Kahancova Slovakia

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The Demise of Social Partnership, or a Balanced Recovery? TheCrisis and Collective Bargaining in Slovakia

Marta Kahancov1

AbstractThis paper analyzes the crisis effects on processes, outcomes and institutions ofcollective bargaining in national and sectoral negotiations in the Slovak Republic. Itargues that the crisis did not alter the long-term trend of gradual demise of social

partnership and trade union marginalization at the national level. At the sector level inthe metal and healthcare sectors two highly organized sectors from the public and

private domains of the Slovak economy the crisis helped consolidating bargaininginstitutions, but did not produce an improved trade union position through bargainingoutcomes. Consolidation has been reached through differing procedural changes to

bargaining in each sector: intensified bargaining due to social partners commoninterest in anti-crisis employment measures (in metal); and associational strength oftrade unions and employers organizations despite escalating post-crisis wageconflicts (in healthcare). Sector-level bargaining thus contributed to a balancedrecovery from the crisis more than national-level social dialogue.

Introduction

In the past 20 years, Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries underwent majoreconomic, political and societal changes. In Slovakia, the inflow of foreigninvestments brought economic and employment growth. Some large foreignemployers helped stabilizing the Slovak bargaining system. However, the 2008outburst of the crisis put the established bargaining system under pressure because ofdiverging interests of employers (employment flexibility), trade unions (employmentsecurity) and the government (employment stability). The aim of this paper is toanalyze how the crisis affected collective bargaining processes, substantive outcomesand institutions at national and sectoral levels.

The focus on national and sectoral levels is substantiated because of contestedtripartism and simultaneously persistent sector-level bargaining in key economicsectors. Bohle and Greskovits (2012) argued that Slovakia underwent a gradual labourexclusion from national-level policymaking. Other authors characterized this trendacross CEE as illusory corporatism because the formal existence of tripartite bodiesfailed to produce policymaking with systematic trade union involvement (Avdagic2005, Mailand and Due 2004, Ost 2000, ICTWSS database 2011, Stein 2002).However, empirical evidence from sector-level studies documents that Slovakia has areasonably established bargaining coordination and decent sector-level organization

1 Contact: Central European Labour Studies Institute (CELSI), Zvolensk 29, 821 09 Bratislava, Slovakia. [email protected] author acknowledges the financial contribution for pursuing this research within the FP7 projectGUSTO and the EC-sponsored BARSORI project (project number VS/2010/0811); and constructive comments from twoanonymous referees and the authors of other contributions in this volume.
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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of employers (Czria 2007 and 2010, EC 2013).2 Sector-level bargaining iswidespread in the public sector, including public healthcare, and in some crucial

private sectors, e.g., the metal industry. The aim of this paper is to reconcile thesecontrasting literatures and explore whether bargaining institutions, procedures andoutcomes evolve in a path-dependent way, or whether the crisis interrupted the

gradual demise of national-level social partnership while maintaining sector-levelbargaining coordination.

The sectoral analysis focuses on two key sectorsmetal and healthcarerepresentingthe private and public domains of the Slovak economy. The metal sector, especiallythe automotive industry, is strategically important for Slovakias economy andemployment. With 106 automobiles per 1000 residents, in 2007 Slovakia became theworlds largest per capita producer of motor vehicles.3 Due to extensive integrationinto international markets, the sector is highly exposed to global economic downturns.In contrast, public healthcare has not been affected by crisis through market exposure,

but through austerity and long-term reforms, creating divergent interests amonghealthcare employers and therefore a threat to coordinated bargaining. Despitevariation across these sectors in their crisis exposure, they share a high rate ofunionization and established sectoral bargaining coordination. It is thereforeinteresting to explore how the crisis influenced bargaining procedures, outcomes andinstitutions across these sectors.

Recent evidence suggests that social partnership in Slovakia played an important rolein reaching a balanced recovery through mediating and overcoming the crisis effects(Czria 2012). In result, the crisis did not have a major impact on Slovak industrial

relations (ibid.). However, this paper argues that crisis effects on bargaining are morecomplex and vary not only across national and sectoral levels but especially acrossbargaining institutions, procedures and outcomes.

