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Volume I ., Number. 2 '. .' '" ~ . .July 1978

Consciousness: A Scientific Approach

;:i<~r1H. Prlbram

Departmenl ofPsychology, Stanford University. . Stanford, California .

The results of rtcent research both in physics and in the brain sciencesmake it pos,ible to attempt a scientific approach to the' problem ofconsciousness. Two major areas are discerned: consciousness as perceptionof the phys:cal and social world ; and consciousness as awareness of selfas distinct from those worlds. Only the former is treated io this paper•.A data-based theory is documented which proposes that a domain existsboth in the world and in th: brain wh:ch is best describl:d in frequencyterms. In this frequency domain. events are distributed and each partrepresents the whole. The hologram provides a model for this fonn of orga­nization. In or{fer fortheworld ofappearances 10 become manifest (in per-··ceptiOD). a transformation from the frequency domain into the space/time'domain must occur. The transfer functions that accomplish this transforma-·.

. tion are proposed to operate hierarchically much as in a computer whichprovides the model for this portion of the theory. Conscious perception ­the appearance of reality - is therefore conceived to be constructed by theoperation' of programme-like structures on a holographic-like matrix.

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The face of psychology has undergonea series of changes during a century ofgrowth as a science. Initial concernswith sensory processes, (as, for instance;in the hands of Helmholtz and Mach)and thought (as studies by Kuple, Bren­tana, and James) gave -way to investiga­tions of feelings" (e.g., Wundt) and moti­vations (e. g., FreEd)... .The introspec­tionism of Titchner was succeeded bythe factors of Spearman, Thurstone, andCattell and by the behaviourism of Wat­son; the Gestalts of Koffka, Kohler,

Requo:sts for reprints should be sent to KarlH. Pribram, Department of Psychology, Stan­ford University, Stanford, California, U.S.A.

Wertheimer and Metzger were'· pittedagainst the karning theories of' Pavlov.Hilgard, Hull. Spence, Tolman and·Skinner. Each of these faces has left alegacy which can be traced through itsdescendants and the variety of theirmodifications, techniques and .formalstatements of what constitutes psycho-

. logy, and attests to the vigour of thisyoung science.

During the past quarter century, theferment has continued. The major influ­ences now are seen to be existentialencounter on the one hand and structuralanalysis based on computers and mathe.matics on the other. Superficially, itappears as if the earlier apposition of

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Gestalt to learning theory had gone to <- <decisional processes in ROC space; toextremes: Who I i sm transcendent vs attention as measured by eye movements,mechanism transitorized. But this would GSR, heart rate changes and reactionbe superficial reading.' A number of time in the presence of distractors; totranscendentalists are beginning to be motivation in relation to food depriva­seriously concerned with physiological tion and pharmacological manipulations;and social mechanisms as explanations to learning as a functional change inof the philosophical teachings of Zen, performance ;' to the structure of memoryTantra and other eastern experiential using computer simulation; and to othersystems, while, the mechanists have gone brain processes by neuroanatomical andcognitive, allowing considerable fluidity electrophysiological investigations. In­and introspective latitude to the models tuitively, I feel that w,hat I have foundthey construct with their computers and out about frontal lobe-function (and themathematics. limbic system function, and temporal

The question I want to address, there- lobe function, etc.) is important not onlyfore, is whether the time is perhaps ripe to brain physiology, but to psychology­for a more comprehensive view of psy- and this intuition is shared by mostchological processes-a view that would psychologists. Yet in trying to under­encompass not only the variety that is stand and communicate what I havepsychology, but playa serious role in the discovered, I come up against a myriadscientific Zeitgeist as a whole. Meanwhile, of systems and beliefs: operant condi­because each current endeavour in psycho- tioners, decision theorists, attentionlogy, as part of science, is deeply rooted theorists, motivation theorists, learningin its technology, the confusion between theorists, memory theorists and neuro­disciplines continues to be aggtavated. scientists of various disciplinary persua­Loyalty is often to the discipline or sub- sions (e. g., microelectrode art i san s,discipline, not to the content of psycho- evoked potential' analysts, the CNVlogy. Thus, several groups, though, specialists or EEG computationists, letpursuing the same problems, fail to alone the neurochemists and neurophar­communicate because of the technical macologists) rarely relate their findingsjargon- developed in each group, often to one another. What is the connectioneven to the use of identical words to con- between learning and memory, betweenvey different referents. attention and decision, between motiva-

My concern with the problem of dis.. tion and the various electrical manife­parate theoretical and technical descrip- stations of brain function? There is notions is a very practical one. I have universally agreed answer. It is as if inspent this quarter century performing the physical sciences we did not knowexperiments that purport to relate brain the relationship between the moons andfunction and behaviour to mental pro- their planets, between the solar systemcesses as these are expressed by verbal and galaxies, between atomic and mole-

, (imd nonverbal) reports of my fellow cular structure, between mechanical,humans (often in a clinical situation). gravitational and electromagnetic forces.In my attempts to communicate the spe- In short, if I am to make sense of mycific fruits of the research results, I have data, I must come to grips with the mul­related the function of the frontal cortex tiple framework within which these dataof primates to conditional operants; to have been gathered-the framework we

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call scientific psychology. This is thetask I want to addres~. Only an outline,a proposal can be entertained in thispaper. , The detailed fitting of data,working the outline into a coherent bodyof scientific knowledge will require amore comprehensive effort over the nextdecades. ,

The proposal is contained in the holo­nomic theory. , As the name suggests,the theory, is holistic. It thereforeaddresses the interests of Gestalt, of exi­stential concerns, of sOcial encounterand transcendence. ,However, it is root­ed in the disciplines of information,computer and systems analysis and thusaims towards expression of facts.' inprecise mathematical form. The theory,because of its comprehensiveness, hasphilosophical implications (see e. g.,Pribram, 1965, 1971a. 1971b); but itscorpus concerns the relationship of neu­ral, behavioural and experiential levelsof inquiry. At this stage, the theorymust of necessity be primarily inductive,relying on a systematization of availabledata and drawing upon metaphor andanalogy from more advanced knowledgeconcerning other physical, biological andsocial organizations for initial modelconstruction.,

In this pape'r I want, in the traditionof empiricism, to discuss the holonomictheory as it concerns problems of con­sciousness, perception, imagining andattention, because, as will be shown inthe last section of this paper, in a' veryreal sense this area of problems is cen­tral to a scientific understanding of any­thing at all and especialty of psychology.My point oi departure is brain organiza­tion and function as it relates to obser­vations of the behaviour (includingverbal reports of experience) of theorganism in which the brain is function­ing. The departure proceeds from a

conflict of views which opposes holisticto imalytic processes.' The followingaccount hopes to show that suchopposi­tion is unwarranted, that in fact bothtypes of processes occur in the brain andthat their interaction is coordinate withperception.

