Kalberg, The Rationalization of Action in Weber's Theory of Religion

THE RATIONALIZATION OF ACTION IN MAX WEBER'SSOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION*

STEPHEN KALBERG

Center for European Studies, Harvard University

An analysis of the manner in which believers' "relations to the supernatural" influenceand even rationalize their action is central to Weber's sociology as a whole as well as hisanalysis of the development of modern capitalism and to his sociology of religion. YetWeber never systematically presents the highly differentiated analytic course followedby the "rationalization of action" in the life-sphere of religion to the "methodicalrational way of life." This study reconstructs this meandering route. In doing so, itemphasizes the ways in which action, according to Weber, is altered as believers altertheir mode of interacting with the supernatural. A sharp distinction between the merelycognitive and ideational influence upon action of "wortd views" and the influence of"salvation paths" is held to throughout. Because they place "psychological premiums"upon action, the latter are seen to be of far greater importance for the rationalization ofaction. Most salvation paths, however, and despite the explanations they offer forinjustice, fail to introduce the enduring "religious mood" and to rationalize actionradically. Those few salvation paths that do so articulate an acute tension between theworld view and human suffering, yet "virtuoso religious qualifications" must also bepresent if the methodical rational way of life is to arise. Throughout, the analyses byTenbruck, Schluchter, and Habermas are critiqued as incomplete and misleading.

The question of the extent to which religioninfluences and rationalizes action arisescontinuously throughout Max Weber's TheReligion of China (1951), The Religion ofIndia (1958), and Ancient Judaism (1952),as well as The Protestant Ethic and theSpirit of Capitalism (1930). It is central alsoin the more theoretical treatments ofreligion in Economy and Society (1968,pp. 399-634/245-381),' "Author's Intro-duction" (1930, pp. 13-31/1-16), "TheSocial Psychology of the World Reli-gions" (1964d, pp. 267-301/ 237-275), and"Religious Rejections of the World"(1946c, pp. 323-359/536-573). Indeed, theassumption that transcendental forces, reli-gious doctrines, and questions of salvationinfluence action decisively and significantlystands as a central pillar in Weber's sociol-ogy as a whole. Yet he fails to articulate sys-tematically the degree to which and mannerin which an orientation to the supernaturalinfluences and even rationalizes action.

"Religious rationalization" has been at

* I would'like to thank Robert J. Antonio for veryhelpful comments and encouragement.

' All references to Weber's texts give the Englishtranslation first, then the page numbers of the original

the very center of a continuing debate inWest German sociology that began in themid-seventies with articles by Tenbruck(english translation: 1980) and Schluchter(english translation: 1979,1981,1987,1989)1984; see Kalberg (1979). The critics haveincluded Riesebrodt (1980), Winckelmann(1980), and Dobert (1989). Habermas(1985, pp. 157-243), remarkably, has sidedintimately with Tenbruck. Departing fromquestions raised in this debate, this studyundertakes to reconstruct the ways inwhich, in Weber's discussion of religion,the orientation of action to religionloci—religious world views, salvation reli-gions, salvation goals, and salvationpaths—may endow action with continuityand even rationalize action. Religion-oriented action is particularly pivotal toWeber for three reasons. He understands itas a) capable of confronting fragmented,random action and introducing a patternedcharacter and clear direction to action; b)empowered in principle to stand firm evenagainst action oriented to the domains ofthe economy, law, and domination; and c)

German. Bibliographic information regarding thelatter appears in the list of references.

THE RATIONALIZATION OF ACTION 59

as potentially calling forth the radical ratio-nalization of action that characterizes themethodical rational way of life? Just thisway of life, Weber argues repeatedly, wassignificant, when embodied in the Calvinist,for the development of the modern West. Itproved also central for the appearance ofthe "type of person" (Menschentyp) whoseaction is guided by a sustained ethicaldimension.

Neither the critics nor Tenbruck orSchluchter have focussed their argumentssystematically upon the issue taken to becentral in this reconstruction: the purelyreligious sources of a) the methodicalrational way of life and b) its course ofdevelopment. The analyses of Tenbruckand Schluchter, moreover, as will be notedthroughout, are incomplete and flawed in anumber of ways: they fail to distinguishsystematically between the influence uponaction of world views and salvation goalsand paths, to provide an analysis of thevarious ways in which the diverse salvationpaths discussed by Weber influence action,to insert rigorously both Weber's four typesof action and his four types of rationalityinto their analyses, and to distinguish—anddraw the consequences in respect to eachsalvation path and the influence of religionupon action—between virtuoso and lay"religious qualifications."'

The precise "direction" of religion-ori-ented action becomes visible if scrutinizedfrom the perspective of Weber's four typesof action (means-end rational, value-rational, affectual, and traditional; see1968, pp. 24-26/12-13) and four types ofrationality: practical, theoretical, formal,and substantive (see Kalberg 1980,pp. 1151-1159; Levine 1985, pp. 157-158).By "inserting" action-orientations into hisdiscussion of religion in a manner morecomprehensively and systematically thanWeber himself ever did, this study recon-structs his analysis of the manner in whichreligion influences action. It scrutinizes the

2 Weber uses the expressions melhodisch rationaleLebensfUhrung and rationale Lebensmethodik (seee.g.. 1968, pp. 497-498/303, 562/340, 630/379). I willemploy "methodical ethical action" synonymously.

3 Rather than disrupt repeatedly the flow of thisreconstruction, the critique of these authors will for themost part take place in a running commentary in thefootnotes.

ways in which action is shaped and evenrationalized by the constraints and oppor-tunities indigenous to this domain's histor-ically significant loci. These constraints andopportunities involve the believer's rela-tions to the supernatural realm and, inmany cases, the question of action appro-priate to insure salvation. In what ways dothey tend, with a certain analytic likelihood,to call forth directed, patterned, and evenrationalized action? The analytic coursetaken by the rationalization of action in thiscentral life-sphere in Weber's sociologymust be reconstructed.''

Because the methodical rational way oflife stands as a pivotal point of referencethroughout Weber's discussion of themanner in which religious belief influencesaction, it has proven ideally suited to serveas a central organizing concept for thisreconstruction: action influenced by reli-gion becomes visible to us more clearly ifscrutinized from the perspective of thedegree to which a methodical rational wayof life is approximated. How, in referenceto purely religious questions, did this way oflife arise? How did it acquire a degree ofpermanency? The ways of life of certainprophets were, in Weber's analysis,methodical rational, yet these charismaticfigures faded quickly. According to him,the route to methodical ethical action is ameandering and even bewildering one.Since unsystematic in respect to this theme,his analysis must be fully reconstructed.Before turning to the "problem" and set ofquestions Weber indentifies as indigenousto this domain and its significant loci foraction, the major features of this way of lifemust be briefly examined.

THE METHODICAL RATIONAL WAYOF LIFE

Weber's argument in The Protestant Ethic(1930) does not concern simply the intro-duction of a new type of means-end(zweckrationales) rational action with Cal-vinism, as frequently argued. The awardingof religious premiums to economic actionby this religion constitutes only one part of

* In part, this analysis can be seen as complementingmy analysis of economic action (see Kalberg 1983).

60 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

his finely woven analysis. The fact that theorientation of the Calvinist to the economicrealm required—of necessity given hissearch for signs of his "election"—amethodical rational way of life was just asdecisive. The combination of a designationof the economic realm as the arena forproof of the state of grace plus themethodical character of the Calvinist's wayof life accounted, in Weber's argument, forthis religion's singular power to shatter the"traditional economic ethic" and its"world mastery."'

The methodical rational way of lifeimplies either a formal or a substantiverationalization of action in reference to acomprehensive constellation of ethicalvalues. A total "organization of life fromwithin" takes place. Although themethodical rational way of life impliesethical action of a systematic character, it ischaracterized by greater flexibility thanaction oriented consistently to sacrednorms, laws, ritual practices, magicalcustoms, conventions, or, for Weber, allstereotyped action imprinted "from with-out." This external determination ofreligion-oriented action requires merely anunquestioning conformity by believers; anyother behavior threatens to violate theinterests of multifarious spirits and godsand thus to incur their animosity. Themonopolization of action by orientations toan inward religious mood and to a "sacredinner state" on the other hand, "sanctionsdifferent maxims of conduct in differentsituations . . . and i s . . . elastic and suscep-tible of accommodation" (1968, p. 578/349). Such a consciously possessed, endur-ing, and "meaningful, total relation-ship of the pattern of life" unified in itspurpose and values can be arrived at onlythrough a systematic rationalization of allpsychic and physical capacities to facilitatethe continuous concentration upon inward

' Indeed, perhaps it was this realization—that theCalvinist's action could not be understood merely asmeans-end rational action—that initially inducedWeber to ponder the possible types of social action. Ingeneral, perhaps the study of Calvinism led Weber toconclude that the distinctions at the level of socialaction indispensable for an understanding of thisreligion could be broadened in scope and then serve asthe basis for an action-based verstehende sociology.

religious goals (1968, pp. 540/328, 533-534/324, 575/348). The scriptural prophetof ancient Judaism, the exemplary prophetof India, the other-wordly ascetic monk ofmedieval Catholicism, and the inner-wordlyascetic Calvinist all led, according toWeber, methodical rational ways of life.

This way of life stands in a relationshipof unequivocal antagonism not only toaffectual action, but also, because of theirfragmented character, to all means-endrational and discrete value-rational action.The ethical component of this way of life,and particularly its internally consistent andcomprehensive aspect, places it £ilso in thestrictest opposition to the "practical ratio-nal" way of life and all traditional action(see Kalberg 1980, pp. 1159-1176).

In addition, precisely the systematiccharacter of the methodical rational way oflife sets it in a relationship of unalterableantagonism to magic, regardless of whetherit became manifest in the form of ritual,sacred norms, orgiasticism, the manipula-tions of sorcerers, or the worship forms andsacraments of priests. Indeed, due to itsethical component as well as its internallyconsistent character, this way of life canarise only if magic is devalued.* The conti-nuous mood of reverence and devotion thatcharacterizes methodical ethical action andprovides believers with a lasting and unifiedfoundation for religiously-based ways oflife, the patterning of action throughsystematic formal and substantive rational-ization processes to attain the secure andcontinuous state of grace—all this diamet-rically opposes the situation-specific andexternal regulation "from without" ofmagic-oriented action. Whether it involvesthe manipulation in ceremonies of gods ordemons by sorcerers, the execution ofsacrifices or sacraments by priests, or a

' It should be clarified that the religions as a wholein which the carriers of methodical rational ways of lifeappeared did not generally abolish magic. Variousforms of magic remained in Judaism, Buddhism, andmedieval Catholicism, and even played quite promi-nent roles. Yet, as will be discussed, the salvation-striving of scriptural prophets, exemplary prophets,and monks repectively stood opposed to all magicalmeans; in respect to their own salvation-striving, magicwas replaced with various forms of ethical action. Seebelow, pp. 76-81.


search through orgiasticism for theeuphoric feeling of ecstasy, no internalizedsense of obligation can be cultivated by thisform of interaction with the supernatural.To Weber, methodical ethical action stoodas the most effective force within thereligious realm antagonistic to magic.

What is the nature of the historicallysignificant sociological loci in this domainaround which action becomes oriented,patterned, and even rationalized? Ananswer to this question must first addressthe problem and set of questions specific,according to Weber, to the domain ofreligion. These issues delineate the domainboundaries within which all action orientedto religion takes place.

THE RELIGION PROBLEM

Weber's main interest relates to the influ-ence of religion upon the action of believers—its "economic ethic"—rather than its"essence" (1968, p. 399/245).

"Economic ethic" does not bring into focusthe ethical theories of theological compendia. . . [rather,] it points to tht practical impulsesfor action which are founded in the psycho-logical and pragmatic contexts of religions(1946d, p. 267/238; emph. orig.).'

Given this focus, he foregoes all attempts todefine religion. Weber states only that therealm of religion involves the ordering ofthe relations of supernatural forces to men(1946d, pp.279/250, 294/266-67; 1968,pp.403/247, 399/245, 424/259, 528/320-321).

Despite his reluctance to define theproblem indigenous to this domain,Weber's analysis of the influence of religionupon action allocates a central role to adomain-specific set of issues. As believers'relations to the supernatural change, themanner in which they interact with itbecomes transformed, as does, concur-rently, the general influence of the super-natural upon action. Thus, in effect,believers' definition of the major character-

istics of the supernatural serves, in therealm of religion, as itself a locus for action.This is clear from Weber's discussion ofworld views. Yet these ethical universes*influence action in a global fashion only.Far more precise is the influence emanatingfrom salvation religions, especially their sal-vation goals and salvation paths. Eachdelineates for the devout an array of morespecific and more powerful constraints andopportunities that define action appro-priate for the believer's salvation quest, aswell as other action to be avoided. Anexamination of the ways in which worldviews and salvation religions serve as locifor patterned and even rationalized actionin the domain of religion constitutes ourmain concern here.

