.Ifhalf-educatedpeoplearetoldthatGodknowsthefuture,theymaydrawfalseconclusions,declinetohandletheiraffairs,andfallintoafatalisticapathy.Al-GhazālīexpressesthisdangerinseveralpassagesoftheRevival;wishingtoguidehisreaderstogoodaction,hestressesthatGodwillbepleasedbysomeoftheiractionswhiledetestingothers.HisreadersareexhortedonlytoperformthoseactionsthatwillpleaseGodandgainthemafterlife’sreward.

Thehuman’schoicestandsinanobviousconflictwithGod’spredestination.Inatleasttwopassages,al-Ghazālītriestoresolvethisconflict,aswewillseebelow.Invariousotherplaces,however,al-Ghazālīsimplyrejectsanydiscussionofthisconflict.HepresentstheprobleminthefamiliarterminologyofGod’sdecision(qaḍāʾ)andHisdetermination(qadar).Intheologicaldiscussions,bothtermsrefertoGod’spredeterminingfutureevents.90Thesubjectofdivinepredestinationappearsseveraltimesinthethirty-secondbookofhisRevival,inthediscussionsofthehuman’spatienceandhisorherthankfulnesstoGod.Yetal-GhazālītriestoavoidcandidstatementsaboutGod’sall-encompassingpredestination,severaltimesshunninghisinquisitivereadersforquestioningGod’spredeterminationofthefuture:

AcceptGod’sactions(ādāb)andstaycalm!Andwhenthepredestination(qadar)ismentioned,bequite!Thewallshaveearsandpeoplewhohaveaweakunderstandingsurroundyou.Walkalong(p.193) thepathoftheweakestamongyou.Anddonottakeawaytheveilfromthesuninfrontofbatsbecausethatwouldbethecauseoftheirruin.91

“Divulgingthesecretofpredestination”(ifshāʾsirral-qadar)issimplynotallowed.92ItisbesttobesilentonthissubjectandfollowtheexampleoftheProphetwho,accordingtoal-Ghazālī,said:“PredestinationisGod’ssecret,sodonotdivulgeit!”93Infact,thosewhohaveinsightsay:“DivulgingthesecretofGod’slordshipisunbelief.”94Attimes,however,al-Ghazālīhimselfcomesclosetodisregardingthisadvice.Whenhediscussesdivinepredestination,however,helimitshimselftosayingthatGodwillsallhumanactions,thosethatpleaseHimaswellasthosethatHedetests,andthatHecreatesboththegoodandthebadhumanactions.ThisdistinctionisdirectedagainsttheMuʿtazilite


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positionthatGodcannotwillmorallybadactions.Al-Ghazālīleavesnodoubt,however,thatalthoughGodcreatesalleventsintheworld,thechoicebetweengoodandbadactionsislefttohumans,whoareallresponsibleforwhattheydo.

DivineforeknowledgeandGod’sall-encompassingpredeterminationareimportantpartsofal-Ghazālī’scosmologyandhisethics.95UnderstandingthatGodhassuchpre-knowledgerepresentsahigherdegreeoftrustinGodthanrelyingonconclusionsdrawnfromGod’shabits.ThishighertrustinGodiscloselylinkedtotheproperunderstandingofdivineunity(tawḥīd).Indeed,advancingtothehigherstagesoftawḥīdistherootthathelpsonedevelopthissuperiortrustinGod.AcquiringacorrectunderstandingofGod’sunityandthusadeeptrustinGodrepresentstheknowledge—beliefintheheart(taṣdīqbi-l-qalb)istantamounttoknowledge—thatwillleadtogoodandvirtuousactions.96

Al-Ghazālī’sethicsinhisRevivalispremisedbythethoughtthatGod’swillaswellasHisknowledgearepre-eternal(azalī)andhaveexistedlongbeforecreationbegan.Theyincludethefirsteventofcreationaswellasthelast.Godalreadyknowswhetherthecrawlingpantherwillcatchhisprey,andHeknowswhichdirectioneachspeckofdustwilltakeinthewind.Mostimportant,ifGod’sknowledgeissingleandunique,itwillalsoneverchange.Theconceptofanunchangingdivineforeknowledgehassignificantrepercussionsforanoccasionalistviewofcreation.Goddoesnotmakeadhocdecisionsaboutwhattocreatenext;HisdecisionshavealreadybeenmadelongbeforeHestartedacting.Inaddition,God’sdecisionsarerecordedinoneofHisloftiestcreations.Allpastandfutureeventsarecontainedinthe“well-guardedtablet”(al-lawḥal-maḥfūẓ)thatsitsinaheavenlyrealm.97Foral-Ghazālī,thetablet,whichismentionedinverse85:22oftheQur’an,representsablueprintofGod’screationandrecordshumanactionsaswellasallothercreatedevents.98AdivinepenhaswrittenGod’splanforHiscreationontothistablet.InhisDecisiveCriterion,al-Ghazālīquotesacanonicalḥadīththatidentifiesthispen,whichappearsintwoenigmaticreferencesintheQur’an(68:1,96:4),asGod’sfirstcreation.99

Theviewthatthewell-guardedtabletholdsthedetaileddraftforGod’screationiswidespreadinphilosophicalliterature.InAvicenna’sThronePhilosophy(al-Ḥikmaal-ʿarshiyya),“thewell-guardedtablet”isreadasaQur’anicreferencetotwodifferentbeings:thehighestcreatedbeingaswellastheactive(p.194) intellect,bothareintellectsintheheavenlyrealm.InthesixteenthdiscussionofhisIncoherence,al-Ghazālīreportsthephilosophicalteachingthatthewell-guardedtabletisaQur’anicreferencetotheactiveintellect.Therehecriticizesthiselementofthefalāsifa’steachingasunprovenandbemoansthatthepeopleofreligion(ahlal-sharʿ)donotunderstandthewell-guardedtabletinthisway.100Yetthereportedpositionsonthewell-guardedtabletarenotatallcontroversial,norwasal-Ghazālī’sownviewsignificantlydifferent.Helaterreferstoanimportantelementofthephilosophers’teachingsthattouchesonthesubjectofthewell-guardedtablet.InhisRevival,heexplainspropheticaldivinationasacontactbetweenthemindsoftheprophetsandthewell-guardedtablet,whichherefunctionsequivalentlytothefalāsifa’sactiveintellect.101Sometimesnormalpeopleachievesuchacontactintheirdreams,whichmayleadtothephenomenonthatwetodaycalldéjàvu.


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Forsometimeafterthisdreamtimecontactwiththeactiveintellect,oneremembersthefutureeventsonehasseenthere,andwhensuchaneventoccurs,onegetstheimpressionthatithashappenedforthesecondtime.Prophetsachievesuchacontactandexperienceoffutureeventswhiletheyareawake.Inotherwords,theprophetscan“read”futureeventsonthewell-guardedtablet,andtheyreportthesefutureeventstotheirfollowers.102

Whenal-Ghazālīexpoundsthisviewinthetwenty-firstbookofhisRevival,hedescribesthewell-guardedtabletasthatthing“whichisinscribedwitheverythingthatGodhasdecideduponuntiltheDayofJudgment.”103Here“thewell-guardedtablet”doesnotrefertotheactiveintellectbutrathertoGod’sfirstcreation,whichismuchhigherinthecelestialhierarchyofintellects.ThesamecategorizationappliestoapassageintheBookoftheFortyinwhichal-Ghazālīquotesapprovinglythepositionofanunnamedscholarassayingthat“[God’s]decision(qaḍāʾ)meansthatallbeingsexistonthewell-guardedtablet,bothinageneralwayaswellasin[their]details.”104Inal-Ghazālī’sthought,justasinAvicenna’sThronePhilosophy,“thewell-guardedtablet”referstoboththefirstcreationaswellastheactiveintellect,withoutclearlydistinguishingbetweenthesetwo.

God’sunchangingforeknowledgeturnsanoccasionalistexplanationoftheworldintoonethatfulfillsallthefivecriteriaoutlinedearlierinthischapter.ThehabitualcharacterofGod’screationsisnolongerunderstoodasamereroutineofGodthatHemaypracticeonanadhocbasis.Rather,God’shabitsareinscribedinHisforeknowledge.ThecontingentcorrelationsthatweexperienceinGod’suniversearethenecessaryresultsofacoherentandcomprehensiveplanofcreationthatexistsfrometernity.

PropheticalMiraclesandtheUnchangingNatureofGod’sHabitAl-Ghazālī’soccasionalistexplanationoftheuniverseincludestheconvictionthatGod’sdecisionsfollowahabitinscribedinatimelessdivineforeknowledge.ButhowstrictisGod’scommitmenttoHishabit?DoesHeeverbreakit?IntheIncoherence,al-GhazālīarguesthatthepossibilityofabreakinGod’s(p.195) habitshouldleadustoacknowledgethattheconnectionsbetweenwhatwecallcausesandtheireffectsarenotnecessary.DoesGodeveractualizethispossibility?AccordingtotheclassicalAshʿariteview,propheticalmiraclesarebreaksinGod’shabit.GiventhatthenaturalscientiststudiesthelawfulnessofGod’shabits,wouldpropheticalmiraclesnotspoilhisorherefforts?

ClassicalAshʿarismhadalreadydevelopedananswertothisproblem.Theeffectofapropheticalmiracledependsonthosewitnessingitknowingittobeamiracle.TheymustbemadeawarethatwhattheyhavewitnessedisabreakinGod’shabit.105ClassicalAshʿaritetheologyrecognizedseveralconditionsforpropheticalmiraclesthataimatmakingprioridentificationsofmiracles.Accordingtoal-Ashʿarī,atrueprophetmustannounceanddescribethemiraclethatGodwillperform.Hemustissueanannouncement(daʿwa)thatGodwillperformamiracleandachallenge(taḥaddin)tothosetowhomheissent.Muḥammad,forinstance,issuedachallengetohisadversarieswhenhedaredthemtoproduceasinglesuralikethosecontainedintheQur’an(Q2:23,10:38).Inorderforthemiracletobevalidandacceptabletohisaudience,Godmust


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performitexactlythewaytheprophetearlierdescribesit.106

Al-Juwaynīgivesadetaileddescriptionoftheconditionsthatarenecessaryinordertoacceptamiracle.Theyincludetheprophet’sannouncementandhischallengetothosewhodoubthisprophecy.Thegoalofthesestrictconditionswastodistinguishapropheticalmiraclebothfromsimplemarvelsandfromsorcery.GiventhatinclassicalAshʿarism,themiracleisconsideredtheonlywaytoverifyprophecy,muchwasatstake.Theauthorityofrevelationandwithittheexistenceofrevealedreligionrestedontheproperidentificationofthepropheticalmiracleandonitsdistinctionfrommerecoincidenceormagic.107

OtherthaninhisIncoherence,al-GhazālīwritesafewtimesaboutpropheticalmiraclesintraditionalAshʿariteterms.108Unlikehismasteral-Juwaynī,however,hedoesnotwriteabouttheconditionsofthemiracleanddoesnotsay,forinstance,thatamiraclemustbeprecededbyachallenge.Thisisbecause,unlikehispredecessorsintheAshʿariteschool,henolongerbelievesthatmiraclesaretheonlyway,orevenagoodway,toverifytheclaimsofaprophet.Al-Ghazālībelievedthatmiraclescouldnotbecrediblydistinguishedfrommarvelsandsorcery.Inhisautobiography,hediscussesthecaseofsomeoneclaimingtobeaprophetwhenheperformsoneofthepropheticalmiraclesthat,accordingtotheMuslimtradition,confirmedtheprophecyofJesus.TheQur’anreportsthatJesusrevivedthedead(Q3.39,5.110),mirroringchapterelevenintheGospelofJohndescribingJesus’revivingLazarusfromhisgrave.Let’sassume,saysal-Ghazālī,thatsomeonecomesalongwhopretendstodothesameandheannouncestheperformanceofthismiracleinadvance—justasearlierAshʿaritesrequiredhimtodo.Evenifheannouncesandsuccessfullyperformstherevivicationofanapparentlydeadperson,thatwouldnot,accordingtoal-Ghazālī,provehisstatusasaprophet.Al-GhazālījustifieshispositionbecausethemiracleofrevivingthedeaddidnotcreatecertainknowledgeofJesus’prophecy.CertainknowledgeaboutJesus’prophecyisgainedthroughothermeans.Oneshouldnotacceptpeople’sclaimstoprophecyjustonthe(p.196) basesofso-calledmiracles.Speakingtothosewhowouldfollowapretenderpurelyonthebasesofhisso-calledmiracles,al-Ghazālīsays:

Let’sassumethatyourImampointsouttomethemiracleofJesus,peacebeuponhim,andsays:“Iwillreviveyourfather,andthatshallbetheproofformesayingthetruth.”Thenheactuallyreviveshimandexplainstomethatheistruly[aprophet].Yet,howdoIknowthathespeaksthetruth?Notallpeoplegainedknowledgethroughthemiracle[ofrevivingaman]thatJesus,peacebeuponhim,spokethetruth.Rather,thematterwasbesetwithquestionsanduncertaintiesthatcanonlybeansweredbysubtleintellectualreasoning.(…)Thatthemiraclepointstowardstheveracity[ofhimwhoperformsit]cannotbeacceptedunlessonealsoaccepts[theexistenceof]sorcery(siḥr)andknowshowtodistinguishitfromamiracle,andunlessoneacknowledgesthatGoddoesn’tleadhumansastray.ItiswellknownthatthequestionofwhetherornotGodleadsusastrayisquitedifficulttoanswer.109


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Ifpropheticalmiraclesweretocreatedefiniteknowledgeabouttheclaimsofprophets,therewouldbenodisagreementsamonghumansastowhoisaprophet.JesusdidreviveLazarus,yettheJewsstilldidnotaccepthisprophecy.TheQurʾan(Q5.110)statesthattheunbelieversamongtheChildrenofIsraelconsideredallmiraclesperformedbyJesustobemeresorcery(siḥr).Thisisduetoitbeingnearlyimpossible,al-Ghazālīimplies,todistinguishapropheticalmiraclefromsorcery.WhileGodcreatestheformertoguidepeopletohisrevelation,Healsochoosestocreatethelattertoconfuseandmisguidepeople.Humansarenotgiventhefaculty,sogoestheimplication,toclearlydistinguishbetweenthetwo.

Inaddition,thereistheproblemthatonlyalimitednumberofpeoplewouldpersonallywitnessthemiracle,andallotherhumanswouldhavetobelievetheviewers’judgmentthatthemiraclewasindeednotsorcery.Thus,whendecidingwhetheraneventoratextistrulyadivinerevelation,humanscanonlypracticetaqlīd;theymustacceptthepositionsofotherpeopleuncritically.Thisisquiteahorriblethoughtforal-Ghazālī.Inaddition,furthergenerationsmustverifythereportsaboutthemiracleandthejudgmentsofitswitnessesthroughimpeccablechainsoftransmission(tawātur).Thiscreatesanewsourceoferror.Al-Ghazālīwasquiteskepticalaboutthevalueoftawātur.Muḥammad’sallegedappointmentofʿAlīatGhadīrKhummisanexampleofaneventthatneverhappened,accordingtoal-Ghazālī,yetmanyintheShiitecommunitystilltrustitsveracitybecauseofitssupposedlyimpeccablechainsoftransmission.IfsuchalargegroupofMuslimsacceptsthehistoricityofapasteventthatneveractuallytookplace,nocommunitycanbeimmunetoerrorinmattersoftawātur110.