, THE BRAIN AND THE COMPUTER

'c, One of the most challenging dis~ove­ries about brain organization concernsthe precise connection between parts ofthe brain and between these parts and

, the topography of bodily surfaces. LoCa­lization of connections predicts a 'locali­zation of function. Grossly, this prediC:tion is often confirmed: For example,eyes, ears and nose project by way ofnerve tracts to separate parts of the brainand when these parts are damaged, sti­mulated or electrically analyzed, a cor­respondence is 0 b t a i ned betweenanatomical projection and sensory func­tion. The challenge is posed by theprecision of the connections.Assign­ment of a precise function to a particularanatomical arrangement does not comeeasily. One investigator, Karl Lashley,has even despaired of ever making suchassignment and suggested that the ana­tomy may represent a vestigial- residueof some phylogenetical1y earlier flmc­tional organization, much as our veri­form appendix represents an earlierfunctional digestive organ (Lashley.1960). .,

The problem arises from the fact ~hat

large holes can be made in the anatomiocal organization of the brain withoutseverely disturbing some functions thatwould be expected 'to depend on thisprecise organization. This does not meanthat holes in the brain have no effect:when made in the sensory projectionareas, for instance, such holes producescotomata in the appropriate' sensory

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receptive field. However, very little dis- of rals and .cabinets to be tackled first, onlyturbance of sensory; perceptual, atten- to witness, the removal of assemblies oftional, memory or other psychological switches and tubes from the innards ofprocess can be ascertained when tests the machine. Our data·processing mean­are'made within the remaining intact while proceeded merrily without anyfield'. The remaining brain-behaviour interruption of the cadences to which wefield, the remaining neural organization had become accustomed. Though weappears capable of taking over, function- expected the whole' affair to come pre­ing in lieu of the whole-the system maturely to' a grinding halt' at anyshows equipolentiality as Lashley put it moment, this did not happen and we(e.g., 1960). Currently, we would say gratefully acknowledged ,the seemingthat the sensory input becomes distribu- equipotentiality of the man-made brain

, ted over' the reach of the projection that had given us such:excellent service;system. The question arises, therefore, -, Could it be, that our biological brains,how. . '. though "wired" as precisely as any com­0, An alternative to Lashley's phylogene- puter,are organized in a similar way-i.e.,tic argument is to look at current data-' to be a general-purpose instrument that,processing systems for an appropriate when properly interfaced and givenanalogy. General purpose computers are proper bootstrap programs to get thewired with very specific connections. Yet, "machine" going, can then handle moreone day, in the early period of computer complex higher order programmes. withtechnology, I experienced the following seeming equipotentiality 1 Why not? Theincident: The then current Stanford underlying principles of the operation ofmachine had been sold to a nearby com- biological and hardware brains may bemercial bank'to make way for a new sufficiently similar to warrant such aninstallation. Unfortunately, I had col- explanation. An early book with Georgelected a batch of irreplaceable data on Miller and Eugene Galanter exploredpatients who had received frontal lobo- this possibility (Miller, GaJanter andtomies some ten years earlier (Poppen; Pribram, 1960) and more recently I pre­Pribram and Robinson, 1965), in a tape sentedthe neurophysiological and neuro­format tailored to the existing computer. behavioural evidence in support of thisLearning of the replacement only at the approach, pointing out as well, however,last moment, we rushed to the computer the divergences and differences betweencenter to process our tapes. Much was biological brains and computers (Pri.completed in the next two days and bram, 1971a).nights, but a small amount of work still One difference involves the very pro­needed to be done when, on the third blem of specificity of connections whichday, dismantling for shipment was begun. initiated the present discussion:- Compu­We discussed' our problem with the per- ters currently are primarily serial andson in charge, hoping to delay things by therefore analytic processors-one eventthe crucial thr~e or four hours we needed leads to another. Brains, to a muchto finish our task. Much to our surprise larger extent, are parallel and thereforehe said, "go ahead and keep processing holistic processors-many related eventsyour tapes, we'll begin the dismantling 'occur simultaneously.in such a way as not to disturb you:' In an attempt to simulate biologicalWe were grateful and expected periphe- brains on the computer, scientists have

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constructed programmes utilizing highlyinterconnected hardware which are calledrandom-net configurations. Though thesedo approximate. one aspect of humanperception" the constructive aspect (Neis­ser, 1967), they nevertheless fail whentested against' the general characteristicsof the human perceptual system.(Minskyand Papert,. 1969),. and fail equally tocorrespond to the anatomical specificityof the human system in which sensoryprojections are topologically discrete.

These limitations of hardware simula­tions have been discouraging to thosewho felt that current computers were, atleast in principle, models of biologicalbrains, and have provided fuel for thosewho would like to reject the use ofmechanistic analogies to the nervoussystem.

Another interpretation is possible,however. Perhaps we have gained only,a partial insight into brain function bystressing essential similarities to theorganization ofcomputers. Perhaps whatis needed, in principle, is a look atanother type of organization conduciveto parallel processing, working in con­junction with that represented by present­day computers;

tHE. BRAIN AND THB HOLOGRAM

There is a set of physical systems thatmeets these requirements---i.e., theydisplay the essentials of parallel process­ing. These are optical (lens, prism,diffraction, etc.) systems-often calledoptical information processing systemsto distinguish them from the systems ofdigital switches comp-rising the computermechanisms through which program­mable information processing is con­ducted. In optical systems "connections"are formed by the paths which lighttraverses and light bears little physicalresemblance to the electrochemical

energy that is the currency of both brain~nd computer. Thus, the analogy mustat once be seen as more restricted. Whatis to be taken seriously is the analog.':between the paths taken by the energy;the interactions among these paths andthe resulting organisations, of "inforomation" that are produced. Elsewhere,I have, with Nuwer and Baron-, discussedpossible (and even on the basis: ofcurrent evidence some probable) physicalcorrespondences between ,optical., and!brain systems with respect to these inforomation processing capabilities (Pribram,Nuwer & Baron, 1974). .. >;

The essence of optical' informationprocessing systems is their image con..struction potential. This capacity is. tobe compared and contrasted. with ,theprogramming potential of the comput~r~

Neither programmes nor images reside as·such . in the information processingsystem-they are configurations madepossible by the construction of thesystem. Both images and programmes canbe captured and stored as such outside

. their processing systems.' When this isdone, there appears to be no superficialresemblance between the image or pro.gramme and the system in which process..ing takes place, nor even with any readilyrecordable event structure that occursduring processing. This is because the- to­pography ofimages and, the statements ofprogrammes are re-presentations of theprocess and as such are subject to traosoformation. The job of the scientist· isto, specify the transformations that occurbetween image and optical informationprocessing system and between program.me and computer. The power ofthese ana..logies to brain function comes when themathematical description of these trans­formations can be shown by experimentto be identical for information processingby t he brain as for processing by optical

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and computer systems. When in aacn:tion, the physical components responsi­ble for the transformations are identified,a model of brain function can be con­structed and tested deductively bysub­sequent experiment.

Images and programmes are patentlydifferent constructions and a good dealof evidence is accumulating to show thatin man the right hemisphere of thebrain works predominantly in an imagemode while the left hemisphere functionis more compatible with programme pro­cessing (see reviews by Sperry, 1974; Mil­ner, 1974; and Gassaniga. 1970). Thereis also a considerable body of evidencethat this hemisphere specialization isderived from an earlier mammalian pat­tern of image construction by the poster­ior·lateral portions of the brain basedon somatotopic and visual input, con­trasted with a more sequential organiza­tion of the fronto-medial (limbic) sys­tems by olfactory and auditory input(see Pribram, 1960 and 1969a for review).These dichotomies are not exclusive andhold only· for overall functions-thereare many sequential processes involvedin image construction (as, for instance,scanning by the eye of a pictorial array)"and there are parallel processes involvedin programming (for example, the con­ducting of a symphony or even theappreciation of auditory harmonics).Yet the fact that neurobehavioural datareadily distinguishirnage and programmeprocessing suggests that both must betaken into acco'!nUn any comprehensiveunderstanding of psychological function.. .. By contrast to programmes, images canbe comprehended in their totality evenafter brief exposures to the energy con­figurations they represent. They tend tobe wholistic rather than analytic, e.g.,they tend to completion in the absenceof parts of the input ordinarily responsi-

ble for them. Also, they tend to be"good" or "bad" on the basis of thestructure of the redundancy of theircomponents (Garner 1962). (Programmes,on the other hand, have no such internalcriteria for goodness•. A programme isgood if it works-Le., is compatiblewith the computer .and is better if itworks faster. When, as in a musicalcomposition, esthetic criteria can beapplied, they pertain to the image-pro­ducing. propertic:s of programmes, theircompatibility rather than their internalstructure.) In short, imaging, obeysGestalt principles (which were firstenunciated in the visual arts) as wouldbe expected, while programming takesits kinship from linguistics. Both havegained precision and a new level ofunderstanding by recourse to inforrnatio!lmeasurement and processing concepts.

