Kant and Practical Reason

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THE KANTIAN MODEL OF MORAL-PRACTICAL REASONAuthor(s): Roger J. SullivanReviewed work(s):Source: The Monist, Vol. 66, No. 1, Right Reason in Western Ethics (JANUARY, 1983), pp. 83-105Published by: Hegeler InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902789 .

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THE KANTIAN MODEL OF MORAL-PRACTICAL REASON

In this essay I will examine several features of the dominant contem

porary view about the nature and functions of practical reason, a view findingitsmost natural home indeontological theorieswithin theKantian tradition.1

I will suggest that such theories are quite wrong inholding that public

morality is the whole of ourmoral life. I will argue that insofar as they denythere is or can be such a thing as a privatemoral life, they tend both tomis

represent and to undermine the nature of human moral life. Some ofmycritical remarks on these points will apply, mutatis mutandis, to utilitarian

theories as well.

My criticism will be made fromwhat, in themain, can be called an

Aristotelian position, which holds that practical reason has both public (butnot wholly public) and private (but not wholly private) functions, and that

each function has its own distinctiveness.2 On this account, practical wisdom

is right reasoning aimed at thegood of the individual and political wisdom is

right reasoning aimed at the common good of the community. Althoughneither function nor neither good can exist without the other, neither shouldone be collapsed into the other. I will not have the space to delineate the

Aristotelian view in any detail, but throughmy comments on the Kantian

view Iwill at least give some indications about how such a view of practicalreason and morality can be constructed.3

I.

Today it is almost a truism that thedelineation of rightpractical reason

inWestern philosophy has been made dependent on theway inwhich practical reason has been related to or contrasted with theoretical reason.

According to a long and illustrious tradition dating back to Plato, the

best and perhaps the only genuine exercise of reason is theoretical. Whetherthe gfound for the claim has been located in the structure of theoreticalreason or in its objects or inboth, such reason has been portrayed as capableof attaining knowledge closely approximating divine knowledge innecessity,

consistency, and universality. Even today this formalistic view of theoreticalreason survives as a philosophic ideology, determiningwhat should and what

should not count as rational explanation and justification. On this view,



84 ROGER J. SULLIVAN

rationality consists in laws which have the same necessity found inmathematical or deductive reasoning; laws which hold universally, with no

recognizable limits to their scope and with few or no qualifications; and laws

which are both internallyconsistent and consistent with one another. Reason

still tends to be conceived of as paradigmatically demonstrative incharacter,

consisting of inferencesmade according to the rules of a systemwhich is com

plete and internallyconsistent, inferences leading necessarily and impersonal

ly to conclusions in a manner which is subjective only to the extent that

various

strategiesmay remain

optional.4By contrast, practical reason is problematic, and the claim thatwe can

have practical knowledge tenuous. For one thing itdeals with the changeablerather than the immutable, so that it is not clear itcan offerus either neces

sityor universality. For another, practical reason seems to introduce an element of ineluctable subjectivitywhich tends to undermine theverypossibilityof objectivity and consistency. Theoretical thinking is the activity of a spectator who seeks only to understand reality and who therefore stands, as. it

were, apart from theworld and his personal engagements with it. Individual

characteristics and personal interests of theoreticians are essentially irrelevant to their

activity,and insofar as

theyhave attained

knowledge, theyare

indistinguishable from one another. Theoretical thinking, consequently, hasan impersonality about itwhich promises objectivity and impartiality. It is a

thoroughly rational activity, an activity, as itwere, of pure reason.

Practical thinking,by contrast, is done by a person who is not somuch

concerned with what is or is not the case as with what ought or ought not to

be the case. "Thought (dianoia) moves nothing," Aristotle wrote,5 and

almost everyone after him has agreed that practical thinking requires the

presence of desires to provide its specific dunamis. But desires also are the

chief competitors with and antagonists to rationality, and even iftheycan be

brought under the dominion of reason and made amode of rationality, theirvery presence puts the purity and objectivity of practical thinking in serious

question. It is unclear how practical reasoning, however, it is done, can ever

attain any of the standards of theoretical thought.Ifwe accept thishistorically-sanctioned strategy of comparing practical

reason with a prior view of theoretical reason, we now have a choice betweentwo alternatives.

One possibility is to admit that theoretical or deductive reason has

qualities which othermodes of reasoning may lack, but still to hold there are

other sorts of reasoning, more appropriate to their subject matter than the

kind of reasoning we find indemonstrative inferences. In general, thiswas theway Aristotle took when he described rational activity as including intuition,

induction, and dialectical or analytical reasoning; and it is theway most logicians and mathematicians think today.



THE KANTIAN MODEL OF MORAL-PRACTICAL REASON 85

The other possibility is to regard rule-governed theoretical thought as

exemplifying our only rational way of dealing with the world. Then we are

leftwith two radically differentways of regarding 'practical reason'. We

might claim that it is simply a misnomer: what rationality there is in such

thought is supplied by theoretical reason, and it ismade practical only insofaras we calculate about how to satisfyour desires, which are subjective and ir

rational surds.Generally speaking, thishas been theway taken bymany em

piricists, particularly positivists and emotivists; and it also was the stance

taken by Kant in his analysis of the rationality present inwhat he called

technical practical propositions. However, because he was unwilling to yieldto the empiricist attack on thepossibility ofmoral knowledge, Kant also took

the second way, which, by modelling moral-practical reason on theoretical

reason, delineates morally right practical reason so that it can achieve the

theoretical standards of necessity, consistency, and universality.

Doing so requires attributing the ground for those standards to reason

alone rather than to itsobjects, and this is a fundamental presupposition to

day of all those contemporary moral philosophers who stand within theKan

tian tradition. To retain the formalism characteristic of demonstrative

reasoning,this

typeof moral

theorizing legislatesthe

contingentand

particular out of consideration by regarding them as morally irrelevant.To re

tain the impartiality and objectivity of theoretical reason, Kantians presentthe practical reasoner in terms like that of the theoretical reasoner: the

rational agent stands outside of practice in the sense of setting aside all in

fluence of personal practical concerns. Finally, just as the theoretician aims

at enunciating law-like judgments about what is the case, so themoral

practical reasoner aims at law-like judgments about what ought to be the

case. All such judgments must be public in the sense that they are publiclydefensible and can be assented to by all other rational agents who also reason

impartiallyand

objectively.The

primaryfunction of

rightmoral reason,

then, emerges as mainly legislative, the enactment of laws of conduct. Other

functions of practical reason?deliberation and execution?are not totally ig

nored; they simply do not have the prominence of the legislative function.

It is time now to examine in some detail one example of this latter typeof moral theory, an example which clearly shows how the delineation of

moral-practical reason is modelled after theoretical reason.

II.

In his article, "On Taking theMoral Point ofView," Paul W. Taylorsets out the essential features of a contemporary moral theorywithin the

Kantian tradition.6 Other authorswithin that tradition, such as Baier, Rawls,and Richards, may analyze the relationships between the various concepts




somewhat differentlythanTaylor, but they all subscribe to substantially the

same fundamental doctrines. I trust, then, that itwill not be unfair forme to

take Taylor's presentation as representative of that tradition.

