Jussi Haukioja - Is Solitary Rule-Following Possible
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Transcript of Jussi Haukioja - Is Solitary Rule-Following Possible
Forthcoming in Philosophia, vol. 32 (2004). Available online with the Editor's permission.
Is Solitary Rule-Following Possible?
Jussi HaukiojaDepartment of PhilosophyUniversity of TurkuFIN-20014 TurkuFinland
ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to discover whether or not a solitary individual, a human being isolated from birth,
could become a rule-follower. The argumentation against this possibility rests on the claim that such an isolate
could not become aware of a normative standard, with which her actions could agree or disagree. As a
consequence, theorists impressed by this argumentation adopt a view on which the normativity of rules arises
from corrective practices in which agents engage in a community. However, it has been suggested that an
isolated individual could engage in such a practice by herself. Three prospective examples of such cases are
considered, and the possibility of solitary rule-following is vindicated. Furthermore, the nature of the goals at
which rule-following practices generally aim is clarified.
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is, obviously, to answer the question asked in the title. It will hardly
come as a surprise that the issue is in some way related to what is known as the 'Private
Language Argument'. Unfortunately, it is not always clear what is meant by a 'private
language', which is why I want to avoid that terminology. I shall begin with an account of
what I take 'solitary rule-following' to be, and also, what kind of possibility it is that is under
consideration in this paper.
A 'private language' is often taken to be a language devised to refer to one's own
sensations, or one that can only be understood by a single individual.1 The possibility of such
a language is not what I will be concerned with here. Rather, I will ask whether it would be
possible for 'a born Crusoe', a human being isolated from birth, to engage in an activity which
deserves to be called rule-following. Moreover, I will not ask whether Crusoe could speak or
create a language. Instead, I will ask the more general question of whether he could follow a
rule. It is generally agreed that in order to speak a language, one must be able to follow rules.
However, there may well be additional considerations having to do with linguistic meaning
which make speaking a language a more demanding task than rule-following in general. I will
not discuss the possible existence and nature of such complications in this paper. The
arguments against solitary language are usually based on general considerations on rule-
following, without any reliance on features specific to linguistic meaning,2 and my intention is
to examine whether those arguments succeed in establishing the impossibility of solitary rule-
following.
Rules, as I understand the term, are normative constraints on actions, judgements, and
so on. That is, they set apart a subset of possible actions, judgements, and so on, as correct or
as otherwise more approprate. By rule-following, in turn, I mean courses of action which aim
at satisfying such constraints. Thus, an action, or a series of actions, may be in accordance
with a rule without being an instance of rule-following, because the agent may not be aiming
at conformity. Examples of rules include such familiar cases as traffic rules, rules of chess,
and the grammar of English.
Still, having restricted the problem in this way, there are at least two different questions
that might be posed by asking whether solitary rule-following is possible. One might be
interested in whether a solitary individual could actually come to follow rules, that is, whether
it is psychologically plausible to suppose that this might happen. This question is not my
2
concern in this paper. Rather, I will inquire whether there is any conceptual incoherence in the
supposition that a solitary individual could follow a rule. If the answer to this question turns
out to be negative, that will in itself say nothing about the psychological question (except that
it can be meaningfully raised). Of course, should it turn out that the notion of a solitary rule-
follower is conceptually incoherent, the psychological question would lose its interest.3
Unlike a large proportion of the literature on the 'Private Language Argument', this
paper will not be concerned with the interpretation of Wittgenstein's writings. The exegetical
literature is full of controversy. Not only is there disagreement as to what form the argument
should take and whether various formulations of it are sound or not, there is also disagreement
as to what the argument is supposed to prove, where it is to be found in Wittgenstein's text,
and whether the target is a solitary rule-follower or a private linguist (as described above). My
interest lies in whether rule-following conceptually requires the presence of a community of
agents, and although it is true that the centrality of this question in current philosophy of mind
and language is largely due to Wittgenstein's later work, I believe that our understanding of
the matter is better improved by focusing on the question itself rather than on exegetical
issues.
2. Normativity
Why would anyone think that a solitary individual cannot be a rule-follower? At first sight, it
may seem quite obvious that a born Crusoe could invent a language to describe his
surroundings. In fact, this supposition has seemed so obvious to some philosophers that they
have simply assumed that Wittgenstein must have been denying the possibility of a private
language, the terms of which refer to an individual's own sensations. (See, for example, Ayer
1971: 55-56.)
3
The reason why many philosophers claim solitary rule-following to be impossible has to
do with the normativity of rules. Rules are, by definition, not descriptive but normative. They
lay down criteria for which choices, courses of action, and so on, are correct instances of
following the rule. But they do not tell us what actually happens: a course of action and a rule
that governs it can come apart. That is, rules can be broken; an agent's actions may go against
a rule when she is trying to remain faithful to the rule, and even when she sincerely believes
that she is successfully doing so.
In order to make sense of errors, a standard of correctness must exist against which the
particular applications of a rule can be compared. Moreover, the rule-follower must be (at
least potentially) aware of the existence of a standard, and of the fact that her actions may or
may not be in agreement with it. After all, we often speak of standards of correctness existing
for the action and performance of non-human animals, even machines - think, for example, of
faulty computer software. What makes rule-followers different is precisely their (potential)
awareness of the standard, the fact that they aim to 'get things right', rather than just perform
the way they have been conditioned or designed to do. When we engage in rule-following, we
leave open the possibility that our judgements (about the applicability of a rule) may be
incorrect, and that we may have to reverse them later.
