Ayatullah Khomeini’s Concept ofGovernance (wilayat al-faqih) and theClassical Shi‘i Doctrine of Imamate

HAMID MAVANI

The serious misgivings and apprehensions that Ayatullah Khomeini’s doctrine ofal-wilaya al-mutlaqa (the jurisconsult’s [wali-ye faqih] all-encompassing and absoluteauthority) could regress into arbitrary religious and clerical despotism (istibdad)became a reality right after Iran’s June 2009 presidential election. AyatullahsMahmud Taliqani (d. 1979) and Muhammad Kazem Shariatmadari (d. 1986)astutely foresaw this possibility in 1979, during the revolution’s early phase, andexpressed their alarm at the clergy’s excessive involvement in political affairs. Evenworse, they stated, the clergy viewed their new role as an entitlement that required noaccountability. Thus many of them compromised Islam’s integrity in the pursuit ofmore power, which led to the development of a culture of clerical elitism. Inresponse, the two ayatullahs called for the ‘clergy to return to the mosques’.1 InAyatullah Khomeini’s formulation, the jurisconsult (the supreme leader) derives hislegitimacy exclusively from God, as opposed to the people, which ruptures therelationship between society and the clergy and, moreover, places his claims beyondcontestation or deliberation. Ayatullahs Husayn ‘Ali Montazeri (d. 2010),2 YusefSaanei, Mohsen Kadivar, Bayat Zanjani, Kazemeyni Boroujerdi, MojtabaShabestari, and Mehdi Karrubi have pointed out the disparity and tension betweenthis model and the one adopted by the first Shi‘i Imam, ‘Ali b. Abi Talib (d. 661),who based his political mandate on divine bestowal (nass) and also anchored it inpublic investiture that validated his caliphate through a public oath of allegiance(bay‘a). By citing this historical model, they seek to restore public sovereignty andplace checks and balances on the jurisconsult’s power and authority as he is viewedas accountable and answerable to the public.

Ayatullah Khomeini first promulgated this concept during his 1970 series of Najaf(Iraq) lectures.3 Relying upon both rational and traditional proofs, he supportedhis case that during the messianic infallible Imam’s4 prolonged occultation, thejurisconsult, by virtue of being his indirect deputy, has both the mandate and theresponsibility not only to interpret Islamic rulings on matters of devotion andpersonal affairs, but also in the social realm, and to manage the state’s affairs onbehalf of the Imam. In other words, the jurisconsult’s authority is an extension ofthat enjoyed by the infallible Imams. This understanding reveals the intimate and

Middle Eastern Studies,Vol. 47, No. 5, 807–824, September 2011

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2011.613208

organic relationship between the Imamate and wilayat al-faqih. Ayatullah Khomeinirevolutionized the former, such that it came to be viewed as uninterrupted andcontinuous (mustamarr), with the right to rule assigned to jurists during theoccultation. He asserted that the awaited Imam’s primary function upon hisreappearance will be to defend and safeguard the Islamic state and to attainmartyrdom in pursuit of this noble cause.

In his lectures, he advocated an Islamic state led by a qualified jurisconsult whowould ensure that Islamic rulings are adhered to and implemented within the broadoutlines and general principles of the Shari‘a. Thus, his scope of authority was atleast circumscribed by the human interpretation of the nebulous concept of Shari‘a,a fact reflected in his establishing a planning council (majlis-i takhtit) rather than alegislative body. Toward the end of his life, however, he realized that traditionalfiqh could not resolve contemporary challenges, ones that had earlier forced theSunnis to invoke maslaha (public welfare) and darura (imperative necessity). As such,Ayatullah Khomeini attempted to fill this void by formally institutionalizing asuitable mechanism: the Council to Determine the Regime’s Welfare (majma‘-itashkhis-i maslahat-i nezam).5 Ultimately, he stretched wilayat al-faqih to its farthestlimit and expanded the scope of the jurisconsult’s authority even further byproclaiming, in January 1988, that this individual can bypass the Shari‘a if (in hisopinion) it conflicts with society’s general welfare and best interests.6 Just whatconstitutes this ‘general welfare’ and ‘imperative necessity’, as well as how they aremeasured, remains nebulous and vague. Moreover, the customary checks andbalances are conspicuously absent. With this proclamation, Ayatullah Khomeinielevated the state’s preservation to a primary central injunction (al-ahkamal-awwaliyya) and downgraded rituals (e.g., the obligatory prayers and fasting) tosecondary injunctions (al-ahkam al-thanawiyya). In his own words: ‘I should statethat the government, which is part of the absolute deputyship of the Prophet, isone of the primary injunctions of Islam and has priority over all other secondaryinjunctions, even prayers, fasting and hajj.’7

Over time, Ayatullah Khomeini’s concept of wilayat al-faqih expanded the jurists’scope and authority. He began by calling upon religious scholars to supervise themonarchy’s legislative and executive branches to ensure that the laws conformedwith the Shari‘a. In 1953 he modified this position by adducing proofs and evidencethat their scope of authority included governance. This shift, which occurred whilehe was in Qum and Najaf, can be seen in his Al-Rasa’il, Tahrir al-wasila, and Kitabal-bay‘. Between 1977 and 1980 he reverted to his preference for the jurists to havea supervisory role and placed greater emphasis on an ‘Islamic Republic’. While inParis in 1978, he explicitly stated that rather than seeking or accepting any officialgovernment position, he would confine himself to the supervisory role of a guide inorder to pursue the society’s best interest. Moreover, he would interject himself intosituations only when he saw treachery and deceit that would harm the publicwelfare.8 Yet this stance is hardly credible, given his vociferous support for wilayatal-faqih while in Najaf: ‘It is our duty to preserve Islam. This duty is one of the mostimportant obligations incumbent upon us; it is more necessary even than prayer andfasting.’9

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The fourth and final phase began in early 1988 and lasted until his death in June1989. During this period, he called for a full-fledged and comprehensive authoritythat would give the jurisconsult the prerogative to override Islam’s primaryinjunctions and suspend or void acts of worship or articles of the constitution ifhe deemed such actions to be in the interest of the people and the state.

His remarks during a 1978 interview in Paris, shortly before his return to Iran,should not be taken at face value, for they contain no details of his government’sstructure or of his future role and that of the religious scholars.10 It is no secret thathe subscribed to the jurisconsult’s comprehensive authority, as he explicitly pointedthis out in his 1970 Najaf lectures on Islamic government. Thus, his later remarks inParis may have been issued to placate and appease those worried about the clergy’srole in the new government. To counter this misgiving, he added that he did not wantthe clergy to involve themselves in politics because their primary function, that ofguiding the country, was a far nobler and more praiseworthy one.11

About one year after his return, Hamid Algar asked him during an interviewabout the religious scholars’ role in the new political structure. He replied:

The religious scholars do not wish to become Prime Minister or President, andindeed it is not in their interest to do so. They do, however, have a role toplay . . . the role they have is one of supervision, not of assuming executivepositions without the proper expertise . . . the expertise of the religious scholarslies in the area of Islamic law.12

After his return, however, he claimed that he could find very few non-clerical peoplecapable of governing the country in a way that would preserve Iran’s sovereignty andintegrity. Therefore, he decided to temporarily (muwaqqat) allow the clergy to enterthe political arena, asserting that they would abandon it and confine their role tosupervision and guidance as soon as capable, righteous, and trustworthy non-clericalindividuals emerged who could administer the country in the manner that Goddesires.13 These ambiguous and conflicting statements ought to be measured againsthis 1970 Najaf lectures on Islamic government, in which he categorically subscribedto the jurisconsult’s comprehensive authority with executive powers to implementthe laws of Islam instead of being confined to a limited supervisory role.

