Khmer Serei Movement

Cambodia's Khmer Serei MovementAuthor(s): Robert L. Turkoly-JoczikReviewed work(s):Source: Asian Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring, 1988), pp. 48-62Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172090 .

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Cambodia's Khmer Serei Movement

ROBERT L. TURKOLY-JOCZIK

eriodic news reports of overcrowded refugee camps, guerrilla warfare, P and anti-Cambodian government coalitions seeking accommodation with the Phnom Penh government are becoming familiar news items to students of Asian affairs. The origin of one particular group of Cambodian dissidents is quite interesting, however, and is historically linked with U.S. military activities in the Second Indochina War. Even though the particular politico-military group known as the Khmer Serei ("free" Khmer) has been segmented and in some quarters is held in disrepute, the group itself and its founder, Son Ngoc Thanh, were a formidable military force in the 1960s and 1970s.

The story of the Khmer Serei's dissidence predates the Second Indochina War. It originated in Vietnam's Mekong Delta, the birthplace of Son Ngoc Thanh. Thanh was born in 1908 in the town of Tra Vinh, Vinh Binh Prov- ince, of mixed Vietnamese and Khmer Krom (ethnic Cambodians born in Vietnam) parentage.'

After spending some time in France, he returned to Indochina (Vietnam) and made an unsuccessful attempt to enter the French Colonial Service. In the early 1930s, he moved to Cambodia and soon became an avowed Cam- bodian (Khmer) nationalist. Through religious contacts he became associated with the Cambodian Buddhist Institute and was eventually appointed its secretary.2 Through the secretary's office, Thanh supervised a select group of zealous and patriotic monks whom he used to carry na- tionalistic messages and Buddhist sermons throughout Cambodia and into the Mekong Delta. In 1936, he founded a newspaper to publicize his anti- French and pro-independence views and was soon acknowledged as Cam- bodia's foremost nationalist spokesman.3

In 1942, Thanh was involved in an anti-French demonstration and, fear-

48



Cambodia's Khmer Serei 49

ing imprisonment, he fled to Japan where he was commissioned an officer in the Imperial Japanese Army. Three years later, he returned to Cambodia and entered political life with Japanese support. In March 1945, Sihanouk declared Cambodia independent and in May of the same year appointed Thanh foreign minister.4 In August 1945, prior to Japan's surrender, Thanh established an anti-French government and installed himself as prime minister. A few days after the Japanese surrendered, he held a plebiscite in which the Cambodian people voted to support him and end the French pro- tectorate.5 The plebiscite clearly indicated that, despite Thanh's three-year absence, he had the support of the people and that his popularity surpassed that of Sihanouk or any other member of the royal family.6 In October 1945, the royal family (some suggest Sihanouk) sent an agent to Saigon to request that the French authorities arrest Thanh. Later that month, he was arrested and charged with acts that threatened the security of the Allied Forces and were detrimental to Cambodian interests. A French military tribunal found Thanh guilty and sentenced him to twenty years at hard labor. The sentence was commuted to house arrest in France, a move made to placate Thanh's supporters and avoid domestic problems within Cambodia.7

While Thanh was in France, a group of his more militant supporters established themselves in Thailand and in the Cambodian provinces along the Thai and South Vietnamese borders.8 There they joined with another dissident group, the Khmer Issarak ("independent" Khmer), who were also committed to Cambodian independence. While these groups harassed Sihanouk's supporters with small-scale skirmishes in the countryside, a group of Thanh's political supporters who had remained in Phnom Penh gained control of the independence-oriented Democratic Party and won the national election of September 1951. The subsequent activities and maneuvering of the party's delegates within the Cambodian National Assembly brought the government to a halt, forcing Sihanouk to try to secure Thanh's freedom.9 Sihanouk is alleged to have written no fewer than four letters to the French government in order to secure Thanh's release.

Thanh was released from house arrest in October 1951. After returning to Cambodia, he founded a newspaper whose political rhetoric agitated Sihanouk and his French advisers.' Thanh was accused of fomenting disorder and, fearing imprisonment, fled to the safety of the Cambodian forests and took refuge with the Khmer Issarak. During this time, the Issarak were a collection of guerrilla bands, differing with each other in their interpretation of the means by which they might achieve independence and a new government. Their total strength was estimated to be three thou- sand, with approximately one-half that number under arms.

From 1952 to 1954 the military activities of the Khmer Issarak were similar to all nascent guerrilla forces, namely small-scale skirmishes against rural police, and propaganda broadcasts from clandestine radio stations



50 Asian Affairs

located in the border provinces. Although several of the Issarak bands were known to have cooperated with the Vietminh, it appears that those affiliated with Thanh remained aloof from the Vietnamese and pursued a course of independent armed politics against Sihanouk. Although Thanh may never have assisted the Vietminh, it is possible that he cooperated with their Cambodian counterparts (Khmer Committee of National Liberation) in an effort to unite all Cambodians in the struggle against the French.