Crucially, a rule-follower has to be capable of making (and becoming aware of) a
specific kind of error. She can be wrong, not just about whether a given case falls under a
given rule, but about what the requirement of the rule is. Dorit Bar-On (1992: 33-34) makes a
useful distinction between three kinds of error that may occur in using linguistic terms:
recognitional errors - having one's perceptual data distorted in one way or another, and using
the wrong term as a consequence; performance errors - slips of the tongue; and meaning
errors - thinking that a word correctly applies to certain entities, when it in fact does not.
Although Bar-On's distinction is between different kinds of linguistic error, it should be
4
obvious that all three kinds are possible with rule-following in general. I will adopt the term
rule-requirement error to refer to the generalisation of meaning errors.4 If one cannot commit
a rule-requirement error, this can only mean that all possible actions are equally correct - but
this is to say that no standard of correctness exists, and no rule is being followed. One cannot
commit recognitional or performance errors if there is no such thing as a correct action, hence
these kinds of errors presuppose the possibility of rule-requirement errors. The notion of rule-
following presupposes that one can be wrong about what the rule requires, in addition to
being wrong about the applicability of a rule because one is mistaken about the specifics of a
particular case.
3. The Argument against Solitary Rule-Following
The argument against solitary rule-following maintains that Crusoe could not commit a rule-
requirement error. Were we to suppose that Crusoe is actually following a rule, there would
seem to be no problem in explaining recognitional or performance errors, but that would
already be to suppose that he can commit rule-requirement errors. But how could Crusoe
possibly become aware of his failure to conform to a standard if all he has to go on are his
own inclinations? No imaginable course of events, the argument holds, could lead to this -
there is no way Crusoe could be wrong about which actions accord with rules and which do
not. And if that is the case, the notion of a rule seems to cease to apply. It is often assumed
that this is what Wittgenstein meant with his often quoted remark (1968: §258): 'One would
like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we
can't talk about "right".'
The point can be illustrated by thinking of rule-following as the act of continuing a
series. In applying a rule in new instances, we are judging whether the new case is similar to
5
the known instances in the relevant respect (perceptual or otherwise). The trouble is, (nearly)
anything is similar to anything else in some respect - how do we determine what the relevant
respect is? A finite series does not by itself determine a single correct way of continuing it -
accordingly, a finite number of past instances do not by themselves determine the correct
course of action to take in a new instance. How could there then, for a solitary agent, be a
standard of correctness potentially different from the actual choice that she makes? If the past
instances do not determine which series it is that should be continued, how can there be a
wrong way of continuing a series?
It is important to note that the problem has nothing to do with the unreliability of human
memory. The argument against solitary rule-following does not rest on the claim that, because
an agent can remember her past sensations and judgements incorrectly, she can (re)interpret,
in the absence of surveillance from other agents, her past actions so that they come out
correct, that is, as corresponding to the standard of correctness laid down by the rule she was
following. The problem is more fundamental: the resources available to a solitary agent do
not, it is claimed, succeed in singling out a standard of correctness in the first place, so there
never was a rule that the agent was following. The problem is constitutive rather than
epistemological, although it is easy to forget this because the constutive question is typically
pursued by idealising our epistemic access to our past sensations and judgements.
As a consequence of normativity considerations, many theorists conclude that the
normativity of rules can only be made sense of in a communal context. We are almost
constantly engaged in practices in which we compare our judgements with those made by
others in our community. We are usually not consciously doing this, and for the most part we
agree in our judgements. Our engagement in the practices becomes obvious when we do not
agree. When we find that some of us do not, say, apply a linguistic term to the same set of
entities as the rest of us, we instinctively take this to be a sign that some users of the term are
6
mistaken, and that their actions stand in need of correction. At times an agent may also find
out that her own usage of a term (or application of some other kind of rule) is incorrect, and
proceed to take steps to adjust her usage to fit the rest of the community.
This idea is at the heart of the so-called 'community view' of rule-following, according
to which agreement with (the majority of) one's peers is all there is to correctness (see, for
example Wright 1980, Wright 1981). In other words, correctness is identified with consensus.
Unsurprisingly, a community view will deny the possibility of solitary rule-following - the
judgements made by an isolated individual ('a community of one') would be trivially correct,
and hence correctness and actual performance could not diverge.
It is not at all clear that the problems surrounding rules are solved simply by bringing in
the community. A pure community view seems to be unable to account for our intuitive
notion of objectivity, regarding our judgements (and other instances of rule-following).
Intuitively, it does not seem to be the case that correctness always coincides with the majority
opinion, as far as rules are concerned. There should, intuitively, be room for the possibility of
an entire community going astray, at least for a while. While it is clear that the community
view can account for an individual's error, a temporary community-wide error seems to be
ruled out.5 Hence, mere consensus cannot be all there is to correctness.
However, a more plausible version of the community view might hold that, as far as
rule-applications are concerned, consensus and correctness may come apart, but that they
cannot come apart for rule-requirements. That is, one might hold that the community, as a
whole, could not commit a rule-requirement error, while still maintaining that the whole
community might, due to some community-wide disturbance, become temporarily prone to
systematic recognitional or performance error.6 For the special case of word meaning, this
would be to say that the community, as a whole, cannot be wrong about what their words
7
mean, but they might be collectively wrong, at least temporarily, about whether the word in
fact correctly applies to a particular entity.
