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The Regime-Model of Fascism: A Typology

Introduction

I n recent years there has been a revival of interest in the nature ofgenericfascism. T his renewed search for a paradigmatic modelof fascism originated as a reaction to the trend of overstating

specificity, of studying fascist phenomena in the longue dureandof using their individual differences to underscore the futility ofgrand theories of fascism. A large part of the blame for the dis-crediting of comparative approaches is borne by the erratic andoften mystifying sample of the studies themselves. Lack of clarityabout the nature and content of fascism resulted in a number ofcomparative studies, whose insufficiently justified sample of casestudies left the concept of fascism in disarray. T he totalitarian

approach focused on the political features of fascism as regime(i.e. I taly and Germany), but then subjected it to a broaderdefinition which dovetailed with aspects of such a disparatesocio-political phenomenon as communism.1 N oltesT hree Facesof F ascismprovided an insightful account of the ideologicalsimilarities between the I talian and German regimes, only toobfuscate his paradigm by including A ction F ranaisein hisanalysis.2 The ideological affinities notwithstanding, the weak-nesses of his generic definition are obvious. I f fascism is a broad

ideologicalphenomenon, then why are other case-studies ex-cluded (A ustria, Britain, etc.)? I f, on the other hand, fascism isboth ideology and action, movement and regime, then why isA ction F ranaisecomparable to the I talian and German regimes?Even the recent account by Roger Eatwell has focused on acurious combination of two major interwar regimes (I taly,Germany) and a plethora of disparate movements (most of whichachieved limited, short-lived appeal and none of which ever

A ristot le A . Kal l is

E uropean H istory Quart erlyCopyright 2000 SA GE Publications, L ondon, Thousand

Oaks, CA and N ew Delhi, Vol. 30(1), 77104.

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reached power) from two further western European countries(Britain, F rance). Similarly, the all-inclusive studies of the 1960sand 1970s offered insight into numerous intricate aspects offascism, but at the same time undermined its generic value

through an excessive broadening of the sample.3

The two most elaborate recent works on generic fascism, byRoger Griffin and Stanley G. Payne,4 have rectified to a largeextent the inadequacies of previous comparative interpretationsthrough a significantly more elaborate theoretical paradigm offascism and a notably wider pool of case-studies. I n spite of theirindividual methodological differences, both works rest on thepresupposition that the two dimensionsof fascism (vertical:

fascism within long-term national history; horizontal: fascism asan epochal phenomenon of interwar Europe), rather than beingantithetical, may jointly promote a deeper and more elaborateunderstanding of the nature of fascism. H owever, the puzzlingepochal appeal of fascism, the mushrooming of movements/parties sponsoring an original or mimetic fascist ideology, andthe unprecedented success of some of them in reaching powerhave to be carefully analysed and accounted for.5 Recently,Robert O. Paxton has stressed the value of studying thedynamicsof fascisms evolution in time: from its ideological origins to theacquisition and exercise of power. H is critique of the staticcharacter of generic theories of fascism focuses on the funda-mental difference between a regime where fascism exercisespower (referring particularly to I taly and Germany as the mostdeveloped expressions of fascism) and a sect of dissident intel-lectuals (a number of fascist groups and movements which eitherfailed to gain power or were neutralized by the political establish-

ment).6 I n this sense, a distinction between fascist movementandfascist regimeis not a question of semantics but a necessityinduced by the entirely different reasons behind the occurrenceof each of the two forms of fascism. I n terms of its ideologicalcrystallization, fascism may be seen as an exceptional variant ofhyper-nationalism a hyper-nationalism-plus phenomenonwhich activated, revived or recast a set of extreme prescriptionsfrom the reservoir of each countrys radical nationalist aspira-

tions and imagery.

7

I n its epochal, horizontal dimension fascismwas also motivated by a short-term, violent response to specifichistoric challenges resentment from frustrated nationalistaspirations after the F irst World War, fear of socialist mobiliza-

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tion after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, social insecurity, politi-cal crisis, etc.

H owever, for those cases where a regime with at least onefascist component was established, the above minimum defini-

tion is inadequate. T he nature of a regime is defined by a plethoraof additional factors how it was installed, who supported it, inwhich political direction it evolved, how competing notions offuture action were negotiated and formulated into official policy,to what extent intentions were facilitated or impeded by exoge-nous elements. I t is a truism that no fascist regime in Europewas established as a result of majority popular choice. I t is also afact that no such regime was instituted in total opposition to the

existing ruling political, economic and social elites. In all cases,and at least initially, fascist leaderships either headed coalitioncabinets or drew their legitimacy from the support of establishedinstitutions (H ead of State, church, armed forces, establishedpolitical parties).8 Everywhere the fascist solution was endorsedby such powerful individuals, groups and institutions in order tostrengthen the popular appeal of the existing state. T his wasintended to be a single remedy for two acute needs to safe-guard the state against socialist subversion and to use the prin-ciple of fascist charismatic leadership as an antidote to the crisisof the liberal-parliamentary system for ensuring strong, stablegovernment. Because of all these factors and considerations, therationale behind installing fascist regimes reflected more theelites longing for a new type of authoritarian system rather thantheir endorsement of fascist ideology or even less a desire tosee the latters radical prescriptions translated into action.

Therefore, assessing the fascist credentials of a regime involves

much more than just ascertaining the fascist character of theleaders ideological beliefs and visions. T his article argues thatthe regime-model of fascism developed in the framework of eliteexperimentation with new forms of the populi st authori tar ian,anti-socialistmodel, based on a pro-system logic of strengtheningthe existing political and social domestic structures. Whatdistinguished the regime-model of fascism from conventionalauthoritarian systems was the ability of the fascist component to

assert its political supremacy over conservative expectations, todevelop its own radical momentum and to embark on the realiza-tion of its particular ideological objectives. Such ability dependedon four factors the ideologyof the fascist component; its

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domesti c consoli dati on; the objectives behind policy-making; andthe scopeof its regenerating ambitions. These criteria are appliedto eight case-studies (I taly, Germany, Spain, Portugal, G reece,A ustria, H ungary, R omania) in order to assess to what extent

and for what reasons each of these regimes departed from theconventional authoritarian model.

The Regime-Model of Fascism: Criteria

Ideology

A s with any general theory of fascism, the problem of which

case-studies to include in the analysis of the regime-model offascism has generated wide controversy. A part from the twomost obvious and generally indisputable candidates (G ermanyand I taly), there is a plethora of regimes which Roger G riffin hasaccurately described as para-fascist, in the sense that theycomprised specific fascist elements and groups with strands ofconservatism, authoritarianism and indigenous nationalism.9 I nmany cases (Spain, A ustria, Romania, Hungary) the fascist com-ponent manifested itself in a variety of different forms, ideologiesand organizations with competing programmes and aspirations.I n some cases (A ustria, Romania, H ungary) a para-fascistregime was established in opposition to other, more extremefascist movements/parties or at least showed active distrust oftheir eventual motives. F inally, during the Second World War,fascist-style puppet regimes were introduced in a number ofEuropean countries, either as the direct result of occupation bythe A xis forces (F rance, H ungary in 1944, Croatia) or in order to

offset such a development (Y ugoslavia before the N azi invasion,Romania). The methodological postulate of this article is toexclude this last category of fascist-like regimes from its sample,as the logic behind their establishment was primarily conditionedby security considerations and not by elite-driven experimentswith new forms of executive power. I nstead, all other cases ofregimes supported by at least one movement/ party of fascistcharacter will be considered.