At the national level, dependence on political support only brought temporaryimprovements in bargaining outcomes for trade unions (i.e., flat extensions ofcollective agreements, co-determination in company-level anti-crisis measures andinvolvement in Labour Code amendments such as the definition of dependent work).While confirming the outcomes-based weakening inclusion of labour in

policymaking, formal tripartite institutions remained stable. Bargaining procedures

underwent a temporary improvement with the introduction of the Council forEconomic Crisis, which was however abolished only a few months later.

At the sector level, the crisis did not undermine coordinated bargaining butcontributed to its consolidation in both scrutinized sectors. Instead of accelerateddecentralization, bargaining institutions remained stable during the crisis but stabilityhas been reached differently in each sector. In metal, social partners shared an interestin adopting anti-crisis employment measures and therefore remained committed to

2 Employers organization density in Slovakia (proportion of employees in employment), declined from 33% (2002) to 29%(2008). Employers organizations are notoriously absent at the sector-level e.g. in Hungary and Poland with predominance ofsingle-employer bargaining patterns. Source: ICTWSS.3 SARIO Sectoral Report on the Slovak Automotive Industrywww.sario.skhttp://www.sario.sk/?automobilovy-priemysel[accessed 3 September 2010].
http://www.sario.sk/http://www.sario.sk/http://www.sario.sk/?automobilovy-priemyselhttp://www.sario.sk/?automobilovy-priemyselhttp://www.sario.sk/?automobilovy-priemyselhttp://www.sario.sk/?automobilovy-priemyselhttp://www.sario.sk/


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bargaining coordination instead of opting out of sectoral deals. In healthcare, socialpartners lacked such common interest but bargaining remained stable because ofassociational strength of unions and employer organizations. In result, the mainchanges to bargaining procedures in metal included bargaining intensification, whilein healthcare bargaining procedures continued via third party mediation after social

partner disputes. From an outcomes perspective, trade unions were involved inadopting sector-specific anti-crisis measures especially in the metal sector. Althoughunions favour these outcomes, they benefit employers more than unions. In sum, thecrisis fuelled changes to sector-level bargaining procedures that helped consolidating

bargaining institutions, but did not produce an improved trade union position throughbargaining outcomes.

The papers findings draw on in-depth interviews and written communication withsocial partners in 2009-2012 within the FP7 project GUSTO and the EC-sponsored

project BARSORI. The author conducted 19 interviews on recent changes to contentsand procedures of sectoral collective bargaining and national social dialogue.4Additional evidence originates from a written questionnaire response of KOZ SRsvice president on trade union action regarding precarious work, national/local media,statistical information, the ICTWSS database5 and Czria (2012) providing originalevidence from a 2008 survey on social partners views on legislative changes tocollective bargaining.

The Slovak industrial relations

Since the late 1990s, the Slovak economy underwent a wide-ranging reform path toreach macroeconomic stability and employment growth. Economic growth peakedwith a 10.5% real GDP growth in 2007.6 Real wages increased in average by 3.8% in2007-2008.7 This economic success was accompanied by radical welfare staterestructuring that was left without major opposition from the public or trade unions.Several reasons can explain the lack of resistance: first, Slovak citizens aimed atcatching up with their neighbours and were willing to tolerate austerity (Bohle andGreskovits 2012: 247). Second, the contested position of Slovak tripartism andindividual responses of dissatisfied citizens yielded emigration, exit from political

participation and the rise of populism (Meardi 2011). The third reason is bargainingdecentralization and a declining trade union density (see Figure 1). Since the late1990s, the established hierarchy of social partners and bargaining institutionsaccounted for a continuing sectoral bargaining in relevant sectors without regular

pattern setting and with weak involvement of peak-level social partners.8 As companybargaining gradually strengthened, enforceability of sector/industry agreements

4Three interviews with bargaining experts from the national-level union confederation KOZ SR and employers confederationsRZ and AZZZ; 5 interviews with chief negotiators of the metal sectors trade union OZ KOVO, 3 interviews with healthcaresector trade union officials (SOZZaSS and LOZ); 8 interviews with employers associations and professional chambers leadersin metal and healthcare.5 Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 countries,1960-2010; version 3.0 (2011).6 Eurostat.7 Slovak Statistical Office ( SR).8 ICTWSS.