By 1955, Sihanouk had clearly gained the upper hand in Phnom Penh by demonstrating a deft ability to turn most situations to his advantage. He won the affection of the people and gained the support of former dissidents. Through the use of coercion, threats, and a great deal of personal charm, Sihanouk made a favorable impression on the nation and drew large numbers of Khmer Issarak back into the national fold with an amnesty.

Son Ngoc Thanh had underestimated Sihanouk's ability to unify the various factions that existed in and out of the government. Recognizing the error in his assessment, he attempted to bridge the differences between them, but Sihanouk refused Thanh's efforts at reconciliation. Conse- quently, Thanh was forced to remain in the forests to conduct guerrilla warfare and propaganda operations against an increasingly popular Sihanouk.

In general terms, the basic disagreement between the two statesmen was rooted in the post-World War II politics of Cambodia. In 1946-47, the two major political organizations in Cambodia were the Liberal and the Democratic parties. The former was composed of conservative upper-level civil servants, landowners, and those people associated with Sihanouk and the royal court. The Democratic Party was a more progressive group con- sisting of lower-grade civil servants, Issaraks, and supporters of Son Ngoc Thanh. The Liberals wished to maintain a status quo and a strong mon- archy; the Democrats impatiently demanded a more egalitarian society, total independence, and the immediate withdrawal of all French troops. Thanh's association with the Democrats and their somewhat draconian

,objectives was obviously in sharp contrast with the conservative diplomacy and conciliatory methods espoused by Sihanouk and the Liberals. Although both men greatly desired Cambodia's independence, their paths to attain this common goal were irreconcilably different. The divergence between the two was permanently established when Sihanouk refused to meet with Thanh; it added a personal vindictiveness to the struggle that remained with both men until Thanh's death.

In the mid-1950s, Sihanouk regularly complained to the press and to the governments of Thailand and South Vietnam about what he termed "inva- sions" of Cambodian territory. He charged these governments with pro- viding support to Thanh and the Issaraks.'2 Sihanouk's charges were not without foundation, for Thanh was in fact conducting military and propaganda activities from Thailand and South Vietnam."3




In 1959, the declining state of affairs between Phnom Penh and Washington. gave Sihanouk an opportunity to vent his frustration and claim that Thanh and his supporters were receiving support from the Central In- telligence Agency (CIA) through sources in South Vietnam.14 In March, Sihanouk launched another philippic against Thanh, accusing him and the CIA of engineering a coup d'etat and assassination plot.'5 The attempted coup, now known as the Bangkok Plot (taking its name from the city where it was planned), occurred in February. Subsequent developments in the case suggest that the plotters were correctly identified by Sihanouk.16

In October 1959, Thanh organized the various Issarak factions most sympathetic to his views into a new organization known as the Khmer Serei, dedicating it to Sihanouk's downfall."7 Like the Issarak, the Khmer Serei conducted guerrilla warfare and propaganda activities in the provinces along the Thai and South Vietnamese borders.

Although Sihanouk considered Thanh his lifelong enemy and his greatest adversary, he also realized that as long as Thanh remained underground his activities could be controlled. Sihanouk understood that the threat posed by Thanh and the Khmer Serei was only as viable as the United States, Thailand, and South Vietnam wanted it to be.

By 1962, the Khmer Serei movement was firmly in the American camp, with sizeable numbers of its troops in Thailand and South Vietnam or along their borders. Although Thanh's forces continued to conduct propaganda and military activities, they had only a marginal effect on Sihanouk's government. It is interesting to note that the Khmer Serei's activities against Sihanouk were somewhat restrained during the 1961-62 period of American and Cambodian rapprochement. Although no official intelligence documentation is currently available that notes the specific amount or type of CIA support that was given to the Khmer Serei, the organization's inac- tivity during this period must have been the result of the CIA's tightening the reins on Thanh, thus demonstrating the Agency's span of control and influence on the Khmer Serei movement. Nonetheless, when Cambodia severed diplomatic relations with South Vietnam in August 1963, it signaled the beginning of a virulent anti-Sihanouk campaign. It was during this period that the Khmer Serei shifted the bulk of its forces from the Thai border to South Vietnam and the more familiar Mekong Delta.

he Khmer Serei had a seasoned corps of guerrilla fighters and propa- T gandists by 1963. The previous ten years of harassing Sihanouk's forces had produced an efficient cadre who were well motivated and militarily pro- ficient.'9 Until this time, the Khmer Serei had been a paramilitary force conducting military operations (small-scale raids and ambushes) against Siha- nouk's forces. No evidence has been discovered of Khmer Serei military ac-



52 Asian Affairs

tions being conducted against Viet Cong or North Vietnamese forces during this period.20 There is nothing odd about this, since the Khmer Serei was, from its creation, primarily an anti-Sihanouk organization.