IntheDelivererfromError,al-Ghazālīsaysthatonlyatanadvancedstageofhisspiritualandintellectualdevelopmentdidherealizethatmiraclesarenotthebestwayofverifyingprophecy.AfterreadingSufiworks,heunderstood(p.197) theretobeawayofdistinguishingthetrueprophetfromthefalsepretenderwithoutrequiringrecoursetoapropheticalmiracle.Prophetscreatethroughtheirteachingsandtheirrevelationseffectsinthesoulsofthosewhowitnesstheirprophecy.IntheBookofForty,al-Ghazālīdescribestheoutwardeffect(athar)thatrecitingtheQur’ancanhave:weeping,breakingintosweat,shivering,gettinggoosebumps,quivering,andsoforth.111Thesephysicalmanifestationswillinspirereflectiononone’sdeeds.Thedirectexperience(dhawq)oftheprophet’spositiveeffectsonone’ssoulisthebestindicatorforthetruthofhismission.Thismethodisquitesimilartohowwedistinguishatruephysicianfromacharlatanoratruelegalscholarfromsomeonewhoonlyclaimstobethat.Inallthesecaseswelookatthepeople’swork.Doesthephysicianhealthesick?Doesthelegalscholarsolvelegalproblems?Iftheanswersarepositive,weaccepttheirclaims.Thesameshouldbetruefortheprophets,whoaretermedphysiciansofthesoul.112Ifwefeelthepositiveeffectsofaprophet’sworkonoursouls,weknowthatwearedealingwithatrueprophet.113ThismethodissuperiortothoseoftheearlierAshʿarites:

Seekcertainknowledgeaboutprophecyfromthismethodandnotfromtheturningofastickintoaserpentorfromthesplittingofthemoon.Forifyouconsiderthateventbyitself,anddonotincludethemanycircumstancesthataccompanythis


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eventyoumaythinkthatitissorcery(siḥr)andimagination(taḥyīl).(…)114

Therearecertainproblems(asʾila)withpropheticalmiracles,al-Ghazālīsayslaterinthispassage.TheclassicalAshʿariteargumentthatamiracleisasignforprophecycaneasilybecounteredbyarguments“abouttheproblematicanddoubtfulnatureofthemiracle.”115Themiracleisonlyoneofmanyindicationsoftrueprophecy,al-Ghazālīsayscautiously.ThispositionmayhaveresultedfromhisreflectionsonmiraclesintheseventeenthdiscussionoftheIncoherence.ItisquiteclearlyexpressedinhisRevival.Here,al-GhazālīsaysthatMosesgainedmanyfollowersbychangingastickintoaserpent.Yetthesesamepeoplelaterfollowedthefalseprophet,“theSamaritan”(al-Sāmirī),whenhemadethembuildthegoldencalfwhileMoseswasonMountSinai:“Everyonewhobecameabelieverbyseeingasnakeinadvertentlybecameanunbelieverwhenhesawacalf.”116Formostpeople,miraclesareindistinguishablefromsorceryandcannotserveasdistinctivemarkersforprophecy.Avicennahadtaughtthatpropheticalmiraclesandsorceryresultfromthesamefaculty(quwwa)ofthehumansoul.Theprophetappliesthiscapacitywithgoodintentions,whilethesorcerer(al-sāḥir)appliesitwithbadones.Sorcererandprophet,however,havethesamekindofstrongsoulthatcanaffecttheirsurroundingsandmakeotherbodiesdotheirbidding.117Theessentialsimilaritybetweenpropheticalmiraclesandsorceryisduetotheirorigininthesamefaculty(quwwa)oftheprophet’sandthesorcerer’ssouls.Thissharedoriginmakesthetwoeventspracticallyindistinguishable.Becauseofthisessentialsimilarity,al-Ghazālīrejectedmiraclesasameanstoverifyprophecy,andthusheneverdiscussedtheconditionsofpropheticalmiraclesinhiswriting.Yethe(p.198) nowheredeniesthatprophetsperformmiraclesanddoesacknowledgethosethatarementionedinrevelation.

Al-Ghazālī’sviewastowhatcountsasapropheticalmiraclealsodifferedmarkedlyfromhisAshʿaritepredecessors’views.Inadditiontodenyingthatmiraclesaresufficientlydistinguishablefrommarvelsandsorcery,healsorejectedthepositionthattheymustbeabreakinGod’shabit.Thisdirectionofthoughtagainhasitsrootsinal-Juwaynī.Accordingtoal-Ashʿarī,amiracleisdefinedas“abreakin[God’s]habitthatisassociatedwithachallengewhichremainsunopposed.”118AlthoughhequotesthetraditionalAshʿaritepositionthatpropheticmiraclesandthewonders(karamāt)performedbysomeextraordinarypiouspeople(awliyāʾ)are“abreakinthehabit”(inkhirāqal-‘āda),al-Juwaynī’sownpositionseemstohavebeenmorecomplex.AbreakinGod’shabitisindeeda“sign”(āya)thatcanverifyaprophet’sauthenticity.Themiracle,however,whichal-Juwaynīseesastheonlymeansofverifyingprophecy,isnolongerdescribedasabreakinGod’shabitbutmerelyastheincapacityoftheopponentstorespondtotheprophet’schallenge.119

ApartfromwhathewritesintheIncoherence,thereisnoindicationthatal-GhazālīeverbelievedthatmiraclesareabreakinGod’shabit.InhisBalancedBook,hesaysthatthebelievercomestotrusttheprophet’sveracity“throughstrangethingsandwondrousactionsthatbreakthehabits.”120“Habits”(ʿādāt)—inplural—seemstorefertothecustomsofpersonsorofthingsinthisworld,includingthehabitsoftheprophets,ratherthantoGod’shabit.Forexample,whenthestickisturnedintoaserpent,thehabitual


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behaviorofthestickisbrokenalthoughGodhadnotchangedHishabit.Thisusageoftheword“habit”(ʿāda)isalreadypresentintheIncoherence,inwhichthefalāsifa’spositionthattheprophethasamorepowerfulpracticalfacultyinhissoulisdescribedas“thespecialcharacter[oftheprophet]differsfromthehabitofthepeople(tukhālifuʿādatal-nās).”121

Thereareclearindicationsthatal-Ghazālībelievedthatalthough“miracles”areextraordinaryandoftenmarvelousevents,theydonotrequireGodtobreakHiscustomaryhabit—thelawsofnature.Inthethirty-firstbookofhisRevival,al-GhazālīsaysthatGodcreatesallthingsoneafterthenextinanorderlymanner.AftermakingclearthatthisorderrepresentsGod’shabit(sunna),hequotestheQur’an:“YouwillnotfindanychangeinGod’shabit.”122ThissentenceisquotedseveraltimesintheRevival;inonepassage,al-GhazālīaddsthatweshouldnotthinkthatGodwouldeverchangehishabit(sunna).123Theimplicationisclear:sinceGodneverchangesHishabit,thepropheticalmiraclecannotbeabreakinHishabit.ItismerelyanextraordinaryoccurrencethattakesplacewithinthesystemofthestrictlyhabitualoperationofGod’sactions.MiraclesareprogrammedintoGod’splanforHiscreationfromtheverybeginning,sotospeak,andtheydonotrepresentadirectinterventionorasuspensionofGod’slawfulactions.124Ifthiswasal-Ghazālī’spositionaboutpropheticalmiracles,andIamquiteconvincedthatitwas,henowherestatesitexplicitlyinanyofthecoreworksoftheGhazaliancorpus.Here,theSecondApproachoftheSecondPositionoftheseventeenthdiscussionoftheIncoherenceremainsoneofthemoreexplicitexpressionsofthisview.125

(p.199) Thosewhostudiedwithal-Ghazālīorwhoreadhisworkscarefullycertainlyunderstoodtherevolutionarycharacterofhisteachingsonpropheticalmiracles.IbnGhaylān,theGhazalianfromBalkh,reportswithsomebewildermentthatal-Ghazālīdidnotopposethefalāsifaintheirteachingsonprophecyandpropheticalmiracles.126Al-Ghazālī’sadversariesweremoreoutspoken.Inhiswidelyknownepistleonwhytheburningofal-Ghazālī’sRevivalinal-Andaluswasjustified,al-Ṭurṭūshīcomplainsthatregardingprophecy,al-GhazālīadoptedtheteachingsofthefalāsifaandparticularlythoseoftheBrethrenofPurity(Ikhwānal-ṣafāʾ).Thesephilosophersteach,al-Ṭurṭūshīcontinues,thatGoddoesnotsendprophets;rather,thosewhodevelopextraordinarilyvirtuouscharactertraitsacquire(iktasaba)prophecy.Al-ṬurṭūshīisnotentirelycorrectinhischaracterizationoftheBrethrenofPurity.Heismorecorrectwhenhesaysthatthefalāsifateachthatsomepropheticalmiraclesarerusesandtrickery(ḥiyalwa-makhārīq)andthatal-Ghazālīagreedwiththemonthispoint.127Al-ṬurṭūshīwasinclosecontactwithAbūBakribnal-ʿArabiandmaybewithotherstudentsofal-Ghazālī.

ForAvicenna,propheticalinsightiscausedbytheextraordinarycharactertraitsofthosewhobecomeprophets.Prophecyislinkedtonormalhumanpsychology,andalthoughitisrare,itisindeedapartofthenormalcourseofnature.TheoriginsofAvicenna’steachingsonprophecy—andsubsequentlymuchofwhatwefindinal-Ghazālī’spsychology—lieintheworksofAristotleandhisNeoplatonicinterpretors,mostprominentlyal-Fārābī.128AlthoughtheBrethrenofPuritysharedtheNeoplatonicorigins


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ofal-Fārābī’sandAvicenna’steachings,theirpresentationofpsychologyandprophecyislessdetailedandwelldeveloped.129Avicenna’sdetailedexplanationofprophecycertainlyinfluencesal-Ghazālī’sunderstanding,andhedoesreproducemanyofitsfeatures.130FuturestudiesmustdecidewhethertheBrethren’spsychologyalsosignificantlyinfluencedal-Ghazālī,orwhethertheconnectionbetweenthetwomerelyresultedfromparallelmethodsofteachingthatareonlyroughlysimilar.

Itistrue,however,thattheBrethren’sworkexpressescertainmysticalnotionsthatalsoappearinal-Ghazālībutareexplicitlyexpressedneitherbyal-FārābīnorbyAvicenna.Particularlyregardingtheinspirationthat“friendsofGod”(awliyāʾAllāh)receive—knowledgesimilartorevelationbutatalowerlevel—theBrethren’sideasarereminiscentofSuficoncepts.131TheBrethren,forinstance,stressthatreceivinginspiration(ilhām)andrevelation(waḥy)requirethesoul’spurificationfromthepollutionsofthenaturalworld—amotifprominentlyexpressedbyal-GhazālīinhislettertoAbūBakribnal-ʿArabī.132Ingeneral,thepresentationofprophecyintheBrethren’sEpistlesshowscloserconnectionsamongphilosophicalteachings,Muslimreligiousdiscourse,andQur’anicpassagesthanweseeinal-Fārābī’sandAvicenna’smoretheoreticaltreatmentsofprophecy.UnlikethetwoAristotelians,whoonlyoccasionallybacktheirteachingswithanexegesisofversesinrevelation,theBrethrenfrequentlyengageinfigurativeinterpretationsofQur’anicverses.Al-Ghazālīwasinspiredbysomeoftheirsuggestions.133Amongreligiousintellectuals,theBrethren’scloseassociationwithQur’anicmotifsmayhavecreatedmoreinterestintheirworkthaninal-Fārābī’sandAvicenna’swork.This,inturn,would(p.200) maketheBrethrenofPurity’sworkmorethreateningtoal-Ghazālī’sconservativeopponentssuchasal-Ṭurṭūshī.Ashedoesinhisdiscussionoflogics,al-GhazālīreplacedsomeofthetechnicallanguageinthepsychologyofAvicennawithwordsmorefamiliartoreligiousscholarsthatconnectmoreseamlesslytomotifsintheQur’an.BorrowingfromQ38:72,al-Ghazālīfrequentlyusestheword“spirit”(rūḥ),whereAvicennawouldhaveusedtheterm“intellect”(ʿaql).134Thisusagemayhavemadeal-Ghazālī’spsychologicalteachingsseemclosertothoseoftheBrethrenofPurity,whousetheterm“spirit”frequently,thantothoseofAvicenna,whousesitonlyoccasionally.