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weakened and bargaining coverage has been systematically declining from 51% in2000 to 40% in 2009 (see Figure 1). The reason is a declining net trade union density(from 67,29% in 1993 to 17,7% in 2008), low organization of employers (netemployer density reaching 29.2% in 2008), and a limited use of legal extensionmechanisms to increase bargaining coverage.9 Bargaining procedures and coveragevary across sectors, with some sectors being more widely covered by sectoral ormulti-employer collective agreements (e.g., metal and healthcare), and some sectorswith predominant company/establishment-level bargaining (e.g., agriculture). Wages,employment security and working conditions are the most important bargainingsubjects (Czria 2012).

Figure 1: Union density and bargaining coverage trends*

* Union density rate = net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners in employmentBargaining coverage = employees covered by wage bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage and salary earners inemployment with the right to bargaining, adjusted according to Traxler (1994)Source: ICTWSS.

The crisis

The crisis interrupted the positive economic developments in Slovakia: after the10.5% growth in 2007, real GDP growth only reached 5.8% in 2008 and plummeted

at -4.8% in 2009 before recovering at 4.5% in 2010.10

Given the strong (automotive)industry orientation of the Slovak economy, the main crisis effects concentrated at

production and labour markets. Industrial production declined by 29% and theproduction of motor vehicles in particular by almost 20% between 2008 and 2009before fully recovering in 2010.11

Such decline reinforced employer restructuring with consequences for employmentand collective bargaining. First, employers adjusted through dismissals (externalflexibility) that reverted the pre-2008 trend of declining unemployment.Unemployment grew from 9.5% (2008) to 14.4% (2010) (see Figure 2). Although

9 ICTWSS. Net density rates weighted by dependent employment.10 Eurostat.11 Eurostat, Brnglov and Kahancov (2011).


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reported collective dismissals increased in 2008 and 2009 (see Table 1), firmspreferred piecemeal dismissals to mass dismissals.12

Figure 2: Unemployment rate in Slovakia

Source: Slovak Statistical Office ( SR).

Table 1: Collective dismissals in 200720102007 2008 2009 2010

Number of registered cases 174 218 347 100Number of employers concerned 170 215 330 99Number of threatened employees 19,131 14,387 30,259 8,788Number of actually dismissed employees 10,417 10,948 23,367 6,287

Source: Central Office of Labour, Social Affairs and Family (PSVaR), Czria (2012).

Second, employers opted for working time and work reorganization (internalflexibility). Although the crisis stimulated legal changes to increase hiring/firingflexibility, large companies preferred core workforce training to dismissals (Czria2012). Temporary agency work dropped from 55,377 (2008) to 37,074 (2009)employees and continued to further decline.13 The share of part-time employment ontotal employment also declined. Third, the crisis slowed down the wage growth: thereal wage growth reached 3.3% in 2008, dropped to 1.4% in 2009 and slightlyrecovered at 2.2% in 2010.14

Policy response to the crisis focused on stabilizing employment and stimulatingconsumption. The 2007 pre-crisis Labour Code amendment introduced the definitionof dependent work and limits to prolongation of fixed-term contracts. Thegovernment adopted over 60 anti-crisis policy measures including state allowances toemployers avoiding dismissals and temporary opt-out clauses from obligatory socialsecurity contributions (Czria 2009a). The most important policy measures includetemporary flexible working time accounts (flexikonto) and short-time work (STW),

both used predominantly in the car industry after 2009 (Czria 2012). Flexikonto hasbeen introduced at the company-level at Volkswagen Slovakia before it became

12 SME (2009).13 PSVaR and http://profesia.pravda.sk/agentury-prenajimaju-firmam-uz-14-tisic-ludi-few-/sk-przam.asp?c=A110728_070525_sk-przam_p01 [accessed August 9, 2011].14 SR, Slovstat.


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subject of sector-level bargaining and the 2009 Labour Code amendment. Theimplementation of flexikonto is subject to agreement with trade unions. STW schemesaimed at avoiding dismissals through shortening the working day or week.