The Khmer Serei forces completed their move to South Vietnam in 1963. For the majority of its members it was a homecoming, since many were Khmer Krom who had been taken to Cambodia in their youth or had gone to Cambodia to join the Khmer Serei.21 The Khmer Serei's arrival was op- portune for the U.S. Army's Special Forces and its Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), for these units had assumed responsibility for a newly created anti-infiltration scheme, the Border Surveillance Program, in 1963.22 (The CIDG was a paramilitary organization originally conceived by the CIA and given to the U.S. Army Special Forces to manage and sometimes lead. Its original purpose was to arm and train the various hill tribes-montagnards-of the central highlands in village defense; later other ethnic minorities such as the Nung and Khmer Krom were brought in- to the program. The organization's mission eventually encompassed border control, direct offensive actions, and cross-border operations as well as village defense.) Thus the Khmer Serei's return to South Vietnam was an unexpected but welcome opportunity for the U.S. military to recruit the Khmer Serei's members into the forces that manned and monitored the South Vietnamese and Cambodian border outposts.23

Thanh's main reason for moving the Khmer Serei forces to South Viet- nam was to obtain greater financial and material support from the Saigon government, which no longer had diplomatic relations with Cambodia. In addition, the Mekong Delta held the promise of unlimited recruiting poten- tial because of its large Cambodian (Khmer Krom) population.24 No less at- tractive were the financially rewarding military positions that were available in the newly created border camps.25 The employment of the Khmer Serei ensured that the organization's treasury would always be full, because all of the Khmer Serei's soldiers were required to contribute to the support of the movement.26

The Khmer Serei leadership maintained a pragmatic attitude about military service in the CIDG. It permitted its members to bear arms for the Saigon government and maintain their Khmer Serei membership. Moreover, service in the irregular units enabled the Khmer Serei forces to upgrade their military skills and acquire the type of military training they would need to defeat Sihanouk's forces. The CIDG also provided the Khmer Serei members with a more regular and certainly higher income than most would have had if the war and the CIDG had not existed.27 Most important, it enabled the Khmer Serei to maintain its unit identity and unit integrity, namely staying together as a cohesive single unit. The idea of being able to concentrate its forces at the various border camps appealed to the Khmer Serei leadership; it permitted the organization to exercise max-




imum control over its members.28 Khmer Serei recruitment was also en- hanced by the arrangement, since it was likely that Khmer Krom would be attracted to military units that were predominantly Khmer, and they would in time be persuaded to join the Khmer Serei,29 an excellent source of manpower for the U.S. military.

Not only did they prove to be good fighters and to have good intelligence from the floating cross-border population, but they could be recruited in entire company-sized blocks with a built-in chain of command.30

To the surprise of most observers, there were few conflicts of interest between the CIDG and the Khmer Serei. The CIDG fought the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese on behalf of the Saigon government, and the Khmer Serei was willing to fight the same groups in order to further its own political goals, which were the deposition of Sihanouk and the creation of a republican government in Cambodia.31 Simply stated, although having different long-range objectives, Saigon and the Khmer Serei shared sufficiently similar intermediate goals to permit them to achieve a type of symbiosis through the CIDG.

Although there were no fewer than twenty-three documents issued by Thanh and the Khmer Serei between 1953 and 1965, there is no documentation that delineates the organizational working structure and functional responsibilities of the Khmer Serei movement.32 On the basis of a period of personal observation made in South Vietnam, the writer noted that the movement's military organization coincided with the structure of the CIDG, that is, the Khmer Serei were organized into platoons, companies, and battalions. Whether this was coincidental or done to accommodate the CIDG is not known. During the same period of observation, the Khmer Serei leadership never alluded to the existence, structure, or missions of the movement's other non-CIDG military units.33 The Khmer Serei's leader, Son Ngoc Thanh, maintained tight control of the organization but on occa- sion was assisted by a small group of junior leaders and staff functionaries who normally performed liaison duties between the CIDG camps and the organization's headquarters. The junior leaders were also used in recruiting or for settling any internal difficulties that might arise among the Khmer Krom irregulars.34 Although the junior leaders of the Khmer Serei were not members of the CIDG, it was not unusual to learn that most of them had at some time in the past served in the CIDG.35 It was an affiliation that had beneficial effects on the relations between the Khmer Serei and the U.S. military and one that was continually reinforced by the Khmer Serei leaders when they encountered U.S. Army Special Forces' personnel with whom they had served earlier tours of duty.36

In Saigon, the Khmer Serei headquarters was located at the Cambodian Buddhist compound, more commonly known as "the temple" to U.S.