The first crucial factor in shaping the regimes outlook isideology. T wo criteria are relevant in this respect: whether theideology of the political pillars of the regime was radicalor con-servative; and, in cases where the regime represented a coalition



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of disparate socio-political forces, which of the two elements wasmore dominant in the overall world-view of the regime. H erethe cases of I taly and Germany are straightforward. N umerousstudies on the two movements have ascertained their radical idio-

syncratic ideological credentials.10 A lso, although M ussolini andH itler came to power as heads of coalition governments, com-manding the support of wide conservative and liberal groups,they succeeded in ridding themselves of this pattern of co-habitation and in gradually establishing a monocratic type ofregime where the fascist component dominated the ideologicalphysiognomy of government. I n all other cases the regimes dis-played a combination of conservative and fascist elements in

constant interaction and sometimes conflict for the crystalliza-tion of the regimes ideological character. I n Portugal the Salazarregime evolved in continuity with the Carmona military dictator-ship, which had abolished the proto-liberal/ parliamentary systemin 1926. T his continuity ensured support from conservativestrata in the Portuguese society and remained unchallenged asthe official political agenda of the regime. A lthough Salazarintroduced radical social reforms in some areas (the EstadoN ovo/ N ew State) and emulated fascist organizational elements(militia, secret police, etc.), the rai son dtreof the regime was thepreservation of conservative and Catholic values, as well as thedefence of the existing system against radical alternative con-ceptions of domestic organizations.11 One of these rival alterna-tives was the N ational Syndicalist movement, headed by Pretoand established in 1932. The organization, sponsoring a moreextreme blend of corporatism, anti-socialism and integral nation-alism, became disaffected with Salazars timid agenda and staged

an unsuccessful bid for power in 1934. Pretos coup was followedby violent suppression of the movement from which the N ationalSyndicalists never actually recovered.12 A lthough in subsequentyears Salazar accentuated his commitment to a mimetic fascistmodel of domestic organization, this remained confined to thearticulation of form and style rather than extending into thesphere of political substance. H is regime remained an essentiallypro-system pattern of conservative-authoritarian government

whose fascist elements of style were duly shed in the 1940s.The case of Spain is similar with regard to the syncretic (i.e.not purely fascist) basis of the regimes support but different inits balance of power between traditionalism and radicalism. T he



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hybrid fascist organization of J ON S (J untas de OfensivaN acional Sindicalista), founded in 1931 and merged with theF alange in 1934 to form the F alange Espaola de las J ON S,blended revolutionary integral nationalism and aggressive anti-

socialism with a traditionalist commitment to militarist andCatholic values.13 I n contrast to the fate of P retos N ationalSyndicalists, the organization headed by J os A ntonio Primode R ivera, son of the erstwhile Spanish dictator M iguel Primo deR ivera sided with the N ationalist forces in 1936 and was laterabsorbed and diffused into the F rancoist regime (under theumbrella organization Falange Espaola Tradicionalista y de las

J ON S, established in A pril 1937), whose ideological outlook

remained deeply imbued with conservative social views, Carlistsympathies and strong Catholic values. T hose initial leadersof the J ON S who were opposed to the traditionalist spirit ofF rancos dictatorship were either politically marginalized orarrested and placed under confinement; others gradually chosethe path of political demobilization.14

I n G reece the M etaxas regime (established in 1936) demon-strated a similar symbiosis of fascist organizational style and con-servative world-view. A lbeit emulating formal patterns of I talianF ascism (youth organization, neo-classicism, palingenetic/ nos-talgic hyper-nationalism), the M etaxas regime was co-opted bythe king and the pro-monarchical bourgeois right in the frame-work of a system-preserving function.15The political agenda ofthe regime was dominated by the long-term aspirations and dis-positions of the monarchical right-wing political elite, of whichGeneral M etaxas had long been a distinguished (though notinfluential) member.16This type of conscious co-opting may also

be seen in Romania. The I ron Guard, established in 1934 byCorneliu Codreanu as the paramilitary wing of his L egion of theA rchangel M ichael (founded in 1927), and after its foundersassassination in 1938 headed by H oria Sima, demonstrated apeculiar mix of ultra-nationalism, antisemitism, Orthodox mysti-cism and mimetic fascist organizational features (youth and para-military organizations, street violence).17 I t was wooed into theruling authoritarian coalition both by K ing Carol in 1940 and by

the A ntonescu regime later in the same year, creating the short-lived N ational L egionary State (named after the L egionaries, asthe members of the I ron G uard were known). H owever, unlike inG reece and Spain, the co-habitation between the conservative-



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authoritarian and the quasi-fascist component neither was con-tinual nor originated from a long-term strategy of co-opting theI ron G uard. H ence, a pattern of inconsistent, opportunistic co-opting emerged, whereby the fascist element would be exploited

at crucial moments to strengthen the legitimacy of the authori-tarian state but would be violently suppressed when it attemptedto increase its influence on the ideology of the regime. Thishappened in early 1941, when A ntonescu, in agreement withH itler, disbanded the I ron Guard and substituted the L egionaryState with his N ational and Social State.18

The co-habitation of fascist and reactionary forces was signifi-cantly more complex in H ungary and in A ustria. I n spite of the

co-opting of G mbs N ational Socialists by A dmiral H orthysconservative regime between 1932 and 1936, the physiognomyof the regime remained essentially traditionalist in ideology.19

This was also manifested in the antagonistic relation betweenother, more revolutionary anti-system groups BszrmenysScythe Cross and Szlasis A rrow C ross. T he former reacted tothe socially conservative agenda of the regime by staging anunsuccessful coup in 1936 which was violently suppressed bythe authorities. T he latter was significantly more influential andradical in its emulation of the N ational Socialist ideologicalmodel, posing a potent alternative to H orthys conservativeregime. T his explains why it was consistently persecuted until1944, when the occupation of H ungary by the Nazi forces pavedthe way to the seizure of power by Szlasi and the establishmentof a puppet regime under the political tutelage of Germany.20

A ustria followed a similar trajectory of antagonistic pluralismof quasi-fascist organizations. The H eimwehr, a paramilitary

hyper-nationalist organization consisting of ex-war veterans ofthe N ational Guard, emerged as a combination of mimetic Pan-German, fascist-corporatist and Christian ideological strandsin 1927 under the leadership of Starhemberg. I n spite of theirpledge to overthrow the liberal system of government and topursue union with Germany, the H eimwehr leadership remainedessentially pliable towards the conservative political establish-ment and displayed a disinclination to sponsor the aggressive bid

for power staged by its Styrian branch in 1931.

21

This pro-systemattitude enabled the D ollfuss conservative-authoritarian regimeto co-opt Starhemberg in 1933. The neutralization of theH eimwehr was completed under Schuschnigg, who succeeded



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the assassinated Dollfuss after the J uly 1934 N azi putsch, whenthe regime disbanded the movement and absorbed its member-ship into a state-sponsored paramilitary organization (F ront-M iliz) in 1936.22 H owever, A ustrian fascism had another, more

uncompromisingly anti-system face, the DN SA P/ N SDA P(A ustrian N ational Socialists). L inked to the development of theN ational Socialist movement in 1918, the A ustrian brand main-tained its closed links with its Bavarian sister-organization afterthe rejection of a GermanA ustrian union by the victors of theF irst World W ar. I t also became the main repository of supportby disaffected nationalists, including radical H eimwehren, andgrew considerably in the 192838 decade. I n spite of its spec-

tacularly unsuccessful bid for power in J uly 1934 and thesubsequent outlawing of the organization, it fought back andco-engineered with Berlin the 1938 A nschluss.23 I t is thereforeevident that the A ustrian conservative establishment co-optedthe more traditionalist variant of diluted fascism (H eimwehr)but remained essentially impervious both to internal models ofrevolutionary fascism (N ational Socialists) and to externalpressures (especially by M ussolini in 19336) for transformingthe authoritarian regime into a mimetic quasi-fascist system.24

Consolidation

The second criterion for assessing the character of the regime-model of fascism is domestic political consolidation. Thispertains to control over the official state apparatus, over thedecision-making process and over other surviving (if any)antagonistic institutional poles of power within the system. I n

order to assess the degree of fascist consolidation in a regime,three further aspects should be appraised: the typeof fascistconsolidation (whether it was co-operative or antagonistic toexisting institutions); its degree(limited/ diffused or dynamic/ all-embracing); and finally its pace(fast track or slow). A gain, N aziGermany offers the most extreme example of fascist domesticconsolidation. A part from a short period of political co-habitation with surviving party organizations and President

H indenburg (until 1934), the N azi leadership employed adynamic, antagonistic and extremely fast strategy for solidifyingits power. This process officially ended in 1938 with the removalof the last conservative functionaries in the government (the



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Economics minister, Schacht, in late 1937, the F oreign M inister,N eurath, in 1938, and the armed forces leadership Blomberg,F ritsch and Beck by the summer of 1938.)25 H owever, H itlersability to rid himself of such powerful figures of the conservative

establishment in such an effortless manner alludes to a highlysuccessful prior strategy of establishing an effective monopoly ofcontrol over decision-making that had been initiated immediatelyafter the seizure of power. The fact that this type of consolidationwas intended to be entirely antithetical to the existing statestructure invested the N azi regime with a sense of extremeantagonistic dynamism and facilitated a swift transition to amonocratic (though not monolithic) fascist regime-model.26

