Delivered by,

Kasturi DasContact: kasturidas@ris.org.in

First Round Table on ASEAN-India Network of Think-tanksNew Delhi, 8 August 2012

Climate Change: Challenges and Cause

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Climate change is widely regarded as one of the greatestchallenges confronting the contemporary world.

The main-stream view is that there is ample scientificevidence to support ‘anthropogenic’ (i.e. human-induced)climate change.

The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) releasedin 2007 says that “warming of the climate system isunequivocal, as is now evident from observations ofincreases in global average air and ocean temperatures,widespread melting of snow and ice and rising globalaverage sea level”.

The warming trend over the previous century wasdetermined by IPCC (AR4) to be in the tune of 0.74°C.

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South East (S-E) Asia is widely considered to be one of theworld’s most vulnerable to climate change, which may beattributable to several factors.

A large segment of the population are concentrated alongcoastlines leaving them exposed to rising sea levels.

The region’s heavy reliance on agriculture makes itvulnerable to increased frequency of extreme weatherevents cased by climate change.

Its high economic dependence on natural resources andforestry—as one of the world’s biggest providers of forestproducts—also puts the region at risk.

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The IPCC (AR4) states the following observed indications in S-E Asia : An increasing trend in mean surface air temperature during the past

several decades, with 0.1–0.3°C increase per decade recorded between1951 and 2000.

A decreasing trend in rainfall. Rising sea levels (at 1–3 mm per year). More frequent and more intense extreme weather events.

Climatic change has led to massive flooding; landslides; and droughtsin many parts of the region, causing extensive damage to property,assets, and human life.

Water shortages in many areas are constraining agriculturalproduction and threatening food security.

Other impacts include forest fires and degradation; damaging coastaland marine resources; and increasing risk of outbreaks of infectiousdiseases.

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An increase in surface temperature of 0.40 C has beenrecorded over the past century at the national level Warming trend in the central and eastern India and cooling trend in

the western and southern India No significant trend has been observed in monsoon rainfall

at the national level but disparities at the regional level havebeen observed A trend of increasing monsoon rainfall has been found along the west

coast, northern Andhra Pradesh, and north-western India, while atrend of decreasing monsoon rainfall has been observed over easternMadhya Pradesh, north-eastern India, and some parts of Gujarat andKerala.

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Increase in some extreme weather events have beenobserved: Overall increasing trend in severe storm incidence along

the coast. A rising trend in the frequency of heavy rain events and a

significant decrease in the frequency of moderate rainevents over central India from 1951 to 2000.

Sea level rise of 1.06 to 1.75 mm per year (in Indian Ocean). However, no concrete link or causality has been established

between the documented changes above and warming dueto anthropogenic climate change.

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Various studies indicate that the key sectors in India, such asthe agriculture, water, natural ecosystem, biodiversity, andhealth are vulnerable to climate change.

There are projections indicating impacts, such as sea-level rise,increase in cyclonic intensity, increased flooding, reducedwater availability, reduced crop yield (e.g. wheat, rice), stresson livestock, reduction in milk productivity, shift in forest typeand spread of vector-borne deseases (e.g. malaria), amongother s.

Climate change is likely to increase the pressure on Indianagriculture, thereby affecting the food systems and increasingthe vulnerability of a large section of the resource-poorpopulation, since around 58% of the 1.21 billion strongpopulation of India is still dependent on agriculture.

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• By comparing a number of natural factors and human activities,and their effect on climate, mainstream scientists have come tothe conclusion that most of the observed increase in globalaverage temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likelydue to the observed increase in anthropogenic Green HouseGas (GHG) concentrations.

• Global atmospheric concentrations of GHGs, such as carbondioxide (CO2), methane and nitrous oxide have increasedmarkedly as a result of human activities (including burning offossil fuels) since 1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial values.

• There has been a 70% growth of GHG emissions in terms of theglobal warming potential between 1970 and 2004 alone.

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Aside from water vapour near the surface, whichstays only for a few days, the GHGs, once in theatmosphere, take a very long time to leave theatmosphere, with some of them having anatmospheric lifetime of thousands of years.

This leads to atmospheric concentration of GHGsover time, which in turn contributes to thephenomena of climate change.

Hence the issue of “historical” emissions. Different GHGs, however, have different Global

Warming Potential (measured in CO2 equivalent)for any given time interval.