Many of the government’s critics have challenged it to hold a referendum tomeasure public support for wilayat al-faqih on the grounds that the earliergeneration has no right to impose its will on the present generation when it comes tochoosing the model of governance. Ayatullah Khomeini used this very argument inhis inaugural speech at the Behesht-i Zahra cemetery upon his return to Iran in 1979:‘what right do our fathers have to make decisions for us?’ The overwhelmingmajority of today’s Iranians never had an opportunity to vote for the 1979constitution and, as such, a referendum is needed. In the aftermath of the 2009presidential election, Ayatullah Karrubi and Hojjatoleslam ‘Abdallah Nouri calledupon the government to set aside its repressive and brutal measures to quell theprotest movement, which it claimed had only nominal support, and instead appointone day for pro-government citizens and another day for anti-government citizensto come out on the streets so that, in the absence of any show of force orintimidation, the public can make its opinion known.14 As expected, the government

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contemptuously rejected this call and construed it as a foreign plot to divide andfragment the united Iranian community, which is unstintingly loyal to the concept ofwilayat al-faqih and the current jurisconsult, Ayatullah Khamena’i. The deepdivisions within the revolution’s senior and founding members, who are locked ina power struggle, along with President Ahmedinejad and Ayatullah Khamena’i’srecent ruptured relationship over the forced resignation of Intelligence MinisterHeidar Moslehi, not to mention the country’s ongoing social and economic malaise,do not bode well for the present model of government.15

In general, Shi‘i ulama believe that certain aspects of the messianic Imam’s wilayahave been bestowed upon them since they function as his general deputies (nowwab-i‘amm) during his occultation on the basis of traditional and rational proofs.16

They disagree, however, over the scope and nature of this authority. The jurists’arrogation of certain functions, such as issuing legal opinions, adjudicatingdisagreements under the rubric of qada’ (judgeship) in matters of hisbiyya,17 andassuming trusteeship for those who need a guardian, are not in dispute. Even thosejurists who dismiss al-wilaya al-mutlaqa as lacking in evidence and outlandish admitthat the ulama are entrusted with some of his duties during his absence.

Shaykh Murtada Ansari (d. 1864), the most eminent Shi‘i jurist of the nineteenthcentury, and considered the ‘seal of the mujtahids’, delineated three functionsadvanced by jurists as having been invested in them during the occultation:(1) Issuing legal opinions and adjudicating religious issues for the laity’s benefit.There is consensus upon this view; (2) Administering justice based on extrapolationsfrom hadiths such as the maqbula (accepted tradition) of ‘Umar b. Hanzala andmashhura (well-known tradition) of Abu Khadija. There is also consensus upon thisview; (3) A jurist’s discretionary authority (wilayat al-tasarruf), which includes thepolitical domain. It is here that the jurists have not reached a consensus.18

The Usulis’ triumph over the Akhbaris as regards the use of independentjudgement (ijtihad), as well as the methodological advances made by the former,enabled Mulla Ahmad Naraqi (d. 1829) to systematically explore the nature andscope of authority vested in the jurisconsult during this period.19 Up until then, thisissue has been dealt with sporadically in different chapters of jurisprudence, such asqada’, khums, and jihad. Employing rational arguments, he advanced religiousordinances and traditions in favour of the jurisconsult’s expansive wilaya (but onlyat the theoretical level) to validate the ulama’s discretionary authority (which wasto remain within the confines of normative law [the Shari‘a]) in a form of juristicspeculation; however, these were not to be implemented. This is evident from the factthat he never tried to actualize or implement his theory. Moreover, he provided legaltools to legitimate the rule of a government headed by a non-jurisconsult andformally acknowledged and sanctioned the ruler of his time, Fath ‘Ali Shah.20

Among Ayatullah Khomeini’s contemporaries, the most eminent and reveredjurist was Ayatullah Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i (d. 1992) of Najaf, the marja‘ al-taqlid(point of reference) for the majority of the world’s Shi‘is. After having examined allof the proofs and evidence normally advanced in favour of general wilaya (thejurisconsult’s authority over the people on general issues), he proclaimed that noneof them, either individually or collectively, convincingly proved that it extends

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beyond the narrow sphere of hisbiyya. While the jurist does have a limited right ofdisposal and administration (tasarruf) on the basis of necessity and exigency tointervene in the area of hisbiyya, this exigency must be invoked only to preserve theindividual welfare. In other words, it cannot be extended to the country’s social orpublic welfare (masalih ijtima‘). In the absence of a qualified jurisconsult, thisobligation is transferred to just Muslims (wilaya ‘udul al-mu’minin):

During the occultation [of the Imam] the wilaya of the jurists cannot beestablished by reference to any proof. The wilaya is exclusive to the Prophet andthe Imams. That which is established in favor of the jurists from the hadithreports is in two fields: in adjudication or judgeship (qazawat) and issuing oflegal opinions ( fatawa) . . . accordingly, that which is established for the jurist ispermission of disposal and administration (tasarruf) but not general wilaya.21

Ayatullah ‘Ali al-Husayni al-Sistani, a student of Ayatullah Khu’i and considered tobe the most distinguished jurist of our times with a majority following among theShi‘is, espouses a similar view. In August 2010, however, he added a conditionalclause: if a faqih (jurisconsult) wants to possess wilaya in the state’s administration,he must secure the people’s general approval (maqbuliyya ‘amma).22 Some haveinterpreted this as an objection to Ayatullah Khamena’i’s fatwa, issued around thesame time, that accorded to the qualified jurisconsult the same scope of authority asthat enjoyed by the Prophet and the Imams. In fact, it viewed the jurisconsult’swilaya as deriving from that of the Imams.

Although this is the view of his mentor Ayatullah Khomeini, the issue of thegoverning jurisconsult’s degree of power and authority was left in abeyance andaccorded a low profile after Ayatullah Khomeini’s death because there was no oneof equal charismatic status ‘who had created and established his own personallegitimacy over and above both constitutional and institutional frameworks’.23

When this fatwa was placed on Khamena’i’s official website, the ensuing uproar wasso intense that it had to be removed.

Other senior government-affiliated jurists have had to enter the fray. For instance,Ayatullah Nasir Makarim Shirazi and Jawadi-ye Amuli have said in the past thateveryone, even the mujtahids and maraji‘ al-taqlid must obey the wali-ye faqih’sdecrees because this matter does not require rational proofs for its validity(ta‘abbudi).24 Ayatullah Mehdi Karrubi, a candidate in the 2009 presidential electionand an opposition Green Movement leader, sarcastically remarked that the amountof discretionary authority bestowed upon this person has expanded to such a degreethat it is unlikely that even the Prophet or the Imams had ever enjoyed so muchauthority. He added that even God would not arbitrarily act in a whimsical andunjust manner, despite the fact that He truly is the Sovereign and the Lord.25

The juridical opinion of Najaf’s Ayatullah Sistani on wilayat al-faqih is diametricallyopposed to the views of many pro-government jurists in Iran, especially thoseof Ayatullah Muhammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, director of the Imam KhomeiniEducation and Research Institute in Qum and member of the Assembly of Experts(Majlis-i khobregan), which is tasked by the constitution with choosing the

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jurisconsult.26 He is infamous for his fiery and inflammatory speeches, statements,and rhetoric, all of which have created a culture of hate and intolerance.