THE RELIGION LOCI

World views provide a supernatural justi-fication for the methodical rational way oflife. The purely ideational thrust theythereby set in motion toward a radicalrationalization of action must be, however,complemented by further loci for actionthat exercise a more immediate influenceupon action. Salvation pjrths and salvationgoals possess the power to facilitate orcurtail these thrusts. In some salvationreligions, the ethical order's thrust towardmethodical rational ways of life isobstructed so effectively that fragmentedritual and magic prevail in the daily livesof the faithful. Nonetheless, salvationreligions, as well as world views, proveindispensable for the shattering of magicand the rise of methodical rational ways oflife.

Weber's concept of "religious quali-fications" is also fundamental for anunderstanding of the manner in which therationalization of action in the domain ofreligion occurs, as will be emphasizedthroughout the analysis to follow. Accord-ing to him, virtuoso and lay believers orienttheir action to world views and the varioussalvation goals and paths in decidedlydifferent ways.

' Since his writings concern the effect of religionupon action, Weber refers to them as purely empirical(1968, p. 551/334).

8 I will be using the terms "world view," "ethicaluniverse," and "ethical order" synonymously.


World Views: the Dualistic Relationshipand the Supernatural Justification forMethodical Rational Ways of Life

In some religions, the dualistic relationshipbetween the supernatural sphere and theworld' develops into a pronounced one inwhich the religious realm becomes visible asa discrete constellation of internally con-sistent ethical, universal, and permanentvalues that express a systematic view of theuniverse. Despite their diverse values, worldviews always establish clear boundaries forthe believer's relations to the transcendentrealm and for the pondering of one's fateand suffering.

From the point of view of such rationallyordered "meaningful totalities," the primi-tive notion of the supernatural as comprisedof miscellaneous spirits, demons, and souls,as well as gods in competition with oneanother, can be understood only asfragmented and "irrational." To Weber,the critical issue in distinguishing theprimitive conception of the supernaturalrealm from that prevalent in world viewsrelates to the question of action: thefunction-specific, competing inhabitants ofthe transcendent sphere in primitive reli-gions fail to offer believers a supernaturalpoint of reference for their action character-ized by an internally unified configurationof values. They thus fail to provide atranscendent legitimation for a way of lifeunified in its purpose and organized into aconsistent pattern.

The first step toward the creation ofworld views takes place with the rise ofethical gods (1968, pp. 429-431/262-263,437/267, 518/314-315, 590/355). Yet ethi-cal deities become acknowledged as centralfor the constitution of world views onlywhen they SLcquire permanent and universal

' The previous stage—one in which sorcerersmanipulated supernatural entities not viewed asradically separate from terrestrial inhabitants—can bedescribed as "monistic" (1968, pp. 401-407/246-250;see also Bellah 1964; Schluchter 1979, pp. 22-23).Because methodical rational ways of life arose only inrelation to dualistic world views, monism, as well as"primitive" religions in general, can be treated hereonly to the extent that they, by contrast, illuminate thenature of world views (on "primitive" religions, see1968, pp. 399-439/245-268). Weber's occasional useof the term "magical world view" to refer to primitivereligions is altogether misleading and will be avoided.

features. In comprehensively surveying thecosmos, ethical, permanent, and universaldeities endow the "meaningful totality"with its internal metaphysical unity andcoherent purposefulness. The "coherentwhole" now created is believed to controlall lesser divinities and to make, at times,ethical demands upon all terrestrialinhabitants.'"

How do world views serve as loci forreligion-oriented action and its rationaliza-tion? With the crystallization of such ethicaluniverses, the entire realm of religionbecomes established as an enduringsubstantive rationality that stands not onlyin contrast to all primitive religions,but also to the "things of the world"(1968, pp. 415-420/255-257, 495/301). Intestifying to the ordered "meaningfulness"and eternal character of the universe as awhole, world views distinguish in a stablefashion the integrated demands made uponhuman beings by the transcendent spherefrom the demands of nature, which remaintied to fragmented occurrences. Thus, tothe extent that specialized, evanescent, andlocal gods are replaced by a view of thesupernatural realm as a unified ethicalorder, the possibility arises for religiously-inclined persons to orient their actionssystematically and in an internally con-sistent manner. In other words, in pos-tulating coherent views of the universe aswell as comprehensive explanations for the"meaning" of life, ethical orders offer thepossibility to the devout of rejecting heter-ogeneous mundane values and of focussing

'" World views have assumed various forms indifferent civilizations. In ancient Greece, they becamemanifest as simply irrational "fate," while inConfucianism and Taoism they appeared as an"impersonal, providential force that guarantees theregularity and felicitous order of world history" (1968,p. 431/263). In India, on the other hand, they took theform of the Hindo rita at first, an "impersonal powerof the fixed order of religious ceremony and the fixedorder of the cosmos," and later became manifest as "asupradivine and cosmic all-unity, superordinate to thegod and alone independent of the senseless change andtransitoriness of the entire phenomenal world" (1968,p. 431/263, 553/335). In ancient Judaism theyassumed the form of an anthropomorphic, omnipotentand fully monotheistic Deity. The Christian Godretained the Judaic God's omnipotence and anthropo-morphism, but, with the Trinity, lost the strictlymonotheistic character of this earlier God (1946c,p. 325/538).


their action and thought in a comprehensivemanner upon the supernatural realm.World views, by permanently articulatingthe discrete realms of "world" and "reli-gion," always provide a transcendent legiti-mation for consistent and systematicaction. It is in this manner that they consti-tute loci for religion-oriented action.

For the devout, the discrepancy alonebetween the supernatural domain viewed asan "ordered totality" and "irrational"earthly events sets, according to Weber, anideal, autonomous thrust in motion that inprinciple opposes the randomness andheterogeneity of empirical events. Amongreligious persons, all of whom now have thepossibility cognitively to evaluate the degreeto which action logically conforms to theirperception of the "meaningful totality's"universal, ethical, and permanent features,this thrust itself has the effect of callingforth consistent action. In Weber's analy-sis, the sheer existence of the holistic andethically rational order superior to earthlyinhabitants offers a supernatural justifica-tion for the integration and unification ofdisparate action. This is one sense in whicha central statement in Weber's sociology asa whole can be understood:

. . . the rationality, in the sense of the logicalor teleological "consistency" of a . . . positionhas and always has had power over man,however limited and unstable this power is andalways has been in the face of other forces ofhistorical life (1946c, p. 324/537; see further1946d; pp. 270/240-241, 286/259, 268-269/238-240)."

Thus, in Weber's analysis, world viewsconstitute the most general locus towardwhich action in the religious realm can beoriented, patterned, and even rationalized.Because they articulate an array of con-straints and opportunities, they are capableof focussing the thought and action of thedevout in an all-encompassing fashion uponthe supernatural sphere: the universalism ofdeities legitimates internally unified andcomprehensively organized action; theethical aspect of gods offers a transcendent

" Thus, terms such as "cognitive consistency" and"theological consistency" will refer here to auto-nomous ideal thrusts.

foundation for internally binding—orobligatory—action "from within" (see1968, p. 36/19); and the permanence ofdeities provides a supernatural frameworkfor regular and consistent action. If theideal thrusts of world views becometranslated into the action of the faithful,methodical rational ways of life arise. In theprocess, affectual, traditional, and means-end rational, as well as practical rationalways of life, mundane values, and all formsof magic, become viewed as "irrational"and devalued.

Nonetheless, world views remainextremely fragile influences upon action.Their cognitive thrusts can never, of theirown accord, in Weber's analysis of religion-oriented action, call forth methodicalrational ways of life. Although indispens-able as foundational loci if methodicalethical action is to crystallize, Weber sees nodirect correlation between the ideationalimpulses set in motion by ethical universesand the action of the devout. Instead, asecurely established world view constitutes,for Weber, the necessary precondition inthe religious realm for the rationalization ofaction and the methodical rational way oflife, rather than an absolute determinant(1946d, pp.268-269/239-240, 280/252;1946c, p. 324/537). Indeed, the cognitivethrust set in motion by ethical universesmay be, Weber emphasizes, effectivelyhindered by wordly configurations as wellas an entire host of purely religious inter-mediary factors, as can even the visibility tobelievers of the ethical universe itself.

The second major locus for religion-oriented action, salvation religions, con-stitutes a necessary element if therationalization of action in this domain is toproceed. Indeed, these religions, by intro-ducing psychological premiums, delineateconstraints and opportunities that influencethe action of believers in a far moreeffective fashion than do world views.

Salvation Religions: PsychologicalPremiums and the Methodical RationalWay of Life

The effect of salvation religions upon theaction of the devout differs distinctly inintensity from the influence of the ideal


thrusts of world views, all of which involvemerely cognitive assessments of whetheraction stands in a relationship of teleolo-gical consistency with the ideal thrusts. Anentirely new dimension comes into play withsalvation religions: namely, psychologicalpremiums.^^ As mediated generally bysalvation doctrines that are themselvesoften oriented to ethical universes, theseincentives are placed directly upon theaction that, if properly executed, promisessalvation to the believer. In Weber'sanalysis, just the capacity of psychologicalpremiums to convince believers of theirredemption from this-worldly suffering andevil endows them with a far greater capacityto create viable constraints and oppor-tunities, and thus with a far greaterpotential to effect action than does acognitive pondering of the consistencybetween action and a world view."

'2 On the critical distinction between the influenceof cognitive consistency as opposed to the effect ofpsychological premiums (Pramien) on action, see 1930,pp. 224 (n. 30)/p. 99 (n. 1), 265 (n. 31)/p. 173 (n. 1).97/86; 1946d, p. 267/238; 1946c, p. 338/552 (Weberemploys the terms "psychological impulse" [Antrieb]and "psychological strength" [Kraft] synonymously).The translation by Parsons ("sanction"; e.g., 1930,pp. 97/86, p. 265 [n. 31]8p. 173 [n. 1]) is clearlyincorrect (see Bendix 1971a, p. 191). I will be using theterms "psychological incentive" and psychologicalpremium" synonymously. See also Bendix's commentsin Stammer (1971b, pp. 157-58).

'3 Weber focusses his argument neither upon theinfluence of world views upon action nor upon thelogical implications of theological doctrines andofficial teachings. For example:

We are of course not concerned with the theoreticaland official teaching of ethics—whatever its prac-tical importance for the influence of the church insermons and parochial welfare—but with somethingquite different: its spread through psychologicalincentives concerned with religious belief andpractice, pointing out a way of life and sustainingthe individual in his way. To a great extent thesepremiums originated in the unique chracter ofreligious conceptions (1930, p. 97/86; tr. alt., emph.orig.).

If one wishes to study at all the influence of areligion on life, one must distinguish between itsofflcial teachings and this sort of actual procedureupon which in reality, perhaps against its own will, itplaces a premium, in this world or the next (1927,p. 364/310).

Tenbruck's (1980) exclusive focus upon an "innerlogic" of world views and Schluchter's (1979,

What are the main features of ethicalsalvation religions?''' The idea of salvationis not, of course, dependent upon theexistence of an ethical universe. It arose asthe search for relief from need, hunger,drought, sickness, and death even inprimitive religions. It acquires, however, a"specific significance" to Weber where it"expressed a systematic and rationalizedworld view" (1946d, p. 280/252, 278/250).With the clear exception of Confucianism,Weber notes that all the world religions areethical salvation religions: Hinduism,Buddhism, Judaism, and Christianity(1968, p. 564/341).'5

pp. 11-59) nearly exclusive stress upon these ethicaluniverses as such both tend to overemphasize thesignificance of ideal thrusts and teleologicalconsistency to the detriment of numerous—also purelyreligious—mediating factors. The omission of Weber'sdistinction between the psychological premiums ofsalvation religions and intellectual consistencyespecially flaws their arguments (see e.g., Schluchter1979, p. 18, where he discusses world views in referenceto their "psychological and pragmatic connections"and as "components of human motives"). As will benoted, some of the mediating factors transferred theideal thrusts of world views into the religious action ofthe devout, while others effectively opposed them.

'^ I am using the terms "salvation religion" and"ethical salvation religion" synonymously (see n. 17below).