This may well be the right thing to say. Indeed, it would be strange to claim that, for
example, one actually can defend against check by castling in a game of chess, and that the
rules actually used in chess are wrong. However, I feel that more needs to be said if we want
to achieve a full understanding of what rule-following consists in. In particular, this revised
community view still leaves it a mystery how humans predominantly agree in their
judgements about the applicability of a rule in new instances. Our judgements about rule-
requirements must also be directed and constrained by factors other than our aiming at
consensus (which is not to say that they are not constrained by that aim, only that it cannot be
the whole story). It seems that individual, but largely shared, tendencies to see certain entities,
situations, and so on, as primitively similar to each other will also need to be assumed in the
explanation of rule-following. This is not, however, the place to go into details of such a
theory.7 What matters for the question at issue here is that if we accept a theory which sees
corrective practices as essential to rule-following, the possibility of solitary rule-following is
threatened.
4. 'Time-Slice' Practices?
Not everyone would agree with the general points about rule-following made in the previous
section. However, those points are among the premises on which the argument against
solitary rule-following is generally based - proponents of other accounts of rule-following
usually have no quarrel with the possibility of solitary rule-followers. For my purposes in this
paper, we may grant that, although work remains to be done, practices of correction and
approval do have a vital part to play in the explanation of normativity. It is only through such
8
corrective practices that we can become aware of a standard of correctness with which our
judgements can either agree or disagree. When we fail to follow a rule correctly, our failure
(or, at least, someone's failure) generally becomes evident when we find that we disagree with
others about the applicability of the rule. And, conversely, agreement signals success (at least
prima facie). To get an answer to the question asked in the title of this paper, we must then
ask: is it necessary for corrective practices to be communal, or could Crusoe, in principle,
engage in such a practice all by himself? Is the presence of a community of individuals, on
purely conceptual grounds, required for corrective practices to take place? Or, to put it in
other terms, could not the 'time-slices' of a single individual form a 'community', the practices
of which give rise to normativity? I will now take a look at three different examples of 'time-
slice' practices given in the literature.
Example 1: Crusoe and Interior Decoration
Baker and Hacker (1984: 38-42) use the following example in arguing that solitary rule-
following is possible:
... to take a simple example, [Crusoe] might use the pattern - - - ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ as a
rule or pattern to follow in decorating the walls of his house; when he notices four
dots in a sequence he manifests annoyance with himself. He goes back and rubs one
out, and perhaps checks carefully adjacent marks, comparing them with his 'master-
pattern'. And so on. Of course, he is not merely following his 'inclinations', but rather
following the rule. And it is his behaviour, including his corrective behaviour, which
shows that he is following the rule, and what he counts as following the rule. (Baker
& Hacker 1984: 39)
The same example, which is a slightly modified version of an example used by Wittgenstein
(Wittgenstein 1978: 344) is used by Meredith Williams to argue that solitary rule-following is
not possible (Williams 1991: 110-112).
9
We are to suppose that the master pattern lays down the rule which Crusoe is following.
But can Crusoe commit a rule-requirement error - that is, can he be wrong about what the
correct application of the master pattern is in a given instance? Certainly we would call it an
error if he did four dots in a sequence. But it seems that if Crusoe, for whatever reasons,
happens to prefer painting a sequence of four dots at a certain point, nothing will force him to
reconsider his decision (even if he sometimes does so in the manner Baker & Hacker
describe.) There is nothing in the master pattern that will, all by itself, force one continuation
of the series of dots and lines rather than another. In taking the master pattern to have a single
interpretation Baker & Hacker are already supposing Crusoe to be a rule-follower. Without
this supposition, the example simply does not work. If we do not take the master pattern to
have an interpretation, Crusoe will be, at any given point, free to take it to suggest anything he
happens to prefer. 'Whatever seems right to him is right', and the Crusoe of this example is not
a rule-follower.
On the basis of this example, Williams concludes that Crusoe could not follow rules,
since anything playing a role analogous to the master pattern would itself need an
interpretation in order to be a normative constraint on Crusoe's actions. For reasons that will
become clear later, I find this generalisation unwarranted. It will be helpful to contrast this
case with other examples, so let us move on.
Example 2: Crusoe and the Rubik's Cube
Simon Blackburn argues for the possibility of solitary rule-following with the following story:
Consider the example (due to Michael Dummett) of a born Crusoe who finds a
Rubik's cube washed onto his island, and learns to solve it. He certainly doesn't solve
it randomly, for he can do it on demand. It is natural to say that he follows principles
(when there is a last corner to do...). Perhaps he has some rudimentary diagrams or
10
other mnemonics which he consults. With these he can do it, and without them he
cannot. (Blackburn 1984a: 297)
Suppose that one morning our Crusoe interprets his mnemonics in a different way from his
previous usage. Is it really the case that 'whatever seems right to him is right'? Blackburn
claims that it is not, because should this happen, Crusoe would no longer be able to solve the
cube. Hence, Blackburn concludes, we have to say he is a rule-follower (see also Blackburn
1984b: 84).
