Rethinking Self-Incrimination, Voluntariness, and Coercion ...
Kiyemba Voluntariness Doctrine
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Transcript of Kiyemba Voluntariness Doctrine
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Kiyemba voluntariness doctrine
There must be an element of voluntariness or purposefulness in the
non-citizen's failure to depart. In most instances, as in this case, thismeans in practical terms that the government must show that the
non-citizen has had a reasonable opportunity to depart, which he
has voluntarily rejected. Upon such a showing, the defendant will be
convicted unless he ran show some justification for rejecting the
opportunity.
Federated States of Micronesia v Jorg
[1983] FMSC 13; 1 FSM Intrm. 378 (Pon.
1983) (9 December 1983)
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA
Cite as FSM v. Jorg, 1 FSM Intrm. 378 (Pon. 1983)
TRIAL DIVISION-STATE OF PONAPE
FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PETER JORG,
Defendant.
CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 1983-543
OPINION
Before Edward C. King
Chief Justice
Ponape, Caroline Islands 96941
December 9, 1983
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APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff: Carl Ullman
Assistant Attorney General
Federated States of Micronesia
Ponape, Caroline Islands 96941
For the Defendant: Loretta Faymonville
Public Defender
P.O. Box 238
Ponape, Caroline Islands 96941
[1 FSM Intrm. 378]
Defendant Peter Jorg, a citizen of Austria, has remained in the
Federated States of Micronesia some seven months after expiration
of his entry authorization. The question is whether be is "willfully"
failing to depart so that his continued presence here constitutes
criminal conduct under 50 F.S.M.C. 112.
Factual Background
Jorg and his fiancee, Heidemarie Eggersmeier, a citizen of West
Germany, arrived in Ponape on a February 16, 1983 Air Nauru flight
from Manila. Their plan was to rendezvous with a friend from the
Marshall Islands, who was to have come here by sailboat. They were
all to sail from Ponape to Majuro on the sailboat. Jorg and
Eggersmeier were then intending eventually to fly from Majuro tothe United States, with the that they might obtain employment
there.
The plan immediately went awry. Upon arrival at the Ponape
Airport, Jorg and Eggersmeier were advised by FSM Immigration
Officer Lucio Remoket that arriving visitors must have with them
tickets for their departure from the Federated States of Micronesia.
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Since they intended to depart from the Federated states of
Micronesia by private sailboat, the couple had no public transport
tickets for their departure. This problem was resolved by an
agreement that the couple would immediately acquire airtransportation tickets for passage from the Federated States of
Micronesia.
They fulfilled this requirement the next day by purchasing two
Air Nauru tickets for flights from Ponape to Nauru. They were
granted authorization to remain within the Federated States of
Micronesia until
[1 FSM Intrm. 379]
March 15, 1983. There is no evidence that this authorization was
ever extended.
Unfortunately, the former friend from the Marshall Islands never
appeared with the sailboat in Ponape. Jorg and Eggersmeier were
forced to seek alternate means of departure from the Federated
States of Micronesia. A couple from Sweden happened to be on
Ponape at the time. Jorg repaired their boat's motor and it was
agreed that Jorg and Eggersmeier could sail with the couple to
Majuro for $800 per person. Early in March, Jorg and Eggersmeier
cashed in their Air Nauru tickets, paid $1,600 to the Swedish couple,
and they all cast off for Majuro.
This is not the end of their story however. Shortly after departure
from Ponape, the boat's motor again began malfunctioning. Thisforced them to divert their boat to Kosrae for repairs.
Sometime after their arrival in Kosrae and while they were still
awaiting parts and repairs the next crucial incident occurred. For
reasons unexplained in the testimony, the Swedish woman became
angered one evening, threw overboard the belongings of Jorg and
Eggersmeier, and decreed that Jorg and his fiancee would not be
permitted to travel farther in the boat. The Swedish couple also
refused to refund the $1,600 on the grounds that the money had
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already been spent on new engine parts. The boat left shortly
thereafter, abandoning Jorg and Eggersmeier on Kosrae.
For several months they remained on Kosrae, without money to
buy a ticket to leave. They relied principally on the generosity of
individual Kosraeans for their food and housing.
[1 FSM Intrm. 380]
Finally, a man who befriended them purchased plane tickets for
their travel back to Ponape.