F ascist I taly departs from this model of consolidation in twoways. F irst, the establishment of the Fascist regime after thedeclaration of dictatorship in J anuary 1925 did involve thegradual marginalization of traditional elite groups but did notremove a pattern of institutional co-habitation with the H ead ofState, K ing V ictor Emmanuel I I I . This constitutional anomaly,whereby M ussolinis position as Prime M inister depended on theCrowns support or tacit approval, was maintained throughoutthe life span of the regime and became the mechanism for theremoval of the D uce in J uly 1943.27 A t the same time, the F ascistregime was forced to deal with another powerful traditionalrepository of public loyalty, the Catholic Church. The 1929Concordat with the Vatican produced a modus vivendiwhich,albeit antagonistic and fraught with disputes, constituted a defactolimitation to the regimes monocratic ambitions.28 I n thisrespect, the consolidation of fascism in I taly was dynamic butoscillating between co-opting and antagonism. T he latter

tendency was accentuated after 1935 from that point onwardsthe F ascist leadership accelerated the pace of consolidation andembarked on a course of increasing marginalization of alter-native centres of power and neutralization of opposition by thesurviving traditional institutions of the state.29

I n all other case-studies of regime-models the pattern of con-solidation pursued was either not entirely dynamic, not overtlyantagonistic, or both. I n Spain, as we saw, the F rancoist regime

diffused the influence of the real fascist element (the F alange)on the political physiognomy of the ruling bloc and chose anessentially co-operative strategy in its dealings with traditionalgroups and institutions (M onarchy, Church, big landowners).



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This should not, of course, detract from the dynamic character ofthe consolidation of the F rancoist regime per se a fact attestedto by the longevity of the system, the effective neutralization ofits opposition and the long-term transformation of organizational

structures of the Spanish state.30 A similar situation characterizedthe case of Portugal. H ere, in spite of the effective removal of thetrue fascist component (Pretos National Syndicalists) from theruling bloc, the Salazar regime survived the 1945 watershed,removed any credible political alternative and effected lastingmodifications through the introduction of the Estado Novo.31

H owever, the nature of fascist consolidation was significantlymore precarious or complex in the rest of the case-studies. I n

G reece, the collusion of M etaxas with K ing George I I and thetraditionalist right ensured a co-operative pattern of consolida-tion which appeared dynamic in its formal aspects (style, dis-course, organization of society) but the fascist componentremained essentially superficial and entrenched within the frame-work of a conservative authoritarian regime, depending on thesupport of the M onarchy.32 I n H ungary and Austria thereappears to be a correlation between the ideological predispositionof the fascist organizations and their participation or not in theregime-model. G mbs diluted, conservative variant of fascismand the H eimwehren corporatisttraditionalist mlange wereaccommodated in the ruling bloc, while Szlasis more radicalA rrow Cross and the A ustrian N ational Socialists (both essenti-ally anti-system radical forces) were ostracized and suppressed tovarying degrees. H owever, there also seems to be a connectionbetween ideology and type of consolidation of those fascist com-ponents that eventually reached power. The traditionalistic

nature of the two former movements ideology facilitated theirco-opting but also enabled their dilution in a limited co-operativepattern of consolidation which left the essential conservativeauthoritarian features of the state largely unchallenged. I nRomania, on the other hand, co-opting the I ron Guard into theconservative-militarist ruling bloc was bracketed by systematicpersecution and repression, thus resulting in a limited andephemeral pattern of fascist consolidation within the framework

of a predominantly authoritarian regime. I n fact, whenever theI ron G uard instigated activities aimed towards an antagonistic,more widespread version of fascist consolidation in the regime-model, conservative elites minimized the potential disruption



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through violent ostracizing strategies (as happened in 1940 and1941).33

L eadership is another pivotal element of the physiognomy ofa political regime. Leaders have a strong influence upon the

process of policy-making, both because of their personal ideolog-ical beliefs about what is socially desirable and because of theirde factorole as co-ordinators of the executive function of thestate. In fascist movements leadership was probably the strongestelement of cohesion and incarnation of fascist values. A lthoughinitially performing a token role ofprimus inter pares, the fascistleadership soon rose to a level of symbolic pre-eminence, as anideological and political elite in charge of leading the movement

to power and orchestrating the process of domestic regenera-tion.34 With regard to the regime-model of fascism, an importantdistinction has to be made between those cases where a fascistleader became head of the government (I taly, Germany,G reece), those regimes embracing the fascist component butheaded by conservative figures (Spain) and those regimes co-opting a less radical fascist component while ostracizing the moreextreme variant (A ustria, Portugal, H ungary). A gain, the per-sonal ideological beliefs of a leader determined his vision ofdesirable political action. H owever, the actual political marginsfor policy-making were conditional upon two additional factors popular legitim acyand att it ude towards the other components/pi l larsof the regime-model.

I n I taly, G ermany and Greece, as already mentioned, thefascist leaders (M ussolini, H itler, M etaxas) were co-opted by theconservative establishment to head the new executive constella-tion and gradually asserted their individual role in the process of

policy-making. H owever, the I talian and German leadershipspossessed two additional advantages which M etaxas could not,and did not, entertain. F irst, both M ussolini and H itler couldboast a high level of popular legitimacy, either as leaders of widesocial movements (PN F , N SD A P) or as charismatic figuresrepresenting the acceptable face of fascism.35 M etaxas, on theother hand, was in a significantly weaker position, lackingany discernible charisma, essentially isolated from any base of

popular support and deprived of any influence on traditionalinstitutions of the state (for example, the armed forces). While allthree leaders were co-opted by the conservative establishment inorder to perform a system-maintaining and stabilizing function,



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M ussolini and H itler championed far more radical ideologies ofpolitical/ social change than M etaxas essentially half-heartedcommitment to radical reform. They could also use their carefullychoreographed charismatic appeal to legitimize their antagonistic

consolidation against the wishes of their initial conservative spon-sors something that M etaxas never contemplated due to hislimited personal appeal. I n this sense, the Greek variant of fascistregime remained entrenched in its initial function as stabilizer ofthe existing system and continued to rely on the political sponsor-ship by the conservative, pro-monarchical establishment.36

I n Spain the leadership of G eneral F ranco drew its legitimacyfrom the successful conclusion of the civil war against the

Republican forces. A lthough, as we saw earlier, the Falange wasabsorbed in the ruling bloc, F rancos personal prestige after 1936did not allow significant margins for alternative, more radicalleadership patterns. H is co-operative attitude towards conserva-tive institutions and social groups ensured that his position assystem-stabilizer would be effectively entrenched and the moreradical prescriptions of other participating forces (especiallyof the F alange) would be diluted and neutralized by the regime.37

I n Portugal, the lack of charisma in the moderate leadership(Salazar) was compensated by its sense of continuity with pre-vious arrangements (the Carmona dictatorship) and its promiseof domestic stability in the face of destabilizing plots by both theleft and other, more radical fascist components (N ationalSyndicalists). A similar notion of continuity legitimized thechoice of A ntonescu in Romania (a choice of the monarchicalestablishment for the stabilization of the system), again in spite ofthe clear lack of popular legitimacy of personal charisma.38 By

contrast, the regimes in A ustria and Hungary, both co-operativein their consolidation and selective in their co-opting of certainmoderate fascist components at the expense of more radicalorganizations, were effectively reduced to an increasingly diffi-cult task of defending the system and balancing the conflictingsocial claims for change. I n A ustria, D ollfuss and especiallySchuschnigg suffered both from a distinct lack of popular appealand from the popularity of the excluded anti-system variant

of N ational Socialism. I n H ungary, the H orthy regime wasforced to deal with the increasing social support for Szlasisradical A rrow Cross after 1935. A lthough the movement wascarefully marginalized (and at some points ruthlessly sup-



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pressed), H orthys regime survived until the occupation of thecountry in 1944 (which brought Szlasi to power) by performinga limited system-maintaining function without any departuresfrom the long-term expectations of the H ungarian conservative

establishment.39

I t seems that there is a correlation here between the position ofthe fascist component in the leadership structure of the regime-model, the personal legitimacy of the leader and the policy-making character of the regime itself. I n cases where the fascistgroup became the dominant component in an antagonistic modelof consolidation (I taly, G ermany), radical change was pursued tovarying degrees. By contrast, co-opting moderate fascist groups

in the framework of co-operative, stabilizing arrangements didnot result in the pursuit of a radical, anti-system political agenda(M etaxas in Greece, G mbs in H ungary). F inally, in thosecases where the fascist component was diluted in an otherwiseconservative constellation of power and under the leadership of amoderate figure, the ensuing regime-model was either unstable(A ustria, H ungary) or modest in its political aspirations, per-forming a limited stabilizing function.