Holograms provide a powerful mecha­nism for storing the image constructionproperties of optical information process­ing systems. As already noted. whatcalled attention to the distributed infor­mation state is that it makes the brainhighly resistant to damage. In addition,the holographic state allows a fantasticmemory storage capacity: some hundredmillion bits of retrievable informationhave been .Jstored in a cubic centimeterof holographic memory. This is accom­plished by separately storing modula­tions of one or another spatial or tempo­ral frequency. It is somewhat as if therewere myriads ofFM (frequency modula­tion) radios com pre sse d into a tinyspace. Tbe short wave length of light .(as compared to sound) makes suchcapabilities possibFe. In the brain, tbeshort wave lengths characterizing a slowpotential microstructure can be assumedto serve in a similar fasbion (Pribram,1971a).

There are other properties (e.g., asso-

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ciative recall, translationil1, i.e., positio­nal and size invariance) of holograms thatmake the analogy with brain function inperception and memory attractive. Thesehave been presented in another paper(Pribram, Nuwer & Baron, 1974)~ HereI want to emphasize that testable hypoatheses can be formulated arid models ofactual brain function can be proposedwithin the domain of what can looselybe caned the holographic properties ofoptical information processing systems.We have reviewed the evidence for imageconstruction by the brain. What assem­blies of neurons (and their processes),if any, function as true Fourier holo­grams? Which brain structures functionmore like Fresnel holograms? Whichmimic a Fourier process by convolving,integrating neighbouring neural eventsand those at successive stages? Thesequestions are being asked and experi­ments are being performed to provideanswers.

As might be expected, such experi­ments have already encountered oneserious obstacle in drawing too close aparallel between optical informationprocesses and image construction by thebrain. This obstacle concerns the size ofthe receptive fields recorded for cells inthe primary visual projection systems.For example, the projection from themacular portion of the retina, the fovealreceptive fields, is extremely small-some3_50 of visual angle as a maximum.A hologram of this size will .hardlyaccount for the fact that informationbecomes distributed accross the entirevisual system !is indicated by the evi­dence from electrophysi610gical record­ings.

A search has therefore been made forlarger receptive fields that integrate theinput from the smaller fields of the pri­mary projection cortex. Such larger

fields"have been found in the cortex thatsurrounds the primary projection areas.It wouid' be simple if one could assumethat there, rather than in the primaryprojection cortex, the true holographicprocess takes place.

But this simple assumption runs con­trary to other evidence. First, it wouldnot account, by itself, for the distribu­tion of information within the projectioncortex. Second, complete resection .ofthis peri projection cortex (where. thelarger receptive fields are found) produ..ccs no permanent damage.. to image con:'struction as far as one can· tell fromanimal experiments (Pribram~ Spinelli &.Reitz, 1969). ." . " .

Beyond these visual areas of the braincortex, however, there is another~ lyingon the inferior surface of the temporallobe which, when it is resected, leavesmonkeys markedly and permanentlyimpaired in their ability to make visualdiscriminations (Pribram, 1954, 1960,1969a). This impairment is limited tothe visual mode (H. Pribram & Barry,1956; M. Wilson, 1957). Only visualperformances demanding a. choice areimpaired; other visual functions. suchas tr;1cking a signal remain intact (Prib­ram, Chapter 17, 19718.). The difficulty

. involves the ability to selectively· attendto visual input (Gerbrandt et al., 1970;Rothblat & Pribram, 1972; Gross,1972).. "Much to everyone's surprise, •. thisvisual "association" area (as the areawith comparable. function is known inman (Milner, 1958) appears to functionremarkably well when'--all known visualinput to it is destroyed. As alreadynoted, removal of the perivisual cortexhas little. permanent effect; destructionof the thalamic input (from the pulvinar,to the inferior temporal cortex has noeffect whatsoever (M ish kin, 1972;

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Ungerleicter, personal communication).Even combined lesions of perivisual andthalamic inputs do not permanentlydisrupt visual discriminations.

These data make plausible the hypo­thesis that the inferior temporal cortexexerts its effect on vision via an outputto the primary visual projection system(Pribram, 1958). Evidence in supportof this hypothesis has accrued over thepast· fifteen years: the. configurationand size of visual receptive fields can beaiteredby electrical stimulation of theinferior temporal cortex (Spinelli &Pribram, 1967); recovery cycles in thevisual projection system are shortenedby such stimulation (Spinelli & Pribram,1966); the pathways from the inferiortemporal cortex have been t rae e d(Whitlock & Nauta, 1956; Rei t z &Pribram, 1969).

. Thus, another, more specific hypothe­sis can be entertained-viz., the sugges­tion that the inferior temporal cortexhelps to programme the functions of theprimary visual projection systems.Specifically, such programming, as wellas programming by input from sensoryreceptors, . could "get together" thedistributed store of information from thevarious lod of restricted receptive fieldsize. If therelevant loci were addressedin unison they would, in fact, functionlike a hologram.

The difference, therefore, betweenbrain function and the function of opt­ical information processing sy~tems isthe one set out at the beginning of thispaper. Brain is both an image construc­tion and a programming-device. Opticalsystems construct only images. .

The thesis presented here, therefore,suggests that the holographic-like storeof distributed information in the primaryvisual projection system is akin to thedistributed memory bank of a computer.

The .. computer's memory IS organizedmo;e or less randomly; the brain'smemory has been stored along hologra­phic principles. Both must be addressedby programmes which access the appro­priate "bits" of information. The com­'puter does this serially; the brain, toa 1 a r g e extent, simultaneously, bypathways that allow signals to be tran­smitted in parallel. Such simultaneityin function produces momentary brainstates that are akin to the holographicpatterns that can be stored '.on film.

·BecaU3e of these differences betweenbrain and optical systems, it may· bebetter to talk about brain function asholonomic rather than just holographicor hologrammic. The term holonomicis used in engineering whenever the,systems, in an interactive set of such·systems, are reasonably linear in theirfunction. Linearity allo.ws the computa­tion of the functions of each system andtherefore an estimate of the amount oftheir in teraction the ud e g r e e s offreedom" that characterize the interac­tive set~ The interactions are known asthe holonomic constraints on the system.In ·the context of the model of brainfunction in vision suggested here, theneural systems that determine anymomentary visual state would~have to.be shown to be linear; then the amountof interaction among the systems inproducing the- holographic visual statewould appear as the degrees of freedomcharacterizing that state.

Evidence is available to show thar thevisual system, despite local nonlineari­ties, acts linearly overaIl above threshold(e.g., Ratliff, 1965). This is the case inother neural systems, notably the motorsystem (Granit, 1970). It is thus reason­able to propose that the hoIonomicmodel applies to brain functions otherthan visual. Support for such a proposal

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(2)

ACHIEVINoCONscrousNESS'· .'

