G.R. Nos. 170339, 170398-403 : March 9, 2010

ROLANDO E. SISON, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J.:

The requirements of the law on government procurements should never be taken for granted because grave consequences await those who violate them.

Petitioner  Rolando  E.   Sison  was   the  municipal  mayor   of   Calintaan,  Occidental  Mindoro,   a fourth-class municipality,1cЃa from July 1, 1992 to June2cЃa 30, 1995, while Rigoberto de Jesus was the municipal treasurer. On July 18, 1994, state auditor Elsa E. Pajayon conducted a post-audit investigation which revealed that during petitioners incumbency, no public bidding was conducted for the purchase of a Toyota Land Cruiser, 119 bags of Fortune cement, an electric generator set, certain construction materials, two Desert Dueler tires, and a computer and its accessories. Pajayon also found out that there were irregularities in the documents supporting the acquisitions.

  Thus, on June 4, 1998, petitioner and de Jesus were indicted before the Sandiganbayan in seven separate Informations3cЃafor seven counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) 3019.4cЃa

On June 24, 1999, petitioner pleaded not guilty to all the Informations. Accused de Jesus has remained at large.

Trial on the merits ensued. Pajayon was the lone witness for the prosecution. She narrated the States  version of   the facts  as  above stated.  The prosecution thereafter rested  its  case and formally offered its exhibits.

When it was the turn of the defense to present evidence, petitioner was called to the witness stand   where   he   admitted   that   indeed,   no   public   bidding   was   conducted   insofar   as   the purchases he was being accused of were concerned.  When asked how the purchases were made,   he   answered   that   they  were   done   through   personal   canvass.  When   prodded  why personal canvass was the method used, he retorted that no public bidding could be conducted because all the dealers of the items were based in Manila. It was therefore useless to invite bidders since nobody would bid anyway. The defense thereafter rested its case and formally offered its exhibits.

On November 14, 2005, the Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty as charged.5cЃa As such, he was meted in each Information an imprisonment term ranging from six years and one month as minimum to ten years as maximum and perpetual disqualification from holding public office. 

The Sandiganbayan also ordered that an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused de Jesus.

Petitioner appealed6cЃa to this Court, praying for an acquittal because his guilt was allegedly not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

We dismiss the appeal.

Non-Compliance with the Requirements of Personal Canvass

RA 71607cЃa explicitly provides that, as a rule, "acquisitions of supplies by local government units shall be through competitive bidding."8cЃa By way of exception, no bidding is required in the following instances:

(1) personal canvass of responsible merchants;

(2) emergency purchase;

(3) negotiated purchase;

(4) direct purchase from manufacturers or exclusive distributors and

(5) purchase from other government entities.9cЃa

Since   personal   canvass   (the  method   availed   of   by   petitioner)   is   an   exception   to   the   rule requiring public bidding, Section 367 of RA 7160 provides for limitations on the resort to this mode of procurement:

Sec. 367. Procurement through Personal Canvass.Upon approval by the Committee on Awards, procurement of supplies may be affected after personal canvass of at least three (3) responsible suppliers  in the locality by a committee of three (3) composed of the local general services officer or the municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, the local accountant, and the   head   of   office   or   department   for   whose   use   the   supplies   are   being   procured.   The award shall be decided by the Committee on Awards.

Purchases under this Section shall not exceed the amounts specified hereunder for all items in any one (1) month for each local government unit:

xxx

Municipalities:

First Class First Class One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00)

Second and Third Class Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00)

Fourth Class and Below Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) (emphasis supplied)

In relation thereto, Section 364 of RA 7160 mandates:

Section 364. The Committee on Awards.There shall be in every province, city or municipality a Committee on Awards to decide the winning bids and questions of awards on procurement and disposal of property.

The Committee on Awards shall be composed of the local chief executive as chairman, the local treasurer, the local accountant, the local budget officer, the local general services officer, and the   head   of   office   or   department   for   whose   use   the   supplies   are   being   procured,   as members. In case a head of office or department would sit in a dual capacity a member of the sanggunian elected from among its members shall sit as a member. The Committee on Awards at the barangay level shall be the sangguniang barangay. No national official shall sit as member of the Committee on Awards. (emphasis supplied)

Note that the law repeatedly uses the word "shall" to emphasize the mandatory nature of its provisions.

 This Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual issues is a function exercised by lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact binding on the Court   except   only   where   it   is   shown   that   the   case   falls   under   the   accepted exceptions.10cЃa Petitioner failed to establish that his case falls under those exceptions. Hence, we have no other option but to uphold the Sandiganbayans factual findings.

Insofar as the purchase of the Toyota Land Cruiser11cЃa is concerned, the Sandiganbayan found that the personal canvass was effected solely by petitioner, without the participation of the municipal  accountant  and petitioners  co-accused de  Jesus,   the municipal   treasurer.  Worse, there was no showing that that the award was decided by the Committee on Awards. Only an abstract  of   canvass   supported   the   award,   signed  by  petitioner   and  de   Jesus,  without   the required signatures of the municipal accountant and budget officer.

To reiterate, RA 7160 requires that where the head of the office or department requesting the requisition  sits   in  a  dual   capacity,   the  participation  of  a Sanggunian member   (elected   from among   the  members   of   the Sanggunian)   is   necessary.   Petitioner   clearly   disregarded   this requirement because, in all the purchases made, he signed in a dual capacityas chairman and member (representing the head of office for whose use the supplies were being procured). That is strictly prohibited. None of the regular members of the Committee on Awards may sit in a dual capacity. Where any of the regular members is the requisitioning party, a special member from  the Sanggunian is   required.   The  prohibition   is  meant   to   check  or   prevent   conflict   of interest as well  as to protect the use of the procurement process and the public funds for irregular or unlawful purchases.

 The same flaws attended the procurement of 119 bags of Fortune cement,12cЃa electric power generator   set,13cЃa various   construction   materials,14cЃa two   Desert   Dueler   tires15cЃa and   a computer and its accessories.16cЃa

With the kind of   items purchased by petitioner,  he also clearly  spent more than P20,000or beyond the threshold amount per month allowed by Section 367 of RA 7160 as far as purchases through personal canvass by fourth-class municipalities (like Calintaan) are concerned.

Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019

Section 3(e) of RA 3019 provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officersIn addition to acts or omissions of public officers already  penalized  by  existing   law,   the   following   shall   constitute   corrupt  practices  of  any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party  any unwarranted benefits,  advantage or  preference  in   the discharge  of  his  official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest impartiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. xxx. (emphasis supplied)

To be found guilty under said provision, the following elements must concur:

(1) the offender is a public officer;

(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officers official, administrative or judicial functions;

(3)   the  act  was  done   through  manifest  partiality,  evident bad faith,   or  gross inexcusable negligence; and

(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.17cЃa (emphasis supplied)

It is undisputed that the first two elements are present in the case at bar. The only question left is whether the third and fourth elements are likewise present. We hold that they are.

 The third element of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed in three ways , i.e., through manifest  partiality,  evident bad faith  or  gross inexcusable negligence.  Proof of any of these three in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is enough to convict.18cЃa

Explaining what "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" mean, we held:

"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature  of fraud." "Gross negligence  has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property." 19cЃa (citations omitted)

In the instant case, petitioner was grossly negligent in all the purchases that were made under his watch. Petitioners admission that the canvass sheets sent out by de Jesus to the suppliers already contained his signatures because he pre-signed these forms20cЃa only proved his utter disregard  of   the   consequences  of   his   actions.  Petitioner   also   admitted   that   he   knew   the provisions of RA 7160 on personal canvass but he did not follow the law because he was merely following the practice of his predecessors.21cЃa This was an admission of a mindless disregard for the law in a tradition of illegality. This is totally unacceptable, considering that as municipal mayor, petitioner ought to implement the law to the letter. As local chief executive, he should have been the first to follow the law and see to it that it was followed by his constituency. Sadly, however, he was the first to break it.

Petitioner should have complied with the requirements   laid down by RA 7160 on personal canvass, no matter how strict they may have been. Dura lex sed lex. The law is difficult but it is the   law.  These   requirements  are  not  empty  words  but  were   specifically   crafted   to  ensure transparency in the acquisition of government supplies, especially since no public bidding is involved in personal canvass. Truly, the requirement that the canvass and awarding of supplies be made by a collegial  body assures the general  public   that despotic,   irregular  or unlawful transactions  do  not  occur.   It   also  guarantees   that  no  personal  preference   is   given   to  any supplier and that the government is given the best possible price for its procurements.

The fourth element is likewise present. While it is true that the prosecution was not able to prove any undue injury to the government as a result of the purchases, it should be noted that there are two ways by which Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be violated the  first, by causing undue injury to any party,   including the government, or the  second, by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. Although neither mode constitutes a distinct offense,22cЃa an accused may be charged under either mode or both.23cЃa The use of the disjunctive "or" connotes that the two modes need not be present at the same time. In other words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction.24cЃa

Aside from the allegation of undue injury to the government, petitioner was also charged with having given unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to private suppliers.25cЃa Under the second mode, damage is not required. The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or 

official   support;   unjustified;   unauthorized26cЃa or   without   justification   or   adequate reason.27cЃa "Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action.28cЃa "Preference"  signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another. 

In  order   to be  found guilty  under  the second mode,   it  suffices that  the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions. Petitioner did just that. The fact that he repeatedly failed to follow the requirements of RA 7160 on personal canvass proves that unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference was given   to   the  winning   suppliers.   These   suppliers  were   awarded   the   procurement   contract without the benefit of a fair system in determining the best possible price for the government. The private suppliers, which were all personally chosen by respondent, were able to profit from the   transactions  without   showing  proof   that   their   prices  were   the  most  beneficial   to   the government. For that, petitioner must now face the consequences of his acts.

Propriety of the Penalty

Any person guilty of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 is punishable with imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years and perpetual disqualification from   public   office.30cЃa Thus,   the   penalty   imposed   by   the   Sandiganbayan   which   is   an imprisonment   term   ranging   from   six   years   and   one  month   as  minimum   to   ten   years   as maximum and  perpetual   disqualification   from  holding   public   office   for   each   count   of   the offense, is in accord with law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Petitioner Rolando E. Sison is hereby found guilty of seven counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. As such, he is hereby sentenced for each count of the offense with imprisonment of six years and one month as minimum to ten years as maximum and perpetual disqualification from holding public office.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT    

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.

G.R. Nos. 168951& 169000, July 17, 2013

DR. ROGER R. POSADAS AND DR. ROLANDO P. DAYCO, Petitioners, v. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

 

Petitioners assail their conviction for Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Section 7(b)of R.A. No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) under Decision1 dated June 28, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case Nos. 25465-66.

The Facts

Petitioner Dr. Roger R. Posadas (Dr. Posadas), a Ph.D. in Relativity Physics graduate from the University of Pittsburgh, is a longtime professor and former Dean of the College of Science at the University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus (UP Diliman).  He was appointed by the Board of Regents (BOR) of the University of the Philippines System as UP Diliman Chancellor for a three-year term starting November 1, 1993 and ending October 31, 1996.

During his term as Chancellor, Dr. Posadas is one of the leading figures in the emerging inter-disciplinary field of technology management in the Philippines.Upon the recommendation of the UP Diliman Task Force on Science and Technology Assessment, Management and Planning composed of deans and professors from the various colleges in UP Diliman, the BOR on February 23, 1995 approved the establishment of the Technology Management Center (TMC)  under the direct supervision of the Office of the Chancellor, UP Diliman.When the TMC became operational in June 1995, the Task Force on Science and Technology Assessment, Management and Planning wrote then UP President Dr. Emil Q. Javier, nominating Dr. Posadas for the position of TMC Director. For undisclosed reason, Dr. Posadas declined the nomination and instead he (Dr. Posadas) designated Prof. Jose Tabbada of the College of Public Administration as Acting Director of TMC.

On July 26, 1995, Dr. Posadas submitted to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) an Application for Funding of his proposed project entitled “Institutionalization of Technology Management at the University of the Philippines in Diliman” (TMC Project).   The TMC Project, to be funded by a grant from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), aimed to design and develop ten new graduate courses in technology management for the diploma, master’s and doctoral programs to be offered by TMC.2

On September 18, 1995, a Memorandum of Agreement3 (MOA) was executed between Dr. Posadas, on behalf of UP-Diliman, and the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) as the Local Executing Agency of the Policy, Training and Technical Assistance Facility (PTTAF) of CIDA.   Under the MOA, CIDA shall provide the funding for the total project cost (P5,442,400.00), with the NEDA as the designated PTTAF Project Implement or for the Government of the Philippines, while UPDiliman shall direct, manage and implement all activities under the approved project with counterpart funding in the amount of P4,228,524.00.

In a letter dated July 30, 1995, the President of Hua Qiao University in Fujian Province, China invited Dr. Posadas and a delegation from UP Diliman to visit on October 30 to November 6, 1995.  On October 5, 1995, then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing (retired Member of this Court) issued the Authority to Travel for the UP Diliman delegation headed by Dr. Posadas.  Among those who joined the delegation were Dr. Amaryllis Torres and Dr. Rosario Yu, UPDiliman’s Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs and Vice-Chancellor for Student Affairs, respectively.4Under Administrative Order (AO) No. 95-170 dated October 24, 1995, Dr. Posadas designated petitioner Dr. Rolando P. Dayco (Dr. Dayco), Vice-Chancellor for Administrative Affairs, as Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of UP Diliman effective October 30, 1995 until November 6, 1995.  This was followed by AO No. 95-170-A dated October 27, 1995, which amended the previous order by extending the OIC designation of Dr. Dayco to November 7, 1995.5

On November 7, 1995, Dr. Dayco appointed Dr. Posadas as Project Director of UP TMC effective September 18, 1995 up to September 17, 1996.In another undated “Contract for Consultancy Services” signed by Dr. Dayco, Dr. Posadas was hired as Consultant for the TMC Project for the same period.6As evidenced by disbursement vouchers and admitted by Dr. Posadas, the latter received his “honoraria” (P30,000.00 per month) and consultancy fees (totaling P100,000.00) as Project Director and Consultant of the TMC Project until May 1996 when the Commission on Audit (COA) raised questions on the legality of the said fees.7

In August 1996, payment of the subject “honoraria” and fees was suspended by COA Resident Auditor Romeo J. Pulido who noted the following deficiencies: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

1. Honoraria were in excess of the rates provided for under the National Compensation Circular No. 73, dated March 1, 1996, x x x.

2. Legal basis for designating the incumbent Chancellor as Project Director by the Officer-In-Charge (OIC), considering that the latter can assume the post only in the absence of the former.  An OIC cannot validly designate since the authority to designate/appoint is among the functions of the Chancellor which cannot be delegated as provided in the University Charter.  Moreover, the authority to appoint can never be delegated since it involves discretion.

3. On the assumption that the designation of the Chancellor as Project Director and Consultant is valid, collecting the remuneration for both positions amount to double compensation which is contrary to existing auditing rules and regulations.8

In a Memorandum9 dated September 16, 1996, UP’s Chief Legal Officer Marichu C. Lambino addressed the foregoing concerns of COA Auditor Pulido.Atty. Lambino stated that (a) the compensation received by Dr. Posadas are in the nature of consultancy fees and hence expressly exempted by Department of Budget and Management (DBM)National Compensation Circular (NCC) No. 75 dated March 11, 1995; (b)  the TMC Project, being a training program, is likewise exempted from the coverage of NEDA Guidelines on the Procurement of Consulting Services for Government Projects; and (c) under Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 43, series of 1993 “Streamlining and Deregulating Human Resource Development Functions” UP is authorized, without prior approval from the CSC, to determine the rates of honorarium for government personnel participating as resource persons, coordinator, and facilitator, in training programs.  On the issue of double compensation, Atty. Lambino pointed out that Dr. Posadas was appointed Project Director because of managerial expertise, and his skills in supervising personnel who are involved in an academic undertaking, and as Consultant because of his expertise in technology management. Finding these explanations/justifications acceptable, Auditor Pulido lifted the notices of suspension in September 1997.

However, even before the issuance of the suspension notices, then UP President Dr. Emil Q. Javier, ordered an investigation on the basis of an administrative complaint filed by Mrs. Ofelia L. Del Mundo, a staff of the University Library who was detailed at the TMC as its Administrative Officer. On July 24, 1996, President Javier created a Fact-Finding Committee to gather, review and evaluate pertinent documents regarding certain transactions of the TMC.10  After the conduct of a preliminary investigation and

finding a prima facie case against the petitioners, President Javier issued the formal charges11 for Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority.  Pursuant to the University’s “Rules and Regulations on the Discipline of Faculty Members and Employees approved at the 704th Meeting of the Board of Regents on January 11, 1963,”12 an Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) was constituted, chaired by Atty. Arturo E. Balbastro, a faculty member of the UP College of Law.

On August 21, 1998, the ADT submitted its Report13 (ADT Case 96-001) to President Javier.  The ADT found petitioners guilty of serious or grave misconduct and recommended the penalty of dismissal in accordance with CSC Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1989, as well as Article 250 of the University Code.  The Report likewise stated that the acts of petitioners for which they were held administratively liable may warrant prosecution under Section 3(h) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019.  Under the Order14 dated August 25, 1998 signed by President Javier, petitioners were dismissed from the service.

On September 3, 1998, Atty. Carmelita Yadao-Guno in her capacity as General Counsel of UP formally endorsed the findings and recommendations of the ADT to the Ombudsman.15  The case was docketed as OMB-0-98-1843.

Meanwhile, the BOR at its 1126th meeting on November 26, 1998, resolved petitioners’ appeal in ADT Case 96-001, as follows: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

1. The Board affirmed the ADT decision finding the respondents guilty of grave misconduct and imposed on them the penalty of forced resignation with the accessory penalties defined in the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order 292 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws – i.e., cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from government service for one year.

2. If after one year they should reapply to the University, they must render an apology to the University and their reappointments will be subject to Board approval.

3. The respondents are permanently disqualified from holding any administrative position in the University.

4. The decision takes effect immediately.16

Satisfied with the BOR’s action, petitioners caused the withdrawal of their appeal before the CSC.17

On June 9, 1999, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of Ombudsman recommended the dismissal of the charges against petitioners for insufficiency of evidence. However, said recommendation was disapproved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto who ordered that petitioners be indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 7(b) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713.18

The corresponding Informations19were thus filed against the petitioners before the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case Nos. 25465-66), as follow: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Criminal Case No. 25465

That on or about 7 November 1995, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, both high-ranking public officers, ROGER DELA ROSA POSADAS, being then the Chancellor and a faculty member of the University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus, and ROLANDO PASCUAL DAYCO, being then the Vice-Chancellor of the said university and Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the Chancellor, committing the crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of their official and administrative functions,and conspiring and confederating with and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits, privilege or advantage to accused POSADAS, when accused DAYCO appointed or designated accused POSADAS as a Project Director of the lone project, Institutionalization of the Management of Technology at U.P. Diliman, of the Technology Management Center (TMC) of the Office of the Chancellor, U.P. Diliman, which enabled or caused the disbursement and payment of monthly salary of P30,000.00 of accused POSADAS, duly received by the latter, for the period 18 September 1995 to 17 September 1996, with accused POSADAS also receiving his salaries as Chancellor and faculty member of U.P. Diliman during this period, and both accused knowing fully well that the appointment of accused POSADAS was beyond the power or authority of accused DAYCO as an OIC and likewise violative of the law, rules and regulations against multiple positions, double compensation and retroactivity of appointment, thereby causing undue injury to the Government in the amount of PESOS: THREE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND (P360,000.00), to the damage and prejudice of the Government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 25466

That on or about 7 November 1995, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, both high-ranking public officers, ROGER DELA ROSA POSADAS, being then the Chancellor and a faculty member of the University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus, and ROLANDO PASCUAL DAYCO, being then the Vice-Chancellor of the said university and Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the Chancellor, committing the crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of their official and administrative functions, and conspiring and confederating with and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally engage in the unauthorized private practice of accused POSADAS’s profession as a technology manager, when accused DAYCO appointed or designated accused POSADAS as a consultant to the project, Institutionalization of the Management of Technology at U.P. Diliman, of the Technology Management Center (TMC) of the Office of the Chancellor, U.P. Diliman, which enabled or caused the disbursement and payment of consultancy fees in the amount of P100,000.00 to accused POSADAS, duly received by the latter, with respondent POSADAS also receiving his salaries as Chancellor and faculty member of U.P. Diliman, and both accused knowing fully well that the appointment to and acceptance of the position of consultant by respondent POSADAS was without authority from the latter’s superior(s) or the U.P. Board of Regents, to the damage and prejudice of the Government service.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Dr. Dayco and Dr. Posadas were duly arraigned on June 15, 2000 and May 28, 2001, respectively, both pleading not guilty to the charges against them.20

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

After due proceedings, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision21 dated June 28, 2005, the decretal portion of which reads: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds both accused Roger R. Posadas and Rolando P. DaycoGUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and Section 7(b) of RA 6713 and are sentenced to suffer the following penalties: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

For violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019: accused Posadas and Dayco are sentenced to suffer in prison the indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years and one day as minimum and twelve (12) years as maximum, with the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.  Both accused are directed to jointly and severally indemnify the Government of the Republic of the Philippines the amount of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P336,000.00).

For violation of Section 7(b) of RA 6713: accused Posadas and Dayco are sentenced to suffer in prison the maximum penalty of five (5) years and disqualification to hold public office.

SO ORDERED.22

The Sandiganbayan held that the evidence supports a finding of   evident bad faith on the part of petitioners who, knowing very well the limitations of Dr. Dayco’s power as OIC, effected the appointment of Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director and Consultant.  These limitations are based on the nature of the power to appoint which is merely delegated to the Chancellor by the BOR, Section 204 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual, and CSC MC No. 38, s. 1993 on non-retroactivity of appointments.

The Sandiganbayan concluded that petitioners’ acts caused undue injury to the Government with the receipt by Dr. Posadas of salaries and consultancy fees.  Petitioners’ contention that the Government did not suffer loss or damage since the funding for the TMC Project came from CIDA was rejected by the Sandiganbayan which stated that from the moment UP received the CIDA funds intended for the TMC Project, said funds became “impressed with public attributes or character,” as in fact it was subjected to the control of UP and audited by the COA.

The Sandiganbayan likewise found no merit in petitioners’ claim that they were just victims of “university politics”as they were staunch critics of President Javier. Petitioners adduced documentary and testimonial evidence to show that Ms. Del Mundo’s filing of a complaint against petitioners was triggered by the fact that it was Dr. Posadas who ordered an administrative investigation against her and recalled her to the University Library, which incident led to the resignation of Prof. Tabbada from TMC.  However, the Sandiganbayan stressed that regardless of the reason for the filing of the cases against petitioners at the university level, these cases would not have come into being if no law has been violated in the first place.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied due course for the

reason that it has not been set for hearing as required by the rules, hence the motion ispro forma.

In this petition for certiorari, petitioners allege grave abuse of discretion and blatant violation of their constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.

The Issues

The Court is asked to resolve whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction: (1) in denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was not set for hearing; and (2) in convicting petitioners of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 6713 on the basis of facts not supported by evidence and on inapplicable rules and principles.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners argue that the July 19, 2005 Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration is not only baseless, but capricious, arbitrary and most unjust because the Revised Internal Rules of theSandiganbayan does not require that the motion for reconsideration be set for hearing.  They cite the case of Alvarez v. Sandiganbayan23 where this Court ruled that motions for reconsideration of decisions or final orders of the Sandiganbayan are not governed by Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, as these may be filed within 15 days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or final order “upon the grounds, in the form and subject to the requirements, for motions for new trial in criminal cases under Rule 121 of the Rules of Court.”

On the charges of graft, petitioners assert that they did not act with bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence. They reiterate that Dr. Dayco’s designation as OIC Chancellor was adjusted for one day merely to accommodate the change in the official travel schedule of Dr. Posadas to China.  The appointment of Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director and Consultant was a valid appointment and was made retroactive for no other reason than to synchronize the activities relative to the TMC Project with the project schedule as approved by the funding agency.  The power of appointment was within the power of the Chancellor to delegate to the OIC Chancellor, it not being expressly prohibited by the University rules.  Such practice, in fact, is not an unusual occurrence in UP.