The crisis and national-level collective bargaining

The pro-labour government (2006-2010), which introduced the above anti-crisismeasures, also fostered the involvement of social partners in policymaking. Anti-crisis measures were subject to tripartite consultations within the Economic andSocial Council (Hospodrska a socilna rada, HSR). Social partners were alsoinvolved in the Council for Economic Crisis, a new advisory body to the government(Czria 2010). Through an openly declared cooperation with the leading political

party Smer, trade unions benefitted from several gains, including their co-determination right on flexikonto, the introduction of horizontal extensions to sectoralcollective agreements, and Labour Code amendments such as the definition ofdependent employment.

The crisis therefore initially seemed to strengthened tripartite social dialogue inprocedural terms. However, the Council for Economic Crisis was abolished already inlate 2009 and formal tripartite procedures resembled the pre-crisis situation. Inoutcomes, tripartisms role remained formal and trade union gains were temporary,

politically dependent and responsive to government action. Since the government wasalso under the influence of business lobby, the above union attitude gradually pavedthe way for more bargaining power for employers. After the 2010 government change

trade unions lost political support and thus their main resource in national-level socialdialogue. The new government abolished the erga omnes extension mechanism andintroduced higher thresholds for trade union representation at the company level.

In sum, while the crisis brought temporary gains to trade unions in terms of outcomesof tripartite negotiations, these gains did not translate into a procedural andinstitutional strengthening of tripartism. Therefore, we support Bohle and Greskovits(2012) in arguing that labour is facing a gradual marginalization from national-level

policymaking. An external shock like the economic crisis failed to revert this long-term trend.

The crisis and sector-level collective bargaining

Czria (2012: 23-24) argued that sector-level bargaining procedures remainedunchanged during the crisis, but the crisis worsened the relations between social

partners, with wage setting being the most common reason for conflicts. Compared toother CEE countries, Slovakia underwent the highest relative reductions in post-crisisincreases of collectively agreed base wages. The 5.5% increase in 2009 dropped to2.2% in 2010.15 Table 2 reports the average nominal wage increases (in company-level agreements) in selected sectors. In metal, the largest drop occurred immediately

in 2009 because of a flexible production response to world markets. In healthcare,

15 EIRO: Pay Developments2010, in: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/studies/tn1109060s/tn1109060s.htm


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post-crisis austerity measures postponed the greatest drop in collective wage increasesuntil 2010.

Table 2 Average collectively agreed nominal wage increases in %2007 2008 2009 2010

Mechanical engineeringand electric industries

6.5 7.1 5.0 3.5*

Chemical industry 5.2 4.2 4.1 3.1**Construction 6.8 6.5 5.2 3.7***Commerce and tourism 4.9 5.7 5.6 4.3Public administration 6.5 4.4 5.5 1.7Health and social care 9.5 8.0 8.8 3.0Education 6.3 4.6 6.7 1.7Source:Information System of Working Conditions (Informan systm o pracovnch podmienkach, ISPP) in Czria (2012: 25).* including metallurgy, ** including the energy sector, *** including municipal services.

While these are important findings, our analysis of metal and healthcare sectors

reveals changes to bargaining procedures in each sector. In metal, the crisis fuelledemployers preferences for individual solutions and simultaneously encouraged

bargaining coordination about feasible anti-crisis measures. In result, social partnersincentives to coordinated bargaining restored sector-level bargaining. In healthcare,escalating wage disputes led to greater use of conflict settlement mechanisms in

bargaining. Despite these differences, in both sector we find path-dependent stabilityin established bargaining institutions.

In bargaining outcomes, Czria (2012: 24-25) reports wage moderation, workorganization changes including less temporary/agency workers, redundancy pay,

conflict settlement and application of flexikonto and STW. The number of multi-employer and single-employer agreements only slightly decreased during 2008 2010.16 However, our analysis again highlights contrasts between sectors. In metal,social partners commitment to sectoral bargaining coordination produced aconsensus on adopted anti-crisis measures. Although the outcome favours employersmore than unions, unions welcome the continuity in concluding sector-level collectiveagreements. In healthcare, social partners were unable to reach consensus and

bargaining outcomes were settled through third party involvement. These findingsderive from original empirical evidence discussed below.

