Keynote Welcome and

Opening Remarks

H.E. Sultan Bin Saeed Al Mansoori

Minister of Economy and Chairman of UAE-General Civil Aviation Authority

Keynote Welcome and

Opening Remarks

Peter Baumgartner

CEO, Etihad Airways

Keynote Welcome and

Opening Remarks

Capt. Salah Alfarajalla

Senior Vice President of Security & National Pilot Development, Etihad Airways

IATA AVSEC WORLD CONFERENCENovember 2017

Captain Salah AlfarajallahSenior Vice President Security and National Pilot DevelopmentEtihad Airways

Outline

▷ Review of recent AVSEC incidents (AUIs)

▷ Impact of AVSEC Incidents

▷ AVSEC counter-measures

▷ Future AVSEC challenges

AVSEC INCIDENTS (AUIs)

Significant AVSEC incidents: last 24 months

Date AUI Location Method Suspected Perpetrator

October 2015

Destruction of aircraft in service

Metrojet aircraft inflight in Egyptian airspace

Improvised explosive device (IED)

ISIS

February 2016

Airport attack (landside)

Baidoa Airport, Central Somalia

IED in laptop and printer

Al Shabaab

February 2016

Sabotage (inflight)

Daallo aircraft in Somalian airspace

Suicide bombing Al Shabaab

Significant AVSEC incidents: last 24 months

Date AUI Location Method Suspected Perpetrator

March 2016

Airport attack (landside)

Brussels Airport Suicide bombing ISIS supporter

March 2016

Hijack (inflight) Egypt Air Dummy IED Mentally-disturbed person

June 2016

Airport attack (landside)

China’s Shanghai Pudong

Introduction of IED ‘Lone wolf’

Significant AVSEC incidents: last 24 months

Date AUI Location Method Suspected Perpetrator

June 2016 Airport attack (landside)

Ataturk Airport, Istanbul

Active shooting and suicide bombing

ISIS Supporter

January 2017

Airport attack (Airside)

Fort Lauderdale Airport

Active shooting ‘Lone wolf’

March 2017

Airport attack (Landside)

Orly Airport,Paris

Hostage taking ‘Lone wolf’

Significant AVSEC incidents: last 24 months

Date AUI Location Method Suspected Perpetrator

September 2017

Airport attack (terminal)

Hamid Karzai Airport, Kabul

MANPAD Taliban

October 2017

Airport attack (landside)

Asheville Regional Airport, North Carolina

IED ‘Lone wolf’

IMPACT AND COUNTERMEASURES

Case Study 1: Brussels Airport Attack

Impacts Countermeasures

▪ Loss of life and serious injuries

▪ Destruction of properties

▪ Damage to airport security integrity

▪ Disruption of airport operations

▪ Flight disruptions/cancellations – Brussels and

network

▪ Increased operational costs for airlines and

airport

▪ Enhanced airport landside/airside security

measures – Brussels and network

▪ Increased landside security, including off-

perimeter checkpoints

▪ Increased security awareness and vigilance

▪ Increased surveillance/monitoring activities

▪ ICAO Annex 17 Amendment 15 for new standard

for landside security

Case Study 2: Daallo Aircraft Sabotage

Impacts Countermeasures

▪ Loss of life ( the suspect) and serious injuries

▪ Damage to aircraft

▪ Damage to airport security integrity

▪ Disruption of airport operations

▪ Flight disruptions/cancellation

▪ Increase operational costs for Daallo airline and

airport

▪ More targeted screening , for example, portable

electronic devices (including laptops and

printers).

▪ Initial and recurrent vetting to address insider

threat.

▪ Aside from 100%, implementation of random

selection

Etihad Airways actions

▷ Intensified Crisis Management Training with Emergency Response Centre

▷ Etihad Airways management sought risk consultancy services to educate on

response to crisis situations

▷ Internal and external stakeholders’ workshop to strengthen coordination for

implementation of airport security measures

FUTURE AVSEC CHALLENGES

Future AVSEC challenges

▷ Use of conventional arms - weapons, MANPADs - will continue

▷ Use of homegrown crude and indigenous techniques including suicide bombs

▷ Technological knowledge and experience obtained from flight simulators and

internet use for cyber attacks

▷ Standardisation of enhanced airport landside security

Future AVSEC challenges

▷ Continuing threats from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)/Drones and lasers

▷ Increased Insider threats for those who have access to airport and airline

operations who may be involved in terrorist and/or criminal activities

▷ Radicalization of individuals for ‘lone wolf’ attacks

▷ CBRN proliferation threats in hands of terrorists

▷ Information/intelligence silo among stakeholders or states

THANK YOU

Captain Salah AlfarajallahSenior Vice President Security and National Pilot DevelopmentEtihad Airways

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What has changed since the last AVSEC World

What has been done, what is still required?