" Fully contradictory statements are to be found inEconomy and Society regarding the status of Islam(p. 625/375,1166/694). Schluchter (1979, p. 23) errs inequating "religious ethics" as such with the advent ofthe salvation religions of interest to Weber, namely,those intimately bound together with a world view.Religious ethics arose in the stage of dualistictheocentrism in primitive religions characterized by theappearance of priests and worship forms (see 1968,pp. 422-37/257-267). Even though these ethicsintroduced the notions of sin and conscience and, indoing so, served as precursor/s for ethical salvationreligions, they did not imply world views. (Thetranslation of the relevant passage [1968, p. 437/267]fails to include "salvation" in quotation marks, asoccurs in the original. Just these quotation marksindicate that the stage of dualistic theocentrism inprimitive religions remained Weber's point ofreference for this term rather than those religionswhere the notion of salvation acquired a "specificsignificance": the world religions.) Schluchter's entireschema is also inadequately differentiated in that itequates the rise of theocentric dualism with theappearance of ethical salvation religions (1979,pp. 22-23, 27-28, 30). These religions, as noted,awaited the appearance of world views. On the otherhand, as will be seen in the case of Confucianism, theadvent of world views did not alone imply the introduc-tion of salvation religions. Schluchter's treatment ofConfucianism, which for him involves nothing more


All salvation religions involve, as a meansof specifying their promises of a releasefrom suffering and responding to thediscrepancy between the "ration2il" super-natural realm and a terrestrial spheresaturated by unexplained and randommisery and injustice, at least a minimum ofreligious doctrine (1968, p. 563/341). As"rational religious systems of thought,"doctrines generally originate from theo-retical rationalization processes undertakenby priests in reference to the problem oftheodicy. Rooted in a stable body of relatedteachings that are accepted as "revealed"knowledge, they constitute, according toWeber, constellations of values and ethicalclaims, or, like the world views theyarticulate and also alter, ethical substantiverationalities. They refer, moreover, to thenature of a salvation religion's goals,promises, revelations, sacred values, andsalvation paths, or, in general, its teachings.As constellations of values, prescriptions,laws, and norms internally consistent withone another to a greater or lesser extent,doctrines endow all thinking regarding Godand sin with a "rational element" (1968,p. 426/260). In doing so, they fulfill thedemand that Weber sees as the "core ofreligious rationalism:"

Many.. .varieties of doctrine have. . . existed.Behind them always lies a stand towardssomething in the actual world which is expe-rienced as specifically "senseless." Thus, thedemand has been implied: that the world viewin its totality is, could, and should somehowbe a meaningful "cosmos." This quest [is] thecore of genuine religious rationalism ... Theavenues, the results, and the efficacy of thismetaphysical need for a "meaningful" cos-mos have varied widely (1946d, p. 281/253;see also 1946c, pp. 325/538, 564/351; 1968,pp. 450-451/275, 563/341, 458/279, 540/328,427/260).

The extent to which doctrines focus thebeliever's actions away from the frag-mented happenings and values of terrestriallife and bestow psychological incentivesupon action oriented to internally consis-tent constellations of purely religious values

than monism and magic (pp. 27/28; 1981,pp. 100-105; 1990), reveals the incompleteness of hisanalysis.

varies widely. Furthermore, dependingupon a doctrine's answers to the questionsof "from what" and "for what" the devoutcan be saved," a non-linear relationshipmight exist between a religion's ideal andpractical evaluation of wordly activity: evenwhile ideally denigrating earthly life, somedoctrines place clear psychological pre-miums upon mundane action (see e.g.,1951, pp. 227/513-514). In addition, manysalvation doctrines, despite their articula-tion of world views endowed with ethical,universal, and permanent features thatideally stand in opposition to the frag-mented character of magic and ritual, notonly fail to reward ethical action in such amanner that magic and ritual are effectivelysuppressed," but also incorporate magicalpractices.'* Finally, some doctrines enun-ciate, especially for the laity, purely this-wordly goals that diverge little from thosefound in primitive religions (1968, pp. 319-20/526-527). Other doctrines reward purelyreligious values and "other-wordly" salva-tion, and the promises and sacred valuesof this redemption also vary (1968, p. 528/320; 1946d, pp. 280-281/252).

Thus, divergent salvation doctrines, all ofwhich place psychological premiums uponaction, may be called forth within eachworld view. These doctrines serve, in effect,as filters for world views. Depending uponthe incentives they place upon action,doctrines can strengthen or weaken the idealthrusts of world views as well as, once these

•6 Weber lists some of the possibilities; see 1946d,pp. 280-281/252-253; 1968, p. 526/319; and below,pp. 67-68, 76).

" In Judaism, for example:

The entire system of outward piety (fVerkheiligkeit)[of Judaism] had a ritualistic foundation. . .;moreover, it was frequently interfused with thedistinctive emotional mood typical of religions thatemphasize faith (1968, p. 498/303; tr. alt.).

Thus, the term "ethical" in the expression "ethicalsalvation religion" refers to a feature of the super-natural realm indigenous to these religions rather thanto a type of action these religions always called forth.Some ethical salvation religions succeeded in intro-ducing ethical action; only a few transferred theethical, universal, and permanent features of the worldviews into methodical rational ways of life.

'* As did, for example, Catholicism, in the form ofthe sacraments.


thrusts become clear, transfer them into theaction-orientations of believers or blockthem (1946d, pp. 258-259/286). Indeed,world views and conceptions of God may bealtered to such an extent by doctrines thatthey lose their capacity to set guidelinesfor salvation-striving." Thus, salvationdoctrines reward and punish a widespectrum of action.^" Moreover, dependingupon whether virtuoso or lay religious qual-ifications predominate, diverging assess-ments arise regarding the severity of thegulf and the tension between the worldview's "meaningful totality" and terrestrialimperfections (see e.g., 1951 [n. 22],p. 227/513; 1946c, p. 541/328). The man-ner in which doctrines respond to thetension between supernatural "meaningful-ness" and earthly injustice is of interest tous here, for just such responses furtherdirectly affect the content and intensity ofthe psychological premiums salvationdoctrines place upon action. These pre-miums are themselves in turn influenced bythe believer's particular religious qualifica-tions. Only two salvation paths—the mosteffective link to action in Weber's analysisand thus the most immediate sociologicallocus for action in this sphere of life—placepremiums upon methodical rational waysof life. Only virtuoso believers provecapable of fulfilling the ethically rigorousdemands imposed by these paths.

Thus, as a consequence of salvationdoctrines and the multiple ways in whichthey endow action with psychologicalpremiums, Weber's repeated stress upon

" As occurred, for example, in India with Restora-tion Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism. In thesereligions, the search for salvation no longer followedan intellectual-theoretical direction (see 1958, pp.233-256/291-328). Conceptions of God were alsoaltered considerably by the various Christiandoctrines. This occurred, for example, in the develop-ment from the strictly supramundane God of ancientJudaism to the Christian Trinity, which, " . . . with itsincarnate Savior and the saints, represented a concep-tion of God which fundamentally was rather lesssuramundane than was the God of Jewry . . . " (1946c,p. 325/538; see also 1968, pp. 570-571/345). Tenbruck(1980) is able to postulate an "inner logic" of religiousrationalization only by neglecting such aspects ofWeber's analysis. See also below, pp. 78-79, 82.

20 In a few cases, psychological incentives becomeplaced even upon action that is, from the point of viewof official doctrine, fully "irrational."

the precarious influence of the ideal thrustsof world views upon the religious action ofthe devout must be taken seriously (1946c,p.324/537; 1946d, pp. 291-292/264, 280/252). Even the world view anchored bymonotheism did not succeed in banishing alllocal spirits and demons, despite the idealantagonism of the permanent, universal,and ethical God to these fragmentedsupernatural forces.

The path to monotheism has been traversedwith varying degrees of consistency, butnowhere—not even during the Reformation—was the existence of spirits and demonspermanently eliminated; rather, they weresimply subordinated unconditionally to theone God, at least in theory. The decisiveconsideration was and remains: who is deemedto exert the stronger influence on the interestof the individual in his everyday life, thetheoretically supreme God or the lower spiritsand demons? If the spirits, then the religion ofeveryday life was decisively determined bythem, regardless of the official God-conceptof the ostensibly rationalized religion (1968,pp. 415-416/255).

The crystallization of developed conceptionsof supernatural forces as gods, even as a singletranscendent God, by no means automaticallyeliminated the ancient magical notions, noteven in Christianity (1968, p. 419/257).

Salvation doctrines are central in Weber'sanalysis of religion-oriented action. In spiteof their variation, only salvation religions,due to their capacity to bestow psycho-logical incentives upon action, are endowedwith the potential to transfer, on acontinuous basis, the comprehensive idealthrusts of world views into the daily actionof the devout. The following two sectionsdelineate the ways in which juxtapositionsof certain salvation goals and paths withreligious qualifications succeed in trans-forming the ethical, universal, and per-manent ideal thrusts of world views intopsychological premiums upon action. As aresult, religion-oriented action is ratio-nalized and, in a few cases, even methodicalrational ways of life congeal. Specialattention will be given to the character ofthe Indian and Judaeo-Christian ethicaluniverses as well as to the extent to whichideal thrusts toward mystical experiences


and wordly ethical action respectively weretransformed into psychological premiumsupon action by particular salvation goalsand paths. As will become clear, no "innerlogic," as Tenbruck (1980, pp. 334-340)and Habermas (1985, pp. 143-242) argue,or "consistency-relativization" axis rootedin world views, as Schluchter contends(1979, pp. 11-59; 1990), adequately cap-tures the analytic course followed by therationalization of action in respect to thesalvation religions (1946d, p. 291/264).^'

Salvation Goals: the Virtuosi and theLaity

Believers in all salvation religions confrontthe query: "Am I among the saved?" Inanswer to this question, the offering of asubjective certidudo salutis^^ feelingbecomes the goal of these religions. Yetenormous differences characterize thesearch for salvation. For example:

"From what" and "for what" one wished tobe redeemed and, let us not forget, "could be"redeemed, depended upon one's image of theworld. There have been very different possi-bilities in this connection: one could wish to besaved from political and social servitude andlifted into a Messianic realm in the future ofthis world . . . One could wish to be savedfrom radical evil and the servitude of sin andhope for the eternal and free benevolence inthe lap of a fatherly God . . . One could wishto be redeemed from the barriers to the finite,which express themselves in suffering, miseryand death, and the threatening punishment ofhell, and hope for an eternal bliss in an earthlyor paradisical future existence. One could wishto be saved from the cycle of rebirths withtheir inexorable copipensations for the deedsof the times past and hope for eternal rest(1946d, pp. 280-281/252).

These differences, according to Weber,can be basically traced back to variations inthe perception of the nature of the world

2' The doctrines of many of these religions workedback upon their world views and altered them. BecauseTenbruck (though, to a lesser extent, also Schluchterand Habermas) too closely links world views todoctrines as such, he systematically neglects thisconsideration.

^̂ I.e. the subjective certainty of salvation. I amusing the expressions perseverantia gratiae and"certainty of grace" synonymously, as does Weber.

view as well as in the acuity of the tensionexperienced by the devout between the"ordered totality" and the earthly domainof haphazard suffering. This perceptionand tension varies not only in respect tosalvation paths, as we will see, but also inrespect to religious qualifications, indeed tosuch an extent that, in Weber's analysis,discussion of the "certainty of grace"salvation goal is best divided into twosections: one that examines the manner inwhich the search for the certitudo salutisfeeling influences the action of virtuosobelievers, and one that discusses ways inwhich the action of the lay devout isinfluenced by this salvation goal. Thecapacity of the goal of salvation to transferthe manifold ideal thrusts of world viewsand the psychological premiums of salva-tion doctrines into religion-oriented actionwill be emphasized throughout.

The Ethic of Conviction: the Virtuoso'sCertitudo Salutis. Wherever the ideal claimsof the Indian and Judaeo-Christian ethicaluniverses are forced upon the consciousnessof believers in a particularly urgent fashion,as is the case with the virtuosi devout, thesalvation goal—the certainty ofsalvation—can be acquired only by a radicalorientation to purely religious values. Inthese cases, the faithful acquire theperseverantia gratiae only when they feelpermanently and thoroughly suffused by an"ethic of conviction" (Gesinnungsethik).Such a radical orientation to the super-natural realm alone and a concomitantsuffusion by this ethic enables a full detach-ment from the random fluctuations of dailylife. Such detachment serves as a necessaryingredient, in Weber's analysis, for theorigin of methodical rational ways of life.

To Weber, a small group in every salva-tion religion perceives the arena of religionas unequivocably divorced from all this-worldly events and values. Just the "mea-ningfulness" of the transcendent sphere tothese charismatic devout reveals earthlyexistence as random and as the locus ofmisery. For them, purely religious valuesassume an enhanced status in their dailylives and both terrestrial existence and theadaptation to given realities are, becauseviewed as standing in opposition to religious


postulates, devalued (1968, pp. 576-634/348-381; 1946c, p. 328/541). Only a radicaland comprehensive concentration of allpsychic and physical energies upon thereligious realm can eradicate the tension feltby the virtuosi between supernaturalperfection and unmerited suffering.^' Inessence, the charismatic faithful seek toescape the senselessness of existencethrough acquisition of a state of conscious-ness that permanently and exclusivelyfocusses their thought and action uponthe transcendent. To Weber, whereversuch a "religious mood" (Dauerhabitus,Gesinnung) and the permanent possessionof//iner religious values become understoodas the goal of salvation, the ethic of con-viction arises (1946c, p. 328/541; 1968,pp. 576-577/348).2t What are the mainfeatures of this ethic?

However qualitatively different in con-tent depending upon a particular religion'ssacred aims, promises, and salvation paths,the constellation of values internallyconsistent with one another in every ethic ofconviction is fully accepted on faith.Moreover, an unwavering commitment to itreigns. Adherence to this ethic, as aninternally binding absolute beyond dl com-promise, involves not simply externalcompliance, but, more importantly, anethical conviction that implies unlimitedtrust in its correctness and an unconditionalreliance upon God (1968, p. 567/343; 1952,p. 216/231).

