Karaomerlioglu, Asım_Alexander Helphand-Parvus and His Impact on Turkish Intellectual Life

Helphand-Parvus and his Impact on TurkishIntellectual Life

M. ASIM KARAOMERLIOGLU

The role of the individual has been one of the most hotly-debated topics in

historiography. Until the twentieth century, a certain kind of history writing

focusing on the achievements of ‘great men’ with an overemphasis on the

history of the states, elites and mainstream politics had dominated

historiography. The rise of the Annales in the 1920s and later of the ‘history

from below’ approach, especially as was carried out by British Marxist

historians, in some ways reversed this historiographical tendency and led to a

new form of history writing that questioned the state-centred and elite

perceptions of history. Theirs was an attempt to direct attention to structures,

economic transformations, social classes and mass politics. Then, beginning

in 1968 with a series of great upheavals and mass movements, the impact of

voluntarism and human agency in the making of history came to be

emphasized more often, although this emphasis was different from the

nineteenth century historical style based on the history of ‘great men’. This

was, so to speak, a revival of the role of the individual and therefore of an

interest in biographical studies. This revival, however, was not simply a

return to the old style biographies of ‘great men,’ but, instead, was a call for

the inclusion of cultural impacts, socio-economic conditions, systems of

thought, psychological factors and the like. This article aims to be a modest

contribution to such a historiographical trend by focusing on the life of

Alexander Israel Helphand, generally known by his nickname, Parvus, or

Parvus Efendi, as his Turkish friends called him.

Helphand-Parvus, no doubt, is one of the most extraordinary political

figures of the twentieth century. He played an influential role in the political

and intellectual life of three countries: Russia, Germany and Turkey. He was

one of the leading Marxist theoreticians and revolutionaries in the Russian

Revolution of 1905, a prominent German Social Democrat in Germany, one

of the eminent figures of the Second International,1 and for a while an adviser

on economic issues to the Young Turks2 between 1910 and 1914 in Istanbul

where he also became a merchant millionaire. Furthermore, during the last

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.40, No.6, November 2004, pp.145 – 165ISSN 0026-3206 print/1743-7881 onlineDOI: 10.1080/0026320042000282928 # 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd.

decade of his life, he was influential not only in contributing to the making of

the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia, but also in the formation of post-

war Germany as an adviser to the Weimar Republic.3

Parvus’s life story in Russia and Germany is well known, thanks especially

to Zeman and Scharlau’s brilliant biography entitled The Merchant of

Revolution, The Life of Israel Alexander Helphand Parvus.4 The four years of

his life that he spent in Turkey, however, to a great extent, remain a mystery.

Although some information written in Turkish is available, this information

falls short of being a systematic and comprehensive analysis of his life and

intellectual ventures in Istanbul.5 The situation is even worse as far as western

sources are concerned, and with the exception of Paul Dumont’s article on

Parvus’s life in Turkey,6 almost no study exists. Parvus’s four years of

residence in Istanbul, however, had a formative impact both on his

personality and his political orientation. Faced with the lack of scholarly

studies about these formative years of Parvus, whom I regard as one of the

twentieth century’s leading intellectual and political figures, I would like to

conduct a systematic, historiographic and personal study of his life in Istanbul

and his impact on Turkish intellectual life.

Before focusing on his Turkish experience, it is important to mention

briefly his life in Russia and Germany. This is essential because scholars of

Middle Eastern history, by and large, have not heard of his influential and

colourful life in those countries. Parvus was born into a middle-class Jewish

family in Russia in 1867. Early in his life in the mid-1880s, he was influenced

by Russian Marxists such as Plekhanov, Akselrod and Zasulic.7 He was never

directly involved in the internal struggles of the Russian Social Democracy;

although he was closer to the Mensheviks for he never believed in the

historical role of the vanguard party envisioned by Lenin.8 In the 1890s, as a

political exile in Switzerland, he received a Ph.D. degree from the University

of Basle.9 Frustrated with academia, however, he joined the German Social

Democratic circles where he developed close friendships with people such as

Karl Kautsky, Clara Zetkin, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Radek and he soon

became one of the most distinguished theoreticians of this party. Interest-

ingly, during the late 1890s, he was the first person in the party to make a

systematic critique of Eduard Bernstein’s revisionist theses which, in a

nutshell, emphasized spontaneity and political reform as opposed to radical

revolution.10 Rosa Luxembourg11 and Parvus were ‘regarded as hotheads and

firebrands by the party hierarchy’.12 In the 1890s and early 1900s, he was not

only engaged in political matters of German and Russian Marxism, but also

extensively wrote on matters such as imperialism, the agrarian question,

finance capital and capitalism, in general.13 For instance, in the 1890s he was

the first to observe and speculate about the long waves of capitalism, a

phenomenon that was later attributed to Kondratieff in the 1920s.14

146 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

In the early 1900s, Parvus’s house in Munich became one of the focal

points of many Russian exiles such as Lenin and Trotsky.15 When the

Revolution of 1905 broke out in Russia, Parvus withdrew into the country,

actively participated in the revolution, and, together with Trotsky, became

one of the most important political figures of the St. Petersburg Soviet.16 His

political and intellectual impact on Trotsky, especially between 1904 and

1909,17 was remarkable and was later acknowledged with appreciation by

Trotsky. According to Trotsky:

Parvus was unquestionably one of the most important of the Marxists at

the turn of the century. He used the Marxian methods in a competent

way, was possessed of wide vision, and kept a keen eye on everything

of importance in world events. This, coupled with his fearless thinking

and his virile, muscular style, made him a remarkable writer. His early

studies brought me closer to the problems of the Social Revolution,

and, for me, definitely transformed the conquest of power by the

proletariat from an astronomical ‘final’ goal to a practical task for our

own day.18

Years later, Trotsky wrote that ‘there is no doubt that he [Parvus] exerted

considerable influence on my personal development, especially with respect

to the social–revolutionary understanding of our epoch.’19 Indeed, the famous

theory of permanent revolution that is generally attributed to Trotsky was

originally formulated by Parvus.20 As early as 1905, he developed his theory

on the peculiarities of the semi-Asiatic character of pre-capitalist Russia. He

argued that cities constituted only administrative centres and were ‘purely

official and bureaucratic in character.’ He claimed that ‘the Russian middle

class was weak, and the workers could and should take the lead in the

revolution, ultimately establishing, ‘‘a workers’’’ democracy.’21 The theory of

permanent revolution, which rejected the overwhelmingly dominant revolu-

tionary paradigm that was popular among the Marxists at the time, was based

on the necessity of a ‘bourgeois democratic’ stage on the way to socialism in

Russia. Indeed, this outstanding contribution of Parvus was vindicated by the

actual historical path that the Russian Revolution took. According to him, the

Russian Social Democrats alone supported by the Russian working class

could assume the political power in Russia and this was the perspective Lenin

adopted only as late as April 1917.

Parvus was an acute observer and a brilliant theoretician. Many of the

theories attributed to Trotsky, such as the worldwide development of

capitalism,22 the decline of the economic and political roles of the nation-

states, capitalism as an ever growing universal system, the significance of the

mass strike as the initiator of political revolution, the Soviet as the role model

HELPHAND-PARVUS 147

for revolutionary political organization, and the ‘actuality of revolution’ were

in fact, initially and brilliantly, put forward by Parvus.23 He was one of the

first and early revolutionary theoreticians who characterized Russia as the

‘weakest link’ of the imperialist system.24 As early as 1904, he talked about

the inevitability of a world war between industrial nations that would result in

world revolution.25 Long before Lenin, Parvus developed a theory of

imperialism which, unlike Marx’s, pointed out that imperialism in the

colonies did not necessarily lead to economic development or capitalism.26

Distancing himself from the eurocentric theories of imperialism, Parvus

pointed out hindrances to as well as the advance of capitalism in the colonies,

a theory similar to the one widely popular in the 1960s and 1970s, especially

in Latin America.