Taylor lists six characteristics which, he holds, taken together define the

conditions necessary and sufficient for a practical rule to be a moral stan

dard. A standard is a moral standard if and only if it has the following six

characteristics.

1. Itmust begeneral

inform. Itmust contain no references toparticularindividuals or circumstances, but only to general kinds of actions which any

agent (including agents having generally described societal positions or roles)must do or not do in certain generally described kinds of situations.

2. Itmust be universal in scope. Itmust apply to allmoral agents in the

kinds of circumstances to which it ismeant to apply.3. Itmust enjoy absolute priority. It must override both other kinds of

norms and the interests of particular individuals and groups.4. Itmust be disinterested. Although itmay specify that the generally

describe4 interests of a generally described class of agents be promoted or

protected,itmust be intended to

applyto and be

obeyedas amatter of

principle, and not as a policy aimed at promoting or protecting the goals of any

particular individuals or groups. The rulemust be formally impartial, i.e.,

consistently apply to all cases falling under it; itmust rule out exceptionsmade in anyone's favor on grounds not stated in the rule, such as an in

dividual's particular desires, inclinations, and aims.

5. Itmust be public. That is, itmust be a maxim which, as Kant said,the individual can will to be universal law; itmust be worthy to function and

be intended to function as a publicly adopted and publicly recognized norm

by all moral agents.

6. Itmust be substantively impartial. That is, itmust conform toKant'ssecond formulation; every person must be regarded as having inherentworth

and as entitled to equal consideration in the protection and promotion of his

basic interests, simplybecause he isa person. Basic interests includewhatever

is necessary forpreserving a person's autonomy and for promoting his fun

damental goals. This characteristic rules out counting the basic interests of

one person as greater or less than the basic interests of another; it also rules

out sacrificing one person's basic interests for the sake of the nonbasic in

terests of others.

Having determined the characteristics which make a practical principle

amoral principle, Taylor writes thatwe stillneed to set out thenecessary andsufficient condition for saying thatmoral principles are valid, that is, in fact

bind all moral agents.We can do that,he continues, by asking but one question:Will adopting thisnorm be for thegood of everyone alike? The very ask




ing of this question presupposes a prior commitment to what he calls "the

ideal mutual acknowledgement test," which is a version of Kant's first for

mulation. According to this test, amoral norm is valid ifand only ifitwould

be subscribed to under ideal conditions of freedom, rationality, and factual

knowledge by all autonomous agents as one of theirmoral norms when com

peting claims occur among them.

One final question needs to be asked: Why take themoral point of view

at all? Given the above analysis, this comes down to asking: What reasonscan be given formaking a commitment to the egalitarian position? Taylor'sanswer is that no reasons can be given, either foror against this commitment

(or any other alternative commitment), simply because it isultimate. (One is

reminded of Kant's defense of morality in the third chapter of the

Groundwork.) All we can do is decide what our ultimate attitude toward

persons will be, therebydeciding the kind of life and world we will to have.

III.

Now thatwe have surveyed the basic structure of a formalisticmoral

theory, I wish to point out certain features of such theories.The first characteristic of such theories towhich I wish to call attention

is that they tend to begin with a Hobbesian view of the natural condition ofhumans outside of a morally structured society.7 In one sense that view is

empty of all significance, for the natural condition is contrasted with'social

arrangements in such a way that it becomes tautologically true that itwill be

"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." What Hobbes meant to do,however, was to stresswhat he saw as a central problem inboth moral and

political philosophy?how to limit the negative and destructive tendencies ofindividuals so as tomake possible a society within which

people

can live

togetherwith civility. Philosophers within the Kantian tradition shareHobbes' view, and ithas enormous consequences for theway inwhich their theoryofmorality can develop.

One of the consequences is the conviction that, as Kurt Baier has put it,"moral solutions to our practical problems often run counter to an individual's strong inclinations and desires, or conflict with his best interests,and demand sacrifices, sometimes severe. For this reason we believe it isoften difficult and against our nature to do what morality requires."8 Somuch is this view now part of the 'common wisdom' of contemporary think

ingabout

moralityand moral

reasoning,that

Baier could then write:"Indeed, we would find ithard to saywhywe should have amorality ifitwerenot so."9




A second consequence is thatKantian use of theHobbesian view blocks

any attempt to justify themoral point of view by claims thatmorality is in a

person's best interest. To the contrary, moral demands will "often run

counter to" what people consider to be in their best interest.

This first characteristic of formalistic moral theories leads to a second:

sincemorality acts as a restrictionon theprivate aims of individuals and since

such restrictionsmust be public, therefore, as Taylor writes, "there are no

privatemoralities" nor can there be.10The contrast here between 'public' and

'private'is

justthat differencewhich Kant delineated between

'morality'and

'prudence'.11 The latterencompasses almost all considerations about our own

welfare and, when they are grounded in desire, about thewelfare of others,which he classified under the rubric of hedonism. Since I will claim later that

theKantian insistence that there is no such thing as private morality is a

serious error, I will review here the main reasons offered on behalf of the

Kantian view.

The first reason depends on combining theHobbesian view with the

Kantian requirement thatmoral rulesmust be worthy to serve as universal

laws. Ifwe accept both doctrines, it then follows thatprivate ends and privatesocial

arrangementsmust tend to be Hobbesian in

nature,characterized

bycompetition and selfishness. Either our individual concerns and private social

unions will incorporate the same laws of justice as a well-ordered society, in

which case they no longer are private; or theywill be either immoral (by

public standards) or amoral and of only secondary importance incomparisonwith morality. The belief that there can be legitimate amoral actions rests on

Kant's contention that, although 'morality' and 'happiness' are radically

heterogeneous concepts, happiness still is a genuine, albeit not an uncon

ditional, good for finite moral agents, which may not be promoted by but

may be tolerated bymorality as long as the quest forhappiness does not con

flictwith the demands ofmorality.There is another argument for conceiving of morality as completely

public, which depends for its force on our accepting theKantian view that

moral-practical reason must conform to the standards of theoretical reason.

It begins by dividing our practical concerns, once again, into concerns about

justice and concerns about welfare. Unfortunately, what we think to be goodand in our best interest is an ideal of the imagination, not of reason. Em

pirical practical reason, therefore,can only deal with probabilities, not neces

sities, with generalities, not universality. Moreover, different people have

conflicting and incommensurable views about what is in their own interest,

and the same person may hold many different views about it during thecourse of his or her life.For this reason, prudential interestsare the source of

inconsistencies, both within each person and between individuals; they




thereforegenerate conflicts,without also being able to offeruniversally valid

prudential rules for resolving them. The conclusion follows that prudentialreason is radically different fromand inferiorto pure practical reason and its

norms of necessity, consistency, and universality.