Petitioners also contend that no injury was caused to the government because the TMC Project budget came from foreign funds, hence not an expense incurred by the Government and neither did UP incur any expense in relation to the said project, its counterpart funding was not in the form of money.Consequently, there can be no conviction under the law in the absence of real or actual damage suffered.

On the “honoraria” and fees received by Dr. Posadas as Project Director and Consultant, petitioners insist they cannot be held liable for double compensation because these were given for separate services rendered by Dr. Posadas.  As opined by the UP Chief Legal Officer, the compensation were in the nature of consultancy fees being received by UP personnel in their capacity as private persons for services to a project outside of their official time, hence it is not covered by the DBM NCC No. 75.  Moreover, petitioners stress that Dr. Posadas did not receive any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in his appointment as TMC Project Director and Consultant.  Dr. Posadas

possesses the superior qualifications and expertise in the field of technology management necessary to ensure that the project was a success.  In fact, his colleagues were expecting him to head the TMC Project and did not oppose his appointment.

As to the charge of unauthorized outside employment, petitioners point out that the University rules do not require clearance from the UP President to engage in consultancy work and the same rules do not prohibit him from performing consultancy work for a project such as TMC.  Therefore, Dr. Posadas’ appointment as TMC Project Director and Consultant were not prohibited outside employment.

Petitioners reiterate their“university politics” defense, claiming that President Javier at the time chose to champion Del Mundo’s complaint motivated by vengeance and spite against two of his staunch critics.  Thus, despite knowledge of the opinion of the UP Chief Legal Officer clearing petitioners of any wrongdoing, President Javier underhandedly caused the filing of administrative charges in the ADT.

Petitioners further submit that the complainant before the Ombudsman, Atty. Carmelita Yadao, was incompetent as she had no personal knowledge of the contents thereof, which were merely narrated or reported to her in her capacity as General Counsel of UP at that time.  The letter-complaint should not have been given due course as it was based on pure hearsay and its main proponent suffered from conflicting interests because she had earlier endorsed the MOA which included the compensation package for TMC Project Director and Consultant.

Finally, petitioners deny having acted in conspiracy as there was no evidence to prove it. The only assumed fact considered by the Sandiganbayan is based on its erroneous hypothesis – the alleged act of “extending” the period of OIC Chancellor for one day to accommodate Dr. Posadas. Dr. Dayco did not even gain anything from his designation of Dr. Posadas.  Thus, in the absence of clear and convincing proof, petitioners cannot be held liable as conspirators.

Our Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Notice of Hearingin Motions forReconsideration Is Mandatory

Contrary to petitioners’ stance, the 2002 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan requires a motion for reconsideration to be set for hearing, as it provides under Rule VII: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SECTION 1. Motion Day. -  Except for motions which may be acted upon ex parte, all motions shall be scheduled for hearings on a Friday, or if that day is a non-working holiday, on the next working day.

Motions requiring immediate action may be acted upon on shorter notice.

In appealed cases, the provisions of Sec. 3, Rule 49 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on Motions shall apply.  (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the Rules of Sandiganbayan, effective January 10, 1979, a petition for reconsideration of a judgment or final order may be filed upon the grounds, in the form and subject to the requirements, for motions for new trial in criminal cases under Rule 121 of the Rules of Court.24  In the case ofAlvarezv. Sandiganbayan25 decided in 1991, the Court upheld the Sandiganbayan in not considering “the failure of the movant to fix the place, date and time of the hearing of his motion a substantial defect, for instead of giving the motion a short shrift, it set the incident for hearing, and even granted the prosecution ten days from [notice] within which to oppose/comment.” The Court noted what was then the practice of the Sandigabayan itself, rather than the movant, to determine the date and time of hearings of motions.  The peculiar circumstances of said case heavilyweighed in favor of relaxation of the rules, with the Court’s finding that the evidence presented against the petitioner does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and may not be deemed sufficient to support a conviction.  Hence, the Court was not prepared “to declare that [petitioner’s] omission to set his motion for hearing is so grievous an error as to foreclose the award to him of the relief to which he is otherwise entitled.”

In any event, the mandatory setting for hearing a motion for reconsideration to reverse or modify a judgment or final order of the Sandiganbayan is already settled.  This Court categorically ruled in the recent case of Flores v. People26

Flores filed a motion for the reconsideration. As the motion did not contain any notice of hearing, the Prosecution filed its Motion to Expunge from the Records Accused’s Motion for Reconsideration.”

In its Resolution, dated November 29, 2007, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for being a mere scrap of paper as it did not contain a notice of hearing and disposed as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration of accused Flores is considered pro forma which did not toll the running of the period to appeal, and thus, the assailed judgment of this Court has become FINAL and EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

x x x xFlores claims that the outright denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Sandiganbayan on a mere technicality amounts to a violation of his right to due process. The dismissal rendered final and executory the assailed decision which was replete with baseless conjectures and conclusions that were contrary to the evidence on record. He points out that a relaxation of procedural rules is justified by the merits of this case as the facts, viewed from the proper and objective perspective, indubitably demonstrate self-defense on his part.

Flores argues that he fully complied with the requirements of Section2 of Rule 37 and Section 4 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court when the motion itself was served upon the prosecution and the latter, in fact,admitted receiving a copy. For Flores, such judicial admission amounts to giving due notice of the motion which is the intent behind the said rules. He further argues that a hearing on a motion for reconsideration is not necessary as no further proceeding, such as a hearing, is required under Section 3 of Rule 121.

Flores’ argument fails to persuade this Court.

Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court reads: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.Section 2, Rule 37 provides: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SEC. 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice thereof. – The motion shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefore, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party.

x x x xA pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of appeal.

Section 4, Rule 121 states: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SEC. 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. – The motion for a new trial or reconsideration shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it is based. x x x. Notice of the motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor.As correctly stated by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Sec.2 of Rule 37 and Sec. 4 of Rule 121 should be read in conjunction with Sec.5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Basic is the rule that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant except for those motions which the court may act upon without prejudice to the rights of the adverse party. The notice of hearing must be addressed to all parties and must specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof of service.

This Court has indeed held, time and again, that under Sections 4 and5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, the requirement is mandatory. Failure to comply with the requirement renders the motion defective. “As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.”

In this case, as Flores committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a notice of hearing, his motion was a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect whatsoever. Thus, his motion was properly dismissed by the Sandiganbayan.27 (Emphasis supplied.)

We thus find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Sandiganbayan when it denied due course to petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on the ground that it “has not been set for hearing as required by the rules” and the same is “deemed pro forma.”

Violation of Section 3(e)of R.A. No. 3019

The essential elements of the crime defined in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, are:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and

3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.28

There is no question regarding the presence of the first requisite considering that at the time the subject appointments were made, both petitioners were faculty members and holding administrative positions in UP Diliman.  What petitioners dispute is the existence of the second and third requisites.

In Criminal Case No. 25465, the information charged that petitioners willfully, unlawfully and criminally gave unwarranted benefits to Dr. Posadas in appointing him as TMC Project Director, in violation of the prohibition against multiple positions and the rule on non-retroactivity of appointments, thereby causing undue injury to the Government.

In Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan,29 this Court explained that there are two (2) ways by which a public official violates Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.  The accused may be charged under either mode or under both.  Moreover, in Quibal v. Sandiganbayan,30 the Court held that the use of the disjunctive term“or” connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.31  Here, petitioners were charged with committing the offense under both modes.

Upon the entire evidence on record, the Sandiganbayan was convinced that petitioners were guilty of causing undue injury to the Government.  In Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,32 this Court said that to hold a person liable for causing undue injury under Section 3(e), the concurrence of the following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; and

(4)  that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

We sustain the decision of the Sandiganbayan holding petitioners liable for causing undue injury to the Government in appointing Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director with evident bad faith.

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.33It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self interest or ill will for ulterior purposes.34  Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.35

In Pecho v. Sandiganbayan,36 the Court en banc defined injury as “any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, or in his rights, reputation or property; the invasion of any legally protected interests of another.” It must be more than necessary or are excessive, improper or illegal. It is required that the undue injury caused by the positive or passive acts of the accused be quantifiable and demonstrable and proven to the point of moral certainty.37  “Undue” means illegal, immoral, unlawful, void of equity and moderations.38

In this case, that petitioners acted in evident bad faith was duly established by the evidence.  We recall that the MOA was executed on September 18, 1995 and became effective upon the signature of the parties.39  Between that date and the China trip scheduled in the first week of November (the invitation was dated July 30, 1995), Dr. Posadas could have already appointed the Project Director and Consultant as indeed the retroactive appointment was even justified by them because supposedly  “project activities” have already started by September 18, 1995.   And yet, he waited until the China trip so that in his absence the designated OIC Chancellor, Dr. Dayco, would be the one to issue the appointment. Apparently, Dr. Posadas’ appointment by Dr. Dayco in an OIC capacity was pre-conceived. Prof. Jose Tabbada testified that when he was summoned by Dr. Posadas to his office, the latter asked him how he (Posadas) could be appointed TMC Project Director.  He then suggested that Dr. Dayco as OIC Chancellor can appoint him to the position and even drafted the memo for this purpose.  He admitted that he gave such advice with some reservations but it turned out to have been pursued by petitioners.40

However, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the delegated authority of the OIC Chancellor has limitations and did not include the power to appoint.

Section 204 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (Volume I on Government Auditing Rules and Regulations) provides: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Sec. 204. Appointment issued by an officer-in-charge. --  A person designated in an acting capacity  may be differentiated from one who is designated merely as an Officer-in-Charge (OIC).  In the latter case, the OIC enjoys limited powers which, are confined to functions of administration and ensuring that the office continues its usual activities.  The OIC may not be deemed to possess the power to appoint employees as the same involves the exercise of discretion which is beyond the power of an OIC (CSC Res. 1692, Oct. 20, 1978).

To prove the alleged practice in the University of an OIC appointing a Chancellor to a certain position, petitioners presented copies of temporary appointment papers issued by OIC Chancellor Paz G. Ramos to former Chancellor Ernesto G. Tabujara who was appointed Consultant-In-Charge of the Campus Planning, Development and Maintenance Office, UP Diliman with P2,000.00 monthly honorarium effective January 1, 1986 to December 31, 1986.   It must be noted, however, that the said appointment was made by the OIC “by authority of the Board of Regents” and these were actually approved and signed by then Secretary of the University, Prof. Martin V. Gregorio, while the renewal appointment was approved by Secretary of the University Prof. Emerlinda R. Roman. Both Gregorio and Roman signed the Notification of Approval of Temporary Appointment.41

Petitioners nonetheless argue that the appointments made by Dr. Dayco were valid on

the basis of Section 9(a) of the Resolution of the BOR reorganizing UP into the UP System adopted at its 828th meeting on December 21, 1972, as amended at its 863rd meeting on July 31, 1975.  Under said resolution, the BOR authorized the Chancellor of an autonomous university of the UP System to delegate his functions and responsibilities which have been assigned or delegated to him by the BOR, unless instructed otherwise by the BOR.  It also enumerated those functions that may not be delegated, among which is: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

B. Functions That May Not Be Delegated

x x x x

f.    Authority to approve the following appointments –

(1) those covered in II, C, 1, and e of the President’s Memorandum Circular No. 30 dated August 28, 1975; and

(2) those covered in II, C, 4, a through c of the aforecited memorandum circular of the President;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

x x x x42

MC No. 30 dated August 28, 1975 issued by former UP President Onofre D. Corpuz provided for “Operating Guidelines on Appointments and Related Personnel Transactions in the University System,” which specifically delineated the authority to appoint of university officials.

The pertinent provisions of said MC No. 30 read: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

C. Delegated Authority of the Chancellor to Appoint

1.   The Chancellor of an autonomous University approves appointments to the following positions:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

a. directors or heads and assistant directors or assistant heads of units supervised by or attached to principal units, except those whose starting salaries are equal to or higher than that of associate professor;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

b. program or project directors;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

x x x x

5.   The Chancellor approves the appointment of personnel, regardless of rank or salary range, incidental to employment in research projects, study and training programs and other programs or projects undertaken in collaboration with, or with the support of, public or private institutions or persons.TYPES OF APPOINTMENT/PERSONNEL ACTION   COVERED:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Appointment as used in II, C, 5 above includes all types of appointment and personnel action pertaining to appointment, except transfer to permanency of faculty members. (Emphasis supplied.)

According to petitioners, since appointments falling under II, C, 5 was not specifically mentioned in the enumeration of those functions of the Chancellor that may not be delegated, it follows that such appointments may be validly delegated, as in this case, the appointments issued by OIC Chancellor Dayco to Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director and Consultant.  Moreover, it is argued that in the BOR Resolution itself, the designated OIC Chancellor was granted full powers: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

E.  Extent of Authority of One Appointed in an Acting/Officer-in-Charge Capacity

One appointed/designated, in an acting or officer-in-charge capacity, to the office of chancellor shall discharge all the functions of the position unless instructed otherwise by the regular incumbent, and in any case, subject to the latter’s instructions, to the policies of the Board of Regents and to the provisions of D hereinabove and of F herein below;provided, that “all the functions of the position” as used in and for purposes of this resolution shall be construed as inclusive of all the functions assigned to the position by competent University authority and all such functions as usually pertain, or are “inherent,” to the position although not expressly assigned thereto by competent University authority.

Petitioners’ argument fails to persuade.

It must be emphasized that the subject appointments involve not an ordinary personnel or faculty member but the Chancellor himself who was also vested with administrative supervision over the institution implementing the TMC Project, TMC.  Note that while II, C, 5 in MC No. 30 speaks of “personnel, regardless of rank or salary range, incidental to employment,” the same could not possibly refer to the Chancellor himself.  This is evident from the exception provided in II, B, 1where it is the President himself who approves the appointment, viz: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

B.   Delegated Authority of the President to Appoint

1.   The President approves the appointment of officers and employees (including faculty members if there are any) who are not included in or covered by the enumerations in II, A above and of those who are covered in II, C, 5 below who are:

a.   in or directly under the Office of the President; orb.   in University-wide units; orc.   in other offices or units, academic or non-academic, that are not part of any autonomous University; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

to the same extent and under the same conditions stipulated in II, C below for the delegated authority of the Chancellor of an autonomous University to appoint.

TYPES OF APPOINTMENT/PERSONNEL ACTION COVERED: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Appointment as used in II, B, 1 above includes all types of appointmentand personnel action pertaining to appointment, except transfer to permanency of faculty members.  (Emphasis supplied.)

Considering that it is the Chancellor himself who is being appointed to a project covered

in II, C, 5, the BOR resolution on the authority of the Chancellor to delegate his functions may not be invoked because the situation is covered by II, B, 1, the Chancellor being directly under the administrative supervision of the UP President as the Chief Executive Officer of the University. The Chancellor, on the other hand, is the executive officer and the head of the faculty of the Constituent University, who likewise performs other functions that the BOR or the President may delegate to her/him.  This is clearly indicated in the organizational structure of the UP Diliman, sourced from the Faculty Manual of the University of the Philippines Diliman43:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

* (see flowchart Decision G.R. Nos. 168951& 169000 page 18.)

Thus, even granting that the subject appointments in UP Diliman, an autonomous educational institution, are not covered by Section 204 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual, they are still invalid and illegal, because the delegated authority to appoint in this case, involving as it does the Chancellor himself, pertains to the President of the University. Indeed, the Chancellor cannot exercise the delegated authority to appoint in the situations covered by II, C, 5 when he himself is the appointee.  The designated OIC likewise had no authority to make the appointment.

As to the prohibition on government officials and employees, whether elected or appointed, from holding any other office or position in the government, this is contained in Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

x x x x

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.  (Emphasis supplied.)

The prohibition on dual employment and double compensation in the government service is further specified under Sections 1 and 2, Rule XVIII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292,44 as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Sec. 1. No appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters or their subsidiaries, unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.

Sec. 2.  No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, xxx.

Under Section 2(d), Rule III of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions,45 appointments of personnel under Foreign-assisted projects shall be issued and approved as coterminous with the project. The MOA itself provides that the “services of the contractual personnel of the University for the Project shall be discontinued upon its completion or termination.”  The appointment of Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director falls within the prohibition against holding of multiple positions since there is no distinction in Section 7, Article IX-B as to the employment status, i.e., whether permanent, temporary or coterminous.  Petitioners failed to cite any law to justify Dr. Posadas’ holding of concurrent positions as Chancellor and TMC Project Director.

Another legal infirmity in the appointment of Dr. Posadas as TMC Project Director is the fact that it was made retroactive, in violation of CSC MC No. 38, Series of 1993, the Omnibus Guidelines on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions.  Section II, 5 B (7) thereof reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

7.   Effectivity of Appointment

a.   The effectivity of an appointment shall be the date of actual assumption by the appointee but not earlier than the date of issuance of the appointment, which is the date of signing by the appointing authority.

b.   No appointment shall be made effective earlier than the date of issuance, except in the case of change of status in view of qualifying in written examination, the effectivity of which is the date of release of the result of the examination. However, the issuance of such appointments shall be within the period of the temporary appointment or provided the temporary appointment has not yet expired.

x x x x

Petitioners assert that appointment as TMC Project Director is not covered by the above rule because it is in the nature of consultancy which is no longer required to be submitted to the CSC.

A perusal of the duties and responsibilities of the TMC Project Director reveals that the latter is tasked to perform the following: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Provide overall direction to the Project; Exercise supervision over Project personnel, including the visiting

experts; Approve the recruitment of personnel, disbursement of Project

funds, and changes in the Project activities and schedule; Coordinate with other persons, agencies and institutions involved

in technology management; Perform such other functions as may be necessary to ensure the

efficient, orderly and effective management and timely completion of the Project.46

The foregoing duties and responsibilities are not susceptible of partial performance or division into parts as would justify its classification into lump sum work.  Neither are these advisory in nature as would make it fall under the scope of a consultancy service.47 The status of Dr. Posadas’ employment as TMC Project Director is a coterminous one.  Under civil service rules, appointments of personnel under foreign-assisted projects shall be issued and approved as coterminous with the project,48 that is, they are considered employees for the duration of the project, in which case, the name of the project and its completion date shall be indicated in the appointment.49  This status of employment is to be distinguished from contract of services which covers lump sum work or services such as janitorial, security or consultancy services, whose appointments need not be submitted to the CSC for approval.

We also find no merit in petitioners’ argument that the element of injury caused to the

Government is lacking since the budget for TMC Project came from a foreign source and hence no public funds are involved.  Under the MOA, UP shall be “principally accountable for the project funds” which shall be released to and properly managed by it to ensure the attainment of the Project’s objectives.  Clearly, these funds are in the nature of “trust fund” which is defined by Presidential Decree No. 1445 as “fund that officially comes in the possession of an agency of the government or of a public officer as trustee, agent or administrator, or that is received for the fulfillment of some obligation.50   A trust fund may be utilized only for the “specific purpose for which the trust was created or the funds received.”51  The Sandiganbayan  thus correctly held that the funds received for the TMC Project were impressed with public attributes or character from the time it came into UP’s possession.

The disbursement and payment of the P30,000.00 monthly salary as TMC Project Director to Dr. Posadas was improper, in view of his invalid appointment.  Said amount represents the actual injury to the Government.The third requisite of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, therefore, was sufficiently established by the prosecution.

Violation of Section 7(b),R.A. No. 6713

In Criminal Case No. 25466, the charge involves the private practice of profession prohibited under Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, by appointing Dr. Posadas as Consultant of the TMC Project.  Said provision reads: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions.  – In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

x x x x

(b)  Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

x x x x

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or

x x x x

Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 93-1881 dated May 25, 1993, a contract for consultancy services is not covered by Civil Service Law, rules and regulations because the said position is not found in the index of position titles approved by DBM.  Accordingly, it does not need the approval of the CSC.52CSC MC No. 38, series of 1993 expressly provides that consultancy services are not considered government service forretirement purposes.  A “consultant” is defined as one who provides professional advice on matters within the field of his special knowledge or training.  There is no employer-employee relationship in the engagement of a consultant but that of client-professional relationship.53

Consultancy is deemed private practice of profession.  Under CSC Resolution 02126454 dated September 27, 2002, accepting a consultancy job under a part-time status is subject to the following conditions: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

1. It must not violate the rule against holding multiple positions;2. The employee/officer must obtain permission or authority from

his/her head of agency as the same constitutes private practice of profession;

3. The consultancy job must not conflict or tend to conflict with his/her official functions; and

4. It must not affect the effective performance of his/her duty.

In convicting petitioners, the Sandiganbayan cited Article 250 of the University Code, which provides:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Art. 250. No member of the academic staff, officer or employee of the University shall, without permission from the President or the Chancellor, as the case may be, practice any profession or manage personally any private enterprise which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be directly financially interested in any contract with the University unless permitted by the Board.  Violation of this provision shall be punishable by reprimand, suspension, or dismissal from the service. (Emphasis supplied.)

Since Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco entered into the contract for consultancy services for the TMC Project without prior permission from the University President, the Sandiganbayan ruled that they violated Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 6713.

Petitioners contend that the section of the University Code cited by the Sandiganbayan had already been superseded by the guidelines on outside activities promulgated by the BOR at its 1031st Meeting on June 28, 1990.  Thus, in the Faculty Manual of the University of the Philippines Diliman while the consultancy at TMC Project falls under the coverage of “outside activities,” prior authorization by the University President is no longer required.  The pertinent provisions of the manual read: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

10.3 Guidelines on Outside Activities [1031st BOR meeting, June 28, 1990]

10.3.1  Coverage

Outside activities of University personnel shall include: limited practice of profession, management of private enterprises, outside consultancy, secondment, teaching in other educational or training institutions with which the University has a Memorandum of Agreement, as well as research and other activities or projects under the auspices of outside agencies which are not considered integral functions of the University.  Such activities shall not be considered part of the regular workload of the personnel concerned.

10.3.2  Prior Authorization

No member of the University personnel shall engage in outside activities without prior authorization from the Chancellor, upon endorsement by the Dean, Director, or head of office concerned, subject to the exigencies of the service.

x x x x

10.3.5   Penalties

Violation of any of the rules on outside activities shall be ground for disciplinary action.   The immediate superior of the faculty/staff member shall immediately submit a report on any violation of the rules to the Office of the Chancellor, through channels.

Disciplinary action on any faculty/staff member may be imposed, but only in accordance with the law, and after due process.

10.3.6 Types

x x x x

c.  Limited/private practice of profession

Permission to engage in private practice of the profession of faculty members may be granted only if such private practice may enhance their usefulness to the University or improve their efficiency. [Art. 252]

The privilege of private practice, when granted, shall be for a definite period of one (1) year, renewable at the discretion of the Chancellor for one-year periods, and under such conditions as may be prescribed by him/her regarding the nature of the work, the time of performance, and other circumstances.  [Art. 253; amended at BOR meetings: 839th, Nov. 29, 1973; 1031st, June 28, 1990]

The limited practice of one’s profession shall be governed by the following guidelines: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

1)   No member of the academic staff, officer or employee of the University shall, without prior permission from the Chancellor, practice any profession or manage personally any private enterprise which in any way may be affected by the functions of her/his office; nor shall s/he be directly financially interested in any contract with the University unless permitted by the Board.  Violation of this provision shall be punishable byreprimand, suspension, or dismissal from the service.  [Art. 250; amended at 1031stBOR meeting, June 28, 1990]

2)   Permission to engage in private practice of profession may granted provided that such practice:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

is NOT ADVERSE to the interests of the University; shall NOT be conducted on official time; will improve the person’s efficiency and usefulness to the

University; and shall be subject to such other requirements as may be

imposed by law or University rules and regulations.  (Emphasis supplied.)

Notwithstanding the supposed amendment of the rule on limited practice of profession as contained in Article 250 of the University Code, we sustain the Sandiganbayan in

holding that petitioners should have obtained prior permission from the University President for the contract for consultancy services in the TMC Project.  As with our conclusion on the issue of authority to appoint the TMC Project Director, considering that it is the Chancellor himself who was engaged as TMC Project Consultant, the contract for consultancy services of Dr. Posadas should have been authorized by the University President as the chief executive officer of the UP System.  To hold otherwise is to leave the matter of determining the criteria or conditions for allowing the private practice of profession provided in the University rules entirely to Dr. Posadas himself as then UP Diliman Chancellor. Consistent with the Civil Service rules that prior authorization by the head of the agency or institution must be sought by the government officer or employee who desires to accept a consultancy job, it is no less than the University President who should have given permission to Dr. Posadas, the latter being directly under his administrative supervision.