Policy-Making

A third crucial factor shaping the profile of a regime is the natureand long-term framework of its policy-making. The ideologicalworldview of the leadership determines what is perceived as bothsocially desirable and politically feasible for future action.H owever, the ability of the leaders to translate thought and ambi-tions into action is an extremely intricate process that is only

partly defined by pure ideological intentions. Obviously, there isa correlation between the degree and type of fascist consolida-tion, on the one hand, and the ability of fascist ideology to per-meate and shape the official state policy-making, on the other. I ninstances of limited-diluted and/ or co-operative consolidation, aswell as of inconsistent co-opting of the fascist component into theruling bloc, the latters ability to pursue its more radical ideologi-cal prescriptions was greatly limited by the co-habitation with

more conservative components. H aving said that, even in casesof (near-)monocratic or all-embracing fascist consolidation, thelimits of what was politically feasible were in the end defined byexternal factors which remained largely impervious to fascist



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intentions the cohesion of the traditional elite groups, the eco-nomic and military capacity of the system, international randomevents and stimuli.

U nsurprisingly, the N azi regime displays an extremely favour-

able combination of all the above elements radical ideology,strong consolidation, high potential capacity of the domesticsystem to meet the material demands of N azi ambitions, andauspicious random events. N otwithstanding a fairly conventionalpolitical profile until 1934, N azi policy-making soon unfolded itsradical agenda and displayed a determination to implement eventhe most radical traits of its long-term vision, including the elimi-nation of inferior races and a new territorial order in Europe.

With regard to both these policies, external factors and resourcesmade a substantial contribution to their implementation. A highlyeffective bureaucratic machinery supervised the allocation ofresources for the speedy elimination of J ews and other ethnic/social groups, while the impressive performance and capacityof the German economy facilitated the approximation of theextortionate demands of rearmament for territorial expansion.40

I n a similar vein, the I talian F ascist regime offers anotherexample of an ideologically radical fascist party achieving a highdegree of control over policy-making, albeit with some institu-tional limitations that formally forestalled the establishment of amonocratic regime-model. I n spite, however, of such limitingfactors and the much more protracted period of domesticconsolidation, the F ascist regime displayed both a commitmentto a more radical style of politics and an increasing ability toradicalize its political agenda. I nternational factors (the rise ofN azism, the instability of the European system, the appeasement

by western powers) facilitated or did not effectively impedethe pursuit of those radical prescriptions of fascist ideology(expansion, militarization of society). The I talian regime, incommon with the N azi regime-model, demonstrated an intenselyradical perception of what was socially desirable and very widemargins for what they regarded as politically feasible. H owever,the I talian case diverges from its German equivalent in thatthe limited effectiveness of the states co-ordinating functions

and the resistance of the indigenous society to the militarizing/regenerating fascist schemes (the uomo fascistaand the cittadinosoldato) circumscribed the freedom of the fascist leadership to setand effectively pursue its radical agenda.41



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I n the rest of the case-studies examined here, the framework ofpolicy-making may be characterized as essentially conventionalin its long-term objectives. This was the result of a combinationof factors explored already diluted radicalism in the ideology

of the participating fascist movements in the regime, exclusion ofthe more radical fascist variants from power, limited and/ orco-operative types of consolidation, and finally inauspiciousexternal influences. While all these regimes aped organizationaland stylistic aspects of either the I talian Fascist archetype or theN azi extreme variant,42 their co-opting of fascist new politicsstayed clear of a commitment to the revolutionary, anti-systempotential prescriptions of fascist ideology. Even in those cases

where the leadership of a regime acknowledged the allegeddecadence of the existing system and called for radical reformand regenerating action, the overall framework of policy-makingwas largely borrowed from the conservative-authoritarianregime-model and was dominated by the long-term aspirationsof its traditional social pillars. A ll these regimes combined amimetic reproduction of certain fascist formal aspects (militia,youth organizations, mass politics, secret police) with traditionalauthoritarian aspects (anti-socialism, censorship, nationalismand trans-class discourse).43Y et, the co-operative and/ or limitedtype of fascist consolidation in all these cases required the pres-ervation and defence of comprehensive continuity with paststructures and policy priorities or necessitated the consent oftraditional forces for any changes in the political direction of theregime. T he example of the violent repression of the I ron G uardin early 1941 by A ntonescu demonstrates the limiting influenceof co-ordinated conservative opposition to the revolutionary

designs of radical fascist movements.

Scope of change

The fourth and final criterion defining the physiognomy of theregime-model of fascism is the scope and long-term aspirationsof its policy-making. As extreme and idiosyncratic variants of thehyper-nationalist tradition and imagery, all fascist regimes

embarked upon the realization of their version of domestic re-generation and trans-class nationalism, thus acting as a bulwarkto the expansive spirit of internationalist socialism. H owever,some fascist movements projected their ideological commitment



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to social rebirth outwards, to wider regions, to Europe and poten-tially to the world as a whole. This was intended to constitute arival utopia to socialism, a form of counterbalancing the lattersappeal as the conquering creed of the twentieth century. F ascism

founded its universalist ambitions on the basis of its self-perception as ethical, cultural and political elite in a socialD arwinist perception of history as a struggle of cultural entitiesfor the predominance of the fittest.44This version of expansivefascism was underpinned by a sense of historic responsibility anda crusading spir itof spreading this new conception of life toterritories and political units beyond the realm of its nation.A gain, of course, it has to be noted that an ideologicalcommit-

ment to this type of crusade did not necessarily translate intoexpansive actionby the regime-model of fascism; external factors such as those analysed earlier played a crucial role inencouraging, frustrating or thwarting such ideological ambitions.

I n this framework of analysis, the N azi regime remains theindisputably most extreme, effective and destructive form ofcrusading fascism. Domestic regeneration was the first crucialstep towards the restoration of the German Volks greatness.

Territorial expansion along historic irredentist lines i.e. overthose lands that had historically formed the German L ebensraumin its most extensive version constituted the second stage ofallegedly ensuring the welfare of the German people. H owever,the N azi biological perception of human society as a constantstruggle of the healthy elements against alien or otherwisedetrimental components remained an essentially universalist,non-state-specific ethical task. I n its campaign to eradicatesuchharmful elements (seen as the only guarantee of social and

cultural regeneration for the white race45) the N azi genocidalmachine did not limit its annihilationist designs to the extendedterritory of the German Reich but attempted to implement a rigidnotion of race hierarchy in all conquered territories in Europeand, after the launch of Operation Barbarossa, in the SovietU nion. F or the N azi regime, the vision of new order was notsimply about domination and political control; it also entailed theexport and imposition of an extremely unbending experiment in

radical social reconstitution with unprecedented destructiveimplications.46

The I talian F ascist regime eventually rallied to the cause of afascist crusade but followed a different trajectory and maintained



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a distinct version of what universal fascism would mean. I n theearly years of the fascist regime-model M ussolini had empha-sized the domestic, purely I talian character of the fascist experi-ment a quality that rendered it unsuitable for other countries.