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GHG Lifetime (yrs)

GWP time horizon (yrs)

20 100 500

Methane 12 72 25 7.6

Nitrous oxide 114 289 298 153

HFC-23 (Hydrofluorocarbon) 270 12,000 14,800 12,200

Sulfur hexafluoride 3200 16,300 22,800 32,600

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Country/Bloc

Cumulative CO2emissions (MtCO2e) Rank

% of World Total

Per capita cumulative

CO2 emissions (MtCO2e) Rank

USA 327591.5 1 29 1087.3 3EU 301530.6 2 27 609.5 12China 92993 3 8 70.6 90Russian Fed. 91430.4 4 8 643.4 10Germany 79535 5 7 966.8 6UK 67688.5 6 6 1109.6 2Japan 43122.2 7 4 337.5 36France 31896.7 8 3 515 22India 26088.5 9 2 23.2 124Ukraine 24792.5 10 2 533.1 20Canada 24583.5 11 2 745.5 8

29

27

8 87

6

43

2 2 2 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

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50

100

150

200

250

300

350

USA EU China Russian Fed.

Germany UK Japan France India Ukraine Canada

% o

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CO2

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CO2 emissions (MtCO2e) % of World Total

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The Arctic, because of the impacts of high rates ofprojected warming on natural systems and humancommunities;

Africa, because of low adaptive capacity andprojected climate change impacts;

Small islands, where there is high exposure ofpopulation and infrastructure to projected climatechange impacts;

Asian and African mega deltas, due to largepopulations and high exposure to sea level rise,storm surges and river flooding.

The first major breakthrough in international cooperation onclimate change was achieved way back in 1992, when theinternational community managed to set in place the UnitedNations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

It was the outcome of the international action on climatechange that was triggered by the release of the first report ofthe IPCC in 1990 – the first ever detailed scientific study of theclimate change phenomena.

The Framework Convention provides the basic foundation forthe climate change regime.

The main decision-making body of the Convention is theConference of the Parties (COP), which is scheduled to meetevery year.

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The ‘ultimate objective’ of the UNFCCC is ‘stabilization of greenhousegas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would preventdangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’.

The first principle enshrined in the UNFCCC states that ‘(t)he Partiesshould protect the climate system for the benefit of present andfuture generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and inaccordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities andrespective capabilities (CBDR).

The principles are developed in the light of the historicalresponsibility of the developed countries in triggering the problem ofclimate change.

Thus, the developed country Parties should take the lead incombating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.’

They are also obligated to provide financial and technological supportto developing countries for their climate actions.

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The Convention requires developed countries to provide financialresources including for technology transfer needed by developingcountries to meet their agreed full incremental costs of implementingmeasures (Article 4.3).

It further commits developed countries to take all practicable steps tofacilitate and finance transfer of and access to environmentally soundtechnologies and know how particularly to developing countries; andrequires them to support the development and enhancement ofendogenous capacities and technologies of developing countries (Article4.5).

It clearly states that the extent to which developing countries wouldimplement their commitments would depend on effectiveimplementation of developed countries’ commitments on financing andtechnology transfer (Article 4.7).

It acknowledges that ‘(t)he Parties have a right to, and should, promotesustainable development’ (Article 3.4) and that ‘economic and socialdevelopment and poverty eradication are the first and overridingpriorities of the developing country Parties’ (Article 4.7).

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The Framework Convention itself, however, stopped shortof including legally binding commitments for the Membercountries towards GHG emission reduction.

At COP 1 in 1995, Parties launched a new round ofnegotiations to agree on stronger commitments fordeveloped countries.

In accordance with the principle of equity andindustrialized country leadership, Parties eventuallyagreed that no commitments would be set for developingcountries as part of that negotiating round.

Highly complex and contentious negotiations took placeover two and a half years, eventually resulting in theadoption of the Kyoto Protocol on 11 December 1997 atCOP3 in Kyoto, Japan.

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Under the Protocol, 37 industrialized countries and the EuropeanCommunity committed to reducing their emissions by an averageof 5.2% below 1990 levels over the first commitment period -2008-2012.

This collective target is divided up among the Annex I Parties, eachof which has its own individual ‘quantified emission limitation orreduction commitment’ listed in the Protocol’s Annex B.