Metal sector bargaining

In 2008-2009, industrial production declined by 16% because of declining exportperformance.17 Besides steel and electronics, the highly export-orientedmanufacturing/car production is the strongest division of the metal sector and has

been most crisis affected. Its 20% share in industrial production (2008) droppedslightly in 2009.18 Remarkably car producers did not announce significant dismissals

16 Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family (multi-employer agreements) and the Information System of WorkingConditions (single-employer agreements).17 Association of Automotive Industry (Zdruenie automobilovho priemyslu SR, ZAP SR)18 Ibid.


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and prioritized other anti-crisis measures, e.g. flexikonto and no temporary agencywork or fixed-term contracts.19

The sector is well organized in a single sector-level trade union OZ KOVO andseveral employers associations that bargain with OZ KOVO individually. The mainlong-term challenge of the sector is bargaining decentralization, fuelled bymergers/splits among employers associations, legal changes and the state weakrolein giving employers incentives to bargaining coordination. Mergers/splits howeveralso had re-centralising effects on the car industry. ZAP SR split from otherassociations and commissioned the Federation of Mechanical Engineering (Zvz

strojrskeho priemyslu, ZSP) to bargain for the whole mechanical engineeringsubsector.

Despite the long-term bargaining decentralization trend, the crisis did not acceleratedecentralization and undermine sector-level bargaining institutions. However, thecrisis brought changes to bargaining procedures. Because of employers support torevoke horizontal extensions and introduce stricter union representativeness criteria,OZ KOVOs attitude to employers associations worsened during the crisis (Czria2012). Overcoming union dissatisfaction and employers incentives to opt out fromsectoral bargaining and adopt tailor-made anti-crisis measures, social partners found acommon stance to negotiate anti-crisis measures. Their common stance relates mainlyto employment stability of skilled workforce. Some employers aimed at preservingskilled labour and offered more generous conditions to skilled employees temporarilyin flexikonto or STW arrangements. Others increased pressures onto regular

employees to involuntarily accept STW. Finally, some employers opted for dismissalsof bogus self-employed and agency workers. With OZ KOVO being open to tailoredemployer preferences, the conclusion of annual or bi-annual collective agreementscontinued without interruption.

Bargaining outcomes refer to the adoption of anti-crisis provisions in all relevantsubsectors: mechanical engineering, electronics, and steel. In mechanical engineering,social partners signed an amendment to the 2008-2009 collective agreementstipulating STW, lockouts with 60% wage compensation, and flexikonto. In the 2010-2011 agreement, social partners reinforced their anti-crisis strategy and included

additional stipulations on joint support to legal changes aiming at lowering non-productive employer costs.20 While earlier collective agreements did not includeprovisions on temporary employment, the 2010-2011 agreement stipulates thattemporary contracts should not be prolonged and (bogus) self-employment should beminimized. Upon OZ KOVO initiative, similar provisions were agreed in electronicsand steel industrys 2010-2011 collective agreements.21

While these outcomes document the social partners efforts to actively use sector-level bargaining institutions, these provisions tend to favour employers and fuel a dual

19 EIRO; inhttp://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2009/08/articles/sk0908019i.htm[accessed September 14, 2012].20 See Brnglov and Kahancov (2011: 39) for details.21 Dismissals are stipulated in the following order: temporary agency workers, subcontractors, self-employed, fixed-termemployees, and core employees in case of labour oversupply. Upon recovery, employees should be re-hired in the opposite order
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2009/08/articles/sk0908019i.htmhttp://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2009/08/articles/sk0908019i.htmhttp://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2009/08/articles/sk0908019i.htmhttp://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2009/08/articles/sk0908019i.htm


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labour market, protecting skills and and shifting the burden of production decline ontoprecarious and less unionized workers. However, the duality does not result fromfailed trade union effort to protect outsiders, but from a deliberate strategy ofbothemployers and OZ KOVO.22

In sum, the crisis did not accelerate bargaining decentralization in the metal sector.Within the path-dependent developments and trade union dissatisfaction withemployers support to anti-union legislative changes, coordinated bargainingcontinued also during the crisis. Noteworthy changes occurred in bargaining

procedures: the social partners common stance on anti-crisis measures brought newincentives for strengthened bargaining coordination and an uninterrupted conclusionof collective agreements with anti-crisis stipulations. Bargaining intensified throughemployers and unions commitment to coordinate anti-crisis measures; and yieldedconsolidation to sector-level bargaining institutions. Finally, bargaining outcomes as adeliberate choice of both unions and employers facilitated a growing gap betweenskilled core employees (given the pre-crisis labour shortages) and employees in

precarious jobs.