Just the believer's quest for the inner

23 Perception of this tension as an extreme oneoccurs more often wherever prophecy appears as acarrier of the religious tradition. In Hinduism, forexample, prophets failed to appear and a radicaltension between the world view and earthly distress wasscarcely articulated.

^ The terms "religious mood" and "ethic of con-viction" are used synonymously. The ethic of convic-tion cannot be limited to the taking of an absoluteposition in regard to political issues and a renunciationof responsibility for its consequences. This interpreta-tion, which derives largely from Weber's well-ktiowndiscussion in "Politics as a Vocation" (1946a), fails toacknowledge the broader usage of this notion asfound, largely though not exclusively, in the"Sociology of Religion" chapter in 1968(pp. 399-634/245-381). Unfortunately, because avariety of English expressions have been employed astranslations of Gesinnungsethik, those without accessto the German texts will find it impossible to traceWeber's usage of this concept in this chapter.

"religious mood" reveals another charac-teristic of the ethic of conviction: this ethicinvolves a strict imperative for a continuousattitude of reverence and devotion. Sincepermanent ethical Gods reward and punishdepending upon whether ethical values areconsistently internalized and complied within all action and thought, winning of thefavor of these deities takes place only ifperpetual obedience exists. The sine quanon for salvation—a lasting and unifiedfoundation for a religiously-based way oflife—requires an uncompromising aban-donment of all irregular suffusion of theconsciousness and a fully alert, voluntaryand anti-instinctual regulation of life. Astrict suppression of all human desires andemotions is required as well if the ethic ofconviction's comprehensive values are to beupheld."

Thus, not a transitory or extraordinaryholy state is awarded with psychologicalpremiums here, such as the ecstasy soughtin orgiastic and magical ceremonies. Affec-tual and erotic frenzies and euphoric statesas well become subordinate to the search fora milder but more secure and continuousstate of grace. Given perpetual worldly eviland the understanding of the religious realmas alone "meaningful," only this conti-nuous, "chronically heightened and idio-syncratic" state convinces believers oftheir salvation and renders them inwardlysafe against earthly distress, for "this'religious mood' is the truly redemptoryquality" (1968, p. 530/322, 534-41/324-328). A constant mood of piety,above all, induces the state of holinessthat insures protection against divinelyappointed inflictions. In doing so, it notonly alleviates the subjective tension thatresults from an awareness of the acute dis-crepancy between the ethical universe andthe "meaningless" character of everydaylife, but also frees the devout from the"irrationality" of worldly reality and itsincessant suffering:

This is more likely to be the case the moresublimated, the more inward, and the moreprincipled the essence of suffering is

25 On the manner in which the ethic of convictionovercomes all natural desires and drives, see e.g.,1968, p. 540/328; 1930, pp. 117-128/115-128; 1951,p. 214/531.


conceived. For then it is important to put thefollower into a permanent state which makeshim inwardly safe against suffering. For-mulated abstractly, the rational aim ofsalvation religion has been to secure for thesaved a holy state, and thereby a "mood" thatassures salvation (1946c, p. 327/540; see also1968, pp. 530/322, 536/325).

Ways of life, accordingly, became metho-dical and oriented comprehensively to theunified ethical order.

Only the life guided by firm principlesemanating from a unitary center can beconsidered a God-pleasing way of life (1951,p. 240/526 [tr. alt.]; see also e.g. 1968,pp. 450-451/275, 465-466/284).

Indeed, the charismatic state that infusesvirtuosi believers once they have acquiredthe religious mood penetrates their entirebeing in such a comprehensive fashion thatit abolishes the normal "contradiction"between the demands of everyday lifeand those of religious doctrines (1968,pp. 536/325, 538/326). Such a thoroughsuffusion by the religious dimension in turnstrengthens the lasting orientation to thesupernatural. To the same degree, actioncan no longer be guided by the haphazardnature of earthly events or the randomcharacter of human relationships. Nor canthese believers even entertain the idea, forexample, of placing their loyalty to familyand sib over that to their God (1946c,p. 329/542). Even the aspiration by thevirtuosi toward teleological consistencywith the world view and the power ofcognitive thought is no longer decisive inguiding action.

Once the religion becomes predominantly anethical rational religion, it possesses anintellectual character only to an incidentalextent. This is the case simply becauseintellectual propositions fulfill the presuppo-sitions of an ethic of conviction at most only atthe lowest stage of faith (1968, p. 566/342; tr.alt.).

Only a clear definition of and conscien-tious orientation of action to specificallyreligious values, such as charity, brotherlylove, and compassion, can now provide acoherent "meaning" and guarantee the

promise of a rescue from terrestrial distress.This deep penetration by the Godly and anexperiencing by believers of the "psycho-logical state" signifies a veritable "unifica-tion" of God and the devout, as well as thevirtuoso's attainment of the certainty ofgrace.^

The Laity's Certitudo Salutis: Even thoughthey pose the same question as theirvirtuoso counterparts—"How can I becertain of my salvation?"—the lay devout,as a result of their lesser religious qualifica-tions, perceive the cleft between the meta-physical purposefulness articulated inworld views and salvation doctrines on theone hand and the imperfections andsuffering of terrestrial life on the other asfar less acute. Accordingly, no radicalsubjective tension crystallizes, according toWeber, in the consciousness of lay believersand no consistent devaluation of earthly lifetakes place. Furthermore, unlike the un-equivocable urgency it assumes in the minds

2* In one of the crucial passages in his sociology ofreligion, Weber succinctly describes the "irrationaliza-tion" of religious goals away from a pragmatic andutilitarian (do ut des) posture as well as this-wordlyvalues and toward the lasting religious mood thatconvinces virtuoso believers of their salvation:

The pervasive and central theme is: do ut des. Thisaspect clings to the routine and the mass religiosityof all peoples at all times and in all religions. Thenormal situation is that the burden of all prayers,even in the most other-worldly religions, is theaversion of the external evils "of this world" and theinducement of the external advantages "of thisworld." Every characteristic of a religion that leadsbeyond evils and advantages in this world is thework of a special developmental process (Entwick-lungsprozess), one characterized by distinctivelydual aspects. On the one hand, there is an ever-broadening rational systematization of the godconcept and of the thinking (Denkens) concerningthe possible ralationships of man to the divine. Yeton the other hand, and as a result, there ensues acharacteristic recession of the original, prac//ca/ andcalculating rationalism. As this occurs, the"meaning" of distinctively religious behavior issought less and less—and parallel with eachrationalization of thought—in the purely externaladvantages of everyday economic success. To thesame extent, the goal of religious behavior is succes-sively "irrationalizd" until finally "other-worldly"—that is, above all non-economic—goalscome to be viewed as constituting the distinctivelyreligious (1968, pp. 424/258-259 [tr. alt., emph.orig.]; see also 1922, p. 433).


of those endowed with extraordinaryqualifications, the centrality of the cer-titudo salutis question for the "masses"varies across a broad spectrum. Thisdepends largely upon whether the particularsalvation religion in question assumes theform of a sacramental or a nonsacramentalreligion (1930, pp. 227-228, n.49/103,n. 2), whether doctrines directly address thetheodicy conundrum, and whether theyalter the given view of God in a manner thatexacerbates or alleviates the tension be-tween the religious postulate and terrestrial"irrationality."

As a rule, lay believers can acquire asubjective certainty of salvation withoutorienting their action continuously to thereligious sphere. In some cases correctlyexecuted ritual, for example, alone enablesbelievers to acquire, and reacquire, this sub-jective feeling. The purely this-worldly anddo ut des character of primitive religions re-surfaces often in the everyday religiousaction of the laity in ethical salvationreligions (1968, pp. 424/258-259; 1946d,p. 277/249). A few doctrines promise thedevout eternal life in an other-worldlyparadise. Most important here, althoughonly a few salvation goals permit the laydevout simply to adapt to given realities,none aim to uproot these believers in aradical and permanent fashion, in behalf ofpurely religious values, from the practicalrational way of life.

The perception of the relationshipbetween worldly evil and the purposefulethical universe—whether one of greatertension or less—itself poses the religiousissue—the theodicy dilemma—that not onlyleads to the formation of salvation goals,but also calls forth a diversity of salvationpaths. Because all paths place psychologicalpremiums directly upon the specific actioncapable of facilitating attainment of thesubjective certainty of salvation, they exist,in Weber's sociology, as the locus endowedwith the greatest power to influencereligion-oriented action. Only a limitednumber of discrete salvation paths weresignificant historically. Three paths com-bine with virtuoso qualifications to awardpremiums to the ethic of conviction andreligious mood that unifies the believer withthe supernatural realm. Two of these

rationalize action to such an extent thatmethodical rational ways of life arise.

Salvation Paths

As the most effective locus for religion-oriented action, salvation paths (Erld-sungswege) constitute, to Weber, thecrucial link between the ideal thrusts ofworld views and the daily action of thefaithful. The perseverantia gratiae goal ofsalvation religions fails to offer the concreteinstructions for action that allows believers,through the successful execution of suchaction, to acquire certainty of their state ofgrace. Only salvation paths place directpsychological premiums upon the "cor-rect" action that promises redemption.However, they consistently transfer thecomprehensive ideal thrusts of a world viewonly rarely. More frequently, they alterthese thrusts or block them, as particularlyoccurs when lay believers experience themas too demanding. Just the repeatedattempts by religion-oriented persons toovercome the tension between the purpose-fulness of the supernatural cosmos and thefragmentation and randomness of earthlyreality not only creates, in Weber's analysis,the impulse that calls forth salvation paths,but also a "strongly dynamic, developmentaspect" in man's relationship to thereligious realm (1968, pp. 578-579/349-350, 520/321)."

Each path, by articulating clearconstraints and opportunities, demarcates aspecific way for the devout to convincethemselves of their salvation. Those thatcrystallize largely as a result of theperception by virtuosi of the cleft betweenthe ethical universe and daily suffering asacute—salvation through faith and throughthe "methodologies of sanctification"(asceticism and mysticism)—designate anemotional attitude or a mode of action thatfacilitates the radical concentration of thesecharismatic figures upon an ethicaluniverse. These paths do so in such amanner that the focus of the devout upon

^' The Economy and Society translation incorrectly(here as well as elsewhere; e.g., as in the passage re-translated in the note above) renders Entwicklung as"evolution."


this universe can become a permanent onecharacterized by a comprehensive suffusionby a "religious mood." They crystallizeonly where the virtuosi devout appear indelineated groups, and these paths alonesucceed in continuously "reactivating"virtuosi qualifications on a regular basisand in a concentrated fashion. On the otherhand, those paths that arise in response tothe lay believer's perception of the gulf—asfar less acute—between the rationalreligious postulate and earthly injusticeoffer less strenous means for redemption.These paths—through ritual, good works, asavior, and an institution—can convince laybelievers of their salvation without demand-ing a lasting focus upon the "orderedtotdity" and its specifically religiousvalues.̂ *

Yet neither the acquisition of the per-severantia gratiae nor the experiencing of itas a "religious mood" stands in a linearrelationship to the rationalization of action.Rather, the suffusion by the religiousdimension that uproots the devout frompractical rational ways of life must beviewed as a necessary but not sufficientcondition for this rationalization and forthe introduction of methodical ethicalaction. Indeed, salvation through faith, incombination with virtuoso qualifications,calls forth an ethic of conviction that placespremiums upon fully "irrational" action.On the other hand, since most believers arenot endowed with charismatic qualities, thesalvation paths most frequently favored arethose that offer a certainty of salvationwithout demanding a thorough penetrationby the devout with religious values; that is,all those requiring less stringent efforts andwhich allow repeated acquisition of theassurance of grace feeling. These paths,none of which place psychological pre-

2* It should be stressed that the extraordinarypowers of virtuoso believers always allow them toexperience the religious mood; i.e. regardless of thesalvation path followed by these possessors ofcharisma. This is evident from Weber's discussion ofthe various paths (see 1968, pp. 529-576/321-348).Some paths, however, as a result of their uniquepsychological premiums, tend to awaken virtuosoqualifications far more effectively and to facilitate theacquisition and maintenance of this mood. Thesepaths call forth the ethic of conviction much morefrequently.

miums upon a consistent rationalization ofaction, nonetheless very often rewardsporadic ethical action as well as means-endrational action and suppress affectual andtraditional action. Salvation paths con-stitute the last—and crucial—step inWeber's aneilysis of the manner in which therationalization of action proceeds in thereligious

Salvation Paths that Fail to RationalizeAction

All of these paths convey the subjectivefeeling of certainty of grace withoutdemanding a comprehensive rationalizationof action. They differ, nonetheless, in thedegree to which they facilitate the virtuoso'squest for attainment of a religious mood.