Al-GhazālīwaslikelyfamiliarwiththeEpistlesoftheBrethrenofPurity.135Someofhiscosmologicalteachingsmaygobacktothem,suchasequatingtheheavenlysphereswiththe“realmofsovereignty”(ʿālamal-malakūt)andseeingthehumanbodyasamicrocosmoftheuniverse.136Itseemsthatalreadyduringhislifetime,al-GhazālīwasaccusedofhavingcopiedfromtheEpistles.Inhisautobiography,heimplicitlyadmitsthatsomeofhisteachingalsoappearinthesetreatises,althoughhedeniesanyinfluenceandarguesthatthecorrelationismoreorlesscoincidental.Hesaysthatingeneral,theteachingsintheBookoftheBrethrenofPurity(KitābIkhwānal-ṣafāʾ)—al-Ghazālīassumesthatitwaswrittenbyasingleauthor—areweakphilosophy,basedonPythagoras,andthatAristotlerepresentsamoreadvancedstage.Thisworkis“thechatterofphilosophy”(ḥashwal-falsafa),al-Ghazālīadds,anditisfalse(bāṭil).HesinglesouttheBookoftheBrethrenofPurityasanexampleofamisleadingphilosophicaltext,particularlybecauseitaimsatappealingtothereligiousscholars.137


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Al-Ghazālī’scritics,however,continuedtoassociatehispositiononprophecywiththeBrethren.Al-Māzarīal-Imām(d.536/1141),aTunisiancontemporaryofal-Ṭurṭūshīwhowroteapolemicagainstal-Ghazālī,sayssomestudentsofal-Ghazālīreportedthathe“constantlycleavedtotheEpistlesoftheBrethrenofPurity.”138Al-Māzarī’spolemicisunfortunatelylostandknownonlyfromquotationsinlatertexts,yethisopinionsprovedtobequiteinfluentialamonglateropponentsofal-Ghazālī.InadditiontotheBrethrenofPurity,al-Māzarīattributesthephilosophicalinfluenceonal-GhazālītoAvicennaandtoAbūḤayyānal-Tawḥīdī(d.414/1023).139Morethanahundredyearsafteral-Māzarīandal-Ṭurṭūshī,theSufiphilosopherIbnSabʿīn(d.c.668/1270)fromCeutaclaimedthattheteachingspresentedinfourofal-Ghazālī’sworksonthehumanintellect,thespirit,andthesoulcomefromtheEpistlesoftheBrethrenofPurity.140

AuthorsfromtheMuslimEastalsounderstoodthatonthesubjectofprophecy,al-Ghazālīgotquiteclosetothefalāsifa.IbnTaymiyya,forinstance,chastisesal-Ghazālīforhavingfollowedthe“pseudo-philosophers”(al-mutafalsafa)intheirviewthatknowledgeofprophecycanbeverifiedwithoutsomeonehavingwitnessedamiracle.141Becauseofal-Ghazālī’steachingsonhowthesoulsoftheprophetsandof“friendsofGod”(awliyāʾ)receiverevelationasinspirationandinsightfromtheheavenlyspheres,IbnTaymiyyasawal-Ghazālīas“fromthesameilkasthehereticalQarmatiansandtheIsmāʿīlites.”Whatismore,hecomplains,al-Ghazālīandothersafterhim,suchasIbnʿArabī(d.638/1240),presenttheseviewsaboutprophecyasSufismandclaimthatitisadeepertruth.142IbnTaymiyyadiligentlycollectedthecriticismofearlierscholarson(p.201) thismatter,reproducingalongpassagefromal-Māzarī’slostpolemic.143Earlier,influentialSunnischolarssuchasIbnal-Ṣalāḥal-Shahrazūrīhadalreadyspreadal-Māzarī’scriticismofal-Ghazālī.Inhiscommentsonthelatter,IbnTaymiyyarejectsal-Māzarī’ssuggestionthatal-Ghazālīhadbeeninfluencedbyal-Tawḥīdī,butheacceptsal-Māzarī’sviewthatal-Ghazālī’spositiononprophecyisbasedonAvicennaandtheBrethrenofPurity.144Afterhisteachingsonthebestofallpossibleworlds,whichwillbediscussedbelow,laterscholarsofIslamfoundal-Ghazālī’sviewsonprophecytobemostobjectionable.

NecessaryKnowledgeinanOccasionalistUniverseInitspracticalimplicationsandparticularlyregardingthepursuitofthenaturalsciences,theoccasionalistuniverseofal-Ghazālīisindistinguishablefromtheuniverseofthefalāsifa.BothcosmologiesassumethateventsinGod’screationarepredetermined.Bothassumethatfirealwaysmakescottoncombust.BothassumethatthelawsofnatureorGod’shabitwillalwaysapply.Thedistinctionbetweenal-Ghazālī’stypeofoccasionalismandthepositionthatGodexertscontrolthroughsecondarycausalityislimitedtothecosmologicalexplanationofcausalconnections.Thisquestionbelongstotherealmofmetaphysics,teachesal-Ghazālī,andshouldhavenoinfluenceonhowwerespondtoGod’screativeactivity.Ifapersoniskilledbytheblowofaswordtohisneck,hewritesinhisStandardofKnowledge,oursenseperceptionrecognizedthatdeathinthispersoncomes“togetherwith”(maʿa)thedeepcut(ḥazz)inhisneck.Ifthisconjunctionappearsrepeatedly,wehavenodoubtthatacutintheneckanddeathareconnected,andweconcludethatoneisthecause(sabab)oftheother.145Despitethisconjunction,somemayindeeddoubttheconnection;amutakallim,forinstance,mayclaimthatthecutisnot


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thecauseofdeathandthatGodcreatedthecutanddeath“sidebyside”(lit.“inthestream,”ʿindajarayān).Al-Ghazālīshowslittlepatiencewiththismutakallim.Wouldhedoubthisson’sdeathwerehetoreceivetheunfortunatenewsthathissonhasacutinhisneck?

WhenitcomestothequestionwhetherthisisaninseparableandnecessaryconnectionthatcannotbeotherwiseorwhetherthisisanarrangementaccordingtothenormalcourseofGod’shabit(sunnatAllāh)throughtheefficacyofGod’spre-eternalwillwhichisnotaffectedbychangeoralteration,[wesay:]thequestionisaboutthekindofconnectionnotabouttheconnectionitself.Thisshouldbeunderstoodanditshouldbeknownthatdoubtingthedeathofapersonwhohasreceivedablowtohisneckispuredelusion(waswās)andthattheconviction(iʿtiqād)thatheisdeadiscertain(yaqīn)andshouldnotbecalledintoquestion.146

Iftheoccasionalistagreeswithal-GhazālīthatGod’shabitistheresultofHispre-eternalwill(mashiʾatuhual-azaliyya),which“isnotaffectedbychangeoralteration”(lātaḥtamilual-tabdīlwa-l-taghyīr),thedisputetheoccasionalisthas(p.202) withabelieverincausalityislimitedtothetypeofconnectionbetweencauseandeffect.Theexistenceofadirectefficacyofthecauseontheeffectcannotbedemonstrated.Bothmustagree,however,thattheconnectionitselfisinseparable,meaningthattheoccurrenceofthecause(cutintheneck)isalwaysconcomitanttotheappearanceoftheeffect(death).

RichardM.Franksuggestedthatforal-Ghazālī,connectionsbetweenwhatwecallcausesandtheireffectsareindeednecessary:“Giventheactualityofallcausalconditionsforitsoccurrenceaneventcomestobeinevitable(lāmaḥāla)andbynecessity(ḍarūratan).”147Buthow,onemustask,canthisconclusionbereconciledwiththefirstsentenceoftheseventeenthdiscussionintheIncoherenceinwhichal-Ghazālīexplicitlysaysthat“accordingtous”(ʿindanā),suchconnectionsarenotnecessary?InhisBalancedBookonWhat-to-Believe,al-Ghazālīlooksatthesameexampleofapersonwhoreceivedablowtohisneck.148Thatvolume’sdiscussionispromptedbythequestionofwhetherthemurderercutshorthisvictim’slifespan.Al-Ghazālī’sgoalistocorrectlyunderstandtheconnectionbetweenthesetwoevents,themurderandthevictim’sappointedtimeofdeath(ajal).Hediscussesthreedifferentwaysofhowthingsinthisworldareconnectedtooneanother,thethirdbeingtheconnectionbetweenacause(ʿilla)anditseffect(maʿlūl).Bywayofageneralstatement,al-Ghazālīsaysthatinourjudgment,theconnectionofthesetwoisnecessary:“Ifthereisonlyasinglecausefortheeffectandifithasbeendeterminedthatthecausedoesn’texist,itfollowsfromit(yalzamumin)thattheeffectdoesn’texist.”149Inthisbook,al-GhazālīusesthelanguageofclassicalAshʿarism.Inthecaseofthemanwhohasreceivedacutinhisneck,causeandeffectareaccidentsthatareconnectedtooneanother:

“Beingkilled”isanexpressionforacutintheneckandthatistracedbacktocertainaccidents,namelythemovementofthehandofhimwhoholdstheswordandotheraccidents,meaningthecleavagesamongtheatomsintheneckofhimwhoishit.Anotheraccidentisconnectedwith(aqtaranabi-)these(accidents),andthisisdeath.Iftherewerenoconnectinglink(irtibāṭ)betweenthecut[intheneck]


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anddeath,thedenialofthecutwouldnotmakethedenialofdeathfollow.Butthesearetwothingsthatarecreatedtogether(maʿan)andconnectedaccordingtoanarrangementthatfollowsthehabitualcourseandnotaccordingtoaconnectinglinkthatoneofthetwohaswiththeother.150

Thepositional-Ghazālītakesinthisbookisdistinctlyoccasionalist.Whilebythemselvesthetwoeventsarenotconnected,theyareconnectedthroughahabit(ʿāda).Hedoesnotelaborateastowhosehabitthisis,andhisAshʿaritereadersmightassumehemeansGod’shabit.Yetinrealterms,thehabitappearstobethatofthecreatures,notofGod.Godmaycreatethetwoeventsindividuallyandmono-causally,witheachonebeingconsidered“athingautonomouslycreatedbyGod”(amrunistabaddaal-rabbu).Thesetwocreations,however,alwaysappeartogether(maʿan)and“inaconnectionaccordingtoanarrangementthatfollowsthehabitualcourse”(ʿalāqtirānbi-ḥukmijrāʾal-ʿāda).(p.203) Theconnectionisnotofakindthatthefirsteventmustbethe“generatingagent”(mutawallid)fortheexistenceoftheother.Thecutintheneckdoesnot“generate”(tawallada)death.Beingacause(ʿilla)simplymeansthat,ifallothercausesofdeathareexcluded,thedenialofacutintheneckmakesthedenialofdeathnecessary.151Cutanddeath,al-Ghazālīimplies,areinseparable,whichmeanstherelationshipofthecorrespondingdenialofacutandthedenialofdeathisnecessary.152

Thepointal-Ghazālīwishestomakeisthatinourknowledge,theconnectionbetweenwhatweidentifyasacauseandwhatweidentifyasaneffectisnecessary.Al-GhazālīusestheArabicverblazimaanditsderivates,whichindicatebothaninseparableconnectionandanecessaryjudgment.Whatwewitnessisthepureconcomitanceoftwoevents,groundedinahabit.Al-GhazālīarguesagainstanunderstandingofoccasionalismthatassumesGodwillbreakHishabit.That,heimplies,willnothappen.Yetal-Ghazālīneedstobereadclosely:henowheresaysthattheconnectionbetweenthetwoeventsisnecessary.Hesaysonlythatthewayourjudgmentconnectsthesetwoeventsisnecessary.HereheimplicitlyreiteratesapointalreadymadeintheIncoherence:necessityisapredicateofhumanjudgments,notapredicateoftheoutsideworld.153Inthispassage,thenecessaryconnectionissaidtoexistasahumanconviction(iʿtiqād):

Hewhoisconvinced(iʿtaqada)thatthecuttingoftheneckisacause(ʿilla)ofdeath,andwhoconnectsthisconvictiontohisobservationthatthebodyofthedeceasesissoundandthattherearenootheroutsideperilousforcesinvolved,isconvincedthatthedenialofthecutandthedenialofanyotherpossiblecausenecessarilymeansthedenialoftheeffect,becauseallcausesaredenied.154

Inthiscase,weconcludenecessarilythatthepersonwhosebodyweinspectisnotdead.Tobeconvincedthatthereareimminentcausesinthisworlddoesnotmeantosay,however,thatthesecauseshavearealefficacytowardtheirsupposedeffects.HereinhisBalancedBookonWhat-to-Believe,al-Ghazālīcomparestheexplanationsofcausalconnectionprovided(1)bythosewhopositcausality(ʿindaqāʾilīnabi-l-ʿilal)and(2)bythoseoftheSunnis(ahlal-sunna)whoareconvincedthatGod“isautonomousintheoriginalcreation[ofevents]”(mustabiddunbi-l-ikhtrāʿ)anddoesnotallowothercreaturestogenerate(tawallad)anything.Hesaysthatthesetwoexplanationsdonot


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differregardingtheconclusionswedrawfromobservingcausalconnections.Yetonthelevelofcosmology,thereisstillaconflictbetweenthesepositionsthatis“lengthy,”and“mostpeoplewhoplungeintoitdonotrealizeitsdivisivecharacter(mithāruhā).”Al-Ghazālīhasnointerestinengagingwiththatconflict.Regardingquestionsastowhetherthecuttingoftheneckcausesdeathornot,herecommendsresortingtoasimplerule(qānūn):onemustavoidassumingthatsomethingcouldbegenerated(tawallada)byanythingotherthanGod.Godcreateseverything,andinthecaseofthekilledhuman,itisbesttosay:whatreallykilledhimwastheendofhisappointedlifespan(ajal).155

(p.204) Despiteitsopenlyoccasionalistlanguage,eveninhisBalancedBook,al-Ghazālīshowsnosignsthathecommittedhimselfexclusivelytoanoccasionalistcosmology.HestressesthattheMuʿtaziliteexplanationofphysicaleventsthrough“generation”(tawallud)iswrong.Eventsinthecreatedworlddonotsimply“generate”fromothercreatedbeingsandcertainlynotfromhumandecisions.Yethere,asinmostofhisworks,al-GhazālīwishestoleaveopenwhethertheseeventsarecreateddirectlybyGodoraretheresultsofsecondarycauses.Giventhathistargetreadershiptendstowardtheformerposition,hehasnoproblemstatinghispositioninalanguagethattheywillfindeasytoadopt.

ConcomitantEventsandRationalJudgmentsAl-GhazālīregardedtherelianceonatomismandoccasionalismasaviablemethodtoexplainGod’screativeactivity,andinsomeofhisworkssuchastheBalancedBookonWhat-to-Believehesucceedsintheseexplanations.ThisbookwaslikelywrittenasatextbookofAshʿaritekalāmtobeusedbystudentsattheNiẓāmiyyamadrasainBaghdad.TheRevivaloftheReligiousSciences,whichal-GhazālīstartedcomposingafterhehadlefttheNiẓāmiyyainBaghdad,doesnothaveasdistinctatargetreadership.Inthisbook,al-GhazālīisnotquiteascommittedtotheoccasionalistlanguageoftheAshʿaritemutakallimūn.AlthoughsomebooksintheRevivaldousethatterminology,mostarecastinamoreadvancedlanguagethattriestogiveequaljusticetobothoccasionalismandsecondarycausality.Onfirstreading,thesetextsappeartoemployadistinctlycausalistlanguage.Atthebeginningofthethirty-fifthbook,forinstance,whichdiscussesbeliefinGod’soneness(tawḥīd)andtrustinGod(tawakkul),theauthorexplainsthedifficultiesofdevelopingdeepconfidenceinthereliabilityofGod’shabit.TrustinGodisdifficulttocomprehendbecausemanypeoplelookexclusivelyatthecauses(asbāb)ofthings,ratherthanseeGod’sactivity.Yetitiswrongtothinkthatcausescouldstandontheirown.Thisdifficultyisexpressedinanambiguoussentenceinwhichal-Ghazālīevidentlywishestoremainuncommittedaboutthetruenatureofcauses.However,hedoeswanttomakehisreadersunderstandthatthecommonword“cause”(sabab)doesnotmeananindependentorabsoluteefficientcause:

Basingoneselfonthecauses(asbāb)withoutviewingthemas“causes”(asbāb)meanstooutsmartrationalityandplungeintothedepthsofignorance.156

These“causes”canbeeithersecondaryorjustanexpressionofthehabitualconcomitanceofGod’simmediatecreativeactivity.Inneithercasedotheyhaveindependentagency.Toassumesuchindependentagencywouldbethegravestmistake


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onecouldmakewithregardtocauses,akintobringing“polytheismintotheideaofGod’sunity”(shirkfīl-tawḥīd).Thenagain,completelydisregardingthecauses,defamestheProphet’ssunnaandslandershisrevelation(ṭaʿnfīl-sunnawa-qadḥfīl-sharʿ).Qur’anandpropheticalḥadīth,al-Ghazālīimplies,discusscausesasiftheyhaverealefficacy.Tounderstandthe(p.205) truemeaningoftrustinGod,onemustbalancetheconvictionthatthereisonlyoneagentorefficientcauseinthisworld(tawḥīd)withrationality(ʿaql)andwithrevelation(sharʿ).157

Rationalityandrevelationarethetwopillarsofverifiablehumanknowledge.NeitherofthemprovidesadecisiveanswerastowhichofthetwocompetingexplanationsofGod’screativeactivityiscorrect.Al-GhazālīimpliesthatneithertheQur’annortheḥadīthprovidesaclearstatementinfavorofeitherposition.Thisindecisivenessalsoappliestorationality:intheseventeenthdiscussionoftheIncoherence,heaimstoshowthatthereisnodemonstrationthatprovesthedirectandimmediatecharacteroftheconnectionbetweenacauseanditseffect.Theseeffectsmaybedeterminedbysecondarycauses,ortheconcomitanceofthemmaybedeterminedbyGod’shabitualcourseofactionashecreateseacheventindividually,onebyone.