Presented as above, I am not convinced that we would be fully justified in saying that
the Crusoe of this example would have to be a rule-follower. There is no doubt that we,
judging Crusoe's actions from the outside, may describe his actions as correct or incorrect
with respect to the goal of solving the cube ('no no, that symbol means he should twist that
part of the cube in that direction, now he won't solve it.'). But the distinction between
correctness and incorrectness need not be available to him. Perhaps the mnemonics he uses
have come to exist due to a highly improbable incident, and Crusoe is just killing time by
twisting the cube in ways somehow suggested by the symbols - he need not be aware of a
correct way of applying those symbols in his cube-twisting activity.
Nevertheless, a slight modification of the example may suffice to remedy this. Instead
of imagining that Crusoe can, in fact, solve the cube and that he has a full system of principles
available to help him solve it, imagine that he is formulating such a set of principles for
himself.8 Furthermore, in order not to presuppose an ability to have internal states with a
determinate propositional content (that is, in order not to suppose that Crusoe is already a
rule-follower), we have to suppose that he cannot use precise descriptions in the formulation.
Rather, he will have to rely on rough perceptual similarities between different configurations
of the cube ('when the cube looks like that, do this manouvre', etc.). These similarities will
have to be seen as primitive, in the sense that they are not similarities with respect to a
11
scheme of classification consciously applied by Crusoe, but rather similarities with respect to
his instinctive dispositions to see entities, configurations, and so on, as similar to each other -
otherwise we would already be presupposing him to be a rule-follower.
In such a situation, Crusoe will have to 'continue the series', that is, judge new
configurations of the cube as either falling under one configuration-type or another (and
similarly for the manoeuvres that he performs on the cube). A crucial point is that he must
proceed by trial and error. Sometimes his classifications will result in his not being able to
solve the cube on that attempt (or, perhaps more realistically, not achieving a subgoal such as
solving one face of the cube). When that happens, he will have to revise his earlier
classifications ('a configuration like that does not require a manouvre like this, after all'). As
far as I can see, in such a situation we must take Crusoe to be a genuine rule-follower. (Of
course, it is doubtful whether an isolated human could in fact manage to do this, but there is
nothing conceptually incoherent in the supposition). His 'later selves' will sometimes find
reason to think that his earlier categorisations have to be revised, thus the distinction between
correctness and incorrectness will be available to him. In order to achieve a full system of
instructions, his different 'time-slices' must seek consensus about which configurations count
as relevantly similar to each other - relevantly with respect to the goal of solving the cube.
What about the points made against the previous example? It may be objected, in
parallel fashion, that a Rubik's cube does not, in itself, contain instructions about what should
be done with it - outside a practice in which there is agreement on what counts as a solved
cube, it is merely a multi-coloured object with moving parts. Are we not, then, illegitimately,
assuming that Crusoe already has a representation with a conceptual content (namely, a
representation of a solved cube)? Without such an assumption, will it not be the case that
whatever configuration of the cube Crusoe ends up with, could be counted as a goal?
12
This objection misses an important difference between the two examples. Although we
are assuming that Crusoe aims at (what we would call) solving the cube, we are not assuming
that he is following a rule we would put as 'a cube should be manouvred so that each of the
six faces has a uniform colour'. The rules we are assuming him to follow concern the
particular manouvres that should be performed on the cube in its various possible
configurations.
Let me clarify the point by making a distinction between primitive and non-
primitive goals. Many of our goals are concept-involving or non-primitive in the sense that, in
order for our success or failure at reaching the goal to have an effect on our subsequent
behaviour, we need to use concepts - we need to classify (the relevant features of) the
situation we find ourselves in. In the rule-following context this means, roughly, that the need
we may feel to engage in a corrective practice derives from our judgement that the goal has
not been reached. Such a judgement can, of course be incorrect - this is as it should be, since
the goal itself is concept-involving, and thus requires rule-following. Primitive goals, in
contrast, are goals which we have and aim at just by virtue of being the kind of organisms we
are. Like other animals, we have primitive goals such as avoidance of physical pain,
avoidance of hunger, and so on. Furthermore, like other animals, our failure to reach these
goals can have an effect on our subsequent behaviour, even if no judgement is made that the
goal has not been reached.
In this example, we need to assume that the ultimate goal of Crusoe's practice, namely,
solving the cube, is primitive. In other words, we need to assume that he simply finds a
scrambled cube so annoying that he is inclined to take the trouble of developing a solving
technique. Then, given that this is the sort of creature Crusoe is, he will need to develop a
technique for solving the cube, and in this technique there will be a distinction between
correct and incorrect manouvres. A similar move is not available in our first example, because
13
Crusoe's activity did not serve any further purpose which could be viewed as a primitive goal.
We could, in that example, take Crusoe's preference for the repetition of three lines and three
dots as primitive, but then the master pattern would no longer have a role to play.
The assumption that Crusoe has the sort of primitive goal required in this example is, to
say the least, psychologically implausible, but there is nothing conceptually incoherent about
it, as far as I can tell. In the third and final example, the presumed ultimate goal of Crusoe's
practice is much more naturally seen as primitive.