When the revolutionary waves faded away in 1906, Parvus, Trotsky and

many other revolutionaries were imprisoned, and later sent to exile in Siberia,

from where they were able to escape. Parvus returned to Germany, and

continued contributing to political and theoretical discussions in the party.

However, his political and personal life in Germany created several

problems. The hostility felt towards him by the leaders of the German

Social Democrat Party escalated as the Russian Marxists accused him of

embezzling the money coming from the European copyright revenues of the

Bolshevik writer Maxim Gorky.27 Tired of the suffocating atmosphere in the

party circles,28 and convinced that a socialist revolution, far from being

possible through working class activities, could come about only as a result of

an inter-imperialist world war likely to start in the Balkans.29 Parvus, in 1910,

came to Istanbul to work as a quite poor press correspondent of a German

Social Democratic newspaper.30 This marked the beginning of Parvus’s

almost five years of residence in Istanbul, the story of which I will return to

later in this article.

During the First World War, Parvus openly carried out pro-German

propaganda activities, and, for this reason, was severely criticized by many of

his former socialist comrades.31 He even encouraged the Ottoman authorities

to enter the War on the side of the Germans, and published two pamphlets to

propagate this goal.32 He believed that such a nationalist attitude did not

contradict his Marxist principles, because what was crucial was the withering

away of Tsarist Russia, the heart of European reactionism and backwardness.

According to him, ‘Only a Russian defeat by the Germans could make the

revolution possible since Germans were the carriers of high culture.’33

Therefore, supporting Germany did not create a problem for him, because

the eventual result would be a socialist revolution.34 What is more, he

believed, if Tsarist Russia actually won the war, this would harm the

democratic nature of the political regimes both in the Entente and the Allied

countries.35 Whether Germany could benefit from this situation was not the


crux of the matter. After all, he was the ‘merchant of revolution’ and perhaps,

this was the first time that the Germans found in Parvus an adviser who knew

Russia so well.36

In the last year of his residence in Istanbul, Parvus contacted the German

Ambassador, Wangenheim, and proposed a grand and impressive plan to

undermine Russia’s standing in the war. The German Ambassador’s telegram

to the German Foreign Ministry about Parvus stated:

The well-known Russian Socialist and publicist, Dr Helphand, one of

the main leaders of the last Russian Revolution, who was exiled from

Russia and has, on several occasions, been expelled from Germany, has

for some time been active here as a writer, concerning himself chiefly

with questions of Turkish economics. Since the beginning of the war,

Parvus’s attitude has been definitely pro-German. He is helping Dr

Zimmer in his support of the Ukrainian movement and he also rendered

useful services in the founding of Batsarias’s newspaper in Bucharest.

In a conversation with me, which he had requested through Zimmer,

Parvus said that the Russian Democrats could only achieve their aim by

the total destruction of Czarism and the division of Russia into smaller

states. On the other hand, Germany would not be completely successful

if it were not possible to kindle a major revolution in Russia. However,

there would still be a danger to Germany from Russia, even after the

war, if the Russian Empire were not divided into a number of separate

parts. The interests of the German government were therefore identical

with those of the Russian revolutionaries, who were already at work.

However, there was as yet a lack of cohesion between the various

factions. The Mensheviks had not yet joined forces with the

Bolsheviks, who had already gone into action. He saw it as his task

to create a unity and to organize the rising on a broad basis. To achieve

this, a congress of the leaders would first of all be needed – possibly in

Geneva. He was prepared to take the necessary first step to this end, but

would need considerable sums of money for the purpose. He therefore

requested an opportunity of presenting his plans in Berlin. He

confidently expected an Imperial Circular holding out to the [German]

Social Democrats the prospect of an immediate improvement in

primary schools and in average working hours, as a reward for their

patriotic attitude, to have a considerable effect not only on German

Socialists serving in the Army, but also on Russians sharing his own

political opinions. Parvus has today travelled via Sofia and Bucharest to

Vienna, where he will have discussions with Russian revolutionaries.

Dr. Zimmer will arrive in Berlin at the same time as Parvus, and will be

available to arrange meetings with him. In Parvus’s opinion, action

HELPHAND-PARVUS 149

must be taken quickly, so that the new Russian recruits will arrive at the

front already contaminated.

Wangenheim.37

In a memorandum entitled ‘The Plan for the Russian Revolution’ written

for this purpose, Parvus states that local economic strikes should gradually

evolve into a general strike with political demands (based on the slogan

‘peace and freedom’) that would then result in the fall of the Tsarist regime.

This could only be led by Russian socialists, and Parvus suggested that

Germany help organize a conference of Russian socialist leaders in a neutral

country such as Switzerland.38 His plan was based on Germany’s active

financial and political support of the revolutionary and nationalist movements

in Russia, especially of the radical wing, the Bolsheviks. These efforts were

aimed at making Russia focus on internal dissident movements, thus

weakening its war efforts.39 Interestingly, Parvus was soon invited to Berlin to

present his plan to the higher echelons of the foreign ministry which he

finally managed to convince. It was due to his plan that huge amounts of

money were pumped into the dissident movements40 inside and outside of

Russia, through a firm founded by Parvus in Copenhagen. The famed

adventurous Bolshevik revolutionary Hanecki (Kuba), who was known as

Lenin’s ‘bodyguard’ and known for providing the Bolsheviks with financial

resources, was involved in speculative and lucrative businesses with Parvus41

despite Lenin’s later denial of any relations whatsoever between the

Bolsheviks and Parvus.42 In fact, it was Parvus who convinced the German

authorities to arrange the famous sealed train by which the emigre Russian

Bolshevik leaders, including Lenin, entered Russia in April of 1917 just after

the February Revolution broke out.43

Seen as such, Parvus’s extraordinary impact on the Russian Revolution is

undeniable. Kerensky, the prime minister of Russia during the days of the

Revolution of 1917, accused the Bolsheviks, particularly their leader Lenin,

of spying for Germany. Indeed, during the famous ‘July Days’ of the Russian

Revolution when the Bolsheviks were declared illegal and went underground,

it was their relationship with Parvus that put them into this difficult

situation.44 Moreover, decades after the revolution, the conservative

historiographical interpretation of the events of 1917 simply as a Bolshevik

coup rather than a genuine political revolution in which German spying

activity sponsored by Parvus has occupied the centre stage has been widely

accepted in academic circles.45 Although such interpretations are certainly

exaggerated, reducing the seminal role of the social and economic discontent

Russia faced in 1917 to a simple conspiracy,46 conservative and influential

Russian historians, such as Richard Pipes, have generally interpreted the

Revolution in this light.47


Despite his contributions, the Bolsheviks did not let Parvus enter Russia

after the Revolution. ‘The cause of the revolution should not be touched by

dirty hands’, Lenin replied to Parvus’s desire to return to his homeland.48 He

thus stayed in Germany and became an adviser to the Weimar Republic. He

was, without a doubt, an important figure in the formation and shaping of the

Weimar Republic. When he died of a heart attack in 1924 in Germany, this

famous Marxist revolutionary theorist and adventurer was one of Germany’s

richest men. To understand how this happened, we need to return to 1910, the

year he first came to Istanbul.