Upon the established facts and applicable law and jurisprudence, we hold that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the Sandiganbayan in convicting petitioners for violation of Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 6713.

Conspiracy

A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it.55For the accused to be held as conspirators, it is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out.” Therefore, if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, then a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved.56

The Sandiganbayan’s finding of conspiracy rests on firm factual support.  Although Dr. Dayco tried to downplay his participation, stating that he did not benefit from the subject appointments and that there were many other appointment papers he had signed in the absence of Dr. Posadas, it is clear as daylight that he had a principal and indispensable role in effecting the said appointments. To stress the point, the Sandiganbayan quoted the relevant portions of the Report submitted by the ADT, as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

It would be the height of naiveté to assume that before making the two (2) appointments of respondent Posadas as Director of the TMC Project and as Consultant to the TMC, respondent Dayco did not, in any manner, confer with respondent Posadas about the matter.  To believe the claim of respondent Posadas that he just saw his appointment papers at his desk when he came back from his trip is to tax human credulity too much.

Under the said circumstances, the natural course of events necessarily points to connivance between respondent Posadas and respondent Dayco in the making of the questioned appointments.

Despite the claim of respondent Posadas that he just saw the appointment papers on

his desk when he returned from his trip, the admitted fact is that respondent Dayco made those appointments for respondent Posadas and the latter acted upon the same favourably as he (respondent Posadas) collected the compensation therein (Exhibits :E” and “E-1”). In fact, as Chancellor, respondent Posadas approved his own Disbursement Voucher for payment from the coffers of the University, covering his honoraria and consultancy fees as Project Director for the TMC Project and as consultant to the TMC, respectively (Exhibit “E-2”).57

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.  The Decision dated June 28, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 25465-66 is herebyAFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188066, October 22, 2014

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. CYNTHIA E. CABEROY, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision2 dated November 21, 2008 and Resolution3 dated May 14, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03498, which reversed and set aside the Consolidated Decision4 dated June 30, 2005 of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman) and absolved respondent Cynthia E. Caberoy (Caberoy) of any administrative liability.

Caberoy is the principal of Ramon Avancena National High School (RANHS) in Arevalo, Iloilo City. She was charged with Oppression and Violation of Section 3(e) and (f) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 or the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" by Angeles O. Tuares (Tuares) for allegedly withholding her salary for the month of June 2002. The case was docketed as OMB-V-A-03-0239-E. Said case was consolidated with OMB-V-A-03-0572-I, which was a complaint filed by Tuares against Ida B. Endonila, Erlinda G. Gencaya, Clarissa G. Zamora and Victoria T. Calunsod.

Caberoy denied the charge against her, alleging, among others, that the payrolls of June 1 to 15, 2002 and June 16 to 30, 2002 show that Tuares received her salary as shown by her signatures on lines no. 11 of the payrolls.5

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In the Consolidated Decision dated June 30, 2005 rendered by the Ombudsman, Caberoy was found guilty of Oppression and was meted out the penalty of dismissal from service. The dispositive portion of the consolidated decision provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CYNTHIA E. CABEROY, Principal II, Ramon Avancena National High School, (RANHS), Arevalo, Iloilo City, is hereby foundGUILTY of OPPRESSION and is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE WITH CANCELLATION OF CIVIL SERVICE ELIGIBILITY, FORFEITURE OF EARNED LEAVE CREDITS AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS, AND DISQUALIFICATION FROM REEMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE. On the other hand, respondents IDA B. ENDONILA, Schools Division Superintendent, ERLINDA G. GENCAYA, Asst. Schools Division Superintendent, CLARISSA G. ZAMORA, Administrative Officer III, all three of the Division of Iloilo City, DepEd Region VI, Iloilo City, and VICTORIA T. CALUNSOD, Officer-In-Charge/Secondary School Head Teacher III, Ramon Avancena National High School, (RANHS) Arevalo, Iloilo City, are found NOT GUILTY of the same offense and/or violating Sec. 3 (f) of R.A. 3019 and thus these cases are consideredDISMISSED as far as they are concerned. Furthermore, on the administrative aspect of the counter-allegation of Perjury against herein complainant ANGELES O. TUARES, Ramon Avancena National High School, Arevalo, Iloilo City, the same is likewiseDISMISSED, for lack of merit.

SO DECIDED.6

Caberoy filed a joint motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Ombudsman in its Order dated September 19, 2006.7

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The Ombudsman found that Tuares was not paid any amount in June 2002 because of her failure to submit her clearance and Performance Appraisal Sheet for Teachers (PAST), while the other teachers received their salaries for the same month.8 The Ombudsman concluded that Tuares was "singled out by respondent Caberoy as the only one who did not receive any amount from the school on June 2002 because, as established earlier, the former failed to submit her clearance and PAST."9 The Ombudsman also took into consideration several infractions previously committed by Caberoy, which allegedly displayed her "notorious undesirability as a government officer for withholding teachers' salaries without authority."10 According to the Ombudsman, Caberoy could not honestly claim that she had not been forewarned by the Ombudsman of the grave consequences of her repeated illegal act.11

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Caberoy filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, seeking the reversal of her dismissal from service, and in the assailed Decision dated November 21, 2008, the CA granted Caberoy's petition. The dispositive portion of the CA decision states: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The consolidated decision dated June 30, 2005, of the respondent Ombudsman is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered ABSOLVING the petitioner of any liability, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.12

The Ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in the assailed Resolution dated May 14, 2009.

In clearing Caberoy from the charge against her, the CA found that no undue injury was caused to Tuares since she received her June 2002 salary. According to the CA, since Caberoy was charged with Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and the element of undue injury is absent in this case, Caberoy cannot be held liable for the offense. 13 The

CA also ruled that Caberoy's "refusal" to release Tuares' salary was justified and the element of "failure to so act x x x for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party, or [discrimination] against another" under Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019, is likewise absent.14 Finally, the CA found that the acts of Caberoy are not constitutive of oppression.15

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Lastly, the CA ruled that the Ombudsman's findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence since Caberoy's act of withholding Tuares' salaries was clearly justified.16

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Hence, the present petition, based on the ground that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS' REVERSAL OF THE PETITIONER OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN'S DECISION FINDING [CABEROY] ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR OPPRESSION IS AN ERROR OF LAW CONSIDERING THAT ITS FINDINGS IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.17

The Ombudsman argues that it was error for the CA to exonerate Caberoy on the reasons that the withholding of Tuares' salary was justified and that there was no undue injury on her part as she later received her salary. The Ombudsman contends that Caberoy was found guilty of Oppression, which is an administrative offense under the Civil Service law, and is distinct from the crime of Violation of R.A. No. 3019, from which she was absolved. According to the Ombudsman, the quantum of proof in these two offenses (Oppression and Violation of R.A. No. 3019) is distinct and the records of the case disclose that there is substantial evidence to support its decision. The Ombudsman also contests the factual findings of the CA that Tuares actually received her salary, stating that in the summary of payrolls and the checks, Tuares' name does not appear. Moreover, no evidence was presented by Caberoy to prove that Tuares actually received her salary, other than her bare allegation. Finally, the Ombudsman states that Caberoy has already been penalized several times for previous misconduct, which displays her propensity to commit the misdemeanor.18

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Ruling of the Court

Initially, it must be stated that in a petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court is limited only to a review of errors of law committed by the CA, and the Court is not required to review all over again the evidence presented before the Ombudsman.19 The rule, nevertheless, admits of exceptions, such as when the findings of the CA and the Ombudsman are conflicting,20which is what occurred in the present case. Hence, the Court must now look into the matter of whether the CA committed a reversible error when it reversed the findings and conclusions of the Ombudsman.

Tuares charged Caberoy in OMB-V-A-03-0239-E with both Oppression and Violation of Section 3(e)(f) of R.A. No. 3019. The Ombudsman, however, found Caberoy guilty only of Oppression.

Oppression is an administrative offense21 penalized under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,22 which provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 52. Classification of Offenses.—Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:x x x x

14. Oppression.1st Offense - Suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year;

2nd Offense - Dismissal.x x x x

Oppression is also known as grave abuse of authority, which is a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury. It is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.23 To be held administratively liable for Oppression or Grave Abuse of Authority, there must be substantial evidence presented proving the complainant's allegations.24 Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.25 In this case, the CA correctly overturned the Ombudsman's findings and conclusions, and explained the reasons for exculpating Caberoy, as follows: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Evidently, from the foregoing disquisitions, respondent Ombudsman contradicted itself when it found and held that petitioner was guilty of "oppression" for not paying the private respondent her June 2002 salary, because as a matter of fact she has been paid albeit delayed. Such payment is clearly and indubitably established from the table where it was shown that private respondent received on July 17 and 25, 2002, her June 2002 salary in the amounts of P4,613.80 and P4,612.00, respectively.

x x x x

The above narration of facts do not show that petitioner committed acts constitutive of "oppression." Assuming petitioner's action is erroneous or overly zealous, this certainly does not merit the most severe penalty of dismissal from government service. Apparently, the petitioner is only protecting herself from any future, adverse consequences if she allows the disbursement of public funds without the appropriate supporting documents. "It is a well-known fact that in the government service an employee must submit his daily time record duly accomplished and approved before one can collect his salary."

x x x x

Finally, on the contention that the findings and conclusions of the respondent Ombudsman is considered conclusive and deserve respect and finality is true only when the same is based on substantial evidence. As discussed above, the action taken by petitioner in withholding the salaries of private respondent was clearly justified. It was a measure taken by a superior against a subordinate who ignored the basic tenets of law by not submitting the required documents to support payment of her salary and proportional vacation pay for the aforesaid period, x x x.

xxx [I]n this case before us, the records is bereft of substantial evidence to support respondent Ombudsman's findings and conclusion that petitioner committed oppressive

acts against private respondent and violated Sections 3(e) and (f) of RA 3019. On the contrary and as earlier discussed, respondent Ombudsman found and concluded that private respondent was paid her June salary albeit late. Hence, it cannot be gainsaid that the act of respondent Ombudsman in concluding that petitioner is guilty as charged despite absence of substantial evidence to support the same is totally unfounded and is therefore, tantamount to grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of discretion, x x x.26 (Citations omitted)

The complaint filed by Tuares against Caberoy charged the latter with "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence for having ordered the payroll clerk of [RANHS] to cause the exclusion of [her] name in the payroll of June 2002 x x x and [in spite of] the fact that [she has already] rendered full service during said days x x x without any justifiable reason and without due process and without any authority under the law."27 A perusal of Tuares' allegations shows that her claim pertains to the alleged withholding of her salary for the month of June 2002.  Records show, however, that Tuares was actually paid her salary for the month of June 2002. Thus, the vouchers for the payroll period of June 1 to 15, 2002 and June 16 to 30, 200229 showed Tuares' name on line 11 and her signature acknowledging receipt of her salary for such period. This was, in fact, confirmed in the 2002 salary payrolls submitted by the RANHS Office of the Auditor and summarized by the Ombudsman,30 to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Period Voucher No.

Date of Check

Tuares' No. in  the Payroll

Amount  Received

June (Proportional pay & salary)

101-02-6-161

June 25, 2002

Name not found

Name not found

June (Proportional pay) 101-02-6-164

June 28, 2002

Name not found

Name not found

June (Proportional pay) PS-02-7-182

July 4, 2002

Name not found

Name not found

June (Proportional pay & salary)

PS-02-7-195

July 17, 2002

11 P4,613.80

June (Proportional pay) PS-02-7-196

July 19, 2002

Name not found

Name not found

June PS-02-7-200

July 25, 2002

11 P4,612.00

July 101-02-8-231

August 19, 2002

16 P4,694.72

The amounts received and signed for by Tuares correspond essentially to the other amounts she received as salary for the other periods in 2002. On this score, entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business, enjoy the presumption of regularity under Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,31 and absent any evidence presented by Tuares showing the contrary, good faith must be presumed in the preparation and signing of such payrolls.32

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Even assuming, as the Ombudsman asserted, that Tuares received her June 2002 salary

only on July 2002, the same does not constitute Oppression or Grave Abuse of Authority. The delay in the release of Tuares' salary hardly qualifies as an "act of cruelty or severity or excessive use of authority," especially when she contributed to the cause of the delay, that is, she submitted her Form 48 (Daily Time Record) for June 2002 only on July 11, 2002.33

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Neither can the Court subscribe to the Ombudsman's conclusion that Tuares was singled out by Caberoy. According to the Ombudsman: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In other words, as far as these fortunate teachers are concerned, checks dated June 25 and 28, 2002 and July 04 and 19, 2002 actually and in paper covered their June 2002 salary; checks dated July 17 and 19, 2002 actually and in paper covered their July 2002 salary; x x x.

Whereas on the part of complainant Tuares, this is what really happened: The checks dated July 17 and 25, 2002 were technically for services rendered in June 2002 as corrected by COA but the amounts corresponding to complainant's salary for the whole month of June 2002 was actually received by her only in July 2002 and that in effect means that she did not really receive any amount from the school in June 2002; x x x.

Viewed from the discussion above, it is therefore crystal clear that complainant was singled out by respondent Caberoy as the only one who did not receive any amount from the school on June 2002 because, as established earlier, the former failed to submit her clearance and PAST.34

It must be stressed that like other grave offenses classified under the Civil Service laws, bad faith must attend the act complained of. Bad faith connotes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.35 There must be evidence, independent of the fact of such delay, which will lead to the inevitable conclusion that it was for the purpose of singling but Tuares. The Court has consistently upheld the principle that in administrative cases, to be disciplined for grave misconduct or any grave offense, the evidence against the respondent should be competent and must be derived from direct knowledge.36 "Reliance on mere allegations, conjectures and suppositions will leave an administrative complaint with no leg to stand on."37 Except for the Ombudsman's deduction based on the dates of issuance of the vouchers and the checks as shown in the payroll, the records of this case are bereft of evidence that will support its view that the delay in the release of Tuares' salary indicated that she was singled out. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the CA, "[t]he certifications issued by Acting Bookkeeper Hayde S. Momblan will show that it was not only [Tuares] who was not included in the June 2002 payrolls; there were other teachers who were not included because they failed to submit the required year-end clearance, xxx Evidently, [Tuares] was not singled out or discriminated against as insisted by her and respondent Ombudsman."38

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All told, the Court finds that the CA did not commit a reversible error in exonerating Caberoy from the charge against her.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. 

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 122166 March 11, 1998

CRESENTE Y. LLORENTE, JR., Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and LETICIA G. FUERTES, Respondents.

 

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In a prosecution for violation of Section 3[e] of the Anti-Graft Law, that is, "causing undue injury to any party," the government prosecutors must prove "actual" injury to the offended party; speculative or incidental injury is not sufficient.

The Case

Before us is a petition for review of the Decision promulgated on June 23, 1995 and the Resolution promulgated on October 12, 1995 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 18343, finding Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr. guilty as charged.

Llorente, then municipal mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, was charged with violation of Sec. 3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, under an Information dated October 22, 1992, textually reproduced as follows: 1

That in or about and during the period of July, 1990 to October, 1991, or for sometime subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Sindangan, Province of Zamboanga del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr., a public officer, being then the Mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in the exercise of his official and administrative functions, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally with evident bad faith refuse to sign and approve the payrolls and vouchers representing the payments of the salaries and other emoluments of Leticia G. Fuertes, without just valid cause and without due process of law, thereby causing undue injury to the said Leticia G. Fuertes.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Duly arraigned on March 29, 1993, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of "NOT GUILTY." 2 After trial in due course, the Sandiganbayan 3 rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:4

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, as minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS, as maximum; to further suffer perpetual disqualification from public office; and to pay the costs.

Respondent Court denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration in the assailed Resolution thus: 5

WHEREFORE, accused's "Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial" is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. His "Motion for Marking of Additional Exhibits Cum Offer of Documentary Exhibits in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trials' is now rendered moot and academic.

Hence, this petition. 6

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

As found by Respondent Court, the prosecution's version of the facts of this case is as follows: 7

After appreciating all the evidence on both sides, the following uncontroverted facts may be gleaned:

1. Accused Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr., at the time the alleged act was committed, was the Municipal Mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.

2. Private [C]omplainant, Leticia C. Fuertes, is the duly appointed Assistant Municipal Treasurer in the same municipality since October 18, 1985.

3. Starting 1986, private complainant was detailed to different offices, as follows:

(a) Municipality of Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte - from April, 1986 to August, 1987 as OIC Municipal Treasurer.

(b) Municipality of Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte - from September, 1987 to March, 1988 as OIC Municipal Treasurer.

(c) Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Zamboanga del Norte - from April, 1988 to May, 1988.

(d) Municipality of Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte - from June, 1988 to June, 1990 as OIC Municipal Treasurer.

4. In July, 1990, she was returned to her post as Assistant Municipal Treasurer in the town of Sindangan.

She was not provided with office table and chair nor given any assignment; neither her daily time record and application for leave acted upon by the municipal treasure per instruction of accused Mayor (Exh. "G-2"; "G-3").

5. On July 23, 1990, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, presided by accused Mayor, passed Resolution No. SB-214 (Exh. "3"), vehemently

objecting to the assignment of complainant as Assistant Municipal Treasurer of Sindangan.

6. On March 12, 1991, accused Municipal Mayor received a letter (SB Resolution No. 36) from the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Piñan, demanding from the private complainant return of the amount overpaid to her as salaries (par. 9, p. 2 of Exh. "4" - counter-affidavit of accused Mayor).

7. On May 22, 1991, private complainant filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages (Exh. "E") against the accused Mayor and the Municipality of Sindangan before Branch II, Regional Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte docketed as Special Proceedings No. 45, for the alleged unjustified refusal of Mayor Llorente to sign and/or approve her payrolls and/or vouchers representing her salaries and other emoluments as follows: (a) salary for the month of June, 1990 in the amount of P5,452.00 under disbursement voucher dated September 5, 1990 (Exh. "H"). Although complainant rendered services at the municipality of Piñan during this period, she could not collect her salary there considering that as of that month, Piñan had already appointed an Assistant Municipal Treasurer. When she referred the matter to the Provincial Auditor, she was advised to claim her salary for that month with her mother agency, the Municipality of Sindangan, [(]p. 12, TSN of August 9, 1994; 10th paragraph of complainant's Supplemental Affidavit marked Exh. "G"); (b) salary differential for the period from July 1, 1989 to April 30, 1990 in the total amount of P19,480.00 under disbursement voucher dated August, 1990 (Exh. "I"); (c) 13th month pay, cash gift and clothing allowance under Supplemental Budget No. 5, CY 1990 in the total amount of P7,275 per disbursement voucher dated December 4, 1990 (Exh. "J"); (d) vacation leave commutation for the period from October to December 31, 1990 in the total amount of P16,356.00 per disbursement voucher dated December 3, 1990 (Exh. "K"); (e) RATA for the months of July, August and September, 1990, January and February, 1991 in the total amount of P5,900.00 (par. 12 & 16 of Exh. "E"); and (f) salaries for January and February, 1991 in the total amount of P10,904.00 (par. 17 of Exh. "E").

8. Accused Mayor did not file an answer; instead, he negotiated for an amicable settlement of the case (p. 24, TSN of August 10, 1994). Indeed, a Compromise Agreement (Exh. "A") dated August 27, 1991, between the accused and private complainant was submitted to and approved by the court, hereto quoted as follows:

COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

That the parties have agreed, as they hereby agree, to settle this case amicably on the basis of the following terms and conditions, to wit:

(a) That the respondent Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr. binds himself to sign and/or approve all vouchers and/or payrolls for unpaid salaries, RATA, Cash-gifts, 13th month pay, clothing allowance, salary differentials and other emoluments which the petitioner is entitled as Assistant Municipal Treasurer of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte;

(b) That the parties herein hereby waive, renounce and relinquish their other claims and counter-claims against each other;

(c) That the respondent Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente Jr. binds himself to sign and/or approve all subsequent vouchers and payrolls of the herein petitioner.

9. On August 27, 1991, a Decision (Exh. "B") was rendered by Judge Wilfredo Ochotorena on the basis of the aforesaid compromise agreement.

10. For his failure to comply with the terms of the compromise agreement, private complainant, thru counsel, filed a Motion for Execution on September 12, 1991. A Writ of Execution (Exh. "C") was issued by the Court on September 17, 1991, and served [on] the accused on September 23,1991.

11. As shown in the Sheriff's Return dated November 19, 1991 (Exh. "D"), private complainant was paid her salaries for the period from January, 1991 to August, 1991, while the rest of her salaries including the RATA and other emoluments were not paid considering the alleged need of a supplemental budget to be enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sindangan per verbal allegation of the municipal treasurer.

12. Complainant was not also paid her salaries from July to December 1990; September and October, 1991; RATA for the period from July 1990 to June 1994 (admission of accused, pp. 8-9, TSN of June 27, 1994, a.m.; Exh. "E"; p. 17, TSN of June 27, 1994).

13. Sometime in 1993, accused municipal mayor received from the Municipality of Piñan, Bill No. 93-08 (Exh. "1"), demanding from the Municipality of Sindangan settlement of overpayment to complainant Fuertes in the amount of P50,643.93 per SE Resolution No. 6 sent on July 23, 1990. The bill was settled by the Municipality of Sindangan in December, 1993 per Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9312487 dated December 2, 1993 (Exh. "2").

14. Private complainant was able to receive complete payment of her claims only on January 4, 1993 in the form of checks all dated December 29, 1992 (as appearing on Exhs. "H", "I", "J", "K" of the prosecution, Exhs. "6", "7", "8", of the defense) except her RATA which was given to her only on July 25, 1994, covering the period from July 1990 to December, 1993 amounting to P55,104.00, as evidenced by Disbursement Voucher dated July 25, 1994 (Exh. "5").

Version of the Defense

While admitting some delays in the payment of the complainant's claims, petitioner sought to prove the defense of good faith - that the withholding of payment was due to her failure to submit the required money and property clearance and to the Sangguniang Bayan's delayed enactment of a supplemental budget to cover the claims. He adds that such delays did not result in "undue injury" to complainant. In his memorandum, petitioner restates the facts as follows: 8

1. Complainant . . . was appointed assistant municipal treasurer of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte on October 18, 1985. However, starting 1986 until July 1990, or for a period of about four (4) and one half (1/2) years, she was detailed in other municipalities and in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Zamboanga del Norte. She returned as assistant treasurer of Sindangan in July 1990. (Decision, pp. 5-6).

2. As complainant had been working in municipalities and offices other than in Sindangan for more than four (4) years, her name was removed from the regular payroll of Sindangan, and payment of past salaries and other emoluments had to be done by vouchers. When complainant . . . presented her vouchers to petitioner, the latter required her to submit clearances from the different offices to which she was detailed, as well as a certificate of last payment as required by COA regulations (Tsn, p. 11, Aug. 10, 1994). Instead of submitting the required documents, Mrs. Fuertes said that "what I did, endorsed my voucher to the mayor through the municipal treasurer" (Tsn, p. 13, June 27, 1994). The municipal treasurer could not, however, process the vouchers and certify as to the availability of funds until after the Sangguniang Bayan had passed a supplemental budget for the purpose (Exhs. D and 6-c Motion), which came only in December 1992.

3. Petitioner, in the meanwhile, received on March 12, 1991 SB Resolution No. 36 from the Municipality of Piñan, demanding from Mrs. . . . Fuertes the reimbursement of P105,915.00, and because of this demand, he needed time to verify the matter before acting on Mrs. Fuertes' claims (Exh. 4). Mrs. Fuertes admitted that she had at the time problems of accountability with the Municipality of Pinan. She testified.

Q. Counsel now is asking you, when you went back to Sindangan there was [sic] still problems of the claims either against you or against the Municipality of Sindangan by the municipalities had, [sic] in their minds, overpaid you?