Example 3: Crusoe and Berries
Bar-On (1992: 35-39) considers the example of a born Crusoe (or Super-Crusoe, as she calls
him) who lives on an island with various kinds of berries available to him, some edible and
some not. However, Crusoe has trouble telling them apart prior to eating them. (Perhaps
edibles and inedibles look, smell and taste the same, or perhaps there are simply too many
kinds of berries for his memory to handle.) To make life easier for himself, he begins marking
bushes with coloured strings - one colour (say, blue) for those which produce edible berries
and another (say, red) for those which do not. Bar-On wants to ask whether solitary language
is possible. She concludes that this example is not a case of solitary language because, in the
course of this practice, Crusoe would have no use for the Gricean intentions sometimes
required for (non-natural) meaning. That is, Crusoe need not form the intention of inducing
with a coloured string, in his future self, a belief via his later recognition of his (original)
intention to induce that belief. As noted above, the denial of a solitary language is usually
based on argumentation against solitary rule-following. Taken as an argument against the
possibility of solitary rule-following, Bar-On's reasoning is obviously not successful: Gricean
intentions already presuppose that the agent be capable of having propositional attitudes
(namely, the intentions themselves). In other words, they presuppose that the agent be a rule-
14
follower. Of course, one might still maintain that Bar-On's argument presents a further
problem for the possibility of a solitary language. However, one can hardly claim that Grice's
account of linguistic meaning in terms of speaker's meaning (and, ultimately, the speaker's
intentions) is universally accepted, and thus the argument will not trouble proponents of other
accounts.
As noted in section 2, in order for Crusoe to be a rule-follower it should be possible for
him to commit a rule-requirement error. In the present context, it should be possible for him
to be wrong about which groups of bushes red and blue strings are correctly attached to. It is
obvious that Crusoe can commit what we would perceive as errors - he might, for example,
attach a blue string on a bush with bad berries. But we perceive this as an error because we
are already assuming that red strings, and not blue strings, are correctly attached to bad
bushes. The question is, could Crusoe be mistaken about what red and blue strings 'mean', in
his usage?
It might seem that he could not. After all, he could extend his usage of coloured strings
in any way he pleased, and no one would be there to correct him. We can imagine Crusoe to
attach a blue string to a bush with bad berries, later eating berries from that bush, and
becoming sick - something we would definitely call a recognitional or performance error, but
only because we naturally assume that blue strings 'mean' edible berries. We can even
imagine Crusoe going on to remove the blue string and replacing it with a red one. We would
naturally call this behaviour corrective. Yet it is not clear that this is enough for Crusoe to
count as a rule-follower, because it does not seem that he has revised his understanding of
what the coloured strings mean - he has only revised his opinion about this particular bush.
Consider, however, the following story. Imagine that Crusoe has been applying the
coloured strings for a while, and it has become a routine matter. The technique is working
15
well for him, and he forgets how awful he feels when he eats more than a couple of the bad
berries (suppose a couple is enough for Crusoe to recognise the symptoms). Suppose,
furthermore, that he is a bit absent-minded and has an eye for colour combinations. Some of
the bushes (both edible and inedible) have such colour that red strings look absolutely hideous
when attached to them. The combination disturbs Crusoe so much that he cannot help himself
- he attaches blue strings on these bushes, regardless of the berries they produce. When going
around eating the berries, however, he picks berries from all bushes marked with blue strings,
and as a result he becomes sick. The displeasure of becoming sick outweighs the displeasure
of having to look at awful colour combinations, so Crusoe returns to marking all bushes with
inedible berries with red strings, regardless of their appearance.
This story would require some ingenuity from Crusoe, but I do not believe it requires
him already to be a rule-follower. Let us take a closer look at what is happening here. At t0,
before Crusoe starts to pay too much attention to colour combinations, he is aiming to attach
red strings to all and only the inedibles (and, possibly apart from the occasional mistake, he is
succeeding in this). At t1, Crusoe is aiming to attach red strings to bushes which produce
inedibles and are not, in his opinion, unfavourably coloured.9 At t2, Crusoe eats berries from
bushes marked with blue, and gets sick. Finally, at t3, he is again aiming to attach red strings
to all and only the inedibles. As far as I can tell, the only way to make sense of this story is to
say that Crusoe has committed, and corrected, a rule-requirement error. Between t0 and t1, his
understanding of which bushes are correctly marked with red has changed, and between t2 and
t3 he recognises this change as an error, and corrects himself.
It is important to note that we are actually assuming Crusoe to be following two rules,
which we (unlike Crusoe!) might verbally characterise roughly as follows:
(R1) bad berries are to be marked with a red string
16
(R2) berries marked with a red string are not to be eaten
This reflects the fact that Crusoe is, so to say, both the speaker and the hearer, or the producer
and the consumer of symbols. At t0, t1 and t3, he is the producer (following R1), at t2 he is the
consumer (following R2). Of course, his different time-slices cannot directly compare their
understandings of what a red string 'means'. However, his different time-slices have a
common goal in using the coloured strings, and the goal is such that failure to communicate
properly across his different time-slices can result in a failure to achieve the goal.
Getting sick, Crusoe fails to achieve the goal of his string-attaching activity. In our
story, the root of the failure is not in a misperception of what the berries are like, or anything
of the sort. Rather, he fails because his different time-slices have had different understandings
about the correctness conditions for applying the coloured strings.10 The situation is analogous
to cases of erroneous understanding of words in a community. Our differences become
apparent only when we fail to achieve non-linguistic individual or collective goals because of
failures of communication - because of different understandings between speakers and
hearers.
As long as Crusoe's activities accord with one of the rules, R1 or R2, he can commit (and
become aware of committing) a rule-requirement error about the other. In our example, he is
only eating berries from bushes not marked with red strings - that is, his actions accord with
R2, and his failure to accord with R1 becomes evident when he becomes sick. The converse
might also happen: were he in accord with R1, his failure to follow R2 would result in his
becoming sick.11 Clearly, Crusoe can commit rule-requirement errors with respect to R1 and
R2, and we can safely say that he is a rule-follower.