Acriticalreadingofal-Ghazālīmustbeawareoftheseambiguities.Ifhesaysthattwothingsarecreated“sidebyside”(ʿalāl-tasāwuqorʿindajarayān),thismaybeduetotheirbeingacauseanditseffectinacausalchainthathasitsbeginninginGodorduetoGod’simmediatearrangement.Ifthingshavea“connection”(iqtirān)orifthereisa“connectinglink”(irtibāṭ)betweentwothings,theirrelationshipmaybeeitherdeterminedbylawsofnatureorduetoGod’shabitualcourseofaction.Evenifsomethingiscalleda“cause”(sabab),thereaderofal-Ghazālīcannotbecertainthatthismeans“secondarycause.”Accordingtoal-Ghazālī,thisisjustthewaywetalkaboutourenvironment,anditwouldbeunwisetojumptoconclusionsaboutthecosmologicalcharacterofthe“causes.”Fromthisperspective,itisunsurprisingthatinthegreatmajorityofhisworks,al-Ghazālīpromotesanaturalistunderstandingof“causes.”Firecausesignition,breadcausessatiety,waterquenchesthirst,winecausesinebriety,scammonyloosensthebowels,andsoforth.Thesamenaturalistunderstandingappliestotheeffectiveexistenceofnatures(ṭabāʾiʿ).“Adatestone,”al-Ghazālīacknowledgesinthetwenty-secondbookoftheRevival,“canneverbecomeanappletree.”158

Inhistwoworksonlogics,theStandardofKnowledgeandtheTouchstoneofReasoninginLogics,al-Ghazālīdiscusseshowweacquireknowledgeofcausalconnections.Herethenominalistunderpinningsofhisepistemologybecomeevident.Causalconnectionsareunderstoodthroughexperienceorexperimentation(tajriba).Experimentationrepresentsoneoffivedifferentmeansforacquiringcertainknowledge,theotherfourbeingaprioriconcepts(awwaliyyāt),innersenseperceptions(mushāhadātbāṭina),outersenseperception(maḥsūsātẓāhira),andknowledgethathasbeenreliablyreportedonotherpeople’sauthority(maʿlūmātbi-l-tawāturormutawātirāt).Inadditiontothesefivesourcesofcertainknowledge(ʿilmyaqīnī),therearealsotypesofknowledgethatcannotbesufficientlyverifiedandcanthusneverbeusedaspremisesindemonstrations.Theseareeitherjudgmentsthatimmediatelyappeartobetruebutthat


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areunverifiable(wahmiyyāt)suchas“allexistenceisspatial”or“beyondtheboundariesoftheworldisnovacuum”ornotionsthatarecommonlyacceptedbythemajorityofthepeople(mashhūrāt),yetverifiableonlythroughothersources,suchasjudgmentsaboutwhichhumanactionsaremorallygoodorbad.159

(p.206) Al-Ghazālīlistsnumerousexamplesofhowexperiencecanproducecertainknowledgeaboutcausalconnections.Theycoverthefullrangeofwhatisconsideredcausality:fireburns,breadleadstosatiety,waterquenchesthirst,hittingananimalcausesitpain,acutintheneckcausesdeath,andscammonyhasalaxativeeffectonone’sbowels.160Thesejudgmentsaredifferentfromsenseperception,al-Ghazālīexplains,astheyexpressuniversaljudgmentsratherthanmerelyindividualobservationsofisolatedevents.Universalitycannotbeproducedsolelybythesenses,butitrathermustbeformedinthehumanrationalcapacity(ʿaql).Suchjudgmentsofexperience(mujarrabāt)mustbebasedontherepeatedsensationofsingleeventsinoursenseperception.161Theyareacombinationofsenseperceptionandrationaljudgment.ConsistentwithhiscriticismintheIncoherencethatnecessityisapredicateofjudgmentsandnotofthingsintheoutsideworld,al-Ghazālīhighlightsthattheuniversalnecessityofthesejudgmentscannotbewhollytakenfromtheoutsideworld.Thenecessityanduniversalityisduetoa“hiddensyllogism”(qiyāskhafī)thatcombinesthemultitudeofobservationsintoasinglejudgment.Al-Ghazālīadmits,however,thatthereasonwhyweacquirecertainuniversalknowledge,ratherthanjustprobableorfalseknowledge,stillremainsunknown.Allwecansayisthatexperienceimposes(awjaba)uponuseitheradecisivejudgment(qaḍāʾjazmī)oronethatweconsidervalidforthemostpart(aktharī),andthatthisisbymeansofa“hiddensyllogisticpower.”162Thispowerworksonourmindsinaninescapableway.InhisTouchstoneofReasoning,al-Ghazālīgivesanexampleofthishiddensyllogisticpower:

Ifsomeonewhohasapainfulspot[onhisbody]poursaliquidoveritandthepaingoesaway,hewillnotacquireknowledgethattheliquidhasstopped[thepain]becausehewillaccountthedisappearanceofpaintocoincidence.163ThisissimilartowhensomeonereadstheSura“Devotion”(Q112)onceoversuchaspotandthepaindisappears.Hewouldgettheideathatthedisappearenceof[pain]appearsbycoincidence.Ifthepaindisappearsrepeatedly[afterreadingthesura]andonmanyoccasions,however,heacquiresknowledge[aboutsuchaconnection].Thus,ifsomeonetriesitoutandreadsthesura“Devotion”oncethefirstsignsoftheillnessappear,andeverytime—oratleastinthemajorityofcases—thepainvanishes,heacquirescertainknowledgethat[readingthesura“Devotion”]issomethingthatmakesthepainvanish,justashehasacquiredcertainknowledgethatbreadmakeshungervanishanddustdoesnotmakehungervanishbutactuallyincreasesit.164

Al-Ghazālīinviteshisreaderstoconsiderasituationinwhichtherecitationofthesura“Devotion”(al-Ikhlās.)andthevanishingofpainatacertainspotrepeatedlyappearinconjunction.Insuchasituationwewillconclude,heargues,thatthereisaconnectionbetweenthetwoevents.Whatmakesusestablishsuchajudgmentisnotarealcausal


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connectionbetweenthetwoeventsbutsimplytheirconcomitantappearance,whichisindeedaconnection,althoughnotnecessarilyacausalone.165Theknowledgethatweacquire,however,is(p.207) thatreadingthesuracausesthepaintogoaway.Knowledgeaboutwhatweregardascausalconnectionisacquiredbyseeinganinseparablerelationship(talāzum)betweentwoeventsandtheconsecutiveandhabitualpattern(iṭṭirādal-ʿādāt)oftheirconjunction.166

Judgmentsaboutcausalconnectionsareuniversal(qaḍāyāʿumūmiyya)andapplytoallindividualswithinacertainspecies(jins).Theycannotbeattainedthoughsenseperceptionalone,assenseperception(ḥiss)canonlyproducejudgmentsaboutindividualobjects(ʿayn).Alluniversaljudgmentsthatwedonotacceptfromrevelationareeitheraprioriandprimordialormustrelyonasyllogism;inthecaseofexperience,thesyllogismishiddenandnotconscious:

Ifyoulookcloselyintothisyouwillfindthattheintellect(al-ʿaql)attainsthesejudgmentsaftersomesenseperceptionandaftertheirrepeatedoccurrencethroughthemediationofahiddensyllogism(qiyāskhafī)thatisinscribedintheintellect.Theintellecthasnocognitiveperception(shuʿūr)ofthatsyllogismbecauseitdoesnotattendtoitanditdoesnotformitinwords.167

IntheFirstPositionoftheseventeenthdiscussionoftheIncoherence,al-Ghazālīmakeshismajorpointonthissubject,namely,thatwithoutthishiddensyllogism,humanperceptioncannotcometouniversaljudgments,includinguniversaljudgmentsaboutcausalconnections.InhisTouchstoneofReasoning,heremindshisreaders:

WehavementionedintheBookoftheIncoherenceofthePhilosophersthatwhichalerts[thereaders]tothedepthofthesematters.Thegististhatthejudgmentsacquiredthroughexperimentation(al-qaḍāyāl-tajribiyya)gobeyondsenseperception.168

Whatexactlymakesthejudgmentsofexperiencegobeyondsenseperceptionisnotclear:“Wecannotsaywhatisthecause(sabab)inreachingtheperceptionofthiscertaintyafterweknowthatitiscertain.”169Consequently,thehiddensyllogismisnowhereclearlyexplained.Itcomestotheforewhenaconnectionbetweentwoindividualsenseperceptionsappearssofrequentlythatitcannotbeexplainedasacoincidence.AgainintheTouchstoneofReasoninghewrites:

Theintellectusuallysays:Wereitnotforthefactthatthiscauseleadstoits[effect],[theeffect]wouldnotcontinuouslyoccurforthemostpart;andif[theeffect]happenedbycoincidenceitwouldappear[sometimes]and[atothertimes]not.Considersomeonewhoeatsbreadandlaterhasaheadachewhilehishungerhasgoneaway.Heconcludesthatthebreadsatisfieshungeranddoesnotcausetheheadachebecausethereisadifferencebetweenthesetwoeffects.Thedifferenceisthattheheadacheappearsonaccountofanothercausewhoseconnectionwiththebreadiscoincidental.Becauseifitcameaboutthrough(bi-)thebread,[theeffect]wouldappearalwaystogether(maʿa)withthebreadorforthemostpart,


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likesatiety.170

(p.208) Thecontinuousappearanceofoneeventtogether(maʿa)withtheothermakesusconcludethattheoneisthecauseoftheother.Itisworthnotingthatal-Ghazālī’streatmentofexperienceseestheconnectionsexpressedbyourjudgmentasnecessaryandconstitutingcertainknowledge,eveniftheunderlyingsenseperceptionsconcuronly“forthemostpart.”Therecanbenodoubtthatthesekindsofjudgmentsqualifyforal-Ghazālīascertainknowledge,despitetheirnearly-but-not-universaloccurrence.171Inhisautobiography,forinstance,al-Ghazālīsaysthattheexperience(tajriba)ofthepositiveeffectsofaprophet’sworkonone’ssoulgeneratesnecessaryknowledge(ʿilmḍarūrī)ofhisprophecy.172Inthiscase,thejudgmentofexperienceisestablishedbytherepeatedconcomitancebetweenperformingtheProphet’sritualprescriptionsandthepositiveeffectsthispracticehasonone’ssoul.Thatresultingjudgment,namely,thatMuḥammadcaneffectivelyhealthesoulthroughhisrevelation,establishescertaintyaboutprophecy(yaqīnbi-l-nubuwwa)andresultsinbeliefthatequalsthepowerofknowledge(al-īmānal-qawīl-ʿilmī).173

Foral-Ghazālī,thefactthattwoeventsalwaysappeartogetherordosoforthemostpartimpliesthattheirconcomitanceisnotcoincidental.Onceweareconvincedthatwearenotdealingwithcoincidence,ourmindmovestowardanecessaryjudgmentabouttheonebeingthecauseoftheother.Talkingabouttheindividualsenseperceptionsthatleadtothisjudgment,al-Ghazālīsaysthat“thecauseandtheeffectalwaysareinseparable(yatalāzimān)andifyouwantyoucansay‘cause’(sabab)and‘effect’(musabbab)orifyouwantyoucansay‘necessitator’and‘necessitated.’”174

Experience(tajriba)inAvicennaandinal-GhazālīInal-Ghazālī’sepistemology,experimentation(tajriba)establishesnecessaryknowledgeaboutcausalconnectionssolelyfromtherepeatedconcurrenceoftwoevents.ThismethodstandsinstrikingcontrasttotheAristotelianviewofhowweknowaboutcausalconnections.InAvicenna’sthought,asinmostAristoteliantheoriesofthesciences,themajorityofcausalconnectionsaretheresultsofactiveandpassivepowersintheessencesofthecauseandtheeffect.Thepassivepower(quwwamunfaʿila)offlammability,forinstance,isanessentialattributeofcottonthatisimpliedbythefactthatitistheproductofaplant.Allplantsandtheirproductsareflammable.Equivalently,firehasinitsessencetheactivepower(quwwafāʿiliyya)ofburning.Oncethetwocometogether,inflammationmustoccurduetotheessentialnatureofthesetwothings.AccordingtoAristotle,weknowtheseessentialqualitiesbywitnessingthesecharacteristicsintheoutsideworldandsubsequentlyinducingtheiressentialnaturefromtheuniversalformsofcottonandfire.Thenecessaryjudgmentthat“fireburnscotton”isreachednotby“experience”(Greekempeiría,Arabictajriba)butby“induction”(Greekepagôgé,Arabicistiqrāʾ).Inthiscase,thehumanintellectobservesacertainprocessandreachesanecessaryconclusionthroughtheassistanceormediationoftheseparateactiveintellectwhenitimprintsorilluminatestheformsoffireandcottoninthehuman(p.209) intellect.175Thatfirehastheactivepowerofburningandcottonthepassivepowerofinflammabilitycanonlybeknownthroughthemediationoftheactive


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intellect.176Wefirstneedtoreceivetheintelligibleuniversalformsof“fire”and“cotton”fromtheactiveintellectbeforeweconcludethatfirenecessarilyinflamescotton.