Within the Kantian framework, then, it seems completely obvious that

our practical lifemust be conceived dichotomously, and only that kind of

practical reason which is thoroughly rational deserves to be considered

moral; only it can provide the basis for our living together with civility,

responsibility,and

cooperation. Bycontrast the

privaterealm is far too sub

jective and particular. Truly moral maxims are only thosewhich are worthyto be publicly recognized as binding on all; and maxims which remain privatearemerely tolerated within the context of the law, as long as theydo not con

flictwith public duties.

The third characteristic of theorieswithin theKantian tradition follows

from thefirst two: rationality consists in rule-making and rule-following (fol

lowing rules of one's own making). Consequently almost all the attention

within this tradition concerns maxims, principles, and laws?how they come

to be, how moral rules differ fromprudential rules, how each can bind us, and

so on. This characteristic clearly shows how, within the Kantian tradition,right reason is conceived on themodel of theoretical and scientific reason.

Formal explanations in the sciences describe the world as rule-bound;likewise formal moral theorizing holds that actions can be rational and intel

ligible only insofar as they also are rule-governed.12 Just as valid scientific

laws hold necessarily and universally, so also valid moral rulesmust obligefree agents absolutely and universally.

The same theoreticalmodel determines how theKantian conceives of the

moral legislator. In the physical sciences, special characteristics of the in

dividual scientist are irrelevant to the standards of scientific objectivity; so

also in themoral-political realm, the personal characteristics of themorallegislators are irrelevant to their legislation. Those legislators, whether we

think ofRawls's "original position" orTaylor's "ideal mutual acknowledgement test,"must be portrayed in completely impersonal terms, freed of all

characteristics except those intrinsic to the Kantian view of the nature of

moral agency, namely, pure rationality and freedom in theKantian sense,

together with whatever factual knowledge is necessary for the exercise of

rationality.The fourth characteristic ofKantian theories towhich I wish to call at

tention concerns theirunderstanding of the nature ofmoral motivation. Let

us thinkofKant's "kingdom of ends" in termsof an ideal of thepublic order,namely, an ideal state, governed only by public laws as we have seen them

described. Such a state ispossible only ifthe citizens take an interest inobey




ing its laws,which restrict theegoism thatmakes social unions impossible. If

we remember that all the citizens are subject to constant temptations to act

egoistically, we wonder what kind ofmotivation can make the legislation of

such a state effective.Within theKantian tradition, only twokinds ofmotives

are available.

Although the private desires of the citizens are conceived of as either ir

relevant to their obeying the law or as tempting them to disobey it, confor

mity might be accomplished by attaching penalties to violations. But those

conformingto the law for fear of

punishment

are

bythat fact not

goodcitizens; they are acting only under coercion. And they stillwill violate the

law when they judge theirpersonal gain greater than the losses extracted bythe law. In a word, theymay observe the legalities,when theydo, but in spirit

they are completely outside the law.

Fortunately, there is another, higher type of civic motivation, that of

dutifulness. A citizen of this ideal state is a good citizen if and only if he or

she obeys its laws just because theyare the law. Despite the fact they all still

have desires which often conflict with the law, good citizens are willing to

frustrate those desires when theymust do so to do theirduty. Penalties for

violatingthe law

(andrewards for

conformingto

it)are irrelevant to dutiful

persons, because they are committed to the law (simply as the law) as more

important than their own welfare.

We already know theKantian explanation forwhy a person will be will

ing to commit himself or herself so completely to duty: each person must

regard himself or herself as the originator of the legislation, which is

thereforenot imposed fromwithout but fromwithin; it is legislation of one's

own reason.

The fifthand final characteristic towhich I wish to call attention is the

Kantian conviction that any alternative proposal for understanding our

moral life is ruled out as mistaken, ahead of any examination of thatproposal. Taylor, for example, writes: "If someone uses other criteria as

grounds foraccepting or rejecting a norm, then I shall say that the individual

is not taking themoral point of view but some other point of view."13 This

could itselfhave been anticipated. For ifan account ofmorality is based on

pure reason, thenwe can know in advance that, insofar as other accounts

diverge from it, theyare tainted by irrationality or plain error.Even the fact

that thehistorical Kantian appeal to ordinarymoral consciousness no longerhas itsoriginal forcewithmany people is an irrelevancy.14That only confirms

how sorely people can be tempted to irrationality by theirdesires and inclina

tions.

Despite the Kantian conviction that I will be engaged in a futile

enterprise, I now will turn to those criticisms which leadme to conclude that

the Kantian mode of theorizing is seriously flawed.




IV.

What I will mainly be concerned with in this section is to explain and de

fend the view that there is such a thingas privatemorality and, furthermore,thatmorality finds itsprimary locus inour private lives, so that it ispersonal

morality which ultimately provides a crucialmoral support for the justice of

public law. I will not have the space tomake my case completely good, but I

hope to indicate how that case can bemade. The best way to do so, I think, is

to contrast the characteristics of public morality, as Taylor has identified

them,with the characteristics of our private lives.Doing sowill point out theradical differences between the Kantian view ofmorality and what is in the

main an Aristotelian view.

A.

The firstmajor contrast can be made by considering together three of

the characteristics ofmoral rules?the first, second, and fourth?as Taylorhas explained them: moral rulesmust be general in form,universal in scope,and apply disinterestedly, that is,both impersonally and impartially.Once we

understand that these are intended to be characteristics of just laws within ajust state, we can appreciate the rationale behind them. It is neither un

reasonable nor particularly novel to say that in the public forum justiceshould wear her blindfold; favoritism on behalf of any particular known in

dividuals or groups normally does offend our ordinary moral convictions

about how justice should be distributed in public social unions.15

When we attend to our private life,we cannot help but be struckby how

thoroughly different it is from theKantian description of a just public order.

For one thing, the scope of our private life ismuch narrower. It is primarilylimited to oneself and those towhom one is related ina personal way, and it is

not directly concerned, normally, with thewelfare of society as a whole. As a

consequence, a major characteristic of our private life is just its partiality,however that partiality isdistributed.16There we engage inexactly the sortof

discriminatory conduct which would be considered immoral in the publicorder. Parents, for example, normally are most concerned about their own

children, and when people are inneed, we thinkwe normally firstshould takecare of those nearest to us by ties of blood and affection.

Moreover, whereas the lawmay serve justice best by ignoring certain

special characteristics and contingent facts about particular and known in

dividuals, this is justwhat we focus on inour private life: known individuals in

all their particularity. A husband clearly should take into account all those

qualities and characteristics which make his wife exactly and only the in

dividual person she is.What theyare, is indeterminate ahead of time;we can

learn them only by coming to know a person. Therefore, many of themoral




considerations within a relationship cannot be known inadvance of all the ex

periences necessary to generate and sustain it.Personal moral considerations

are profoundly dependent on empirical knowledge; personal relationshipscannot be structured ahead of time by purely a priori reasoning.