A. Yes, your Honor, that was evidence[d] by the bill of the Municipality of Pinan to the Municipality of Sindangan. (Tsn, p. 18, Aug. 3, 1994).

4. Petitioner also stated that he could not act on complainant's claims because she had not submitted the required money and property accountability clearance from Pinan (Tsn, 11, Aug. 10, 1994) and that at the time the Sangguniang Bayan had not appropriated funds for the purpose. (Tsn, pp. 18, 30, 42-43, Aug. 10, 1994). Nonetheless, petitioner included Mrs. Fuertes' name in the regular annual budget beginning 1991 (Exhs. 4-b, 4-d, 4-f), as a result of which she had been since then receiving her regular monthly salary.

5. On May 21, 1991, Mrs. Fuertes filed a complaint . . . Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint, alleging as a defense, that plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies. (Annex B, p. 3, Petition; Exh. 1-Motion). On August 27, 1991, the parties entered into a compromise agreement, which the trial court approved (Exh. B). . . .

6. Upon motion of counsel for Mrs. Fuertes, the trial court issued a writ of execution of the compromise judgment. However, the writ of execution was addressed only to petitioner; it was not served on the municipal Sangguniang Bayan. . . .

Thus, Mrs. Fuertes had been receiving her regular salary from January, 1991 because petitioner had included her name in the regular budget beginning 1991, which fact complainant did not dispute. With respect to her other claims for past services in other offices, Municipal Treasurer; Mrs. Narcisa Caber, informed that a supplemental budget for such purpose to be passed by the Sangguniang Bayan was necessary before she could be paid thereof. Being the municipal treasurer, Mrs. Caber knew that without such supplemental budget, payment of Mrs. Fuertes' other claims could not be made because the law requires that "disbursements shall be made in accordance with the ordinance authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations" (Sec. 346, RA 7160) and that "no money shall be disbursed unless . . . the local treasurer certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose." (Sec. 344, RA 7160).

7. Petitioner had instructed the municipal budget officer to prepare the supplemental budget for payment of complainant's unpaid claims for submission to the Sangguniang [Bayan] for enactment. (Tsn, pp. 32-33, Aug. 10, 1994). The budget officer, Mr. Narciso Siasico stated as follows:

1. I am the budget officer for the Municipality of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, a position I have held since 1981.

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3. Immediately after said mandamus case was settled through a compromise agreement, Mayor Llorente instructed me to prepare the necessary budget proposals for the deliberation and approval of the Sangguniang Bayan;

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8. Instead of waiting for the Sangguniang Bayan to enact the budget or of securing an alias writ of execution to compel the Sangguniang Bayan to pass the same, Mrs. Fuertes filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman under date of October 28, 1991, admitting receipt of her salaries from January 1991 and saying she had not been paid her other claims in violation of the compromise judgment. (Exh. F). She had thus made the Office of the Ombudsman a collecting agency to compel payment of the judgment obligation.

9. While the budget proposal had been prepared and submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan for action, it took time for the Sangguniang Bayan to pass the supplemental budget and for the Provincial Board to approve the same. It was only on December 27, 1992 that the municipal treasurer and the municipal accountant issued a certification of availability of funds for the purpose. Petitioner approved the vouchers immediately, and in a period of one week, Mrs. Fuertes was paid all claims, as evidenced by the prosecution's Exhs. H, I, J and K, which were the four vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes, . . . .

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11. Petitioner testified that he could not immediately sign or approve the vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes for the following reasons:

a) The Sangguniang Bayan had not appropriated the amounts to pay Mrs. Fuertes. (Tsn, pp. 18, 30, 42-43, Aug. 10, 1994).

b) Municipal Treasurer Caber, to whom Mrs. Fuertes endorsed her vouchers for processing, and the Municipal Accountant issued the certificate of availability of funds only on December 27, 1992 (Tsn, p. 42, Aug. 10, 1994; Exhs. H, I, J and K); and the delay in the issuance of the certificate of availability of funds was due to the delay by the Provincial Board to approve the supplemental budget. (Tsn, p. 43, Aug. 10, 1994).

[c]) He received on March 12, 1991 a demand from the Municipality of Pinan, Zamboanga del Norte, where Mrs. Fuertes last worked, for the reimbursement of P105,915.00, and the matter had to be clarified first. (Exh. 4). Mrs. Fuertes admitted that she had some problem of accountability with the Municipality of Pinan. (Tsn, p. 18, 1994). It took time before this matter could be clarified by the Municipality of Pinan reducing its claim to P50,647.093 and the Municipality of Sindangan paying said claim. (Exh. 2; Decision, p. 9).

[d]) Mrs. Fuertes had not submitted the required clearance from the Municipality of Pinan. (Tsn, p. 11, Aug. 10, 1994). He did not insist on this requirement after the trial court issued the writ of execution to implement the compromise judgment. (Tsn, p. 23, Aug. 10, 1994). Nonetheless, in the post audit of Mrs. Fuertes' accountability, the Commission on Audit issued a notice of suspension of the amount of P5,452.00 from Mrs. Fuertes for her failure to submit: "1. Clearance for money & property accountability from former office. 2. Certification as [sic] last day of service in former office. 3. Certification of last salary received & issued by the disbursing officer in former office, certified by chief accountant and verified by resident auditor." (Exh. 2-Motion).

12. The Information dated October 12, 1992 filed against petitioner alleged that petitioner as mayor did not sign and approve the vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes for payment of her salaries and other emoluments from July 1, 1990 to October 1991, which caused her undue injury. However, the prosecution's Exh. "D", the sheriff's return dated November 19, 1991, stated that Mrs. Fuertes had received her salary from January 1, 1991 "up to the present", which meant that even before the information was filed, she had been paid her regular salaries from January 1, 1991 to October 1991. The supplemental budget to cover payment of her other claims for past services was passed only in December 1992 and the municipal treasurer and accountant issued the certificate of availability of funds only on December 27, 1992, and Mrs. Fuertes got paid of [sic] all her other claims, including those not claimed in the Information, within one week therefrom. (Exhs. H, I, J, and K).

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Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

Respondent Court held that the delay or withholding of complainant's salaries and emoluments was unreasonable and caused complainant undue injury. Being then the sole breadwinner in their family, the withholding of her salaries caused her difficulties in meeting her family's financial obligations like paying for the tuition fees of her four children. Petitioner's defense that complainant failed to attach the required money and property clearance to her vouchers was held to be an afterthought that was brought about, in the first place, by his own failure to issue any memorandum requiring its submission. That the voucher form listed the clearance as one of the requirements for its approval had neither been brought to complainant's attention nor raised by petitioner as defense in his answer. In any event, the payment of complainant's salary from January to November 1991, confirmed by the sheriff's return, showed that the clearance was not an indispensable requirement, because petitioner could have acted upon or approved the disbursement even without it. The alleged lack of a supplemental budget was also rejected, because it was petitioner's duty as municipal mayor to prepare and submit the "executive and supplemental budgets" under Sections 318, 320, and 444 (3)(ii) of the Local Government Code, 9 and the complainant's claims as assistant municipal treasurer, a permanent position included in the plantilla for calendar year 1990 and 1991, were classified as "current operating expenditures" for the same calendar years, which were chargeable against the general funds of the town of Sindangan. Except for the representation and transportation allowance, Fuertes' claims for thirteenth month pay, cash gift and clothing allowance were already covered by Supplemental Budget No. 5 for calendar year 1990. Petitioner's contention that funds covering complainant's claims were made available only in December 1992 was unbelievable, considering that an ordinance enacting a supplemental budget takes effect upon its approval or on the date fixed therein under Sec. 320 of the Local Government Code.

The Sandiganbayan also ruled that the petitioner's evident bad faith was the direct and proximate cause of Fuertes' undue injury. Complainant's salaries and allowances were withheld for no valid or justifiable reasons. Such delay was intended to harass complainant, because petitioner wanted to replace her with his political protege whom he eventually designated as municipal treasurer, bypassing Fuertes who was next in seniority. Bad faith was further evidenced by petitioner's instructions to the outgoing municipal treasurer not to give the complaining witness any work assignment, not to provide her with office table and chair, not to act on her daily time record and application for leave of absence, instructions which were confirmed in the municipal treasurer's certification. (Exh. G-2).

The Issues

In his memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues: 10

1. Could accused be held liable under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 "in the discharge of his official administrative duties", a positive act, when what was imputed to him was failing and refusing to sign and/or approve the vouchers of Mr[s]. Fuertes on time or by "inaction on his obligation under the compromise agreement" ( ibid., p. 19), a passive act? Did not the act come under Sec. 3(f) of R.A. 3019, of [sic] which accused was not charged with?

2. Assuming, arguendo, that his failure and refusal to immediately sign and approve the vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes comes [sic] under Sec. 3(e), the questions are:

(a) Did not the duty to sign and approve the same arise only after the Sangguniang Bayan had passed an appropriations ordinance, and not before? In other words, was the non-passage of the appropriation ordinance a justifiable reason for not signing the vouchers?

(b) Did Mrs. Fuertes suffer undue injury, as the term is understood in Sec. 3(e), she having been paid all her claims?

(c) Did petitioner not act in good faith in refusing to immediately sign the vouchers and implement the compromise agreement until the Sangguniang Bayan had enacted the appropriation ordinance and until Mrs. Fuertes submitted the clearance from the Municipality of Pinan, Zamboanga del Norte?

Restated, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of undue injury and bad faith. Additionally, petitioner submits that a violation of Section 3[e] of RA 3019 cannot be committed through nonfeasance.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious. After careful review of the evidence on record and thorough deliberation on the applicable provision of the Anti-Graft Law, the Court agrees with the solicitor general's assessment that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of the crime charged.

First Issue: Undue Inquiry

Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3[e] of R.A. 3019, which states:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

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(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

To hold a person liable under this section, the concurrence of the following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution:

(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;

(2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;

(3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; and

(4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. 11

The solicitor general, in his manifestation, 12 points out that "undue injury" requires proof of actual injury or damage, citing our ruling in Alejandro vs. People 13 and Jacinto vs. Sandiganbayan. 14 Inasmuch as complainant was actually paid all her claims, there was thus no "undue injury" established.

This point is well-taken. Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Sec. 3[e] cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established. Its existence must be proven as one of the elements of the crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury or the giving of any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is required that the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.

In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently interpreted as "actual damage." Undue has been defined as "more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal;" and injury as "any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property[; that is, the] invasion of any legally protected interest of another." Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law. 15

In turn, actual or compensatory damages is defined by Article 2199 of the Civil Code as follows:

Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

Fundamental in the law on damages is that one injured by a breach of a contract, or by a wrongful or negligent act or omission shall have a fair and just compensation commensurate to the loss sustained as a consequence of the defendant's act. Actual pecuniary compensation is awarded as a general rule, except where the circumstances warrant the allowance of other kinds of damages.  16 Actual damages are primarily intended to simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong. 17

Furthermore, damages must not only be capable of proof, but must be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. They cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon speculation, conjecture or guesswork.  18 They cannot include speculative damages which are too remote to be included in an accurate estimate of the loss or injury.

In this case, the complainant testified that her salary and allowance for the period beginning July 1990 were withheld, and that her family underwent financial difficulty which resulted from the delay in the satisfaction of her claims.  19 As regards her money claim, payment of her salaries from January 1991 until November 19, 1991 was evidenced by the Sheriffs Return dated November 19, 1991 (exh. D). She also admitted having been issued a check on January 4, 1994 to cover her salary from June 1 to June 30, 1990; her salary differential from July 1, 1989 to April 30, 1990; her thirteenth-month pay; her cash gift; and her clothing allowances. Respondent Court found that all her monetary claims were satisfied. After she fully received her monetary claims, their is no longer any basis for compensatory damages or undue injury, their being nothing more to compensate.

Complainant's testimony regarding her family's financial stress was inadequate and largely speculative. Without giving specific details, she made only vague references to the fact that her four children were all going to school and that she was the breadwinner in the family. She, however, did not say that she was unable to pay their tuition fees and the specific damage brought by such nonpayment. The fact that the "injury" to her family was unspecified or unquantified does not satisfy the element of undue injury, as akin to actual damages. As in civil cases, actual damages, if not supported by evidence on record, cannot be considered. 20

Other than the amount of the withheld salaries and allowances which were eventually received, the prosecution failed to specify and to prove any other loss or damage sustained by the complainant. Respondent Court insists that complainant suffered by reason of the "long period of time" that her emoluments were withheld.

This inconvenience, however, is not constitutive of undue injury. In Jacinto, this Court held that the injury suffered by the complaining witness, whose salary was eventually released and whose position was restored in the plantilla, was negligible; undue injury entails damages that are more than necessary or are excessive, improper or illegal. 21 In Alejandro, the Court held that the hospital employees were not caused undue injury, as they were in fact paid their salaries. 22

Second Issue: No Evident Bad Faith

In the challenged Decision, Respondent Court found evident bad faith on the part of the petitioner, holding that, without any valid of justifiable reason, accused withheld the payment of complainant's salaries and other benefits for almost two (2) years, demonstrating a clear manifestation of bad faith. 23 It then brushed aside the petitioner's defenses that complainant failed to submit money and property clearances for her vouchers, and that an appropriation by the Sangguniang Bayan was required before complainant's vouchers could be approved. It said: 24

Secondly, his reliance on the failure of complainant to submit the clearances which were allegedly necessary for the approval of vouchers is futile in the light of the foregoing circumstances:

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b. The evidence on record shows that complainant's salaries for the period from January to November 1991 (included as subject matter in the mandamus case) were duly paid, as confirmed in the Sheriff's Return dated November 19, 1991 (Exh. "D"). This means that accused, even without the necessary clearance, could have acted upon or approved complainant's disbursement vouchers if he wanted to.

c. It may be true that a clearance is an indispensable requirement before complainant will be paid of her claims, but accused could not just hide behind the cloak of the clearance requirement in order to exculpate himself from liability. As the approving officer, it was his duty to direct complainant to submit the same. Moreover, accused could not just set aside the obligation he voluntarily imposed upon himself when he entered into a compromise agreement binding himself to sign complainant's vouchers without any qualification as to the clearance requirement. Perforce, he could have seen to it that complainant secured the same in order that he could comply with the said obligation.

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Fourthly, accused's contention that the delay in the release of complainant's claim could not be attributed to him because the vouchers were only submitted to him for his signature on December 24-27, 1992; that the approval of the budget appropriations/resolutions depends on the Sangguniang Bayan, Budget Officer and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is unavailing.

As revealed in the alleged newly discovered evidence themselves, particularly . . . SB Res. No. 202 and Appropriation Ordinance No. 035, both dated May 21, 1990 (Exh. "5-a"- Motion), the Sangguniang Bayan appropriated a budget of P5M in the General Fund for calendar year 1991 [the Budget Officer does not approve the budget but assists the Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan in the preparation of the budget (Sec. 475, Local Government Code of 1991)]. Complainant's claims consisted of her salaries and other benefits for 1990 and 1991 which were classified as Current Operating Expenditures chargeable against the General Fund. It is undisputed that she was holding her position as Assistant Municipal Treasurer in a permanent capacity (her position was also designated Assistant Department Head), which was included in the plantilla for calender years 1990 and 1991 (Exhs. "4-a" & "4-b", Motion). In Program Appropriation and Obligation by Object (Exhs. "4-c" & "4-c", Motion), appropriations were made for current operating expenditures to which complainant's claims properly appertained. . . . Verily, complainant's claims were covered by appropriations duly approved by the officials concerned, signifying that adequate funds were available for the purpose. In fact, even complainant's claims for her 13th month pay, cash gift and clothing allowance, subject matter of Disbursement Voucher marked Exhibit "J" which would need a supplemental budget was covered by "Supplemental Budget No. 5 for CY 1990 duly approved by the authorities concerned" as shown in the voucher itself. This means that the said claim was already obligated (funds were already reserved for it) as of calendar year 1990. . . . It is clear, then, that as regards availability of funds, there was no obstacle for the release of all the complainant's claims.

The Court disagrees. Respondent Court cannot shift the blame on the petitioner, when it was the complainant who failed to submit the required clearance. This requirement, which the complainant disregarded, was even printed at the back of the very vouchers sought to be approved. As assistant municipal treasurer, she ought to know that this is a condition for the payment of her claims. This clearance is required by Article 443 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991:

Art. 443. Property Clearances - When an employee transfers to another government office, retires, resigns, is dismissed, or is separated from the service, he shall be required to secure supplies or property clearance from the supply officer concerned, the provincial or city general services officer concerned, the municipal mayor and the municipal treasurer, or the punong barangay and the barangay treasurer, as the case may be. The local chief executive shall prescribe the property clearance form for this purpose.

For her own failure to submit the required clearance, complainant is not entirely blameless for the delay in the approval of her claims.

Also, given the lack of corresponding appropriation ordinance and certification of availability of funds for such purpose, petitioner had the duty not to sign the vouchers. As chief executive of the municipality, Llorente could not have approved the voucher for the payment of complainant's salaries under Sec. 344, Local Government Code of 1991. 25 Also, Appropriation Ordinance No. 020 26 adding a supplemental budget for calendar year 1990 was approved on April 10, 1989, or almost a year before complainant was transferred back to Sindangan. Hence, she could not have been included therein. SB Resolution No. 202 and Appropriation Ordinance No. 035, 27 which fixed the municipal budget for calendar year 1991, was passed only on May 21, 1990, or almost another year after the transfer took effect. The petitioner's failure to approve the complainant's vouchers was therefore due to some legal obstacles, 28 and not entirely without reason. Thus, evident bad faith cannot be completely imputed to him.

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. (Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2nd Series, 895, 1007). It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self interest or ill will for ulterior purposes (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 166-167). Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage. 29

In Jacinto, evident bad faith was not appreciated because the actions taken by the accused were not entirely without rhyme or reason; he refused to release the complainant's salary because the latter failed to submit her daily time record; he refused to approve her sick-leave application because he found out that she did not suffer any illness; and he removed her name from the plantilla because she was moonlighting during office hours. Such actions were measures taken by a superior against an erring employee who studiously ignored, if not defied, his authority.  30

In Alejandro, evident bad faith was ruled out, because the accused gave his approval to the questioned disbursement after relying on the certification of the bookkeeper on the availability of funds for such disbursement. 31

Third Issue: Interpretation of Causing

The Court does not completely agree with petitioner's assertion that the imputed act does not fall under Sec. 3[e] which, according to him, requires a positive act - a malfeasance or misfeasance. Causing means "to be the cause or occasion of, the effect as an agent, to bring into existence, to make or to induce, to compel." 32Causing is, therefore, not limited to positive acts only. Even passive acts or inaction may cause undue injury. What is essential is that undue injury, which is quantifiable and demonstrable, results from the questioned official act or inaction.

In this case, the prosecution accused petitioner of failing or refusing to pay complainant's salaries on time, while Respondent Court convicted him of unduly delaying the payment of complainant's claims. As already explained, both acts did not, however, legally result in "undue injury" or in "giving any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, [or] administrative . . . functions." Thus, these acts are not punishable under Sec. 3[e].

It would appear that petitioner's failure or refusal to act on the complainant's vouchers, or the delay in his acting on them more properly falls under Sec. 3[f]:

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.

Here, the neglect or refusal to act within a reasonable time is the criminal act, not the causing of undue injury. Thus, its elements are:

1) The offender is a public officer;

2) Said officer has neglected or has refused to act without sufficient justification after due demand or request has been made on him;

3) Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the public officer having acted on the matter pending before him; and

4) Such failure to so act is "for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party, or discriminating against another. 33

However, petitioner is not charged with a violation of Sec. 3[f]. Hence, further disquisition is not proper. Neither may this Court convict petitioner under Sec. 3[f] without violating his constitutional right to due process.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner is ACQUITTED of violating Section 3[e] of R.A. 3019, as amended. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-45376-77. July 26, 1988.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, in his capacity as Judge of Circuit Criminal Court, 16th Judicial District, Davao City and City Mayor ANTONIO C. ACHARON & ROSALINA BERNABE, Respondents.

Romerico P. Vencer for respondent Mayor Antonio C. Acharon.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (RA 3019); SUSPENSION OF PUBLIC OFFICER, MANDATORY BUT NOT AUTOMATIC: HEARING ON VALIDITY OF INFORMATION, INDISPENSABLE. — The Court has previously ruled that, under Sec. 13, Rep. Act 3019, suspension of a public officer is mandatory. However, suspension cannot be automatic, the reason being that "a hearing on the validity of the information appears conformable to the spirit of the law, taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction and that public interest demands a speedy determination of the issues involved in (the) cases." Thus, before a suspension order can be issued, a hearing on the issue of the validity of the information must first be had. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted to determine basically the validity of the information, from which the court can have a basis to either suspend the accused, and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS, SECURED. — In a pre-suspension proceeding, the accused is accorded the right to prove that the information filed against him was filed without prior and due preliminary investigation to which he is entitled under the law. This is to protect him from hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts for which he is charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; VALIDITY OF PROCEEDINGS MAYBE CHALLENGED BY WAY OF A MOTION TO QUASH. — A challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts for which the accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, should be treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In other words, a resolution of the challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of an offense punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.

4. CRIMINAL LAW; ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (RA 3019), PRE-SUSPENSION PROCEEDINGS; GUILT OF ACCUSED NEED NOT BE ESTABLISHED BEFORE TRIAL ON THE MERITS; RATIONALE. — The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before the trial on the merits proceeds. Nor does it prohibit the trial, and thus the suspension, of the innocent. The law permits the trial of the accused based merely on probable cause, as long as probable cause has been properly determined. And for honest lapses in its administration, the law provides for remedial measures upon which am innocent public officer is vindicated and compensated. A requirement that the guilt of the accused must first be established in the pre-suspension proceeding before trial proper can proceed would negate the ruling of the Court that the." . . mandatory suspension . . . requires at the same time that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the Act" and make the trial proper a surplusage.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION COMMITTED IN CASE AT BAR. — The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it practically held that the prosecution failed to establish the culpability of the accused in a proceeding which does not even require the prosecution to do so. It acted with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, when it pre-emptively dismissed the cases and, as a consequence thereof, deprived the prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby violating its fundamental right to due process.

D E C I S I O N

PADILLA, J.:

Petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the order of the Circuit Criminal Court, 16th Judicial District, Davao City, dated 20 December 1976, in Criminal Case No. CCC-XVI-1-GSC (256) and Criminal Case No. CCC-XVI-2-GSC (256), which denied Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of a previous order, dated 28 October 1976, resolving that the informations filed therein are "invalid ab initio" and consequently dismissing said criminal cases.

On 11 June 1971, an information was filed in the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 255, charging City Mayor Antonio C. Acharon for violation of Paragraphs (e) and (f), Section 3 of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information reads as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That for the period from January to December 1968, in the City of General Santos, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused being then the incumbent Municipal Mayor of General Santos, South Cotabato, and thereafter from July 8, 1968 to the present is the City Mayor of the City of General Santos, Philippines, and being the public officer charged with the grant of license or permit to operate cockpits in the said City (formerly a Municipality), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, deny the application for renewal of one EMILIO EVANGELISTA for license or permit to operate his cockpit situated at Labangala, now City of General Santos, Philippines, and issuing instead — in the same year 1968 — a license and permit to operate, as in fact said accused did issue a license or permit to LUIS ACHARON, his uncle (relative within the third civil degree) to operate a new cockpit about 250 meters away from the cockpit of Emilio Evangelista and inspite of the order of the CFI in Civil Case No. 840, entitled "MANDAMUS" in which Emilio Evangelista is the Petitioner, directing the then Municipal Mayor to accept and give due course to the application of petitioner Emilio Evangelista for a license or permit to operate his cockpit; the said accused failed and refused to accept and give due course to said application for a license or permit, thereby causing injury to said applicant and gave his uncle, LUIS ACHARON, an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in connection with which City Mayor under Section 10 of Republic Act 5412, known as the City Charter of General Santos City, has the sole charged (sic) of issuing license or permits, giving his relative within the third civil degree preference in the discharge of his official functions thru his manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence and or he has neglected or refused after due demand or request of Emilio Evangelista for the renewal of his permit to operate his cockpit without any sufficient justification, thus, giving directly or indirectly his own uncle, LUIS ACHARON, benefit or advantage or has discriminated on Emilio Evangelista in the performance of his official duties.