While stillin the practice ofneurosur­gery, [was called one day to' consult oila case some 200 miles distant.- A 14- .year-old girl had fallen from a'rapidlymoving automobile when its' rear doorinadvertently opened. She had laceratedher. scalp badly, .and, when the e!riergen:'cy procedilres to stop the bleeding wereaccomplished, r was called, because'thefamily physician was afraid that' thepatient's ,head injury would becomeexacerbated by the additional trauma ofa long trip by ambulance~ I waS informedthat the girl's condition was critical andthat everyone feared she was moribund~

When I arrived on the scene some l to

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CONSCIOUSNESS: A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH 103

'\ comes froni work on the' auditory (von or.-brain furiction.is therefore rriathema-'Bekesy, 1960); ·somatosensory. (von tically precise, and its assumptions (suchBekesy~ 1959) and even .·gustatory (von as overall linearity of component· prog..Bekesy, 1967;' Pfaffman,' : 1960) . and ramming systems) and consequences (theolfactory systems' (Gesteland, et ~I., distributed nature of the deep structure1968). . . . ...., of the memory store) are; at' least in

Briefly summarizing, the holonomic principle, testable. " 'model of' brain', function: proposes that "But what relevance does the holonornicthe brain partakes of both computer and model of brain function hold for' psycho..optical' information· processes. The logy? The advent of 'computers .gavebrain is like acomputer in that infonna- rise to a' psychological scien~·tha.t could,tion is prOCessed in steps'-by an, organiz- cope with cognitive processes: :.Theed' and organizing set of rules.. It differs scope of studies of memory mechanisms~

from current computers in that each step attentionaqdproblem solving'could nowis more extended in' space-brain has be precisely explored and models' con,.consIderably, more parallel processing ,structed "in vitro".much·as tliebiochem..

. . capability than today's computers. ist can model and ex pi or e'.in theThis. parallel' processing aspect of laboratory the chemistry believed to; be

brain function leads. to another diffe- . operative in organism. Holographyrenee. The rules of parallel· processing promises to provide. similar "in vitia"are more akin to those that apply to possibilities forthe study of conSciouS­optical information processes than they ness. Perceptual proCe:JiSes. imaging'andare to those, used in current serial com- the like can now be modelled and exploredputers. Thus the momentary states' set in the laboratory. Let us ne~t, therefore;up by the programming activity are con- take a look at the pioblems posed bysiderably like those of image construct- the study of consciousness and examine.ing devices, i.e., holographic. Thus the ways in which the holonomic theorymemory storage is also. holographic can contribute to their resolution;rather than random as in today's com­puters. / This does not deny, however,that storage of rules also takes place-.as it does in 'machine' peripherals' (e.g.,DEK tapes fcir minicomputers). .Whatthe model requires is that the ~'deep

structure" of the m em 0 r'y store isholograph-ic.: ..

Since the holographic state is coni~

posed by 'programmes and since the dis­tributed store must oe gof together by ,the actions of and interactions amongprogrammes, the holographic brain statecan be analyzed according to the systemsthat produces it Thus theholonomicconstraints or degrees of freedom thatcharacterize the holographic state canbe determined. The holonomic'" model

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4 hours later, the situation had deterio­rated further. The girl had not evenbeen moved to a nearby hospital andwas lying'in a bed at a farmhouse nearthe scene of the accident. She was notexpected to live.

I entered the bedroom. Blinds weredrawn~ Blood-soaked bandages werewrapped around the girl's head. Onlya small part of her face showed, and ithad a sickly colouration. She was hardlybreathing.," The distressed family made room forme at the ,bedside. As was my custom,I said, "Hello, Cathy" (the girl's name)as I took her hand to feel her pulse.Much'to my amazement, Cathy openedher eyes and said, "HeIlo, Doctor I"~,

Cathy was conscious!My whole approach to the consulta­

tion changed. I quickly looked at thegirl's eyes to see if her pupils were ofequal diameter, which they were, did theessentials of a neurological examination,such as lifting' her head to rule outstiffness due to bleeding inside the head,and thenwent on to ascertain that alllimbs were movable, etc. But' myattention became focused, not on theneurological, but on the remainder of athorough physical exaIIrination. I noticedthat, in moving her right arm, thepatient expressed considerable discom­fort. And very quickly I ascertainedthat some ribs had been broken and hadpunctured the girl's right lung. She wasindeed in critical condition, and I order.ed an oxygen _tent to be brought immedi-

, ately from 'the h 0 s pit a I since ourpatient's trouble was not in her headbut in her chest.' Recovery ensuedrapidly once the locus of the problemhad been iden tifled.

This case history points up the set ofproblems concerning the concept "con­sciousness" that I want to take up. (1)

The concept consciousness is not justsome esoteric theoretical football to betossed to see whether interception byman-made computers can take place:My attribution of consciousness is ofpractical concern to those who are sograced; (2) consciousness is relatedprimarily to brain function;' and (3)consciousness sometimes involves theidentification of self: Cathy respondedonly when T, addressed her by name.

My' story, I "believe, indicates theusefulness of the concept consciousness.I inferred that Cathy was conscious fromoccurrences that,' in this par tic u I a rcircumstance, were, in fact, surprising.What then are the categories of episodesfrom which I infer consciousness? '

The first category is that of life, basedon the occurrence of growth and replica­tion in some asymmetrical mass showingvaried parts. The second category is

, that of movement in space. In short, Itend to view animals, especially furryanimals, as conscious--not plants, notina~imate crystals, not computers. Thismight be termed the "cuddleness cri­terion" for consciousness. My reasonsare practical; i't makes little differenceat present whether computers are con·scious or not, and, in the Jamesiantradition, I hold that only a differencethat makes a difference is worth pur­suing~

, 'How does consciousness make adifference? ,Ryle (1949, p. 136) suggeststhat the concept of mind in general andsuch concepts as perception. :tttention.interest. and consciousness in particulartake their' origin in occurrences thatindicate that the conscious, interested.or attending organism minds, i.e., heedshis surroundings. Also' in this view,consciousness derives from the interac­tionof an organism with his environ­ment-it is therefore. meaningless to ask

CONSCIOUSNESS: ASCIENl'IFIC APPROACH

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whether consciousness "intervenes" orinteracts with either the organism F hisbrain, or his environment. In this sense,consciousness describes a property bywhich organisms achieve a special rela-.tionship with· their environment. Wehave easy access to this relationship whenit becomes manifest. in the behaviourof the organism.. Here the term "beha­viour" should· be understood in a largersense then its usual English connotation.The German "Verhaltung". and theFrench "comportment". come closersince they connote English "bearing" aswell as more active behaviour. Thus, aquestion we need to address is whetherwe can also access these manifestationsof consciousness by looking at the beha­viour of restricted parts of the organismsuch as his brain.

A useful analogy comes from mecha­nics: although we speak of gravity asa property of a mass, this propertybecomes manifest only when interac­tions among masses occur. So we mayloosely talk of locating gravity .at thecenter of a mass or of consciousness inthe centre of the head, but· only in thecase of consciousness do' some stillseriously entertain the proposition thatif we g<>:dig deeply enough, we willassuredly find "it." But neither thesophisticated earth scientist, nor thebrain scientist would argue againstcoming'up with some samples that might explainspecific characteristics of the ~'gravita­

tional" or "conscious" process.What are some of these specific

characteristics of con~iousness? Welook to see, we liste'n to hear, we re­m e m b e r w hat we see and hear.And sometimes we also. remember thatwhich' we have forgotten. In additionF

of course, we can let .others know wehave seen and heard and we can eventalk about it. So we have a variety of

toscharacteristics to be explained. Theyrange" from asking practical questionsabout "seeing" (for some of us are blind)p­through those that deal with "looking'·(since so often we see only what we lookfor), and remembering (because muchof our behaviour is based on antecedentrather than on concurrent episodes), tothe more difficult problems about for­getting (it's so damned selective), andtalking (the sine qua non of academic andother human endeavour). Finally, we.must face the issue of.' who.is "we" orwho am the I that manifests such con­scious' characteristics (the clinic is full' ofpeople in search of their identities).Analyzed into such components theproblem of consciousness becomes some­what less awesome and certainly amena­ble to scientific investigation.