In the post-election debate on whether the public could hold the jurisconsultaccountable, he has vociferously championed the model of government proposed byAyatullah Khomeini, in which the public has no role in validating or holding thejurisconsult accountable. According to him, this person, whom the Assembly ofExperts discovers by the grace of God, is to be viewed as the infallible messianicImam’s deputy. As such, he is presented to the people only for the purpose ofinformation, not to obtain their consent or endorsement. If any infallible Imamsought the public’s endorsement to become caliph, this was done merely to empowerhim to carry out the reforms with the public’s assistance. In no way can it beinterpreted as meaning that the messianic Imam’s post in the socio-political domaindepends upon public approval for its validation.27

In addition, Ayatullah Mesbah Yazdi declares that the wali-ye faqih obtains hislegitimacy from God by virtue of being the messianic Imam’s indirect deputy and, assuch, the validity of the presidential election depends upon his approval andendorsement. He further asserts that obeying the president is equivalent to obeyingGod, because once the wali-ye faqih accepts the president, the latter receives thelegitimacy and benefits from the light of the former’s sacred authority. Accordingly,it then becomes religiously mandatory upon everyone to obey the president.28 InMay 2010 he asserted that one way of deducing the messianic Imam’s consent andpleasure is to seek out the jurisconsult’s (currently Ayatullah Khamena’i) opinion,suggesting that the latter is almost infallible and that his actions have been approvedby the messianic Imam.29

The recent dispute between President Ahmedinejad and Ayatullah Khamena’iover the reinstatement of the intelligence minister represents the first instance of agovernment official publicly challenging the wali-ye faqih’s decree. This hasprompted zealous supporters of Ayatullah Khamena’i, such as Ayatullah KazemSeddighi, to assert that unquestioning obedience of the wali-ye faqih is demandedbecause he has been vested with the all-encompassing divine mandate. For example,he would be within his rights to divorce a married couple without their consent.According to Ayatullah Seddighi, if the wali-ye faqih were to do this in the case ofAhmedinejad and his wife, their marriage would be over.30 Such claims represent aradical break with traditional Shi‘i understanding of Imamate and the jurists’indirect deputyship.

Ayatullah ‘Ali Sa‘idi, Ayatullah Khamena’i’s representative among the Sepahforces, made an even more bizarre and audacious claim: he warned the soldiersabout the harmful consequences that would befall them if they failed to heedAyatullah Khamena’i’s admonition, advised them not to entangle themselves withany political group or party, and told them to accept and follow the plan based uponthe jurisconsult’s strategy and directive. Moreover, they should not be concernedabout the views of others, because the jurisconsult’s edict is equivalent to that of themessianic Imam himself (hukm-i o hukm-i Imam-i zaman ast).31

In August 2010, Ayatullah Sa‘idi outlined the many internal and externalchallenges facing Iran and stated that it is passing through a critical phase. It is attimes difficult, in his opinion, for the general public to distinguish truth fromfalsehood, because advocates of every group claim to be following the Qur’an.

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In such a situation, the Qur’an cannot be made the criterion for distinguishing onegroup from another because it is subject to different interpretations and exegesis, asmentioned by Imam ‘Ali: ‘The Qur’an is a book, covered, between two flaps, and itdoes not speak. It should therefore necessarily have an interpreter. Human beingsalone can be such interpreters.’32 The only available option is to view the jurisconsultas the standard for discovering the truth and reality, because in every age God sendsa hujja (proof) to provide certainty. The reference here is, of course, to AyatullahKhamena’i. This is a daring appropriation from Shi‘i tradition, in which the Prophetand the infallible Imams are exclusively referred to as the proofs (hujaj, pl. of hujja)of God on Earth.

He continues that just as in the past, when some people who had initiallysupported Imam ‘Ali and his right to the caliphate after the Prophet’s deatheventually abandoned him and acted treacherously, such individuals exist today.In particular he mentioned Abu Dharr Ghiffari and Ammar Yasir on one side andTalha and Zubayr on the other, thereby suggesting that those who oppose the leadercan be liquidated, just as Imam ‘Ali had to fight his enemies and kill some of thosewho were Muslim and his former allies.33 Ayatullah Khamena’i also made this latterpoint in one of his June 2010 Friday sermons in Tehran. While commemorating theanniversary of Ayatullah Khomeini’s death, he mentioned that Imam ‘Ali hadfought with resoluteness and determination and, likewise, that Ayatullah Khomeinihad shown no leniency to those who had betrayed the revolution. In fact, he hadthem executed although they had been quite close to him and had accompanied himon the plane to Tehran in February 1979.34

The post-election crisis and Ayatullah Khamena’i’s inability to contain it,35 alongwith his unequivocal preference for Ahmedinejad,36 both of which destroyed anyappearance of impartiality and instead encouraged factional politics, has given freshmomentum to a critical interrogation of the merit and validity of AyatullahKhomeini’s interpretation of wilayat al-faqih.37 The hazard of such blind imitationand emulation (taqlid) was brought to the fore in November 2002 by Dr. HashimAghajari, an Iranian professor of history, during one of his lectures in Hamadan(Iran), entitled ‘FromMonkey to Man: A Call to Islamic Protestantism’: ‘The peopleare not monkeys who merely imitate. They understand and react, and they try toexpand their own understanding, so someday they will not need the teacher.’38 Hiscomments, viewed by the Islamic revolutionary court as pejorative and denigratingto the jurists’ honour and dignity, earned him a death sentence.

Among jurists, the pre-eminent role of critically analysing Ayatullah Khomeini’sconcept of governance has been undertaken by Ayatullah Montazeri,39 his one-timedesignated heir and protege (he was removed in 1989), who attempts to re-conceptualize it by adding democratic principles. The end result is something calledthe ‘electoral and limited guardianship of the jurist’ (velayat-i entekhabi-yemuqayyadeh-ye faqih).40 He has met with questionable success, however, becauseeven in this revised form the jurist’s mandate could easily approach authoritarian-ism. Before this radical shift from full-fledged authority of the jurisconsult whichundermined popular sovereignty, to his supervisory role in politics,41 he had writtena four-volume Arabic-language work to justify the legitimacy and validity of

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Ayatullah Khomeini’s concept by citing Qur’anic verses and hadiths, as well as byusing reason (‘aql); however, his interpretation was quite anomalous within Shi‘ischolarship.42 In this work, he advocated concentrating authority in the jurisconsult,who would be chosen not by the people but rather selected on account of hisproficiency and expertise in temporal and religious matters. At the same time hebegan to express his own views forcefully, views that were diametrically opposed toAyatullah Khomeini’s, on matters dealing with the state administration and thetreatment of political prisoners. As a result, Ayatullah Khomeini removed him fromthe post of succession about two months before he died.