They arrived here on August 16, still dependent on others for the
necessities of life. Most of the help has been provided by the
Federated States of Micronesia which has furnished housing and
food for the impecunious travelers. The Federated States of
Micronesia is billing Jorg for these provisions and he acknowledges
that his indebtedness to the Federated States of Micronesia now
exceeds $1,000. He promises to pay eventually but is unable to do
so now.
Throughout recent months Federated States of Micronesia
immigration officials have been working with the nations of
citizenship of Jorg and Eggersmeier, Austria and West Germany,
respectively. Eggersmeier eventually received a loan from the West
German government enabling her to purchase a plane ticket. She
has departed from the Federated States of Micronesia.
The Republic of Austria is tendering funds to Jorg for his return
travel to Austria. Before issuing an airline ticket to him, however,
the Austrian Embassy demands that he sign a promissory note
agreeing to repay within 30 days the $1,226 price of the ticket to
Vienna.
Jorg insists that it would be impossible for him to repay the
$1,226 loan within 30 days and he refuses to sign the note.
Meanwhile he has made arrangements with yet another boat owner,
this one from West Germany, whose boat is awaiting repair. The
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captain of that boat confirms their agreement that Jorg will sail with
that boat to Manila after repairs are completed within a month or so.
The Federated States of Micronesia, unwilling to wait longer, presses
forward with its charge
[1 FSM Intrm. 381]
that, by refusing to obtain the Austrian funds, Jorg is "willfully and
unlawfully" remaining after expiration of his entry authorization in
violation of 50 F.S.M.C. 112.
Meaning of "Willfully"
Under 50 F.S.M.C. 112, a noncitizen of the Federated States of
Micronesia who "remains willfully and unlawfully after expiration or
revocation of his entry authorization" may be subjected to two years
of imprisonment, fined up to $10,000 and deported.
A. Federated States of Micronesia Sources
There are few clues within the law here as to the meaning of
"willfully." The Immigration Act offers no definition. The word
"willfully" was not discussed in any committee report or floor
discussion reflected in the Congress Journal. A comparison of 112
with the former Trust Territory immigration law reveals that the
penalty clause was drawn in great part from that earlier Trust
Territory provision, 53 TTC 62. While this suggests the Congress
was adopting "willfully" with the meaning ascribed to it under TrustTerritory law, we have found no Trust Territory High Court
interpretation of the word. Finally, this Court has not previously had
occasion to consider the meaning of the word "willfully."
B. Other Sources
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In the absence of clear guidance from sources within the
Federated States of Micronesia, we may look elsewhere for
assistance in determining the meaning of willfully.
I have reviewed United States court decisions under statutes
mandating certain actions and imposing criminal liability for willful
[1 FSM Intrm. 382]
failure to comply. These include cases Involving the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.S. 1252(e)1 (willful failure of alien under
deportation order to depart within six months or to make timelyapplication for documents necessary to departure); the Internal
Revenue Code, e.g., 26 U.S.C.S. 7203 (willful failure to file return
or pay tax) and 7204 (willful failure to furnish statement)2; and the
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.S. 322(a) (willfully failing to
comply with statutory or regulatory mandates).3
However, none of these authorities are sufficiently persuasive,
either for uniform results or as to mode of analysis, to warrant
outright adoption or extended discussion here.
The imprecision of analysis and lack of uniformity in results in
cases concerning "willful" failures to act is well illustrated in the tax
cases most closely parallel to Jorg's current circumstance. Where
taxpayers who could have borrowed funds to pay taxes, but did not,
are prosecuted for willful failure to pay taxes, there is a split of
authority. Compare United States v. Goodman, 190 F. Supp. 847, 856
(N.D. I11. 1961) ("I think it is obvious that there is no requirementthat a person must borrow money or agree to an assignment of his
fees in order to pay his income tax liabilities"), with United States v.
Tucker, 686
[1 FSM Intrm. [1967] USCADC 336; 383]
F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1982) ("This argument borders on the
ridiculous.... A taxpayer is obligated to conduct his financial affairs
http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5B1967%5D%20USCADC%20336?query=noncitizen%20nationalityhttp://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=383%20F2d%20230?query=noncitizen%20nationalityhttp://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=383%20F2d%20230?query=noncitizen%20nationalityhttp://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=383%20F2d%20230?query=noncitizen%20nationalityhttp://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=383%20F2d%20230?query=noncitizen%20nationalityhttp://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=383%20F2d%20230?query=noncitizen%20nationalityhttp://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5B1967%5D%20USCADC%20336?query=noncitizen%20nationality -
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in such a way that be has cash available to satisfy his tax
obligation").