Parvus’s activities in the late Ottoman Empire between 1910 and 1914

should be investigated under three headings: his intellectual impact on

Young Turk thinking, his political activities and, last but not least, his

speculative business transactions. Just as he was involved in German

politics as if Germany were his own country,49 Parvus involved himself

deeply in Turkish politics, developing relationships with the Young Turk

leaders and devising policies especially concerning economic issues in the

Ottoman Empire. According to Georgeon, Parvus had a deep intellectual

impact on the Young Turks.50 Although we do not know exactly when and

how Parvus developed close relations with the Young Turks,51 he became a

popular figure in the Young Turk press and focused extensively on

economic issues.52 He was made an honorary member of Turkish nationalist

associations such as Turk Bilgi Dernegi53 and wrote continuously in Turkish

journals and newspapers such as Bilgi Mecmuası, Jeune Turc, Turk Yurdu,

Azadamard, Ictihad and Tasvir-i Efkar. He even wrote a book on the

foreign debts of Turkey entitled Turkiye’nin Can Damarı: Devlet-i

Osmaniye’nin Borcları ve Islahı (Turkey’s Vital Interest: The Debts of

the Ottoman State and its Reform).54 Parvus’s impact on Young Turk

thinking in economic matters can be best seen in his writings published

between 1912 and 1914 in the influential journal Turk Yurdu, which was a

pan-Turkist journal, first published in 1911, whose contributors consisted

primarily of emigre Tatar intellectuals, especially the prominent Yusuf

Akcura, who played a leading role in this endeavour, as well as the leading

Turkish intelligentsia of the time.55 In his introduction of Parvus to the Turk

Yurdu readers, Akcura pointed out that Parvus was a well-known Social

Democrat (Marxist) in Europe, who was going to contribute to the pages of

the journal on economic issues. Despite the difference in ideological

orientation between Parvus and the Turk Yurdu circle, a difference between

Social Democracy and nationalism, Akcura wrote that in terms of being a

populist (halkseven) they shared the same concerns.56

Parvus urged the Young Turk intelligentsia to pay more attention to the

economic necessities of the country. As a matter of fact, he saw the decline of

the Ottomans as a result of the deterioration of the Ottoman economy rather

HELPHAND-PARVUS 151

than of cultural, religious, and political factors, a perspective quite

widespread among many European Orientalists of the time.57 According to

him, the Ottomans were concerned only with state finances, but not with the

economy at large. They had either ignored the economy completely or wasted

all the available sources that could be used for economic development.58

Unlike European states, which also had foreign debts, Parvus argued, the

Ottoman bureaucracy irrationally and wastefully consumed its foreign loans

which then became a big financial burden for the country.59 He also carefully

distinguished the state from the people and the nation arguing that, thanks to

economic dynamism, nations can survive even if they lose their political

independence as was the case in Poland.60

In many of his writings on the Ottoman Empire in general and on the

Ottoman economy in particular, Parvus emphasized the peculiarities of the

development of capitalism in the non-western world such as the Ottoman

Empire that was completely different from that of West European

experience. This view stemmed from Parvus’s understanding of imperi-

alism, a theme that ran through the heart of his writings. In this sense, he

differed from the classical Marxist interpretation of imperialism that

expected capitalist development also in the economically backward

countries and the colonies. In other words, like Karl Kautsky, Parvus

emphasized that rather than development, in places such as the Ottoman

Empire, the impact of European imperialism could only lead to the

hindrance of development and to the destruction of domestic economic

life.61 He therefore continuously criticized the imperialist dominance of

Europe over the Ottoman Empire. In this vein, he claimed, for instance,

that German imperialism, by using its railroad construction undertakings in

the region, was colonizing Anatolia for its own interests and expanding its

sphere of influence.62 It was European financial power that in reality

controlled the destiny of the country, not the Ottoman state, not the

nation, not the Muslims nor the Christians.63 The financial domination of

the Europeans was made possible not only by the ever-increasing debt of

the Ottomans, but also by lucrative businesses such as railroad

construction in the Empire.64 According to Parvus, the Ottoman state,

far from serving the interests of the Ottoman people, had simply become a

puppet of European finance capital.65

To make his point, Parvus harshly attacked the Public Debt Organization

(Duyun-i Umumiye) which was founded in 1881 as a multi-national European

institution with the aim of directly collecting taxes and revenues of many

major Ottoman goods.66 This organization, in fact, was so powerful that it was

able to control and manipulate the Ottoman economy.67 Parvus pointed out

that the Organization prospered while the Ottoman state finances deteriorated

and emphasized that it functioned like a parasite and for the sole interests of


the Europeans. A case in point was the Organization’s huge investment in

Italian state bonds while the Ottomans were at war with the Italians!68

Similarly, Parvus relentlessly criticized the capitulations and argued that

overall the financial and economic dependence of the Ottomans made them

politically vulnerable vis-a-vis the Europeans.69 As Berkes points out, ‘it was

with Parvus that anti-liberal and anti-imperialistic economic ideas along

Marxian lines began to appear in the Turkish press’.70 The solution Parvus

offered was an economic policy of creating a ‘National Economy’ based on

an anti-liberal idea.71 The policy of ‘National Economy’, first and foremost,

implied getting rid of the non-Muslim and foreign merchants and

industrialists and founding an industrial base to foster independent economic

development.72 In this sense, two of his points deserve special attention.

Parvus argued that the liberal theories of which the Ottomans had been

mistakenly quite fond of for decades, led to the destruction of the domestic

economy, a resulting lack of industry and increased Ottoman dependence on

the Europeans.73 Secondly, although as a Marxist he was aware of the

possible class differentiation that industrialization could bring about, Parvus

argued that a national economy and industry were the sine qua non of

liberating the Ottoman Empire from European yoke.74

Despite his harsh critique of European imperialism, Parvus cautioned

Ottoman intellectuals not to develop hatred towards Europe. In this sense, he

touched upon a very delicate discussion which is still unabated in Turkey

today. According to him, there were two Europes, one of them being the

imperialistic, military and official Europe, and the other being the

‘democratic’ one. Historically, Turkey only knew and imitated the former.

However, the other Europe, the ‘democratic’ one, was the Europe struggling

against its own speculators, exploiters and dictators, and not the Europe of the

diplomats, bankers and capitalists. In their struggle against the imperialistic

Europe, the Turks should learn and cooperate with the democratic one.75 For

instance, the other Europe, he stressed, could exemplify a democratic

tradition for the Turks.

Another recurring theme in Parvus’s writings is the lack of democracy

in Turkey. He severely criticized the Unionists for their unwillingness to

have a democratic government and argued that public opinion and

consciousness are required for the development of democracy.76 Because

there was no effective public pressure on the Ottoman government,

arbitrariness and the abuse of state power could often be the rule in the

Empire.77 Furthermore, public pressure was necessary not only for the

control of domestic affairs, but for putting pressure on European

governments as well. For Parvus, a government which did not respect

the public opinion of the nation should not expect to be taken seriously by

the Europeans.78

HELPHAND-PARVUS 153

One of the most important and interesting topics that Parvus dealt with in

the Ottoman press was related to the question of the peasantry. He can

certainly be considered one of the first social critics in Turkey who raised the

issue of the importance of improving the social and economic conditions of

the Ottoman peasants for the well-being of the Empire as a whole and of the

state in particular.79 According to him, the intelligentsia ignored the Turkish

peasants, to a large extent, despite the fact that they not only made up of the

majority of the population, but also constituted the financial and military

strength of the Ottoman state. In this sense, his critiques anticipated those of

Omer Lutfi Barkan of the 1930s who complained about the ignorance of the

Turkish intelligentsia with regard to the question of peasantry and

landlessness.80

Economic and financial expert that he was, Parvus elaborated on the

systematic discrimination of the Ottoman Turkish peasantry. According to

him, the peasants in Anatolia and Syria paid almost twice as much tax to

the state than, for example, the peasants in the European provinces of the

Empire.81 He quoted Anatolian peasants who complained that even the

Turkish/Muslim peasants in Bulgaria were living under relatively much

better conditions. Parvus further pointed out that city dwellers, especially

the non-Muslims and the rich, together with the well-to-do farmers of the

countryside, could avoid being drafted into the army by paying a certain

amount of cash.82 Ironically, though, it was in fact the poor peasants who

provided the necessary manpower and were needed for agricultural

production given the primitive level of technology of the time. Parvus

often described the terrible conditions prevailing among the Anatolian

peasants. Many of his writings are full of observations about disease,

famine and poverty in the Anatolian countryside.83 After the Crimean War,

he wrote, the economic misery of the Anatolian peasantry worsened

because of the impact of European economic penetration and the rising

level of state spending.84

The peasant question, in Parvus’s mind, was directly related to the question

of the state. He raised the question of the real duty of the state and argued that

