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Where causal dualism comes from

Monika Koeppl

Causality, Cognition and the Constitution of Scientific Phenomena

Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Heidelberg

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Introduction

Causal pluralism is a fashionable idea which may imply various philosophical positions.

I focus on causal dualism as the claim that

Question: How to interpret this claim? Is causal dualism a consistent position in itself?

(1) the word ‘cause‘ has two different senses: (a) a cause is something that is connected to the effect; (b) a cause is something that makes a difference to the effect; (2) both senses cannot be accomodated within one unified framework, but are equally legitimate explications of the concept of causation.

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Overview

Conceptual analysis

Hall‘s argument

The price of making causal dualism a consistent claim

Where causal dualism comes from

Conclusion

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Conceptual analysis

Assumptions:1. There is only one answer to causation ‘in the objects‘.2. Causation ‘in the objects‘ and our way of talking about it are interrelated.

Conceptual analysis

Causation ‘in the objects‘

Causation as we talk and think

about it

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Hall‘s argument

Negative causation: e.g. “The failure of the alarmclock is the cause for Billy‘sdelay.“

Overdetermination:e.g. “Suzy‘s rock is the cause for the broken bottle (even ifBilly‘s would have broken thebottle, too).“

Intuitive causal judgements

A cause is something thatmakes a difference to theeffect (dependence view).

A cause is something thatis connected to the effect(production view).

Two concepts of causation.

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The price of making causal dualism a consistent claim Solution A:

The two concepts represent two kinds of causal relationships in the world. departs from the assumption that there is only one answer to causation ‘in the objects‘.

Solution B: Causal dualism is a mere psychological statement. BUT: Why should we have developed two notions of causation? What about the implications for causation ‘in the objects‘?

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Interventionist theory of causation (Woodward)

Method: Conceptual analysis with a specialfocus on epistemic and pragmatic aspects (i.e. How do we know aboutcausal relationships? Why do wecare about causal relationships?) A causal relation is a relation

between variables that are correlated under intervention.

Inclusion of negative causation, but exclusion of e.g. variables with only one value

Where causal dualism comes from

Theory of physical causation(Salmon, Dowe)

Method: Empirical analysis of causation ‘inthe objects‘ with primaryjustification drawn from empiricalsciences (physics) Causal processes are more

fundamental than cause-effect-relationships.

Exclusion of negative causation as genuine causation

Philosophical explication of the production view and the dependence view

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Theory of physical causation

e.g. defines necessary and sufficient conditions for what should be called a cause-effect-relationship.

The project is based on the assumption that empirical sciencesmight tell us something aboutcausation ‘in the objects‘ which isindependent of our way of thinkingabout causation.

Interventionist theory

e.g. holds that the truth of a causal relationship depends on objective facts of the world (once the variables are fixed).

The project is based on scepticismwith regard to the prospects of areductive analysis of causation.

Common assumption: Our way of talking about causation and causation ‘in the objects‘ are

interrelated.

Why this way?

?

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Where causal dualism comes from Solution C: The two concepts represent two ways of tackling the

philosophical problem of causation. Which of the two ways is chosen depends on the author‘s conviction whether empirical sciences might yield independent insight about causation ‘in the objects‘ or not.

As one cannot be sceptical and non-sceptical at the same time, both theories cannot be defended seriously at once. Therefore, causal dualism is not a consistent position.

Causal dualism is an artefact of conceptual analysis which ignores these diverging convictions.

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But ... Do these methodological discussions explain why we seem

to endorse both views in our intuitive causal judgements?

Yes, because ..… the dependence view is the default view of thinking and talking about causation.

As soon as we reach the limits of the dependence view (as in cases of overdetermination), we ‘switch‘ to another perspective. The nonsceptical intuition is part of our everyday convictions and is called for when needed.

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Conclusion

There are three ways of interpreting causal dualism. Causal dualism might be

1. a guide to two kinds of causal relationships in the world; 2. a mere psychological statement;3. an artefact of conceptual analysis.

The first two interpretations challenge the assumptions on which conceptual analysis is founded.

The third interpretation challenges conceptual analysis itself.

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Thank you!