It is misleading to take the crucial question to be that of whether or not Crusoe can be
wrong about the fact that a red string 'means' inedible berries. In a sense, Crusoe could extend
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his practice any way he pleased. He could start marking some inedibles with blue strings, and
still reach his goal of not becoming sick by refraining from eating berries from these bushes
by some other means. In this situation, a blue string would no longer 'mean' edibles. The
situation is analogous to meaning change in language - both Crusoe-the-producer and Crusoe-
the-consumer have changed their understanding of which bushes the strings are correctly
applied to. Hence, Crusoe would no longer be following the rules we would put as R1 and R2,
but rather a different pair, R1* and R2
*. But note that there would still be a possibility of
Crusoe's committing rule-requirement errors with respect to R1* and R2
*. The question is not
whether the correctness conditions for Crusoe's practice are the same as those for rules we
would find most natural, but whether such correctness conditions exist for Crusoe's string-
attaching activity, in a way which he can be aware of. The crucial question is, can he have an
erroneous understanding of what the coloured strings are supposed to be attached to. And in
our story, Crusoe clearly can.12
Since Crusoe could, in the sense described, extend his practice as a whole in any way he
pleases, we will have to acknowledge that there are no correctness conditions for his practice
as a whole. True, it will either succeed or fail as a strategy of avoiding bad berries, but this is
conceptually a wholly different matter. However, given that he is using one strategy,
correctness conditions will come to exist for the rules within that practice, in the manner
described above. Note that this is paralleled on the communal level - there is no sense in
which, say, the grammar of English language, or the set of rules for chess, as a whole, are
correct or incorrect, yet correctness conditions exist for particular rules within the grammar or
the rules of chess. Furthermore, one can meaningfully raise the question of how efficient the
English language is for some purpose, or whether the game of chess fulfils its purpose.
One might still worry that we are implicitly presupposing Crusoe to be a rule-follower
in setting up the example.13 That is, one might claim that in taking Crusoe to start marking
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berries with coloured strings, we would already be taking him to be capable of seeing himself
as a classifying agent - we would already assume him to have some notion of what it is to
have symbols. A related worry could be raised about the previous example.
We should be careful not to demand so much of Crusoe that a parallel argument would
succeed in showing that it would be impossible for any agent, solitary or not, to become a
rule-follower. Think about the communal case. Children learn symbols initially by having
them presented to them in conjunction with their referents. After this stage their own usage is
controlled by adults. Prior to this process, children are not able to follow rules, yet at some
point they do become rule-followers. (When this happens, precisely, I do not know - I am not
even sure there is a precise answer, since the process is likely to be gradual.)
I claim that the process could be mirrored in the solitary case, at least with suitable
modifications of the example. In the berry example, we might imagine that some good berries
already are marked with blue strings, and some bad berries with red strings, for whatever
reason. If the berries are otherwise indistinguishable (except for their effects on Crusoe after
he has eaten some), surely Crusoe could start taking red strings as a warning sign - not in the
sense of understanding a red string to be a symbol, but in the sense of coming to be
indisposed to eat berries from bushes with red strings. This, I imagine, is something many
non-human animals could learn to do. Crusoe would form a pre-conceptual connection
between red strings and inedible berries. This would not yet be for him to use strings as
symbols. However, we can imagine various possible (though improbable) events which might
lead Crusoe towards actively using strings to mark berries. For example, he might see a string
become untied in the wind. I do not see why we could not imagine Crusoe taking the string
and retying it to the bush, without presupposing him to be a rule-follower. Similar
contingencies could gradually lead Crusoe to apply strings to previously 'unclassified' bushes,
after which the road would be open for him to engage in a corrective practice, as explained
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above. In other words, we can enrich the examples so that Crusoe's natural surroundings play
a role analogous to that of a 'teacher' or 'trainer', in whatever senses needed. The events we
need to imagine might be highly improbable, but I see no reason to deny their possibility. In
any case, the burden of proof is on those who claim that this cannot be done. If there is an
argument to be found against solitary rule-following, based on a claim that natural
surroundings could not play this role, this would be a new argument, not directly related to the
usual grounds for denying Crusoe to be following rules, discussed here.
5. Conclusions
On the basis of the three examples considered above, we can draw some general conclusions.
In order for a course of action to count as rule-following, it must serve some further end,
where a failure to reach this end will be dispose the agent to reconsider her earlier actions. In
the first example, the success or failure of Crusoe's painting dots and lines was directly
connected to his own feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction (as noted, the existence of a
master pattern does not make a difference, since we cannot presuppose it to have a definite
interpretation). Thus, the appropriateness of Crusoe's actions (in the sense of satisfying his
own aesthetic preferences) is evident straight away, and there will be no need to reconsider
his earlier actions. Things are different in the other two examples. Crusoe must classify
situations and entities (that is, configurations of the cube, and particular bushes), but his
success or failure will only become evident later on. For this reason, Crusoe must leave open
the possibility that he will have to reverse his initial classification. In other words, he must be
aware of the possibility of a rule-requirement error, which is precisely what is required for
him to be a rule-follower.