Y et, by the end of the 1920s he had made a spectacular politicalU -turn by declaring fascism an export product. The publicationof the Doctri ne of F ascismin 1932 provided a systematization ofthis universalist notion: fascism, like liberalism in the eighteenthcentury and socialism in the nineteenth, was the only true univer-sal doctrine of the twentieth century.47 I nitially, this commitmentto international fascism was expressed in terms of a voluntaryassociation of all kin regimes and movements in the framework

of a F ascist I nternational (the 1934 abortive Conference inM ontreux). H owever, the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War inthe summer of 1936 provided the first appropriate battlegroundfor the ideological struggle between fascism and communism forthe domination of E urope.48 I n the remaining years until the N aziinvasion of Poland in September 1939 fascist I taly displayed anincreasing commitment to the aggressive agenda of the A xisalliance and a gradually radicalizing perception of the regimeslong-term goals. H owever, in contrast to N azism, the I talianF ascist regime remained primarily committed to its specifichistoric irredentist agenda of reconstituting the third RomanEmpire in the M editerranean.49 I ts crusading spirit was moretraditionalist in its rationale, less extended in its scope and evenless rigid in its social implications for the societies of theconquered states. The genocidal campaigns in L ibya during192832 and the establishment of a quasi-apartheid regime inEthiopia after 1936 reflected a fairly conventional prejudice

against alien races, prompted by either security considerations(in L ibya) or an attempt to emulate previous colonial practices ofdomination (in Ethiopia). There is very little evidence to suggesta rigid perception of race hierarchy for Europe similar to theN azi notion of race super-state an assumption that is furthervalidated by the half-hearted, inconsistent and limited imple-mentation of the antisemitic laws after 1938. F urthermore, thecrusading aspirations of the fascist regime-model were further

thwarted by the limited economic/ military capacity of the I taliansystem. Participation in the war was delayed until J une 1940 dueto logistical problems of preparation, it remained initially limiteddue to scarcity of resources and, when it acquired a more exten-



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sive character in the autumn of 1940 (in the Balkans and A frica),it was undermined in its effectiveness by similar material andorganizational problems, resulting in a spectacular and swiftdefeat in all fronts by early 1941. Even after the rescue of the

I talian war by the N azi forces, the I talian administration of theconquered areas showed little inclination to emulate the radicalsocial programme of the N azi authorities in German-occupiedareas.50

The other fascist regimes did not manifest crusading tenden-cies in their policy-making. I n those cases where an ideologicalcommitment to some form of expansion beyond the nationalterritory existed, such policies were either never implemented or

resulted from a conventional expansionist spirit of accumulatingirredentawithout rigid attempts to instil a new framework forsocial organization. F rancoist Spain was a traditional nationalistregime, more intent on establishing and perpetuating domesticsocial stability than extending the national territory. I n spite ofits alleged political affinity to the F ascist and N azi regimes,F rancos government stubbornly resisted the attempts of the twoA xis leaders during 19401 to lure Spain into the war in returnfor substantial territorial compensations. A part from his limitedinterest in the crusading aspects of international fascism, Francowas also aware of the extremely limited capacity of the Spanisheconomy and his armed forces to unleash and sustain an inter-national war after a recent long period of infighting for the con-trol of the country itself. T hese two factors explain his obstinateneutrality throughout the Second World War, as well as theinward-looking character of his regime.51The M etaxas regimein G reece demonstrated a similar emphasis on domestic re-

organization and an even more conspicuous self-restraint withregard to its potential expansionist designs. I n terms of its ideo-logical profile, the regimes motto of a third H ellenic civiliza-tion emulated the palingenetic discourse of the third Rome putforward by the fascist regime in I taly. Both countries nationalisttraditions shared a similar nostalgia for past imperial glories andan emotional imagery of regeneration for future ascendancy.H owever, the policy-making framework of the M etaxas regime

remained essentially system-preserving, tied both to the Britishforeign policy of avoiding war and to the political efforts of theso-called Balkan Entente to achieve enduring peace in theregion.52 N otwithstanding the traditional irredentist ambitions of



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Greek foreign policy in the north (northern Epirus in A lbania,Cyprus, the Dodecanese, and areas on the western coast of

Turkey), M etaxas remained intent on avoiding any disturbancein the region. A further restraining factor was the awareness of

the structural and material shortcomings of the G reek system.The experience from the disastrous campaign against Turkey in19202 had exposed the limited capacity of the Greek war-machine and had resulted in a subsequent moderation of thepolitical aims of G reek foreign policy (the abandonment of theG reat I dea for a Greater G reece).53 I n the 1930s, both beforeand during the M etaxas period, G reece as a pro-system state was more interested in fostering the existing status quo and

defending it against growing I talian aggression (especially afterthe invasion of A lbania in A pril 1939) rather than in unilaterallyrevising it.

Of the other case-studies discussed here, A ustria offers aninteresting variant of the inward-looking, system-defending typeof regime. A lthough Austrian nationalism comprised a distinc-tive anti-socialist and socially regenerative discourse, it remainedconspicuously devoid of any clear expansive aspirations ordesigns. A ustrian nationalism itself lacked a definitive ideologi-cal direction and long-term vision. The creation of the A ustrianstate itself was the result of the dissolution of the H absburgempire and the rejection of the claim for union with Germany bythe victorious powers. I n this sense, A ustrian nationalismoscillated between three visibly different political rationales.

There was the extreme Gesamtdeutschlandvision, sponsored bythe A ustrian N ational Socialists and certain pan-G erman sectorsof the H eimwehr, which had little time for the notion of A ustrian

independence and was intent on bringing about the absorptionof A ustria into a G reater G ermany. There was the H absburg,pro-monarchical legitimist variant, advocated by traditionalconservative circles and by the less radical elements of theH eimwehr, which subscribed to the notion of A ustrian inde-pendence as an interim stage towards the restoration of anA ustrian H absburg conservative system. F inally, there was astrong system-preserving component, epitomized by the official

line of the D ollfussSchuschnigg regimes, which aimed toentrench the existing status quo vis--vis both monarchicalfantasies and external assimilationist influences. This situationforced the A ustrian regime to a purely defensive position, steer-



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ing clear from the other two alternatives as the only availableantidote to the crusading spirit of N ational Socialism and thethreat to A ustrian specificity posed by it.54

Conclusions: The Regime-Model of Fascism and Authoritarianism

F ascism in its generic epochal form did not evolve in an ideo-logical and political vacuum. A s an idiosyncratic and extremevariant of hyper-nationalism it was essentially rooted in (albeitnot constrained by) the radical nationalist tradition of eachcountry. I n terms of its ideological production, fascism in each

country recast and radicalized pre-existing radical themes, pro-vided a new overall prescription for future action and appealed toa powerful extreme nationalist imagery in order to historicize itsvision and legitimize its specificity (vertical dimension). A t thesame time, fascism originated as a specific form of reaction to thereality of postwar political and economic crisis in proto-liberal,unstable systems of various European countries (horizontal,epochal dimension). A generic explanation of the emergence offascist movements may be formulated on the basis of a hyper-nationalism-plus formula, which identifies a set of similarfactors that motivated the emergence of fascist movements whiletaking into account relative variations in the autochthonousconditions and traditions that shaped the physiognomy of eachmovement. H owever, with regard to the regime-model offascism, a number of other elements must be carefully analysed.Without any exception, fascist movements/ parties climbed topower through the complicity of indigenous elite sectors in the

framework of a conscious political experiment with more popularforms of authoritarianism. A ll these fascist components, eventhe one with the largest electoral constituency (N SD A P inGermany), initially shared executive power with certain tradi-tional political groups and enjoyed the passive support of a widerange of social forces. I n this sense, a rigid distinction betweenauthoritarian and fascist regime-model is highly problematic first because of this early political co-existence between the two

components, and second because of their de factosimilarities inpolitical practice and objectives (strong state, anti-socialism,censorship, restrictions in political and social association etc.).I nstead, the crucial factor is to what extent the fascist component



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emancipated itself from the initial predominance of its traditionalconservative sponsors and to what degree it departed once inpower from conventional forms/objectives of policy-makingtowards a more radical direction.

F our main criteria were employed to assess the character of anumber of regimes which contained at least one fascist compo-nent. I deologyremains a crucial determinant factor, in the sensethat it set the limits of what each movement regarded as the mostdesirable prescription for long-term action. E specially in thosecountries where a multiplicity of fascist movements with vary-ing degrees of ideological extremism remained politically active(A ustria, H ungary, Portugal, Spain), participation or exclusion/

suppression determined to a great extent the ideological profile ofthe regime-model and its commitment to radical change. Whilein Germany, I taly and Greece the most radical fascist compo-nent seized power, in the remaining countries there was a highdegree of ideological dilution. I n Spain, the F alange was gradual-ly absorbed and neutralized in the more conservative F rancoistregime. I n Portugal the radical component (national syndicalism)was violently suppressed, while in A ustria and H ungary theregime co-opted the less extreme variant (H eimwehr andN ational Socialists) and carefully ostracized the main anti-system force (N ational Socialists and A rrow Cross). I n Romaniathe co-opting of a radical form of fascism (I ron G uard) was inter-mittent and short-lived, thus minimizing its ideological impact onthe official regimes policy-making.