CONTRARY TO PARAGRAPHS (e) and (f) of Section 3, Republic Act No. 3019, . . ." 1 

On the same day, another information was filed in the same court, docketed as Criminal Case No. 256 charging City Mayor Antonio C. Acharon and then City Vice-Mayor Rosalina Bernabe of violating Section 3, in relation to Section 1, of Republic Act 3019. Said information reads as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That for the period July to December, 1969, in the City of General Santos, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, being the incumbent City Mayor and City Vice Mayor, respectively, of General Santos City, Philippines, taking

advantage of their positions as City Mayor and City Vice Mayor, which positions and offices are public trust, conspiring, confederating together and mutually assisting one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, use the names of 327 employees of the city government of General Santos City, fraudulently procure and purchase 1,635 sacks of rice in bulk with the Regional Office of the Rice & Corn Administration, Region No. XIII, stationed at General Santos City, by using their own money and after obtaining said 1,635 sacks of RCA rice at a price very much lower than the prevailing price in the open market for the same quality of rice, dispose the same illegally to persons other than the said 327 employees of the city government in violation of paragraph (a), (e), (h) and (1) of Section 3, in relation to Section 1 of Republic Act 3019, the accused City Vice Mayor Rosalina Bernabe persuading, inducing or influencing accused City Mayor Antonio C. Acharon to make a fraudulent official procurement of rice from the RCA and accused City Mayor Antonio C. Acharon allowed himself to be so persuaded, induced or influenced to make said fraudulent official procurement and, as a result the accused City Mayor has caused injury to the government by the fraudulent official procurement of rice from the RCA and has given accused City Mayor an unwarranted benefit and advantage thru said fraudulent official procurement of rice from the RCA; the Mayor being an officer charged with the grant of concession, namely, the official procurement of rice for city employees without whose intervention no such rice in bulk can be obtained except from RCA accredited retailers by the gantas, and/or both accused, directly or indirectly, had financial or pecuniary interest in the fraudulent procurement of rice from the RCA in connection with which the said accused intervened in their official capacities, the accused City Vice Mayor having used her own money in paying the low price of said rice and, thereafter, illegally disposing of the same and accused City Mayor knowingly approved or granted the privilege or benefit in favor of the accused City Vice Mayor who was not qualified or legally entitled from procuring said rice in bulk from said agency, the official request being a privilege or a benefit. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

CONTRARY to Section 3, in relation to Section 1, Republic Act No. 3019. . . ." 2 

The prosecution then filed an Urgent Motion for the issuance of an order suspending the accused from office. The accused Rosalina Bernabe filed a Motion to Dismiss in Criminal Case No. 256. The trial court thereupon issued a "show cause" order in both criminal cases, directing the accused to show the invalidity of the informations filed against them.

Before the pre-suspension hearings in the two (2) cases could be held, the accused were arraigned, both pleading not guilty. Likewise, pursuant to a resolution of this Court, both cases were transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court, 6th Judicial District, Davao City (hereinafter referred to as the trial court) for trial and disposition. Criminal Case No. 255 and Criminal Case No. 256 were re-docketed as Criminal Case No. CCC-XVI-1-GSC (255) and Criminal Case No. CCC-XVI-2-GSC (256), respectively.

On 30 October 1972, the cases were set for trial. However, at the instance of the Acting District State Prosecutor, and on the latter’s manifestation that a petition for reinvestigation had been filed with his office by accused Acharon, and that the granting of the same was still pending determination, trial was postponed. Likewise, the presiding judge who was hearing the cases was subsequently appointed to another court: hence, the trial of the cases was further delayed until herein respondent judge, Hon. Rodolfo B. Albano was appointed in December 1975 presiding judge of the trial court.

In September 1976, the cases were again set for hearing. On the date of hearing, 4 October 1976,Accused Acharon filed a Motion to hear the validity of the informations filed against him.

In said hearing, the contending parties in both cases agreed to submit the question of the validity or invalidity of the two (2) informations on the basis of the records of each case. And with such submission, the trial court subsequently issued an Order, dated 28 October 1976, deciding the cases on the merits by making findings of fact based on its assessment of the records of the antecedent proceedings had in the cases, taking into consideration matters of defense of the accused, resolving that the informations in both cases are "invalid ab initio" and consequently dismissing said cases. The prosecution moved for reconsideration; however, on 20 December 1976, the trial court issued its Order denying the same.

Hence this petition by the prosecution.

Basically, petitioner challenges the manner in which the trial court arrived at its conclusion that the informations filed in both cases are invalid. Petitioner assigns as reversible errors the following: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH BOTH ACCUSED ARE CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (R.A. No. 3019) BY TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION MATTERS NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATIONS.

"2. THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS WITHOUT TRIAL; CONSEQUENTLY, THE ORDERS OF DISMISSAL IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR WANT OF DUE PROCESS." 3 

This assignment of errors raises in turn the following issues: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. whether in a pre-suspension proceeding to determine the validity or invalidity of an information filed under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a court may consider matters not alleged in the information under consideration. cralawnad

2. whether a court may, without a trial proper, decide a case on the merits by making findings of fact after an assessment of the evidence on the record, taking into consideration matters of defense of the accused, and, on the basis thereof, dismiss the same.

Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019 provides that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Court has previously ruled that, under Sec. 13, Rep. Act 3019, suspension of a

public officer is mandatory. 4 However, suspension cannot be automatic, the reason being that "a hearing on the validity of the information appears conformable to the spirit of the law, taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction and that public interest demands a speedy determination of the issues involved in (the) cases." 5 Thus, before a suspension order can be issued, a hearing on the issue of the validity of the information must first be had. This pre-suspension hearing is conducted to determine basically the validity of the information, from which the court can have a basis to either suspend the accused, and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension of the latter and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceeding which impairs its validity.

As the Court held: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court . . . ." 6 

It should be stressed that the right to challenge the validity of the information, in prosecutions under the anti-graft law, is not limited to the right to challenge the completeness or sufficiency of the recitals in the information vis-a-vis the essential elements of the offense as defined by substantive law. Considering the serious and far-reaching consequences of a suspension of a public official even before his conviction, the right to challenge the validity of an information entitles the accused to challenge the validity of the CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS leading to the filing of the information against him.

However, this right of the accused does not divest the prosecution of its right to prove the guilt of the accused in a trial on the merits, nor should the pre-suspension hearing substitute the trial proper.

Thus, in a pre-suspension proceeding, the accused is accorded the right to prove that the information filed against him was filed without prior and due preliminary investigation to which he is entitled under the law. 7 This is to protect him from hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts for which he is charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.

However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts for which the accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, should be treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the criminal proceeding by way of a

motion to quash on the ground provided in Paragraph (a), Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In other words, a resolution of the challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of an offense punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.

Private respondent Bernabe objects to this procedure, contending that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . This would render nugatory the purpose of the pre-suspension hearing. Considering the harshness of suspension from office, an accused should be allowed to present evidence in his behalf to refute the allegations in the information. Otherwise, any public officer can be suspended from the office on the basis of an information complete and regular upon its face but which may have been based on false, malicious and unfounded imputation by unscrupulous persons. . . ." 8 

Contrary to private respondent’s contention, the right to be secured against false, malicious and unfounded imputations is already covered by the right to a due preliminary investigation granted to the accused. The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before the trial on the merits proceeds. Nor does it prohibit the trial, and thus the suspension, of the innocent. The law permits the trial of the accused based merely on probable cause, as long as probable cause has been properly determined. And for honest lapses in its administration, the law provides for remedial measures upon which am innocent public officer is vindicated and compensated. As the law provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Should he [the accused] be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under the law, but IF HE IS ACQUITTED, HE SHALL BE ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT AND TO THE SALARIES AND BENEFITS WHICH HE FAILED TO RECEIVE DURING THE SUSPENSION, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him." 9 (Italics supplied)

Considering the mandatory suspension of the accused under a valid information, the law does not contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence, so that a court can have a valid basis in evaluating the advisability of his suspension pending the trial proper of the case filed against him. 10 Besides, a requirement that the guilt of the accused must first be established in the pre-suspension proceeding before trial proper can proceed would negate the ruling of the Court that the." . . mandatory suspension .. requires at the same time that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly protracted such as to thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the Act" 11 and make the trial proper a surplusage.

In the case at bar, respondent Antonio Acharon does not claim that he was denied his right to due preliminary investigation. Private respondent Bernabe filed a motion to dismiss dated 18 June 1971, on the ground that the facts alleged in the information against her do not constitute an offense. Further, respondent Antonio Acharon filed a motion, dated 4 October 1976, praying that a pre-suspension hearing of the cases be held to determine the validity of the informations against him, but he did not specify any ground upon which he challenged the validity of the same. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In any event, when the contending parties in both cases agreed to submit the question of the validity of the informations on the basis of the records of the cases, among others, 12 to determine whether accused Acharon can be mandatorily suspended, the trial court was competent to inquire only whether or not (1) accused Acharon had been afforded due preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the informations against him, (2) the acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, or (3) the informations against him can be quashed, under any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, not deemed waived in view of the previous arraignment of the accused. 13 

Consequently, the submission by the parties of the issue of invalidity of the informations on the basis of the records of the case makes said records, in addition to facts admitted by the prosecution and indubitable facts contained therein, only a legal source from which the trial court can inquire whether accused Acharon was afforded due preliminary investigation before the informations were filed against him.

Likewise, in determining whether the acts for which respondent Antonio Acharon was charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should have limited its inquiry to (1) the averments in the informations, as hypothetically admitted, (2) facts admitted by the prosecution, and (3) indubitable facts.

To traverse the allegations contained in the information, and conclude that "no law had been violated by the accused," 14 merely on the basis of the records of the case which contain evidence submitted by the prosecution in the preliminary investigation, pre-emptively denies the prosecution its right to exhaustively present its evidence against the accused at the trial proper.

Considering that the law does not require the conviction of the accused in the pre-suspension proceeding but only the determination of the validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of the information, and given the ability of the latter to overcome a motion to quash, the prosecution should not be faulted if what it presents as evidence in the pre-suspension proceedings does not satisfy a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused.

The records of the instant case do not show that the proceedings leading to the filing of the informations against the accused were tainted with any irregularity so as to invalidate the same. Likewise, a reading of the informations shows that the allegations contained therein meet the essential elements of offense as defined by substantive law. 15 The record is also bereft of undisputed facts to warrant the quashal of the informations under any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.

The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it practically held that the prosecution failed to establish the culpability of the accused in a proceeding which does not even require the prosecution to do so. It acted with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, when it pre-emptively dismissed the cases and, as a consequence thereof, deprived the prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby violating its fundamental right to due process. 16 With this violation, its Orders, dated 28 October 1976 and 20 December 1976, are therefore null and void. 17 Likewise, for

being null and void, said orders cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. 18 As held by the Court: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.chanrobles law library : red

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.

In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy." 19 

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders of the trial court are hereby declared NULL and VOID. Criminal Case No. CCC-XVI-1-GSC (255) and Criminal Case No. CCC-XVI-2-GSC (256) are remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with law. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 160718 : May 12, 2010] 

ANUNCIO C. BUSTILLO, EMILIO SUMILHIG, JR., AND AGUSTIN BILLEDO, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N 

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

It is disputably presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. In this case, this presumption remains unrebutted; hence, petitioners who were charged with violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, deserve an acquittal. It was not proven that they gave undue preference or acted in evident bad faith in effecting the transfer of the properties owned by the local government unit.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the July 31, 2003 Decision[2] of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24741, finding herein petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Also assailed is the November 6, 2003 Resolution[3] denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

Factual Antecedents

Congressman Ceferino Paredes, Jr. (Congressman Paredes) used a portion of his Countryside Development Fund (CDF) to purchase one unit of Toyota Tamaraw FX and six units of Kawasaki motorcycles. All vehicles were registered in the name of the

Municipality of Bunawan and were turned over to the municipality through its mayor, herein petitioner Anuncio C. Bustillo (Bustillo).

On May 17, 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed Resolution No. 95-27[4] which authorized the transfer without cost of the aforesaid vehicles to the San Francisco Water District (SFWD). Pursuant thereto, Bustillo executed on June 19, 1995, a Deed of Transfer[5] relative to the aforementioned vehicles in favor of the SFWD represented by its General Manager, Elmer T. Luzon (Luzon).

On July 27, 1995, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 183[6]disapproving the Sangguniang Bayan's Resolution No. 95-27 for being violative of Section 381[7] of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code. On August 17, 1995, it passed Resolution No. 246[8]canceling and declaring the Deed of Transfer as null and void for being highly irregular and grossly violative of Section 381 of RA 7160.

On May 23, 1996, a complaint[9] was filed charging Bustillo, Vice-Mayor Agustin Billedo, Jr. (Billedo), and Sangguniang Bayan members Teogenes Tortor (Tortor), Emilio Sumilhig, Jr. (Sumilhig), Ruth C. Orot (Orot), and Ernesto Amador, Jr., with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Also included in the complaint were Antonio Taotao and Luzon, the Board Secretary and General Manager, respectively, of SFWD.

On August 13, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao issued a Resolution which provides:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds probable cause to prosecute respondents Antonio C. Bustillo, Agustin Billedo, Jr., Teogenes Tortor, Emilio Sumilhig, Jr., Ruth C. Orot, Ernesto Amador, Jr., and Elmer T. Luzon for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019. It is hereby recommended that the enclosed Information be filed with the Sandiganbayan against the above- named respondents.

FINDING insufficient evidence to hold respondent Antonio Taotao, Board Secretary of SFWD, liable for the charge, let the instant case against him be dismissed.

SO RESOLVED.[10]

Consequently, on June 24, 1998, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan docketed as Criminal Case No. 24741 charging Bustillo, Billedo, Tortor, Sumilhig, Orot, Amador, and Luzon, for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, committed as follows:

That on or about 19 June 1995, or shortly prior or subsequent thereto, in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Anuncio C. Bustillo, a public officer being then the Mayor of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur, with salary grade 27, Agustin Billedo, Jr., Vice Mayor of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur, Teogenes Tortor, Emilio Sumilhig, Jr., Ruth C. Orot, Ernesto Amador, being then members of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Bunawan, and Elmer T. Luzon, General Manager of San Francisco Water District (SFWD), all public officers with salary grades below 27, committing the offense in relation to their official duties and taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring and confederating with each other [sic], thru evident bad faith, did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, cause undue injury to the government, by passing Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 95-27 which transferred

without cost one (1) unit of Tamaraw FX vehicle and six (6) units of KE Kawasaki motorcycles purchased for the Municipality of Bunawan out of the Countryside Development Fund of Congressman Ceferino Paredes, Jr. and municipal counterpart fund and which were newly purchased and in perfect running condition, to the San Francisco Water District in violation of Section 381 of R.A. 7160, and despite the subsequent nullification of SB Resolution No. 95-27 by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur and the repeated demands by the municipal government of Bunawan, accused Elmer T. Luzon and the San Francisco Water District refused to surrender the afore-enumerated motor vehicle and motorcycles to the Municipality of Bunawan, thereby depriving it of the possession, ownership and use thereof, to the damage and prejudice of said local government unit.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]

All the accused posted their respective bail for their provisional liberty, with the exception of Orot who died on June 28, 1998.[12]

On April 16, 1999, Bustillo, Billedo, Tortor and Sumilhig entered pleas of "Not Guilty". [13]

During pre-trial conference[14] held on June 7, 1999, the following facts were admitted by both the prosecution and the defense:

"1) At the time material to this case all the accused are public officers namely, Anuncio C. Bustillo as Municipal Mayor and Agustin Billedo, Jr., as Vice Mayor, Teogenes Tortor and Emilio Sumilhig, Jr., as members of the Sangguniang Bayan all of the Municipality of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur;

2) That during the local election held on May 8, 1995, accused Anuncio C. Bustillo was not re-elected as Mayor of the Municipality of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur;

3) That on May 17, 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur, during its 17 th regular session passed Resolution No. 95-27 transferring without any consideration and cost to the San Francisco Water District the following properties: one (1) unit of Tamaraw Toyota FX and six (6) units of Kawasaki Motorcycles; Accused Agustin Billedo, Jr., Teogenes Tortor and Emilio Sumilhig, Jr., were among the members of the said council who voted to approve said Resolution;

4) That on June 19, 1995, accused Anuncio C. Bustillo in behalf of the Municipality of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur executed a Deed of Transfer relative to the above mentioned vehicles in favor of San Francisco Water District represented by Elmer T. Luzon, General Manager;

5) That on July 27, 1995, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur in its 3rdregular session passed Resolution No. 183, series of 1995 disapproving Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 95-27 of the Municipality of Bunawan;

6) That on August 17, 1995, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 246, series of 1995, canceling and declaring the aforementioned Deed of Transfer executed by and between the Municipality of Bunawan and San Francisco Water District as null and void;

7) That, in a letter dated July 11, 1995, of Leonardo Barrios, Municipal Mayor of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur addressed to the Director of San Francisco Water District, it was requested that the subject Tamaraw FX and Kawasaki Motorcycles owned by the Municipality of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur be returned to the Municipality of Bunawan;

8) That in response to said letter dated July 11, 1995, of Municipal Mayor Leonardo Barrios, Antonio Tao-Tao, Acting Board Secretary of San Francisco Water District on his letter dated July 16, 1995, refused to return the subject vehicles;

9) That the subject vehicles are all newly purchased and serviceable and in good running condition at the time of the transfer in question;"

The other set of facts agreed upon were:

a) That the purchase price or value of the Toyota Tamaraw FX was P400,000.00 and the six (6) units Kawasaki Motorcycles P305,100.00, or a total purchase price or value of P705,100.00 Pesos;

b) That Resolution No. 95-27 was unanimously approved by the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur and was not judicially declared null and void.On June 15, 1999, the SFWD executed a Deed of Donation  [15] effecting the transfer of the aforesaid vehicles in favor of the Municipality of Bunawan because according to SFWD, the water projects funded by the CDF of Congressman Paredes were already completed.

Thereafter, Luzon and Amador also entered pleas of "Not Guilty".

On December 9, 1999, the Sandiganbayan was informed of the death of Tortor.[16]

During trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: 1) Florencia Ilorde, 2) Lilia J. Nacorda, and 3) Leonardo Barrios. After the testimonies of the witnesses and the admission of its exhibits, the prosecution rested its case.[17]

On December 6, 1999, herein petitioners filed a Demurrer to Evidence[18] but it was denied[19] for lack of merit. Luzon's Demurrer to Evidence[20] was likewise denied on February 4, 2000.[21] Thus, the defense presented its evidence. Four witnesses, namely: 1) Luzon, 2) Benigno G. Asis, 3) Sumilhig, and 4) Ceferino S. Paredes, were presented along with other exhibits.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

On July 31, 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision[22] finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Luzon and Amador were acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The case against Tortor and Orot was dismissed on account of their demise.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[23] which was denied in a Resolution dated November 6, 2003. [24]

Issue

Hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari faulting the Sandiganbayan for finding petitioners guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

Our Ruling

The Sandiganbayan based its conviction of (Mayor) Bustillo, (Vice-Mayor) Billedo and (Councilor) Sumilhig on the finding that they conspired to effect the transfer of the vehicles to the prejudice of the Municipality of Bunawan in violation of the provision of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x x

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. [25]

In this case, only the first element was proven. At the time material to this case, all the petitioners are public officers, namely, Bustillo as Municipal Mayor, Billedo as Vice Mayor, and Sumilhig as member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

All the other elements were not present. It cannot be denied that the transfer of the vehicles to SFWD was made in furtherance of the purpose for which the funds were released which is "to help in the planning, monitoring and coordination of the implementation of the waterworks projects located throughout the Province of Agusan del Sur." The Deed of Donation expressly provided that the subject vehicles shall be used for the same purpose for which they were purchased.

Moreover, the transfer was made to ensure the success of the implementation of the CDF-funded waterworks projects of the province of Agusan del Sur. In the Memorandum of Agreement dated February 10, 1993, SFWD was designated to implement, control or supervise all the CDF-funded waterworks projects. Clearly, the vehicles were donated to SFWD not because it was given any preference, unwarranted benefits or undue

advantage, but in recognition of its technical expertise.

We find no evidence on record which would show that petitioners were motivated by bad faith when they transferred the vehicles to SFWD. Bustillo, as Mayor, is authorized by law to enter into contracts for and in behalf of the local government unit. Billedo, as Vice Mayor, acted as the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan and did not even vote for the passage of Resolution No. 95-27. Said Resolution was unanimously passed by the Sangguniang Bayan and Sumilhig was only one of those who voted for its passage.

In sum, the petitioners have in their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties which the records failed to rebut. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption in rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.  [26]

WHEREFORE, the July 31, 2003 Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24741 and its November 6, 2003 Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Anuncio C. Bustillo, Agustin Billedo, Jr. and Emilio Sumilhig, Jr., are hereby acquitted for failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

PEDRO G. SISTOZA, petitioner,   vs. ANIANO DESIERTO in his capacity as Ombudsman, and ELISEO CO, respondents.

D E C I S I O NBELLOSILLO, J.:

There is no question on the need to ferret out and expel public officers whose acts make bureaucracy synonymous with graft in the public eye, and to eliminate systems of government acquisition procedures which covertly ease corrupt practices.  But the remedy is not to indict and  jail  every person who happens to have signed a piece of  document  or  had a hand  in implementing   routine   government   procurement,   nor   does   the   solution   fester   in   the indiscriminate use of the conspiracy theory which may sweep into jail even the most innocent ones.  To  say   the   least,   this   response   is  excessive  and  would   simply  engender  catastrophic consequences   since  prosecution  will  likely  not   end   with   just   one   civil   servant   but  must, logically, include like an unsteady streak of dominoes the department secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman, agency head, and all chief auditors who, if the flawed reasoning were followed, are equally culpable for every crime arising from disbursements they sanction.

Stretching the argument further, if a public officer were to personally examine every single detail,  painstakingly   trace  every   step   from  inception,  and   investigate   the  motives  of  every 

person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority, if only to avoid prosecution, our bureaucracy would end up with public managers doing nothing else but superintending minute details in the acts of their subordinates.  It is worth noting that while no charges of violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,   as   amended,  were  filed  against   the   responsible  officials   of   the Department of Justice and officers of other government agencies who similarly approved the procurement subject of the instant petition and authorized the disbursement of funds to pay for it, all the blame unfortunately fell upon petitioner Pedro G. Sistoza as then Director of the Bureau of Corrections who merely acted pursuant to representations made by three (3) office divisions thereof, in the same manner that the other officials who were not charged but who nonetheless authorized the transaction in their respective capacities, relied upon the assurance of regularity made by their individual subordinates.

In truth, it is sheer speculation to perceive and ascribe corrupt intent and conspiracy of wrongdoing   for  violation of  Sec.  3,  par.   (e),  of   the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,  as amended, solely from a mere signature on a purchase order, although coupled with repeated endorsements   of   its   approval   to   the   proper   authority,   without  more,   where   supporting documents along with transactions reflected therein passed the unanimous approval of equally accountable public officers and appeared regular and customary on their face.

Stated otherwise, in situations of fallible discretion, good faith is nonetheless appreciated when the document relied upon and signed shows no palpable nor patent,  no definite nor certain defects or when the public officer's trust and confidence in his subordinates upon whom the duty primarily lies are within parameters of tolerable judgment and permissible margins of error.  As we have consistently held, evidence of guilt must be premised upon a more knowing, personal and deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy.

Furthermore, even if the conspiracy were one of silence and inaction arising from gross inexcusable negligence, it is nonetheless essential to prove that the breach of duty borders on malice   and   is   characterized   by   flagrant,   palpable   and  willful   indifference   to   consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.  Anything less is insufferably deficient to establish probable cause.  Thus,  when at the outset the evidence offered at preliminary  investigation proves nothing more than the signature of a public officer and his statements verifying the regularity of prior procedure on the basis of documents apparently reliable, the prosecution is duty-bound to dismiss the affidavit-complaint as a matter of law and spare the system meant to restore   and   propagate   integrity   in   public   service   from   the   embarrassment   of   a   careless accusation of crime as well as the unnecessary expense of a useless and expensive criminal trial.