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In the above explanation of solitary rule-following, I have assumed that the solitary
agent has (reasonably) stable dispositions to see certain groups of entities (etc.) as primitively
similar to each other. Without this assumption, we could not make sense of Crusoe treating,
say, a certain configuration of the Rubik's cube, or a particular red string, as similar to others
he has encountered earlier. Obviously, a similar assumption has to be made in the case of
communal rule-following as well. Moreover, these dispositions have to be assumed to be
stable, not only across times, but across persons as well. On this basis, Stephen Davies (1988)
suggests that we can think of isolated individuals as having membership in the 'human
community'. He reasons that a born Crusoe could be a rule-follower, provided that he is seen
as belonging in 'the community of mature human beings' (Davies 1988: 61-64). While I
certainly agree with Davies' general point about rule-following, I feel that this stretches the
limits of the word 'community'. Surely it would be highly misleading to call this a 'community
view' of rule-following. Furthermore, what is important is not the existence of others with the
same nature (same patterns of response) but the (successful) pursuit of intertemporal
agreement - this is the case in solitary as well as communal rule-following. If our Crusoe is a
true isolate, never having had contact with other humans, how could the existence of others of
the same nature have any bearing on whether he can become aware of a normative standard
for his behaviour? We may not recognise Crusoe to be a rule-follower unless we (largely)
share his nature - because we may not recognise his goals - but this is beside the point!
Kripke famously concedes that we can think of a born Crusoe as following rules, but he
claims that in doing so, we are 'taking him into our community and applying our criteria for
rule following to him' (Kripke 1982: 110). Moreover, 'the falsity of the private model need not
mean that a physically isolated individual cannot be said to follow rules; rather that an
individual, considered in isolation [...] cannot be said to do so' (ibid.). These passages have
puzzled many commentators. In my opinion, the crucial point is whether or not Crusoe
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himself can aim at conforming to a normative standard - it makes no difference whether or not
we would be inclined to ascribe correctness or incorrectness to his actions. However, perhaps
Kripke's comment could be read in the following way. When we consider an individual in
physical and temporal isolation, there is no sense in calling the agent a rule-follower. A single
time-slice of an individual may have all the dispositional properties which enable the agent to
engage in a corrective practice (socially or individually), but to be justified in calling that
agent a rule-follower we must know whether or not she in fact does take part in such a
practice.
In the examples, we have tried to show how an agent could become a rule-follower, that
is, we have assumed that Crusoe has not been a rule-follower prior to the events described in
the examples. For this reason, we needed to assume that the goals pursued by Crusoe are
primitive. That is, they are not goals which Crusoe pursues because he has formed a
conception of how things should be. Rather, he pursues them because he is the kind of
creature he is. There is no doubt that the majority of goals that we pursue, in a community, are
non-primitive - we want something to be the case and we take actions that we believe to be
necessary for our desire to be fulfilled. Nonetheless, I believe there is a more general
conclusion to be made here. Our having these non-primitive goals will, in turn, require rule-
following on our part, and hence they will have to be seen as being aimed at some further
goal. Presumably this hierarchy of goals has a number of levels, but ultimately we will have
to assume ourselves to have primitive goals in the communal case as well. These are likely to
include such goals as happiness, avoidance of suffering, and so on. It may well be the case
that some of our primitive goals are, in fact, social in nature - many of our non-primitive goals
certainly are. The relevant rule-following practices will then, of course, be inherently social.
But this is a fact about these practices, not about rule-following in general. Crusoe certainly
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could not follow many of the rules we in fact follow, but he could, nonetheless, come to
follow rules of his own.14
References
Ayer, A.J. (1971), “Could Language Be Invented By a Robinson Crusoe?” , in Jones (ed.) ThePrivate Language Argument. London: Macmillan.
Baker, G.P., and Hacker, P.M.S. (1984), Scepticism, Rules and Language. Oxford: Blackwell.
Bar-On, D. (1992), “On the Possibility of a Solitary Language”, Noûs 26: 27-46.
Blackburn, S. (1984a), “The Individual Strikes Back” , Synthese 58: 281-301.
Blackburn, S. (1984b), Spreading the Word. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Davies, S. (1988), “Kripke, Crusoe and Wittgenstein” , Australasian Journal of Philosophy66: 52-66.
Esfeld, M. (2001): Holism in the Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Physics. Dordrecht:Kluwer.
Haukioja, J. (forthcoming): “Hindriks on Rule-Following” , Philosophical Studies.
Hindriks, F. (forthcoming): “A Modest Solution to the Problem of Rule-Following” ,Philosophical Studies.
Kripke, S. (1982), Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
McDowell, J. (1984), “Wittgenstein on Following a Rule” , Synthese 58: 325-63.
Pettit, P. (1990), “The Reality of Rule-Following” , Mind 99: 1-21.
Pettit, P. (1996), The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics (2ndedition). New York: Oxford University Press.
Williams, M. (1991), “Blind Obedience: Rules, Community and the Individual” , in Puhl (ed.)Meaning Scepticism. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Wittgenstein, L. (1968), Philosophical Investigations (3rd edition). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1978), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (Revised edition).Cambridge: MIT Press.
Wright, C. (1980), Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics. Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press.
Wright, C. (1981), “Rule-Following, Objectivity and the Theory of Meaning” , in Holtzmanand Leich (eds.) Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Wright, C. (1986), “Does Philosophical Investigations I. 258-60 Suggest a Cogent ArgumentAgainst Private Language?”, in Pettit and McDowell (eds.) Subject, Thought, andContext. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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1 See Wright (1986) for a detailed account of the distinction between private language and solitary language.