the state, first and foremost, should take into account the necessities of the

peasants since they made up the majority of the population.85 Although the

military and economic basis of the Ottoman state had been the peasants for

centuries, the state had never helped them.86 The only time the state thought

of them was when it needed to recruit soldiers and collect taxes. What he

suggested was offering credit facilities to the peasants and delivering titles to

land which the peasants desperately lacked. Even the government’s railroad

project had to be pursued based on the necessities of the peasants.87 This was,

of course, a very harsh critique of the Unionists who were then in power. He

also related the declining power of the Unionists to their increasing distance


from the peasants. In his opinion, the Unionists did not fulfil any of the

promises of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, such as alleviating taxes

paid by the peasants.88 According to him

One of the reasons behind the decline of the CUP influence is that

nothing was done for the prosperity of the peasants for the last four

years under the Constitutional administration. The peasants until now

have been in an extraordinarily miserable situation. But, it is the

peasants who make up the Ottoman army. . .. The question of

alleviating the tax burden of the peasants arose just after the revolution.

This issue, however, was always postponed and finally nothing was

done. This, however, was a fatal mistake.

The intelligentsia’s ignorance of the peasants, Parvus wrote, led to the

failure of Turkish nationalism. Based on historical examples, he argued that

the Armenian, Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek intellectuals and politicians

had taken care of their peasants, but the Turkish intelligentsia did not.89

They even avoided their peasants. In so doing, Parvus continued, the

Turkish intelligentsia not only left the Turks out of politics, but also made

themselves into aimless and disoriented intellectuals.90 Parvus stressed that

the peasants were necessary for the intelligentsia in its nationalist project,

yet the intelligentsia was not really doing what was necessary. For this

reason, he harshly criticized the Unionist government and the Turkish

intelligentsia:

You accepted the Constitutional way; however, you did not uncover the

desires of the people. You, the intelligentsia, distance yourselves from

the nation and you do not get to know your own people. You either

idolize them like heroes in your dreams or disapprove of their

ignorance and conservatism. There is no common point between your

feelings and the life of the people. . .When you think that you are

dealing with the issues of people’s prosperity, in fact, you deal with

your own dreams, not with their realities.91

Parvus’s standpoint on the question of the peasantry is very interesting

in the sense that he perceived the peasant question in the Ottoman Empire

directly as a question of ethnicity and, therefore, nationalism. This, he

wrote, was inevitable given the disintegrating multi-ethnic structure of the

Ottoman Empire.92 In other words, the Turkish intelligentsia had to ‘go to

the people’ to win their hearts and minds and only then would be able to

implement their nationalistic project with the mass support won from the

Turkish peasants. Likewise, in a letter to the Turkish youth, Parvus

HELPHAND-PARVUS 155

contended that the power the youth was seeking should be found in the

people only.93

Parvus’s remarks point to the paradox between the discourse and the

practice of the Young Turks. Although the Turkish intelligentsia started

talking about the people and the peasants, they had indeed achieved little, if

anything, for the prosperity of the peasants. The great hopes and expectations

of the peasants aroused by the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 were not

fulfilled at all.94 According to a journalist, Ahmed Serif, who toured Anatolia

a year after the revolution, the peasants were frustrated by the revolution, as

nothing significant had changed for them. As many observers of the time

noted, the taxes were unjust and not collected peacefully; murders and theft

in villages continued, and life in the countryside became even worse and

more chaotic than before.95

One of Parvus’s most important attempts to influence the Young Turks can

be seen in his conviction that the Ottoman Empire should side with Germany

in the First World War. Though we do not know to what extent his pro-

German attitudes and writings had an impact on the Young Turks,96 we know

that his pamphlets and articles on this question were widely read by the

leading statesmen and intellectuals of the time.97 His pamphlets were broadly

discussed in the Ottoman media and newspapers such as Ikdam, Tasvir-i

Efkar and Tercuman-ı Hakikat and articles were published concerning

Parvus’s pamphlets. In the two pamphlets he wrote a month after the outbreak

of the war, he seems to speculate on the probable outcome of the war on the

world; however, a close look at the pamphlets makes it clear that his real

intention was to convince the Unionists that they should side with the

Germans.

One of the reasons why he felt the government should side with Germany

was Britain’s hostile attitude toward the Ottomans. Parvus noted that in

recent decades the British were hardly concerned with the Ottoman Empire,

but rather focused on Egypt and India.98 With the decline of British

imperialism vis-a-vis Germany, the British attitude towards the under-

developed world relied on the retardation of any possible development in

these countries.99 Furthermore, the British were increasingly occupied with

controlling the oilfields in the Ottoman Empire,100 and such an attitude left no

options for the Ottomans, other than collaboration with Germany.

One of the most important standpoints that can be found in Parvus’s

pamphlets is his hostility towards Russia.101 According to him, Germany and

the Ottoman Empire shared common interests against Russia and Britain.102

The Russians, he argued, had their eye on the straits, but, he continued,

Russia’s main interest in the region was not the straits, but the vast area of the

Middle East that the Ottomans controlled.103 This standpoint, of course,

coincides with Parvus’s discussion of the general context of Europe. His main


concern was the defeat of Russia at any cost and this explains why he

sounded like a German patriot. According to him, a Russian defeat in the War

would fuel the revolutionary and nationalistic movements in Russia, and then

political power could change hands. Even in his first pamphlets, Parvus talks

about a possible socialist revolution due to the war, and goes further and

prophetically states that a peace treaty could even be signed by a

‘revolutionary’ government.104

Just after the War broke out in Europe, Parvus wrote an article in the

influential newspaper Tasvir-i Efkar in which he outlined the measures the

Ottoman government should take. Parvus pointed out that the war could last

longer than expected, that a socialist revolution could take place because of

war, and therefore Turkey should prepare herself for long-lasting troubled

times. The first and the most crucial measure was to abolish the capitulations

as soon as possible and indeed the government did so soon after.105 In addition

to this, he proposed measures for the government such as the nationalization

of the railroads, the prohibition of the export of gold, the taxation of foreign

residents, and the raising of customs duties.106

In Istanbul, Parvus did not simply limit his activities to the intellectual

sphere. He was deeply concerned with and involved in socialist and dissident

movements in the Ottoman Empire,107 the Balkans, and Russia. He carefully

observed such movements, advised those intellectuals and activists on several

crucial topics and developed relations with them. As soon as he came to

Istanbul, he contacted the famous Romanian Marxist, Rakovsky,108 a former

friend of his who was also then in Istanbul and who provided the necessary

connections in socialist circles. In 1910, with Rakovsky and others, he

celebrated May Day in Istanbul.109 He had close relations with the Socialist

Worker Federation that was founded in the Ottoman Empire. His special

attention, though, was directed towards the socialist and nationalist move-

ments in the Balkans.110 He often went to the Balkan countries and attempted

to organize a federalist, democratic organization throughout the area (he also

had business relations there).111 According to the German Ambassador

mentioning Parvus’s political activities in the Balkans, in January 1915,

‘there exists in Sofia and Bucharest an organization of Russian revolution-

aries, and these elements seem now to have gone to work.’112 Parvus, together

with Vlahof and Rakovsky, wrote a political manifesto in an effort to prevent

the coming Balkan War.113 His main concern, there, was to form an anti-

Russian political bloc, and for this reason, he saw the nationalist dissident

movements as very important to weaken Russia.114 For example, he tacitly

supported the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine in its cause for the