The Kyoto Protocol finally came into force on 16 February 2005,after being ratified by the required number of parties.

Although the United States signed the Protocol, it refrained fromratifying it primarily on the grounds that it did not include bindingemission reduction commitments for developing countries.

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In COP 13 held in Bali, Indonesia in December 2007, Membersarrived at a road map for negotiations on the post-2012 climateregime - the Bali Action Plan (BAP).

The BAP sought ‘to enable the full, effective and sustainedimplementation of the Convention through long-term cooperativeaction, now, up to and beyond 2012’.

With this aim in view, it set out the deadline to reach ‘an agreedoutcome’ in COP 15 that was to be held in December 2009 inCopenhagen, Denmark .

Importantly, the BAP set out the road map for the Copenhagendeal, quite in tune with the core principles and provisions of theUNFCCC, including equity and CBDR.

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The BAP has the following building blocks: A shared vision;mitigation; adaptation; finance; technology and capacitybuilding.

The BAP calls for: A ‘shared vision for long-term cooperative action, including a long-

term global goal for emission reductions, to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention’.

It also calls for ‘Enhanced national/international action on mitigationof climate change’ [1(b)].

‘Enhanced action on adaptation’ [1(c)]. ‘Enhanced action on technology development and transfer to support

action on mitigation and adaptation’ [1(d)]. ‘Enhanced action on the provision of financial resources and

investment to support action on mitigation and adaptation andtechnology cooperation’ [1(e)]

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The BAP envisages ‘quantified emission limitation and

reduction objectives’ for developed countries.

Developing countries are only expected to ‘consider’

undertaking ‘nationally appropriate mitigation actions’

(NAMAs) in the context of sustainable development, that are

to be ‘supported and enabled by technology, financing and

capacity-building’ by developed countries.

Both the supported actions by developing countries and the

support provided by developed countries are to be

‘measurable, reportable and verifiable’ (MRV).24

Since the advent of the BAP, negotiations wentunderway in two tracks: one that aims at implementation of the BAP [under

the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term CooperativeAction under the Convention (AWG-LCA)].

and another that seeks to amend Annex B of theKyoto Protocol to arrive at commitments by theAnnex I Parties in the second commitment periodstaring 2013 [under the Ad Hoc Working Group onFurther Commitments for Annex I Parties under theKyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)].

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AWG-KP: Two key issues: Collective emission reductions commitments by all

Annex I Parties (developed countries) taken together,beyond the first commitment period of the Protocol,i.e. beyond 2012.

‘Quantified emission limitation or reductioncommitment’ to be taken by each individual Annex IParty.

AWG-LCA is mandated to follow-up on the BAP,which in turn, seeks to enhance theimplementation of the Convention.

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US: 17% below 2005 levels (conditional) European Union: 20% [30%] below 1990

levels Japan : 15% below 2005 levels or 25% below

1990 levels Canada: 20% below 2006 levels Australia: 5-25% below 2000 levels Norway: 30% below 1990 levels New Zealand: 10-20% below 1990 levels

China: 40-45% reduction in carbon intensityof GDP by 2020 compared to 2005 level.

Brazil: 36.1-38.9% reduction in GHGemissions from projected levels in 2020.

South Africa: 34% deviations below the‘Business as usual’ emissions growthtrajectory by 2020 and 42% by 2025.

India: 20-25% reduction in emission intensityof GDP by 2020 compared to 2005 level.

Divergences were too huge to bridge to arrive at a legallybinding agreement in Copenhagen in December 2009 (COP15).

The summit failed to adopt any draft with consensus. It ended merely by ‘taking note’ of the ‘Copenhagen Accord’

– a three-pager that was struck by 29 countries with 5 ofthem in the forefront: the US and 4 BASIC countries (China,India, Brazil and South Africa).

More than 100 countries subsequently associatedthemselves with the Accord.

Many developed and developing countries submittedemission reduction pledges for inclusion in the Appendices ofthe Accord.

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The post-Copenhagen negotiations leading up to theadoption of the Cancun Agreements in COP 16 held inCancun, Mexico during November-December 2010 builtupon the broad contours of the Copenhagen Accord.

A significant progress was made in Cancun COP by way ofadoption of a set of decisions called Cancun Agreements.

The Cancun Agreements envisage certain fundamentalchanges in the climate regime that are mostly in line withthe stands taken by the developed countries.