BRAIN AND CONSCIOUSNESS

A second main topic was brought intofocus by Cathy's case history: conscious­ness and brain are somehow intimatelyinterwoven. Some would have us believethat consciousness is a brain state, butsuch statements are a mixture of mindtalkand brain talk (Mackay, 1956) thatirritate the purist. Another possibilitywo uld be that certain. brain states. resultin consciousness,. and this is wbat I.implied in the previous section. Butsuch statements also run into difficulties.:­If brain states can result in consciousexperience, we should be able to repli­cate the brain state and thus produce acomputerized robot who is conscious.My friends in computer and other phy­sical sciences seem to welcome this asan ultimate achievement-I should liketo point out to them only one amongmany difficulties: The emergence of an'SPCC 'which would attempt to legislatethe scientists' activities in order to preo

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Somewhat more seriously, the questionentertains the possibility of consciousnessand self-consciousness as emergent pro­perties of certain kinds or amounts ofneural (and therefore, perhaps of other)organizations and addresses the issue ofthe primacy and privacy of subjec­tive experience. Critical philosophyhas given a lead in exploringthese problems in a logical fashion thatallows scientific inquiry to proceed.Most of these· analyses have come outon the side of a monistic and against adualistic interpretation of the mind.brainissue, although multiple aspects of anidentity are ordinarily allowed. I haveelsewhere (Pribram, 1971a, 1971 b, 1972)made the case that, in fact, these arenot multiple aspects but multiple realiza­tions of an ultimately understandablebiological process. However, manybiologists, including Sir Charles Sher­rington, Wilder Penfield, Sir JohnEccles, and Roger Sperry, are dissatisfiedwith this sort of explanation becausethey cannot as yet visualize a brainmechanism that readily transforms nerveimpulses into subjective experience.They then come to wrestle with theconverse prqblem that experience alters .brain structure and function.

The issue can perhaps be statedsomewhat more clearly by asking whatsort of transformations allow spec~ral

energiell to become transformed intoneural, and back again.. We have littledifficulty in grasping the principles of acamera which stores spectral qualitiesand quantities on film, which, whenilluminated by other spectral energies,produces an image corresponding to theoriginal qualities and quantities. It.is but a step to store the spatial phaseof the relationship between these quali­ties and quantities rather than thequalities, . and quantities themselves;

And, as we know, such films (knownas "holograms") are in some respects(see below) even more versatile inreproducing images corresponding to theoriginal.

My proposal here is that there .area set of properties. manifest in organized(i.e., spectral) energy that we have beenslow to comprehend fully when engagedin trying to understand biologicalorganization. Only during '. the pastquarter . century have - we come toappreciate the power of the concept"information" in describing communica­tions of. any sort. Information is notthe property of any single· event, butthe property of the relation betweenthem, their sequence, their hierarchicalstructure, their arrangements. Informa­tion becomes encoded in such organiza­tions and .decoded from them~ Codesare languages (Pribram, 1971a): andlanguages are the key to the structureof consciousness (Cassirer, 1966 ; Langer,1951)•. not only in the sense ordinarilyused by critical' philosophers, .but in adeeper· sense that "the limits of mylanguage are the limits of my world'·(Wittgenstein, 1922, italiCs mine).

I believe that the particular code, theparticular transformation, that makessubjective experience, conscious aware­ness, such a difficult topic is thatbiologists have yet dealt only minimallywith the implications of holonomicprocesses. As we have seen, holographicencoding presents for study just the kindof problem that has troubled neuroscien­tists, biologists, psychologists, andphilosophers for centuries. How areimages reconstructed? Where are theseimages located? What is the physicalproperty that makes superposition ofthe functions of neighbouring elementsmandatory? How can a pattern, theencoded information, be· transmitted

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THE DlsPOsmoN TOWARD

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

, The third' main 'question raised byCathy's case history concerns herawareness of self, identified by hername.' How does self-consciousnesscome about? . ,;. :

A student enters my office, sits downin a chair opposite me and asks meto explain holography. I demonstratehow images can be reconstructed froma piece of film that itself does not looklike an isomorphic representation ofthe object to be imaged. I point tothe image, but when I try to apprehendit, touch it, the image disappears. Theimage is not located in the film, yet arepresentation of the object is locatedthere, and from this representation theghostlike image can be conjured by theappropriate incantations of the input.Where then is the "image" stored?Certainly not on the film, here only therepresentation occurs. Where is theimage "located" when it does occur?Certainly not in the film itself. Theimage is projected beyond the film (ina transmission hologram) or inside theapparatus (in a reftection hologram).

I ask the student where she sees thebook I am holding. She points to itand says, "Why there!" She is puzZledby my question.

I now say to her, "My, you lookpretty today, Eva." Whereupon shechanges her bearing slightly, blushes abright crimson, smiles and acknowledgesmy compliment. I now ask her where shefeels beautiful. The blush," which hadjust begun to subside, returns fullblownand she says; "All over, it's just afeeling 1 have inside."

1:07.

Why/does Eva perceive the book as'out there' and feel' the glow of bea~ty­

as inside herself? After all, the stimula~,

tion that initiated her perception. occur..;.red at the retinal surface and the stimula.;tion that initiated her feeling occurredin the Bushing of her body surface- botliin surfaces between "Eva" and her:"environment." ..-

A series of experiments by, Bekesy.(1967) gives at least' a partial answer;to this age-old philoSQphical puzzle.:'Bekesy had modelled thecocbJea of theear by making a device' that placed five:vibrators on the surface of 'the skin.:The frequency and phase relationshipsof the vibrators could be varied. Whenplaced on the inside of the forearm orthigh, the s~nsation produced was thatof a point source which could be madeto move' along the surface by changingthe relative rates of the vibrators. ThenBekesy placed two of these devices onhis subjects-one on each limb. ,Hewould now play with the phase relaotionship between the two devices."' At"first the subject would feel the pointsource, to jump from one limb to theother, but after someexposure-usuaIIyseveral hours- he would begin' tolocalize the source of stimulation to apoint between the limbs. In short, henow projected the somatosensory sourceinto space much as stereophonic soundbecomes projected into the space betweentwo loudspeakers.