This petition for certiorari and prohibition stemmed from a routine purchase of tomato paste to be used as ingredient in the austere diet of the inmates of the New Bilibid Prison.  On 10   August   1999   the Pre-Qualification, Bid and Awards Committee (PBAC)   of   the   Bureau   of Corrections offered for public bidding the supply of tomato paste  in addition to other food items for consumption in the month of September.  Among the bidders were RBJJ, PMS Trading Enterprises,   Filcrafts   Industries,   Inc.,  and  Elias  General  Merchandising.  The  specification  for 

tomato paste appearing in the bid announcement and the bid tender form where it appeared as item 55 was 48/170 tins-grams to one (1) case.[1]

The offers of the respective bidders were embodied in their individual bid tender forms securely placed inside sealed envelopes.  Elias General Merchandising offered a bid ofP1,350.00 for 100/170 tins-grams to one (1) case while RBJJ and PMS Trading Enterprises tendered their respective bids for the same quantity at the higher prices of P1,380.10 andP1,380.05 per case.[2] On the other hand, Filcrafts Industries, Inc., proffered P539.00 for the quantity of 48/198 tins-grams   to   one   (1)   case.  It   appears   that   the   bid   tender   form   executed   by   Elias   General Merchandising and submitted to PBAC already indicated a change in the quantity specification from 48/170 tins-grams to 100/170 tins-grams which PBAC  approved as shown by the initials of the chairman and members thereof.[3] In the same breadth, PBAC rejected the bid of Filcrafts Industries, Inc., for offering a non-registered brand of tomato paste in the Philippines and its failure to specify in the bid tender form the country of origin of the tomato paste it would supply.[4]

Based on the abstract of bidding, Elias General Merchandising won the bidding with its offer  of P1,350.00   for  100/170 tins-grams to  one  (1)  case.[5] On 13  August  1999  the  Supply Division of the Bureau of Corrections thus prepared the purchase order (PO No. C-99-0140) for the one (1)-month supply of tomato paste in favor of Elias General Merchandising. [6] It reflected the supplier's winning offer of P1,350.00 for 100/170 tins-grams to one (1) case and no longer the   initial   specification  of   48/170  tins-grams.[7] The  Management  Division  of   the  Bureau  of Corrections passed upon the purchase order and confirmed the regularity of the procedures previously undertaken, while the Accounting Division authorized the funding of the purchase order.[8] Petitioner Sistoza received the purchase order and its supporting documents, cursorily read them and thereafter affixed his signature on the purchase order.[9] On 2 September 1999 PBAC issued a resolution noting that Elias General Merchandising "in all angles x x x greatly complied with the specifications provided" thereby confirming its winning bid for the month-long supply of tomato paste.

Petitioner   Sistoza   endorsed   the   winning   bid   of   Elias   General   Merchandising   to   the Department of Justice which initially disapproved the same.[10] The Justice Department observed that the award to the supplier with only the second lowest bid was not adequately justified in the 2 September 1999 resolution of the PBAC.  The purchase order was thus returned to the Supply  Division which then  informed Elias  General  Merchandising of  the development.  The winning bidder replied to the Supply Division and expressed its willingness to "meet the price of the lowest bidder for item No. 55, tomato paste which is more or less P1,120.00/box for 100 cans/170  grams."  The  Supply  Division  proposed   in   return   the  price  of P964.12/box  of  100 cans/170 grams supposedly matching the lowest bid of Filcrafts Industries Inc. [11] Elias General Merchandising   rejected   the   counter-offer   and   pegged   its   price   offer   at P1,120.00   for   100 cans/170 grams.

On 29 October 1999 petitioner endorsed to the Department of Justice the purchase order in   favor   of   Elias   General   Merchandising   and   conveyed   the   supplier's   discounted   offer ofP1,120.00 for 100 cans/170 grams.  He also alluded to the fact that the tomato paste had been delivered to the New Bilibid Prison and already consumed by its inmates.  For the second 

time, the Justice Department disapproved the endorsement notwithstanding the reduced price since Elias General Merchandising allegedly remained to be only the second lowest bidder.[12]

On 29 November 1999 Sistoza endorsed for the third time the purchase order of tomato paste in favor Elias General Merchandising to the Department of Justice.   He said -

The   Pre-Qualification,   Bid   and   Awards   Committee   in   its   resolution   dated   2 September   1999   states   that   Item  No.   55   (tomato   paste)  was   awarded   to   Elias General Merchandise in spite of being the 2nd lowest bidder due to the fact that the offer of Filcrafts Industries, Inc. does not conform [to] the specification provided for in the purchase orders.  The lowest bidder makes a counter-offer while Elias General Merchandise complied with all the requirements and specifications set forth [in the] said item.  Copy of the said resolution is attached for your reference.  The dealer on its part, since it is questioned for being awarded to the second lowest bidder, offered to reduce [its] price from P1,350.00/box (100 tins per box of 170 grams per tin to P1,120.00/box) x x x x

He again appealed for the approval of the purchase order emphasizing that the tomato paste had been used for the subsistence of the inmates of the New Bilibid Prison for the month of September.

On   8  December   1999  Undersecretary   of   Justice   Ramon   J.   Liwag   finally   approved   the purchase order for the tomato paste in favor of Elias General Merchandising at the reduced price   of   P1,120.00   per   case   for   two   hundred   fifteen   (215)   cases   or   a   total   of P240,800.00.   Consequently,   Disbursement   Voucher   No.   99100393   was   prepared   by   the Bureau of Corrections for the obligation of P240,800.00 and Land Bank Check No. 082195-QQ dated 17 December 1999 was paid to Elias General Merchandising.

On 22 September 1999 while efforts to secure the approval of the purchase order were being undertaken, respondent Eliseo Co, a perennial bidder for supply of food items of the New Bilibid Prison, filed an affidavit-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman alleging criminal and   administrative   charges   for   violation  of   Sec.   3,   par.   (e), RA 3019,   otherwise   known  as theAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against petitioner Pedro G. Sistoza as Director of the Bureau of Corrections and officers and members of its Supply Division and PBAC. [13] He claimed that Sistoza and his staff conspired with each other to cause undue injury to the government and   the   inmates   of   the   New   Bilibid   Prison   by   giving   undue   advantage   to   Elias   General Merchandise although its bid was higher in price and lower in quantity than that offered by Filcrafts Industries, Inc.

On 7 July 2000 the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the administrative proceedings, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-99-1130, against petitioner Sistoza and some of his co-respondents therein on the ground that their actions in awarding the supply of tomato paste to Elias General Merchandising, although its bid was not the lowest, were merely recommendatory and that they were effectively scrutinized and validated when the award was eventually approved by the Department of Justice.

On 29 November 1999, after counter-affidavits and supporting documents had been filed in   the   criminal   proceedings,   docketed   as   OMB-Case   No.   0-99-1985,   the   Evaluation   and Preliminary   Investigation   Bureau   (EPIB),   Office   of   the   Ombudsman,   issued   a   resolution recommending the prosecution of petitioner Sistoza and his co-respondents therein with the exception of the Chief of the Supply Division for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019.  The EPIB asserted that a failure of bidding should have been decreed since Elias General Merchandising did not comply with the original specification of 48/170 tins-grams when it submitted a bid of 100/170 tins-grams in the same manner that Filcrafts Industries, Inc., did not abide by several provisions of the bid announcement and that the offer of Elias General Merchandising should have been rejected since it tendered a price higher than the bid of Filcrafts Industries, Inc.  The EPIB concluded that these anomalies were fairly obvious from supporting documents showing why and how the supply of tomato paste was awarded to Elias General Merchandising and that Sistoza with no greater effort than to look casually at these documents would have discovered the irregularity of the award.

On 29 March 2000 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, rendered   a  memorandum   concurring  with   the   findings   of   the   EPIB   in   its Resolution of   29 November 1999.  It stressed the deviation of the offer of the supposed winning bidder from the specification of  48/170 tins-grams and the seemingly   irregular  preparation of   the purchase order ahead of the 2 September 1999 PBAC Resolution formally awarding the supply of tomato paste to Elias General Merchandising.  The OSP also claimed that petitioner Sistoza failed to disclose   in  any  of  his  endorsements  of   the  bidding   to   the  Department  of   Justice   that   the discounted offer of Elias General Merchandising at P1,120.00 for 100 cans/170 grams was still higher than the price quoted by Filcrafts Industries,  Inc.,  a fact which petitioner could have easily found out and conveyed from the counter-proposal made by the Supply Division to Elias General Merchandising at P964.12/box of 100 cans/170 grams purportedly to match the lowest bid of Filcrafts Industries, Inc.

On   8  May   2000   the   Office   of   the   Chief   Legal   Counsel,   Office   of   the   Ombudsman, recommended   approval   of   the   29  March   2000   OSP Memorandum.  On   7   June   2000   the Ombudsman authorized the filing of the appropriate Information against Sistoza and his alleged co-conspirators.  On 14 June 2000 the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Crim. Case No. 26072, accusing Sistoza of the following acts -

That on or about August 10, 1999 or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, in Muntinlupa   City,   Metro  Manila,   Philippines   and   within   the   jurisdiction   of   this Honorable Court, accused x x x together with accused Director PEDRO SISTOZA and Supply Division Chief x x x conspiring and confederating with one another, while in the performance of their official duties, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith made it possible for Elias General Merchandising to qualify and be the winning bidder in the supply of tomato paste for the subsistence of prisoners for the month of September 1999 x x x accused PEDRO SISTOZA,  knowing  fully  well   that  Elias  General  Merchandise  was  only   the second  lowest  bidder  and   that   the  subsequent  offer  by   the  said  supplier  of   the 

reduced price of P1,120.00 for 100/170 grams per case was still higher than the offer of Filcrafts Industries, Inc. at P964.12 for 100/170 grams per case as computed by accused [Supply Division Chief], still recommended the approval of Purchase Order No. 0-99-140 to the Department of Justice and subsequently resulted in the approval thereof, hence Disbursement Voucher No. 9910093 in the amount of P240,800.00 was approved by accused PEDRO SISTOZA, and Land Bank Check No. 082195-QQ was issued   to  Elias  General  Merchandising,   thereby  giving   said   supplier  unwarranted benefit, advantage and preference of the Government in the amount of P46,381.95 x x x x

On 22 June 2000 Sistoza filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion for reinvestigation and suspension of proceedings therein.  The court a quo granted reinvestigation and referred the matter   to   the   Ombudsman   but   denied   the   prayer   for   suspension   of   the proceedings.  Accordingly, on 11 July 2000 Sistoza filed an amplified motion for reconsideration with the Office of the Special Prosecutor but this was also denied on 8 August 2000.  On 25 August 2000 the Ombudsman affirmed the denial.  Hence, this petition.

On   18   October   2000   this   Court   issued   a   temporary   restraining   order   enjoining   the Sandiganbayan from conducting further proceedings in Crim. Case No. 26072 against petitioner Sistoza in order not to render the instant petition academic and futile.

Petitioner Sistoza argues that he had no active participation in the award of the supply of tomato paste to Elias General Merchandising and that his involvement was limited to signing the purchase order for this food item.  He claims that upon receipt of the purchase order, he cursorily perused the document and readily affixed his signature on it since the purchase order had  already  passed   the   scrutiny  of   three   (3)  office divisions  of   the  Bureau  of  Corrections, namely, the Supply Division, Management Division and Accounting Division.  He concludes that as a matter of  law his signature on the purchase order,  without more, does not prove any violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019.

It is settled that the preliminary investigation proper, i.e., the determination of whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial, is the function of the prosecution.[14] For criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, it is the Office of the Special Prosecutor, as an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman, which exercises investigatory and prosecutory powers.  Concomitantly, as a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman's determination of the existence or absence of probable cause.  The strict application of this rule, insofar as the Ombudsman is concerned, is not a trivial matter.  In the instant case, we see this principle at work when the Sandiganbayan deferred to the authority of the prosecution to exercise investigatory powers when it granted petitioner Sistoza's motion for reinvestigation.

As   in   every   rule,   however,   there   are   settled   exceptions.  Hence,   the  principle   of   non-interference does not apply when there is grave abuse of discretion[15] which would authorize the aggrieved person to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, 1997 Rules

of Civil Procedure.  There is grave abuse of discretion where power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.[16] When   the   Ombudsman   does   not   take   essential   facts   into   consideration   in   the determination of probable cause, it has been ruled that he gravely abuses his discretion.[17]

Section 3, par. (e), RA No. 3019 defines "corrupt practices of public officers." It provides-

In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful x x x x (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.  This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The elements of the offense are: (a) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (b) The public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public functions; (c) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; (d) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and, (e) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable   neglect.  Evidently,  mere   bad   faith   or   partiality   and   negligence per se are   not enough for one to be held liable under the law since the act of bad faith or partiality must in the first   place   be evident or manifest,   respectively, while   the   negligent   deed   should   both be gross and inexcusable.  It   is   further  required  that  any  or  all  of   these modalities  ought   to result in undue injury to a specified party.[18]

We   note   that   the Information against   petitioner   Sistoza,   while   specifying manifest partiality and evident bad faith, does not allege gross inexcusable negligence as a modality in the commission of the offense charged.  An examination of the resolutions of the Ombudsman would however confirm that the accusation against petitioner is based on his alleged omission of effort  to discover the supposed  irregularity of the award to Elias General  Merchandising which  it  was claimed was fairly obvious from looking casually  at the supporting documents submitted to him for endorsement to the Department of Justice.  And, while not alleged in the Information, it was evidently the intention of the Ombudsman to take petitioner to task for gross inexcusable negligence in   addition   to   the   two   (2)   other   modalities   mentioned therein.  At   any   rate,   it   bears   stressing   that   Sec.   3,   par.   (e), RA 3019,   is   committed  either by dolo or culpa and although the Information may have alleged only one (1) of the modalities of committing the offense, the other mode is deemed included in the accusation to allow proof thereof.[19]

In the instant case, there is no direct evidence that petitioner Sistoza acted in conspiracy with the officers and members of the PBAC and the other implicated public officials.  He did not himself participate in the bidding procedures nor was he involved in the award of the supply of tomato paste to Elias General Merchandising.  Plainly, the accusation against him rests upon his signature on the purchase order and his repeated endorsements thereof notwithstanding his knowledge that the winning bidder did not offer the least price.  The Ombudsman concluded that  these acts constituted manifest  partiality,  evident  bad faith,  or  even gross  inexcusable negligence resulting in undue injury to the government.

We disagree with the conclusions of the Office of the Ombudsman.  We have meticulously analyzed the arguments raised by the parties in the various pleadings and motions, together with their documentary evidence, which all formed the basis for the issuance of the questioned resolutions, and we are convinced that no probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges against petitioner Sistoza for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019.

To   begin   with,   before manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence may even  be  considered,   the  Office  of   the  Ombudsman  should  determine  with certainty the facts indicative of the modalities of committing a transgression of the statute.

Simply alleging each or all of these methods is not enough to establish probable cause, for it is well settled that allegation does not amount to proof.  Nor can we deduce any or all of the modes from mere speculation or hypothesis since good faith on the part of petitioner as with any other person is presumed.  The facts themselves must demonstrate evident bad faith which connotes  not  only  bad   judgment  but  also  palpably  and  patently   fraudulent   and  dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.[20]

On the other hand, gross inexcusable negligence does not signify mere omission of duties nor plainly  the exercise of   less than the standard degree of  prudence.   Rather,   it   refers  to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.[21] It entails the omission of care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property,  and  in  cases   involving  public  officials   it   takes  place  only  when breach  of  duty   is flagrant and devious.[22]

Clearly, the issue of petitioner Sistoza's criminal liability does not depend solely upon the allegedly scandalous irregularity of the bidding procedure for which prosecution may perhaps be proper.  For even if it were true and proved beyond reasonable doubt that the bidding had been   rigged,   an   issue   that   we   do   not   confront   and   decide   in   the   instant   case,   this pronouncement alone does not automatically result  in finding the act of petitioner similarly culpable.  It is presumed that he acted in good faith in relying upon the documents he signed and thereafter endorsed.  To establish a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, the prosecution must show not only the defects in the bidding procedure, a circumstance which we need not presently determine, but also the alleged evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence or manifest partiality of petitioner in affixing his signature on the purchase order and repeatedly endorsing the award earlier made by his subordinates despite 

his knowledge that the winning bidder did not offer the lowest price.  Absent a well-grounded and   reasonable  belief   that  petitioner  perpetrated   these  acts   in   the   criminal  manner  he   is accused of, there is no basis for declaring the existence of probable cause.

As defined above, the acts charged against petitioner do not amount to manifest partiality, evident bad faith nor gross inexcusable negligence which should otherwise merit a prosecution for   violation   of   Sec.   3,   par.   (e), RA 3019.  It   is   not   disputed   that   petitioner   relied   upon supporting documents apparently dependable as well as certifications of regularity made by responsible  public  officers  of   three  (3)  office divisions  of   the Bureau of  Corrections before affixing his  signature on the purchase order.  In Alejandro v. People,[23] evident  bad faith was ruled out because the accused gave his approval to the questioned disbursement after relying on the certification of the bookkeeper on the availability of funds for the expenditure and since the act of relying upon a subordinate's certification of regularity cannot be considered gross inexcusable negligence.  In Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan[24] this Court similarly rejected the theory of criminal liability where the head of office in discharging his official duties relied upon an act of his subordinate.

The fact that petitioner had knowledge of the status of Elias General Merchandising as being only the second lowest bidder does not ipso facto characterize petitioner's act of reliance as recklessly imprudent without which the crime could not have been accomplished. [25] Albeit misplaced, reliance in good faith by a head of office on a subordinate upon whom the primary responsibility   rests  negates  an  imputation of  conspiracy  by gross   inexcusable negligence to commit graft and corruption.[26] As things stand, petitioner is presumed to have acted honestly and sincerely when he depended upon responsible assurances that everything was aboveboard since it   is  not always the case that second best bidders  in terms of price are automatically disqualified from the award considering that the PBAC reserves the authority to select the best bid not only in terms of the price offered but other factors as well. [27] In fact, while we do not decide the truth of this assertion,  it  is worth noting that the PBAC Chairman and members would allege that Filcrafts Industries, Inc., offered an unacceptable and unusable product as its bid,[28] a representation upon which petitioner could have relied upon in assessing the propriety of the process handled by his co-workers in the Bureau of Corrections.

Verily, even if petitioner erred in his assessment of the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the documents presented to him for endorsement, his act is all the same imbued with good faith because the otherwise faulty reliance upon his subordinates, who were primarily in charge of the task, falls within parameters of tolerable judgment and permissible margins of error.  Stated differently, granting that there were flaws in the bidding procedures, an issue which we leave to the Sandiganbayan to decide as against  the other accused therein,   there was no cause for petitioner Sistoza to complain nor dispute the choice nor even investigate further since neither the defects in the process nor the unfairness or injustice in the actions of his subalterns are definite, certain, patent and palpable from a perusal of the supporting documents.  Benjamin N. Cardozo would have explained that "[w]hen x x x we speak of the law as settled, though, no matter how great the apparent settlement, the possibility of error in the prediction is always present." Given that the acts herein charged failed to demonstrate a well-grounded belief that petitioner  had prima facie foreknowledge of   irregularity   in   the selection of   the winning  bid 

other than the alleged fact that such bid was not the lowest, we cannot conclude that he was involved in any conspiracy to rig the bidding in favor of Elias General Merchandising.

The instant case brings to the fore the importance of clearly differentiating between acts simply negligent and deeds grossly and inexcusably negligent punishable under Sec. 3, par. (e), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.[29] While we do not excuse petitioner's manner of reviewing the award of the supply of tomato paste in favor of Elias General Merchandising, whereby he cursorily perused the purchase order and readily affixed his signature upon it, since he could have checked the supporting documents more lengthily, it is our considered opinion that his actions were not of such nature and degree as to be considered brazen, flagrant and palpable   to  merit   a   criminal   prosecution   for   violation   of   Sec.   3,   par.   (e),   of RA 3019.  To paraphrase Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan,[30] petitioner   might   have   indeed   been   lax   and administratively remiss in placing too much reliance on the official documents and assessments of his subordinates, but for conspiracy of silence and inaction to exist it is essential that there must be patent and conscious criminal design, not merely inadvertence, under circumstances that  would  have  pricked  curiosity  and  prompted   inquiries   into   the   transaction  because  of obvious and definite defects   in  its  execution and substance.  To stress,  there were no such patent and established flaws in the award made to Elias General Merchandising that would have made his silence tantamount to tacit approval of the irregularity.

It   is also too sweeping to conclude the existence of conspiracy from the endorsements made by petitioner Sistoza to the Department of Justice of the result of the bidding.  Fairly evident   is   the   fact   that   this  action  involved  the  very   functions  he had to  discharge   in   the performance   of   his   official   duties.  Furthermore,   contrary   to   the   allegation   that   petitioner misrepresented key facts to the Department of Justice, it is clear that his references to the price offered by Elias General Merchandising and the rejection of the bid of Filcrafts Industries, Inc., were supported by documents noted in and attached to his endorsements.  Hence, there was no way by which the approving authority,   i.e.,   the Department of Justice,  could have been misled by him.  Clearly, to prosecute him for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, on the basis of his endorsements would be the same as pegging his criminal liability on a mere signature appearing on the document.  In Sabiniano v. Court of Appeals[31] we held that a signature on a voucher,  check or warrant,  even if  required by law to be affixed thereon,  is  not enough to sustain   a   finding   of   conspiracy   among   public   officials   and   employees   charged   with defraudation.  We further ruled -

x x x x Proof, not mere conjectures or assumptions, should be proffered to indicate that   the   accused   had   taken   part   in,   to   use   this   Court's   words   in Arias v. Sandiganbayan,   the   "planning,   preparation   and   perpetration   of   the   alleged conspiracy   to  defraud   the  government"   for,  otherwise,   any   "careless  use  of   the conspiracy theory (can) sweep into jail even innocent persons who may have (only) been  made   unwitting   tools   by   the   criminal   minds"   really   responsible   for   that irregularity x x x x [32]

Since petitioner had no reason to doubt the validity of the bidding process and given the urgency of the situation since the tomato paste had by then been delivered and consumed by the inmates of the New Bilibid Prison, we certainly cannot infer malice, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence from his signing of the purchase order and endorsing the same to the Department of Justice.  Considering that his duties as Director of the Bureau of Corrections entailed a lot of responsibility not only on the management side but also in the rehabilitation and execution of  convicted prisoners,  public   relations and other  court-imposed duties,   it   is unreasonable to require him to accomplish direct and personal examination of every single detail in the purchase of a month-long supply of tomato paste and to carry out an in-depth investigation of the motives of every public officer involved in the transaction before affixing his signature on the pro-forma documents as endorsing authority.

To illustrate the detailed work that this proposition would have entailed, the tomato paste was only item 55 in a partial list of sixty-four (64) other food items for the month of September alone.  In the instant case, petitioner has no duty to go beyond the verification of the PBAC and to personally authenticate the procedures previously undertaken.  To compel him to perform such task, i.e., review personally the bidding procedure for each of these items in all cases and instances  as  the Ombudsman seems to suggest,  would have meant consuming all  his  time attending  only   to   the  meals  of  prisoners.  Necessarily,   since  workload   is   expectedly  heavy, duties have to be delegated among the different offices for utmost efficiency  in the prison system, an organizational scheme upon which petitioner was entitled to trust and rely upon for the discharge of his own duties.  Indeed the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion when he found probable cause against petitioner Sistoza despite the presence of essential facts negating evident   bad   faith,   manifest   partiality   and   gross   inexcusable   negligence,   which   were   all disregarded.