independence of the Ukraine.115 Likewise, he had good relations with the

Armenian and Georgian revolutionaries.116 At one time, he made considerable

efforts in reconciling the competing Armenian revolutionary organizations,

HELPHAND-PARVUS 157

the Dasnaks and the Hincaks.117 It has often been argued that Parvus offered

‘useful strategical information’ to the Young Turk governments about the

state of things in the Balkans and, in turn, was rewarded, perhaps monetarily,

for his secretive activities.118

In addition to Parvus’s intellectual and political activities in the Ottoman

Empire, his business ventures turn out to be a very interesting topic of study

as well. In fact, it was his business transactions, that made it possible for him

to contact the German authorities at the outbreak of war, thus ensuring his

immense role during the Russian Revolution in 1917.

As pointed out above, Parvus came to Istanbul as a poor journalist. The

income he got from news correspondence to the German and Austrian

newspapers was not significant.119 Initially, he led a quite modest life. For

instance, he often ate in cheap restaurants. But, he immediately realized with

his seismographic talents that Istanbul was the best place for him to convert

his intellectual abilities into money and wealth. After all, he had worked on

theories of imperialism, financial flows, commercial activities and stock

markets for a long time. Ironically, then, his Marxist background would offer

him the personal wealth with which he could make his own revolution and

publish his own journal. His Turkish experience taught him something that he

could hardly learn anywhere else: if you have close relations with the

government, you can make an incredible fortune very easily in a short period!

He was therefore able to make huge financial gains by the synthesis of his

brilliant financial abilities with his closeness to the Young Turks.120

However, one cannot trace Parvus’s business transactions in exact detail,

since he himself burnt many of his documents before he died.121 Still, there is

enough information and widespread rumours that may be revealing in this

respect. According to one such rumour, Parvus, while in an Istanbul coffee-

house, passed some insider information that he had secretly got from

government officials to a businessman and within moments had made an

incredible fortune.122 During the Balkan Wars and after, he imported railway

equipment for the Ottoman army and spare parts for the milling industry;

founded a publishing house in Istanbul,123 and became a business agent for

several European businesses, including the Krupp and perhaps Sir Basil

Zaharoff, ‘the mystery man of Europe’.124 He also established businesses in

neighbouring countries such as Bulgaria and was actively involved in trade.125

With the outbreak of the First World War, he made his first million by

delivering bread to Istanbul.126 Later in his notebooks, he commented on this

speculative business as something that had saved the Young Turk regime

from disaster.127 Not surprisingly, after he moved out of Istanbul, he

continued to run his businesses during the war and was mostly involved in

provisioning ammunition to different European armies.128 It has been

suggested that he had ‘dabbled in smuggling obsolete German arms, for


which there was a great demand in the Balkans, and made a considerable

fortune out of these deals.’129

The once poor and revolutionary Marxist turned out to be a millionaire

merchant and speculator, and for this reason, his old friends such as Trotsky

condemned him harshly and their destinies parted irreversibly.130 In Trotsky’s

eyes, Parvus changed so much that he considered him to have died and even

wrote an ‘obituary’ for Parvus.131 Despite the many different evaluations

written about Parvus, I think he still should be seen as an extraordinary

cosmopolitan intellectual of the turn of the twentieth century whose influence

on the political and intellectual life of at least three countries was

considerable. He did not learn socialism from books, nor did notions such

as freedom or equality inspire him in this regard. He rather found a meaning

in socialism because of his adventurous nature. As an eminent Russian

historian said, he was ‘a character from a Balzac novel’. He was a gambler

and an ‘adventurer in politics, in socialist thought, in high finance, in high

diplomacy, and in love (perhaps the word should be sex) – a free-thinker, a

free-actor, and a freebooter in all of them.’132 Not all of his predictions came

true; not all the risks he took turned out to be successful; not all of his

undertakings were worthy of esteem, but, as Trotsky noted, he ‘did

everything on a large scale.’133 In a world of mediocrity and a time of

decadence, he was colourful, ambitious, theoretical, prophetic, extraordinary,

– a man of incredible intuition and intelligence.

NOTES

I would like to thank Bogazici University Research Fund (project no 01HZ103) for funding thisresearch.

1. K. Haenisch, Parvus; ein Blatt der Erinnerung (Berlin: Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaft,1925), p.5.

2. See S. Aksin, Jon Turkler ve Ittihat ve Terakki (Istanbul: Gercek Yayınları,1980), p.278.Parvus later on openly denied that he was any adviser whatsoever to the Young Turks in theface of harsh criticisms from European socialists. See Parvus’s ‘Ein Verleumdungswerk’,Die Glocke, No.3, (Oct. 1915), pp.129–130.

3. B.D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution (New York: Dial Press, 1964), p.300; HeinzSchurer, ‘Alexander Helphand-Parvus – Russian Revolutionary and German Patriot’,Russian Review, Vol.18, No.4 (1959), p.330.

4. As Professor Mete Tuncay reminded me, in the original German edition, instead of‘merchant of revolution’, ‘freebooter’ is used. I think in the case of Parvus, ‘merchant’ ismore appropriate. (Freibeuter der Revolution Parvus/ Helphand. Eine politischeBiographie (Koln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1964). Wolfe, however, argues that‘freebooter’ is a better term than ‘merchant’ to characterize Parvus. See Wolfe’s review onZeman and Scharlau’s English edition in Slavic Review, Vol.25, No.4 (1966), p.697.

5. Many Turkish sources give incredibly false information about Parvus’s life. One example isA. Sayılgan’s Turkiye’de Sol Hareketler (1871–1972) (Istanbul: Hareket,1972), pp.55–9.See also F. Tevetoglu, Turkiye’de Sosyalist ve Komunist Faaliyetler (Ankara: Ayyıldız,1967), pp.477–8.

HELPHAND-PARVUS 159

6. P.Dumont, ‘Un economiste social-democrate au service de la Jeune Turquie’, in MemorialOmer Lutfi Barkan, (Paris:Librairie d’Amerique et d’Orient Adrien Maisonneuve,1980),pp.75–86.

7. C. Zetkin, ‘Helphand Parvus’, Die Kommunisticshe Internationale; Organ Des Execu-tivkomitees der Kommunistischen Internationale, Imprint, (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1967),originally published in 1925, p.78.

8. G. Katkov, Russia 1917, The February Revolution (New York: Harper & Row Publishers,1967), p.78.

9. Whether Parvus got the degree is a point of controversy, however. According to Heresch,Parvus ‘had not earned his academic title, but awarded it to himself to help create arespectable image’. See Elisabeth Heresch, The Empire of the Tsars, the Splendour and theFall (Stroitel, 1993), p.184.

10. M. Donald, Marxism and Revolution, Karl Kautsky and the Russian Marxists 1900–1924(London: Yale University Press, 1993), p.10; Schurer, ‘Alexander Helphand-Parvus –Russian Revolutionary and German Patriot’, p.314.