Unlike public morality which, as we have seen, Baier described as

originating in conflict and as virtually justified by itsutility in resolving con

flicts, private morality originates mainly inpossibilities and needs. Conflicts

may arise inour private life,butmost of our private concerns are not intrin

sically competitive, and itwould be amistake to so construe them.Mainly we

are taken up with introducing some coherent shape into an indefinite and

fluid range of possibilities, determining what we should care about, and

responding to legitimate needs, whether our own or those of people with

whom we are personally related.

Throughout, our private moral practice is based on interest,whether

self-interest or the interests of those to whom we are related by love or

friendship.How urgently and legitimately such interests present themselves

to us depends on an indefinitenumber of particular, contingent facts about

ourselves, about others, and about the world. We cannot determine such

thingsahead of time in a

formalistic,a

priorimanner.17

Given the fact that the private sector of our life is limited, partial, par

ticular, empirically conditioned, and based on interest,what can moralitymean in the expression 'privatemorality'? Clearly, it cannot mean what

morality means in the Kantian sense (although it can include a deontic

delineation as morality in an inferioror secondary sense). What moralitymeans here iswhat I think thevastmajority of people infact take to be at the

very center of human moral life: being the kind of person who has those

qualities of character (virtues) which entitle us to say that that person is a

'good person'. Such a person does what is right, because he loves what is

right; and he has learnedto

doso

by learningbothto assume

personal responsibility for his lifeand to initiate and sustain close personal relationships with

others.

In order to describe such a person we need to retrieve and rehabilitate

certain terms?freedom, respect, and autonomy?which have been ap

propriated by the Kantian tradition only by itsdoing violence to theway we

use them in our ordinary discourse. Although the application of these terms

in their non-Kantian sense should not be restricted to describing our personalmoral life,here I can only indicate theirmeaning in that lifeand only in a

very sketchymanner. By freedom Imean the libertywithin our private lifeto

engage in thoughts and behavior which aremoral yet too particular in focusand too dependent on personal interestsand contingent circumstances to be

appropriate to the public forum. By self-respect and respect for others I




mean, in general terms, the right of each person to critically evaluate and

direct his or her own life,taking intoaccount all the relevant particularities of

that life;and respect for the need and ability of others to do so as well. I shall

saymore about respect in this sense inSection C below, and I shall discuss

the notion of 'private autonomy' in Part V below.

B.

Kant ruled our personal life and affective relationships out of themoral

world, not because he did not understand their distinctive nature, forhe did,but because he was convinced thatmoral-practical reason must be modelled

after theoretical reason. As we have seen, on thatmodel rationality is con

ceived of as rule-bound thought,18 and only certain kinds of practical rules

deserve to be considered moral. According toTaylor's second, third,and fifth

characteristics togetherwith his "mutual acknowlegement test,"moral rules

must be lawlike in form and application, so they can function as absolute

public norms among all rational agents.

By contrast, personal affective human lifecannot be codified into univer

sal, absolute, impersonal, and completely objective practical laws. It is true

that part of that lifemay be stated in rules specifyinggeneralized rightpatternsof behavior, but, as Aristotle rightlysaid, inmatters which admit of "so

great variety and irregularity," practical truthcan hold "only for themost

part."19 Ifwe prefer absolutes, we may feel somewhat uncomfortable with the

way inwhich human moral life recalcitrates the use of neat, absolute rules.

But reflection on that life does tend to support Aristotle's contention that

"although general statements have a wider range of application, statements

on particular points have more truth in them."20

Whether we are concerned onlywith our own lifeorwith others as well,we must take into account a

constantly changing world,like an artist

workingwith materials which never quite duplicate each other. Even when generalrules are right,we feel free to violate themwhen the situation demands it, ustas theaccomplished artist feels free to break the conventions of his craftwhen

that is demanded by the particular materials with which he is working.Private morality is better described by expressions such as "doing what is

suitable, given these circumstances," rather than in terms of absolute laws.21

In our personal relationships, there is justice, but not justice in the sense

of an impersonal and impartial distribution of rights.Rather, it is justice in

the sense of sensitivity towhat contributes to good of those involved, both for

themoment and within the context of theirrelationship.

As aconsequence,what is just will vary according to the relationship and how it is constructed.

The closer the relationship, the greater are the claims of this kind of justice.




By contrast, "when people are friends, theyhave no need of justice" in the

sense of public rules of equitable distribution.22

Even when a personal relationship ispartly constituted by public norms,as in the case ofmarriage, toomuch emphasis on the formal legalities, rights,and obligations either indicates the relationship already is in trouble or tends

todestroy its specificallymoral quality, which requires genuine caring and af

fection.

What introducesmorality into our private life and sustains it there isnot

a body of rules but good moral character which leads a person to do what is

right in each situation, not because that is an instantiation of some law, but

because he or she is thatkind of person. Aristotle offersus a crucially important analysis inEth. Nie. 2. 4, where he compares character to knowing how

to use a language.23 Competence in language is not just a matter of knowingall the rules of grammar, for that clearly doesn't guarantee a person will

speak or write well. For one thing,a living language allows toomany exceptions to its rules. For another, the experienced and expert speaker orwriter

may have* forgottenmost of the rules, if indeed he ever knew them,without

that affecting his skill. Such a person does not normally need to attend to

grammaticalor

stylisticrules when he

speaks

or writes, because hesimplyknows how to do so, and how to do so well.

In likemanner, the good person has the kind of character which enables

him both to know and to do justwhat is themorally right thing to do ineach

situation; and knowing that typically is not a matter of knowing 'what the

rules require'. This iswhy Aristotle writes that moral judgment does "not

come under the head of any artwhich can be transmitted by precept."24 It is

no accident that he does not describe themorally good person as, in today'sidiom, 'aman of principle'. The latter applies more accurately toAristotle's

obstinate person, who clings rigidlyand foolishly to his rules evenwhen doingso shows moral

insensitivity. Instead,Aristotle calls the

good person"a law

unto himself."25

C.

I have now completed my examination of the main ways inwhich our

private moral life isdistinctively differentfrom themorality of public social

unions. Within the Kantian context, that verydistinctiveness isused to argue

that, insofar as our life is not completely public, it isnot completely moral in

significance. I have argued, in turn, that it is just our private lifewhich con

tainsmany ofour

most precious moral concerns, and that it is thea

prioricharacter of Kantian ethics which results ina systematic effort tomislead us

into thinking our private lifehas, at best, only indirectmoral significance. I

now wish to turn to another and related deficiency in theKantian approach.




Let us once more return to Taylor's list of characteristics, particularlyhis fourth and sixth and, once again, his "ideal mutual acknowledgementtest." The fourth states thatmoral rulesmust be impersonal and impartial;

theymust be disinterested and obeyed On principle'. The sixth states theymust be substantively impartial so that each person must be regarded as en

titled to the same consideration as any other in theprotection and promotionof his or her basic interests, simply because he or she is a person. And the test

can be summarized, following Taylor, as a commitment to an egalitarianview of persons. All three restfinally onKant's second formulation, theprin

ciple of respect forpersons as persons, and they show the enormous importance given to the notion of 'person' as the ultimate and overriding norm in

moral theories within the Kantian tradition.My argument is not with the

Tightnessof respecting persons, but with themanner inwhich thisprinciple is

interpretedwithin the Kantian view.