54 Asian Affairs

military personnel.37 The movement also maintained a field headquarters on the Cambodian border at the South Vietnamese village of Tinh Bien, not far from the Seven Mountains region of the border.38

The Khmer Serei soldiers were always inspired by Thanh's staying power and resolve. After nearly thirty years of political and military activity, Thanh still impressed observers with his ebullience. During an interview conducted in 1965, when Thanh was already fifty-seven years old, he con- fidently forecast that he would eventually win his battle with Sihanouk and take control of Cambodia. In the same year, the Khmer Serei reflected Thanh's audacity and formally declared war on Cambodia."39 A short time after that, it had the temerity to claim responsibility for several past border incursions." In December 1965, non-CIDG Khmer Serei units conducted several incursions into Cambodia. A radio station identifying itself as Free Cambodia Radio [sic] claimed that Thanh's forces had attacked Ratanakiri and Stoeng Treng provinces along the South Vietnamese and Laotian borders. A subsequent report on the attack indicated that eight Cambodian soldiers had been killed and another eight had been wounded, including the governor and military commander of the region.41

Although there is no doubt that the attacks in Ratanakiri and Stoeng Treng were perpetrated by Khmer Serei forces, they were Khmer Serei units under Thanh's direct control. It is not known if these units were the reci- pients of CIA aid, support, or direction. These independent Khmer Serei military units had been established along the South Vietnamese and Cambo- dian border two to three years earlier. (When the units were established in 1963 a Khmer Serei official named Preap In was captured by Cambodian forces and publicly revealed that Khmer Serei units were being established all along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese frontier.)42 The Khmer Serei's military activities of December 1965 in Ratanakiri and Stoeng Treng provinces were not in themselves of sufficient magnitude to bring about the col- lapse of the Cambodian government, but they did serve to remind Sihanouk that the Khmer Serei was actively opposing him and attempting to cause his downfall.

With the exception of the independent Khmer Serei units along the border, virtually all of the other Khmer Serei personnel were associated with the U.S. Army Special Forces' activities conducted in the Mekong Delta. It is difficult to identify with absolute certainty the exact number of Khmer Krom CIDG soldiers who were also members of the Khmer Serei. In general terms it is safe to estimate, however, that at least 50 percent of all Khmer Krom CIDG soldiers were also members of the Khmer Serei.

In 1967, the Khmer Serei was involved with a top-secret intelligence unit, Special Forces Operational Detachment B-57 (SFODB-57), also known as Project Gamma.43 Project Gamma's mission was to develop intelligence on the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) bases in Cambodia, as well as Canm-




bodia's support for the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong." The Khmer Serei was alleged to have assisted Project Gamma in this endeavor by pro- viding it with interpreters and guides for the operational groups who were collecting this intelligence in Cambodia.45 In referring to one of Project Gamma's intelligence activities known as Operation Cherry, it was dis- closed that the unit employed CIDG members of the Khmer Serei organization on missions that took place outside South Vietnamese territory (presumably in Cambodia).46 A U.S. Army officer revealed that the group he commanded was composed of eleven Khmer Serei and five U.S. soldiers. He went on to describe the group's mission as "making liaison with various units, and conducting reconnaissance."47 The names of the units and their locations were never made public.48

Project Gamma's mission to contact and make liaison with various Cam- bodian units suggests that the Khmer Serei's involvement in the mission was far more than general intelligence collection. In April 1966, the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam was concerned about the use of Cambodian territory by the North Vietnamese Army and requested ap- proval to conduct a military operation across the border. In June, it was proposed that the Fifth Special Forces Group, Airborne undertake an ex- tensive intelligence-gathering effort.49 Among the effort's objectives was a special intelligence collection program for Cambodia. The program was to gather data on the North Vietnamese Army's infiltration routes in Cam- bodia, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army base areas in Cambodia, and Cambodian support to the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army.5o These were all items of vital concern to any plan dealing with a combat operation across the border. In Joseph A. McChristian's The Role of Military Intelligence, he outlined the collection effort and mentioned Project Gamma (SFODB-57) as one of the units involved in the project.51 It is interesting to note that Operation Cherry was concluded at the same time that the U.S. Army's plans to cross the border into Cambodia were vetoed by the U.S. Department of State.52 On the basis of this evidence, it would seem that Operation Cherry was a specific intelligence mission designed to support an early incursion into Cambodia."53