When Ayatullah Montazeri became even more vocal, his seminary classes werecancelled, his assets (part of the religious dues sent to him by his followers) werefrozen, and his movements were curtailed. He had argued in the past that thepeople who had written the constitution had never intended to endow thejurisconsult with absolute power and thus render him immune from criticism:

He can never be above the law and he cannot interfere in all the affairs,particularly the affairs that fall outside his area of expertise, such as complexeconomic issues, or issues of foreign policy and international relations. Themost important point to be highlighted is that Islam is for the separation ofpowers and does not recognize the concentration of power in the hand of afallible human being.43

He also scathingly rebuked Ayatullah Khamena’i in 1997, after the reformist leaderAyatullah Muhammad Khatami’s landslide presidential victory, for trying tomonopolize power and interfering in the people’s political, economic, social, andreligious life. According to Ayatullah Montazeri, the wali-ye faqih is entitled to overseeand supervise the state’s activities, but cannot meddle in each and every aspect of itbecause he lacks the necessary expertise to do so. In addition, he reminded AyatullahKhamena’i of his junior rank in the clerical leadership and his lack of scholarlycredentials, prestige, and charisma in comparison with the late Ayatullah Khomeini:‘Whatever your supporters may claim, you give no evidence of filling the scholarlyposition of Imam [Khumayni], may God have mercy upon him.’44

Recently, he expressed sorrow and apologized for having supported the absolutistform of this particular concept. He exhibited similar contrition in a 2001 interviewwith Geneive Abdo, in which he said that ‘no one can claim to have access to theabsolute truth, and that everyone should always strive to correct one’s positions andviews in the direction of the superior truth’.45 In his September 2009 message, whichhe circulated among the senior jurists, he went so far as to say that he viewed himselfas partially complicit in the state-inflicted loss of life and injuries after thepresidential election, the underpinnings and foundation of which are supported byhis earlier writings. The present state has degenerated into a military guardianship(wilayat-i nizami) and can no longer claim to be based on the concept of wilayat-ifaqih.46

Towards the end of his life, he strove to make a case that popular participationand endorsement are integral to legitimizing the jurisconsult’s mandate. One of hisprimary arguments is that even Imam ‘Ali, traditionally viewed by the Shi‘is ashaving been explicitly designated by God as the Prophet’s successor, adopted this

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mode of securing popular investiture.47 A similar line of argument has recently beenadvanced by one of Qum’s senior ayatullahs, Behjat Zanjani, who asserts thatthe best paradigm on governance can be gleaned from the years of ‘Ali’s caliphate(656–61) because his son Hasan, the only other Imam who became caliph, only ruledfor a few months. He also proposed that the epistle that ‘Ali prepared for Malikal-Ashtar before appointing him the governor of Egypt be highlighted todemonstrate the equality of all human beings and the people’s right to dissent andhold the ruler accountable.48 In his estimation, freedom occupies the supremeposition in the hierarchy of rights, and voiding it would be equivalent to robbingthe people of their religion and the essence of what makes them human. People havebeen granted the designation of ‘God’s vicegerent’ (khalifa) because they are freeagents possessing autonomy and intellect. He cautions that an inequitable religioussystem of governance would cause far more harm than a secular one because theformer would motivate people to become irreligious and develop a distaste andrevulsion toward religion.49

Ayatullah Khomeini, who sought legitimacy on the ground that the juristswere the messianic Imam’s general deputies (nowwab-i ‘amm), did not regardpublic allegiance as necessary for their legitimacy. At the same time, advocates ofan authoritative, theocratic government have insisted, somewhat paradoxically,that an Islamic state is compatible with democratic principles and under-pinnings.50 The resulting tension and, at times, contradictions finally eruptedafter the controversial result of the 2009 presidential election. This widespreaddiscontent has gradually transformed itself into a movement that seeks todismantle the wilayat al-faqih itself. According to Ayatullah Kadivar, ‘reconcilia-tion between democracy and government based on velayat-e faqih is impos-sible’.51 Instead, he proposes a ‘divine-democratic sovereignty’ (mashru‘iyyat-iilahi-ye mardom) system of governance.52

Ayatullah Salehi Najafabai (d. 2006) broached the notions of public participation,social contract theory (‘aqd wa qarardad-i ijtima‘i), and pledged allegiance to thejurisconsult in 1984 in his Wilayat-i faqih: hukumat-i salihan.53 Scholars like him,along with Ayatullah Montazeri, have attempted to investigate and explicate howthe infallible divine guides were chosen – divine decree, public investiture, or both –to make a case that even ‘Ali sought public allegiance and that his actions werecircumscribed by divine law.54 This clearly conflicts with the current official processfor selecting the jurisconsult whose authority is considered so great that he can evenoverride the divine law. In other words, Ayatullah Montazeri is attempting to bringthe elements of popular sovereignty and national identity into the election process ofthe wali-ye faqih.55

Ayatullah Kadivar provides an elaborate, penetrating, and systematic critiqueof wilayat al-faqih in his many works and speeches. He was at the forefront ofchallenging the absolute authority of the jurisconsult and the system of governanceat a time when these tenets were treated as sacrosanct and beyond reproach. HisFebruary 1999 article ‘The Basic Problem of Iran is Wilayat-i Faqih’, written duringPresident Khatami’s term in office, landed him in jail for 18 months on the charges of‘propagating slander and lies against the sacred system of the Islamic Republic ofIran’ and ‘publishing untruths and disturbing public minds’.56 His major worksinclude Nazariyyeh-ha-ye dawlat dar fiqh-i Shi‘a,57 Hukumat-e Velayi,58 and Haqq

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al-nas: Islam wa huquq-i bashar.59 A reform-oriented religious intellectual who wasactive during the Iranian revolution, he has received both academic and theologicaltraining from the University of Tehran and the seminaries in Qum, respectively.Quickly becoming a stellar student in Qum, he obtained his certificate in ijtihad fromAyatullah Montazeri in the early 1990s. He has been a vocal critic of thegovernment’s brutal post-election crackdown. At the time, he was serving as a guestlecturer at the University of Virginia and thus took advantage of the freedom he hasto speak out against his country’s system of governance.60 At present, he is a lecturerat Duke University and would be ill-advised to return home.

Substantial evidence can be found in the Nahj al-balagha, a compilation of sermons,letters, and proverbs attributed to ‘Ali, as well as other works recording hisstatements, which suggest that he regarded public endorsement and the pledge ofallegiance (bay‘a) as integral parts of legitimizing his caliphate. This mode ofendorsement, a common practice among the tribal Arabs of his time, was expressedin several pledges of allegiance offered to the Prophet, such as the first and secondpledges of ‘Aqaba61 along with the pledge to fight (jihad) alongside him.62 Thefollowing instances can be advanced to make a case for public investiture:

1. An early eighteenth-century work composed by Sulaym b. Qays relates a reportthat shortly after ‘Uthman’s murder, ‘Ali emphasized the obligatory nature ofchoosing a caliph and the great urgency of doing so in the aftermath of the previouscaliph’s death or assassination:

It is a mandatory ruling by God and of Islam upon the Muslims thatimmediately upon the death or assassination of their leader (imam) – whetherguided or led astray; oppressed or oppressor; lawful to shed his blood orunlawful – not to engage in any activity of any sort or begin anything withoutselecting from among themselves a leader (imam) who is compassionate,knowledgeable, pious, and intimately aware of giving rulings and the sunna.63