H owever, regimes are much more than just ideological inten-tions and aspirations. The formulation of policies rests on long-term perceptions of what is the most desirable course of action,

but is also determined by a series of structural factors that mayenhance or restrict the political freedom of a leadership to trans-late its ideas into action. Domestic consolidation is a crucialvariable as it relates to the political struggle between conven-tional authoritarianism and radicalism (fascism) for the soul ofthe regime-model. W here the consolidation of the fascist com-ponent was antagonistic and all-embracing (Germany, I taly to ahigh extent), the margins of freedom for the fascist leaderships to

promote their more extreme plans were significantly larger. Bycontrast, a co-operative type of consolidation resulted either inthe neutralization or relative moderation of the fascist compo-nent (A ustria, Spain, H ungary). The relative strength and cohe-



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sion of the conservative authoritarian bloc is a significant factorin explaining why in some cases the antagonistic intentionsof certain fascist groups were effectively thwarted (Portugal,Romania) but succeeded in overpowering the conservative

opposition in other countries (Germany, I taly).Policy-makingis the qualitative criterion that provides a clear

standard for judging the varying ability of the fascist componentsto influence the formulation of political objectives. The correla-tion between this factor with both domestic consolidation andideological intentions is crucial. Those fascist groups thatachieved a comprehensive, (near-)monocratic type of consolida-tion (Germany, I taly) generally emancipated themselves from

the restraining framework of conventional policy-making andsponsored more radical activities. I n co-operative or dilutedmodels the adoption of a fascist profile by the regime wasrestricted to aping or counterfeiting formalistic aspects of thefascist stylebut did not result in a clear departure from conven-tional political objectives (A ustria, H ungary, Spain, Portugal,G reece, Romania). A lso, the co-opting of less radical fascistcomponents (at the expense of other, more extreme forms) byauthoritarian regimes ensured a more uneventful co-habitationwithout substantially imperilling the continuity in policy-making.

F inally, the scopeof long-term intentions depended on both theideological nature of each movements nationalism, the marginsfor anti-system action and the influence of external or randomfactors. I n this respect, the N azi regime departs from all otherregime-models in its large-scale ideological commitment to anew universal social order, in its political determination topursue such an ambition, and in its ability to do so extensively

and effectively. The I talian F ascist regime demonstrated acomparable crusading spirit but retained the traditional focuson historic irredentism and refrained from imposing new radicalmodels of domestic organization in the conquered areas inEurope. T he rest of the regimes focused on the domestic aspectsof regeneration, either as a means of defence against externalthreats (A ustria) or because they lacked the material/ structuralpreconditions for a form of expansive policy (Greece, H ungary).

I n the end, a categorical distinction between authoritarian andfascist regime-model obfuscates the complex structural andpolitical continuities between the two models, as well as theaffinities in their ideological rationale.55 When admitted into



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power, the fascist movements/parties lacked a concrete politicalalternative vision for a totally novel form of regime. T hey wereco-opted by traditional groups and were forced to operate withinthe framework of a conventional authoritarian system which

entailed a combination of social forces with disparate anticipa-tions and notions of desirableor feasibleaction. T he varyingemancipation of individual fascist components in governmenttook the form of a gradual process of rejecting aspects of theexisting system and conceptualizing new prescriptions in opposi-tion to conventional pro-system attitudes. I n this sense, an ideal-type of the regime-model of fascism [radical anti-system ideo-logy, all-embracing antagonistic consolidation, radical policy-

making, crusading spirit] does not constitute a check-list fordeciding whether a regime was or was not fascist; it is only mean-ingful as a description of the end-result of a tendencytowards thegradual re-organization of the authoritarian models style andcontent. The N azi regime offers the closest approximation of thismodel, while the I talian F ascist variety continued to oscillatebetween its radical ideological agenda and the restrictivestructural continuities with the pre-existing composition of thesystem.56The remaining case-studies absorbed the fascist com-ponent in an essentially pro-system political structure or sub-

jected its ideological aspirations to the needs ofRealpolitikandadherence to pre-existing strict political choices. The epochalimpact of I talian F ascism (as the archetypal fascist regime) andof German N azism (as the most dynamic example of fascistregime-model) prompted mimetic reproductions of fasciststylistic elements in many other European regimes. H owever, thefascist style could be appropriated more easily than its substan-

tive political implications. T he crucial test was the extent towhich these new constellations of power regressed into theconventional authoritarian model or developed a politicalmomentum in the other direction, i.e. towards a new version ofauthoritarianism based on a radical re-ordering of social forces,forms of participation and long-term political objectives. R atherthan entailing a rigid identification with any ideal-type, theregime-model of fascism evolved within idiosyncratic autochtho-

nous political frameworks, occupying in each case varying posi-tions between the indigenous model of conventional authori-tarianism and its alternative reinterpretations by traditional ornew social forces.



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Notes

1. See, amongst others, H . A rendt, T he Or igins of T otalitari anism(L ondon1967, 3rd edn), 461 ff; K . F riedrich, ed., Totalitarianism(Cambridge, M A 1954);K . F riedrich and Z.K . Brzezinski, T otalitari an D ictatorship and A utocracy(Cambridge, M A 1956); L . Schapiro, Totalitarianism(L ondon 1973). F or a recent,interesting comparison between N azism and Stalinism see I . K ershaw and M .L ewin, eds., Stali nism and N azism. D ictator ships in Compar ison(Cambridge 1997).

2. E. N olte, Der F aschismus in seiner E poche. D ie A ction F ranaise, derI tali enische Faschismus, der N ational soziali smus(M unich 1963), and in Englishtranslation, T hree F aces of F ascism. I tali an F ascism, A ction F ranaise, N ationalSocialism(L ondon 1965).

3. See, for example, S.J . Woolf, ed., European F ascism(L ondon 1968), andT he N ature of F ascism (L ondon 1968); S.U . L arsen, B. H agtvet and J .P.M yklebust, eds, Who Were the Fascists? Socia l Roo ts of E uropean F ascism(Bergen,Oslo, T roms 1980); G.L . M osse, ed., I nternational Fascism(L ondon 1979); P.H ayes, ed., F ascism(L ondon 1973); Turner, F ascism and M odernization in

Turner, H .A . ed.,Reappraisals of F ascism(N ew Y ork 1975), 11739.4. R . G riffin, T he N ature of F ascism(L ondon & N ew Y ork 1994); S.G. Payne,

A H istor y of F ascism, 191445(L ondon 1997).5. J .J . L inz, Some N otes Towards a Comparative Study of Fascism in

Sociological H istorical Perspective, in W. L aqueur, ed., F ascism: A Reader sGui de. A nalyses, I nterpretations, B ibl iography (H armondsworth 1979), 21 ff.;Political Space and F ascism as L ate-Comer, in Larsen, H agtvet and M yklebust,eds, Who Were the Fascists?, 1534.

6. R .O. Paxton, The F ive Stages of Fascism, Journal of M odern H istory, 70(1998), 123 (here 11). Cf. M ilza, P., F asci sme franais: passet prsent(Paris1987).

7. Cf. the nationalism-plus formula put forward by L . Birken, H it ler asPhil osophe. Remnants of the Enli ghtenment in N ational Sociali sm(Westport, CT &L ondon 1995).

8. Cf. H . M ommsen, A usnahmezustand als H errschaftstechnik des N ational-sozialistischen-Regimes, in M . F unke, ed., H itl er, D eutschland und die M chte.M ateriali en zur A ussenpoliti k des D ri tten Reiches(D sseldorf 1977), 3045.

9. G riffin, N ature of F ascism, Ch. 5.

10. F or a general overview of fascist ideology see G riffin, N ature of F ascism,Chs 12; Z. Sternhell, F ascist I deology, in W. L aqueur, ed., F ascism: A Reader sGui de. A nalyses, I nterpretations, B ibl iography(H armondsworth 1979), 325406.F or F ascist ideology see, among others, Griffin, N ature of F ascism, Ch. 3; A .J .G regor, T he I deology of F ascism. T he Rationale of T otalitari anism(New Y ork1969); E. Gentile, L e origini dell ideologia fascista, 19181925(Rome & Bari1975); R.J .B. Bosworth, T he I tali an D ictator ship. Pr oblems and Perspectives in t heI nterpretation of M ussolini and F ascism(L ondon & N ew Y ork 1998). For Nazismsee G riffin, op. cit., Ch. 4; E. J aeckel, H itlers Weltanschauung. A B lueprint f orPower (M iddletown, CT 1972). See also S. Saladino, I taly and E. N olte,

Germany, both in H . R ogger and E. Weber, eds, T he E uropean Right. AH istorical P rofile(L ondon 1965), 24860 and 296307 respectively.