The Khmer Serei's role in making liaison with the unnamed units in Cam- bodia was part of the plan to gather intelligence on the North Vietnamese Army's dispositions and to ensure that Cambodian Army units were either bypassed or warned to withdraw from the proposed areas of operations. The participation of the Khmer Serei in the mission was vital. The Khmer Serei membership knew the terrain and the language and had established contacts with anticommunist personnel in the Cambodian military who were sympathetic to any plan to rid Cambodia of the North Vietnamese presence.54 Information from these reliable sources would have been crucial to the success of any plan for a military incursion into Cambodia, and it



56 Asian Affairs

gives an indication of the importance of the Khmer Serei's role in Operation Cherry.

n early 1969, a Khmer Serei effort to change the balance of power and set I the stage for Sihanouk's overthrow took place when a significant number of Khmer Serei ostensibly defected to Cambodia.55 In January, there were two hundred defectors; in May, three hundred more Khmer Serei rallied to Sihanouk.56 The five hundred defectors were welcomed to Cambodia and were integrated into the Cambodian armed forces."57 There are two explana- tions for the defections. The first is that Son Ngoc Thanh ordered five hundred men to defect so that the Khmer Serei could infiltrate the Cambodian armed forces and subvert Sihanouk's government.58 The second is that the defectors were actually employed by the CIA in order to reinforce Lon Nol and his forces when they made their move to depose Sihanouk. Thanh and the CIA have never explained the rationale behind the defections. What is known is that the so-called defectors supported Lon Nol's government when it seized power on 18 March 1970 and that the same defectors were later used by Lon Nol to fight the North Vietnamese forces based in Cambodia.

The most plausible explanation for the defections is that the five hundred Khmer Serei were part of an agreement the CIA made between Thanh and Lon Nol established once Sihanouk was deposed. This assumption is partly substantiated by events that took place after Sihanouk was overthrown. In April 1970, Thanh initiated an intense recruiting drive on behalf of the Lon Nol government. Its objective was to enlist as many Khmer Krom as possible from South Vietnam's Mekong Delta; the recruits' ultimate destination was Phnom Penh and integration into the Cambodian Army. The recruiting effort was a moderate success, with several hundred Khmer Krom volunteers leaving the delta each week for a training camp located at Lon Hai (near Cape Saint Jacques) for a brief training period before going to Cambodia. Concurrently all the Khmer Serei already serving in the CIDG (approximately fifteen hundred to twenty-five hundred men) were flown in toto as complete company-sized fighting units to Phnom Penh. Once in Cambodia, they were frequently deployed to the fiercest battle areas where they usually gave a good account of themselves.

During this same period Son Ngoc Thanh formally announced the dissolution of the Khmer Serei organization [the author was a witness to this event] and pledged his support to the Lon Nol government. In August 1970, Thanh was made a special councilor to Lon Nol. Thanh's duties in this capacity usually required him to remain in Saigon, where he was charged to see that Cambodian political and military affairs were promptly handled and not subordinated to South Vietnam's war. Two years later, Lon Nol rewarded Thanh for his efforts by appointing him prime minister of Cambodia.59

Although the defection of the five hundred Khmer Serei does not appear




to be a military role or battle action in the accepted context of the term, it was a military action and does merit comment. The defection was part of a politico-military strategem that was successfully employed by Lon Nol and Son Ngoc Thanh. It was a contemporary, skillful version of the Trojan horse; the five hundred defectors were accepted and welcomed by the Sihanouk government. Moreover, the defectors cleverly played their roles for the better part of one year before their true mission was revealed. Ac- cording to several sources, the defectors were armed and secretly brought to Phnom Penh on the eve of the coup." They were effectively used by Lon Nol to bolster his own forces and later used to reinforce the Cambodian Army in its battle against the North Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge.6' The role of the Khmer Serei soldiers in the scheme was effective, and the entire episode can be classified as a well-planned maneuver in deception, followed by a skillfully executed and successfully concluded show of force.

An assessment of the Khmer Serei movement's role in the Second In- dochina War reveals that the organization had two objectives, namely to depose Sihanouk and to fight the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese on behalf of the South Vietnamese Government. Initially the Khmer Serei fought against Cambodian military and police units, hoping that such actions would destabilize the Sihanouk government. The actions were only sporadic, however, and had a short-term effect. These activities were only harassment operations at best and had little value other than their psychological effect on rural police and military units. If the actions are evaluated as psychological operations, they were moderately successful-for they did harass and disturb Sihanouk, never permitting him to feel that the Cambodian countryside was completely his. From a strictly military viewpoint, since the combat operations inflicted few casualties, capturing no equipment or territory, they must therefore be considered a failure.