The Cancun Agreements moved away from the top-downapproach followed by the Kyoto Protocol on developedcountries’ mitigation commitments and adopted instead thebottom up pledge-and-review approach advocated bydeveloped countries.

It took note of the emissions reduction pledges made by thedeveloped countries under the Copenhagen Accord.

But these are overall such poor targets, that their aggregatedoes not come anywhere close to what sciencerecommends.

IPCC-AR4 recommended that Annex I Parties should reducetheir emissions at least by of 25-40% by 2020.

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For developing countries (non-Annex I Parties), the CancunAgreements envisage a whole lot of new obligations,particularly on mitigation actions, their reporting andverification.

The developing countries are supposed to submit their plansand targets on nationally appropriate mitigation actions(NAMAs), which are to be compiled in a document and later ina registry - to be updated regularly.

The Cancun Agreements also oblige developing countries toreport on their national emissions inventories, mitigationactions and their effects, in national communications reportsonce every four years and to submit biennial update reports.

These reports are to be subjected to international scrutinyincluding by technical experts.

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Further, the Cancun Agreements propose stringent MRV(measuring, reporting and verification) and ICA(international consultation and analysis) for all mitigationactions to be undertaken by developing countries, thedetailed guidelines for which remained to be worked out.

The MRV and ICA regimes included in the Cancun Text marksa significant departure from the Bali Action Plan (BAP).

While the BAP envisages international MRV only forinternationally supported mitigation actions of developingcountries, the Cancun Agreements subjects evendomestically supported mitigation actions to MRV and ICA.

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On finance, the Cancun Agreements propose establishment of a GreenClimate Fund with the World Bank as its ‘interim’ trustee.

It also reiterates the developed country pledges made in theCopenhagen Accord on (a) the so-called ‘fast-start finance’approaching $30 billion for the period 2010-12; and (b) ‘long-termfinance’, i.e. a ‘goal’ of jointly mobilizing $100 billion per year by 2020.

Several proposals extended by the developing countries have insteaddemanded an assessed contribution of 1.5% or 6% of the GDP/GNP ofthe developed countries annually by 2020.

According to some rough estimation, 1.5% of GNP of developedcountries currently adds up to $600 billion.

Moreover, even the ‘goal’ of jointly mobilizing $100 billion per year by2020 is conditional – “in the context of meaningful mitigation actionsand transparency on implementation” by developing countries.

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The Cancun Agreements elaborates upon theTechnology Mechanism mentioned in theCopenhagen Accord.

The Technology Mechanism, which is establishedunder the guidance of the COP and is alsoaccountable to it, comprises two components: (a) A Technology Executive Committee (TEC), and (b) a Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN).

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In the section on ‘shared vision’, the Cancun textrecognizes the need to limit temperature rise tono more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels andthat parties should take action to meet this goalconsistent with science and on the basis ofequity.

However, it does not contain any concreteemissions reduction goals, either at theaggregate level or at the level of countrygroupings (developed and developing) forattaining this target.

The Durban climate conference (COP17) held in November-December 2011 arrived, 36 hours after the scheduled end ofthe conference, at a set of landmark decisions.

These include decisions to extend the Kyoto Protocol for asecond commitment period (beginning 1 January 2013);operationalize some of the key Cancun decisions, such as, theGreen Climate Fund, Technology Mechanism and theAdaptation Framework; and most importantly, launch of anew process – “Durban Platform” for negotiating the post-2012 climate regime.

There was a quid-pro-quo in the sense that without anagreement to negotiate a future climate regime involving allParties, the EU would not have agreed to a Kyoto secondcommitment period.

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Parties agreed to negotiate “a Protocol, another legal instrumentor agreed outcome with legal force under the Conventionapplicable to all” for the post-2020 period.

A subsidiary body under the Convention called the Ad Hoc WorkingGroup on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) wasestablished for this purpose.

It was also agreed that the AWG-LCA shall complete its work in2012 and reach the agreed outcome pursuant to the BAP andsubsequent COP decisions and shall be terminated at COP18 to beheld in Doha.

The terms of reference of the Durban Platform will be decidedupon in 2012, and this instrument is scheduled to be adopted in2015, and implemented from 2020.