As we have seen, the notion of 'person' is not based on any contingent,

empirical facts about individuals?their biological and physical features,their interests and desires, even theirmoral character.26 In fact, 'respect for

persons' says nothing at all about persons. Unlike merit assessments, ascribe

inginherentworth to persons is not a matter of

applyingstandards at all.

Taylor agrees with J. Feinberg that there simply are no facts about personswhich can serve as the basis forasserting theyall have equal worth.27 In fact,

Taylor writes, "the kinds of entities on which moral agents place inherent

worth need not themselves be moral agents?even potential ones."28 Talk

about persons and respect forpersons, then, isactually away of talking about

an attitude which lies at the base of formalistic moral theories.

What is odd about this doctrine is themanner inwhich a completely

impersonal abstraction has replaced our more ordinary notion of people, with

all theircontingent and individuating characteristics. Flesh-and-blood human

beingsseem to

disappearfrom themoral

world;we seem to be in a Platonic

World of absolute values, but aWorld uninhabited by living,breathing peo

ple. We have only personless Persons, morally indistinguishable tokens to

which we are to give our respect.To illustratemy point, letme repeat a storyMichael Stocker tells of one

person visiting another in thehospital. When the illperson thanks his visitor

for coming, forbeing such a good friend, the visitor responds, he came onlybecause itwas his duty and he always tries to do his duty.29The storypoints

up thedehumanizing character of respect forpersons, just as persons. What

we do for them really has little or nothing to do with them as individuals.

Surely something is deficient in themotive, the onlymotive allowed withintheKantian tradition,which requires us to regard personal feelings as moral

ly insignificant.We might admit that themotive ismoral innature, for it does

motivate us to act dutifully because it is our duty (even in the face of our




reluctance to do so). But it is an inferiormoral motive in personal

relationships, for it systematically discounts and excludes exactly what lies at

theirmoral center?the way we care emotionally about people, with all the

special, empirical, contingent facticity thatmakes them to be the individuals

they are.

There also is respect in these relationships, but in varying degrees,

depending upon the persons and qualities we find admirable (as opposed to

qualities we simply like). Moreover, it is a personal respect which regardspersons as valuable and special forjustwhat theyare.Not everyone isdeserv

ing of the same respect; we may have no respect at all for some peoplebecause theyhave a despicable character. This kind of respect is somethingthatmust be earned; unlike theKantian notion of respect, thiskind of respect

clearly depends on merit assessment.

It ispossible to point out the radical deficiency in theKantian notion of

respect in still another way. Ifwe find ourselves having to decide between the

basic interestsof several persons, the egalitarian view allows no rational wayto do so.30As a consequence, the only fair, albeit still non-rational way, to

decide, say, between a woman and her life-threateningfoetus (ifwe regard the

foetus as a person) is to resort to some such strategy as flipping a coin or,

when several persons are involved in a conflict between their basic interests,

holding a lottery.The egalitarian principle leaves such moral decisions to non-rational

luck, because it strips people of all the specialness which makes each a dis

tinctive individual and insists that nothing ismorally relevant but an impersonal attitude. This is the ultimate ironyof the Kantian position. It is based

on the initirllyplausible claim thatmorality requires us to respect persons,but the impersonal manner in which this claim is interpreted imitates too

closely theway in which the theoretician or scientist deals with objects or

things.Individual

personsbecome mere variables under the universal

quantifierof Person.

People sense just thiswhen theyprotest that bureaucracies reduce them

to numbers in a computer. But the use of numbers isnot only often themost

efficientway to administer benefits; it also guarantees complete equality of

treatment.What is it then that people are protesting? That their essential

humanity?their individual personhood?is being ignored. There are two

ways in which to respond to their criticism.We might hold that people are

mistaken inwhat theywant. Just as the public model ofmorality is not ap

propriate to our private life, so, we might say, it also is the case thatwe

should not try to extend personal morality into public life. The secondresponse protests that this is to bifurcate ourmoral life andmake it impossible forus to bring anywholeness or integritybetween our private and public



THE KANTIANMODEL OF MORAL-PRACTICALREASON 97

life.What this alternative suggests ismore radical: people are right in sensingthat theKantian view is inadequate even inmatters of public morality. Ifwe

think of amoral theoryas organizing forus an ideal view of human life, then

that theory should advocate ways inwhich at least part ofwhat we mean by

friendship can be extended to the public realm in the formof what Aristotle

called 'civic friendship'.

D.

The final criticism Iwish tomake of theorieswithin theKantian tradition concerns Taylor's contemporary statement of theburden ofKant's final

remarks in theGroundwork: no reasons can be given either for or against

taking themoral point of view. Ifwe do not find this shocking, it is onlybecause we are so steeped in theKantian tradition thatwe are accustomed to

believing thatmorality is ultimately rationally unjustifiable.I do not have the space to review all the arguments which lead to the

Kantian position.What Iwish to do, however, is suggest an alternativewhich

offers some better hope of justifyingmorality. My suggestion appeals to the

fact thatwe all necessarily develop some sort ofmoral character. In thiswe

have no choice. (Of course, this is character in theAristotelian sense, a com

plex of dispositional traitsdeveloped from theways we act.) Since we cannot

help but become a person with a definite character, the ultimate basis for

morality may be found by asking such questions as:What kind of a person do

I admire and wish to become? What kind of desires and interests should I

have?We cannot totally avoid asking such questions; they are not optional.Aristotle was right in saying that only an utterly insensitiveperson can be un

aware of the fact that theway he acts determines what kind of a person he is

becoming.Once a

person'scharacter has firmed to the

pointwhere he no

longerwishes to change what he is, such questions do lose their force. (Periods of

great traumamay enable a person to reopen such questioning.) But this is a

loss which experience has already taught us to expect. The main possibilitiesforbecoming moral, when thequestion of justificationmost naturally arises,

lie with children and young adults, before their character has completelyfirmed.Children have an acute ability to recognize various types of character

and they typically choose some person or persons to imitate. By acting like

them, they tend to develop the same sorts of characteristics theyhave learned

to admire in theirmodels.

This is admittedlya

fragile foundation. So much dependson

themoralcharacter of thosewho nurture children, on theenvironment inwhich theyare

reared, and on the kind of persons they learn to admire. However, children




are not completely dependent on their familes, nor are families completelyleft to theirown resources. This is exactly why the ideology of a state and its

moral arrangements are so crucially important. If a state is a just state,with

good laws and good institutionsdeveloped through theyears by fundamental

lygood people, then the state will support and sustainmoral education within

the family. Together, theprivate and public sectors can complement and rein

force each other in themoral education of the young.We still will reach an ultimate point?moral disagreements between

those who have developed different kinds of character, and disagreements

between people of like character who happen not to share similar beliefs, say,because of differing religious convictions. But these disagreements most

typcially are not about whether we ought to bemoral; theyare about how we

are to act as moral people. This is a substantial gain. Morality or themoral

point of view no longer needs to be regarded as unjustifiable or as only one

viewpoint among several.