The Khmer Serei's military role as part of the CIDG is quite different. In virtually all respects, the members of the Khmer Serei who were part of the CIDG were good soldiers. The most important qualities they displayed were their loyalty and discipline, both to the CIDG and the Khmer Serei movement. To the Khmer Serei soldier, fighting and political aspiration went hand in hand. If a Khmer Serei CIDG unit performed poorly, all that was required to improve it was to notify the Khmer Serei liaison officers at Saigon or at Tinh Bien. Within twenty-fours a Khmer Serei representative arrived at the CIDG camp and assembled the Khmer Serei soldiers. After an abusive harangue he would demote, promote, and replace personnel as required; the problem was thus resolved and performance was improved.62

According to one U.S. Army commander, the Khmer Serei were good soldiers because "they knew the border area, could communicate with the local population, and could get intelligence about the Viet Cong and what



58 Asian Affairs

they were doing in their sanctuaries across the border."63 The Khmer Serei were good soldiers for other reasons as well. As shown in Operation Cherry, the Khmer Serei had a considerable degree of expertise in conducting sophisticated intelligence activities with unnamed units in Cambodia.64

There were several other aspects of the Khmer Serei movement's military role that made it somewhat unusual. The Khmer Serei did not undergo a period of military development under U.S. Army Special Forces' supervi- sion during which its members evolved from civilians into soldiers. The military transformation of the majority of its members had taken place several years earlier in the jungles along the border under the watchful eyes of Son Ngoc Thanh. When the organization entered South Vietnam and took service with the CIDG, many of its members were already seasoned fighters imbued with a soldier's appreciation for discipline, order, and purpose. For these reasons, the organization's successful participation in U.S.-sponsored military activities was not unusual. The Khmer Serei's entry into the Second Indochina War was based on several pragmatic factors. Joining the CIDG permitted the movement to achieve many of its own organizational objectives such as recruiting and indoctrinating new members from the Khmer Krom population. Its affiliation with the CIDG also enabled the Khmer Serei to use the U.S. Army Special Forces' camps to house its troops. The association of the U.S. military and the Khmer Serei also provided each with another important benefit: the Khmer Serei sup- plied the manpower, and U.S. Army Special Forces CIDG provided the Khmer Serei with a sponsor and a thinly veiled cover for its anti-Sihanouk activities.

Since the fall of Cambodia in 1975, the Khmer Serei-or groups calling themselves Khmer Serei-have been a source of disruption along the Thai- Cambodian border. At various intervals during the 1980s, these groups have been part of an uneasy coalition composed of Khmer Rouge and various pro-Sihanouk or pro-Son Sann factions that have conducted sporadic military activities against President Heng Samrin's Vietnamese- sponsored People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).65 The effects of these actions on the PRK have been minimal, but they have provoked effective counterresponses from Phnom Penh's Vietnamese occupiers against the dissidents' base camps on the border. To add to the complexity of the politico-military alignments of the coalition is the divisiveness within the coalition itself, and more specifically the factionalism within the various Khmer Serei groups. At the current time, it appears that the Khmer Serei does not have an overall leader who is recognized by all its factions. Moreover, the movement lacks a central command to coordinate its combat operations, public information, and recruiting programs. As a conse- quence, those calling themselves Khmer Serei may be little more than groups of independent free agents. Although claiming to be Khmer Serei




they bear little resemblance to those Khmers who wore the "serrated wheel" badge, Son Ngoc Thanh's official symbol for the Khmer Serei movement in the Second Indochina War. It has been reported that many Khmer Serei groups are little more than black marketeers or bands of extortionists who prey on the defenseless in the border refugee camps. Other reports state that the Khmer Serei are quicker to take arms against other rival Khmer Serei groups than against the forces of Heng Samrin, a practice that could not have survived under the charismatic and forceful leadership of Son Ngoc Thanh.66 If these allegations are true, it would appear that Son Ngoc Thanh's dreams for Cambodia will never materialize through any effort on the part of the remaining Khmer Serei organization.

In examining the past and current activities of the Khmer Serei, a com- plex picture emerges of political and ethnocentric loyalty-a loyalty that manifested itself during the Second Indochina War in the organization's displays of nationalism for a country (Cambodia) in which most of its members did not live, and to a territory (the Mekong Delta) that they did not govern. Even its final activity in support of Lon Nol's government did little to advance its own political ambitions, since it came in Cambodia's twilight. The organization's current activities likewise cast the Khmer Serei as an improvidential lot whose feeble military efforts confuse the observer. Its stated goal-to become a permanent part of the Cambodian body politic-has little promise of fruition in a coalition dominated by a KImer Rouge majority and led by the histrionic Sihanouk. Like many dissident movements, the Khmer Serei has become an aberration, a political anomaly that still haunts the Cambodian hinterlands as a specter of lost hope and a promise unfulfilled.