11. P.C. Schmitter, The Social Origins, Economic Bases and PoliticalI mperatives of A uthoritarian Rule in Portugal, in L arsen, H agtvet and



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M yklebust, eds, Who Were the Fascists?, 43666. For Salazars own explanation ofhis ideological beliefs see A . Oliveira Salazar, D octri ne and A ction. I nternal andF oreign Policy of the New Por tugal(L ondon 1939).

12. T . Gallagher, Conservatism, D ictatorship and F ascism in Portugal,191445, in M . Blinkhorn, ed., F ascists and Conservatives. T he Radi cal Ri ght andthe E stabli shment in Twentieth-C entur y E urope(L ondon 1990), 15775; P.G .Schmitter, T he Regime dException That Became the Rule: Forty-eight Y earsof A uthoritarian Domination in Portugal, in I . G raham and H . M akler, eds,Contempor ary Por tugal. T he Revoluti on and its A ntecedents(Austin, TX 1979),3263. For a short exposition of the N ational Syndicalists disagreements with theSalazar regime see Preto, E rsatz Fascism, translated in R . G riffin, ed., F ascism(Oxford & N ew Y ork 1995), 1945.

13. S.G . Payne, F alange. A H istory of Spani sh Fascism(Stanford & L ondon1962) and Spain, in Rogger and Weber, eds, European Right, 18996; P. Preston,Populism and Parasitism: the F alange and the Spanish Establishment, in

Blinkhorn, ed., F ascists and Conservati ves, 13857. See also J os Antonio Primode R ivera, Total F eeling, translated in G riffin, ed.,F ascism, 1878.

14. H . Thomas, Spain, in S.J . Woolf, ed., European Fascism(L ondon 1968),2968; M . Blinkhorn, Introduction: A llies, R ivals or A ntagonists? F ascists andConservatives in M odern Europe, in Blinkhorn, ed., F ascists and Conservatives,113; Payne, Spain, 201 ff.

15. D . Close, Conservatism, A uthoritarianism and Fascism in G reece,191545, in Blinkhorn, ed., F ascists and Conservati ves, 205 ff.

16. Y . A ndricopoulos, The Power Base of Greek A uthoritarianism, inL arsen, H agtvet and M yklebust, eds,Who Were the Fascists?, 56884.

17. Z. Barbu, Psycho-H istorical and Sociological Perspectives on the I ronGuard, the F ascist M ovement of R omania, in L arsen, H agtvet and M yklebust,eds, Who Were the Fascists?, 3827; and Romania in Woolf, ed., EuropeanF ascism, 14666; E. Weber, R omania, in Rogger and Weber, eds, T he E uropeanRight, 517 ff; B. Vago, F ascism in E astern Europe, in L aqueur, ed., F ascism. AReaders Guide, 21718, 2223. See also Codreanus own statement T heResurrection of the Race, in G riffin, ed., F ascism, 2212.

18. F .L . Carsten, T he Rise of F ascism(L ondon 1967), 1903.19. I . Dek, H ungary, in European Right, 37781; Griffin, N ature of F ascism,

1278; Carsten, Ri se of F ascism, 16975.

20. P.H . M erkl, Comparing Fascist M ovements, in L arsen, Hagtvet andM yklebust, eds, Who Were the Fascists?, 75283; D ek, op. cit., 388405; J . Ers,H ungary, in W oolf, ed., European Fascism, 11145. For Szlasis notion ofH ungarism see G riffin, ed., F ascism, 2236.

21. A . W hiteside, A ustria, in R ogger and Weber, eds, European Right, 334 ff;M . K itchen, T he Com ing of A ustri an F ascism(L ondon & M ontreal 1980), Ch. 3;F .L . Carsten, F ascist M ovements in A ustr ia. F rom Schnerer to H itl er(L ondon &Beverly H ills 1979), Chs. 6, 8, 10.

22. K itchen, op. cit., Ch. 8; Carsten, Ri se of F ascism, 2239; J . L ewis,Conservatives and Fascists in A ustria, 191834, in Blinkhorn, ed., F ascists and

Conservatives, 10314; B.F . Pauley, N azis and Heimwehr F ascists: the Strugglefor Supremacy in A ustria, 19181938, in L arsen, H agtvet and M yklebust, eds,Who Were the Fascists?, 2323; L . J edlicka, The A ustrian Heimwehr, in G .L .M osse, ed., I nternational F ascism: N ew T houghts and N ew A pproaches(L ondon &



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Beverly H ills 1979), 22340.23. J . Gehl,A ustr ia, Germany and the Anschluss, 19311938(L ondon 1963); G .

Botz, The Changing Patterns of Social Support for A ustrian N ational Socialism(19181945), in L arsen, H agtvet and M yklebust, eds, Who Were the Fascists?,20245; Carsten, F ascist M ovements in A ustr ia, Ch. 14.

24. Whiteside, op. cit., 3426.25. J . N oakes, German Conservatives and the Third Reich: an Ambiguous

Relationship, in Blinkhorn, ed., F ascists and Conservati ves, 7197; K .-J . M ller,The Structure and N ature of the N ational C onservative Opposition in G ermanyup to 1940, in H .W. K och, ed.,A spects of t he T hir d Reich(L ondon 1985), 13378;K . Deutsch, H itl er and H is General s. T he H idden Cr isis, JanuaryJune 1938(M inneapolis 1974), 78215.

26. K .D . Bracher, Stufen totalitrer M achtergreifung, Vi er teljahr sheft e frZ eitgeschichte, 4 (1956), 3042; M . Broszat, T he H itler State. T he F oundation andD evelopment of the I nternal Str ucture of the T hir d Reich(London & N ew Y ork

1981; Griffin, N ature of F ascism, 10710. For an overview of the existing litera-ture see I . K ershaw, T he N azi D ictatorship(3rd edn, L ondon 1993), Ch. 4.

27. F or the role of the Savoy monarchy in the F ascist state see A . A quarone,L or ganizzazione dello St ato T otalitari o(Turin 1965), Ch. 4; D . M ack Smith, I ta l yand its M onarchy(N ew H aven, CT & L ondon 1989); M . K nox, Conquest,Domestic and Foreign, in F ascist I taly and N azi G ermany, Journal of M odernH istory, 56 (1984), 27 ff.

28. F or the relations between state and Church in F ascist I taly see D .A .Binchy, Church and State in F ascist I taly(Oxford 1970); J .F . Pollard, T he Vaticanand I tal ian F ascism, 19291932. A Study in C onflict(Cambridge 1985). For the

competition between the two institutions for control over education see T .M .M azzatosta, I l r egim e fascista tr a educazione e propaganda ( 19351943)(Bologna1978).

29. R . Sarti, I talian Fascism: Radical P olitics and Conservative Goals, inBlinkhorn, ed., F ascists and Conservati ves, 1430. See also the review of the exist-ing literature in Bosworth, op. cit., Chs 56; Aquarone, op. cit., Chs 45.

30. P. Preston, Populism and Parasitism: the F alange and the SpanishEstablishment, 193975, in Blinkhorn, ed., F ascists and Conservati ves, 13856,esp. 144 ff.; G riffin, N ature of F ascism, 1612; R . Carr, M odern Spain, 18751980(Oxford 1980), Ch. 10.

31. Schmitter, R egime dException, passim; Cor poratism and Publi c Policy inA uthori tar ian Portugal(L ondon & Beverly H ills, CA 1975), esp. 12 ff.; A .C. CostaPinto, Salazars D ictator ship and European F ascism. P robl ems of I nterpretation(N ew Y ork 1995); H . M artins, Portugal, in Woolf, ed., European F ascism,30236.

32. Close, op. cit., 204 ff.; A ndricopoulos, op. cit., 56882; R. C logg, A ShortH istory of M odern Gr eece(Cambridge 1979).