Having   thus   concluded,   the  only   remaining   issue   is  whether   this  Court   can  direct   the Sandiganbayan to dismiss Crim. Case No. 26072 as against petitioner Sistoza.  This will not be the first time that we order the dismissal of a criminal case being heard by a trial court for want of probable cause, and there is no reason not to prescribe the same justified outcome in the instant petition.  In Cabahug v. People[33] where this Court ordered the dismissal  of a criminal case pending before the Sandiganbayan for absence of probable cause, we declared -

While   it   is   the   function   of   the  Ombudsman   to   determine  whether   or   not   the petitioner should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial, he cannot  do  so  arbitrarily.  This   seemingly  exclusive  and unilateral  authority  of   the Ombudsman must be tempered by the Court when powers of prosecution are in danger of being used for persecution.  Dismissing the case against the accused for palpable  want   of   probable   cause   not   only   spares   her   the   expense,   rigors   and embarrassment of trial,  but also prevents needless waste of the courts’  time and saves the precious resources  of   the government x  x  x  x   [T]he very purpose of  a preliminary   investigation   is   to   shield   the   innocent   from precipitate,   spiteful   and burdensome prosecution x x x [and] spare the innocent the trouble, expense and 

torment of a public trial [as well as] unnecessary expense on the part of the State for useless and expensive trials.  Thus, when at the outset the evidence cannot sustain a prima facie case or that the existence of probable cause to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused cannot be ascertained, the prosecution must desist from inflicting on any person the trauma of going through a trial.

In the interest of a fair and just prosecution we cannot degree otherwise.

WHEREFORE,   the   instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is   GRANTED.  The   29 November 1999 Resolution and 29 March 2000 Memorandum and allied issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman resolving to charge petitioner PEDRO G. SISTOZA with violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as he was thereafter  indicted, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  For want of well-founded and reasonable ground to believe that petitioner PEDRO G. SISTOZA violated Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 as amended, or for absence of probable cause therefor, the Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to DISMISS forthwith Crim. Case No. 26072, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Pedro Sistoza y Guimmayen, et al.," only as   against   accused   PEDRO  G.   SISTOZA,   herein   petitioner.  The   18 October  2000   temporary   restraining  order  of   this  Court  enjoining   the  Sandiganbayan   from conducting further proceedings in Crim. Case No. 26072 against petitioner PEDRO G. SISTOZA is made PERMANENT.  This Decision is without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings in Crim. Case No. 26072, promptly and without delay, insofar as the other accused therein are concerned.  No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION JOSE M. GALARIO,                              Petitioner,   -  versus  -  OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 166797 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,      Chairperson,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, andNACHURA,* JJ. 

(Mindanao) and RUTH P. PIANO, Respondents.

Promulgated: July 10, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x                                                  D E C I S I O N CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:  

Before  Us   is  a  Petition  for Certiorari under  Rule  65  of   the  1997 Revised Rules of Court seeking the nullification of the (1) Resolution[1] of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao (OMB-Mindanao)  dated 26 November 2004 finding probable cause to indict Jose M. Galario, Jr. (petitioner) for violation of Section 3(f)   of  Republic  Act  No.   3019   (Anti-Graft  and  Corrupt  Practices  Act);   and   (2) Order[2] of the same Office dated 7 January 2005 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. In effect, petitioner, on injunction against the OMB-Mindanao, prays to prevent said Office from prosecuting him asserting that there is an abject absence of probable cause to hold him for trial. 

 This   case   originated   from  an   affidavit-complaint   filed  by  Ruth  P.   Piano 

(private   respondent)   against   petitioner   resulting   in   the   institution   of administrative  and criminal   investigations  by  the OMB-Mindanao,  docketed as OMB-M-A-04-128-G and OMB-M-C-04-0282-G, respectively.

 The following facts are undisputed: Petitioner  was  elected  on  his  first   term as  City  Mayor  of  Valencia  City, 

Bukidnon,   during   the  May   2001   local   elections.   Upon   assumption   of   office, petitioner effected reorganization and personnel audit of the local bureaucracy. He   then  issued   two  memoranda,   both  with   subject   heading   “TRANSFER  OF ASSIGNMENT” and dated 02 July 2001, addressed to private respondent. In the first memorandum, petitioner directed:

 

Effective upon receipt, you are relieved from your present position as the City Budget Officer and to perform functions as the  City Liaison Officer to do the following task[s] to wit:

 1.                  To coordinate with the City Mayor and Department of Budget and 

Management   and   with   other   Agencies/Functionaries   for   the facilitation   and   immediate   release   of   our   Internal   Revenue Allotment (IRA) and other financial assistance for the different City projects.

 2.                  To undergo  and submit  a   study  on  How to   Improve   the  City’s 

Economic Enterprise/Revenue for the welfare of our people. 

3.                  To   submit,   keep   the   Local   Chief   Executive   abreast   of   every transaction[s] relative hereto.

 4.                  To turn-over all  the documents & properties of the City Budget 

Office to Mr.  Bartolome C.  Barte as Budget  Officer  in an Acting capacity.

  

Thus,  petitioner  created the position of  City  Liaison Officer to  which he “transferred” private respondent with the task of studying and recommending how to improve the economic enterprises and the local revenue collection efforts of the city.

 The second memorandum was of the same tenor as the first and was a 

substantial restoration thereof. 

          Private respondent opposed the two memoranda and filed a complaint for Constructive   Dismissal,   Reinstatement   to   Former   Position   and   Payment   of Representation and Travel  Allowance (RATA) with the Civil  Service Commission–Regional   Office   X   (CSC-Regional   Office).  The   CSC-Regional   Office   agreed   with private respondent and by virtue of an Order dated 7 January 2002, mandated the reinstatement of private respondent to her former position as City Budget Officer, thus:         

WHEREFORE,   premises   considered,   instant   appeal   is hereby GRANTED.   Accordingly,   Mayor   Galario   is   ordered to REINSTATE Ms. Piano to her previous position as City Budget Officer and   to CAUSE   THE   PAYMENT   OF her   RATA   from   the   time   she   was deprived of it until her reinstatement. x x x.[4]

  

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order which was denied by the CSC-Regional Office in another Order dated 18 February 2002. Petitioner, hence, appealed the Orders of the CSC-Regional Office dated 7 January 2002 and 18 February 2002 to the CSC-Main Office, which subsequently dismissed   said   appeal   in   Resolution   No.   030096   dated 21   January   2003.   In Resolution No. 030544 dated 5 May 2003, the CSC denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration   and   affirmed   CSC   Resolution   No.   03-0096   dated 21   January 2003[5]:

 WHEREFORE, the appeal of Valencia City Mayor Jose M. Galario, Jr. 

is   hereby  DISMISSED.   Civil   Service   Commission  Regional  Office  No.   X Orders dated January 7, 2002 andFebruary 18, 2002 declaring the Office of   the  Mayor   Orders   both   dated July   2,   2001 null   and   void,   stand. Accordingly,  Ruth P.  Piano  is  reinstated to her former position as City Budget Officer.[6]

  

Private   respondent   subsequently   moved   for   the   execution   of   CSC Resolution No. 030544 dated 5 May 2003 affirming CSC Resolution No. 030096 dated 21 January 2003.

 Even   before   the   CSC   could   act   on   private   respondent’s   motion   for 

execution, petitioner issued Memorandum Order No. 07-55 dated 25 July 2003, ordering private respondent to be reinstated to her former position of City Budget Officer with the grant of benefits[7] appurtenant to the said position, supposedly in compliance with CSC Resolution No. 03-0096 dated   21 January 2003. Much later, however,   petitioner,   in   another   letter  dated 28   July   2003,[8] instructed  private respondent not to involve herself in the signing of documents relating to the city’s financial   transactions,   citing   her   pending   case[9] with   the   Office   of   the 

Ombudsman.  The task was given to Mr. Bartolome Barte, who was authorized to sign “For the City Budget Officer” in the financial transactions of the city.

 In Memorandum Order No. 07-65 dated 30 July 2003, petitioner directed 

private   respondent   to   transfer   office   from   the   City   Hall   Main   Building   to the Sangguniang Kabataan Building.

 Meanwhile,   petitioner   formally   asked   the   opinion   of   the   CSC-Regional 

Office on whether or not he could legally prohibit private respondent from signing documents relating to the financial  transactions of the city.   In a  letter dated 6 October   2003 addressed   to   petitioner,   the   CSC-Regional   Office   opined   that considering that the Office of the Ombudsman had dismissed the administrative case  against  private   respondent,   there  was  no more   legal   impediment   to  her reinstatement as City Budget Officer as well as in the performance of her duties as such.[10]

 Thereafter,   private   respondent  filed  with   the  CSC  a   second  Motion   for 

Execution of  its Resolution No. 030096 dated 21 January 2003, resulting in the issuance   by   the   CSC   of   Resolution   No.   040552   dated 17  May   2004 ordering petitioner   to   immediately   reinstate  private   respondent  as  City  Budget  Officer. Petitioner, on the other hand, issued official letters on 24 June 2004 and 02 July 2004 announcing the vacancy of the Office of the City Budget Officer of Valencia City,   prompting   private   respondent   to   file   with   the   CSC   a   third  Motion   for Execution of CSC Resolution No. 030096 dated 21 January 2003 which ordered her immediate reinstatement as City Budget Officer.

 The   CSC,   in   Resolution  No.   04-1003   dated 7   September   2004,   directed 

petitioner to allow private respondent to perform all the duties of a City Budget Officer.  The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:

         WHEREFORE,   the   Commission   hereby   directs   Mayor   Jose   M. 

Galario,   Jr.   to   allow   Piano   to   perform   all   the   duties   relevant   to   the position of City Budget Officer and to allow her to hold office at the City Budget  Office.  Failure  of  Mayor  Galario,   Jr.   to   comply  with   the   same would   compel   the   Commission   to   cite   him   in   contempt   and  file   the appropriate charges with the Office of the Ombudsman.

 The Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. X is directed to 

monitor  the strict   implementation and enforcement of   this  Resolution and to  submit  a   report   to   the  Commission  within   ten   (10)  days   from receipt.[11]

  

Still  not   satisfied  with   the   latest  Resolution  of   the  CSC  and  petitioner’s purported non-compliance with the CSC Order to reinstate her as City Budget Officer, private respondent went before the OMB-Mindanao to charge petitioner administratively (OMB-M-A-04-128-G) and criminally (OMB-M-C-04-282-G) based on the following allegations:

 Oppression, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the government  service,  and violation of  anti-graft and corrupt  practices acts, causing undue injury to [herein private respondent], and refusing to act upon lawful order of the Civil Service Commission, to fully implement the  Resolution  of   the   Civil   Service  Commission,   and   violation  of   ethical standards required of government officials and employees, under RA6713.  After   a   preliminary   investigation   and   the   submission   of   petitioner’s 

counter-affidavits  and other  evidence,   the OMB-Mindanao  issued a Resolution dated 26 November 2004 in OMB-M-C-04-0282-G, finding as follows -

 WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds probable cause 

to indict [herein petitioner] CITY MAYOR JOSE M. GALARIO, JR., GUILTY of violation of Section 3(f) of R.A. 3019, as amended.

 Accordingly,   let   the   corresponding   information   be   filed   in   the 

Sandiganbayan.[12]

  

Petitioner   thereafter  filed  a  Motion  for  Reconsideration  praying   for   the setting aside of the aforestated OMB-Mindanao Resolution dated 26 November 2004.  The OMB-Mindanao thereafter ruled, in its 7 January 2005 Order, that:

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

 The Resolution dated 26 November 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED.  

Here now comes petitioner  before this  Court via a  Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the revised Rules of Court, raising the following arguments:

I.                    THE   OFFICE   OF   THE   OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO   COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF   JURISDICTION  WHEN   IT   RESOLVED   THAT   PROBABLE   CAUSE EXISTS TO HOLD PETITIONER LIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(F) OF R.A. 3019, WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, THE ELEMENTS OF THE SUBJECT CRIME DO NOT EXIST  IN THIS CASE AND THAT THERE IS NO FACTUAL BASIS TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF THE ELEMENT   OF   “FAVORING   HIS   OWN   INTEREST   OR   GRANTING UNDUE ADVANTAGE IN FAVOR OF ANOTHER PARTY”.

 II.                 THAT   THE   OFFICE   OF   THE   OMBUDSMAN   FOR   MINDANAO 

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT INSISTED THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO HEED THE CSC REINSTATEMENT ORDER OF 17 MARCH 2004[13] WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT,  THERE  IS BOTH A LEGAL AND   A   PHYSICAL   IMPOSSIBILITY  TO   COMPLY  WITH   THE   SAME CONSIDERING   THAT   PRIVATE   RESPONDENT   WAS   ALREADY REINSTATED TO HER POSITION AS EARLY AS 25 JULY 2003.

 III.               THE   PUBLIC   RESPONDENT   COMMITTED   GRAVE   ABUSE   OF 

DISCRETION   AND   FAILED   TO   ACCORD   DUE   PROCESS   TO PETITIONER WHEN IT SUBSEQUENTLY FOUND HEREIN PETITIONER LIABLE  UNDER SECTION 3(F)  OF  R.A.  3019  WHEN THERE   IS  NO FACTUAL  ALLEGATION OF  ANY OF THE ELEMENTS  OF THE SAID OFFENSE   IN   THE   COMPLAINT   OF   PRIVATE   RESPONDENT   AND MORE   IMPORTANTLY,   PETITIONER   WAS   NOT   GIVEN   ANY OPPORTUNITY   TO   RESPOND   TO   AND   REFUTE   SUCH   CHARGE CONSIDERING THAT ONLY FACTS RELATING TO SECTION 3(E) WERE RAISED IN THE COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT.

 

 As petitioner empathically stated in this Petition for Certiorari: [P]etitioner comes to the succor of the Honorable Supreme Court in order to restrain   the   respondents   from   prosecuting   the   case   against   petitioner before the Sandiganbayan and find that the Ombudsman acted without or in excess of its authority amounting to grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the filing of informations [sic] against petitioner for violation of R.A. 3019, despite the palpable absence of probable cause.[14]

  

          Petitioner   posits   that   the   OMB-Mindanao   committed   grave   abuse   of discretion amounting  to   lack  or  excess  of   jurisdiction when  it   found probable cause for the filing of an information against him for the violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019[15] since an important element of the offense was not established, particularly, that he was “favoring his own interest or granting undue advantage in favor of another party.”

             Petitioner further alleges that he was deprived of due process because he was not given the opportunity to respond to and refute the charge against him considering   that   the   offense   referred   to   in   the   affidavit-complaint   was   for violation of Section 3(e),[16] and not Section 3(f), of Republic Act No. 3019.         

Moreover, petitioner further claims that while private respondent accused him of   refusing   to  act  within   reasonable  time on   the  Resolutions  of   the  CSC directing private respondent’s “full reinstatement” as City Budget Officer, proof to support   the   allegation   remains  wanting.   Petitioner   reiterates   that   there  was reinstatement of private respondent as early as 25 July 2003 and therefore, there already existed a legal and physical impossibility to execute CSC Resolution No. 041003   dated 17   September   2004.   Hence,   he   argues   that   there   is   sufficient justification why he no longer ordered the reinstatement of private respondent.                   On the other hand, the OMB-Mindanao, as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), asserts that the allegations in the complaint-affidavit filed 

with the OMB-Mindanao make a case for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019.  In its Comment, the OSG reasoned: 

[W]hile   it   is   true   that   private   respondent’s   complaint-affidavit   does   not contain   any   specific   allegation   to   the   effect   that   petitioner   refused   to implement CSC Resolution No. 030096 dated 21 January 2003 to favor his own interest or give due advantage to Mr. Bartolome Barte, a combined evaluation and analysis of the allegations in the complaint-affidavit would readily reveal otherwise. x x x.[17]

  

           The OSG argues that private respondent’s complaint-affidavit narrates the acts of the petitioner of removing private respondent from her position as City Budget Officer in order to have total control of the City’s finances. Moreover, it maintains   that   the   complaint-affidavit   clearly   alleged   that   petitioner   banned private   respondent   from   signing   any   document   involving   the   City’s   financial transactions to give undue advantage to Mr. Bartolome Barte who was thereafter authorized by petitioner to perform said tasks.         

The  OSG   states   that   the   allegations   in   the   complaint-affidavit   and   the evidence on record, including petitioner’s neglect or refusal to fully implement the  CSC’s   order   to   reinstate  private   respondent   as   City  Budget  Officer,  were unjustified and such refusal  qualifies  as  corrupt  practice under  Section 3(f)  of Republic   Act   No.   3019.  The   complaint-affidavit   filed   by   private-respondent reveals  that petitioner’s  refusal   to heed the CSC’s  order of  reinstatement was clearly intended to discriminate against private respondent based on petitioner’s subsequent acts including, but not limited to, the following:

 Petitioner’s offer to private respondent to retire from the service with payment of all  her retirement benefits knowing fully well  that private respondent was not yet available for retirement.

 Petitioner’s  act  of declaring the position of City  Budget Officer vacant after receiving CSC’s Resolution No. 040552 dated 7 May 2004 for the execution of  CSC Resolution No. 030096 dated 21 January 2003 which ordered petitioner’s reinstatement. 

           The OSG also  avers   that   the  petitioner’s  purported  reinstatement  of   the private respondent, but still barring her from signing the financial documents of the city without valid reasons, showed a sinister motive on the part of petitioner. The OSG called attention to the fact that private respondent was even ordered by the petitioner to transfer to an office without any support staff, table, secretary, and office facilities. Finally, the OSG contends that the transfer by petitioner of private respondent from City Budget Officer to City Liaison Officer, a non-existent position, was equal to constructive dismissal.

           The threshold issue involved, therefore, in the present petition is whether or not the OMB-Mindanao acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing (1) its Resolution dated 26 November 2004 finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019;  and (2)  an Order dated 7  January 2005 denying petitioner’s  Motion for Reconsideration of  its earlier Resolution.           In   the   determination   of   probable   cause   conducted   by   the   investigating authority,   a   task  which   falls  herein  on   the  OMB-Mindanao  since   the  criminal complaint was filed against a public official in relation to the performance of his official duties,[18] probable cause does not require certainty of guilt for a crime. It is sufficient that based on the preliminary investigation conducted, it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. It  has been   clearly   explained   in   several   decisions   by   this   Court,   as   in Raro v. Sandiganbayan,[19] that: 

Probable   cause  has  been  defined  as   the  existence  of   such   facts   and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the   facts   within   the   knowledge   of   the   prosecutor,   that   the   person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Probable cause is a reasonable ground for presuming that a matter is or may be well-founded on such state of facts in the prosecutor’s mind as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe – or entertain an honest or strong suspicion – that it is so.  x x x.[20]

  

In the instant petition, we do not perceive any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the OMB-Mindanao when it issued its Resolution dated 26 November 2004 and Order dated 7 January 2005 finding probable cause for the filing of an information against herein petitioner for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Firstly, a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing 

that more likely than not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and   convincing   evidence   of   guilt,   neither   on   evidence   establishing   absolute certainty of guilt. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. x x x.  Probable cause does not require an  inquiry  into whether there  is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.  (Italics supplied.)[21]

  

          Secondly,   the  allegations  and  evidence  presented  by  petitioner   failed   to prove that the OMB-Mindanao acted in such a capricious and whimsical exercise of   judgment   in   determining   the   existence  of   probable   cause   against   him.  As defined by this Court – 

By grave abuse of  discretion  is  meant  capricious  and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[22]

  

          The  OMB-Mindanao based  the  finding  of  probable  cause  on  the  various affidavits   and  memoranda  and  other  evidence   submitted   to   it  by   the  parties during  preliminary   investigation.  Petitioner  and  private   respondent  were  both accorded   the   opportunity   to   present   their   sides   and   refute   each   other’s 

contentions.  It   bears   to   emphasize   that   the  Resolution[23] dated 26  November 2004 of the OMB-Mindanao specifically referred to the following evidence which it took into consideration in its investigation:

 Memorandum dated 2 July 2001Memorandum dated 2 August 2001Complaint for Constructive Dismissal, Reinstatement to Former Position and Payment of Representation and Travel   AllowancePetitioner’s Counter-AffidavitPrivate Respondent’s Affidavit-ComplaintPetitioner’s Answer to the Affidavit-ComplaintPrivate Respondent’s Reply  That   the   OMB-Mindanao   looked   into   the   aforementioned   documents 

submitted by BOTH parties before issuing its assailed Resolution strongly negates against any averments that it issued the same capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or in a despotic manner.

And thirdly, a finding of probable cause is a finding of fact which is generally 

not reviewable by this Court. Only where there is a clear case of grave abuse of this discretion will this Court interfere in the Ombudsman's findings of probable cause.  As a  general   rule,   the Court  does not   interfere  with the Ombudsman's determination of the existence or absence of probable cause.

 As the Court  is  not a trier of facts,   it  reposes immense respect to the factual determination and appreciation made by the Ombudsman. x x x.[24]

  

Absent   any   grave   abuse   of   discretion   tainting   it,   the   courts  will   not interfere   with   the   Ombudsman’s   supervision   and   control   over   the preliminary investigation conducted by him.  x x x.              x x  x.  It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it.[25]

 

 It is not sound practice to depart from the policy of non-interference in the 

Ombudsman's   exercise   of   discretion   to   determine   whether   or   not   to   file information against an accused. As cited in a long line of cases, this Court has pronounced that it cannot pass upon the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to determine the existence of probable cause.  The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to   the   Office   of   the   Ombudsman   but   upon   practicality   as   well.   If   it   were otherwise, this Court will be clogged with an innumerable list of cases assailing investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, to determine if there is probable cause.

 [T]he Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s discretion in the finding   of   probable   cause   resulting   in   its   investigations.   The Ombudsman’s findings are essentially factual in nature, and the Supreme Court is NOT a trier of facts.[26]

  Unless it is shown that the questioned acts were done in a capricious and 

whimsical   exercise   of   judgment   evidencing   a   clear   case   of   grave   abuse   of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere in the findings of probable cause determined by the Ombudsman. The exercise of the Ombudsman of its constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers shall, as a general rule, be left alone by this Court.

Now we move to the legal issue raised by petitioner as to whether he may 

be charged with violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019 when he was charged in the affidavit-complaint for another offense, Section 3(e) of the same Act. 

 Petitioner   contends   that   the  OMB-Mindanao   had   no   basis  whatsoever 

when it ruled that the herein petitioner may be held liable under Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019 when he refused to reinstate private respondent to favor his   own   interest   or   to   give   undue   advantage   in   favor   of   Bartolome Barte.  Petitioner   alleges   that   the  OMB-Mindanao   arrived   at   such   a   sweeping conclusion when not even the private respondent had made the said allegations 

in her affidavit-complaint or any pleading.  Petitioner argues that “absent such allegations in the affidavit-complaint, there is simply no basis for the public respondent to declare that the herein petitioner may be held liable for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019, as these allegations are essential to have a finding of probable cause of violation of Section 3(f).”[27]

Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 3019, namely, Sections 3(e) and

3(f), are reproduced below: SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x x

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the

Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licences or permits or other concessions.

(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without

sufficient justification to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for purpose of favoring  his  own  interest  or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party. (Italics ours.)

  

          Private respondent’s affidavit-complaint alleged the violation by petitioner of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, but the Ombudsman, after preliminary investigation, ordered the filing of an information against petitioner for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019 instead.

 

This Court spelled out in Sistoza v. Desierto[28] the following elements of the offense falling under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019:

 (a) The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in

conspiracy with the former; (b)   The   public   officer   commits   the  prohibited acts during the

performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public functions;

 (c) That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the 

government or a private party; (d) Such undue injury is caused by giving  unwarranted benefits,

advantage or preference to such parties; and (e)   That   the   public   officer   has   acted  with  manifest  partiality,

evident bad faith or gross inexcusable neglect.   Evidently,  mere  bad faith or partiality and negligence per se are not enough for one to be held liable under the law since the act of bad faith or partiality must in the first place be evident or manifest, respectively, while the negligent deed should both be gross and inexcusable.   It is further required that any   or   all   of   these  modalities   ought   to   result   in   undue   injury   to   a specified party.

  

The OMB-Mindanao determined the  absence of one element,   thus,  barring   it from indicting petitioner for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.  In its Resolution dated 26 November 2004, the OMB-Mindanao found:

             The   complainant   alleged   that   her   representation   and transportation allowance (RATA) was cut-off effective 01 August 2001, in favor of Bartolome C. Barte, acting as Officer-in-Charge and functioning as   Budget  Officer.  However,   the   explanation   of   the   respondent   that complainant   had   been   receiving   the   benefits   corresponding   to   her position per Memorandum Order No. 0755 dated 25 July 2003 was not denied by the latter. 