Bekesy~s original findings of ascribinga movable point source to a set of phase­related vibratory stimuli was describedin terms of inhibitory interactionsimposed by the receptive surface andthe central processing of sensory input.Such inhibitory interactions are presentin the visual as well as the auditory andsomatosensory systems, and Bekesyproduced some preliminary evidence

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which suggests that the taste mechanism­may also be organized in this fashion.A great number of facts, such as theoccurrence of Mach bands (Ratliff,1965), of meta.contrast (Bridgeman,1971), and apparent motion (Comsweet,1970) can -be explained readily by theseinhibitory processes.. The mathematical equations used by

Bekesy (see Ratliff, 1965) and othersto quantitatively describe the inhibitorymechanisms are sets of reversibletransforms that superpose the effects ofneighbouring stimuli. These mathema­tical descriptions, often called holonomictransformations (McFarland, 1971), areof. the .same genre as those used byGabor (1948) when he invented hologra­phy to enhance the resolution of elec­tronmicroscopy.· In short, there is aresemblance between the equations thatdescribe sensory processing and physicalholography... This resemblance let me to proposethat we take seriously the analogybetween neural processing and physicalholography (1966, 1971 a, 1974, Pribram,

.Nuwer & Barron 1974). Work on thev~ualsystem has supported thisproposal: the system as a whole andcortical cells' in parti~ular have been'found (Campbell, 1974; Campbell et al.,1968,.1969; Pollen, 1971, 1974) sensitiveto spatial frequency (e.g., the distancebetween neighbouring edges of a grating).

In view of these similarities betweensensory processing. and physical holo-·'·graphy, the. projection of images awayfrom the receptor surface becomes some­what less of a mystery. When theappropriate phase relationship betweenneighbouring excitations occurs, the sour­ce ofthose stimulations becomes attribut­ed to space between the surfaces. The mys­tery is not completely solved, for it wasEva and I who saw the images in my

hologram demonstration. Who sees theimages produced by the neural. holo­grams occurring in the sensory systems.?

INTENTIONALITY ' .."

So we turn to the enigma that is cen­tral to any discussion on consciousness:the problem of self-consciousness, thequestion of who am 1? .... ' . _

There is a good deal of evidencethat self.awareness is achieved graduallyand that it i!t relatively fragile. Spitzhas described the development of thesmiling response (1946) and the emergenceof "yes" and "no" . (1957) as infants'begin to differentiate themselves fromtheir caretakers. Piaget (J 960) hassuggested that full awareness of~· self isnot attained until the age of7 or 8.Experiments show that only the greatapes and man can recognize mar~s placed.on his body or face as identifying hisimage in a mirror (Gallup, 1970). Lesserapes (gibbons) and monkeys (F.P. Patter­son and K. Pribram, unpublished obser­vation) fail to have such reactions whiclidemand a simultaneous recognition of'body image and an external projectionof such an image. All of this evidence..added to my simple demonstration withEva, suggests that the disposition toward.self-consciousness needs to be construct­ed and is not universal among organisms.

What then might be the critical aspectsof the mechanism that allows the simul­taneous perception of a body image andits external representation1 In subtlerform, this is the problem ofintentionalitydiscussed so extensively by Brentano(1960) and the' postcritical realists.Intentionality is the capacity to identifydie difference between agent (self) andpercept (externally projected image) andto perceive both simultaneously. . Theconcept thus involves intention or voli­tion as well as self.consciousness.

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CONSCIOUSNESS: A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH 109

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.Elsewhere (Pribram, 1971a) I haveargued that subjective awareness is thereciprocal of smooth control of input­output relationships in the central ner­vous system, that only when .perfor­mances become habitual and experiencesbecome habituated does processingbecome automatic... Dishabituation tonovelty engages the junctional and dend­ritie- mechanisms of the brain where theslow potential micro-structure, the holo­graphic ..• representation. of input, .isproduced. Only with repetition dopattemsof these slow potentials inter­correlate sufficiently to generate the nerve.impulses necessary to action._ Each slo'."potential pattern is assumed to leave itsresidue at these synaptic junctions and

.dendritic locations and so participate ingenerating the correlations. In short, tothe extent that our experiences fail tocorrelate, to the extent that our actionsare uncontrolled by habit, to that extentthey are voluntary and we are conscious.

Ordinary consciousness is thus achiev­ed hy a mechanism (somewhat like ahologram) that disposes the organism tolocate fresh experiences and performancesat some distance from the receptive andexpressive interfaces that join organismand environment. In this respect the

.body image is,that which cannot be pro­jected, and self-consciousness developsfrom the remainder of consciousnesswhen external attributions fail to "mate­rialize:'

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STRUCTURB AND PROBABILITY

In the concludingI,art of this paper,I want, therefore, to explore some ques­tions as to the organization of this exter­nal "material" physical world. Unlesswe know something of consensuallyvalidatable "information" that remainsinvariant across transformations of the .input to the braih-and"aswe have seen,

we cannot rely only on the directness ofour ~r<;eptualexperience for this kiloW'~

ledge--how can we think clearly aboutwhat is being perceived? Questions ~to the nature of the physical universelie in the domain of the theoretical phy';'sicist. Physics has enjoyed unprecedent~

ed success not only in this century, butin the se~eral preceding ones. Physicsought: to know something, therefore;about the universe we perceive.. And, ofcourse; it does~·· However, as we' shallshortly·· see, the structure-distributionproblem is as pervasive 'here-as itis'~inbrain function. . " -.. :;

The special theory of relativity .madeit clear that physical laws as conceivedin classical mechanics hold only in certaincircumscribed contexts. Perceptions:"ofthe Brownian "random" movements ofsmall suspended particles, or of the patnsof light coming from distances beyondthe solar system, strained the. classicalconceptions to the point where additionalconcepts applying to .a wider range ofcontexts had to be brought in. As in thecase of direct perception, the lawS·.ofphysics must take into account not Onlywhat is perceived but the more extendeddomain in which the perception oCcurs~

The apparent flatness of the earth wenow know is an illusion. .. '... The limitations of classical physicswere underscored by research into themicrocosm of the atom. The very instnioments of perception and even scientificobservation itself became suspect as pro~

viding,only limited, situation-relatedinformation. Discrepancies appearedsuch as an electron being in two places(orbits) at once or at best moving' fromone place to another faster than thespeed of light-the agreed upon maxi·mum velocity of any event. And withinthe nucleus of the atom matters areworse-a nuclear particle appears to

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arrive in one location before it ha~ left "reality." In this sense, as well as fromanother. Most of these discrepancies the viewpoint of brain processes,. we areresult from the assumption that these always constructing physical reality. Theparticles occupy only a point in space- arguments of the quantum physicist andthus' when the - equations that relate those of the neurophysiologist and pSyolocation to mass or velocity are solved, chologist of perception are in this respectthey lead to infinities. Furthermore, in identical. . ­the atomic universe, happenings take But several theoretical physicists areplace in ju~ps-they appear to be quan- not satisfied with these solutions or lacktized, i.e., particulate. Yet when a of solutions. Feynman (1965). for in­small particle such as an electron, or a stance, notes that though we have avail- ­photon of light, passes through a grating able most - precise and quantitativeand another particle passes through a mathematical descriptions in quantumneighbouring grating, the two particles mechanics, we lack good images of whatappear to interact as if they were waves, is taking place. _ (His own famous dia­since interference patterns can be recorded grams show time flowing backwards inon the far side of the gratings. It all de- some segments!) DeBroglie, who firstpends on the situation in which measure- proposed wavelike characteristics for thements .are made whether the "wavicle" electron fails to find solace in Ii probabi­shows its particle or its V/ave characteris- listic explanation of the experimentaltics. . results that led him to make the proposal