11. Parvus and Rosa Luxembourg were lovers for some time. See Z.A.B. Zeman and WinfriedB. Scharlau, The Merchant of Revolution; the Life of Alexander Israel Helpland (Parvus)1867–1924, (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p.106.

12. Schurer, ‘Alexander Helphand-Parvus – Russian Revolutionary and German Patriot’, p.315.13. Some of Parvus’s works include Mezhdunarodnyi zhandarm (Geneva, 1904); K. soldatam

(Geneva, 1904); V chem my raskhodimsia? (Geneva, 1905); Nastoiashchee politicheskoepolozhenie i vidy budushchago (St. Petersburg, 1906); Die Kolonialpolitik und derZusammenbruch (Leipzig, 1907); Rossiia i revoliutsiia (St. Petersburg, 1907); DieReichstagwahlen und die Arbetierschaft (Leipzig, 1907); Der gewerkschaftliche Kampf(Berlin, 1908); Die Sozialdemokratie und der Parlamentarismus (Berlin, 1908); Diekapitalistische Produktion und das Proletariat (Berlin, 1908); Der Ideenkampf gegen denSozialismus (Berlin, 1910); Das soziale problem unserer Zeit (Dresden, 1910); Die Banken,der Staat und die Industrie (Dresden, 1910); Der Sozialismus und die soziale Revolution(Berlin, 1910); Der Klassenkampf des Proletariats (Berlin, 1911); Die Soziale Bilanz desKrieges (Berlin, 1917); Der Arbeitersozialismus und die Weltrevolution (Berlin, 1919); DerStaat, die Industrie und der Sozialismus (Berlin, 1919); Germany’s Economic Remedy(Berlin, 1921).

14. H.A. Goldstein and Michael I. Luger, ‘Theory and Practise in High-Tech EconomicDevelopment’, in R.D. Bingham and Robert Mier (ed.) Theories of Local EconomicDevelopment, Perspectives From Across the Disciplines (Newbury Park: Sage, 1993),p.152; Jacob van Duijn, ‘Kondratieff’, The Economist, June 9, 1979, p.6.

15. ‘. . .. Helphand’s flat in Schwabing was a focal point for the Russian exile. Rosa Luxemburgmet Lenin there for the first time; Lev Trotsky stayed there with his wife.’ Zeman andScharlau, The Merchant of Revolution, p.57; Schurer, ‘Alexander Helphand-Parvus –Russian Revolutionary and German Patriot’, pp.314–15.

16. Trotsky, My Life (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970), p.177.17. Schurer, ‘Alexander Helphand-Parvus – Russian Revolutionary and German Patriot’, p.317.18. Trotsky, My Life, p.167.19. Leon Trotsky, Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence (New York: Harper &

Brothers, 1941), pp.429–30.20. N. Geras, The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg (London :New Left Books, 1976), p.47.21. K.A. Wittfogel, ‘The Marxist View of Russian Society and Revolution’, World Politics,

Vol.2, No.4 (1960), p.502.22. In 1898 Lenin praised Parvus’s book on the development of world market. See Lenin’s

review ‘Parvus. The World Market and the Agricultural Crisis. Economic Essays, CollectedWorks, Vol.4 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1960), pp.65–6. Lenin with his own initiativewas involved in 1908 for the translation of Die Kolonialpolitik und der Zusammenbruch(1907) into Russian. See O.F. Solov’ev, ‘Parvus: Politicheskii Portret’, Novaia i NoveishaiaIstoriia, No.1 (1991), p.170.

23. Zeman and Scharlau, The Merchant of Revolution , p.76.


24. I. Berlin, ‘The Origins of Bolshevism: The Intellectual Evolution of Young Lenin’ in R.Pipes (ed.), Revolutionary Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p.58.

25. Donald,Marxism and Revolution, Karl Kautsky and the Russian Marxists 1900–1924, p.69;A. Solzhenitsyn, Lenin in Zurich (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1976), p.120.

26. M. Michielsen, ‘The Missing Link: The Views of the Second International School ofThought on Development, Underdevelopment and Dependency’, Itinerario [Netherlands],Vol.14, No.2 (1990), pp.62–3.

27. Solov’ev, ‘Parvus: Politicheskii Portret’, p.170; Zeman and Scharlau, The Merchant ofRevolution, p.70; Solzhenitsyn, Lenin in Zurich, p.119.

28. Zetkin, ‘Helphand Parvus’, p.89.29. Haenisch, Parvus; ein Blatt der Erinnerung, p.29; Parvus, ‘Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie’,

Die Glocke, No.1 (1915), p.36; O.N. Akbayar, ‘Bir Sosyalist Tip’, Turkiye Defteri, No.19(1975), pp.6–7.

30. Zeman and Scharlau, The Merchant of Revolution, pp.124–8.31. Parvus, ‘Meine Stellungnahme zum Krieg’, Die Glocke, No.3 (1915), p.160. Rose

Luxembourg harshly criticizes Parvus for his attitudes during the war: ‘Since Parvus presseshimself on everyone’s notice with his (revolutionary personality) we will say this to him:whoever regards war against Russia as the sacred duty of the proletariat would be takenseriously if he were in the trenches. But first to make a fortune during a war in which manythousand German and Russian proletarians are being killed, and then to sit in the safety ofKlampenborg in Denmark and run from there a limited company for the exploitation of theconnection between these two national proletariats – for this superior revolutionary role wehave little understanding.’ See J.P. Nettl, Rosa Luxemburg, Vol.2, (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1966), p.634.

32. Parvus, Umumi Harb Neticelerinden: Almanya Galip Gelirse (Istanbul, Turk YurduKutuphanesi, 1330) and Parvus, Umumi Harb Neticelerinden: Ingiltere Galip Gelirse(Istanbul; Turk Yurdu Kutuphanesi, 1330). It has been claimed that Parvus even went to theSublime Porte to convince the Ottoman authorities for this purpose. See Haenisch, Parvus;ein Blatt der Erinnerung, p.35.

33. Parvus quoted in Solov’ev, ‘Parvus: Politicheskii Portret’, p.172.34. ‘No one, or hardly anyone, in Europe could lift himself far enough out of his rut to see that

the destruction of Russia now held the key to the future history of the world! All else wassecondary.’ Solzhenitsyn, Lenin in Zurich, p.142.

35. As early as October 1914, he wrote a comprehensive article about this subject while he wasstill in Istanbul. See Parvus’s ‘Fur die Demokratie – gegen den Zarismus’, Die Glocke, No.2(1915), pp.77–85.

36. Solzhenitsyn, Lenin in Zurich, p.139.37. Z.A.B. Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915–1918 (Documents from the

Archives of the German Foreign Ministry), (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp.1–2.

38. See ‘The Plan for the Russian Revolution, – Alexander Parvus’s Memorandum’, inHeresch, The Empire of the Tsars, the Splendour and the Fall, p.257.

39. Ibid., p.259.40. See Ibid., p.187. About Parvus’s service to Germany, The Minister in Copenhagen to the

German Under State Secretary, Brockdorff-Rantzau sent a telegram to the ForeignMinistery saying ‘. . . I think that there can be no question that he is an extraordinarilyimportant man whose unusual powers I feel we must employ for the duration of the war andshould, if at all possible, continue to use later on.’ See Z.A.B. Zeman, Germany and theRevolution in Russia, p.4.

41. Schurer, ‘Alexander Helphand-Parvus – Russian Revolutionary and German Patriot’, p.324.42. V. Lenin, Collected Works, 4th English Edition (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964),

pp.219–220. See also H. Stone, ‘Another Look at the Sisson Forgeries and TheirBackground’, Soviet Studies, Vol.37, No.1 (1985), p.92; A.E. Senn, ‘The Myth of GermanMoney During the First World War’, Soviet Studies, Vol.28, No.1 (1976), p.83.