NOTES

1. Mouvement Khmer Serei, Biographic individuelle (Kampuchea: undated): This document consists of twelve mimeographed pages that discuss the Khmer Serei's political objectives and also reveal several facts about Son Ngoc Thanh's early life. The text is well written but does not carry a propaganda theme identifying it as a mass-media publication; it appears to be an executive-level internal working paper.

2. Michael Leifer, Cambodia (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967): 26. Also see Roger M. Smith, Cambodia's foreign policy (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell Univ. Press, 1965): 25.

3. Smith, note 2: 25. In 1936, Thanh founded the Nokor Wat newspaper. 4. Donald P. Whitaker, Judith M. Heimann, John E. MacDonald, Kenneth W. Martin-

dale, Rinn-Sup Shinn, Charles Townsend, Area handbook for the Khmer Republic (Cam- bodia) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968): 33.

5. Ellen J. Hammer, The struggle for Indo-China (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1954): 121.

6. Smith, note 2: 28. 7. See note 4. Thanh was arrested on 16 October 1945 by British and French officers who

were escorted by Indian troops. See Smith, note 2: 28. 8. Note 5: 254. 9. Note 4: 36.



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10. Thanh's newspaper was called Khmer Krok (Cambodians Awake). Its publication was suspended in February 1952. Norodom Sihanouk, War and hope (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980): XVII.

11. Michael Field, The prevailing wind (London: Methuen & Co., 1965): 212. 12. Smith, note 2: 114-115. 13. William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the destruction of Cambodia (New

York: Simon & Schuster, 1979): 47. T. D. Allman comments that Thanh had been receiving U.S. (CIA) support for nearly twenty years, "Pledges against a prince," The Guardian, 3 Aug. 1971: 3.

14. Shawcross, note 13: 54. 15. Sihanouk, My war with the CIA (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973): 102-111. 16. Shawcross, note 13: 54. Also see David J. Steinberg, Cambodia (New Haven, Conn.:

Hraf Press, 1959): 96; and Field, note 11: 210-214. William Colby stated that the CIA attempted to dissuade the principals in the plot (Thailand and South Vietnam) from encouraging the Cambodian "coup makers." In this attempt, the CIA recruited an agent on the Cambodian military staff, whose mission was to keep them (the CIA) informed of events in Cambodia. When this agent was discovered by Sihanouk, the CIA became identified with the plot. For more on the subject see William Colby, Honorable men (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978): 149-151.

17. Manifeste, Mouvement Khmer Serei, Kampuchea: 19 Oct. 1959. The Manifeste is a commercially printed political Credo of the Khmer Serei. It consists of 21 pages and contains a clear mass media promotional theme; the document was undoubtedly prepared for public distribution. It amplifies much of the material that is contained in the Mouvement Khmer Serei (see note 1). With respect to the differences among the various Issarak factions and the reasons one group may or may not have joined Thanh in creating the Khmer Serei-it would appear that differences among the Issaraks may have focused on ideological differences acquired during the First Indochina War. It is common knowledge that many Issarak bands were affiliated with the Vietminh in that conflict; one group's Marxist bent may consequently have precluded its participation in the Khmer Serei movement, which did not espouse that particular ideology. For more information on the subject of the Vietminh and the Indochinese Communist Party's (ICP) influence on the Issaraks, see Nayan Chandra, Brother enemy, the war after the war (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986): 57, 119, 249.

18. Indo-China Chronicle, 15 July 1971: 2-5. 19. Ben Kiernan, Peasants and politics in Kampuchea (London: Zed Press, 1982): 109. 20. Although the writer could not find evidence of the Khmer Serei fighting these groups,

Kiernan suggests that Thanh and the Khmer Serei cooperated with the Vietminh against the French. See Kiernan, note 19: 18-19, 115.

21. In discussing these matters with several members of the Khmer Serei in South Vietnam in 1970-71, the writer was told that many of the Khmer Krom went to Cambodia to join the Khmer Serei in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

22. Francis J. Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973): 36. For more information on the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), see Shelby L. Stanton, Green berets at war (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985): Chapters 3-5.

23. Ibid.: 46. Also see Charles M. Simpson, Inside the green berets (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1983): 114.

24. Robert Shaplen, "Back and forth in Phnom Penh," New Yorker, 18 Apr. 1964: 40-44. 25. Ibid. 26. When the CIDG troops were mustered for monthly pay call, it was not unusual to note

the presence of the Khmer Serei cadre, there to collect funds for the movement. Personal observations made by the writer in South Vietnam during 1970-71.