The Lack of an Ethic of Conviction:Salvation Through a Savior, anInstitution, Rituat, and Good Works

In readily alleviating any tension betweenthe "ordered totality" and worldly im-perfection, these salvation paths provide ahope for redemption to believers lackingvirtuoso qualifications. In fact, these pathsin part arise as doctrinal responses to thesearch of lay believers for a means toacquire the certitudo salutis withoutrigorously organizing their entire ways of

2' There is no unequivocal relation between specificpaths and specific religions. The same path is found ina variety of religions, and a single religion very oftenrequires a) the same believer to follow several salvationpaths and b) believers in possession of differentreligious qualifications to follow different paths.Furthermore, no one to one relationship can beestablished between salvation paths and the two worldviews that anchor salvation religions: the Indian andthe Occidental (see 1968, pp. 529-576/321-348).Tenbruck's (1980) near total omission of the "Socio-logy of Religion" chapter in Economy and Societyallows him, in the formulation of his "inner logic"thesis, to neglect such complications. A clear relation-ship also fails to crystallize, in Weber's analysis,between ethics of conviction, those salvation paths thatstress the believer's own efforts (ritual, good works,asceticism, mysticism; 1968, pp. 529-534/321-324,541-551/328-334), and those that define salvation asemanating from forces fully external to and inde-pendent of the actions of the devout (the savior,the institution, and faith; 1968, pp. 557-563/337-340).The methodical rational way of life can emanate onlywhere salvation results from the believer's efforts, butnot all of these paths can lead to this way of life.


life. Indeed, most of the faithful never viewthe tension between the ethical universe andthe injustices of daily life as an acute one.Consequently, for them, acquisition of thesubjective certainty of salvation can takeplace without a permanent orientation toreligious values and a concommitant radicaldevaluation of terrestial existence. Thesalvation paths that congeal within thiscontext naturally fail to require, for attain-ment of the state of grace, a suffusion of thebeliever's entire way of life with a ' 'religiousmood," a perpetual uprooting from givenrealities, or a consistent rationalization ofaction. Instead, all offer less rigorousmeans for the devout to convince them-selves of their redemption; they also offerthe possibility repeatedly to acquireassurance of salvation after it has been lost.They do so by thwarting the ideal thrusts ofworld views and by casting the salvationsearch much more in the direction of an"adaptation to the world." Action,consequently, is influenced by the domainof religion only partially.

Salvation through a savior proclaims thepower of a great hero—whether a prophet,a guru, or a god incarnated as a divinesavior—to act as an intermediary betweenthe human and the divine and to dispensegrace. Instead of knowledge of ritual lawsor sacred texts, the central basis of thepower of Jesus, the Buddhist Bodhisattva,and the Dalai Lama, for example, stemfrom their knowledge that the "way ofGod" leads through them (1968,p. 631/379). Thus, in this case, the actionsof the believer are not decisive. Instead,those of the hero or savior prove moreimportant for salvation: as a consequenceof his extraordinary achievements he hasaccumulated an "excess" of grace, and thiscan be distributed to others. Since the savioralone liberates persons from dragons or evildemons, from the world's crass hypocrisy,from the oppressive consciousness of sin,and even from the sinful nature of thehuman creature as such, all depends uponthe strength of his charismatic endowment.Because the believer's own efforts arerejected as inadequate for the attainment ofsalvation, no pattern of action can ariseamong the devout that consistentlyemanates from a comprehensive core of

ethical values. On the contrary, all religion-oriented action remains merely a responseto the unlimited authority of the savior, andhis dictates vary depending upon situationalfactors as well as for reasons incompre-hensible to the faithful. Instead of introduc-ing methodical rational ways of life, thissalvation path, whether it appears in Indiaor the Occident, generally places psycho-logical premiums upon ritual obedienceand, occasionally, single and unrelatedethical acts (1968, pp. 557-558/ 337-338).

Weber notes a clear similarity in themanner in which salvation through a saviorand institutional grace affect action: bothgenerally weaken the influence of ethicaldemands:

Every type of actual dispensation of grace by aperson, regardless of whether this dispen-sation is legitimated from personal charismaor from an office within an institution, has thenet effect of weakening the ethical demandsupon the individual. The vouchsafing of gracealways entails an inner release of the person inneed of salvation; it consequently facilitateshis capacity to bear guilt. Since the sinnerknows that he may always receive absolutionif he performs some occasional religiousaction, he is, other things being equal, largelyspared the necessity of developing his ownethically systematized pattern of life (1968,p. 561/339; tr. alt.).

The very fact that the institution alwayspossesses an oversupply of religious grace tobe distributed anew curtails the need for acontinuous, internal monitoring of action.Through the granting of dispensations, thetension that arises from the believer'sawareness of his failure to' fully conform tohis God's ethical demands can be relieved.In this sense, the Catholic Confessional, forexample, in offering the devout a " . . .means for the periodic 'abreaction' ofan affect-laden sense of guilt," releasesthem from the burden of their sins (1930,p. 106/97; tr. alt.; see also 1930, p. 234/113; 1946b, p.320/234; 1968, pp.1191/712, 562/339-340).

The manner in which divine blessing isdispensed in institutions also leads to a frag-mentation of religious action: since discretedeeds are understood to be the correctcompensation or penance for particular


sins, value adheres to atomized acts ratherthan to an internally united personalitypattern. A piecemeal resolution of tensionresults. Not the consistent efforts of thebeliever himself are decisive, as occurs inthe rigorous self-control practiced by theascetic or the mystic; rather, action isperpetually referred to an authority outsidethe self in possession of unlimited religiouspowers. For this very reason, ethicalobligation as the specific arena of religiousaction is suppressed in behalf of an attitudeof formal humility, pure obedience, and a"general readiness to subject one's ownconvictions to religious authority" (1968,p. 562/340; tr. alt.). For Weber, whereverinstitutional grace is consistently applied,this attitude integrates the way of life ratherthan methodical ethical action. Only tradi-tionalism and a means-end rationaladaptation to given situations can resultfrom this salvation path (1968, pp.561-563/339-340, 566/342).

On the other hand, ritual practices insome ethical salvation religions canoccasionally exert an ethical effect uponaction. This occurs, for example, inCatholicism: ethical action in this religionresults from the sacraments as a result oftheir linkage with the belief that only thosefree from sin—or the ethically pure in thesight of God—will be saved. Since theinstitution of the Confession, however,provides the possibility for repentance fromsin, the lay believer is not psychologicallycoerced internally and continually tomonitor his action in behalf of ethicaldemands. Consequently, no premiumsreward methodical rational ways of life(1968, pp. 531-532/322-323, 560/339). Theabolition of the Confession, as occurredwith Calvinism, enhances the power ofsacraments of an entirely different char-acter to introduce ethical action. Thistook place, for example, as a result of thefrequent administration of the Lord'sSupper in all Protestant sects: participationin this ritual could occur—due to the motto"whoever does not believe and yet eats, eatsand drinks himself to judgment"—only bythose who had, in daily life, strictly upheldthe tenets of their religious doctrine. Suchobedience became an unconditional neces-sity in most of these sects due to the

lack of any possibility for absolution(1968, pp. 531-532/332-333). Nonetheless,whether this ethical action develops intomethodical rational ways of life dependsupon a whole host of further factors.

Nor can the performance of good worksgenerally lead to the placing of psycho-logical premiums upon a systematic pene-tration of the devout by the specificallyreligious dimension and to the methodicalrational ways of life. To Weber, the "book-keeping" feature of this salvation pathmeans that particular actions, dependingupon their virtuousness or wickedness, addto or subtract from the "account" of theperson in search of redemption. Since themajor concern of the faithful here involvesan external "balancing" of all accounts bythe time of death, good works can be viewedat any given point in time in relation to thedifficulty of their realization. Thus, ethicalstandards remain of a labile nature and theway of life an ethically unmethodical suc-cession of single, unrelated actions (1968,p. 533/323-324).3<'

In sum, salvation through a savior, aninstitution, ritual and good works generallyoffers redemption without awarding psy-chological premiums to the cultivation ofa "religious mood" that focusses the ener-gies of the devout upon the ethical, univer-sal, and permanent aspects of world views;nor do these salvation paths call forth acomprehensive, ethical rationalization ofaction. Instead, the feeling of grace can beattained through less rigorous means, onesthat never require a radical shattering oftraditional action or suppression of thepractical rational way of life. Whereverbelievers in possession of virtuoso qualifica-tions view the tension between "religion"and "world" as an acute one, however,different salvation paths crystallize, all ofwhich place intensive demands upon thefaithful. These paths—three in all—facili-tate the quest of the charismatic devout toovercome the "contradiction" between the"rational" religious postulate and sense-less, haphazard terrestrial life by consis-

30 Weber notes that these accounting procedurestypical of the good works path to salvation appear inCatholicism, Zorastrianism, the Hindu Karma doc-trine, and popular Judaism (1968, pp. 532-533/323-324).


tently assisting their attempts to becomeradically penetrated by the religious dimen-sion.^' Yet they differ distinctly in regard tothe degree to which they mediate the idealthrusts of world views toward methodicalethical action: unlike the "self-perfection"paths of asceticism and mysticism, salva-tion through faith regularly places psycho-logical premiums upon an ethic of convic-tion that fails to introduce rational action ofany sort, let alone a methodical rationalway of life.

The Presence of an Ethic of Conviction:the Irrational Suffusion by Faith

This attitude of unconditional inner reli-ance" upon God permeated the mysticalsects in Western Europe in the seventeenthcentury and in Eastern Europe in theeighteenth and nineteenth centuries aswell as the attitude of Jesus and Paul inancient Christianity (1968, pp. 567/434,563-564/341). It also appeared in Luther-anism as an emotional quality of utter trustthat sought refuge in God's goodness andgrace." Tinged by passion or a latent ormanifest eroticism, it arose as faith in eithera God or a savior in Suffism, the Pietistmovement led by Zinzendorf, and theHindu Vishnu sects (1968, pp. 571-572/

5/346).3'If believers possess charisma, the path to

" In essence, the introduction of paths embedded indoctrines that facilitate the rise of the "religiousmood" give a character oipermanency to the achieve-ment originally carried out, in a non-systematic man-ner, by prophets: the abolition, for believers, of "thecontradiction between daily life and the exceptional(ausseralltSglich) 'religious mood'" (1968,p. 538/326).

32 In Economy and Society, Weber's term Glaubenis translated randomly as "belief" or "faith" (see e.g.,pp. 563-572/340-346). I will use "inner reliance,""faith," and "trust" here synonymously.

3' This took place even though this religion's"justification by faith" placed strong psychologicalpremiums upon vocational activity in the world (see1968, pp. 571-572/345-346).

3'» The salvation path based upon faith appears alsoon several occasions in a manner such thatpsychological premiums are not placed upon a"religious mood." Perhaps the lay Catholic's//derim'plicita in his institution may be the most prominentexample. This involves a "general readiness to subjectone's own convictions to religious authority" (1968,p. 566/342).

salvation through faith proves quite capableof convincing them of their redemption bysuffusing them with the "religious mood."An abandonment by the devout of con-fidence in their own powers to insuretheir salvation is common, according toWeber, wherever faith appears. No attemptis undertaken here to decipher the desires ofthe God through a cultivation of knowledgeif only because, measured against thegrandeur of, in particular, the trans-cendent, personal God, all humanly intel-lectual powers pale in significance. Simplybecause the God's nature cannot be fullyknown through cognitive processes, sal-vation through faith demands a completetrust in the Divinity's goodness. The con-tinuous trust of the Christian in his God, forexample, constitutes, to Weber, a charismathat can be maintained only by an exerciseof the will (1968, pp. 571-572/345-346).

The relationship to God based uponunconditional faith never places psycho-logical premiums upon efforts to sys-tematize consistently ethical action. Onthe contrary, the attitude of unshakeableinner reliance tends to locate the religiousessence in subjective emotional—or anti-rational—states. Not action, but a cultiva-tion of an attitude of complete trust in thepromises of a god or a savior, an uncondi-tional religious surrender, and a spiritualand intellectual humility is most importanthere for acquisition of the "religiousmood" (1968, pp. 567-568/343-344). Allconsequences of action, furthermore, areunderstood as fully attributed to God, andno additional attention need be paid to theca;res of tomorrow. Indeed, faith in God'sprovidence occasionally tends to lead to anacosmic indifference toward all practicalconsiderations." Thus, even though theethic of conviction based upon faithtransfers the thrust of world views in the

'5 The "religious mood" called forth by faithwholly rejects the view of asceticism—that the devoutare merely instruments of God—as a "wickedpreoccupation with purely human powers" (1968,p. 569/344). To Weber:

Salvation through faith, wherever an increasingemphasis is placed upon it in everyday religion,normally does not easily lead to an ethical and activerationalization of the believer's way of life (1968,p. 569/344).


sense that it intensively devalues terrestrialexistence and, in calling forth the "religiousmood," innerly uproots the virtuoso devoutfrom all practical rational orientations, itfails to mediate this thrust in respect to itsaction content: it never conveys the ethicalor universal aspects of world views and thusfails to bestow psychological premiumsupon either methodicd rational ways of lifeor action that shatters traditions whilerationally dominating the world (1968,pp. 569-570/344-345).