InAvicenna,theindividualparticularsofathingareperceivedbythesensesandstoredinthefacultyofimagination(khayāl).The“lightoftheactiveintellectshinesupontheparticulars”inimagination,andtheintelligibleuniversalforms“flowupon”(yafīḍuʿalā)thehumansoul.Theintelligibleuniversalformsare“abstracted”(mujarrad)fromindividuallyperceivedparticulars“throughthemediationofilluminationbytheactiveintellect.”177InAvicenna,likeinAristotle,thesourceofourknowledgeoftheessentialactiveandpassivepowersofthingsisnotnatureanditsobservationbuttheseparateactiveintellect.Sensualperception,Avicennateaches,cannotleadtonecessaryjudgments.178Itisimportanttonotethatinductiononlyworksiftheactiveandpassivepowersthatleadtocausalconnectionsarepartoftheessencesofthethings.179

Whentheactiveandpassivepowersthatnecessitatethecausalconnectionarenotpartoftheessencesofthethings,Avicennamandatestheuseofexperimentation(tajriba).AnexamplethatAvicennaandal-Ghazālībothmentionisthatinmedicine,wewitnessthatscammonycausespurgationinthegallbladder.AccordingtoAvicenna,therelationshipbetweenscammonyandthepurgationofbileisnotduetoanactivepowerthatispartoftheessenceofscammony.Rather,theeffectisduetoan“inseparableaccident”(ʿaraḍlāzim)oraproprium(khāṣṣa)ofscammony,meaninganaccidentthatinherespermanentlyandisthereforeaninseparablepartofit.180Sincethecauseofthislaxativeeffectisanaccidentalcharacteristic,wecannotknowitthroughinduction(istiqrāʾ).Inthiscase,experimentation(tajriba)leadsustoconcludethattheaccidentofcausingthislaxativeeffectinheresinscammony.Therepeatedobservationofthisconnectionestablishesthatthereissomethingeitherinscammony’snatureorjust“withit”(maʿahu)thatcauses—atleastinourlands,Avicennaadds—purgationofbile.181

AnimportantaspectofAvicenna’stheoryofexperienceisthatitestablishesuniversaljudgmentsnotonlywhentherelationshipisalways(dāʾiman)observed,butalsoevenincasesinwhichweonlyobservethatrelationshipinmostcases(akthariyyan).Theforceofnecessityinourjudgmentsisconsideredasyllogism(qiyās).“Thereisasyllogism,”Avicennasays,“thatisproducedinthemindwithoutbeingperceived.”182Thesyllogism,however,ismerelythewaythatthenecessityofthejudgmentisexpressed;itcannotbethesourceofthenecessity.Infact,itisnotentirelyclearwhatpreciselyjustifiestheepistemologicalleapfromanobservationofeventsthatlikelyindicatearelationshiptothenecessityofasyllogism.183ExperimentationinAvicennaseemstobebasedontheunderlyingassumptionthatwhentwothingsrepeatedlyhappentogether,theydosoeitherduetochanceorduetonecessity.Whenthetwothingsarejustaslikelytohappentogetherasnottohappen,therepeatedobservationthattheyalwayshappentogether,orinthegreatmajorityofcases,(p.210) justifiestheconclusionthattheydonothappentogetherbychance(ittifāqan).184Theythereforehappentogetherduetosomenecessity.

InAvicenna’sview,experimentationinformsusthatscammonyhasapurgingeffect,yetit


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doesnotallowustoconcludehowthiseffectoccurs.Unlikeinduction,itdoesnotprovidetheunderlyingcausalexplanation.Experiencethusdoesnotprovidescientificknowledge(Greekepisteme,Arabicʿilm)inthestrictAristoteliansenseofitbeingbothnecessaryandexplanatory.185Inaddition,Avicennaadmitsthatbecauseofitsshakyepistemologicalbasis,experimentationdoesnotprovide“absolutesyllogisticknowledge”butonly“universalknowledgethatisrestrictedbyacondition.”186Thisconditionisthemethodologicallysoundapplicationofthejudgment.Whenusingexperimentation,thescientistmustrecordthevariablesandbackgroundconditionssurroundingtheobservations.Onlywhenexperimentationisconductedinthiscarefulwaycanonebecertainthatthereisanecessaryrelationbetweenthetwoeventsinquestion.Thismethodoftenforcesthescientisttolimithisorherresultstotheconditionsheorsheobserved,suchaswhenAvicennasaysthatscammonyhastheobservedeffect“inourlands.”187Limitations,suchastheacknowledgmentthatscammonymaynothaveitspurgingeffectinotherclimates,areveryimportantinAvicenna’stheoryofexperience.Theyarearesultofthefactthatweareonlydealingwithacausethatisanaccidentinscammony,andnotapartofitsessence.188Evenifallmethodologicalconditionsarefulfilled,Avicennanotes,experienceisnosafeguardagainsterror;andinhiswork,hefurtherdiscusseslikelymistakeswhenpursuingexperimentation.189Nevertheless,experiencecanprovidecertainknowledge,albeitofalimitedkind.190

ForAvicenna,experimentationbecomesmuchmoreimportantthanforearlierAristoteliantheoriesofknowledgebecausehebelievedthatinduction(istiqrāʾ)shouldalwaysbecombinedwithexperience(tajriba).Attheendofhisdiscussionofexperience,Avicennaadmitsthateveninduction(istiqrāʾ)—usuallyconsideredastrongerandmorereliablesourceofknowledgethatexperimentation—reliesonexperimentation.Comparingtheresultsofsenseperception,ofinduction,andofexperimentation,Avicennasaysthatunlikesenseperception,whichjustproducesindividualobservations,inductionandexperimentationbothproduceuniversalknowledge.Byitself,however,inductionproducesnomorethanan“overwhelmingassumption”(ẓannghālib),whichisnotknowledge.Theresultofinductionmustbecombinedwithexperimentationinordertoproduceauniversaljudgmentthatisnotlimitedbyanyconditions.Studyingnature’sconnectionsthroughexperimentation(tajriba)ispartoftheprocessofobtainingtrulyuniversalknowledgefromtheactiveintellect.Avicennasaysthatexperimentationis“morereliable”(ākad)thaninduction,andwhileinductionbyitselfcannotproducecertainuniversalknowledge,experimentationcan.191Byitself,however,experimentationproducesuniversalknowledge,whoseuniversalityislimitedbytheconditionsoftheunderlyingobservations,meaning,forinstance,itisvalidwhereobserved,thoughnotnecessarilyelsewhere.192

JonMcGinnisarguesthatinAvicenna’scritiqueofinduction,hemovesfromapureAristotelianpositionofhowwehaveknowledgeofcausalconnections(p.211) towardthedirectionofamoremodernepistemologywherecausalconnectionsarenotlearnedfromtheuniversalformsoftheactiveintellect.193Avicenna’sfolloweral-Ghazālīwentmuchfurtheronthispath.Inal-Ghazālī’sdiscussionofthesourcesofhumanknowledge,thereisatraceofneitherinduction(istriqrāʾ)northeapprehensionfromtheactive


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intellectoftheessentialcharacteristicsofthings.Thisepistemologyisconsistentwithal-Ghazālī’snominalistcriticismofAvicenna’spositiononcausality.Al-Ghazālīdoesnotdistinguishbetweenfireburningcottonorscammonyproducingalaxativeeffect:bothareexamplesofasingulartypeofcausalconnections.Subsequently,al-Ghazālīdoesnotdistinguishbetweenactiveandpassivepowersthatareeitherrootedintheessenceofthingsorformedbytheirconcomitantaccidents.Infact,al-Ghazālīnowherementionstheexistenceofactiveandpassivepowersinthings.

Causalconnectionsare,foral-Ghazālī,merelytherepeatedconjunctionoftwoevents.Witnessingsuchevents,ourrationalcapacity(ʿaql)producesnecessaryjudgmentsabouttheseconnections.Al-Ghazālī’streatmentofexperiencereliesheavilyonthatofAvicenna.Thejudgmentsofexperimentation(al-tajribiyyāt),Avicennasays,“arematters[inthemind]towhichcredenceisgivenfromthesideofsenseperceptionthroughtheassistanceofahiddensyllogism(qiyāskhafī).”Wehavealreadyseenthatinal-Ghazālī,theuniversaljudgmentsprovidedbyexperimentationrelyonasequenceofsenseperceptionsinwhichtheconnectionhasbeenobservedeitherconstantlyoronlyforthemostpart.Inbothcases,thejudgmentsconsistoftwoelements:therepeatedobservationthattwoeventsoccurtogetherandahiddensyllogisticforce(quwwaqiyāsiyyakhafiyya)thatmergesmanyobservationsintoone.LikeAvicenna,al-Ghazālīalsorequiresexperiencetobepursuedwithacertaindegreeofrigidity.Thedatafromsenseperceptionmustbegatheredbysoundsenseorganswhentheobjectisclosetothesensesandwhenthemediumbetweenthesensesanditsobjectisdense.194

Inalongsentence,al-Ghazālīdescribesthewholeprocessofacquiringknowledgeaboutcausalconnectionthroughexperience,takingaccountofallaspectsofourjudgmentsthattwoeventsarecausallyconnected:

Ifthe[repeatedconcurrenceoftwoevents]werecoincidentaloraccidentalandnotinseparable(lāzim),itwouldnotcontinuetooccurforthemosttimewithoutvariation;sothateveniftheeventthatisinseparable(lāzim)[fromafirstevent]hasnotcomeintoexistence,thesoul(nafs)regardsthedelayof[thesecondevent]fromthefirstasasingleoccurrenceoronethathappensrarely(nādiran),anditwouldsearchforacause(sabab)thatpreventedthe[second]eventfromoccurring.

Iftheindividualsenseperceptionsthatoccurrepeatedlyonetimeaftertheotherarebroughttogether,andthenumberofoccurrencescannotbedetermined,likethenumberofauthorities(mukhbir)inasecurelytransmittedtradition(tawātur)cannotbedetermined,andifeachoccurrenceislikeanexpertwitness,andifthesyllogism(qiyās)(p.212) thatwementionedaboveiscombinedwithit,thenthesoulgrantsassent.195

Inthiscontext,thefactthatthesoul“grantsassent”(ʿʿanatal-nafsli-l-taṣdīq)tothejudgmentmeansthatthenecessityoftheconnectionisestablished,anditcanbeusedasapremiseindemonstrativearguments.Ifconductedintherightway,experienceproducesuniversalandcertainknowledgeofallkindsofcausalconnections.Unlike


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Avicenna,al-Ghazālīdoesnotlimitthevalidityofthesejudgmentstocertainregionsorlands,forinstance,ortoothercircumstances.

Itwouldbefalsetosay,however,thatforal-Ghazālī,causalconnectionsaremerementalpatternswithoutcorrespondenceintherealworld.Theapparentregularityoftheconnectionbetweenwhatwecallacauseanditseffectjustifiesthejudgmentthatscammonycauseslooseningofthebowels.Althoughtheremaybenotruecausalefficacyonthesideofscammony,theregularityoftwoconcomitanteventstriggersourjudgmentofcausesandeffects.196UnlikeAvicenna,al-Ghazālīnevermentionsaconcomitantlaxativeaccidentinscammony,andonsomelevelhepleadsignorantastowhetheritreallyexists.Inhiscosmologyheremainsuncommittedtoscammony’sagencyonthelooseningofthebowels.Thecausalinference,however,isnotjustsomethingthemindputsintotheworld.Theoutsideworldisevidentlyorderedinawayasiftherewerecausalconnections.Althoughthetruecauseoftheregularityofconcomitanceisuncertain,thefactthattheyappeartogetheriscertain.

FollowingAvicenna’sterminology,however,itwouldnotbecorrectforal-Ghazālītosaythatnecessityissolelyafeatureofourjudgments.Necessity,whichforAvicennaisidenticalwithtemporalpermanence,existswhentwothingsalwaysappeartogether;andthelatterfactisnotdeniedbyal-Ghazālī.Al-Ghazālī’scriticismofcausalityinAvicennabreakswiththestatisticalinterpretationofmodalconceptsandappliesaviewofnecessitybasedonthedenialofsynchronicalternatives.Bothagreethattheconnectionbetweenacauseanditseffectappearsalways.ForAvicenna,thisissynonymoustosayingitisnecessary.Al-Ghazālī,however,pointsoutthatwhereasthecausalconnectionswewitnessintheoutsideworldwillalwaysappearinpast,present,andfuture,Godcouldhavechosenanalternativearrangement.Thepossibleexistenceofanalternativemeansthattheconnectionintheoutsideworldisnotnecessary.

Makingtrulynecessaryconnectionsthatallownoalternativesis,accordingtoal-Ghazālī,solelyafeatureofthehumanrationalcapacity(ʿaql).Logicisthedomainwherethisrationalcapacityisappliedinitspurestform.Al-GhazālīopenlyendorsedthelogicoftheAristotelians,favoringitoverthatofthemutakallimūn.197AverroesandRichardM.Frankquestionedhowal-GhazālīcouldclaimtoadheretoAristotelianlogicwhilealsosubscribingtoacosmologythatbelievestheconnectionbetweenacauseanditseffectisnotnecessary.198IntheAristotelianunderstandingoflogics,theconnectionbetweenthetwopremisesofasyllogismanditsconclusionisthatoftwocausesthataretogethersufficientandnecessarytogeneratetheconclusion.Moreprecisely,itisthecombinationofthetruthsofthetwopremisesthatcausestheconclusiontobetrue.IntheTouchstoneofReasoning,atextbookofAristotelianlogics(p.213) writtenforstudentsinthereligioussciences,al-Ghazālīsharesthisposition.MichaelE.Marmurasuggestedthathere,asinotherworkswherehedefendsAristotelianlogics,al-Ghazālīreinterpretsthedemonstrativemethodalongsideoccasionalistlineswithoutthisaffectingeithertheformalconditionsthatlogicsmustsatisfyoritsclaimforattaininguniversalcertainty.199Foral-Ghazālī,therefore,theseeminglycausalconnectionbetweenthepremisesofasyllogismanditseffectisjustoneofthosecaseswhereanevent,namely,thecombination


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oftwotruepremises,regularlyappearsconcomitantlywithanotherevent,namely,thetruthoftheconclusion.Afterexplainingthatanykindofpropositioncanformthepremiseofasyllogism,heclarifiesinhisStandardofKnowledgehowtheconclusionisderived:

Therefore,thosecognitionsthatareverifiedandthatonehasgrantedassenttoarethepremisesofasyllogism.Iftheyappear(ḥadara)inthemindinacertainorder,thesoul(nafs)getspreparedforthe[new]knowledgetocomesabout(yaḥduthu)init.FortheconclusioncomesfromGod.200

Weregardtheconnectionbetweenthepremisesofasyllogismanditsconclusionasnecessary.Werewenot,wecouldhavenotrustinrationalityandwouldhavetoconcludeitismereconjecture.Theconnectionbetweenthepremisesandtheconclusionisofthesamekindastheconnectionthatexistsbetweencausesandtheireffectsintheoutsideworld.Ourassumptionaboutthenecessarycharacterofthesyllogisticconnectionsinourmindsuggeststhatallcausalconnectionsshouldindeedbeconsiderednecessary.201Thisis,infact,al-Ghazālī’sposition.Inallcontextswherethecosmologicalorepistemologicalaspectsofcausalconnectionsareirrelevant,heassumesthatforuscausalconnectionsarenecessary.Atnopoint,however,doeshecalltheconnectionthatexistsassuchbetweenthecauseanditseffectnecessary.Onlyhumanjudgmentsabouttheconnectionsarenecessary.ConsistentwithhiscriticismintheseventeenthdiscussionoftheIncoherence,al-Ghazālīdoesnotassumethatcausalconnectionsintheoutsideworldarenecessary.Whiletheywillalwayshappenjustastheyhappennow,theyaresubjecttoGod’swillandthuscanbedifferentifHedecidestochangeHisarrangement—whichweknowHeneverwill.(p.214)

Notes:

(1).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:305.4–5/2494.5–6.