V.

We have seen how profoundly the nature ofmoral theorizing has been

affected by the belief that right practical reason must conform to the

methodology and standards of theoretical reason. The result has been a dis

astrous oversimplification andmisrepresentation of thecomplexities and sub

tleties of human moral life.31 he Kantian tradition does notmerely describe

morality but does it in such a way as to systematically legislatemany of our

most precious moral concerns out of consideration. We need to push our in

quiry furtherand try to explain Kant's insistence onmodelling rightmoral

reason on theoretical reason, despite the cost.32

At least part of the answer can be found, I believe, ifwe attend to the

basic structural outlines of the religious view of themoral world dominant in

theworld inwhich Kant was reared and lived,which he adapted so itwould

conform to theaspirations as well as the strictures of theEnlightenment.33 In

thatChristian view, the responsibilities for themoral world are neatly divided

between God and man. God does the legislating, and the responsibility of

each member is simply to do what God commands. Since God is both om

nipotent and perfectly just, he will see to it that no one is asked to do more

than he can, and justice will be done, ifnot in thisworld, then in the next.

We can easily see theways in which Kant's theory is indebted to its

prototype. Pure reason is now the foundation of themoral world, and ithas

the awesome

responsibilityto formulate and

promulgate

the laws of that

world, theKingdom of Ends?laws which, like the laws of God, apply to

everyone and enjoy absolute precedence. The requirement of universality for




malizes thismoral duty: when we reason morally, we can and must legislateas ifwe were enacting the formal fabric of the entiremoral world. (Apartfrom its background, such a requirement might simply seem ludicrous.)

Moreover, what is required of us as agents is only thatwe do our duty as

reason reveals it to us, without regard for the consequences. (In the end Kant

had to rely on God to insure distributive justice, and it is onlywhen we un

derstand the original model forKant's theory thatwe can see thatGod and

immortality are more integral to theKantian view thanmany contemporary

proponents are

willing

to admit.)There are other intriguingparallels todraw. Just as God's will provides a

single ultimate moral norm, the source of all more particular moral laws, so

also pure reason must provide a single ultimate moral norm fromwhich it

must be possible to "derive" all particular moral laws. Further, as God's will

is the source of harmony within theChristian moral world, so also, within the

Kingdom of Ends, the ultimate demand of reason, consistency stated as a

categorical imperative, must provide the harmony within that Kingdom.There should be nomoral problems which cannot be settledby appeal to that

norm.

In the Christian delineation, the basicrelationship

between the

originator of themoral law and thosewho obey it is that between creator and

creature, characterized on the side of God by total and comprehensive domi

nion, and on the side ofman by total dependence. Consequently, there is and

can be no area of human life completely private fromGod, no area of

morality which can exist outside of,much less ground,moral rules. In aword,within theChristian moral world there is no room for anything like private

morality. Insofar as itsmembers try to claim there is, they are committingthe ultimate evil of selfish rebellion, putting consideration of their own

welfare ahead of the rule of God and themoral good of the entireworld.

We can understandmore clearly now why itwas thatKantcame

to thinkthatmoral-practical reasonmust be construed in termswhich would enable it

to attain the standards of divine knowledge?necessity, consistency, and un

iversality.We also can see why itwas thatmorality was conceived of as

providing the fundamental structure for an ideally constructed social union

with laws having the same comprehensive and absolute moral dominion over

itsmembers that, in the religious delineation, was given toGod.

I wish now to return to thematter ofmoral motivation. Within the

traditional Christian view we find the basic conception of human nature to

which Kant himself remained faithful: as a result ofAdam's fall, human

nature is irrevocably scarred, so thatwe all tend towhat ismorally evil ratherthan what ismorally good. Morality finds itsplace, then,forus in the conflict

between God's will and our desires. The main moral problem is not with




knowing what is rightbut with doing it.The only proper response foraChris

tian is to obey and to obey on principle, on the principle that God's laws

should be obeyed simply because theyareGod's laws.Mere compliance does

not satisfy the requirements ofmorality, nor does obedience based on conse

quential considerations. The spirit of Christian morality requires lovingobedience out of respect for God's will.

What Iwish to suggest is that the term 'autonomy' now functionswithin

Kantian moral theories, with only minor emendations, just as the terms

'obedience', 'holy obedience', and even 'blind obedience' functionwithin the

Christian view.What obedience requires, in the religious view, is awillingnessto obey theDivine Legislator. It sometimes is called 'blind' precisely because

such obedience requires the complete subjugation of all considerations of personal welfare when they conflictwith the demands of God's laws. This is justwhat 'autonomy' signifieswithin theKantian tradition: absolute obedience to

themoral law because it is the law and one's duty; and the setting aside of all

merely prudential considerations when that is necessary. Even theKantian

point thatwe must regard themoral legislation as our own is not completely

novel; forwithin the religious tradition obedience signifies the conformity of

one's own will to the divinelaw,

whichthrough

internalization isaccepted

as

the expression of one's own will.

If this is all the termmeans, we have cause towonder why 'autonomy'seems somuch more attractive to people than does 'obedience' and certainly'blind obedience'. At least a good part of the explanation, I think, lieswith

the fact that 'autonomy' is also often used both as a psychological term andas a moral term in a non-Kantian sense?also referringto a person's abilityto be self-governing and determine one's choices on the basis of one's own

thinking.But this use of the term also extends towhat may be called 'personal autonomy': determining how best to secure one's own welfare and the

welfare of those about whom wecare,

andconforming

or notconforming

to

public moral norms, depending on whether one judges them to be acceptable

personal moral guides. This, of course, isnot autonomy in theKantian sense,

but heteronomy, the always potential antithesis ofmorality. In theKantian

view, therecan be no such thingas private autonomy anymore than there can

be private morality; autonomy means placing public constraints on our

freedom, not just inexercising freedom responsibly.Nonetheless, thepositiveconnotations of thenon-Kantian sense of the termcontinue todistract many

people from the Kantian meaning, however clearly the latter is stated.