33. Weber, op. cit., 552 ff., 562 ff.34. L inz, Political Space and Fascism as a Late-Comer, 16970. See also R.

K hnl, Contemporary Approaches to F ascism: A Survey of P aradigms, in

L arsen, H agtvet and M yklebust, eds, Who Were the Fascists?, 289; R . Wilford,Fascism, in R. Eccleshall, V . Geoghegan, R. J ay, M . K enny, I . M acK enzie andR. Wilford, eds, Polit i cal I deologies. A n I ntroduction(L ondon & N ew Y ork 1984),1946.



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35. S. A ndreski, Fascists as M oderates, in L arsen, H agtvet and M yklebust,eds, Who Were the Fascists?, 525. F or M ussolinis charismatic power see P.M elograni, The Cult of the Ducein M ussolinis I taly, in I nternational Fascism,7390; E. Gentile, I l culto del littor io. L a sacralizzazione della polit i ca nell I tal iafascista(Rome & Bari 1993). For H itlers charisma see J . N yomarkay, Charismaand F actionalism i n the N azi Par ty(M inneapolis 1967); K .D . Bracher, The Role ofH itler: Perspectives of I nterpretation, inF ascism. A Reader s Gui de, 193212.

36. A ndricopoulos, op. cit., 57482.37. Payne, Spain, 2005; Payne, H istor y of Fascism, 25267.38. Gallagher, Portugal, 160 ff; Carsten, Ri se of F ascism, 18993.39. C.W. Schum, The DollfussSchuschnigg Regime: F ascist or

A uthoritarian, in L arsen, Hagtvet and M yklebust, eds, Who Were the Fascists?,24953; M . Clemenz, Gesellschaft li che U rsprnge des F aschismus (Frankfurt1972), 20632; Ers, H ungary, 126 ff.

40. F or the importance of the racial crusading element in N azism see M .

Burleigh and W. W ippermann, T he Racial State. Germany 19331945(Cambridge1991); D . G oldhagen, H itlers Wi ll ing E xecutioners. Or dinary Germans and theH olocaust (L ondon 1996). For the organization of the H olocaust see C.R .Browning, T he Path to Genocide. E ssays on L aunching the F inal Soluti on(Cambridge 1992), 6976; U . H erbert, A rbeit und Vernichtung. konomischesI nteresse und Primat der Weltanschauung im N ationalsozialismus, in D.D iner, ed., I st der N ati onalsozial ismus Geschichte?(F rankfurt 1987), 198236; andG . A ly and S. Heim, D ie konomie der E ndlsung: M enschenvernichtungund wirtschaftliche N euordnung, Beitr ge zur nati onal sozial isti schen Gesundheits-und Sozialpoli tik, V: Sozialpol it ik und Judenvernichtung: G ib t es eine konomi e derE ndlsung?(Berlin 1987), 790.

41. F or the two concepts ofcit tadi nosolda toand uomo novosee M . I snenghi,I l mito di potenza, in A . Del Boca, M . L egnani and M .C. Rossi, eds, I l regimefascista. Storia e storiografia (Rome & Bari 1995), 1445; P.V. Canistraro,M ussolinis Cultural Revolution: F ascist or N ationalist?, Journal of Cont empo-rary H istory, 7 (1972), 129 ff. F or an extreme critique of the regimes organiza-tional incapacity see D . M ack Smith, M ussolini s Roman Empire(L ondon 1982),andM ussolini(L ondon 1981). See also Griffin,N ature of F ascism, 7682, and E.R .

Tannenbaum, T he F ascist E xperi ence. I tali an Society and Cul tur e, 19221945(NewY ork 1972).

42. See G riffin, N ature of F ascism, Ch. 5; Borejsza, op. cit., 359 ff.; Payne,H istory of F ascism, Ch. 5.

43. M erkl, 75281; N . OSullivan, F ascism(L ondon & M elbourne 1983); N .K ogan, F ascism as a Political System, in S.J . Woolf, ed., T he N ature of Fascism(L ondon 1968), 1118.

44. H . Arendt, T he Or igins of T otalitari anism(3rd edn, L ondon 1967). C f. M .N eocleous, F ascism(L ondon 1997), Ch. 1 and Sternhell, op. cit., 334 ff.

45. N .H . Baynes, ed., T he Speeches of A dolf H itl er. A pri l 1922A ugust 1939(L ondon, New Y ork, Toronto 1942), Vol. I , 668 (interview with the U nited Press,27 N ovember 1935) and 707 (speech at the 1937 Nuremberg Party Rally, 10

September 1937). F or an analysis of these ideas see I . K ershaw, Hit ler ,18891936: H ubris(L ondon 1998), 501, 60 ff., 1502; Goldhagen, 80128.

46. See the selection of documentary evidence from the implementation of N aziracial policies during the war in J . N oakes, and G. Pridham, eds, N azism. A D ocu-



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mentar y Reader, Vol. 3: F oreign Relations and Racial E xtermination(Exeter 1988).47. E . Susmel, and D . Susmel, eds, Opera Omnia di B enito M ussolini(F lorence

and Rome 195178), Vol. X X I V, 516 (Speech to the Quinquennial A ssembly ofthe Regime, 10.3.1929); B. M ussolini, F ascism: D octrine and I nstitutions(Rome1935), reprinted in M . Oakeshott, ed., T he Social and Polit i cal D octrines ofContemporary Europe(N ew Y ork 1949), 1789. See also Griffin, Nature ofF ascism, 6871.

48. F or the attempts at a F ascist I nternational see D . Veneruso, L I t al ia fascista (19221945 ) (Bologna 1981), 16575. F or I talys involvement in theSpanish Civil W ar see R . Cantalupo, F u la Spagna. Ambasciata presso F ranco,febbraioapri le 1937(M ilan 1948).

49. K nox, Conquest, 123; G riffin, N ature of F ascism, 6976.50. F or the policies in L ibya see G . Rochat, I I colonial ismo ital iano(Turin

1973), 103 ff. F or the quasi-apartheid policies in E thiopia see L . Goglia, N ote sulrazzismo coloniale fascista, Storia Contemporanea, 19 (1988), 122366. F or the

economic and military deficiencies of the I talian system see F. M inniti, A spettidella politica fascista degli armamenti dal 1935 al 1943, in R . D e Felice, ed.,L I tali a fr a T edeschi e A lleati. L a politi ca estera fascista e la seconda guerr a

mondiale(Bologna 1973), and I I problema degli armamenti nella preparazionemilitare italiana dal 1935 al 1943, Storia Contemporanea, 2 (1978), 156, M .K nox, Expansionist Zeal, F ighting Power, and Staying Power in the I talian andGerman D ictatorships, in R . Bessel, ed., F ascist I taly and N azi G ermany.Compar isons and Contr asts(Cambridge 1996), 11533; J .J . Sadkovich, The I talo-G reek W ar in Context: I talian Priorities and Axis Diplomacy, Journal ofContemporar y H istory, 28 (1993), 49364, and U nderstanding D efeat: R eapprais-

ing I talys Role in World War I I , Journal of Contemporary H istory, 24 (1989),2761. For the implementation of the anti-Semitic legislation see J . Steinberg,A llor N othing. T he A xi s and the H olocaust, 194142(L ondon 1990).

51. F or F rancos negative replies to the German proposal for a joint frontagainst the British see D GF P, D , 11, 220/207/227/246/476/491.

52. F or the ideology of the M etaxas regime see Andricopoulos, op. cit.,57980. F or the regimes foreign policy see Close, op. cit., 209 ff.; C logg, op. cit.F or the attempts for Balkan co-operation in the 1930s see B.M . J ankovic, T heBalkans in I nternational Relations(Basingstoke & L ondon 1988), 14964.

53. M .L . Smith, T he I onian Vision. Gr eece in A sia M inor(L ondon 1973).

54. F or the various strands of A ustrian nationalism see Whiteside, op. cit.,338 ff.; Griffin, N ature of F ascism, 1246; B.F . Pauley, H itler and the F orgottenN azis. A H istory of A ustri an National Socialism(L ondon 1981); J edlicka, op. cit.,232 ff.

55. Blinkhorn, op. cit., 913; S.G . Payne, F ascism. Compar ison and D efinit ion(M adison 1980), 6 ff.

56. G riffin, N ature of F ascism, Ch. 8.

Aristotle A. Kallis

is Tutor at the U niversities of E dinburgh andG lasgow. H e is the author of a forthcoming bookon Fascist Expansionism (R outledge), and ofseveral other articles on the theme of fascism.


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