What has changed since the last AVSEC World

What has been done, what is still required?

Moderator

Matthew Vaughan, Director of Aviation Security, IATA

Panelists

Kas Beumkes, Senior Safety Expert, ICAO

George Rhodes, Assistant Director Safety and Flight Operations (SFO), IATA

Andrew Nicholson, CEO, Osprey

Kaarlo Karvonen, Head of Security, Finnair, Chair, IATA Security Group

AVSEC World 2017Kas E. Beumkes, Senior Safety Expert ANB/ICAO

Update on the ICAO work programme on Conflict Zones and way forward

Abu Dhabi, 14 November 2017

39th ICAO Assembly Outcomes

The Technical Commission agreed that the Council should afford priority in light of the 2017 – 2019 Budget to:

Relevant highlights of following Council Sessions

Council directed ICAO Secretariat to:

Launch a survey on the availability of tools and mechanisms developed by external entities to share risk-based information, noting States’ and industry progress in developing systems - 25th AVSEC World 2016, and noting the decline in postings on the ICAO Conflict Zone Information Repository (CZIR).

The key findings of the survey were:

➢ the information provided by entities external to ICAO meets the requirements of the end-users;

➢ there is a requirement to standardize the format in which risk information is made available and there is a requirement to develop solutions allowing for timely and automated access to such information.

Relevant highlights of following Council Sessions

Council directed ICAO Secretariat to:

Discontinue the CZIR and provisionally approve modification into a library of

links to States’ own websites with aeronautical information related to risks to

civil aviation operations over or near conflict zones.

Explore ways to improve States’ risk management capabilities.

How to improve information sharing/exchange?

Ongoing Activities

Timeline

DSB MH17 recommendation: Ensure that operators are required through national regulations to make risk assessments of overflying conflict zones. (…)Annex 6

Expected Outcomes Tasks Lead Entity Status

Standard for operator where conflict zones are overflown, a risk assessment shall be conducted and appropriate risk mitigation measures taken to ensure a safe and secure flight

Draft operational requirement to perform a pre-flight risk assessment of the airspace along the entire route to ensure for safe and secure flight

ICAO Secretariat supported by States and industry

An information paper was drafted for FLTOPSP/WG/4, 15-19 May 2017 to introduce the issue for Annex 6 –Operation of Aircraft, followed by a working paper for consideration in the FLTOPSP/4, 4-8 Dec 2017

FLTOPSP/4, 4-8 Dec 2017 Annex 6, Amendment 43, 2020?

Ongoing Activities TF RCZ

DSB MH17 recommendation: Incorporate in Standards that States dealing with an armed conflict in their territory shall at an early stage publish information that is as specific as possible regarding the nature and extent of threats of that conflict and its consequences for civil aviation. Provide clear definitions of relevant terms, such as conflict zone and armed conflict.

Annex 11Doc 9971

Expected Outcomes Tasks Lead Entity Status

Building on the current provisions and guidance on contingency planning

Expand so as to enable States to meet air traffic services needs of changes in traffic flows

a. Update, as necessary, the relevant guidance material for these provisions

b. Develop, as necessary, operational requirements for the development and promulgation of air traffic flow management contingency plans and aerodrome emergency plans for implementation in the event of armed conflict and the potential for armed conflict

ICAO Secretariatsupported by States and industry

a. Amendment to Annex 11 – Air Traffic Services, for the appropriate ATS authority to conduct a safety risk assessment for activities potentially hazardous to civil aircraft and mitigating measures, is being progressed by the Secretariat

b. Amendment to Doc 9971, Manual on Collaborative Air Traffic Flow Management regarding ATFM and contingency is being progressed by Air Traffic Management Operations Panel (ATMOPSP)

Timeline

ATMOPS WG (11-15 Sept 2017)ANC (Oct 2017)

a) completed by 2020b) completed by 2018

Ongoing Activities TF RCZ

DSB MH17 recommendation: Incorporate in Standards that States dealing with an armed conflict in their territory shall at an early stage publish information that is as specific as possible regarding the nature and extent of threats of that conflict and its consequences for civil aviation. Provide clear definitions of relevant terms, such as conflict zone and armed conflict.