C. Application
Having completed review of the various guides available, we are
still left to find our own way. I therefore return to the Act itself to
form an analysis.
The Immigration Act commands the alien to depart the
Federated States of Micronesia upon expiration of his entry
authorization. He whose conduct is defined as criminal, is one who
"willfully" fails to do so. By using the word "willfully," Congressdemonstrated that it did not intend that a person, by reason of a
bona fide misunderstanding of his obligations, physical or mental
incapacity, or other factors beyond his control, should become a
criminal by mere failure to measure up to the prescribed standard of
conduct.
Thus, it is not enough for the government to show only
knowledge of the requirement to depart and failure to depart. There
must be an element of voluntariness or purposefulness in the non-
citizen's failure to depart. In most instances, as in this case, this
means in practical terms that the government must show that the
non-citizen has had a reasonable opportunity to depart, which he
has voluntarily rejected. Upon such a showing, the defendant will be
convicted unless he ran show some justification for rejecting the
opportunity.
Applying these standards to this case, I find that, until theAustrian government tendered funds to him, Jorg had not voluntarily
[1 FSM Intrm. 384]
rejected or forgone any reasonable opportunity to depart. He had
taken no steps or omitted any actions with knowledge that such
steps or omissions would prevent compliance with the statutory
mandate.
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The government, however has shown that since late September
or early October, funds have been available to Jorg from the
Austrian government. Acceptance of those funds would provide the
opportunity to depart.
The remaining and central question then is whether Jorg is
justified in refusing to sign the promissory note tendered by his own
nation as a condition to the provision of funds which would enable
him to leave.
A hard look at the realities points toward the answer. The present
situation borders on the absurd. An itinerant Austrian citizen is
accepting food and housing from the Federated States ofMicronesia, a small, new, relatively poor nation, while
simultaneously refusing to accept travel funds from his own nation
because he does not like the terms of his nation's loan offer. Jorg
asks that we accept his reluctance to accept the demands of the
Republic of Austria as valid justification for his continued failure to
depart. In effect, he is asking that this Court and the Federated
States of Micronesia intervene in his dealings with has own country
by reviewing in detail Jorg's personal circumstances and the loanterms demanded by the Austrian government.
This Court and the Federated States of Micronesia must not be
lured into the role of mediator between visitors and their nations of
citizenship. Only in the rarest of circumstances, if ever, would the
[1 FSM Intrm. 385]
Court second-guess and scrutinize the conditions which other
nations place upon offers of funds to their own citizens.
Even if I were willing to engage in this line of inquiry, the
evidence would not justify a finding that the Austrian government is
placing Jorg in an unfair or untenable position.
Except for Jorg's brief, conclusory testimony that be has no
money or property, that he cannot receive assistance from his
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brother in Austria, and that the job market is bad in Austria, there as
no evidence of Jorg's personal or family circumstances or of the
Austrian economy. Consequently, we have no precise information as
to when, if ever, the Austrian government might reasonably expectto receive repayment from Jorg and what terms that government
might reasonably impose upon him in exchange for its loan of funds.
These are matters more within the competence of the Austrian
government to decide. It would be unworkable and improper for this
Court to try to determine whether the Austrian government is taking
a "reasonable" position under the circumstances and whether it is
treating its own citizen properly. In any event, it does not seem
unreasonable for that government, in loaning money to its citizen
marooned on a Pacific Island, to insist that he agree to repay the
money promptly upon his return to Vienna.
Jorg points out that under Austrian law debtors may be
imprisoned for non-payment. The implication is that he may be
imprisoned soon after his return to Austria if he signs the note. Yet,
there is no evidence indicating the circumstances under which
debtors are imprisoned, nor the frequency with which that occurs.