Salvation Paths that Rationalize Action:the Presence of an Ethic of Conviction

Salvation through faith reveals that ame-lioration of the acute subjective tension thatresults from a perceived radical disjunctionbetween the "meaningful" ethical universeand worldly injustice does not itself implya rationalization of action. In this case,an emotional attitude comprehensivelyfocusses the energies of the virtuoso devoutupon religious values and, as such, con-stitutes the appropriate means to reach thecertitudo salutis goal. Yet this "religiousmood" never introduces methodicalrational ways of life. Basically, the ethic ofconviction, in emancipating individualsfrom the fragmented values and occur-rences of daily life, can be best understoodas a necessary but not sufficient precondi-tion for a comprehensive rationalization ofaction. Whereas the faith salvation pathonly severs the virtuoso faithful from therandom flux of terrestrial events, themethodologies of sanctification (Heilsme-thodiken)—mysticism and asceticism—place unequivocable psychological pre-miums upon methodical rational ways of

36 It is not at all clear why Weber includes the beliefin predestination in his discussion of salvation paths(1968, pp. 572-576/346-348). It is true that he notespredestination as not only calling forth a "religiousmood" in the form of an "inner relationship to God"(1968, p. 573/346) and as an "instrument for thegreatest possible systematization and centralization ofthe ethic of conviction" (1968, p. 575/348), but also asinvolving a "demonstration of the capacity to serve asone of God's instruments in fulfilling his injunctions ina continuous and methodical fashion" (1968,p. 573/346). Nonetheless, in order to serve as a salva-tion path at all, the manner in which the belief inpredestination accomplishes all this must be detailed.

Salvation Through the Methodologies ofSanctification: the Directed Salvation-Striving of Methodical Rational Ways ofLife

Mysticism and asceticism, just as the faithsalvation path, arise largely from theattempts of virtuoso believers to overcome atension perceived as acute between theethical universe and the random sufferingof daily life. These radical paths of "self-perfection"" facilitate, just as the faithpath, the striving of the devout to becomedetached from given realities, to focus theirenergies upon the supernatural, and tobecome suffused with a "religious mood."Only this mood eliminates the believer'suncertainty regarding his state of grace.

Yet a distinction of pivotal importanceseparates these methodologies of sanctifica-tion from salvation through faith: whereasthe charismatic faithful who follow thelatter path become convinced of their stateof grace simply by an exercise of the will,the ascetic and the mystic can acquire thecertitudo salutis feeling only through sys-tematic and comprehensive procedures thatmethodically rationalize their action. Asself-perfection methodologies that unre-lentingly monitor action as well as subordi-nate everyday routine to orientations to thesupernatural realm, mysticism and asceti-cism rationalize action in a more systematicfashion than all other redemption paths. Inthe process, they call forth ethics of convic-tions of great continuity that eliminate all"irrational methods."'*

Yet Weber fails to enlighten us in this respect: hedesignates no mechanisms, psychological premiums,or standardized instructions that regularly call fortheither the "central and constant quality of thepersonality" (1968, p. 573/346) or methodical action,such as do the methodologies of sanctification (seebelow). Moreover, since the influence upon the faith-ful of the belief in predestination is regularly routinizedor dependent upon supplementary salvation paths, itwill not be treated here as a separate salvation path.

''' These paths are described as "radical" becausethey consistently and methodically direct salvation-striving.

'* The "acute" form of salvation through self-perfection, which aims to produce ecstatic states ofmental aberration (Entrticktheit) or possessionthrough the breaking down of all natural inhibitions,leaves scarcely a trace upon everyday action. There-fore, it will not be considered further here (see 1968,p. 535/325.

76

The particular character of the certification ofsalvation {HeilsbewUhrung) and thus of theassociated practical conduct is fundamentallydifferent according to, above all, the' characterof the promised salvation, the possession ofwhich implies blessedness. Salvation may beviewed as the distinctive gift of active ethicalaction performed in the awareness that goddirects this action, i.e., that the actor is aninstrument of god. We shall designate thistype of attitude toward salvation, which ischaracterized by a methodical procedure forachieving religious salvation, as "ascetic".. . . But the distinctive content of salvationmay not be an active quality of action, that is,an awareness of having executed the divinewill; it may instead be a subjective conditionof a distinctive kind, the most notable form ofwhich is "mystic illumination." This too is. . . only to be achieved as the end product of asystematic execution of a distinctive type ofactivity {TUtigkeit), namely "contemplation."Contemplation requires, if to succeed inachieving its goal of mystic illumination, theextrusion of all everyday mundane interests.(1968, pp. 541/328, 544/330; emph. orig:tr. alt.).

Unlike the faith salvation path or thepaths that introduce neither an ethic ofconviction nor methodical rational ways oflife, the self-perfection paths transfer theuniversal, permanent, and ethical idealthrusts of their respective world views in aconsistent fashion into the salvation-striving process. They, and they alone, inWeber's terminology, "direct" the searchfor salvation in a permanent and intensivemanner that places psychological incentivesupon methodical rational ways of life.''

Mysticism: Meditational Techniques asFormally Rationalizing Action DirectedToward a "Flight from the World." Themystic, just as the exemplary prophet,escapes earthly senselessness and attains a"religious mood" by immersing himselfinto his immanent, impersonal God.'"' Only

39 See below, p. 78.'"' That mysticism is a path to salvation rather than a

goal is clear from the table of contents of the"Sociology of Religion" chapter in the Germanedition (Wirtschqft und Gesellschaft) as well fromEconomy and Society, pp. 545-546/331 and 529/321.Paragraph 10 in this chapter (Die ErIOsungswege undihr Einfluss auf die Lebensftihrung) discusses all thesalvation paths, both radical and non-radical. The

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

the extraordinary subjective condition inwhich the devout seek to become "One"with this acosmic Force can convince themof their salvation (1946d, pp. 289/261-262;1968, pp. 548-550/332-333).

Accordingly, this virtuoso attains "gnos-tic knowledge" only when he minimizesactivity by withdrawing from everydaymundane interests, practical routines,satisfactions, and temptations:

The mystic . . . minimizes activity just becauseit can never give him certainty of his state ofgrace, and what is more, because it may diverthim from union with the divine (1968,p. 547/332).

Action in the world must.. .appear as endan-gering the absolutely irrational and other-worldly religious state (1946c, p. 325/539; seealso p. 342/556).

Consequently, no psychological premiumsreward practical action in the workadayworld, all types of which—includingeconomic action—are considered to be"meaningless."'" Furthermore, because themystic views terrestrial success as devoid ofall significance for his redemption and asdistracting him from his god of serving as a"vessel' of the ethical Being, he remainsfully resigned and indifferent to the institu-tions of the world.

Thus, for this charismatic figure, theattempt to experience the "quietness andinwardness of God" through a perfec-tion of self always requires, in accord withhis world view's ideal thrusts, a radicaldevaluation of the "irrational," frag-mented events of daily life, a rejection ofthis-worldly values, and a "fleeing from theworld." Yet how is such a thoroughgoingbreak from everyday life to be achieved? ToWeber is takes place through formalrationalization processes of a comprehen-sive nature that facilitate an "energetic con-centration" upon meditational techniques

Economy and Society table of contents confuses thisissue by dividing the discussion of these paths intothree subsections (ix-xi).

*' Thus, viewed strictly, not a rationalization ofaction is here involved, but a withdrawal from allaction. Nontheless, a methodical rationalization of allenergies is apparent. Weber employs the term TUtigkeit(activity).

THE RATIONALIZATION OF ACTION

and certain "truths," an elimination of themind's continuous chatter, and anevacuation of the consciousness. The mysticcan thoroughly defend himself against allintrusions from nature and his socialenvironment only through utilizing suchtechniques. They, in turn, allow a suffusionby the cosmic Oneness as well as anexperiencing of the deep holy peacefulnessburied within every individual (1968,p. 546/331).

This salvation-striving through formalrationalization processes, even thoughcharacterized by an intellectual-theoreticaldirection*^ still calls forth an ethicalsystematization and methodical rationalway of life based upon an ethic of convic-tion. Only such a rationalization enables themystic to feel himself as penetrated fully bythe Divine immanent Being and, thus,as certain of his state of grace (1946cpp.325-26/538-539; 1968, pp.545-46/330-31; 1958, p. 332/366). The ascetic alsoattains the perseverantia gratiae through aunification with his God, yet his methodicalrational way of life diverges sharply fromthat of the mystic.''̂

Asceticism: the Substantive Rationalizationof Action Directed Toward "Dominationof the World." If methodical, Weberdesignates as asceticism the search forsalvation through "active ethical behaviorperformed in the awareness that God directsthis behavior" (1968, p. 541/328; myemph.). Attainment of the "religiousmood" involves for the ascetic a perfectionof himself as an instrument of his Godcapable of systematically introducingethical values into his own life and into hisreligious milieu, whether a cloister (other-worldly asceticism) or society as a whole(inner-worldly asceticism). As the earthly

*2 Occasionally, Weber describes this formal ratio-nalization as a "negative" rationalization of action.This is the only case when formal rationalizationprocesses fail to take mundane action as their point ofreference. "Intellectual-theoretical" refers here, asusual, to a direction for the pursuit of salvation: flightfrom the world. It must be kept distinct from theoret-ical rationalization processes, a concept with a moregeneral centrality in Weber's sociology (see Kalberg1980, pp. 1159-1177).

•" Although certain aspects of asceticism can beclearly found in mysticism (see 1968, pp. 544-551/330-334).

77

executors of an omnipotent Deity's Com-mandments, all ascetics feel obliged topattern their lives in a systematic andorderly fashion: they can convince them-selves of their salvation only if they demon-strate a capacity to integrate their actionsrationally in regard to "meaning," means,and end. These actions, all of which areendowed with psychological premiums,must be governed by principles and rulesunconditionally consistent with the ethicalnorms of religious virtue (1968, pp. 541/328, 549/333).

For the ascetic . . . the sensing (Erfassung) ofthe divine through emotion or consciousness isof central significance. In his case, however,and when he does so through emotion, theexperiencing of the divine is, so to speak, of a"motor" type. This "feeling" exists when heis conscious that he has succeeded inbecoming, through rational ethical actioncompletely oriented to God and an instrumentof his God (1968, p. 546/331; tr. alt.).

Above all, all natural drives, sexual ties,affectual expressions, elements of passion,spontaneous enjoyments, and othersymptoms of man's inconstant, irrationalnature become viewed by the ascetic asdiabolical threats to a continuous con-centration upon the aim of salvation.

Every "rational" asceticism worked atassisting persons to assert and render viable, inopposition to the "emotions," their "con-stant motives," especially those which theyhad, through drill, "exercised" upon them-selves. . . .This was important because asceti-cism aimed to assist the believer to be able tolead an alert, conscious, and intelligent life.This was the goal of asceticism: to placeorder into the way of life of believers andto destroy the spontaneous and impulsiveenjoyment of life. This was the most urgenttask (1930, p. 119/117 [tr. alt.]; see alsopp. 118-119/116).

Yet how can a taming of all natural drivesand a renunciation of all worldly pleasuresin behalf of a strict adherence to ethicalcommandments take place? Such a thor-ough penetration by their God's ethicaldemands can occur only when the devoutsucceed, as is the case with mysticism, insubstituting a dependence upon the world


and nature by conscious, methodicalorienting of their ways of life exclusively tothe "meaningful" ethical universe and theattainment of the perseverantia gratiaestate. Work, above all, when performed in asystematic manner such that it regulates allemotions and desires, is viewed by theascetic as an invaluable means for self-control and a focussing of the consciousnessupon the purely religious goal. Moregenerally, acquisition of the inner feeling ofgrace by this religious actor usually entails amethodical rationalization of terrestrialaction in behalf of the constellation ofethical values implied in his salvationdoctrine. No formal rationalization pro-cesses directed toward a quieting of theself, a minimizing of mundane activity, andan intellectual-theoretical "flight from theworld" characterizes the ascetic's way oflife, as is the case with the mystic. Instead,this virtuoso's search for redemptionnecessarily assumes a practical-ethicaldirection that involves a "domination ofthe world": a comprehensive substantiverationalization of mundane action prevailshere if only because this action aloneconvinces the ascetic that he serves as theearthly instrument of his demanding God.Thus, psychological premiums are awardedto methodical rational ways of life thatconfront the random character of everydaylife and rationally order it to conform"*̂ to