(2).Onthesubjectofefficientcausality,Ockhamtaughtthatthenecessityoftheconnectionsbetweenthecauseanditseffectcannotbedemonstrated.Nevertheless,heconsideredthenecessityofthisconnectiontobepresentinhumanknowledge.SeeAdams,WilliamOckham,2:741–98.Onhismodaltheory,seeKnuuttila,ModalitiesinMedievalPhilosophy,145–57.

(3).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,74.11–75.4/44.12–18.

(4).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Manṭiq,al-Burhān,44.11–12;al-Najāt,(ed.Dānishpazhūh)169–70.ThepassageismissingfromṢabrīal-Kurdī’seditionofIbnSīnā’sal-Najāt.

(5).Seebelowpp.205–12.OnnominalisttendenciesinIbnSīnā,seeMcGinnis,“ScientificMethodologiesinMedievalIslam,”325–27.

(6).Al-Ghazālī,al-Maqṣad,15–59;seeGätje,“Logisch-semasiologischeTheorien,”162–68.

(7).Seeforinstance,theparableofthe“inquiringwayfarer”inthethirty-fifthbookofthe


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Ihyāʾ,inwhichthe“pen,”thatis,theactiveintellect,“writes”knowledgeonthe“spread-outtabled”inthehumansoul(Iḥyāʾ,4:310.22–312.1/2502.12–2504.3).Onthisparable,seebelow,p.219.Therearenumerousdistinctly“realist”commentsintheworksofal-Ghazālī,suchasinthefirstbookoftheIḥyāʾ,1:120.7–16/148.5–16,inwhichhesaysthatknowingiseffectively“remembering”(tadhakkur)theformsorideasthathumansaretaughtintheirprimordialdisposition(fiṭra).Seealsoapassageinhisal-Mustaṣfā,1:80.7–8/1:26.12:“(…)thereforethe[human]intellectcanbecomparedtoamirrorinwhichtheformsoftheintelligiblesareimprintedaccordingtohowtheyreallyare(ʿalāmāhiyaʿalayhā),andImeanby‘formsoftheintelligibles’theiressences(ḥaqāʾiq)andtheirquiddities(māhiyyāt).”OrtheMishkātal-anwār,67.15–6/153.3–4:“Ifthereareintheworldofsovereigntyluminous,noble,andhighsubstances,whicharereferredtoas‘theangels,’fromwhichthelightsemanateuponthehumanspirits(…).”

(8).IbnRushd,Tahāfutal-tahāfut,531.11–13;EnglishtranslationbyvandenBergh,Averroes’Tahafut,1:325:“Knowledge”alwaysimpliestruth—falsehoodisnotconsideredknowledge.”

(9).bi-mujarradil-qudraminghayriwāsiṭaawbi-sababinminal-asbāb;al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,369.5/222.6–7.

(10).Ibid.,369.6–370.1/222.7–14.

(11).Ibid.,13.10–12/7.17–19.

(12).Abrahamov,“Al-Ghazālī’sTheoryofCausality,”91.

(13).Strauss,PersecutionandtheArtofWriting,68–74.

(14).Gairdner,“Al-Ghazālī’sMishkātal-AnwārandtheGhazālīProblem,”153.

(15).Onesotericandexotericwritinginal-Ghazālī(thoughwithlittlereferencetothequestionofhiscosmology),seeLazarus-Yafeh,Studies,349–411.

(16).Frank,CreationandtheCosmicSystem:Al-Ghazâlî&Avicenna.Frankpresentstheseresultsfirstinhisarticle“Al-Ghazālī’sUseofAvicenna’sPhilosophy.”Later,inhis“CurrentsandCountercurrents,”126–34,herevisitsthesubjectagainandaddsnewinsights.

(17).Cf.Frank’sownsynopsisofhisconclusionsinhisAl-GhazālīandtheAshʿariteSchool,4.

(18).Frank,CreationandtheCosmicSystem,86.

(19).Frank,Al-GhazālīandtheAshʿariteSchool,87.

(20).Ibid.,31–37.Frankishighlycriticalofal-Ghazālī’sability—orwillingness—toexpresshimselfclearly.Oncertainsubjects,al-Ghazālī“fudgestheissue(…)inafogoftraditional


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language,”“tendstoweasel,”“buriestherealissueunderacloudofdialecticalobfuscation,”andoffers“somewhatinconclusiverigmarole”(Frank,Al-GhazālīandtheAshʿariteSchool,49,89–90).Frank’sanalysisofal-Ghazālī’slanguagehasbeencriticizedbyAhmadDallalinhis“GhazālīandthePerilsofInterpretation,”777–87.DallalseesacertainphilologicalsloppinessinFrank’streatmentofal-Ghazālī’stextsthatjumpstopreconceivedandoftenuntenableconclusions.

(21).Marmura,“GhazaliandDemonstrativeScience”;idem,“Al-Ghazālī’sSecondCausalTheoryinthe17thDiscussionoftheTahāfut”;andidem,“Al-GhazālīonBodilyResurrectionandCausalityinTahafutandtheIqtisad.”

(22).Marmura,“GhazālianCausesandIntermediaries,”92–93.

(23).Craig,KalāmCosmologicalArgument,45–46;repeatedinidem,TheCosmologicalArgument,101.ThepositionofCraigandMarmurawasgenerallyacceptedupto1992.

(24).Marmura,“GhazālianCausesandIntermediaries,”89.

(25).Ibid.,91,93–97,99–100.

(26).Marmura,“Ghazali’sChapteronDivinePowerintheIqtiṣād.”

(27).InTahāfut,78.4–7/46.9–12,al-GhazālīmentionsQawāʿidal-ʿaqāʾidasthetitleofthebookthataffirmsthetrueteachings(ithbātmadhhabal-ḥaqq).Qawāʿidal-ʿaqāʾidisthetitleofthesecondbookoftheIḥyāʾ.Thefirstpartofthatbookalsocirculatesinmanuscriptsasanindependentworkunderthistitle.Marmura,“Ghazali’sal-Iqtisadfial-i’tiqad:ItsRelationtoTahafutal-FalasifaandtoQawa’idal-Aqa’id,”makestheconvincingcasethatthetitleQawāʿidal-ʿaqāʾidintheTahāfutrefers,infact,toal-Iqtiṣādfīl-iʿtiqād.


(29).Marmura,“GhazaliandDemonstrativeScience,”193.


(31).Marmura,“Ghazali’sAttitudetotheSecularSciences,”100.

(32).Marmura,“GhazaliandAshʿarismRevisited,”93,108.

(33).Marmuraexpressedthatexplicitly(“GhazaliandDemonstrativeScience,”183);FrankneverconsideredthatoptionasfarasIcansee.

(34).Frank,Al-GhazālīandtheAshʿariteSchool,3,100–101.Marmurabelievesthisisavailableinal-Iqtiṣādfīl-iʿtiqād.

(35).Frank,Al-GhazālīandtheAshʿariteSchool,4,29,87,91.

(36).kilāhumāmumkināniʿindanā;seeabovepp.178–9.


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(37).Marmura,“Al-Ghazālī’sSecondCausalTheory,”86,96–98,101–7;idem,“GhazalionBodilyResurrectionandCausality,”50,59–65.

(38).McGinnis,“Occasionalism,NaturalCausationandScienceinal-Ghazālī.”

(39).Marmura,“Ghazali’sSecondCausalTheory,”97.

(40).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,279.2/171.8;279.11/171.16;289.4–5/176.15.

(41).Ibid.,283.9–285.6/173.16–174.14.

(42).Ibid.,376.7–10/230.6–9.

(43).Ibid.,279.2/167.8–9.

(44).Ibid.,96.11–97.1/56.1–3.

(45).Ibid.,98.1–2/56.16–7.

(46).Gyekye,“Al-GhazālīonAction,”90.

(47).maʿal-ʿilmibi-l-murādiandhuwaʿālimunbi-māarādahu;al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,96.11–12/56.2–3;100.2–3/58.1–2.

(48).Al-Ghazālī,al-Iqtiṣād,87.ult.–88.2;Marmura,“Ghazali’sChapteronDivinePower,”304;Druart,“Al-Ghazālī’sConceptionoftheAgent,”437.

(49).Al-Ghazālī,al-Munqidh,23.11–13.

(50).Thesuggestionthatal-Ghazālīdevelopedhisviewsonthissubjectisnottrulyconvincing.Al-Juwaynī,Irshād,110.3,hadalreadyclarifiedthatthereisonlyoneagentinthisworld,whichisGod.

(51).Gyekye,“Al-GhazālīonAction,”84–88,reviewstheargumentsanddiscussestheirphilosophicalunderpinnings.

(52).Al-Ghazālīarguesthatincomparisontoanimatebeings,inanimateonesarecalledagentsonlybywayofmetaphor(Tahāfut,98.13–99.6/57.8–14);thisargumentstandsmuteinlightofhiswholeœuvre,sinceintheIḥyā’,hemakesclearthatevenanimatebeingscannotbeconsideredagentsinthetruesenseoftheword.Herehesaysthatcallingahumananagentisonlybymeansofametaphor(Iḥyāʿ,4:320.12–16/2516.4–9).

(53).Sabra,“KalāmAtomismasanAlternativePhilosophy,”207–9.

(54).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,120.13/71.1.

(55).Ibid.,134.5/79.12.Druart,“Al-Ghazālī’sConceptionoftheAgent,”428–32.

(56).OnthiselementofIbnSīnā’steachings,seeabovepp.142–3.


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(57).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,157.1–5/92.3–6;161.6–7/95.18–19;163.2–5/96.1–4.

(58).Ibid.,293.ult./175.14.

(59).Gyekye,“Al-GhazālīonAction,”88.

(60).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyā’,4:322/2518–19.

(61).Ibid.,4:325.ult./2523.12–13;cf.al-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,9:465.18–19;andGramlich,Muḥammadal-ĠazzālīsLehre,558.

(62).Al-Ghazālī,Ihyā’,4:326.6–7/2523.20–21.

(63).wa-yakūnuqadjarāfīsābiqiʿilmihianlāyafʿalahu…;al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,286.8–10/171.9–10.Thepassageiscomposedofafullsentenceatthebeginningplustwoḥālsentencesthatqualifythefirst.IfollowMarmura’ssuggestionandseethefirstḥālasanobjection.

(64).IbnTūmart,Sifrfīhijamīʿtaʿāliqal-Imāmal-maʿṣūmal-Mahdī,220.6–7;cf.Nagel,ImOffenkundigendasVerborgene,109;andGriffel“IbnTūmart’sRationalProof,”779–80.

(65).IbnTūmart,Sifrfīhijamīʿtaʿāliqal-Imāmal-maʿṣūmal-Mahdī,219.16–20.

(66).Al-Bukhārī,al-Ṣaḥīḥ,qadar1;anbiyā’1;cf.alsotawḥīd28andbad’al-khalq6.Cf.Wensinck,Concordanceetindices,1:22a–b.SeeWatt,FreeWillandPredestination,18;andvanEss,ZwischenḤadīṯundTheologie,1–32.

(67).Muslim,al-Ṣaḥīh,qadar2.Cf.Wensinck,Concordanceetindices,5:319a.SeeWatt,FreeWillandPredestination,17.

(68).Al-Ghazālīdiscussesthisquestioninal-Iqtiṣād,222–25.Thepassageisdiscussedbelow,pp.202–4.Hecomesdownonthelatterside,sayingthatsomeonealwaysdies“atthetimeof”(bi-,alsomeaning:“through”)hisappointedtimeofdeath(ajal).ThisistheusuallanguageappliedbyAshʿaritestothatquestion;cf.Gimaret,Ladoctrined’al-Ashʿarī,423–28.Foral-Ghazālī,thismeansthattheajalandthedeatharealwayscreatedconcomitantly,justlikeacauseanditseffect.

(69).Watt,FreeWillandPredestination,135.OnthevariouspositionsondivinepredeterminationtakenbyMuʿtazilites,seeibid.,61–92;vanEss,TheologieundGesellschaft,4:492–500;andGimaret,Ladoctrined’al-Ashʿarī,424–28.

(70).IbnFūrak,Mujarradmaqālātal-Ashʿarī,135–39;Gimaret,Ladoctrined’al-Ashʿarī,423–32.

(71).IbnFūrak,Mujarradmaqālātal-Ashʿarī,74.12–13;seealsoidem,45.15–17;98.8–11;andFrank,Creation,70.


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(72).Gimaret,Ladoctrined’al-Ashʿarī,393–95,411–22.

(73).Al-Isfarāʾīnī,“al-ʿAqīda,”134.4–5;seealsoibid.,162,fragm.72.

(74).Al-Baghdādī,Uṣūlal-dīn,145.10–12.

(75).Seebelowp.191.Al-Fārābī’sproposedsolutiontothedilemmabetweenhumanfreewillanddivinepredestination(pp.139–40)canalsobeunderstoodasareactiontothedebatebetweenMuʿtazilitesandtheirSunniopponents.

(76).Abūl-Ḥusaynal-Baṣrī,Taṣaffuḥal-adilla,116.9–10;118.14.Seealsotheeditors’introductiononpp.xviii–xix.

(77).IbnFūrak,Mujarradmaqālātal-Ashʿarī,11.21;al-Bāqillānī,al-Tamhīd,29–30;al-Baghdādī,Uṣūlal-dīn,8.5–6;al-Juwaynī,al-Irshād,13.14–16.

(78).OnAvicenna’snotionofasingleeternaldivineknowledgeandhowitcontainsindividualeventssuchastheeclipseofcelestialbody,seepp.138–41.

(79).khurūjminal-dīn;al-Juwaynī,al-Irshād,96.3–7.

(80).Ibid.,98.1–8.SeePaulWalker’sEnglishtranslationofthispassageinal-Juwaynī,AGuidetoConclusiveProofs,56.

(81).Al-Juwaynī,al-Irshād,13.14;94.14.AvicennaalsotaughtthatGod’sknowledgeistimeless.OnGod’sknowledgeinclassicalAshʿaritetexts,seeFrank,“TheNon-ExistentandthePossibleinClassicalAshʿariteTeaching,”7–16.

(82).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,1:124.18–21/155–56;idem,al-Arbaʿīn,5.13–6.2/5.7–11.

(83).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,1:125.1–4/156.12–15;correctedaccordingtoal-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,2:28–29,whoaddsṣifaazaliyyalahuinthefirstsentence.SeethetranslationanddiscussionofthispassageinFrank,Creation,53.Itisalsoinal-Ghazālī,al-Arbaʿīn,6.13–7.2/6.7–11.

(84).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,1:148.9–11/188.13–16.Tibawi,“Al-Ghazālī’sSojoun,”84.26–29,105.