My final suggestion is that theKantian transformation of theChristian

moral world into a completely rationalistic ethic has been accomplished onlyat great cost. What Kant and his successors have tried to do is to erect a

secular moral world apart from itsoriginal foundation and head, and without




the fundamental bond uniting themembers of theChristian moral world with

their head and with one another. The problem consists in trying to

appropriate a particular model of themoral world and being unable to find

adequate substitutes for the basic components of the original. In place of a

loving Person, we are given impersonal reason and its law; inplace of lovingresponse to a Person, we are given submission to an impersonal law; and in

place of bonds of love between members of the church, we are given the

notion of respect fora completely abstract notion of Personhood. Morality is

now merely a "point of view," of all things, lacking the most basic

legitimation, and deprived of everything which in the older version of the

model was held to be the very spirit ofmorality.However we account for it, contemporary secular philosophers?both

rationalists and empiricists (logical empiricists and logical positivists)?stillare committed to an "ideology of reason" which provides a natural home for

formalistic ethical theorizing.34 This ancient view of rationality, brieflydelineated in the opening section of this paper and articulated anew by 17th

and 18th-centurythinkers, regards the highest and best formof reason to be

philosophic thinking done sub specie aeternitatis, apart from the

contaminatinginfluence of emotions and of

any historically-dimensionedlife.

As a result,modern ethicists typically begin with some "original position"

having authority independent of any historical conditions and any shared

social lifeand/or end with some supreme principle grounded in reason's pure

judgment on all conditioned reality. This description applies to such

otherwise diverse thinkers asMill, Marx, Rawls, and Nozick. The problem,as Alasdair Maclntyre has pointed out, is that all such variations of the same

ideology tend to end in skepticism.

VI

I will conclude by summarizing what I have tried to argue.I have suggested thatwe should pay particular attention to two historical

influenceswhich have led somany philosophers, particularly thosewithin the

Kantian tradition, to thinkofmoral theorizing as the construction of an ideal

moral world defined by impersonal, public, absolute, and universal laws: the

belief that moral-practical reason should be modelled after a completelyformalistic delineation of theoretical reason; and the lingering influence ofthe Christian model fromwhich modern moral theories evolved.

I have argued that, insofar as Kantian theorizing has ignored the

distinctive features of privatemorality and ruled privatemorality completelyout of themoral world, ithas systematically discounted many of our most

importantmoral considerations?a part ofmorality which exists in varying




degrees both within and outside the law, a part of morality which

complements public morality while both sustaining and competing with it.35

The losses have been great. I will mention only three. First, such theories

simply are not helpful to us when we are troubled by many of our most

important moral problems. Second, such theories offer us only a thin,

legalistic account of public morality, an account which is not only overly

simplified but also tends to undermine the spirit of morality in both our

private and public life.Finally, such theories fail to provide the foundation

for an

adequatetheory concerning the development of moral character?

moral education with its roots in private as well as public morality.If but one fundamental error is to be isolated, it lieswith Kant's first

formulation of the categorical imperative. Through ithe promulgated a basic

confusion which has permeated moral philosophy to our own day?theformalistic contention that all morality must be identifiedwith universal

laws, at the cost of themoral significance of thepersonal, the particular, and

thepartial.What Kant saidmay be trueof some laws of a just state, but what

he said is also largely irrelevant to those times in ourmoral lifewhen acting

morally does not mean acting on maxims, much less on maxims we think

should serve as universal laws.

It seems tome thatwe need completely to reconstructmoral theorizingso as adequately to take into account the complexities and subtleties of our

moral life.Aristotle provides us with a way to begin, for he did not fall into

the errors Kant so persuasively enunciated. Although he believed that

rationalitymust be intra-personal and although he believed that theoretical

thinking is amode of rationality superior to practical thinking, stillhe did not

make themistakes of believing that rationality always must be characterized

by universality, impersonality, and formal consistency, or of tryingtomodel

practical reasoning on theoretical thinking. Instead, very early in the

Nicomachean Ethics he points out that "it is themark of an educated personto look for thatdegree of precision in each kind of studywhich the nature of

the subject matter admits."36

Roger J. Sullivan

University of South Carolina, Columbia

NOTES

1.Work on thispaperwas supported inpart by a grant from theCommittee onResearch and Productive Scholarship,University of South Carolina.

2. I realize thatmy claim here flies in the face of an almost overwhelmingconcensus to thecontrary f a long listof eminentscholars,who pointout again and




again that themorality of a Greek of Aristotle's timewas entirelypublic (but, ofcourse, not in theKantian senseof 'public').However, ithardlyever ismentioned inthisregardthatAristotle tellsus thattheordinary language of his day did distinguish,albeit not completelyclearly,betweenpracticalwisdom and politicalwisdom (seeEth.Nie. 6. 8).Moreover, as a metic,Aristotle himselfhardly could have lived the full

publicAthenian life;he did livea leisured lifefilledwith study nd friendship,ust ashis Ethics recommends.At anothertime hope to show thatthe textualevidence supportsmy interpretation.ut even if werewrong on thispoint, thatwould not affectthefact that thedistinctionforwhich I am arguingfinds ubstantialsupport nour or

dinary moral awareness today.3. In thispaper I will be concerned

primarilywith how contemporaryauthors

within theKantian tradition eal with the issues and only secondarilywith whatKanthimselfheld.

4. In this section I am indebtedtoCh. Perelman, The New Rhetoric and theHumanities (Dordrecht,Holland: D. Reidel, 1971),pp. 26-35. I also wish to thankDonald Livingston forhis criticisms oth of this section and of the restof thepaper.

5. Eth. Nie. 6. 2. 1139a36.

6.Midwest Studies inPhilosophy 3 (1978): 35"?61.7. My use of the term Hobbesian' isused only as a shorthand xpressionfor the

view thatman is naturally selfish.8. "Moral Reasons," Midwest Studies inPhilosophy 3 (1978): 62.9. Ibid.

10. Taylor, p. 46. It also is thecase

that the Kantian traditiongrantssome

minimal, indirectmoral significanceto our private life insofar s the fulfillmentf

personal needs is necessary to supportpublicmoral life.See Gr. 11-13/399.11. To label these concerns 'private' is not to say theycannot be described and

discussed. To thecontrary, ince they re addressed by practical reason, they an beenunciated,and actions followingfrom uch reasoningare inprinciple ustas open toexamination as actions conforming to pure practical reason.

12.An important ritiqueof the view thatrationalityshould be restricted o rule

followingbehavior isgivenbyAndrew Harrison inhisMaking and Thinking:A Studyof IntelligentActivities (Indianapolis: Hackett PublishingCo., 1979).

13. Taylor, p. 40; see also p. 46.14. Ibid., p. 42.

15. Here and throughoutthe restof thepaper, my saying that thepublic orderrequires justice is notmeant to commitme to the claim that justice requires a

deontological justification s itsonly rational ground.16.Within this context of partiality,we may decide it ismoral to be impartial

toward those sharing a similar relationship with us, e.g., to treat several children alike.

But differences ntheir ges and, say, health,will stillmean therewill be differencesndetails of the relationshipsand how theyare structured.

17.Given the limitations f space, there re a numberof crucial questions I cannotdiscuss at any length, .g.,what inourprivate life s notmoral in ny sense?Where dowe draw the linebetweenpublic and privatemorality? In cases ofconflict, ow dowedeterminewhether public or private morality takes precedence? and so on. I aminclinedto think thatanswers to suchquestions can only indicatewhat istruefor the

most part;what, for xample, ismorally relevantinparticular situationsdepends toomuch upon the situations themselves.