** This point should not be misinterpreted. The factthat the psychological premiums asceticism andmysticism place upon action mediate completely theideal thrusts of their respective world views towardmethodical rational ways of life should not beconstrued to imply that cognitive consistency and idealthrusts causally call forth these salvation paths. Again,various paths may arise; some are empowered to block(partially or completely) various ideal thrusts; otherstransfer them (partially or completely). An entire hostof factors always contributes to the formation of eachpath. Above all, to draw such a causal implicationwould indicate a confusion of cognitive orientations,which relate to ethical universes, with psychologicalpremiums, which are intimately bound up with thesearch for salvation as manifest in paths, goals,promises, and other aspects of salvation doctrines.World views alone, as Tenbruck argues, are never, inWeber's analysis, endowed with the power to placepsychological premiums upon action. Due to the inter-vening role played by doctrines, no necessary causalrelationship exists at all between ideal thrusts andpsychological incentives. The asceticism of theCatholic monk, for example, arose even though the

the mighty Deity's ethical prescriptions.*^Despite the differences in the character

and direction of salvation-striving intro-duced by the self-perfection paths, bothmysticism and asceticism, as methodologiesof sanctification, require believers torationalize their ways of life in the mostrigorous fashion if the religious mood is tobe acquired and maintained. Just thisradical penetration by and focussing uponthe religious dimension, regardless ofwhether it takes the form of a withdrawalfrom everyday reality or a mastery of it,makes for a radical devduation of thefragmented character or everyday life anddaily interests. All non-divine, "ordinarythings of life" as well as the symptoms ofman's status naturae creatureliness, since"meaningless" for the pursuit of redemp-tion, are viewed as belonging to the realm ofthe "ethically irrational." They are there-fore understood as threats to the consciouspossession of the certitudo salutis. In sum,both mysticism and asceticism place psy-

God that anchored this religion's world view wasfundamentally less monotheistic than Yahwe (see1946c, pp. 324-325/538) in ancient Judaism, a religionthat never introduced asceticism (see e.g., 1968,p. 498/303). Moreover, as noted, psychologicalpremiums are often placed upon action inconsistenteven with a religion's official teachings; for example,Calvinist asceticism arose as a fundamentally"irrational" by-product of the Calvinist doctrine ofpredestination (1930, pp. 78/62). Likewise, mysticismcongealed for a variety of purely religious reasonsunrelated to the Indian world view (e.g., the quietisticcharacter of its carrier stratum of intellectuals). Thisremains the case even though its ideal thrusts, given thehighly cognitive orientations of the mystic virtuoso,were undoubtedly causally more important than in therise of asceticism. Furthermore, salvation doctrinesnever crystallized in Confucianism. As a consequence,the ethical, permanent, and universal features of thisreligion's world view were never either transfered intoaction or mysticism, nor were they transformed (seep. 83). These issues simply cannot be grasped by theconceptual frameworks employed by Schluchter (1979,1981, 1989) or Tenbruck (1980)/Habermas (1984).

^' The sacred promises and salvation routes ofeach sanctification methodology appear wholly"irrational" when viewed from the perspective ofthe other (see e.g., 1930, pp. 26/11-12; 1946c,pp. 325-326/538-539). To the ascetic, mysticism'sindifference to the world simply demonstrates areligiously sterile "indolent enjoyment of self" and areprehensible deification of the creaturely. The mystic,for his part, views the rationalization of worldly actionas endangering his religious state and as an "entangle-ment in the godless ways of the world [and] a


chological premiums upon action thatsevers the faithful from mundane life andhuman desires."^ In doing so, these paths,just as salvation through faith, amelioratethe acute subjective tension that resultsfrom the virtuoso's perception of a severe"contradiction" between the comprehen-sive purposefulness of world views andearthly misery and random injustice.Indeed, the penetration by sacred values isso complete that all physical and psycholog-ical capacities become tightly bound withinthe specifically religious component. Eventhough acting within the "irrational" ter-restrial environment, the longing of thesebelievers for the inner charismatic states ofeuphoria that convince them of their salva-tion precludes an acknowledgement of dailytasks as divorced from religious goals."'

Mysticism and asceticism, just as doessalvation through faith, facilitate attain-ment of the ethic of convictioh in which

complacent self-righteousness" (1946c pp. 325-326/539). To the mystic, involvement within the realm ofhuman creations, because it subjects the individualto the insoluble tensions and contradictions thatinherently burden terrestrial existence, invariablydistracts him from his search for a unity with his God.The mystic's aim to "empty" his consciousness of allworldly experience and interests and to make himself"equal to ether" absolutely indicts the asceticist idealof rationally ordering a religious milieu as a barbaricgreed for life (1958, pp. 332/367, 338-339/372-373;1951, pp. 179/464-465; 1968, p. 546/331). To theascetic, on the other hand, "the contemplative mysticappears not to be thinking of God, the enhancement ofhis kingdom and glory, or the fulfillment of his will,but rather to be thinking exclusively about himself"(1968, p. 547/331). Weber contrasts the effect onconduct of asceticism and mysticism on severaloccasions (1968, pp. 544-551/330-334, 621-(>29/377-378; 1946c, pp. 325-326/538-540, 338-340/552-553; and 1946d, pp. 289-291/261-263).

••* "When they attain the level of an ethic of convic-tion, the methodologies of sanctification implypractically an overcoming of particular desires oremotions of raw human nature that had not hithertobeen controlled by religion. Whether this involvedcowardice, brutality, selfishness, sensuality or someother natural drive as the one most capable of divertingthe believer from his charismatic religious mood mustbe assessed for each particular religion" (1968,p. 540/328).

^' The methodical procedures of mystics andascetics also stand in a relationship of antagonism tothe sporadic ecstatic states sought through orgy andsorcery in all primitive religions as well as in oppositionto the regular worship forms conducted by ritualpriests (see 1968, pp. 541-563/328-3

sacred values penetrate the devout fully.They diverge distinctly, however, in theextent to which they confront magic.

Mysticism and Asceticism: Magic and theRationalization of Action. Even thoughmystics and ascetics act in strict conformitywith the ideal thrusts of their respectiveethical universes and rationalize their actioninto methodical rational ways of life basedupon ethics of conviction, only the ethicalaction of the ascetic takes place in theworld. The capacity of the salvation path ofasceticism to transfer systematically theethical dimension of the world viewanchored by the anthropomorphic God intothe arena of daily action proves decisive inthis respect. Since manifest as ethical Com-mandments, this dimension undertakes torevolutionalize terrestrial milieus in behalfof the Divine Will. Whereas the intellectual-theoretical direction of the mystic'ssalvation-striving implies a radical disjunc-tion between his passive ethical action—contemplation—and "the world," no suchdivision can arise wherever a practical-ethical direction characterizes the pursuitof salvation: for the ascetic, attainmentof the certainty of grace occurs onlythrough mundane ethical action of amethodical character. This ethical actionradically opposes magic, above all due tothe latter's fragmented character and itsirrelevance for attainment of the religiousmood. Although the systematic character ofmysticism also stands in an antagonisticrelationship to magic, it tolerates the"irrationality" of earthly existence becausethis entire realm, in light of this virtuoso'saim to flee the world and immerse himself inhis immanent God, remains one of indif-ference to him.

Ironically, the extraordinary strength ofthe ascetic's power to uproot magic can betraced back in part to his fundamentally'' Janus-faced'' (Doppelgesicht) posturetoward terrestrial action: on the onehand, a turning away from the world(Weltabwendung) and even rejection of it(Weltablehnung) and, on the other hand, amastery of it (see 1946c, p. 327/540).'« As

*8 Weber notes also in this passage that the asceticobtains "magical powers." These result from theturning away from the world itself and the acquisition


noted, he understands the world as a massaperditionis and earthly existence as merelyprovisional. To the ascetic, "the world'sempirical character and ethical irrationality. . . its ethical temptations to sensualindulgence, to epicurean satisfaction, andto reliance upon natural joys and gifts"(1968, p. 548/332), as well as the worldlyvalues of "dignity and beauty, of the beau-tiful frenzy and the dream, purely secularpower, and the purely worldly pride of thehero" (1946d, p. 291/263), become notonly competitors of God's kingdom, butalso, in view of his focus upon purelyreligious values, "meaningless.""" Yet theascetic's devaluation and even ethicalrejection of terrestrial life fails to lead to awithdrawal from the worldly "naturalvessel of sin" into mystical contemplation.

Such a withdrawal never presents itself asa viable option to the practitioners ofasceticism; for them, a renunciation of theirGod's decree that the world conform toHis ethical commandments would betantamount to a renunciation of all chancesfor salvation. The world, as a creation ofGod and as the realm where His powersbecome effective, continues to offer theonly arena within which the devout mayacquire and retain a certainty of their stateof grace. In essence, since the mightypersonal God continues to exist as atranscendent Being who demands thefulfillment of His decrees on earth, theextent of the ascetic's ideal devaluation andeven ethical rejection of terrestrial actioncannot conform to the degree to which

of the "religious mood." Weber refers often to thischarismatic feeling state as "magical". The meansemployed in order to acquire this certitudo satutisstate—methodical ethical action—are, however, asnoted, strictly opposed to all magic.

^' "Not only do the simple 'natural' values withinthe world not guarantee salvation, but they actuallyplace salvation in jeopardy by producing illusions as tothat which alone is indispensable. . . The 'world' in thereligious sense, i.e., the domain of social relationships,is therefore a realm of temptations. The world is full oftemptations, not only because it is the site of sensualpleasures which are ethically irrational and completelydiverting from things divine, but even more because itfosters in the religiously average person complacentself-sufficiency and self-righteousness in the fulfill-ment of common obligations, at the expense of theuniquely necessary concentration on the active achieve-ments leading to salvation" (1968, pp. 542/328-329).

religion-oriented action in the world ispractically rejected. Mundane ethical actionof a systematic character remains the mosteffective means for ascetics to acquirea certainty of their redemption (1968,pp.543-545/329-330, 548/332; 1951,p. 227/513).

For this reason, the ascetic's "domina-tion of the world" and the practical-ethicaldirection of this salvation-striving involvenot simply a "naive 'affirmation of theworld' of unbroken humanity, as inAntiquity and lay Catholicism" (1946d,p. 291/263), but an intensified continuity ofaction. If fidelity to the demands of theCreator God can be proven only within a"meaningless" realm saturated by wickedtemptations, an extreme concentration ofall energies upon the purely religious spherebecomes necessary. The world, as a conse-quence of its ethically "irrational" char-acter, becomes a "task" and a challengefor ascetics that enables them, amidsttheir struggles against terrestrial pleasuresand their attempts to rationalize actionto conform to their God's command-ments, to prove the depth of their convic-tion in service to their God (1951,p.238/525; 1968, p.534/329; 1946d,p. 291/263). In this manner, psychologicalpremiums upon the ascetic's methodicalrational way of life are intensified. To thesame degree "irrational" and fragmentedmagic become all the more throughlysuppressed.

THE RATIONALIZATION OF ACTIONIN THE RELIGIOUS SPHERE

This reconstruction of Weber's analysis ofthe rationalization of action in the domainof religion must be completed by a sum-mary overview. The ideal thrusts of worldviews and the capacity of religious qualifi-cations as well as particular salvation goalsand paths to either convey or thwart theseideal thrusts will remain central. As hasbeen stressed throughout, Weber, unlikemany sociological theorists of religion,retains as his focus, through his notion of asociological locus for action, the meaning-ful action of individuals. The constraintsand opportunities that surround each locusare constituted from, in this domain, the


believer's awareness that certain action-orientations improve relations to thesupernatural realm. In the case of salvationreligions—the main concern here—theseconstraints and opportunities clearly punishand reward, thereby defining action thatassists and even insures the salvation of thedevout, and other action to be avoided.Moreover, they place psychological pre-miums upon appropriate action.

World views constitute the substantiverationalities that provide the most funda-mental loci for religion-oriented action. Inarticulating the coherent purposefulness ofthe universe and in addressing "the ultimatequestion of all methaphysics" (1968,p. 451/275) by explaining earthly suffering,they offer to the devout the opportunity toorient their action systematically and in aninternally consistent manner to the super-natural. In essence, these ethical universes"take a stand in the face of the world" andchallenge the faithful to focus their actionaway from the random nature of terrestriallife and upon the religious realm. Asopposed to the primitive conception of thesupernatural, which divides the religioussphere into discrete arenas ruled over byevanescent and specialized spirits, localdemons, or functional gods and thus offersa supernatural justification only for frag-mented action, world views are character-ized by ethical, universal, and permanentfeatures. For the devout, just thediscrepancy between the rational transcen-dent domain viewed as a "meaningfultotality" and random earthly occurrencesand injustices sets in motion, according toWeber, an autonomous thrust. Thiscognitive thrust not only unequivocablyopposes the heterogeneity of empiricalevents, orientations to pragmatic interests,and all primitive religions, but also providesthe transcendent point of reference thatoffers a comprehensive "meaning" to lifeand legitimates religion-oriented methodi-cal ways of life. In Weber's analysis, thehegemony of dualistic world views overmonism exists as the most general precondi-tion for the systematic rationalization ofreligion-oriented action. Yet the sheerpower of cognitive thrusts to motivateaction is far less than that of psychologicalpremiums.