2. The Kharijis, his inveterate enemies, initially belonged to ‘Ali’s party butabandoned him after the Battle of Siffin (657). The famous account of this group’sorigin states that they felt remorseful and guilty for ending this battle by acceptinga truce, the terms of which would be articulated by nominees from both camps.Initially they favoured this approach because Mu‘awiya’s soldiers had raisedparchments of the Qur’an on their lances to indicate their deference to it inresolving the dispute. Later on, they regretted their actions because it let people,instead of God, decide the battle’s outcome. They therefore adopted the slogan:‘No judgment but God’s’ (La hukm illa li Allah). In response to this call, ‘Ali stated:

The sentence is right but what [they think] it means, is wrong. It is true that theverdict lies but with Allah, but these people say that [the function of] governanceis only for Allah. The fact is that there is no escape for men from ruler good orbad . . . Through the ruler tax is collected, enemy is fought, roadways areprotected and the right of the weak is taken from the strong till the virtuousenjoys peace and allowed protection from [the oppression of] the wicked.64

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In the above passage, he objects to the Kharijis’ faulty interpretation and emphasizesthat there must be a ruler, regardless of whether he is a just or an unjust person;however, he does not add that this person has to be divinely appointed. Second, heasserts that this person’s role and function are temporal in nature, and thus appearsto suggest that as the system of governance is a temporal (non-religious) affair it isleft to the people’s choice. Dissenters have pointed out that in response to theKharijis’ claims that having a leader to arbitrate disputes or to govern was notnecessary, ‘Ali was making a general statement on the imperative for every society tohave a government. Thus his statement cannot be applied specifically to the Muslimcommunity as regards who would lead it after the Prophet’s death. As such, the issueof succession is not a matter of mu‘amalat (transactions dealing with humaninterrelationships), where the people can negotiate the outcome.

3. After ‘Uthman’s murder, Talha, Zubayr, and many other people converged on‘Ali’s house and pleaded with him to become caliph. He told them: ‘I am in no needof your government. I will provide my consent and satisfaction with whomever youchoose.’65 In a version preserved by Tabari, ‘Ali went even further by assuring themthat he would be among the most heedful and obedient of people to whomever waschosen as caliph.66 Ibn Qutayba records in al-Imama wa al-siyasa that Ali told thedelegation which had come to pledge allegiance to him that they were not entitled toselect the next caliph; rather, this was restricted to the Ahl al-Badr, those people whohad participated in the Battle of Badr. Whomever they choose, via consultation,should be regarded as the next caliph.67 In another report, ‘Ali is alleged to havewritten to Mu‘awiya: ‘Consultation is confined to the muhajirun and the ansar. Ifthey agree on an individual and take him to be Caliph it will be deemed to meanAllah’s pleasure.’68

In response to their repeated appeals, he issued a stern warning that they mightnot be able to tolerate and endure his austere and disciplined form of leadership andsuggested that they choose someone else. If they decided to do so, he would beprepared and willing to listen and obey this individual and confine himself toproviding advice. Once again, ‘Ali appears to be exhibiting his stance that choosinga caliph falls under the rubric of public choice:

Leave me and seek someone else. We are facing a matter which has (several)faces and colours, which neither hearts can stand nor intelligence can accept.Clouds are hovering over the sky, and faces are not discernible. You shouldknow that if I respond to you I would lead you as I know and would not careabout whatever one may say or abuse. If you leave me then I am the same asyou are. It is possible I would listen to and obey whomever you make in chargeof your affairs. I am better for you as a counsellor (wazir) than as chief (amir).69

Ibn Abi al-Hadid, in his commentary on this sermon, points out that the Sunnicommunity has invoked it as proof that the Prophet did not designate ‘Ali as hissuccessor.70

4. ‘Ali tells his supporters that if they leave him no choice but to accept theirappeals, then they must pledge their allegiance to him at the mosque and before thegeneral public. In other words, the people’s presence and consent legitimates his

Ayatullah Khomeini’s Concept of Governance 817

rule.71 During this public event, he outlined his expectations of them and againstressed that no one has the right to govern without public acknowledgement andsupport: ‘O people, these are your affairs and mandate [government], and no one hasa right to assume the position [of the caliph] except the one whom you bestow withthis authority.’72 Another time, he reiterated the people’s freedom to choose theircaliph in response to Talha and Zubayr, who he claimed had no right to oppose himafter having freely pledged their allegiance to him and then transferring it to ‘A’isha(his opponent) before the Battle of the Camel (656):

Now, both of you know, although you conceal it, that I did not approach thepeople till they approached me, and I did not ask them to swear allegiance to metill they themselves swore allegiance to me, and both of you were among thosewho approached me and swore me allegiance. Certainly, the common peopledid not swear me allegiance under any force put on them or for any money givento them.73

5. ‘Ali was confident that if the matter of succession was placed before the public,instead of being hastily decided upon by a small group of people, he would have beenchosen due to his merit and excellence:

O’ people, the most rightful of all persons for this matter [caliphate] is he who ismost competent among them to maintain it, and he who knows best Allah’scommands about it. . . . By my life, if the question of Imamah was not to bedecided unless all the people were present, then there would be no such case. Butthose who agreed about it imposed the decision on those who were absent, somuch so that he who was present could not dissent and the one who was absentcould not choose.74

‘Ali underlined the voluntary and free nature of the pledge, which he saw as acovenant between the people and their leader: ‘The people offered their pledge ofallegiance to me neither out of fear or disgust nor on account of compulsion or force.Rather, they surrendered on their free choice and volition.’75 More importantly, theperson chosen to lead the community would be graced with divine pleasure: ‘If theyagree on an individual and take him to be caliph, it will be deemed to mean Allah’spleasure.’76

Alongside ‘Ali’s call for free and unhindered public investiture, he clearly presentedhimself as the most qualified and competent person to lead the community becauseof his merits, knowledge of Islam, and close association and kinship with theProphet: ‘Beware! By Allah the son of Abu Quhafa (Abu Bakr) dressed himself withit [the caliphate] and he certainly knew that my position in relation to it was the sameas the position of the axis in relation to the hand-mill’77 and ‘When I was only a childhe [Muhammad] took charge of me . . . I used to follow him like a young camelfollowing the footprints of its mother.’78 When he was dragged in front of Abu Bakrto pledge his allegiance, ‘Ali is reported to have said: ‘I am better qualified and moredeserving to be the leader instead of you. As such, I will not pledge allegiance to

818 H. Mavani

you and instead you ought to pledge allegiance to me.’79 He also made a similarstatement upon ‘Uthman’s selection: ‘You have certainly known that I am the mostrightful of all others for the Caliphate.’80

Ali was amazed and bewildered that the Arabs chose someone else, although hisown merits outshone those of all other Companions and were manifestly clear andunique:

By God, it never occurred to me, and I never imagined, that after the Prophetthe Arabs would snatch away the caliphate from his Ahlu’l-bayt [the membersof the Prophet’s house], nor that they would take it away from me after him,but I suddenly noticed people surrounding the man [Abu Bakr] to swear himallegiance.81

In addition, he was bitter and angry with the Quraysh for robbing him of that whichhe, and he alone, was entitled to and worthy of: ‘O’ my God! I beseech You to takerevenge on the Quraysh and those who are assisting them, for they have cut asundermy kinship and over-turned my cup, and have joined together to contest a right towhich I was entitled more than anyone else.’82 When ‘Uthman was selected as caliphafter ‘Ali refused to accept the terms put forth by ‘Abd al-Rahman, he is reported tohave said:

You have certainly known that I am the most rightful of all others for theCaliphate. By Allah, so long as the affairs of Muslims remain intact and there isno oppression in it save on myself I shall be keeping aloof from its attractionsand allurements for which you aspire.83

Nevertheless, I remained patient despite length of period and stiffness of trial,till when he [Umar] went his way [of death] he put the matter [of Caliphate] in agroup and regarded me to be one of them. But good Heavens! What had I to dowith this ‘consultation’? Where was any doubt about me with regard to the firstof them that I was now considered akin to these ones?84

In other words, ‘Ali considered himself the Prophet’s designated successor in boththe temporal and religious domains85 and, as such, viewed himself as the onlylegitimate Imam possessing wilaya. However, he was neither duty-bound to becomecaliph nor to seek that position by force so long as the people withheld theirallegiance from him. Thus, the Imam is designated by divine decree to the post ofImamate, as distinct from the caliphate, and his mandate covers the religious andspiritual spheres. If necessary, and if the public voluntarily gives its consent, it can beexpanded to cover the governmental and social spheres. This is diametricallyopposed to the views of many pro-government jurists, especially those of AyatullahMesbah Yazdi, who sees no substantive role for public participation other thanendorsing the Assembly of Experts’ designated supreme leader.

Iran’s post-election crisis has expedited the scholarly and vibrant discussion ofdifferent paradigms and models of governance in a Muslim country. It appears that anoticeable shift is now underway in the discourse and practice of Shi‘i authority, one

Ayatullah Khomeini’s Concept of Governance 819

that is moving away from Ayatullah Khomeini’s absolutist and comprehensiveformulation and toward one that is pluralistic and allows the public to help devisea civil society that incorporates various democratic values and institutions. Thisoutcome is emerging due to the critical re-examination of the traditional and rationalproofs advanced by Ayatullah Khomeini along with a study of the people’s role inconfirming or validating the political mandate of the Twelver Shi‘i Imams. ‘Ali, thefirst Shi‘i Imam, clearly sought public investiture through a public oath of allegiancewhen a large group of Muslims converged upon his house after ‘Uthman’sassassination (656). The Prophet and the Imams are idealized and regarded as perfectrole models and, as such, their conduct represents the norm and is binding. Ali’sseeking of public allegiance instead of imposing himself in the political realm, despitebeing divinely designated (according to the Shi‘is), is of great significance for thosewho advocate a state model that bestows public sovereignty.86

Arguments in favour of public sovereignty and limiting the wali-ye faqih’s powerand holding him accountable, as well as engendering a culture of tolerance anddiversity of opinions are being framed in this new medium by reinterpreting the veryconcept of religious authority. Such voices, which were present in the revolution’searly years, are now resurfacing with a greater intensity. This is true to such an extentthat it may not be so far-fetched to envision a significant curtailment of his authoritybecause the present model of wilayat al-faqih seems to have disillusioned andalienated many people. After all, it has (in their opinion) failed to deliver on itspromise of a just and egalitarian society. But even more importantly, the evidence forsuch a wide-ranging and absolute mandate is simply not there; rather, it is clearlylimited to dealing with hisbiyya issues.

In this regard, Ayatullah Muhammad Mahdi Shamsuddin (d. 2000) asserts that itis perfectly clear that no one has wilaya over anyone else except in an exigency, andeven then such authority is strictly limited to the individual sphere and pertains tothose who cannot decide for themselves (e.g., orphans, minors, and the mentallyincompetent). Resolving social issues and establishing a government constitutesa collective responsibility (wajib-i kifa’i) and, as such, devolves upon the entirecommunity (not just the jurists). He even coined a phrase for this concept: al-wilayatal-umma ‘ala nafsiha, namely, the authority to arrange society resides in the peoplethemselves, who are obliged to formulate a system of governance via consultationthat accords with Islam’s general principles: ‘The believers, both men and women,support each other; they order what is right and forbid what is wrong’ (Q. 9:71).

Ayatullah Shariatmadari, at the very outset of wilayat al-faqih’s incorporationinto the constitution in 1979, raised the possibility of clerical despotism if power wereto be concentrated in the wali-ye faqih. Instead, he advocated wilayat al-fuqaha(guardianship by a group of jurisconsults) to reduce this possibility and limiting itsmembers’ power to monitoring judicial issues to ensure that they conform withIslamic principles.87 More recently, Ayatullah Kadivar has argued that ‘people’ssovereignty over themselves has been delegated to them from God and no one hasthe right to deny them this divine right’.88

According to these and other ayatullahs, the public retains its right to choose itspolitical system through consultation and to seek its own benefit and welfare becauseno particular governing model is prescribed in the revelatory textual sources or bythe conduct of the infallible divine guides. The tasks associated with administering

820 H. Mavani

a society and polity are issues that intelligent and qualified people can undertakesuccessfully, as they do not require any special training in the religious sciences.Therefore, jurists have no priority over non-jurists. The whole discourse of religiousauthority is permeated with transitioning from the jurisconsult’s actual governanceand unchallengeable authority to one in which he supervises (nezarat) and guides(hidayat) the society. This trend, in all likelihood, will be accentuated with theascendancy of the religious seminaries (hawza) in Iraq, especially Najaf, where themajority of senior jurists disagree categorically with Ayatullah Khomeini’s conceptof governance. They desire no active political role because, first, this concept cannotbe found in the revelatory sources and, second, they fear that any such involvementon their part will reduce Islam to no more than an ideological and/or politicalmovement.89

Notes

1. S. Akhavi, ‘Islam, Politics and Society in the Thought of Ayatullah Khomeini, Ayatullah Taliqani and

Ali Shariati’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.24, No.4 (Oct. 1988), p.415.

2. It is ironic that the person who insisted on placing this concept in the 1979 constitution and

institutionalized it become the most vocal dissident and opponent of its adherents’ excesses and its

mode of implementation. Ayatullah Montazeri made the following remark during discussion of the

draft constitution in 1979: ‘Let the gentlemen be sure that we [the Assembly] will never endorse a

constitution that does not include the issue of velayat-e faqih and laws based on the Book and sunna.’

S. Saffari, ‘The Legitimation of the Clergy’s Right to Rule’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,

Vol.20, No.1 (1983), p.71.

3. Until the late 1960s, Ayatullah Khomeini had only called for the clergy to have a supervisory rule

(nezarat) and for the shah to abide by Islam’s dictates. At this time, he did not advocate the overthrow

of the monarchy.

4. President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad has been exploiting the messianic Imam’s promised return

(millenarianism) to enhance his religious legitimacy and give the impression that this figure has

somehow endorsed his appointment. One finds such eccentric ideas in his statement, such as when he

told Ayatullah Jawadi-ye Amuli that he felt a ‘halo of light’ around himself while delivering his speech

to the UN General Assembly and that the audience had been so fixated on him that no one blinked

until he had finished. He also makes a point of offering prayers to expedite the Mahdi’s return, which

is common in Shi‘i gatherings but odd and bizarre in a setting like the UN. http://tehranlondon.com/

article.php?id¼38222 (accessed 22 Jan. 2010).

5. M. Tamadonfar, ‘Islam, Law, and Political Control in Contemporary Iran’, Journal for the Scientific

Study of Religion, Vol.40, No.2 (June 2001), pp.213–15.