Several approaches to this dilemma of - (1964). And DeBroglie 'is joined bysituational specificity have been forward- Schroedinger (1935) who formulated theed. The most popular, known as the wave equation in question and especiallyCopenhagen solution, suggests that the by Einstein, whose insights led him towave equations (e.g;, those of Schroedin- remain unconvinced that an unknowableger, 1935, and DeBroglie, 1964) describe universe, macro- and micro-, was· builtthe average problbilities ofchance occur- on the principle of the roulette wheel orrences of particulate events. An earlier the throw-of dice.solution -by Niels Bohr (the "father" of I share this discomfort with attributingthe Copenhagen group, 1966) suggested too much to chance becauseof an experiothat particle and wave were irreconcilable ence of my own. In the Museum ofcomplimentary aspects of the whole. Science and Industry in Chicago, there isHeisenberg (1959) extended t~is sugges- a 4isplay which demonstrates the com­tion by' pointing out that the whole position of a Gaussian probability distri­cannot in fact be known because our bution. Large lead balls are let fall froinknowledge is always dependent on the a tube into an open maze made of aexperimental situation in which the lattice of shelves. The written and audi­observations are made. Von Neumann tory explanations of the display empha­(1932) added; tnat given a positivistic size the indeterminate nature of the pathoperational framework, the whole reality oreach of the falling balls and providebecomes therefore not only unknown bot an excellent introduction to elementaryunknowable. Thus, the whole becomes statistics. However, nowhere is mentionindeterminable because we cannot in any made of the symmetrical maze throughspecific situation be certain that what Wfl which the balls must fall in order toare observing and measuring reflects achieve their probabilistic ending. Hav';'

CONSCIOUSNESS: A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH III

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ing just completed Plans and the Struc- These inte'racting forces display fluctua­lure of Behavior (Miller,' Galanter & tions=-some are linear and account forPribram, 1960), I was struck by the the wave form characteristics of theomission: In fact~ students of biology space or field. Other interactions areroutinely use statistics to discover the ,n~nlinear (similar to turbulence in fluidorderliness in' the proceSses they are systems) and on Occasion produce quantalstudying. For example, when a measur- . events. In biology, Thorn (1972>' hasable entity shows a Gaussian distribution developed a mathematics to deal within a population, we immediately look such occurrences in the morphogeneticfor its, heritability. Perhaps the gas laws field and this mathematics has beenfrom which statistics emerged have mis- applied to perception by Bruter (1974).led us. A Gaussian distribution reflects ,Thorn calls the emergence of quasiquan­symmetrical structure and not just the tal structures from turbulent processesrandom 'banging 'about of particles. ~'catastrophes.", In physiCs" the quanta!Again, the physical' reality behind the structures that result from such catastrOodirect perception may contain surprises. phic processes may, therefore, be only

Moreover, when we obtain a probabi- partially stable. Thus, they can disappearlistic curve, we often refer to a distribu- and reappear nearby in a seemingly ran­tion of events across a population' of dom fashion, which, on the average, how..such events-e.g., a Gaussian distribu- ever, are subject to the more regular oscil­tion. Could it be that for the physical lations' of the forces. In biology, observa;'universe, just as in the case of brain tions pertaining to the entrainment of .function, structure and distribution, oscillatory processes by clocks or tempo-,mutually interact? After all. the brain rary dominant foci parallel these can­is a part of the physical' universe. For cepts. Bohm goes on to point out wherebrain function, we found structUre to be in the subquantal domain these eventsin the form of program and distribution will become manifest:' the interactionsin the form of holograms. Is the rest of, of high frequency and high energyparti­the physical universe built along these cles in nuclear reactions, in black bodies,lines as well? " etc. 'An article in a' recent issue of

Scientific American reviews the contem-THESmUCTURAL AND HOLONOMIC porary scene in these attempts ata Uni-

ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATION fied Field .Theory in the subquantalDavid Bohm (1957), initially working domain (Weinberg, 1974).

with Einstein, has among others, made '. More recently, Bohm (1971, 1973) hassome ~ubstantial contributions to theore- . reviewed the conceptual development oftical physics compatible with ihis line of physics from Aristotelian through Galli­reasoning. Bohm points out, as noted lean and Newtonian times to modemabove, that the oddities of quantum developments in the Quantum Mechanics.mechanics derive almost exclusively from' He points out how much of out imagethe assumption that the particies in of the physical universe results from thequestion occupy only a point in space; fact that, since Gallileo, the opening ofHe assumed instead that the. "wavicle" new worlds of enquiry in Physics hasoccupies a finite space which is structured depended on the use of lenses. Lensesby subquantal forces akin to electro- have shaped our images and lenses objec­magnetic and gravitational interactions. tify. Thus, we tend to assess external

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space in terms of objects, things and-- ~physical world. My proposal departsparticulars. from Russell, - however, in suggest-

Bohm goes on to suggest that image ing .that intrinsic properties (whichformation is only one result of optical he defines as the stoneness of stones,information processing and proposes that ~.g.) are also knowable-that in .factwe seriously consider the hologram as they .are· the 'ground' in which theproviding an additional model for viewing extrinsic properties are embedded in

"the organization of physical" processes. order' to become realized. Thus artists,He and his group are now engaged in artisans and engineers spend most ofdetailed application of this basic insight their· time realizing the extrinsic pro:'to see whether in facta holographic grammes, laws and rules of the arts andapproach can be helpful in solving the sciences by grounding ,them in an appro­problems of high energy nuclear physics. priate medium~ For example, a BrahmsInitial developments have shown promise. symphony can be realized by an orche­.. As noted above, the subquantal domain stra, on sheet music, on a long-playingshows striking similarities to holographic record or on tape. Each of these reaIi­organization. Just. as in the case for zations come about after long hours ofbrain processes presented here, Bohm's development of the medium in whichtheoretical formulations retain classical the realization occurs. R u sse II wasand quantum proc.."SSes as well as adding almost correct in his view that the in­the holographic. The holographic state trinsic properties of the physical world'described by wave equations and the are unknowable-they have apparentlyparticle state describedquantalIy, are little to do with the more enduring ex­part of a more encompassing whole. The trinsic properties, show no resemblancesparallel holds because the holographic among themselves, and demand consi­models describe only the deeper levels of derable know-hoW'to replicate.the' theory which is thus holonomic; The sum of these ideas leads to therather than holographic, as we found it . proposal that the intrinsic properties ofto be for the special case of brain fune- the physical universe," their implicate-tion (where the deeper level is constituted 0 r g ani z a t ion, the field, ground orof pre•. and post-synaptic and dendritic medium in which explicit organizations,potentials and the quantal level, of the extrinsic properties, become realised, arenerve impulses generated by these slow multiform.: In the extreme, the intrinsicpotentials). properties, the 'implicate' organization,

Bohm relates structural and hologra- "is holographic. As' extrinsic propertiesphic processes by specifying the differen- become realized, they make the impli­ces in" their organization. He termscate organization become more explicit.classical and particle organization expli- The consequence for t.his "view is acate and holographic-o r g ani z a t i 0 n- revaluation of what we mean by proba­implicate. Elsewhere (Pribram, 1971a), bilistic. Until now, the image, theI have made a parallel distinction for model of statistics, has been indetermi­perceptual processes: following Ber- nacy. If the above line of reasoning istrand Russell (1959), .I proposed that correct, an alternate view would holdscientific analysis as we practice it today, that a random distribution is based' onbegets knowledge of the extrinsic pro- holographic principles and is thereforeperties (the rules, structures, etc.) of the determined. The uncertainty of occur-

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CONSCIOUSNESS: A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH 113