Doc 9554

Expected Outcomes Tasks Lead Entity Status

Development of a set of possible changes to ICAO Annexes, guidance and/or other materials so as to give effect to the recommendations made on enhancements of risk assessments for civil aircraft operations near or over conflict zones

Update, as necessary, Doc 9554, Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations

ICAO Secretariat, supported by States and industry

Amendment is being progressed by the Secretariat in coordination with appropriate expert groups

Timeline

Preliminary review 2Q 2018 Completed by 2020

Contingent upon the next Annex 11 amendment

Ongoing Activities TF RCZ

DSB MH17 recommendation: Incorporate in Standards that States dealing with an armed conflict in their territory shall at an early stage publish information that is as specific as possible regarding the nature and extent of threats of that conflict and its consequences for civil aviation. Provide clear definitions of relevant terms, such as conflict zone and armed conflict.

Circ 330Doc 10088

Expected Outcomes Tasks Lead Entity Status

New manual content:Development of processes, including types of reliable, timely and relevant information that States require to effectively discharge their responsibilities in sovereign or delegated airspace and for the operation of their own operators outside of that airspace

Review Circular 330, Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management for coordination between military and civil aviation authorities and upgrade to a manual

ICAO Secretariat supported by States, regional organizations and industry

The development of Doc 10088, Manual on Civil/Military Cooperation in Air Traffic Management is being progressed by the Air Traffic Management Operations Panel (ATMOPSP)

Timeline

Target draft publication 1Q 2018 Completed by 3Q 2018

Ongoing Activities

Timeline

DSB MH17 recommendation: Incorporate in Standards that States dealing with an armed conflict in their territory shall at an early stage publish information that is as specific as possible regarding the nature and extent of threats of that conflict and its consequences for civil aviation.

Annex 15

Expected Outcomes Tasks Lead Entity Status

Standard for States that a conflict zone is a reportable hazard for air navigation, including information as specific as possible regarding the nature and extent of threats of the conflict and its consequences for civil aviation

a. Include conflict zones to the list of reportable hazards for air navigation and

b. Explore possibilities to develop structured and formalized content of conflict zone related NOTAMs

ICAO Secretariatsupported by States and industry

a. Inclusion of conflict zones in list of reportable hazard for air navigation and appropriate template is being progressed by the Secretariat in coordination with appropriate expert groups

b. Tasks being progressed by the Secretariat

a) ANC, Oct 2017b) Secretariat, Q4 2017

Annex 15, Amendment 41, 2020PANS-AIM, Amendment 1, 2020

Ongoing Activities

DSB MH17 recommendations: Incorporate in Standards that States dealing with an armed conflict in their territory shall at an early stage publish information that is as specific as possible regarding the nature and extent of threats of that conflict and its consequences for civil aviation. (…) Amend relevant Standards so that risk assessments shall also cover threats to civil aviation in the airspace at cruising level, especially when overflying conflict zones. (…)

Annex 17

Expected Outcomes Tasks Lead Entity Status

a) States keep under constant review the level and nature of threat to civil aviation within its territory and airspace above it.

b) States establish and implement procedures to share with airspace users relevant information to assist them to conduct security risk assessments relating to their operations.

Update provisions in Annex 17:a) So that besides the level of threat also the nature of threat is reviewed when flying in the airspace above conflict zone territory;b) Develop new Standard for States to share information with end users to conduct risk assessments for their operations.

ICAO Secretariatsupported by States and industry

a) Amendment 15 to Annex 17 –Security, par. 3.1.3, effective 3 April 2017.b) Amendment 16 to Annex 17, par. 3.1.3bis. Reviewed by the Committee on Unlawful Interference (UIC) and Council in June 2017, in State consultation until 6 October 2017. Final review by UIC and Council in Q1 2018

Timeline

a) Council, 23 Nov 2016b) AVSECP/28, June 2017

a) Annex 17, Amendment 15, effective 3 April 2017 b) Annex 17, Amendment 16, Q2? 2018

Ongoing Activities

DSB MH17 recommendations: Provide clear definitions of relevant terms, such as conflict zone and armed conflict. (…) Amend relevant Standards so that risk assessments shall also cover threats to civil aviation in the airspace at cruising level, especially when overflying conflict zones. Risk increasing and uncertain factors need to be included in these risk assessments in accordance with the proposals made by the ICAO Working Group on Threat and Risk.