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India, until the final hours of the conference, had resisted theattempts by the EU and its allies on a legally binding instrument,arguing that it could agree at best to launch a process towards a“legal outcome” — which would leave the precise legal form of theinstrument open.

This formulation lacked the clarity and ambition that the EU andits allies, such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), theLeast Developed Countries, etc. were seeking.

Critically, this was not sufficient for the EU to endorse a secondcommitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.

In the final hours of the conference, India had to agree tosubstitute the term “legal outcome” with the phrase “agreedoutcome with legal force”, which triggered the acceptance of aKyoto second commitment period by the EU and its allies.

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Importantly, the Durban Platform decision does not containa reference to “equity” or “common but differentiatedresponsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR).

This is in line with the developed countries’ position that anyreference to CBDR must be qualified with a statement thatthis principle must be interpreted in the light ofcontemporary economic realities.

Developed countries were also insistent that the futureregime must be “applicable to all”.

India, among other developing countries, argued in responsethat this would tantamount to amending the FrameworkConvention.

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The only way out of this impasse was to draft the text suchthat it was rooted in the Convention — “under theConvention” — thereby implicitly engaging its principles.

The phrase “applicable to all” was further added in line withthe developed country position.

However, the political context for the inclusion of the phrase- “under the Convention” - coupled with the conspicuousabsence of the usual markers for differentiation — equity andCBDR — makes it rather clear that developed countries areaiming at shifting the goal posts on differentiation post-2020.

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India argues that the phrase “under the Convention” implicitlyrecognizes all the principles and provisions of the Convention,including, in particular the principles of ‘equity’ and CBDR.

According to India, a successful outcome on Durban Platform mustbe built on equity and duly incorporate requirements of CBDR.

India is not in favour of undertaking a legally binding commitmentat this stage of its development.

India also stresses on finance and technology transfer fromdeveloped countries to developing countries.

This is not to suggest that India will not take progressivelyambitious mitigation actions domestically, but rather that thescale and effectiveness of these mitigation efforts will depend onthe ability of the international community to enable India, amongother developing countries, to take these mitigation actions.

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Much of the Durban conference was caught up by the bargainingof the EU in a Kyoto second commitment period with thecondition of launching talks on new legally binding treatyinvolving all.

The Durban Decisions on Kyoto states that the secondcommitment period starts on 1 Jan 2013 and can last for 5 or 8years (this will be decided in 2012).

However, Japan, Canada and Russia announced they will not takepart in a second period, leaving only the EU, Australia and NewZealand as possible participants.

Even Australia and New Zealand are uncertain participants. The KP was thus barely kept alive in Durban. Canada later pulled out of Kyoto Protocol altogether as it was

clearly missing its first Kyoto target.43

The Durban Decisions invited Annex I Parties to submitinformation on their QELROs (Quantified emission limitationor reduction objective ) under the Second CommitmentPeriod of the Kyoto Protocol by 1 May 2012.

Not all Annex 1 Parties have submitted such information. Even those who have submitted, have done so inadequately. The level of ambition remains far too low. Some Annex 1 Parties have still not decided on their

participation in the Kyoto-Second Commitment Period. The information submitted by some are only “provisional” . Some have even imposed conditionalities.

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Though the Green Climate Fund has been operationalized inDurban, regarding the long-term finance of US$100 billionper year, there is not much clarity on which country willprovide how much and through which channel.

While developing countries have insisted that most of thefinancing should be in the form of grants or payments andnot loans, and should be sourced from the public sectorrather than from the private sector or markets, the CancunAgreements mentions a wide variety of sources of funding:“public and private, bilateral and multilateral, includingalternative sources”.

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Although Durban has operationalized theTechnology Mechanism, several importantbarriers like finance and intellectual propertyrights (IPRs), among others, still remainunaddressed.

However, unless these important barriers aretaken care of adequately and effectively theTechnology Mechanism may eventually turnout to be a non-starter.

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It is also significant that it was deemed necessary tolaunch a new process, though the Bali Action Plan(BAP) could have offered the basis for a new climateregime post-2020 as originally envisaged.

Notably, the BAP did create a firewall betweendeveloped country commitments and developingcountry actions.

In a bid to move away from this Bali firewall, the US,among others, insisted on a new process, and onterminating the Bali process in 2012.

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Developing countries are concerned that developedcountries are trying to avoid the issue of “enhancing ofmitigation ambition” by shifting away from the AWG-LCA tothe Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform (ADP).