43. For a detailed presentation of the role Parvus played in arranging the sealed train see M.Pearson, The Sealed Train. Journey to Revolution Lenin – 1917 (London: Macmillan,

HELPHAND-PARVUS 161

1975). See also D.S. Anin, ‘Lenin, Trotsky and Parvus’, Survey, Vol.24, No.1 (1979),p.208.

44. A recent study on the role of the German money indeed shows that the funnelling ofGerman money through Parvus’s networks is not easy to prove. See S. Lyandres, TheBolsheviks’ ‘German Gold’ Revisited: An Inquiry into the 1917 Accusations, The Carl BeckPapers of Russian and East European Studies, No.1106. (Pittsburg: Center for Russian andEast European Studies, 1995).

45. See, for instance, G. Katkov, ‘German Political Intervention in Russia During theFirstWorld War’, in Pipes (ed.), Revolutionary Russia, pp.63–88.

46. A. Dallin ‘Comment on Katkov’s – German Political Intervention in Russia During the FirstWorld War’, in R. Pipes (ed.), Revolutionary Russia, pp.91–3.

47. See, for example, R. Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990).48. Zeman and Scharlau, The Merchant of Revolution, p.246.49. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution, p.298.50. F. Georgeon, Turk Milliyetciliginin Kokenleri, Yusuf Akcura, 1876–1935 (Ankara: Yurt

Yayınları, 1986), p.60.51. Dumont, ‘Un economiste social-democrate au service de la Jeune Turquie’, p.78.52. The annual, Nevsal-i Millimentions Parvus’s name. See Akbayar, ‘Bir Sosyalist Tip’, pp.8–

9.53. Ibid., p.8.54. This book aroused great interest among the Turkish intelligentsia. Interestingly in 1923, the

second edition was published, and furthermore, the book was translated into French. SeeDumont, ‘Un economiste social-democrate au service de la Jeune Turquie’, p.79.

55. Especially after the Young Turk Revolution, the number of Tatars migrating to Istanbulincreased significantly. See N. Devlet, Ismail Bey Gaspıralı, 1851–1914 (Ankara: Kultur veTurizm Bakanlıgı, 1988), p.125. In his article in Turk Yurdu, Ismail Bey Gasprinskycomplained about the massive flow of Tatar intellectuals into the Ottoman Empire whoended up living mentally in-between the two empires. Ismail Gaspıralı, ‘Muhaceret-iMuntazama’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.2, No.11 (1912), p.707. Turk Yurdu was even financed by theTatar bourgeoisie. See Georgeon, Turk Milliyetciliginin Kokenleri, Yusuf Akcura, 1876–1935, pp.59–60.

56. Yusuf Akcura, ‘Iktisad,’ Turk Yurdu, Vol.1, No.9, 1327/1912, p.262.57. Parvus, ‘Turkiye’de Ziraatin Istikbali’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.5, No.1 (1329/1913), pp.859–60.58. Parvus, ‘1327 Senesinin Ahval-i Maliyesine Bir Nazar’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.2, No.1 (1328/

1912), pp.398.59. Ibid., p.396.60. Parvus, ‘Is Isten Gecmeden Gozunuzu Acınız’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.3, No.12 (1329/1913),

pp.361–2.61. Michielsen, ‘The Missing Link’, pp.62–3, 67.62. Parvus, ‘Turklerin Odunc Almaya En Haklı Oldukları Bir Akce’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.3, No.1

(1329/1912), pp.1617.63. Parvus, ‘Mali Tehlikeler’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.3, No.5 (1329/1913), p.148.64. Parvus, ‘Turkiye Avrupa’nın Maliye Boyundurugu Altındadır II’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.2, No.5

(1328/1912), pp.528–9; Parvus, ‘1327 Senesinin Ahval-i Maliyesine Bir Nazar’, pp.398.65. Parvus, ‘Turk Ili, Maliyeni Gozet!’ Turk Yurdu, Vol.4, No.3 (1329/1913), pp.486.66. Parvus, ‘Turklerin Odunc Almaya En Haklı Oldukları bir Akce’, pp.23–4; Parvus,

Turkiye’nin Can Damarı: Devlet-i Osmaniye’nin Borcları ve Islahı (Istanbul: Turk YurduKitaphanesi), 1330 (1914), translated by Emin Rasid, p.17.

67. Ibid., p.17, 42.68. Parvus, ‘Turkiye Avrupa’nın Maliye Boyundurugu Altındadır II’, pp.526–7.69. Parvus, ‘Koyluler ve Devlet’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.1, No.9 (1327/1912), p.263.70. N. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press,

1964), p.335.71. See Zafer Toprak, Turkiye’de ‘Milli Iktisat’ (19081918) (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982),

p.170.72. For a comprehensive analysis of the policy of ‘National Economics’ see Ibid.


73. Parvus, ‘Turk Genclerine Mektup II’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.4, No.9 (1329/1913), p.727.74. Parvus, ‘Is Isten Gecmeden Gozunuzu Acınız’, pp.364–6.75. Parvus, ‘Turkiye Avrupa’nın Maliye Boyundurugu Altındadır II’, p.530; Parvus, ‘Turklerin

Odunc Almaya En Haklı Oldukları Bir Akce’, pp.17–19; Parvus, ‘Devlet ve Millet’, TurkYurdu, Vol.3, No.3 (1329/1912), pp.83–86.

76. When many European socialists later accused him of collaborating with the ‘reactionary’and ‘anti-democratic’ Unionist regime, he defended himself in his journal Die Glocke onthe grounds that he already criticized in his writings the Unionists for not being democraticenough. See Parvus, ‘Meine Stellungnahme zum Krieg’, p.160.

77. ‘Parvus Efendi Namına Gelen Mektuba Cevap’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.2, No.6, pp.564–5;Parvus, ‘Is Isten Gecmeden Gozunuzu Acınız’, pp.366–7.

78. Parvus, ‘Turk Ili, Maliyeni Gozet!’ Turk Yurdu, V.4, No.3 (1329/1913), pp.490.79. He himself later on in his journal points out this fact. See Parvus, ‘Meine Stellungnahme

zum Krieg’, p.160.80. M. A. Karaomerlioglu, ‘Elite Perceptions of Land Reform in Turkey’, The Journal of

Peasant Studies, Vol.27, No.3 (April 2000), p.119.81. Parvus, ‘Devlet ve Millet’, pp.83–6.82. Parvus, ‘Koyluler ve Devlet’, p.266.83. Parvus, ‘Devlet ve Millet’, pp.83–4.84. Ibid.85. Parvus, ‘Koyluler ve Devlet’, pp.262–8. See also his ‘Koylu ve Devlet I,’ Turk Yurdu,

Vol.4, No.9, 1329, pp.1125–6 for similar comments on peasantry.86. ‘Although the peasants were the ones who fed the whole state, the state never thought of

helping them and it did not help them. In the end, the financial and spiritual conditions ofthe peasantry deteriorated.’ Parvus, ‘Devlet ve Millet’, p.85.