Rather than assume that the Austrian government will insist that itsdesperate
[1 FSM Intrm. 386]
citizen sign a 30 day note, which he candidly says he cannot pay,
and then promptly use that note as a basis for throwing him into the
jail soon after his return, I see as more likely the possibility that the
Austrian government is requiring the signing of a 30 day note simply
to assure that it will be repaid promptly, if funds are available. If Jorg
subsequently establishes that he in fact has no resources for
repayment of the note within 30 days, the Republic of Austria, one
hopes and trusts, will surely renegotiate the terms of payment.
Finally, there is no indication that Jorg himself has taken steps to
obtain funds under any better terms fran the Austrian government
or from any other source. For all that appears, he has merely
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rejected his own government's offer and continued to receive the
housing and food being furnished him by the Federated States of
Micronesia government.
For all of these reasons, I conclude that Jorg does have a
reasonable opportunity to depart from the Federated States of
Micronesia and that the conditions imposed by the Austrian
government upon their loan offer do not justify his refusal to accept
the funds.
Jorg's reluctance to accept the funds from the Republic of Austria
under the terms offered is understandable, as is his preference to
depart by boat to Manila rather fly to Vienna. Those are merepersonal preferences however. They do not rise to the level of
justifications for failure to comply with the statutory mandate to
depart. Jorg's focus on his own personal preferences rather than the
statutory mandate amounts to a willful violation of the Act. He now
remains in the Federated States of Micronesia willfully and
unlawfully after expiration of his entry authorization in violation of
50 F.S.M.C. 112.
[1 FSM Intrm. 387]
Conclusion
The defendant here knows about the statutory mandate to
depart. He has the opportunity to depart by accepting funds from
his nation. He refuses to accept those funds because he does not
want to become entangled with the Austrian government. Insteadhe prefers to await the anticipated departure of a boat in a month or
two, knowing that the Federated States of Micronesia feels
responsible to assure that food and housing will be available to him.
Jorg's personal preference is this situation is understandable,
even reasonable. The law, however, requires that he respond to the
statutory mandate to depart now, not to his personal preferences to
linger awhile longer and depart by a more attractive means to a
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more preferred destination. His refusal to respond to the statutory
mandate can only be seen as willful.
I therefore conclude that he is guilty of violating 50 F.S.M.C. 112.
Sentencing will be on December 14 at 1:30 p.m.
So ordered the 9th day of December 1983.
/s/ Edward C. King
Chief Justice
Supreme Court of the Federated
States of Micronesia
Entered this 12th day of December 1983.
/s/ Emiliana J. Kihleng
Chief Clerk of Court
[1 FSM Intrm. 388]
1. Heikkinen v. United States, [1958] USSC 1; 355 U.S. 273, 78 S. Ct.
299, 2 L. Ed. 2d 264 (1958).
2. United States v. Murdock, [1933] USSC 167; 290 U.S. 389, 54 S.
Ct. 223, 78 L. Ed. 381 (1933); Spies v. United States,[1943] USSC
16; 317 U.S. 492, 63 S. Ct. 364, 87 L. Ed. 418 (1943); Annot., 22
A.L.R. 3d 1173 (1968).
3. United States v. Illinois Central R.R., [1938] USSC 63; 303 U.S.
239, 58 S. Ct. 533, 82 L. Ed. 773 (1938).
http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5B1958%5D%20USSC%201http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=355%20US%20273?query=noncitizen%20nationalityhttp://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5B1933%5D%20USSC%20167http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=290%20US%20389?query=noncitizen%20nationalityhttp://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5B1943%5D%20USSC%2016http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5B1943%5D%20USSC%2016http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=317%20US%20492?query=noncitizen%20nationalityhttp://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5B1938%5D%20USSC%2063http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=303%20US%20239?query=noncitizen%20nationalityhttp://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=303%20US%20239?query=noncitizen%20nationalityhttp://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5B1958%5D%20USSC%201http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=355%20US%20273?query=noncitizen%20nationalityhttp://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5B1933%5D%20USSC%20167http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=290%20US%20389?query=noncitizen%20nationalityhttp://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5B1943%5D%20USSC%2016http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5B1943%5D%20USSC%2016http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=317%20US%20492?query=noncitizen%20nationalityhttp://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5B1938%5D%20USSC%2063http://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=303%20US%20239?query=noncitizen%20nationalityhttp://www.paclii.org/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=303%20US%20239?query=noncitizen%20nationality