(85).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,1:148.16–20/189.1–5;Tibawi,“Al-Ghazālī’sSojourn,”85.6–11,105.Seethecommentarybyal-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,2:141.3ff.

(86).Al-Ghazālī,al-Iqtiṣād,101–13.

(87).Ibid.,101.9–102.7.

(88).OnemightcomparethiswithFakhral-Dīnal-Rāzī,al-Maṭālibal-ʿāliya,9:57.7–12(alsoinidem,Muḥaṣṣal,459.6–7),whoconcludesfromtheexistenceofanall-encompassingdivineforeknowledgethathumanactionsarepredeterminedand


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“compelled”(majbūr).

(89).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:111.5/2224.8and4:317.17/2511.ult.:qudraazaliyya;ibid.4:12.17/2091.4:hukmazalī;ibid.4:30.23/2115.21:irādaazaliyya.Comparewiththis,e.g.,al-Maqṣad,145.6,inwhich“God’sforeknowledge”(sābiqʿilmihi)isclearlyspelledout.

(90).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:120.22–4/2237.6–7.

(91).Ibid.,4:121.3–5/2237.16–18.Seeal-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,9:74;andGramlich,Muḥammadal-ĠazzālīsLehre,209.

(92).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:111.8–9/2224.ult.

(93).al-qadarusirruLlāhifa-lātafshūhu;ibid.,4:440.4–8/14:2680.14.Onthenoncanonicalsourcesofthisḥadīth,seeal-ʿIrāqī’snotesonthepropheticalsayingsquotedintheIḥyāʾ;Gramlich,Muḥammadal-ĠazzālīsLehre,209;idem,NahrungderHerzen,2:172;andMichot,inhisintroductiontoIbnSīnā,Lettreauvizir,121*.

(94).qālal-ʿārifūna:ifshāʾusirrul-rubūbiyyakufr;al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:306.23/2499.15–16.Cf.al-Makkī,Qūtal-qulūb,2:90.19–20:“Someofthosewhohaveknowledgeoftheimplicationsoftawḥīdsay:(…)TheLordshipisasecret,revealingitwouldforfeitprophecy;andprophecyisasecret,revealingitwouldforfeitknowledge.”Cf.Gramlich,Muḥammadal-ĠazzālīsLehre,522.Al-Ghazālīdiscussesthesayinginhisal-Imlāʾ,44–46/3075–78.InIhyāʾ,1:128–34/161–74,hediscussesinextensowhichelementsofthecreedshouldnotbediscussedinpublic.

(95).Cf.Marmura,“GhazaliandAshʿarismRevisited,”105.Frank,CreationandtheCosmicSystem,45;idem,Al-GhazālīandtheAshʿariteSchool,19.

(96).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:305.2–6/2494.3–7.Al-Ghazālīpromisestodiscussjustasmuchoftawḥīdasisnecessarytodeveloptherightkindoftawakkul.Itisthethirdamongfourdegreesoftawḥīdthatformsthebasisofasoundtawakkul.

(97).Ibid.,3:24.20/8:1376.16.

(98).Cf.alsoQ56:78and80:13–16.FortherangeofviewsofhowthelawḥmaḥfūẓhasbeenunderstoodbyMuslims,seeDanielMadigan,“PreservedTablet,”inEQ,4:261–63;vanEss,TheologieundGesellschaft,4:617–30.

(99).Al-Ghazālī,Fayṣalal-tafriqa,182–83/37–38.Notethatthisisnot“thepen”ofthethirty-fifthbookoftheIḥyāʾthatwritesonthehumantablet.Theḥadīththatthefirstcreationisthepenisforinstancereportedbyal-Tirmidhī,Jāmiʿal-ṣaḥīh,tafsīrsūrat68.

(100).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,258–61/155–57.

(101).OnAvicenna’steachingsonprophecy,seep.68.


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(102).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,3:24.17–22/1376.12–18;4:241.12–13/2406.15–16.Cf.ibid.,4:217.20–22/2374.5–7.OntheAvicennaninfluenceonal-Ghazālī’sunderstandingofthelawḥal-maḥfūẓ,seePines,“Quelquesnotessurlesrapportsdel’Iḥyāʾʿulūmal-dīnd’al-Ghazālīaveclapenséed’IbnSīnā,”14–16.Accordingtoal-Ghazālī’sreportofthefalāsifa’steachings,theimaginativefaculty(quwwamutakhayyila)oftheprophetscanseeinthelawḥal-maḥfūẓ“theformsoffutureparticulareventsimprintedinit”(al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,273.8–10/164.1–2).

(103).alladhīhuwamanqūshunbi-jamīʿimāqaḍāLlāhubihiilāyawmil-qiyāma;al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,3:24.20–24/8:1376.16–17.

(104).Al-Ghazālī,al-Arbaʿīn,11.10–12/11.4–6.Thequotationisfroma“Sharḥli-l-Maṣābīḥ”byanunidentifiedscholarwhomhecalls“al-imāmmawlānāʿAlāʾal-Dīn.”SeeFrank,CreationandtheCosmicSystem,21,45.

(105).Al-GhazālīhintstothispositionintheseventeenthdiscussionoftheTahāfutwhenhewrites:“(…)thecognitions[thatthemiracleisamongthewayGodactshabitually]slipawayfromthe[people’s]heartsandGoddoesnotcreatethem”(Tahāfut,286.7–8/171.7–8).

(106).IbnFūrak,Mujarradmaqālātal-Ashʿarī,176.16–20;177.10–15.Gimaret,Ladoctrined’al-Ashʿarī,459–60;Gardet,Dieuetladestinée,193–94;Antes,ProphetenwunderinderAšʿarīya,37–39.

(107).Al-Juawynī,al-Irshād,307–15.FortheclassicalAshʿariteviewsonprophecyanditsverification,seeGimaret,Ladoctrined’al-Ashʿarī,453–63;Gardet,Dieuetladestinéedel’homme,193–204;Antes,ProphetenwunderinderAšʿarīya,29–46;Griffel,“Al-Ġazālī’sConceptofProphecy,”101–3.

(108).SeeAntes,ProphetenwunderinderAšʾarīya,95.Inhiskalāmcompendiumal-Iqtiṣād,198–99,al-Ghazālīwritesaboutpropheticalmiraclesinaverytraditionalway,teachingthatmiraclesestablishtheveracity(ṣidq)oftheprophetswithoutclearlystatingthatmiraclesareabreakinGod’shabit.Seealsohisal-Risālaal-Qudsiyya(=Iḥyāʾ,1:154.ult./198.14–15)wherehesays,“Whereasthephysician’struthfulnessisknownthroughexperienceandtheprophet’struthfulnessisknownthroughmiracles(…)”(Tibawi,“Al-Ghazālī’sSojourn,”91.29–30,117).


(110).Al-Ghazālī,al-Mustaṣfā,2:154–55/1:138.16–17;idem,Faḍāʾiḥal-bāṭiniyya,133–36;Weiss,“KnowledgeofthePast:TheTheoryoftawāturAccordingtoGhazālī,”93,95.

(111).Al-Ghazālī,Arbaʿīn,64.1–4.ThepassageistranslatedinGianotti,Al-Ghazālī’sUnspeakableDoctrine,156.

(112).Al-Ghazālī,Ḥimāqat-iahl-iibāḥat,9.17–18/171.3.


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(113).SeeGriffel,“Al-Ġazālī’sConceptofProphecy:TheIntroductionofAvicennanPsychologyintoAšʿariteTheology,”138–44;andFrank,Al-GhazālīandtheAshʿariteSchool,67–68.

(114).Al-Ghazālī,al-Munqidh,44.1–3;cf.theEnglishtranslationbyMcCarthy,DeliverancefromError,86.


(116).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:315.9–10/2508.18–19.Thestoryofthepseudo-prophetal-SāmirīandhowhemisledtheIsraelitestobuildthegoldencalfistoldinQ20:83–98.

(117).IbnSīnā,al-Ishārātwa-l-tanbīhāt,220.15–221.2.Al-Ghazālīcopiedthispassageinhisreportofphilosophicalteachings,MSLondon,BritishLibrary,Or.3126,fol.284a.Cf.alsoal-Ghazālī(?),Maʿārijal-Quds,165.12–13.Seeabovepp.68–69;andal-Akiti,“ThreePropertiesofProphethood,”191.

(118).IbnFūrak,Mujarradmaqālātal-Ashʿarī,157.4.

(119).Al-Juwaynī,al-Irshād,307–8,314.9–12.Accordingtoibid.,312.3–5,andtoal-Juwaynī,al-Shāmil(ed.Tehran),96–97,the“ahlal-ḥaqq”holdthatmiraclesandkaramātarebreaksinGod’shabit.

(120).Al-Ghazālī,Iqtiṣād,6.14.

(121).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,289.11–12/173.1–2.Thatpositionisrepeated,forinstance,inal-Ghazālī’sletterstoAbūBakrinal-ʿArabī,seep.69.

(122).lātajidufīsunnatiLlāhitabdīlan,Q33:62,48:23(…taḥwīlan,inQ35:43);cf.alsoQ30.30:lātabdīlali-khalqiLllāh.Al-Ghazālī,al-Iḥyāʾ,4:8.4–5/2084.ult.

(123).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:12.17–18/2091.4–5.Forotheroccurrences,seeibid.,4:30.23/2115.20–21;4:58.9–11/2151–52;4:370.4/2586.6–7.ForIbnSīnā’sunderstandingofthisQur’anicverse,seeal-Ḥikmaal-ʿarshiyya,15.16–17.

(124).Frank,CreationandtheCosmicSystem,59;idem,Al-GhazālīandtheAshʿariteSchool,20.ForevidencethatthispositionistheonethatunderlinesthewholediscussionintheseventeenthdiscussionoftheTahāfut,seeBahlul,“MiraclesandGhazali’sFirstTheoryofCausation,”139–41.Marmura,“GhazalionDemonstrativeScience,”196,200–201;andidem,“GhazaliandAshʿarismRevisited,”105,maintainsthatforal-Ghazālī,miraclesareabreakinGod’shabit.

(125).Al-GhazālīwasmostexplicitinhisMunqidh,whichwasnotedbymanyofhislatercritics.See,forinstance,theremarkinFakhral-Dīnal-Rāzī’sMuḥaṣṣal,491.11–12.Onal-Ghazālī’ssubtletechniqueofincludingIbnSīnā’sthreepropertiesofprophecyinhisMunqidh,seeal-Akiti,“ThreePropertiesofProphethood,”197–99.Al-Ghazālī’spositionabouttheverificationofprophecyintheMunqidhhasbeenacontroversialsubjectamong


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Westerninterpreters.Forreportsabouttheliterature,seePoggi,Unclassicodellaspiritualitàmusulmana,239–45;andGriffel,“Al-Ghazālī’sConceptofProphecy,”105,n.12.

(126).IbnGhaylān,Ḥudūthal-ʿālam,8.19–22.

(127).Al-Ṭurṭūshī,RisālailāʿAbdallāhibnMuẓaffar,160.8–161.5;seeGhurāb,“Ḥawlaikhrāqal-Murābiṭīnli-Iḥyāʾal-Ghazālī,”136.

(128).Al-Akiti,“ThreePropertiesofProphethood,”194–95;Davidson,Alfarabi,Avicenna,andAverroes,onIntellect,58–63,116–17.

(129).TheBrethrenpresenttheirteachingsonprophecyinthethirty-fifth,forty-sixth,andforty-seventhepistlesinRasāʾilIkhwānal-ṣafāʾ,3:231–48/3:227–42,4:123–96/4:61–144.OnprophetologyintheBrethren,seeMarquet,LaphilosophiedesIhˇwānal-Safāʾ,477–508;idem,“Révélationetvisionvéridique”;Goldziher,Richtungen,186–96;Giese,“ZurErlösungsfunktiondesTraumes”;andal-ʿAbd,al-InsānfīfikrIkhwānal-ṣafāʾ,254–73.

(130).Al-Akiti,“ThreePropertiesofProphethood,”195–210;Davidson,Alfarabi,Avicenna,andAverroes,onIntellect,141–42;Griffel,“Al-Ġazālī’sConceptofProphecy.”

(131).Baffioni,“FromSensePerceptiontotheVisionofGod,”230–31.CfalsoBaffioni’sstudyontheBrethren’sterminologywithregardtotheawliyāʾAllāh:“AnEssayonTerminologicalResearchinPhilosophy.”

(132).RasāʾilIkhwānal-ṣafāʾ,3:246.15–17/3:240.21–23;GermantranslationinDiwald,ArabischePhilosophieundWissenschaft,202.Onal-Ghazālī’sletter,seeabovepp.68–69.IbnSīnā’steachingsonthissubjectarehardlydifferent.Healsosaysthat“purification”(tazkiya)leadstheprophetsandawliyāʾtotheirperfection(al-Ishārātwa-l-tanbīhāt,220.15–18).

(133).See,forexample,Whittingham,Al-GhazālīandtheQurʾān,68–69.

(134).IbnSīnā,however,didnotshyawayfromusingthewordrūḥhimself.Seetheʿaqlqudsīandal-rūḥal-qudsiyyainal-Shifāʾ,al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt,al-Nafs,248–49,andcomparetheseteachingstoal-Ghazālī’suseofal-rūḥal-qūdsīinMishkātal-anwār,51–52/133.10–12,77.13–15/166.9–12,81.4–10/170–71.

(135).Gimaret,LelivredeBilawharetBūḏāsf,37–38,forinstance,makesthecasethattheallegoryofthekingwhoconfuseshisbridewithacorpseinal-Ghazālī’sKīmiyā-yisaʿādat,1:105–6,goesbacktotheRasāʾilIkhwānal-ṣafāʾ,4:212–14/4:162–64.Diwald,ArabischePhilosophieundWissenschaft,7,mentionsnumerousconnectionsbetweentheRasāʾilandworksofal-Ghazālī.Shepromisestopresenttheiranalysisinavolumethatunfortunatelynevercameout,

(136).Seebelowpp.269–71,219.


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(137).Al-Ghazālī,al-Munqidh,26.5–17;27.2–6,33.19–22.TheIkhwānal-ṣafāʾarenotmentionedintheTahāfut.

(138).lahuʿukūfunʿalāRasāʾiliIkhwānil-ṣafāʾ;al-Subkī,Ṭabaqāt,6:241.7;andal-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,1:28.22.SeealsoIbnTaymiyya,“Sharḥal-ʿaqīdaal-iṣfahāniyya,”116.19.ThesepassagesseemtobequotationsfromthelostKitābal-Kashfwa-l-inbāʾʿalāmutarjambi-l-IḥyāʾbyAbūʿAbdallāhMuḥammadibnʿAlīal-Māzarīal-Imām.ForaSpanishtranslationofthepassage,seeAsínPalacios,“Unfaqîhsiciliano,contradictordeAlĠazâlî,”227.

(139).Al-Subkī,Ṭabaqāt,6:241.7–15;andal-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,1:28.22–28.IbnTaymiyya,“Sharḥal-ʿaqīdaal-iṣfahāniyya,”116.19–117.9.