Despite his acknowledgement of theimportance of world views as loci and hisrecognition of their necessity as super-natural frameworks if methodical rationalways of life are to develop (1946c,p. 324/537; 1946d, p. 280/252), Weberadmonishes his readers repeatedly to avoidequating the comprehensive ideal andmerely cognitive thrusts that these ethicalorders set in motion with the rationalizationof action as such. As we have seen, this rela-tionship holds only under certain circum-stances (see e.g., 1946d, p. 280/252). Forhim, an understanding of how a worldview's ideal thrusts are transferred intoeveryday action cannot result from anexamination of these religious postulatesand their content alone, as Tenbruckimplies. This relationship is far more com-plicated and the value configurationarticulated by world views requires morethan a cognitive element if to be effectively"transferred" into the action of believers;this tranference takes place only after avariety of purely religious mediating factorshave crystallized. The presence of an ethicaluniverse provides merely the potential for aradical rationalization of action. Whetherthe ideal thrusts of world views indeed callforth methodical rational ways of lifedepends upon the presence of salvationreligions, virtuoso religious qualifications,the presence of the enduring "religiousmood" as the salvation goal, and theexistence of either of the methodologies ofsanctification—asceticism or mysticism—as the salvation path.'"

5" Although this reconstruction can be correctlyunderstood as opposing the interpretations byTenbruck (1980)/Habermas (1984. pp. 143-216) andSchluchter (1979, pp. 11-64; 1981, pp. 39-69; 1990),all of which emphasize world views at the expense ofpurely religious (as well as non-religious) intermedia-ting factors, it does not call into question one ofWeber's most well-known statements:

Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directlygovern man's action. Yet the "world images" thathave been created by "ideas" have, like switchmen,very often determined the tracks within which actionhas been pushed by the dynamic of interests (1946d,p. 280/252; tr. alt.; see Kalberg 1985).

It does, however, argue that a focus upon this postulateas a means of explaining religion-oriented action omitstoo much and, in the end, distorts the Weberian


Very frequently, salvation goals andpaths thwart the ideal thrusts of worldviews. Most paths do so by failing to placepsychological premiums upon the ethicallyrigorous action that severs believers fromgiven realities, the prerequisite for atransmission of the "meaningful totality's"ethical, permanent, and universal features.Just such a concentration upon the super-natural realm and a casting of the salvationsearch away from an "adaptation to theworld" becomes necessary only when thedevout seek to attain the "religious mood."Yet even acquisition of this mood does notitself imply either a direct transference ofthe world view's ideal thrusts or therationalization of action, as the faithsalvation path illustrates. For this to occur,salvation-striving has to acquire theintellectual-theoretical or practical-ethicaldirected character introduced respectivelyby the radical salvation paths: mysticismand asceticism. Only these methodologiesof santification are, in effect, "infiltrated"

analysis by implying a priority to world views overother purely religious variables in particular and to thereligious sphere over worldly spheres in general(Kalberg 1979; Riesebrodt 1980; Winckelmann 1980).In effect, it fails to understand world views as merecognitive ideal thrusts not only distant from thereligious concerns of most believers, but also as quitecapable of being upset and even changed by a host ofintermediary factors. The skewed emphasis ofTenbruck, Schluchter and Habermas derives in partfrom the attempt to discuss the rationalization themewithout either focussing their analyses squarely uponthe issue of the rationalization of action or distin-guishing unequivocally between the level of worldviews on the one hand and action on the other. Hadthey done so, the crucial distinction Weber makesbetween cognitive consistency as it relates to thedynamically autonomous ideal thrusts of world viewsand psychological premiums upon action—all of whichdirectly involve the critical certitudo salutis ques-tion—would have become apparent, as well as the fargreater strength of the latter to influence action. Theabolition of magic in Calvinist asceticism, for example,resulted much more from the psychological premiumsthis religion placed upon methodical ethical action inthe world than from either theoretical rationalizationprocesses carried out in reference to the problem oftheodicy or an "internal logic of religious rationaliza-tion," as Tenbruck asserts (1980, pp. 334-342).Indeed, not primarily a cognitive pondering of thisdilemma directly made for religious development in thesense of an alteration of world views, salvation goals,and salvation paths, but believers' more immediatequestion of what type of action might enable them toacquire a certainty of salvation.

consistently and comprehensively by worldviews and above all by the respective con-ceptions of God and the sacred valuesthey imply. Only they, in introducingcorresponding psychological premiums,succeed in transferring the ideal thrustsof salvation religions effectively (1968,pp. 553/335, 541/328; 1927, p. 310/364).5'

All the remaining paths—through asavior, an institution, ritual, and goodworks—because they generally appear incombination with entirely different salva-tion goals and lay religious qualifications,effectively block the ideal thrusts of boththe Indian and the Judaeo-Christian worldviews. They do so by offering redemptionfor the performance of action not strictly inconformity with these autonomous thrusts.None of these paths articulate psychologicalpremiums that require, for attainment ofthe certainty of salvation, a continuousorientation to purely religious values or asystematic patterning of action into metho-dical rational ways of life based upon ethicsof conviction. Confucianism, on the otherhand, represents in this respect the extremepolar case: although this world religiondistinguishes itself clearly from primitivereligions by articulating a world view, itnever became a salvation religion. Conse-quently, no purely religious means existedfor a transference of the Confucian worldview's ethical, universal, and permanentideal thrusts into daily action. Weber callsattention to the complexity of the manner inwhich world views influence action bynoting, for example, that a whole series ofintervening factors need to fall into placeif the Judaeo-Christian ethical universeanchored by the transcendental God is tolead to asceticism:

5' Again, this transference itself implies nothingregarding the causal relationship between the idealthrust and these radical salvation paths. These pathsarose for a variety of purely religious reasons. This isthe context for an important passage:

Neither religions nor men are open books. Theyhave been historical rather than logical or evenpsychological constructions without contradiction.Often they have borne within themselves a series ofmotives, each of which, if separately andconsistently followed through, would have stood inthe way of the others or run against them head-on.In religious matters, "consistency" has been theexception and not the rule (1946d, p. 291/264).


The conception of the supramundane God . . .has been especially important for the activeand the asceticist direction of the quest forsalvation . . . However, this intimate connec-tion . . . is not absolute . . . Jewry developedmysticism, but it developed hardly anyasceticism of the Occidental type. And earlyIslamism directly repudiated asceticism . . .Important though it was, the conception of asupra-mundane God, in spite of its affinity toemissary prophecy and active asceticism,obviously did not operate alone but always inconjuction with other circumstances. Thenature of religious promises and the paths ofsalvation which they determined were para-mount among these circumstances (1946c,pp. 324/538; see also 1968, p. 622/374).

Religion, to Weber, in articulating anarray of constraints and opportunities thatshape action, is unequivocally endowedwith the power to uproot meaningful actionfrom its amorphous flow, to provide it withcontinuity and regularity and even, at times,to rationalize it, indeed to such an extentthat it acquires a methodical and ethicalcharacter. This detailed reconstruction ofWeber's sociology of religion explicitlyfrom the point of view of the influence ofthe supernatural upon action has sought toindicate—in a more systematic and succinctfashion than Weber ever did—the mannerin which the relations of believers to thetranscendent realm may call forth patternedand even rationalized action." Salvationpaths have been pivotal in this analysis: indirectly bestowing psychological premiumsupon action, they provide the mostimmediate and effective loci for religion-oriented action. Of course, as is the case foraction-orientations indigenous to eachdomain, whether action influenced by thelife-sphere of religion effectively opposesaction-orientations originating, for exam-ple, in the economy, law, or domina-tion domains remains, for Weber, an openand empirical question to be investigated ona case-by-case basis.

REFERENCES

Bellah, Robert N. 1964. "Religious Evolution."American Sociological Review 29 (March): 353-374.

52 Indeed, this reconstruction has aimed to be moresystematically centered upon the issue of therationalization of religious action than is Weber's.

Bendix, Reinhard, 1971a. "Japan and the ProtestantEthic." Pp. 188-206 in Scholarship and Partisan-ship, by Bendix and Guenther Roth. Berkeley: TheLlniversity of California Press.

. 1971h. "Discussion on Industrialization andCapitalism." Pp. 154-161 in Max Weber andSociology Today, edited by Otto Stammer andtranslated by Katherine Morris. New York: Harper& Row.

DObert, Rainer. 1989. "Rationalitat und Rational-isierung im Werk Max Webers." Pp. 210-249 inMax Weber heute: ErtrSge und Probleme derForschung, edited by Johannes Weiss. Frankfurt:Suhrkamp.

Habermas, JOrgen. 1985. The Theory of Communica-tive Action, vol. 1. Translated by ThomasMcCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press.

Kalberg, Stephen. 1979. "The Search for ThematicOrientations in a Fragmented Oeuvre: the Discus-sion of Max Weber in Recent German SociologicalLiterature." Sociology 13 (January): 127-139.

. 1980. "Max Weber's Types of Rationality:Cornerstones for the Analysis of RationalizationProcesses in History." American Journal ofSociology 85 (March): 1145-1179.

. 1983. "Max Weber's Universal-HistoricalArchitecture of Economically-Oriented Action."Pp. 253-288 in Current Perspectives in SociologicalTheory, edited by Scott G. McNall. Greenwich, CT:JAI.

. 1985. "The Role of Ideal Interests in MaxWeber's Comparative Historical Sociology."Pp. 46-67 in A Weber-Marx Dialogue, edited byRobert J. Antonio and Ronald M. Glassman.Lawrence: Llniversity Press of Kansas.

Levine, Donald N. 1985. "Rationality and Freedom,Inveterate Multivocals." Pp. 142-179 in The Flightfrom Ambiguity. Chicago: The Llniversity ofChicago Press.

Riesebrodt, Martin, 1980. "Ideen, Interessen,Rationalisierung: kritische Anmerkungen zu F. H.Tenbrucks Intepretation des Werkes Max Webers."KOlner Zeitschrift far Soziologie und Sozial-psychotogie 32 (March): 111-129.

Schluchter, Wolfgang, 1979. "The Paradox of Ratio-nalization: On the Relation of Ethics and World."Pp. 11-64 in Guenther Roth and Schluchter, MaxWeber's Vision of History. Translated by GuentherRoth. Berkeley: The University of California Press.

. 1981. The Rise of Western Rationalism.Translated by Guenther Roth. Berkeley: TheUniversity of California Press.

-. 1984. "Max Weber's Religionssoziologie: einewerkgeschicht liche Rekonstruction." KOlner Zeit-schrift far Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 36(December): 342-366.

-. 1987. "Weber's Sociology of Rationalism andTypology of Religious Rejections of the World."Pp. 92-118 in Max Weber: Rationality and Moder-nity, edited by Sam Whimster and Scott Lash.London: Allen & Unwin.

-. 1990 forthcoming. Berkeley: The University ofCalifornia Press.

Tenbruck, F.H. (1975) 1980. "The Problem ofThematic Unity in the Works of Max Weber." TheBritish Journal of SociotogyXXXHSept.): 316-351.


Weber, Max. (1922) 1973. "Ober einige Kategorien derverstehetideti Soziologie." Pp. 427-474 iti Gesam-melte AufsHtze zur Wissenschaftslehre (fourtheditioti), edited by Johatines Witickelmann.Tubingen: Mohr.

. 1927. General Economic History. Translatedby Frank H. Knight. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.Originally: 1923. Wirtschaftsgeschichte,eAiXeAbyS.Hellmen and M. Palyi. Munich: Duncker &Hutnblot.

-. 1930 (1958). The Protestant Ethic and theSpirit of Capitalism . Translated by Talcott Parsons.New York: Scribner's. Originally: (1920) 1972.Pp. 1-206 in Gesammelte Aufsdtze zur Religions-soziologie (hereafter GARS), vol.1. Tubingen:Mohr.

-. 1946a. "Politics as a Vocation." Pp. 77-128in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (hereafterEssays), edited and translated by H.H. Gerth and C.Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.Originally: (1958) 1971. Pp. 505-560 in GesammeltePotitische Schriften, edited by JohannesWinckeltnann. Tubingen: Mohr.

-. 1946b. "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit ofCapitalism." Pp. 302-22 in Essays. Originally:pp. 207-236 in GARS, voi. 1.

. 1946c. "Religious Rejections of the World."

Pp. 323-359 in Essays. Originally: pp. 537-573 inGARS, vol 1.

-. 1946d. "The Social Psychology of the WorldReligions." Pp. 267-301 in Essays. Originally:pp. 237-268 in GARS, vol. 1.

1951. The Religion of China. Edited andtranslated by Hans H. Gerth. New York: The FreePress. Originally: pp. 276-536 in GARS, vol. 1.

. 1952. Ancient Judaism. Translated andedited by Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale.New York: Free Press. Orginally: (1920) 1971.GARS, vol. 3.

-. 1958. The Religion of India. Edited andtranslated by Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale.New York: The Free Press. Originally: (1920) 1972.GARS, vol. 2.

-. 1968. Economy and Society. Edited byGuenther Roth and Claus Wittich. New York:Bedtninster Press. Originally: (1921) 1976. Edited byJohannes Winckelmann. Tubingen: Mohr.

-. 1972. Die protestantische Ethik: Kritiken undAntikritiken. Edited by Johannes Winckelmann.Hamburg: Siebenstern.

Winckelmann, Johannes. 1980. "Die Herkunft vonMax Webers 'Entzauberungs'-Konzeption." KdlnerZeitschrift far Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 32(March): 12-53.

Kalberg, The Rationalization of Action in Weber's Theory of Religion

Documents

Transcript of Kalberg, The Rationalization of Action in Weber's Theory of Religion