Healthcare sector bargain ing

Until 2005, healthcare was covered by collective agreements for public service signedby national-level social partners. Since 2006, independent sector-specific bargainingapplies to healthcare with two sectoral trade unions directly negotiating multi-employer collective agreements with each of the four employers associations. Uniondensity reached about 50% and employer density about 80% in 2006, makinghealthcare one of the best-organized sectors in the economy (Czria 2009b).Collective agreements cover about 95% of public healthcare employees.

Crisis effects on public healthcare remarkably differ from the metal sector. Instead ofdirect exposure to overemployment and production decline, the crisis helped torelieve pre-crisis labour shortages (Kaminska and Kahancov 2011) and affectedhealthcare through public sector austerity measures. Austerity meant that healthinsurance companies received fewer funds from the state budget, which increased the

budget constraints of public healthcare providers (especially smaller hospitals). This

situation escalated conflicts in sector-level bargaining where wage increases recurredas the main point of dispute.

Despite the above crisis-induced effects, established bargaining institutions inhealthcare did not break down. However, similar to the metal sector, noteworthychanges occurred in bargaining procedures. It has been increasingly difficult toconclude agreements after 2009 because of wage disputes. In the hospital subsector,the unions concluded collective agreements with each of the two employersorganizations in 2006 and amendments thereto in 2007 and 2008. After this period,social partners bargained regularly but failed to conclude new agreements until mid

2012 when they finally reached an agreement with the Association of Faculty

22 Interview OZ Kovo, May 2011.


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Hospitals (AFN SR) but not with the Association of Hospitals of Slovakia (ANS).Between 2009 and 2012, all negotiations ended in the hands of a dispute settlementinstitution instead of a direct deal between social partners. These disputes derivedfrom differing social partner perspectives on wage rises. All mediator decisionsstipulated lower wage increases than trade unions requested.

The bargaining agenda did not change substantially and covers predominantly wages,working time, pension contributions, dismissal regulation and social fundmaintenance. Some broadening in bargaining outcomes is obvious from 2009, e.g.,training and lifelong learning, conditions for work-life balance and performance-related pay increases. These provisions are more common in hospitals with lower

budget constraints.

In sum, coordinated bargaining in Slovak healthcare shows remarkable stabilitydespite public sector austerity, causing tensions between unions and employers onwage increases. There are also other pressures onto bargaining decentralization,including frequent legal changes, attempts to legally limit trade union codeterminationrights and a major reorganization of healthcare employers associations. However,

because of a strong interest representation structure in healthcare, unions regularlyvoice their dissatisfaction with these pressures in protests, strikes and governmentnegotiations.23 In result, pressures for bargaining decentralization increased butsimultaneously created preconditions for strengthening sector-level bargaining byshifting the entire bargaining responsibility onto healthcare social partners. Theseopposite forces crystallized in social partners hands and sector-level bargaining has

not been defeated but strengthened because of the unions and employersorganizations high associational power and greater bargaining responsibilities uponpublic sector austerity measures. This continuity in bargaining procedures, despitegreater third party involvement in reaching post-crisis bargaining outcomes,contributed to consolidation of bargaining institutions.

Conclusions: A balanced recovery through collective bargaining?

Due to a strong industrial focus of the Slovak economy, crisis effects became obviousmainly through output decline, unemployment, and a greater exposure to precarious

employment. In contrast, in the public sector, especially in healthcare, the crisishelped to relieve labour shortages but brought serious austerity measures.

How did these effects influence collective bargaining in Slovakia? This paper aimedat uncovering how the crisis influenced collective bargaining procedures, outcomes,and institutions within Slovak industrial relations at the national and sector levels.

We argue that there is a dual pattern in crisis effects on bargaining at the national andsectoral levels, with a declining role of social partnership in mitigating crisis effectsthrough tripartite concertation at the national level on the one hand, and consolidation

23The 2011 campaign of the Doctors Trade Union LOZ, involving coordinated job leave threats of doctors in largest hospitals,attracted massive media interests and pushed the government to stipulate higher wages and revoke the planned organizationaltransformation of hospitals (Kahancov and Szab 2012).