Doc 10084

Expected Outcomes Tasks Lead Entity Status

a. Advise for States and operators on the risks for civil aviation of flying over conflict zones at cruising altitudes, incl. definition of conflict zones/armed conflict.

b. Risk Assessment Manual with guidance material of existing provisions and practices for States, operators and ANSPs.

a. Provide broad advice for States and operators about the risks from surface-to-air missiles and key risk factors to be considered for their own risk assessments.

b. Review and upgrade the existing Doc 10084 to include guidance material based on existing ICAO provisions and industry practices more than 3 years after MH17.

ICAO Secretariatsupported by States and industry

a. The 1st edition of Civil Aircraft Operations Over Conflict Zones (Restricted) was published in November 2016 and it was reissued in April 2017 as Doc 10084 (Restricted).

b. The new Doc 10084, Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations over or near Conflict Zones (Unrestricted) is being progressed by the Secretariat in coordination with appropriate expert groups

Timeline

WGTR/Secretariat, Q4 2014Secretariat, Q3-4 2017

1st edition: November 20162nd edition, Doc 10084: April 20173rd edition, Doc 10084: Q1 2018

ICAO

Annex 6 Annex 15Annex 11 Annex 17

Doc 9971 Circ 330Doc 10084Doc 9554

THANK YOU

What has changed since the last AVSEC World

What has been done, what is still required?

Networking Coffee Break

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What’s New on the Radar?

What’s New on the Radar?

Neil Parry

Vice-President,Service Delivery, CATSA

What’s New on the Radar?

What’s New on the Radar?

Moderator

Hugo Porter, Chair, ICAO AVSEC Panel

Panelists

Nick Careen, Senior Vice President, Airports, Passenger, Cargo & Security , IATA

Darby LaJoye, Assistant Administrator, Security Operations, TSA

Laureen Kinney, Assistant Deputy Minister, Safety and Security, Transport Canada

Mohammad Al Tayer, Chief Policy Specialist, UAE GCAA

What’s New on the Radar?

What’s New on the Radar?

Mohammad Al Tayer

Chief Policy Specialist, UAE GCAA

What's New on the Radar ?

UAE General Civil Aviation Authority

14 Nov 2017

Introduction

Name: Mohammad AlTayer

Position: Chief policy specialist, AVSEC Affairs, UAE General Civil Aviation Authority

Contact me on: mtayer@gcaa.gov.ae

66

67

About the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority

GCAA the United Arab Emirates Civil Aviation Regulator

Vision:

“To develop a leading, safe, secure and sustainable civil aviation system”

Mission:

To regulate and oversee aviation safety, security and environment; deliver air navigation services and

facilitate air connectivity through international collaboration in order to efficiently serve the general

public and civil aviation industry.

68

About the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority Cont..

• ICAO AVSEC Panel

• ICAO Facilitation Panel

• ICAO Working Group on Threat and Risk

• ICAO Working Group on Innovation in Aviation Security

• IATA Events

• Others….

GCAA Aviation Security Affairs Sector represents the UAE actively on several panels and working

groups such as:

69

Risk based approach to oversight and regulations and importance of

facilitation

• Necessity ( Risk Based)

• Flexibility ( Where Appropriate )

• Continues Improvement

Base regulations on three important pillars:

Continues Improvement

FlexibilityNecessity

70

Management of change in civil aviation

Impact Assessment should be considered as a complimentary tool to evaluate the effects of

introducing a new or modified measure on the existing aviation system on all relevant stakeholders in

the industry.

71

Management of change in civil aviation Cont…

Policy Making Cycle :

• Risk Assessment

• Proposal for Change

• Review of the proposal

• Impact assessment

• Implementation

• Evaluation

Steps for Impact Assessment:

• Identification of options to be assessed (as a result

of a risk assessment)

• Desktop assessment (theoretical impact

assessment) and/or operational trials (practical

impact assessment), as appropriate

• Measurements of impacts

• Evaluation of results and

• Decision-making process (possible measures)

72

Aviation Security Culture, Human factor and Insider Threat

Humans are complex creatures of habit. We do the things we do, because that’s the way that we have

always done them. The same can be said of cultures in our society and work.

It is important to promote such culture through:

• Coordination

• Communication

• Training

• Leading by example

• Continues AVSEC Culture assessment and improvement

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Promoting Innovative Approaches

• We have to stay several steps ahead of those who wish us harm

• We have to continue to work all together in finding innovative approaches

• We need to encourage Innovation to keep up with the industry through reviewing our measures,

processes, technology and especially human factors

74

Promoting Innovation

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Thank you all for listening !

Shukran !

What’s New on the Radar?

Program At-A-Glance: Tuesday | 14 November

18:00 – 20:00

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