6. A. Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn (Stanford, CA:

Stanford University Press, 2007), p.101.

7. R.M. Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, trans. H. Algar (Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1981), pp.82–3.

8. M. Kadivar, Hukumat-i vilayi (Tehran: Ney Publishing House, 1998), pp.141–6.

9. Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, p.75.

10. R.M. Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nur (Tehran: Sazman-i madarik-i farhanghi-ye inqilab-i Islami, 1990),

Vol.4, p.206; Vol.3, pp.107, 56, 75, 88, and 96.

11. Ibid., Vol.22, p.128.

12. Kadivar, Hukumat-i vilayi, pp.342–3.

13. Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye nur, Vol.16, pp.211–12.

14. http://www.iranuk88.com/article.php?id¼43136; http://www.iranuk88.com/article.php?id¼53898(accessed 20 Dec. 2010); http://www.payvand.com/news/09/oct/1277.html (accessed 12 Oct. 2010).

15. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13155282 (accessed 12 June 2011).

16. N. Calder, ‘Accommodation and Revolution in Imami Shi‘i Jurisprudence: Khomeini and the

Classical Tradition’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.18, No.1 (Jan. 1982), p.4.

17. The scope of hisbiyya consists of having limited authority over people and properties such as a

discretionary mandate over children, orphans, people of unsound mind, endowments, unclaimed

Ayatullah Khomeini’s Concept of Governance 821

property, and similar matters. In the absence of a qualified jurist who can assume these

responsibilities, the authority devolves upon those Muslims who possess the ethical attribute of

justice (‘udul al-mu’minin). However, the basic principle is that no one has authority (wilaya) over

another person or his/her property under normal circumstances.

18. M. Ansari, al-Makasib (Qum: Mu’assasat al-hadi, 1997), Vol.3, pp.545–6.

19. R.J. Abisaab, Converting Persia (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2004), pp.105–12.

20. A.K. Moussavi, Religious Authority in Shi‘ite Islam (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1996), p.155.

21. Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i, al-Tanqih fi sharh al-‘Urwat al-wuthqa, ed. M. ‘Ali Gharawi Tabrizi (Qum:

Bustan, 1990), p.424. Ayatullahs Mulla Muhammad Kazim Khurasani (d. 1911), Sayyid Muhsin

al-Hakim Tabataba’i (d. 1970), and Sayyid Ahmad Khwansari (d. 1984) also held this opinion.

22. http://www.sistani.org/local.php?modules¼nav&nid¼5&cid¼366 (accessed 5 June 2011); Question 1.

23. H. Katouzian, ‘Problems of Political Development in Iran: Democracy, Dictatorship or Arbitrary

Government’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.22, No.1 (1995), p.13.

24. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn¼8905080088 (accessed 4 May 2011).

25. http://www.roozonline.com/persian/news/newsitem/article/2010/july/31//-f200da7bdd.html (accessed

8 Feb. 2011).

26. S. Siavoshi, ‘Ayatullah Mesbah Yazdi: Politics, Knowledge, and the Good Life’, The Muslim World,

Vol.100 (January 2010), pp.124–44.

27. Mesbah Yazdi, Huquq wa siyasat dar Qur’an, ed. M. Shahrabi (Qum: Intisharat-i mu’assasa-ye

amuzashi wa pazhuhashi-ye imam Khomeini, 1999), p.317.

28. http://www.tehranlondon.com/article.php?id¼40442 (accessed 12 Nov. 2009).

29. http://tehranlondon.com/article.php?id¼50323 (accessed 8 Aug. 2010).

30. http://www.parsine.com/fa/pages/?cid¼37133 (accessed 22 May 2011).

31. http://tehranlondon.com/article.php?id¼49488 (accessed 21 Dec. 2010).

32. ‘Ali b. Abi Talib, Nahj al-balagha, compiled by S. Radi, trans. S.A. Reza (Rome: European Islamic

Cultural Centre, 1984), Sermon 124, p.278.

33. http://tehranlondon.com/article.php?id¼52876 (accessed 5 Dec. 2010).

34. http://tehranlondon.com/article.php?id¼50568 (accessed 10 March 2011).

35. Ayatullah Khamena’i, clearly eager to accept the disputed results, sent out a congratulatory message

to the Iranian people informing them of the ‘divine assessment’ and the great bounty bestowed upon

them by the election, in which about 85% of eligible voters participated. In his later messages, he

equated any dissent or questioning with being the ‘greatest crime’ that one could commit against the

nation of Iran. http://tehranlondon.com/article.php?id¼40955 (accessed 2 Jan. 2011).

36. In his first post-election Friday sermon, Ayatullah Khamena’i said: ‘Of course, since the 2005

elections, there have been differences between Mr Hashemi and Mr President. The differences still

continue. They have differences of opinion on foreign issues, on how to implement social justice and

on certain cultural issues. However, the viewpoints of the President are closer to those of mine’ and

‘Sometimes the difference is 100,000, 500,000 or even 1 million. In that case, one could say that there

might have been vote-rigging, but how can they rig 11 million votes?’ http://www.cnn.com/2009/

WORLD/meast/06/19/iran.amanpour.analysis/index.html (accessed 10 April 2010).

37. On 10 Nov. 2009, presidential candidate Mir. Hossein Mousavi called for constraining the

jurisconsult’s powers and holding him accountable by revising those articles of the constitution that

give him absolute power. He added that the constitution should not be viewed as an immutable sacred

or revealed document that cannot be subject to change or modification. http://www.tehranlondon.

com/article.php?id¼41630 (accessed 10 June 2010).

38. A. Amanat, ‘From Ijtihad to wilayat-i faqih: The Evolution of the Shi‘i Legal Authority to Political

Power’, in A. Amanat and F. Griffel (eds.), Shari‘a: Islamic Law in the Contemporary Context

(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), p.121.

39. Ironically, he supported it, including its in the constitution. Recently, he expressed his regret over the

American hostage incident and now considers it an error because of its negative impact on American–

Iranian relations.

40. F. Vahdat, ‘Post-revolutionary Discourses of MohammadMojtahed Shabestari and Mohsen Kadivar:

Reconciling the Terms of Mediated Subjectivity’, Critique, Vol.17 (Fall 2000), pp.151–2.

41. S. Akhavi, ‘The Thought and Role of Ayatollah Hossein’ali Montazeri in the Politics of the Post-1979

Iran’, Iranian Studies, Vol.41, No.5 (Dec. 2008), p.665.

822 H. Mavani

42. H. ‘Ali Montazeri, Dirasat al-wilaya al-faqih wa fiqh al-dawlat al-Islamiyya, 4 vols., 2nd ed. (Lebanon:

al-Dar al-Islamiyya li al-matbu‘at wa al-nashr wa al-tawzi‘, 1988).

43. G. Abdo, ‘Rethinking the Islamic Republic: A ‘‘Conversation’’ with Ayatullah Hossein ‘Ali

Montazeri’, Middle East Journal, Vol.55, No.1 (Winter 2001), p.11.

44. C. Kurzman, ‘Critics Within: Islamic Scholars’ Protest against the Islamic State in Iran’, International

Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol.15, No.2 (Winter 2001), p.347.

45. Abdo, ‘Rethinking’, p.13.

46. ‘Grand Ayatullah Montazeri’s Letter to Marjas, Islamic Scholars and Seminaries’, http://khordaad88.

com/?p¼570 (accessed 22 Jan. 2011).