2 A notable exception is Bar-On (1992). I will discuss her argumentation below.
3 Bar-On (1992: 28-29) distinguishes three different senses of possibility in this context: psychological, conceptualand logical. She is interested in the question of whether solitary language is conceptually possible, that is, whether wecan 'make sense of [Crusoe's] coming to employ signs with particular meanings.' She takes this to be distinct from thequestion of logical possibility, that is, the question of “whether there is a contradiction in the idea of a solitaryindividual becoming a language speaker.” About the latter question, Bar-On simply says that she assumes that there isno contradiction. As for the former, she assumes that an affirmative answer would have to 'come in the form of aplausible [...] story outlining a route [Crusoe] might take to language'. I am not convinced that there really are twodistinct questions here. In any case, the usual way of discussing solitary language and rule-following lumps the twotogether: the denial of solitary language is invariably based on an alleged contradiction in the notion of a solitary rule-follower, while the claim that solitary rule-following is possible is generally accompanied by a fictitious story. If theformer is successful, Bar-On's question of conceptual possibility is also answered negatively. If the latter is successful,we have established what Bar-On calls the logical possibility. Hence, if either side of the traditional dispute succeeds,we need not worry about Bar-On's distinction.
4 Thus, a rule-follower can, in general, commit recognitional, performance and rule-requirement errors, where the lastcategory includes meaning errors, but also errors pertaining to rules where it would be quite inappropriate to speak ofmeanings. In a game of chess one might, for instance, mistake one's pawn for a bishop and move it along a diagonal(recognitional error), intend to make a legal move but accidentally place one's piece on the wrong square (performanceerror), or, say, think one can defend against check by castling (rule-requirement error).
5 John McDowell (1984: 359n10) brings out this point with his 'semi-paraphrase' of Wittgenstein's §258, quotedearlier: 'One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to us is right. And that only means that here we can'ttalk about "right".'
6 In other words, this would be to claim that on the community level, unlike on the individual level, the possibility ofrule-requirement errors is not necessary for the possibility of recognitional or performance errors. This may seemproblematic, but in reality it is not. A community-wide recognitional error would, in fact, be the sum of individualrecognitional errors, and these are made possible by the fact that each individual could, on her own, commit a rule-requirement error. To claim that a community-wide rule-requirement error is impossible would preclude the possibilityof the majority of individuals committing a simultaneous rule-requirement error, but there is nothing objectionable inthis, as far as I can see.
7 See Pettit (1990, 1996) for a general explanation of rule-following which combines individual dispositions withcommunal and/or solitary corrective practices. Hindriks (forthcoming) presents a series of objections to Pettit's view;see Haukioja (forthcoming) for an extension of Pettit's theory, intended to avoid these.
8 In Blackburn 1984b, the example is of 'a born Crusoe who over the years evolves a technique for solving a Rubik'scube washed onto his island' (p. 84). This slight difference in presentation makes a crucial difference.
9 Of course, these are our descriptions, not Crusoe's - we are not assuming him to be operating with an explicitdefinition.
10 Thus, his failure is not just a failure to follow what Bar-On (1992: 32-33) calls a teleological norm - he has notmerely failed to follow a (natural or acquired) habit in order to achieve his goals. He has failed in a particular way- he has failed to follow the rule governing the correct use of coloured strings. The correctness conditionsthemselves aresomewhat arbitrary (just as word meanings are), and not dictated by the goal of not getting sick. Butthe success of his whole string-using activity depends on his time-slices having a shared understanding of thesecorrectness conditions. And it is here that he has failed.
11 It may seem as if we are already assuming Crusoe to be a rule-follower here, but that is not the case, for twoseparate reasons. Firstly, it is quite enough that Crusoe's actions conform to the other rule - we do not have to supposethat Crusoe is aiming at conformity with that rule. Secondly, it does not seem implausible at all to say that Crusoestarts following both rules simultaneously when he begins marking bushes with coloured strings.
12 Esfeld (2001, Ch. 3.2.2) insists that an asymmetry exists between the communal and solitary cases, because: 'thepresent disposition of the person always has a privileged position; for the past self cannot reply and give feedback.' Thisis, of course, true. But this is equally true of the 'past selves' of other members of one's community! If I, in a communal
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setting, form an honest judgement about a particular case, surely I believe that I am correct in my judgement.Nonetheless, I leave open the possibility that later events (which may or may not involve others in my community) maylead me to reverse my judgement. This very same possibility can be left open in the solitary case. This act of 'leavingopen' indicates that the agent is involved in a corrective practice, and hence counts as a rule-follower. Note that thisapplies both to judgements about rule-application and to judgements about rule-requirements.
13 I am grateful to Philip Pettit for stressing this point.
14 Most of this paper was written while I was a Visiting Fellow at the Research School of Social Sciences (RSSS),Australian National University, in 2001. I am grateful to the RSSS for having me as a visitor, and to the AlfredKordelin Foundation, the Academy of Finland (projects 51319 and 52379), and the Turku University Foundationfor making the visit financially possible. I also want to thank the following people for helpful comments anddiscussion: Michael Esfeld, Alex Miller, Philip Pettit, Michael Ridge, Juha Räikkä, and two anonymous refereesfor this journal.
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