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of sector-level bargaining institutions through coordinated bargaining procedures inthe studied sectors on the other hand. Moreover, we argue that the crisis not only hada differential impact on bargaining at the national and sector levels, but also across

particular sectors.

At the national level, dependence on political support brought temporary gains totrade unions in bargaining outcomes (horizontal extensions of collective agreementsand co-determination in anti-crisis measures and Labour Code amendments).Similarly, bargaining procedures only underwent a temporary improvement. From along-term perspective, we confirm the path-dependent weakening of social

partnership and marginalization of unions in policymaking based on bargainingoutcomes (c.f. Bohle and Greskovits 2012), However, the crisis did not acceleratechanges to formal tripartite institutions, which show relative stability within path-dependent developments of the overall national industrial relations system.

At the sector level, the crisis did not cause a shock to the established bargaininginstitutions in either metal or healthcare sectors. Despite remarkably different crisis-induced challenges in each sector (dismissals, STW and flexikonto in metal and wagedisputes in healthcare), coordinated bargaining was consolidated in both sectors.However, consolidation in bargaining institutions happened through proceduralchanges to bargaining, which differed across each sector. In metal, the crisis unitedthe social partners in seeking the most feasible anti-crisis measures, which producedmore intensive bargaining on collective agreements in mechanical engineering, steeland electronics. This procedural change reinforced social partners use ofestablished

bargaining channels and thus consolidated bargaining institutions instead of theirdefeat. In healthcare, pressures for bargaining decentralization originated in publicsector austerity measures that shifted bargaining responsibilities onto healthcare social

partners and also divided healthcare employers along their budgetary limits. Socialpartners continued with independent multi-employer bargaining but failed to concludecollective agreements due to escalating wage disputes. Bargaining procedures thusincreasingly occurred through third party involvement. However, the strongassociational power of healthcare unions and employers associations prevented acollapse of coordinated bargaining procedures and consolidated the established

bargaining institutions.

From the perspective of bargaining outcomes, unions were part of formulating anti-crisis stipulations (e.g. on temporary employment in the metal sector and on wages inhealthcare sector). Most outcomes favour employers (metal) or are based on amediators decision (healthcare); however, unions are satisfied with their role in the

bargaining process despite that outcomes did not foster improvements in unionsposition.

We can derive several implications for the future role of collective bargaining andtrade unions from the above arguments. First, it is relevant to ask how do

developments at the national and sector levels interact. The Slovak case documentsthat a reasonably established and functioning sector-level bargaining can contribute toa sustainable coordinated bargaining system more than formally established but


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illusory tripartism at the national level. More research is required to test thisimplication from a long-term perspective on developments in bargaining institutionsand more sectors representing the entire economy. Such evidence could revert theargument that tripartism became the hallmark of industrial relations across CEE

because it partly compensates for underdeveloped sectoral collective bargaining (c.f.EC 2013, Tatur 1995, Iankova 1998).

The second implication refers to trade union strength in facilitating a balancedrecovery from the crisis. From a process-oriented perspective, trade unions areincreasingly marginalized from national-level policymaking while they successfullyavoided marginalization from sector-level bargaining. Therefore, sectoral unions

played a crucial role in a balanced, or coordinated, recovery from the crisis. However,from the perspective of outcomes, unions failed to achieve sustainable gains forworkers or for themselves at the national and sector levels. Interestingly and incontrast with the above process-oriented argument, national-level unions succeeded inextending more protection to precarious workers (through the re-definition ofdependent employment) than sector-level unions that explicitly sidelined most

precarious workers (especially in the metal sector).

Although this paper tried to offer a comparative perspective covering the national andsector-level developments as well as a comparison of two sectors, the remainingcaveats are the generalizability of the sector-based arguments to the whole economy,and a difficulty to separate crisis-induced challenges on industrial relations fromchallenges to the long-term evolution of political economy (e.g., transition, neoliberal

policymaking, declining union density across the EU). Slovakia is still considered as acountry where the sector is the dominant bargaining level, but there are many sectorswith decentralized bargaining. Sectors studied in this paper are crucial for the GDPand employment in Slovakia. Addressing more encompassing sector-level bargainingdevelopments and the above caveats is subject to further research.

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