47. W. Madelung, The Succession to Muhammad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

48. ‘Ali, Nahj al-balagha, pp.534–49.

49. https://bayatzanjani.net/fa/news/article-239.html (accessed 10 May 2011).

50. V. Nasr, ‘The Present and Future of Iranian Politics’, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol.15, No.1

(Fall/Winter 2008), pp.37–8.

51. Vahdat, ‘Post-revolutionary Discourses’, p.148.

52. Ibid., p.150.

53. S. Najafabadi, Wilayat-i faqih: hukumat-i salihan (Tehran: Rasa, 1984). Qur’an 5:1 is of crucial

significance: ‘O you who believe, fulfill your obligations.’ So are Qur’an 3:159 and 42:38, which deal

with consultation. I have translated his work on religious exaggeration into English as: Religious

Extremism: Intellectual and Doctrinal Deviance in Islam, trans. H. Mavani (Montreal: OAIK, 2009).

54. S. Akhavi, ‘Shiite Theories of Social Contract’, in Amanat and Griffel (eds.), Shari‘a: Islamic Law in

the Contemporary Context, p.147.

55. http://tehranlondon.com/article.php?id¼41120 (accessed 10 July 2010).

56. Y. Matsunaga, ‘Mohsen Kadivar, an Advocate of Postrevivalist Islam in Iran’,’ British Journal of

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.34, No.3 (Dec. 2007), p.318.

57. M. Kadivar, Nazariyyeh-ha-ye dawlat dar fiqh-i Shi‘a (Tehran: Ney Publishing House, 1993).

58. Kadivar, Hukumat-i vilayi.

59. M. Kadivar, Haqq al-nas: Islam wa huquq-i bashar (Tehran: Kavir, 2008).

60. The understanding of wilayat al-faqih expounded by Iran’s reformist scholars is probably close to the

model proposed by Ayatullah Husayn ‘Ali Sistani, an eminent jurist and marja‘ al-taqlid (source of

emulation) residing in Najaf. A student of Ayatullah Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i, he, like his mentor,

remained apolitical and circumscribed the scope of the jurisconsult’s authority. This conception,

however, does not preclude political involvement if the jurist believes that it would be in the best

interest of religion and the community, as has sometimes been the case with Ayatullah Sistani in the

post-Saddam era in Iraq. See A. Kadhim, ‘Forging a Third Way: Sistani’s maja‘iyya between Quietism

and wilayat al-faqih’, in Iraq, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World (New York: Routledge,

2011), pp.66–100.

61. Some have argued that the Prophet sought his followers’ allegiance (bay‘a) because this was the norm

in pre-Islamic Arabia; however, this should not be taken to mean that it is a condition for legitimizing

his prophethood, ministry, or mandate over the people in all aspects of their lives, including the socio-

political sphere.

62. ‘Those who pledge loyalty to you [Prophet] are actually pledging loyalty to God Himself – God’s hand

is placed on theirs – and anyone who breaks his pledge does so to his own detriment’ (Q. 48:10).

63. Sulaym b. Qays Hilali ‘Amiri Kufi, Kitab Sulaym b. Qays, 3 vols., 2nd ed. (Tehran: Matba‘at al-huda,

1994), Vol.2, p.752.

64. ‘Ali, Nahj al-balagha, Sermon 40, p.175 (emphasis added).

65. Ibid., Sermon 91, p.234.

66. Muhammad b. Jarir al-Tabari, Ta’rikh al-Tabari, ed. M.A. al-Fadl Ibrahim (Cairo: Dar al-ma‘arif,

1977), Vol.4, p.434.

67. Ibn Qutaybah, al-Imama wa al-siyasa, ed. T.M. al-Zayni (Cairo: Mu’assasat al-halabi, 1967), p.47.

68. ‘Ali, Nahj al-balagha, Letter no. 6, p.465.

69. Ibid., Sermon 91, p.234.

70. Ibn Abi al-Hadid ‘Abd al-Hamid b. Hibat Allah, Sharh Nahj al-balagha (Beirut: Dar al-jil, 1987),

Vol.2, p.170.

71. Baqir Majlisi, Bihar al-anwar, 110 vols., 2nd ed. (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-wafa’, 1983), Vol.32, p.24.

Ayatullah Khomeini’s Concept of Governance 823

72. Tabari, Ta’rikh al-Tabari, 4:435. Appointment to the post of Imam is made by divine decree and thus

requires no public validation for it to be actualized or religiously legitimized (mashru‘iyyat). In

contrast, the caliph is duty-bound to undertake the office’s responsibilities but only when he has

sufficient public support. See S.‘A. Q. Maqami, Qudrat wa mashru‘iyyat (Tehran: Intisharat-i sura,

2000), pp.135–6.

73. ‘Ali, Nahj al-balagha, Letter 54, p.549.

74. Ibid., Sermon 172, p.343.

75. Ibid., letter 54, p. 549 and letter 1, p.460.

76. Ibid., letter 6, pp.464–5.

77. Ibid., Sermon 3, p.105. This is the most important sermon, known as Shaqshiqiyya, concerning ‘Ali’s

serious objections to the previous three caliphs and his assertion that only he was entitled to assume

the caliphate. Some scholars, such as Ibn Abi al-Hadid in his Sharh Nahj al-balagha, have cast doubt

on the authenticity and attributed it to the compiler, Sayyid Radi. However, ‘Allama Amini has

demonstrated that this sermon originates with ‘Ali by providing 28 chains of transmission, some of

which pre-date the compiler’s birth. See Abd al-Husayn al-Amini al-Najafi, Al-Ghadir fi al-kitab wa

al-sunna wa al-adab, 11 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-‘Arabi, 1977), Vol.7, p.82.

78. ‘Ali, Nahj al-balagha, Sermon 191, p.393.

79. Ana ahaqq bi hadha al-amr minkum, Ibn Qutayba, al-Imama, p.18.

80. Anni ahaqq bi-ha min ghayri, ‘Ali, Nahj al-balagha, Sermon 73, p.201.

81. Ibid., Letter 62, p.554.

82. Ibid., Sermon 216, p.436.

83. Ibid., Sermon 73, p.201.

84. Ibid., Sermon 1, p.106.

85. Wilferd Madelung cites several examples from the Qur’an that previous prophets had transmitted

their authority and charisma to their immediate family members who were accorded an elevated

position in the Qur’an. Thus, it would not be far-fetched to expect that Muhammad would have

envisioned his succession in a similar light. See Madelung, The Succession to Muhammad, pp.8–18. See

also Qur’an, 3:33–4, 19:58, 6:84–9, 37:76–7, 57:26, 11:71–3 and 4:34.

86. In the early days of the Iranian revolution, Ayatullah Khomeini underlined the need for the world to

pay heed to the millions of Iranians who had demonstrated their will to remove the Shah, as an

inalienable right in keeping with the charter of human rights. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼F8O4xrjMLPc (accessed 10 March 2011).

87. Saffari, ‘The Legitimation of the Clergy’s Right to Rule’, p.79.

88. Vahdat, ‘Post-revolutionary Discourses’, p.150.

89. A.R. Norton, ‘Al-Najaf: Its Resurgence as a Religious and University Center’, Middle East Policy,

Vol.18, No.1 (Spring 2001), p.138.

824 H. Mavani