India and many other developing countries expressedconcerns over efforts to prematurely terminate the AWG-LCA in Doha, without ensuring a successful agreed outcomeon all the elements of the Bali Action Plan mandate andsubsequent COP decisions.

They are of the view that such an action would be contrary tothe political agreements reached at Durban to have abalanced and comprehensive package.

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India, in its submission has emphasized that the work underthe Durban Platform should draw upon the work done underAWG-LCA and should have a synergistic relationship with theimplementation of its mandate.

India believes that no issue currently covered by the AWG-LCAand AWG-KP should fall between the cracks if and when theseprocesses are brought to an end.

The ADP should be the logical home for most of the remainingsubstantive issues on their respective agendas.

Post 2020 arrangements to be evolved under the DurbanPlatform must, inter alia, address the issues of equity,unilateral measures and technology related IntellectualProperty Rights (i.e. three key agendas of India) sufficientlyand adequately . 49

India in its submission has stressed that irrespective of thelegal form of the final arrangements post-2020, thedeveloping country targets under such arrangements cannotbe binding until the principle of differentiation based onequity is defined and the conditions implicit in suchdefinition of equity are met.

The principle of equity will need to be elaborated throughnegotiations.

The post-2020 arrangements , in India’s view, must include amandate that there will be no unilateral measures taken byany country in the name of climate change.

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India emphasizes that the work under the technologydevelopment and transfer pillar must operationalize technologytransfer to developing countries, ensure developed countryfinancing for technology development, remove obstacles to andprovide financing and incentives for transfer of technology, andfacilitate R & D cooperation in climate technology.

India strongly supports a facilitative IPR regime that balancesrewards for the innovators with the common good of humankindand thereby enables developing countries to take early andeffective mitigation and adaptation actions at the national level.In the absence of such a facilitative IPRs regime, the objective ofadvancing nationally appropriate mitigation and adaptationactions at the scale and speed warranted by the Convention willnot be achievable.

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The ASEAN Regional Forum has been deliberating on thesecurity implications of climate change.

Several seminars have been organized by ARF. It has been highlighted that climate change presents

complex non-traditional threats to security, such as, food,health, energy and water security and human rights.

It has been pointed out that climate change poses trans-boundary threats including forced migration and watermanagement challenges.

Concerns have been expressed that the existing instrumentsof security may not be sufficient to address these threats.

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The 12th ASEAN Summit and the Second East Asia Summitheld in January 2007 in Cebu, Philippines marked a significantstep forward on the issues of climate change.

In the Cebu Declaration on East Asian Energy Security, thesixteen countries of the ASEAN-Plus Six pledged to workclosely together to mitigate GHGs through effective policiesand measures.

The parties emphasized voluntary measures that involve theprivate sector involvement and the introduction of moreefficient and innovative technologies.

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At the 13th ASEAN Summit held in Singapore in November 2007, theAgenda was "Energy, Environment, Climate Change and SustainableDevelopment”.

During that time, the Singapore Declaration was signed by ASEAN PlusSix.

Collectively, the statements show parties’ recognition of the need totackle the issues of climate change, energy security and otherenvironmental and health issues.

The Singapore Declaration aims, among other things, to deepenunderstanding of the S-E Asian region’s vulnerability to climate changeand to implement appropriate mitigation and adaptation measures.

The measures include intensifying ongoing operations to improve energyefficiency and the use of cleaner energy, promoting cooperation inafforestation and reforestation, and continuing support and initiativesunder the UNFCCC.

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During the 6th India-ASEAN Summit held in Singapore inNovember 2007, the Indian PM Dr. Manmohan Singhproposed the setting up of an India-ASEAN Network onClimate Change that would pool and share expertise,exchange best practices and submit recommendations forcommon positions taking into account national priorities.

To give a boost to this cooperation, he further proposed toset up an India-ASEAN Green Fund with an initialcontribution of USD 5 million for pilot projects to promoteadaptation and mitigation technologies, which was set up in2010.

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Notwithstanding some such initiatives, it maybe said that regional cooperation on climatechange between ASEAN and India has yet totake-off.

ASEAN-India collaboration on climatechange can go a long way in helping all thesecountries to confront the challenges posedby this trans-boundary environmentalproblem much more effectively.

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