18. For aWittgensteinian-based critique of the view that rationalityshould be

equated with rule-following behavior, see John McDowell's "Virtue and Reason,"TheMonist vol. 62. no. 3 (July 1979): 331-50.




19. Eth. Nie. 1.3. 1094b21; see 11-27. All further eferences oAristotle are alsofrom th.Nie. While Aristotle refers o themajor premiseof the 'practicalsyllogism'as a universal (katholou), this snot a universalas understood inmodern logicbut onewhich is flexible ratherthanfixed; forAristotle therecan be demonstrationswith

premiseswhichhold only"for themost part."On thisseemyMorality and theGood

Life: A Commentary on Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics" (Memphis:MemphisState UniversityPress, 1978),pp. 66?71. Also, J.Owens, "The Ethical Universal in

Aristotle," Studia Moralia (Rome) 3 (1965): pp. 27-47; and "TheGrounds ofEthical

Universality inAristotle,"Man and World vol. 2 no. 2 (1969): 171-93.20. 2. 7. 1107a30-31.

21. In the titleessay

inPublic and PrivateMorality,

StuartHampshire,

ed.

(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1978),ProfessorHampshire offers imilar

arguments against what he calls a "rational computational morality."22. 8. 1. 1155a26?27. It is only when people are led to believe thatmorality

consists of rules thatthey ome to think theway to create amoral relationship, .g.,marriage, is by legislatingeven thedaily division of responsibilities n a mutuallyagreed pre-nuptial ontract.Although marriage isa legalcontract,itsspiritresides ina moral relationship involving ove, trust, oyalty,andmutual respect.

23. It probably isunnecessary tomention that,although skillsand character areboth hexeis,Aristotle always is careful to insistthatmoral character is not just amatter of skills.

24. 2. 2. 1104a5?6. It is character in thissensewhich enables us togo beyond the

view thatmorality consists entirelyof rules and which givesmoral meaning to theexpression 'personalautonomy'; and italso is character in thissensewhich providesthesupportfor ustice inthepublic realm.The good citizen isa justperson, that is, a

personwho acts justlybecause he is that kind ofperson.He also knows that the lawsof justice cannot totallyset out everything e shoulddo to support nd promote thecommon welfare.

25. 4. 8. 1128a33.26. Professor Veatch has pointed out thatKant insistedwe should not admire

people for theirgood moral qualities; instead,"all respectfora person isproperlyonly respectforthe law... ofwhich thepersonprovidesan example" (Gr. 17/402; seealso Pr.R. 78). See HenryB. Veatch, "The Rational Justification fMoral Principles:Can There Be Such a Thing?", TheReview ofMetaphysics vol. 29 no. 2 (1975): 231.

27. Taylor, pp. 56-7; J. Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall, 1973),pp. 90-94.

28. Taylor, p. 57.

29. Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," TheJournal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 462. After I had worked out this criticism of

personhood, I came across essentiallythesame criticism nStocker's article,directed

against hedonisticegoismand utilitarianism.In thesetheories, tockerwrites, "One

person isno different rom,normore important, aluable, or special thanany other

personor evenanyotherthing. he individuals s suchare not important-What is

lacking inthese theories ... is theperson" (pp. 457, 459). Initially tseems odd thattheKantian theory s susceptibleto the same criticismas egoism and utilitarianism.The reason is thatall three ommit theerrorof extending formalistic heory bout

publicmorality to theprivate realm. In itsworst form,egoism also commits thefurther lunder ofadopting theworst possible theory fpublicmorality, tyranny. tcan be argued that letcher's situationalethics (whichadmits ofnoprinciples)and the




Golden Rule theory (which admits of only one) apply (inadequately, I believe)primarilyto theprivaterealmand that it samistake toextend themto thoseareas oflifewherewe do need impersonalrules.

30. See Taylor, p. 50. For other argumentsagainst theKantian delineation of

'person',seeS. F. Sapontzis, "A Critique ofPersonhood," Ethics 91 (1981): 607-18.31. Professor PatrickNowell-Smith directs thiscriticismnot just againstKant but

against a general tendency fboth classical and modernwriters to "oversimplify oadisastrous extent." See his "What isAuthority?",Philosophic Exchange 2 (1976):3?15, esp. p. 4.

32. Obviously there remany otherhistorical influences am neglectinghere.One

deserves specialmention, though?Machiavelli's The Prince. ProfessorHampshirehas noted thatno one else has argued so vividlyfor the thesis thatpublic policies affectsomany that it is "irresponsibleandmorally wrong to apply topolitical action themoral standards that re appropriate toprivate life nd topersonal relations" (Publicand Private Morality, p. 49). The natural reaction toMachiavelli was to placeattentionmainly on publicmorality.

33. If this section seems too speculative,we may need to remind ourselves thatKant clearly said that,withinthe limitations f reasondelineated inthefirst ritique,he wished only to setout and defend thatview ofmoralitywhichwas already incur

rency."Who would want to introduce newprincipleofmorality and, as itwere, beits inventer, s iftheworld had hithertobeen ignorantof what duty is or had been

thoroughlywrong about it?" (Pr.R. 5n). I had emphasized the importanceof the

dominantChristian view in thedevelopmentofKant's ethical theory n "The KantianCritique ofAristotle'sMoral Philosophy:An Appraisal" (TheReview ofMetaphysicsvol. 23, no. 1 (1974): 24-53; see esp. pp. 41-42, 50-53). The claim thatwe can onlyunderstandmodern ethical theoriesby examining theirhistorical antecedentscan befound inAlasdair Maclntyre's AfterVirtue (NotreDame: UniversityofNotre Dame

Press, 1981), and J. B. Schneewind's "The Divine Corporation and theHistory of

Ethics," read at The Chapel Hill Colloquium inPhilosophy, 1981; forthcoming.34. I am indebted here to Donald Livingston's forthcomingbook, Humes

Philosophy of Common Life.35. ProfessorRawls now seems to sense theTightness f at least some of theclaims

I have beenmaking, for ina draft he recentlyread he said thatjustice as fairness s

only a political conception and not a comprehensivemoral conception framed to

combine intoone scheme the fullrangeofmoral notions (from"The Right and theGood in theConception of Social Union," read at The Chapel Hill Colloquium in

Philosophy, 1981). Ifmy analysis is in themain correct,it isunclear how an adequatenotion of privatemorality can be developedwithin a Kantian framework,nor howsuch a notion can be incorporatedintoa singlecomprehensiveKantian scheme.

36. 1.3. 1094b23-5. In this aper I have been concernedmainlywith the laim that

morality is identicalwith publicmorality. How Aristotle delineates the complexrelationshipsbetween private and publicmorality, between practical wisdom and

politicalwisdom,must remainthesubjectof anotherpaper, and thebrief referenceshavemade to his analysis obviously requirea good deal of fleshing ut. Even whenthat has been done, it is still n open questionhowmuch of his analysis isacceptable

today.

Kant and Practical Reason

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