(140).IbnSabʿīn,Buddal-ʿārif,144.ult.–145.4.IbnSabʿīnmentionsthetwenty-firstbookoftheIḥyāʾ(Sharḥʿajāʾibal-qalb),Maʿārijal-qudsfīmadārijmaʿrifatal-nafs,Mishkātal-anwār,and“Kīmiyāʾal-saʿāda.”ItisunlikelythatIbnSabʿīnreadthePersianKīmiyā-yisaʿādat,sothelatterbookismostprobablytheArabicKīmiyāʾal-saʿāda,areworkedsummaryoftheIḥyāʾ.Bouyges,Essay,136–37;andBadawī,Muʾallafāt,275–76,havequestionedal-Ghazālī’sauthorshipofthisbook.OnthepassagebyIbnSabʿīn,seeAkasoy,PhilosophieundMystik,230–31,323.Onthenegativereactiontoal-GhazālīintheMuslimWest,seealsoSerranoRuano,“WhyDidtheScholarsofal-AndalusDistrustal-Ghazâlî?”

(141).IbnTaymiyya,“Sharḥal-ʿaqīdaal-iṣfahāniyya,”111.12.

(142).IbnTaymiyya,Minhājal-sunna,4:148:33–149–21.

(143).IbnTaymiyya,“Sharḥal-ʿaqīdaal-iṣfahāniyya,”115–18.

(144).Al-Māzarīal-Imāmmayhavebroughtupal-Tawḥīdī’snamebecauseinhisal-Imtāʿwa-l-muʾānasa,2:11–18,hereportsadisputeintheworkshopofthecopyistsatBasra.There,AbūSulaymānMuḥammadibnMaʿsharal-Bīstīal-Maqdisī,oneoftheinitialauthorsoftheRasāʾilIkhwānal-ṣafāʾ,claimedthatprophetshealsickpeopleandthatthehealthysoulsofthosewhopracticephilosophy(aṣḥābal-falsafa)areinnoneedofprophecy.Stern,“AuthorshipoftheEpistles,”369,observesthatthisgoesbeyondwhatistaughtintheRasāʾilandthat“al-Maqdisī,intheheatofdispute,letslipfromhismouthopinionswhichwereusuallyrestrictedtotheinnercircleofadepts.”Al-Maqdisī’spositionhasmorethanoncebeenmisattributedtoal-Tawḥīdī;cf.,forinstance,Moosa,GhazālīandthePoetics,155.

(145).Al-Ghazālī,Miʿyāral-ʿilm,122.11–20;MSVatican,Ebr.426,fol.128b.Thisexampleappearsmoreofteninal-Ghazālī’swork—seeabovep.172—andinmanyeditions,thewordḥazz(“incision,notch”)ismistakenlyrenderedasjazz(“cuttingoff”).Thisledtothefalseimpression,reproducedbymostinterpreters,thatal-Ghazālīheretalksaboutdecapitation.TheJudeo-Arabicmanuscript,inwhichthelettersḥāʾandjīmareverydistinct,hasḥazz.AlreadyinBouyges’scriticaleditionoftheTahāfut,277.7,278.3–4(=


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166.6,166.11inMarmura’sedition)itisclearthatḥazzisthelectiodifficiliorandshouldhavebeenadopted.Thisisalsotrueforthediscussioninal-Iqtiṣād,223.12–14,whichisdealtwithbelowonp.202,andwhichclarifiesthattheḥazzleadsto“cleavages(iftirāqāt)amongtheatomsintheneckofhimwhoishit.”

(146).Al-Ghazālī,Miʿyāral-ʿilm,123.8–11;MSVatican,Ebr.426,fol.129a.IamreadingḥuzzatraqabatuhuaccordingtotheMS.ThispassageisdiscussedinMarmura,“GhazaliandDemonstrativeScience,”195–96;Frank,Al-GhazālīandtheAshʿariteSchool,18;andDallal,“Al-GhazālīandthePerilsofInterpretation,”783.

(147).Frank,CreationandtheCosmicSystem,38.

(148).TheMiʿyāral-ʿilmwasmostprobablywritteninthesameperiodrightaftertheTahāfutandbeforetheIḥyāʾʿulūmal-dīn.ThefollowingpassageisalsodiscussedinMarmura,“Al-GhazalionBodilyResurrectionandCausality,”68–70;andFakhry,IslamicOccasionalism,62–63.

(149).Al-Ghazālī,al-Iqtiṣād,223.8–9.Marmura,“Al-GhazalionBodilyResurrectionandCausality,”69,suggeststhatthe“singlecause”hereisunderstoodtobeGod,whichwouldchangetheunderstandingofthispassage.Thatinterpretation,however,isnotviable.Itwouldallowforwhatcanonlybeanabsurdassumptionforal-GhazālīthatifGodisregardedastheonlycauseofdeath,Hecouldnotexist.InthewholepassageGodisnowherementionedasacause(ʿilla).Hereal-Ghazālītalksaboutwhatweusuallyregardasproximatecausesofeventssuchasdeath.Thepassagefocusesonhumanknowledgeofcausalconnectionsandnotonthecreationofthem.

(150).Al-Ghazālī,al-Iqtiṣād,223.12–224.1.

(151).lazimaminintifāʾihiintifāʾul-mawt;ibid.,224.3.

(152).al-mawtuamrunistabaddal-rabbutaʿālābi-ikhtirāʿihimaʿal-ḥazz;ibid.,224.7–8.

(153).Seeabovep.152.

(154).Al-Ghazālī,al-Iqtiṣād,224.8–10.

(155).Ibid.,224.11–225.1.

(156).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:302.19/2490.15–16.Readingtaghbīrfīwajhal-ʿāqlinsteadoftaghyīraccordingtoal-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,9:385.30.Gramlich,Muḥammadal-ĠazzālīsLehre,515–16,inhisotherwisemeticulousGermantranslationrendersasbābas“secondarycauses,”whichleadstoundueconclusions.

(157).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:302.19–20/2490.16–17;readʿaqlinsteadofnaqlfollowingal-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,9:385.32.

(158).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,3:72.11/1445.15–16.InthefirstbookoftheIḥyāʾ,1:118.1–


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119.3/145.7–146.16,heclarifiesthatcertainpartsoftheʿaqlarepartofthehumannature(ṭabʿ),amongthemtheinstinctivecapacitytodistinguish“thepossibilityofthepossibilitiesfromtheimpossibilityofwhatisimpossible(jawāzal-jāʾizātwa-stiḥālatal-mustaḥīlāt).”

(159).Thislistofsevensourcesfollowsthedivisioninal-Ghazālī,Miḥakkal-naẓar,47–52(andsubsequentlyal-Mustaṣfā,1:138–46/1:44–46).SeeWeiss,“KnowledgeofthePast,”100–101.IntheMiʿyāral-ʿilm,121–25,thedivisionisslightlydifferentandexcludesreliablyreportedknowledge(mutawātirāt).InMiʿyāral-ʿilm,125–35,therearethreekinds(aṣnāf)ofnoncertainknowledge,whicharefurtherdividedinmanysubdivisions,mostofthemdiscussedinquiteanamountofdetail.IntheIḥyāʾ,1:103.5–7/124.18–20,al-Ghazālīincludestawātur.There,thefourcategoriesofcertainknowledgeare:(1)aprioriknowledgeandknowledgeestablishedthrough(2)tawātur,(3)experimentation(tajriba),and(4)burhān.

(160).Al-Ghazālī,Miʿyāral-ʿilm,122.12–15;idem,Miḥakkal-naẓar,50.1–6;

(161).ḥukmul-ʿaqlibi-wāsiṭatil-ḥissiwa-bi-takarruril-aḥsāsimarratanbaʿḍaukhrā;al-Ghazālī,Miḥakkal-naẓar,50.1–12;andidem,al-Mustaṣfā,1:141.2–12/1:45.10–16.Forverysimilarlistsofcausesandtheireffects,seeMiʿyāral-ʿilm,122.13–15;andMaqāṣidal-falāsifa.1:47.19–48.1/103.4–8.Cf.Frank,Al-GhazālīandtheAshʿariteSchool,18.

(162).quwwaqiyāsiyyakhafiyya;al-Ghazālī,Miʿyār,122.16–18.

(163).idhyaḥtamiluannazawālahubi-l-ittifāqonlyintheparallelpassagefromal-Mustaṣfā.

(164).Al-Ghazālī,Miḥakkal-naẓar,50.13–51.1;andal-Mustaṣfā,1:142.2–8/1:45.16–46.2.

(165).Bahlul,“MiraclesandGhazali’sFirstTheoryofCausation,”146–47,observescorrectlythatinal-Ghazālī,thereisnodifferencebetweencausalconnectionsand“accidentalconnections,”thatis,thosenotrepresentingcausalinfluences.

(166).Al-Ghazālī,Miḥakkal-naẓar,51.9–10;idem,al-Mustaṣfā,1:142.14–15/1:46.4.Notethatal-Ghazālī’slanguageassumesthatthethingsitselfhavesuchhabits;hedoesnotspeakofGod’shabit.

(167).Al-Ghazālī,Miḥakkal-naẓar,51.1–3;al-Mustaṣfā,1:142.9–11/1:46.2–3.

(168).Al-Ghazālī,Miḥakkal-naẓar,51.11–12;al-Mustaṣfā,1:142.ult.–143.1/1:46.4–5.Cf.Miʿyāral-ʿilm,123.4–5.SeeMarmura,“GhazaliandDemonstrativeScience,”195;andidem,“Ghazali’sAttitudetotheSecularSciences,”107–8.

(169).Al-Ghazālī,Miʿyāral-ʿilm,122.16;reading“ḥuṣūluidrākidhālikal-yaqīn”accordingtoMSVatican,Ebr.426,fol.128b.


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(170).Al-Ghazālī,Miḥakkal-naẓar,51.4–9(readingiqtirānuhuinline8);cf.al-Mustaṣfā,1:142.11–13/1:46.3–4.

(171).Marmura,“GhazaliandDemonstrativeScience,”195,remarksthatal-Ghazālī’suseofcertaintyinconnectionwiththeresultofexperimentationissomehowambiguous.Iseenosuchambiguity.


(173).Ibid.,43.12–ult./44.5–11.SeeGriffel,“Al-Ġazālī’sConceptofProphecy,”104,141.

(174).mūjibwa-mūjab;al-Ghazālī,al-Munqidh,70.8–9.

(175).Davidson,Alfarabi,Avicenna,andAverroes,onIntellect,83–94;McGinnis,“ScientificMethodologiesinMedievalIslam,”312–13.

(176).Aristotle,Categories,2a.35–2b.6.

(177).bi-tawassuṭiishrāqil-ʿaqlil-faʿʿāl;IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt,al-Nafs,235;seeHasse,“AvicennaonAbstraction,”53–58;andMcGinnis,“MakingAbstractionLessAbstract,”173–76,180.

(178).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Manṭiq,al-Burhān,44.11–12;McGinnis,“ScientificMethodologies,”313.Experience(tajriba)inIbnSīnāisalsodealtwithinabriefpassageinhisal-Najāt,61/113–14(seealsopp.169–70,butonlyinDānishpazhūh’sedition),andapassageinhisRisālatal-Ḥukūmafī-l-ḥujajal-muthbitīnli-l-māḍīmabaʾanzamaniyyan,134.18–135.6,whicharebothtranslatedinPines,“Laconceptiondelaconsciencedesoi,”255–57.

(179).McGinnis,“ScientificMethodologies,”314–15.

(180).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Manṭiq,al-Burhān,45.15–18,46.4;McGinnis,“ScientificMethodologies,”317,320.

(181).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Manṭiq,al-Burhān,46.5–7.

(182).hunākaqiyāsunyanʿaqidufīl-dhihnibi-ḥaythulāyushʿarubih;IbnSīnā,Risālatal-Ḥukūmafī-l-ḥujaj,134.23;seealsoal-Shifāʾ,al-Manṭiq,al-Burhān,161.19;46.11;46.20.Janssens,“‘Experience’(tajriba)inClassicalArabicPhilosophy,”56.

(183).McGinnis,“ScientificMethodologies,”318–19,arguesthatalthoughinductionattemptstoengenderanecessaryjudgmentthroughtheenumerationofpositiveinstances,experimentationisbasedatleastinpartontheabsenceoffalsifyinginstances.Thisrequires,asMcGinnisadmits,thatobservation“forthemostpart”notincludeafalsificationandthatanexceptionbeextremelyrare,perhapsobservedonlyonceortwice.Janssens,“‘Experience’(tajriba)inClassicalArabicPhilosophy,”54,objectsthat


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thisinterpretationhasnobasisinthetextandissimplytoomodern.

(184).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Manṭiq,al-Burhān,46.2.

(185).Aristotle,Analyticaposteriora,71b.9–12;McGinnis,“ScientificMethodologies,”321;Janssens,“‘Experience’(tajriba)inClassicalArabicPhilosophy,”55.

(186).ʿilmkullībi-sharṭ;IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Manṭiq,al-Burhān,46.20–23;McGinnis,“ScientificMethodologies,”323;Janssens,“‘Experience’(tajriba)inClassicalArabicPhilosophy,”57–58.

(187).Janssens,“‘Experience’(tajriba)inClassicalArabicPhilosophy,”58.

(188).Ibid.,57–59.

(189).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Manṭiq,al-Burhān,47.11;McGinnis,“ScientificMethodologies,”324–27.

(190).Janssens,“‘Experience’(tajriba)inClassicalArabicPhilosophy,”59.

(191).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Manṭiq,al-Burhān,161.19–ult.;Janssens,“‘Experience’(tajriba)inClassicalArabicPhilosophy,”60.

(192).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Manṭiq,al-Burhān,48.14–ult.;Janssens,“‘Experience’(tajriba)inClassicalArabicPhilosophy,”59–62.

(193).McGinnis,“ScientificMethodologiesinMedievalIslam,”326–27.

(194).Al-Ghazālī,Miʿyāral-ʿilm,122.9–10.

(195).Ibid.,122.18–123.1;MSVatican,Ebr.425,fol.128b.Cf.alsoaparallelpassageinMaqāṣidal-falāsifa,1:48.2–3.


(197).Seeabovep.116.

(198).IbnRushd,Tahāfutal-tahāfut,522.8:“fa-manrafaʿal-asbābafa-qadrafaʿal-ʿaql”;Frank,Al-GhazālīandtheAshʿariteSchool,17.SeealsoMarmura,“GhazaliandDemonstrativeScience,”183–85;andidem,“Ghazali’sAttitudetotheSecularSciences,”105.


(200).fa-l-natījatuminʿindaLlāhitaʿālā;al-Ghazālī,Miʿyāral-ʿilm,119.8–10;MSVatican,Ebr.426,fol.127a.Marmura,“Al-GhazaliandDemonstrativeScience,”194,pointstoparallelsinIbnSīnā,inwhichtheconclusionofanargumentisanemanationfromtheactiveintellect.


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(201).Kukkonen,“CausalityandCosmology,”33–34.

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