87. ‘Parvus, ‘Koylu ve Devlet II,’ Turk Yurdu, V. 5, No.10 (1329/1913), p.1161.88. Parvus, ‘Esaret-i Maliyeden Kurtulmanın Yolu’, Turk Yurdu, Vol.2, No.7 (1328/1912),

p.587.89. Parvus, ‘Koyluler ve Devlet’, p.265.90. Ibid., p.265.91. Parvus, ‘Is Isten Gecmeden Gozunuzu Acınız’, pp.363–4.92. Parvus, ‘Koyluler ve Devlet’, p.264.93. Parvus, ‘Turk Genclerine Mektup I’ , Turk Yurdu, Vol..4, No.5 1329, p.571.94. A.D. Novichev, Krestianstvo Turtsii v noveishee vremia (Moscow: Izd-vo vostochnoi litry,

1959), p.10.95. ‘But so far nothing has happened. In the past, some things used to function even better;

today everything is in a mess. . ..We go to the state office and the court but we cannotexplain our problem. They only think of collecting taxes. . .We work all year round and wepay our taxes annually; if we don’t they take them by force, even selling our pots andbedding. Thus we are always in debt. During the past few years there have been manypeasants in the village who have not had seed to sow. Since there is no help from anywhereelse we have had to buy seed from the aga (landholders) at either 100–25 kurus a kile [abushel] or return him three kile for one. Those agas are a menace; they can have the peasantbeaten by their toughs, have him jailed, or sometimes have him bullied by state officials. Inthis way they collect their debt from those who cannot pay. As a matter of fact theAgricultural Bank is giving loans but that does not help us. The money runs out before itreaches our village.’ A. Serif quoted in F. Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London:Routledge, 1993), pp.41–2. Things more or less remained the same even 20 years after therevolution. A peasant talking to Mehmed Emin, the so-called ‘national poet’, in 1928:‘During the reign of Abdulhamit, the pashas said ‘give’, so we gave. They said ‘die’, so wedied. They vanished and instead other pashas came and they also said ‘give’, so we gave.They said ‘die’, so we died. They also vanished, and then you came. You also said ‘give’, sowe gave. You said ‘die’, so we died. We are now curiously waiting. When will you guysever say ‘take’?’ Quoted in H. Tuncer, Turk Yurdu Uzerine Bir Inceleme (Ankara: KulturBakanlıgı Yayınları, 1990), p.483.

96. Akbayar, ‘Bir Sosyalist Tip’, p.9.

HELPHAND-PARVUS 163

97. P. Dumont, Mustafa Kemal (Ankara: Kultur Bakanlıgı Yayınları, 1993), p.3.98. Parvus, Umumi Harp Neticelerinden: Ingiltere Galip Gelirse, pp.9–10.99. Ibid., p.11.100. Ibid., pp.22–3.101. Parvus’s position towards the war in general and his hostility towards Russia can be read in

his article ‘Meine Stellungnahme zum Krieg’, pp.148–62.102. Parvus, Umumi Harb Neticelerinden: Almanya Galip Gelirse, p.19.103. Ibid., p.21.104. Ibid., pp.5–6.105. Parvus himself wrote in the journal, Die Glocke, which was his own journal published in

1915, that he was the first person who publicly advised the Turkish administration to lift thecapitulations. (‘Als der europaische Krieg ausbrach, war ich der erste, der turkischenRegierung offentlich den Rat gab, sofort die Kapitulationen aufzuheben.’ See Parvus, ‘Diedeutsche Sozialdemokratie’, p.36. published in Munich and subsequently in Berlin between1915–25.

106. This was an interview with Parvus. The original document can be found in Toprak,Turkiye’de ‘Milli Iktisat’ (1908–1918), pp.390–2.

107. G. Harris, The Origins of Communism in Turkey (Stanford: Hoover Institution on War,Revolution and Peace, 1967), p.26.

108. Rakovsky was killed during Stalin’s 1938 trials because he was accused of transferringmoney given by Parvus to the Romanian socialists. See Schurer, ‘Alexander Helphand-Parvus – Russian Revolutionary and German Patriot’, p.322.

109. K.T. Eidus, Ocherki Rabochego Dvizheniia v Stranakh Vostoka (Moscow: Gosudarstven-noe Izdatel’ctva, 1922), p.75. For Parvus’s letter about his observations about the May Dayactivities see M. Schreiner, ‘Parvus’un 1910 Bir Mayıs Bayramı Uzerine Mektubu’, Tarihve Toplum, Vol.17, No.101 (1992), p.21.

110. Schurer, ‘Alexander Helphand-Parvus- Russian Revolutionary and German Patriot’, p.321.111. Dumont, ‘Un economiste social-democrate au service de la Jeune Turquie’, pp.77–8.112. Katkov, ‘German Political Intervention in Russia During World War I’, p.77.113. M. Tuncay, Turkiye’ de Sol Akımlar, 1908–1925 (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1978), p.53.114. Katkov, ‘German Political Intervention in Russia During the First World War’, p.77.115. Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, founded in 1914, was a nationalist organization aiming

at the independence of Ukraine. Its representative to the Ottoman Empire, Mariyan Basok-Melenevs’kyi, first met with Parvus when he came to Istanbul. The two knew each otherand Parvus helped him ‘organize his propaganda activities’. See H. Kırımlı, ‘The Activitiesof the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine in the Ottoman Empire during the First WorldWar’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.34, No.4 (Oct. 1998), p.182.

116. See Parvus, ‘Ein Verleumdungswerk’, pp.125–30.117. P. Dumont and George Haupt, Osmanlı Imparatorlugu’nda Sosyalist Hareketler (Istanbul:

Gozlem Yayınları, 1977), translated by Tugrul Artunkal, p.148; Dumont, ‘Un economistesocial-democrate au service de la Jeune Turquie’, p.84.

118. Solov’ev, ‘Parvus: Politicheskii Portret’, p.171.119. Dumont, ‘Un economiste social-democrate au service de la Jeune Turquie’, p.75.120. Zetkin, ‘Helphand Parvus’, p.89.121. Stone, ‘Another Look at the Sisson Forgeries and Their Background’, p.100.122. Akbayar, ‘Bir Sosyalist Tip’, p.10; Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution, p.299.123. Akbayar, ‘Bir Sosyalist Tip’, p.10; Dumont, ‘Un economiste social-democrate au service de

la Jeune Turquie’, p.78; R. Fisher, Stalin and German Communism (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1948), p.9.

124. Dumont, ‘Un economiste social-democrate au service de la Jeune Turquie’, p.78.125. Solzhenitsyn, Lenin in Zurich, p.176; R. Olson, Imperial Meanderings and Republican By-

Ways. Essays on Eighteenth Century Ottoman and Twentieth Century History of Turkey(Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1996), p.109.

126. ‘At the start of war, he made his first million by the delivery of bread to Constantinople.’ K.Radek, ‘Parvus’, Pravda, (14 Dec.1924). Radek wrote this news item in Pravda as anobituary.


127. Katkov, Russia 1917, The February Revolution, p.78.128. ‘From Germany he moved to Vienna, and from there to Constantinople, where eventually

the World War found him. During the war he achieved wealth immediately through militarycommercial enterprises.’ Trotsky, My Life, p.167. See also Solzhenitsyn, Lenin in Zurich,p.134.

129. Katkov, Russia 1917, The February Revolution, p.78.130. ‘At the same time, he came out publicly as a defender of the progressive mission of German

militarism, broke definitely with the revolutionaries, and became one of the intellectualleaders of the right wing of the German Social Democracy. It goes without saying that sincethe war I have not had any political or personal contact with him.’ Trotsky, My Life, p.167.

131. Donald, Marxism and Revolution, Karl Kautsky and the Russian Marxists 1900–1924,p.195; Zeman and Scharlau, The Merchant of Revolution, p.155; Solov’ev, ‘Parvus:Politicheskii Portret’, p.173.

132. See Wolfe’s review of The Merchant of Revolution, p.697.133. Trotsky, My Life, p.179.

HELPHAND-PARVUS 165

Karaomerlioglu, Asım_Alexander Helphand-Parvus and His Impact on Turkish Intellectual Life

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