TRANSCENDENTALISM AND ,THB LOGICAL

PARADOX

But perhaps the most striking impact

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renee of events is only superficial and is of a constructional approach to theprOoA~ ,

the result of holographic "blurring" blem of consciousness comes from obser. 'which reflects underlying, symmetries vations of transcendental, experiences;,(much as does the Gaussian distribution As already noted. certain brain structu·in our earlier example), and not just res have been found, to control thejoinhaphazard occurrences. ,.This relati9n among the various feedback and feed.,between appearance and, reality in the forward mechanis~s of the brain (po:­subquantal domain of nuclear physics bram. 1969b). , These structures (circuitsand its dependence on underlying symme- centering on the amygdala) also beCometries (spin) is detailed in the revie"Y' arti- the site of pathological. disturbance incle in Scientific American already referred man. Epileptogenic lesions of the medialto (Weinberg. 1974). ' , part of the pole of the temporal lobe of

A preliminary answer· to the question 'the brain near the amygdala episodicallyposed at, the outset of this section- disrupt self-awareness. .Patients withwhat is it that we perceive-is therefore' such lesions experience inappropriatethat we perceive a physical universe not deja nre and jamois vue feelings of" fami.much different in basic organization" liarity and unfamiliarity and. fail .~o

from that of the brain. ,This is comfort- 'incorporate into memory experiencesing since the brain is part of the physi- occurring during an episode of electricalcal universe as well as the organ of per- seizure activity of their brains. In aception. It is also comforting. to find sense, therefore, these clinical episodesthat the theoretical physicist working point to a tran-scendence of content. afrom his end and with his tools and data' phenomenon of consciousness withoutbas come to the identical problem (which content, a phenomenon also experiencedis, in Gibson's terms, the nature of the in mystical states. and as a result, ofinformation which. remains invariant Yoga and Zen procedures--a transcen.across situations) faced by the neuro- dence' of the dichotomy between "self"physiologist and psychologist interested and "other" awareness. , 'in perception (Bohm, 1965; Appendix)., "A~ illustrated by Globus's (1976)Though surprising, the fact that at least defense of panpsychism and Eccles'sone renowned theoretical physicist has (1976) defense of the soul. many scien­made a. proposal'that addresses this tists desire not to eschew the mysticalcommon problem' in terms similar ,to and feel that certain transcendent pro· 'those set fqrth on the basis of an analy- perties of consciousness cannot be ignor­sis of brain function, is most encourag. ed: perhaps we must lapse into dualisming. For science is. of a piece. and .full after all" if we ,are to be happy everunderstanding cannot be restricted to after. '. The constructional realist needsthe developments made possible by one no recourse to such, counsels of despair.discipline alone. Th.i~.is.-especially true At a recent and most eventful gathering•.for perception-where perceiver meets called by, Alan Watts and John Lilly, atthe perceived and the perceived meets Esalen Institute.. I learned of the work ofthe perceiver. G. Spencer Brown (1972). a student

of Wittgenstein's and Russell's. Asan engineer, Brown (and bis brother)devised for British Railways a gadgetthat could automatically monitor the.

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number of wheels entering and exitingtheir tunnels irrespective of the recur­sions a particular wheel of a partiallyhalted train might perform. As amathematician. Brown quickly realized'that in devising the gadget he had per­formed some unorthodox arithmeticaltwist which. upon scrutiny, turned Olit tobe the invention ofan imaginary numberin the Booiean algebra. Pursuing theproblem further, he found that this

.' invention became necessary because his·system had to deal with oscillation.Oscillations occur when negative feed~

backs are imperfectly timed. And oscil­·lations may never stop-..:thus, when thesystem had to deal with an infinite cal­culus, the invention became necessary.As a pupil of Russell and Wittgenstein.Brown was 'seized by the idea that hehad encountered the Whitehead-Russelldilemma of the logical paradox ("thisstatement is a lie") in the form of an·oscillation and that his solution hadtranscended the paradox. Spencer Browntold us of some of the implications forphilosophy of his mathematical 'disco­very (see also Keys [alias G. SpencerBrown], 1972) and we developed others.for ourselves.- In this spirit, von Foerster pointed·out that the problem of the existenceofa reality external to us, so persuasively·discussed by Hume (1888) and Berkeley(1904), had a solution akin to that pro.

· posed by Spencer Brown. To paraphrasethe ensuing discussion: If I had to

·choose to regard my subjective reality aspurely private and you regard yours inlike manner, we have a choice. We caneither retreat to our own corners anddeny the world, or, like oscillatingwheels, shuttle our private experiencebetween us through communication. Inorder to keep such communication open­infinite-we "invent," construct, a real

world which includes the distinctionbetween the "other" and the "self." Inshort, here again is evidence that self­consciousness is a construction, a con­struction as real as any other admittedby the constructional realist~

So you see. the constructional realist'sreality is not bounded by the material.universe ihough he sees no virtue inden y in g its reality. Russell (1959)suggests that the'· structural propertiesof the physical world are the job ofscience to discover. He defines intrinsicproperties as those that are undiscovera­ble. I prefer to think of intrinsic proper­ties as those in which structural proper.:.ties are enbedded. They have a' specialrelationship to the structural properties:they actualize, make possible the reali­zation of the structural properties.Thus, we know a Beethoven symphonyby its structure, but this structure mustbecome realized in the notations onsheet music, the recorded imprint on aplastic disc. the arrangement of magne­tized minerals on a tape, or the orchestra­tions at a concert. The intrinsic propertiesof. paper making. printing, laboriouslyconstructing 33 1/3 rpm records andplayback phonographs, the invention ofwire recording and its gradual develop­ment into present-day tapes and cas­settes. seem to have little to do with thestructure' of a symphony-yet they areessential to its realization.~ In biology.realization of genetic structures is depen­dent on the morphogenetic field· inwhich the genetic material is embedded,and interestingly. early formulations ofholographic-like processes were address­ed to pro b I ems of morphogenesis(Pribram et aI., 1974). In short, I wantto suggest that Russell's intrinsic pro­perties are those in which structuralproperties must become embedded in.order to be realized. become embodi~d.

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Further, I might point out that theseintrinsic properties are the concern ofand take up a considerable portion of.effort expended by experimentalists,engineers, artisans. and arti.sts ,who areengaged in realizing scientific and artisticstructures. Yet. as Russell emphasized.these intrinsic properties are unknowable,in the sense of scientific theory, sincethey are sUbject to vagaries of themoment, are apparently unrelated to

, each other in any systematic fashion andcan be appreciated, in the final analysis;

,only individually and subjectively,. as inthe case of the symphony, by listening.I repeat. however. constructional realismis not a reductive materialism. Thoughhistorically derived from the multiple­aspects theories of the critical philoso­phers, it differs sharply from them ingiving primacy to realizations as embo­diments of structure, not to those unde­fined somethings whose aspects are to beviewed. It is an understanding of struc­ture, and of the intrinsic organizationsin which structures become embedded,that is elusive and that has to be workedby observation and analysis. In this'sense, constructional realism is moreakin to William James's neutral monismand Russell~s ideas on structural andintrinsic (embodied) properties and onthe morphogenetic field.

Thus, the constructional realist is notafraid of spelling out the laws of tran­'scendence-nor the brain organiZationsthat make such laws possible. 'There isfor him no more mystery to the mysticthan to the induction process that allowsselective derepression of D.N.A. to formnow this organ, now that one. Theorganizations that produce voluntarybehaviour and those that give rise totranscendence are yielding to our analy­ses. What we must face squarely isthat such analyses do not dispel the

"my-stecy" engendered by the operationof these processes in synthesis-that weneed not polarize as opposites the hard­headed analysis and the search for struc-

, turesand the wonder and awe when weview the embodiment of those structures.This is science as it was originally con­ceived: the pursuit of understanding.The days of the cold-hearted,hard­headed technocrat appear to be num­bered-today's. psychologist can delightin the vistas that are opened- by thisrenewed view of.science.

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