27. Time, 19 July 1968: 33. 28. The arrangement also enabled the organization's cadre to monitor the political and

military situation in Cambodia vis-a-vis the CIDG's intelligence reports. Writer's observations of these events in South Vietnam, 1970-71.

29. During the writer's tour of service in South Vietnam, Khmer Krom volunteers invariably sought membership in CIDG units that were predominantly Khmer Krom in ethnic composition.

30. Simpson, note 23.




31. Allman, note 13. 32. Documents et ecrits se rapportant au Khmer Serei (Vietnam: Mouvement Khmer Serei,

30 June 1966). These are assorted Khmer Serei political and historical reports. The document is general in scope and appears to be an attempt to create an official organization history.

33. Comments based on writer's enquiries made to members of the Khmer Serei in South Vietnam in 1970 about non-CIDG Khmer Serei military units.

34. During the Second Indochina War, internal disputes among the Khmer Serei were rare, largely due to the dynamic and very personal leadership of Son Ngoc Thanh. When difficulties did arise, they were usually between the Khmer Serei and the Vietnamese Special Forces. Writer's recollection of events in South Vietnam.

35. During the writer's tenure as an observer of Khmer Serei activities in South Vietnam, the only Khmer Serei he encountered who had not formerly served in the CIDG was Thanh himself. Admittedly this may have been due to Thanh's assigning only former CIDG Khmer Serei to work with the U.S. military, feeling that their familiarity with the U.S. military system would make for more effective liaison.

36. Comments are based on the writer's observation of Khmer Serei activities in South Viet- nam during 1970-71.

37. Simpson, note 23. 38. Allman, note 13. 39. Declaration de guerre. Mouvement Revolutionnaire Khmer Serei, December 1965. This

document formally declares that a state of war exists between the Khmer Serei organization and the Sihanouk government.

40. The New York Times, 1 Jan. 1966: 3. 41. Ibid.: 2 Jan. 1966: 72. 42. Malcolm Caldwell, Cambodia in the Southeast Asian war (New York: Monthly Review

Press, 1973): 178. On the basis of personal observation of similar activities in South Vietnam, the writer noted that sponsoring agencies (intelligence units notwithstanding) rarely interfered with an organization or its activities except when they were involved in special projects or specifically directed missions. Even in these instances the preferred method of operation was to provide simple directives to the organization's leaders. Such practices ensured the sponsor's anonymity and in certain cases enabled the desired action to be nonattributable.

43. The New York Times, 28 Mar. 1970: 1. Also see Sihanouk, note 15: 64-65. 44. The New York Times, 28 Jan. 1970: 1. 45. Ibid. 46. Sihanouk, "The story of my overthrow and resistance," Ramparts, July 1972: 46. 47. Note 44. 48. The New York Times, 29 Mar. 1970: 17. 49. General Joseph A. McChristian, The role of military intelligence (Washington: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1974): 108. 50. Ibid.: 109. 51. Ibid.: 108-109. 52. Note 44. 53. Caldwell, note 42: 293. 54. Ibid.: 119. Also see Wilfred Burchett, Second Indo-China war (London: Lorrimer

Publishing, 1970): 44. 55. Le monde diplomatique, Apr. 1970. 56. Shawcross, note 13: 119. Also see Sihanouk, note 15: 39. 57. Noam Chomsky, At war with Asia (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970): 137. 58. Caldwell, note 42: 198. 59. Whitaker et al., note 4: 182. Thanh was appointed a senior adviser to Lon Nol in August

1970. On 18 March 1972 (the second anniversary of Sihanouk's deposition) Lon Nol named the longtime nationalist leader premier. Fox Butterfield, "Lon Nol names a Cambodian premier," The New York Times, 19 Mar. 1972: 3. The author met with Dr. Son Ngoc Thanh on many oc- casions during this and subsequent periods and was a witness to much of the Khmer Krom recruiting activity that took place in the Mekong Delta.

60. J. C. Pomonti, "Avec Kim Keth," Le Monde, 25 Apr. 1970. 61. Note 57. 62. Simpson, note 23.



62 Asian Affairs

63. Ibid. 64. Note 44. 65. Michael Vickery, Kampuchea, politics, economics and society (London: Frances Pinter,

1986): 49-50. 66. Ibid. Also see Shawcross, The quality of mercy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984):

225-226, 341, 354; and Linda Mason and Roger Brown, Rice, rivalry and politics: Managing Cambodian relief (Notre Dame, In.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983): 45, 72, 75. Both of these sources provide an alarming portrait of the alleged illicit Khmer Serei activities that are being conducted in the border refugee camps.



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