            As a result,  one of the elements constituting the offense under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, that the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, is missing. Accordingly, proof of the extent or quantum of damage is not essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or benefit received can be perceived to be substantial enough and not  merely  negligible.   It   is   recognized  that   there  was  no proof  of  damage caused   to   the  complainant   since   in   fact   she   is  now receiving her RATA.[29]

  Notably,   private   respondent   and   petitioner   agree   that   petitioner   was 

already receiving her RATA as private respondent did not controvert the fact of payment of her RATA.

 While the OMB-Mindanao did not find probable cause to indict petitioner 

for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, it did find that there was probable cause to file an information against petitioner for violation of Section 3(f) of the same statute. 

 A violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019 is committed when the

following elements[30] exist: 

a) The offender is a public officer; b)  The said officer has  neglected or has refused  to  act  without 

sufficient justification after due demand or request has been made on him;

 c) Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the 

public officer having acted on the matter pending before him; and d) Such failure to so act is "for the purpose of obtaining, directly

or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party, or discriminating against another.

  

The OMB-Mindanao, in its Resolution dated 26 November 2004, justified its finding  of  probable  cause   to  file  an   information against  petitioner  before   the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019, as follows:

 The   real   issue   before   us   is   one   in   which   [herein   private 

respondent] accuses [herein petitioner] Mayor Galario, Jr. of refusing to act within a reasonable time on the Order/Resolution of the Civil Service Commission   directing   the   latter   to   fully   reinstate   the   former   to   her position as Budget Officer.

 Records  would   show  that  on  7   January  2002,   the  Civil   Service 

Commission   [Regional  Office]   issued an order  directing   [petitioner]   to reinstate [private respondent] Piano to her previous position as Budget Officer   and   to   cause   the   payment   of   her   RATA.  The   Motion   for Reconsideration   filed   by   respondent  Mayor  was   denied   by   the   CSC, Region X, Cagayan de Oro City, on 18 February 2002.  In a Resolution No. 030096 dated 21 January 2003, of the Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, the Appeal filed by [petitioner] was dismissed.

 Despite   the   Resolution   of   the   Civil   Service   Commission, 

[petitioner]   did   not   implement   the   same.   Dilly-dallying   its implementation,   [petitioner]   filed   a   Motion   for   Reconsideration questioning  CSC Resolution No.  030096 dated 21  January  2003.  Then, [petitioner] resorted to intimidating [private respondent] by threatening to file a case against  the [private respondent],  and  in the alternative, offered and lured her to resign, with payment of all retirement benefits.

 Consequently,   the   Civil   Service   Commission,   on 5   May   2003, 

denied [petitioner’s] Motion for Reconsideration. Accordingly, Resolution No.   03-0096   dated 21   January   2003,   of   the   Civil   Service Commission, Quezon City thereby stands.

 While [petitioner] reinstated [private respondent] as City Budget 

Officer   on 21  May   2003,   nevertheless,   on   26  May   2003,   [petitioner] relieved herein [private respondent] as City Budget Officer and instead designated the latter as City Cooperative Officer.  Now, by virtue of the Motion for Execution filed by herein [private respondent] before the CSC, Region  X,  Cagayan  de  Oro  City  on  7   July  2003,   the  CSC   issued  again another   Order   directing   [petitioner]   to   reinstate   herein   [private 

respondent].  On 25   July   2003,   [petitioner]   pretentiously   reinstated [private   respondent]   as   City   Budget  Officer   but   on 28   July   2003,   he banned the [private respondent]  from signing financial  transactions of the   local  government  unit.   Instead,   [petitioner]  designated  Bartolome Barte   to   sign   all   documents   pertaining   to   the   financial   transactions of Valencia City  while [private respondent] to act as Liaison Officer.

 Consequently, [private respondent] filed a Motion to Implement 

CSC Resolution No. 030096 dated 21 January 2003, of the Civil  Service Commission, Quezon City.

 x x x x Accordingly,   it   is   apparent   that   CSC   Resolution   No.   040552, 

dated 17 May 2004, directed [petitioner] to immediately implement the said   Resolution.   But   [petitioner]   arbitrarily,   arrogantly,   and   illegally defied the said Resolution to fully reinstate herein [private respondent] as   Budget   Officer   of Valencia City,   until   now.   [Petitioner]   even recommended [private respondent] to the position of City Cooperative Officer   just   only   to   oust   the   latter   in   the   City   Hall.  But   [private respondent] did not accept. Not only that, by issuing letters dated June 29, 2004 and July 2, 2004, [petitioner] made it appear that the position of Budget Officer is vacant, thus, [private respondent] must apply thereto. Patently,   [petitioner]  has no  intention of complying the said aforesaid Resolution. Undoubtedly, [petitioner] is making it hard for herein [private respondent] to reassume her position as Budget Officer.

 By   the   foregoing   acts,   it   is   apparent   that   [petitioner’s] 

Manifestation   of   Compliance   with   the   Order/Resolution   of   the   Civil Service Commission is tantamount to non-compliance.

 Accordingly,  [petitioner]  may be held liable under Section (f),  R.A.  3019, 

by  x x x refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on reinstating herein [private respondent] as Budget Officer, for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of Bartolome Barte.

 WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds probable cause to 

indict [petitioner] guilty of violation of Section 3(f) of R.A. 3019, as amended.[31]

 

There is no reason for us to disturb the findings of the OMB-Mindanao as aforequoted.  We   reiterate   that   this   Court   has   adopted   a   policy   of   non-interference   in   the   conduct   of   preliminary   investigations,   and   leaves   to   the investigating   prosecutor   (the  Ombudsman,   in   this   case)   sufficient   latitude   of discretion, not only in determining what will constitute sufficient evidence that will  establish "probable cause" for the filing of information against a supposed offender, but as well as the proper offense to be charged against said offender depending again on the evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation.

 Squarely in point is Avila v. Sandiganbayan and Ombudsman which stated 

thus: We find no merit in petitioner's contention that he was deprived of 

due process because the accusation in the information was for violation of Section 3(e), R. A. 3019, but the crime charged in the letter complaint subject of the preliminary investigation was for direct assault.

 In Enrile vs. Salazar,  we   ruled   that   there   is   "nothing   inherently 

irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for   an   offense   different   from   what   was   charged   in   the   initiatory complaint,   if   warranted   by   the   evidence   developed   during   the preliminary investigation."[32]

  

          However, this power of the Ombudsman to determine probable cause and thus charge the proper information is subject to the requirements of due process, as embodied in the Constitution. 

            While   the   Ombudsman   has   the   full   discretion   to   determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed, this Court is not precluded from   reviewing   the  Ombudsman’s   action  when   there   is   an   abuse   of discretion, in which case Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may exceptionally be invoked pursuant to Section I, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.[33]

  

Finally,   it  bears emphasizing once again the extent of the powers of the Ombudsman in the fulfillment of its constitutional mandate as protector of the people. Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, enumerates the powers, functions, and duties of the Office of the Ombudsman, among which is to:

 (1)   Investigate on its  own, or on complaint by any person,  any act  or 

omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

  The Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6770) likewise provides: 

Sec 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

(1)  Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It   has   primary   jurisdiction   over   cases   cognizable   by   the Sandiganbayan and,  in the exercise of this  primary  jurisdiction,   it  may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.  (Emphases supplied.)  It  is clear from the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions that 

the Ombudsman is given a plenary and unqualified authority with respect to its investigatory   and   prosecutory[34] power,   subject   only   to   the   constitutional limitations, and its coverage cannot be limited to the allegations in any complaint-affidavit   that   may   have   been   filed   against   a   public   officer.  In   fact,   the Ombudsman  may   investigate   and   prosecute   on   its   own,  without   need   for   a complaint-affidavit,   for  as   long  as   the  case   falls  within   its   jurisdiction.  Hence, regardless  of   the  allegations  and  accusations  against   the  public  officer   in   the affidavit-complaint, it still rests upon the Ombudsman to determine the proper crime or offense which can be charged against the public officer depending on the findings of the Ombudsman in the preliminary investigation.

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao dated 26 November 2004 in OMB-M-C-04-0282-G finding probable cause against petitioner Jose M. Galario, Jr. for violation of Section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 3019 and the Order of the same Office dated 7 January 2005 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration are herebyAFFIRMED. Let the appropriate information be filed against the petitioner before the Sandiganbayan.  Costs against petitioner.  

    SO ORDERED.

NEMESIO M. CALIM,                            Petitioner,  

-  versus  -  THE HONORABLE JESUS F. GUERRERO, THE HONORABLE EMILIO A. GONZALEZ III, THE HONORABLE ADORACTION A. AGBADA, in their respective capacities as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, Director and Graft Investigation Officer II, THE HONORABLE ROBERTO J. ACOBA, Vice-Mayor, Siniloan, Laguna, PAUL SIMON Z. GO, HOMER R. SERRANO, FELIPE A. EM, ELIGIO R. DE LEON, FELIPE V. CASTRO, GAUDENCIO C. SALAY,

  G.R. No. 156527   Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,     Chairperson,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CALLEJO, SR.,*

CHICO-NAZARIO, andNACHURA, JJ.           

ANDRES V. QUINTERO, HECTOR A. MANEJA, SEDFREY B. REALEZA, all members of the Sangguniang Bayan, Siniloan, Laguna,                            Respondents.**

  Promulgated:  March 5, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:           Before Us is a Petition for Mandamus seeking to compel public respondents to file the appropriate information against the private respondents for violation of Section 5(a)[1] of Republic Act No. 6713,[2] otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.           The relevant antecedents follow:           Petitioner Nemesio M. Calim operates Eastern Laguna Tours and Tourist Services in Siniloan, Laguna.  Private respondent Roberto J. Acoba was the Vice-Mayor ofSiniloan, Laguna.  On the other hand, private respondents Paul Simon Z. Go, Homer R. Serrano, Felipe A. Em, Eligio R. de Leon, Felipe V. Castro, Gaudencio C. Salay, Andres V. Quintero, Hector A. Maneja, and Sedfrey B. Realeza were councilors of the Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan, Laguna. 

 On 23 November 2001, petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit[3] with the

Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon against private respondents for violation of Section 3(e)[4] of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 6713.  The case was docketed as OMB-1-01-1121-K. 

 Petitioner alleged, inter alia, that on or about 22 July 2001, he was given a

mayor’s permit from the municipal government of Siniloan, Laguna, for his tours and tourist services business. On 31 July 2001, he applied for the registration of his business name with the Regional Office of the Department of Trade and Industry

in San Pablo City, initially indicating therein as first priority the name, Mabuhay Tours and Tourist Services for his business.  He was, however, advised by the aforesaid office to change the name to Eastern Laguna Tours and Tourist Services, and thereafter, was issued a Certification of Registration thereon on 29 August 2001.  He informed Municipal Mayor Guillermo L.Acero, through the Municipal Business License Office, of the fact of change of the name Mabuhay Tours and Tourist Services to Eastern Laguna Tours and Tourist Services. 

 He further alleged that on 6 August 2001, he received an invitation from

private respondent Vice-Mayor Acoba to appear before the Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan, Laguna.  It appears that a certain Amador Igos filed a letter-complaint with the said body alleging, in the main, the absence of a franchise of public conveyance on the part of Eastern Laguna Tours and Tourist Services.  Ultimately, on 22 August 2001, the Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan, Laguna in Kapasiyahan Bilang 81 T-2001,[5] unanimously recommended the cancellation of the municipal license and permit issued to Eastern Laguna Tours and Tourist Services.  Thus, the operations of his business ceased, thereby, causing him injury, and giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to his competitor, Van on the Run.  The president of Van on the Run is Felipe Castro, who was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan, Laguna, and one of the private respondents herein. 

 Petitioner averred that the recommendation of

the Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan, Laguna, to cancel his municipal license and permit resulted in the cancellation of various service contracts bringing about a loss of P3,000.00 per day.  He alleged further that on 6 September 2001, he sent a letter individually addressed to private respondents for the purpose of inquiring as to the basis of their recommendation to cancel his business license and permit to operate Eastern Laguna Tours and Tourist Services.  Up to the time of filing the letter-complaint, or on 18 November 2001, he said, all private respondents had not answered the letter, in gross violation of Section 5,[6] Republic Act No. 6713.  Finally, on 4 October 2001, Mayor Guillermo Acero cancelled the mayor’s permit to operate Eastern Laguna Tours and Tourist Services based on the recommendation of the Sangguniang Bayan in Kapasiyahan Bilang 81 T-2001.

 

On 1 February 2002, six of the eleven private respondents, namely, Felipe A. Em, Noel Laberinto, Homer Serrano, Eligio de Leon, Hector A. Maneja, and Sedfrey Realezafiled a joint Counter-Affidavit.[7]  They contended that there was nothing irregular in the issuance of Kapasiyahan Bilang 81 T-2001, as the same was merely a request to the municipal mayor for cancellation of the mayor’s permit after a finding on their part that the petitioner violated the terms and conditions set in the permit.  They similarly contested petitioner’s use of air-conditioned vans to transport passengers from Siniloan to Manila on the ground that such a purpose was outside the permit which was granted to petitioner.  Petitioner merely applied for a booking office to be established in his residence.  Moreover, they argued that private respondent Felipe Castro was the adviser, and not president of Van on the Run, as claimed by petitioner.  Finally, they stressed that Van on the Run, the alleged business competitor of Eastern Laguna Tours and Tourist Services was established as a civic organization and not for profit or commerce.

 Meanwhile, private respondents Vice-Mayor Roberto J. Acoba, Paul Simon

Go, Gaudencio Salay and Andres Quintero filed a Rejoinder,[8] averring similar arguments as raised in the Counter-Affidavit previously filed by their co-private respondents.  Reiterating their prayer that the Complaint against them be dismissed for utter lack of merit, they maintained that their action taken as members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan, Laguna, in recommending the cancellation of the mayor’s permit granted to petitioner was a product of due deliberation and investigation.[9]  They insisted that petitioner failed to prove that he was authorized to engage as a common carrier to offer daily tours to Metro Manila and Baguio from Siniloan, Laguna.  Hence, in openly engaging in the business of transport services, petitioner violated the terms and conditions of the mayor’s permit.   

 After an exchange of pleadings between the parties, the Office of the Deputy

Ombudsman for Luzon,[10] through Graft Investigation Officer I Ma. Theresa B. Bagro, issued a Resolution[11] dated 29 July 2002, recommending the dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint for lack of probable cause.  The recommendation was approved by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, Jesus F. Guerrero.  It was underscored therein that the stoppage of petitioner’s business operations was due to the act of the mayor in canceling his business permit.  In canceling the same, the

mayor relied on several grounds, one of which was the assailed Resolution or Kapasiyahan Bilang 81 T-2001.  The Deputy Ombudsman was likewise not persuaded that the Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan, Laguna, passed the Resolution with bad faith.[12]  According to the Deputy Ombudsman, the facts showed that petitioner actively participated before the Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan, Laguna, during the investigation of petitioner’s business permit, and the recommendation by the private respondents to cancel the permit was reached only after the body’s lengthy deliberations.  Moreover, the private respondents presented documents from the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB), the Regional Office of the Department of Trade and Industry, as well as the Municipal Planning Development Coordinator, to support their conclusion that petitioner violated the conditions set forth in the mayor’s permit.  The Deputy Ombudsman resolved that the recommendation to cancel petitioner’s permit was substantiated with enough bases, and the action of private respondents Sangguniang Bayan members of Siniloan, Laguna, did not constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

 The decretal portion of the 29 July 2002 Resolution reads: 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the instant complaint be DISMISSED for lack of probable cause.[13]

 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon.  He assigned as error

the omission of the 29 July 2002 Resolution to rule on the second charge against the private respondents, i.e. violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713.  He thus prayed that the Deputy Ombudsman render a ruling on the charge for violation of Republic Act No. 6713.  He also prayed that the Resolution finding no probable cause on the part of private respondents for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 be reversed.

 On 4 November 2002, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman issued a Joint

Order.[14]  While dismissing the complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for lack of probable cause, it however acknowledged that it committed a reversible error in not taking consideration of the charge for the violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 as contained in petitioner’s

Complaint-Affidavit.  Indeed, in the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioner averred that private respondents failed to reply to his letter of inquiry dated 6 September 2001.  In his letter, petitioner sought a clarification from private respondents as to the bases of their recommendation in canceling his business permit.  However, private respondents failed to send a response thereto.  Ruling on the matter, the Deputy Ombudsman found that there was no justification on private respondents’ part in ignoring to reply to petitioner’s letter within the prescribed time, as specified in Republic Act No. 6713, and, hence, admonished the private respondents for such failure, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.  Thus:

 Anent the first ground invoked in the motion for reconsideration,

We submit that this Office has committed a reversible error in not taking into consideration the charge for violation of Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 6713 as contained in the complaint-affidavit.  The complaint is anchored on the alleged failure of the respondents to respond to the September 6, 2001 letter of the complainant inquiring as to the basis of their recommendation to cancel the business license and permit of his tours and tourist services company.  This allegation was answered by respondents Roberto J. Acoba, Paul Simon Z. Go, Felipe V. Castro, Gaudencio C. Salay, and Andres V. Quintero, in their Rejoinder by stating that they failed to respond to the complainant’s letter because of computer problems, the details of which was not elaborated. Respondents Felipe A. Em, Noel M. Laberinto, Homer R. Serrano, Eligio R. de Leon, Hector A. Maneja andSedfrey L. Realeza never filed any answer to this allegation.  After due evaluation of this particular charge, We find that the failure of the respondents to answer the letter was not justified. There are many ways, aside from using a computer, by which the respondents may prepare a response to the complainant’s letter.  For this, the respondents must be admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of their duties with stern warning that repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely in the future.  However, We do not find that there is basis for their indictment for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 as it appeared that their failure [to reply to] respondent was not motivated by malice and bad faith.  With the attendance of the complainant and his counsel during the deliberations of the Sangguniang Bayan on the mater, it can be deduced that they have been apprised of the grounds relied upon by the body in recommending

the revocation of their business permit.  Neither it appeared that the complainant has sustained any actual injury by the failure of the respondents to answer his letter.[15]

 The dispositive portion of the Joint Order of 4 November 2002, pronounces: 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that that the subject two Motions for Reconsideration dated September 10 and 11, 2002 filed by the complainant bedenied for lack of merit.  However, concerning the failure of the herein respondents to respond to the complainant’s letter, they are hereby admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of their duties with stern warning that repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely in the future.[16]

  

          Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Mandamus, seeking to compel the public respondents to file the appropriate information for violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713, against private respondents Sangguniang Bayan members of Siniloan, Laguna.           The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment, [17] dated 10 July 2003, praying that the Petition be dismissed for lack of merit.           Petitioner relies on the following grounds for the allowance of the Petition, viz: 

I 

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS UNLAWFULLY NEGLECTED TO PERFORM AN ACT WHICH THE LAW SPECIFICALLY ENJOINS AS A DUTY RESULTING FROM AN OFFICE;and

 II 

THERE IS NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURT OF LAW.[18]

  

Petitioner’s bone of contention is that since the private respondents were found by public respondent Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to have committed a violation of Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 6713, that is, by failing to respond to his letter of inquiry within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof, they should be punished with a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months’ salary or suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or removal depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency, as prescribed in Section 11[19] of the same Act.  Hence, petitioner submits that the public respondents should have filed the proper information with the proper court for the criminal violation by private respondents of the aforesaid Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713.  Otherwise stated, petitioner theorizes that public respondents can be compelled by a writ of mandamus to file a criminal information against the private respondents for their violation, instead of merely admonishing them, as it did in the assailed Joint Order of 4 November 2002.  There is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to him in the ordinary course of law. According to him, the Complaint was for a criminal offense, and not simply a case of administrative misfeasance.  He is adamant that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is no longer necessary and is rendered useless by the act of public respondents in admonishing the private respondents.

 We dismiss the Petition. It is elementary that mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioner’s

right is founded clearly on law and not when it is doubtful.[20]  In varying language, the principle echoed and reechoed is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights are well-defined, clear and certain. [21]  A writ of mandamus can be issued only when petitioner’s legal right to the performance of a particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete.  [22]  A clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law.[23]  Mandamus, therefore, is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a discretionary duty.[24]

 Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a

public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to

exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act.[25]  It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.[26] 

 Essentially, what petitioner attacks in the instant Petition for Mandamus is

the order of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in admonishing the private respondents.  The case partakes of an administrative disciplinary nature.

 Herein, petitioner was not able to establish his entitlement to a writ

of mandamus.  Petitioner fails to demonstrate that he has a clear legal right to compel the public respondents to file a criminal information against the private respondents.  Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.[27]  Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate[28] and the courts will not interfere in its exercise.[29]  Courts have upheld the wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers that the Ombudsman enjoys; and such powers are virtually free from executive, legislative or judicial intervention.[30]  The rationale of this rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers that the Office of the Ombudsman is granted under the present Constitution,[31] but upon practicality as well; otherwise, the functions of the courts would be perilously bound by numerous petitions assailing the result of the investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office, in much the same way that the courts would be saturated if compelled to review the prosecutors’ exercise of discretion each time they decide to file an information or dismiss a complaint.[32]  The discretion to prosecute or dismiss a complaint filed before it is lodged in the Office of the Ombudsman itself.  To compel the Ombudsman to further pursue a criminal case against the private respondents, as petitioner would have it, is outside the ambit of the courts. 

 Corollarily, Section 2, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the

Ombudsman which runs: SEC. 2. Evaluation. – Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be: 

a)         dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; 

b)         referred to respondent for comment; c)         indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has

jurisdiction over the case; 

d)         forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;

 e)         referred for administrative adjudication; or f)          subjected to a preliminary investigation.

  

and is reinforced by Section 3, Rule III of the same Rules, hereby quoted: 

          SEC. 3. How initiated. – An administrative case may be initiated by a written complaint under oath accompanied by affidavits of witnesses and other evidences in support of the charge. An administrative proceeding may also be ordered by the Ombudsman or the respective Deputy Ombudsman on his initiative or on the basis of a complaint originally filed as a criminal action or a grievance complaint or request for assistance.  

clearly provides the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude of discretion in determining what and which acts to prosecute criminally and/or administratively.  In the instant case, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman opted, based on the evidence on hand, to only administratively admonish the private respondents, a penalty which is in fine tune with the mandate of Rule IV, Section 52 (C) (13) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[33] which provides: 

          SEC. 52. Classification of Offenses. – Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.

                         x x x x                                   C. The following are light offenses with corresponding penalties:

                         x x x x 

13. Failure to act promptly on letters and requests within fifteen (15) days from receipt, except as otherwise provided in the rules implementing the code of conduct and ethical standards for public officials and employees: Ist Offense > Reprimand; 2nd Offense > Suspension for one (1) to thirty (30) days; 3rd Offense > Dismissal.

 A graver reason that impels this court to reject petitioner’s plea is the mode

taken by petitioner in elevating the case to this court.  In the case of Fabian v. Desierto,[34] this court ruled that appeals, if availing,[35] from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be brought to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43[36] of the Rules of Court.  In Lanting v. Ombudsman,[37]  we underscored the catena of cases subsequent to the Fabian ruling, thus:

 In Fabian v. Desierto, we held that only “appeals from the

decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 (of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure).”  We reiterated this ruling in Namuhe vs. Ombudsman and recently in Barata vs. Abalos, Jr. and Coronel vs. AnianoDesierto, as Ombudsman, and Pedro Sausal, Jr.[38]

  

There is, verily, a limited applicability of this court’s pronouncement in Fabian.   The Fabian ruling does not extend to orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases.  Kuizon v. Ombudsman[39] and Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas),[40] instructed that petitions for certiorari questioning the Ombudsman’s orders or decisions in criminal cases should be filed in the Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeals. [41]  This is the prevailing rule.[42] The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, in admonishing the private respondents, deemed the matter to be one in the nature of an administrative disciplinary case.  The petitioner, in filing the instant Petition for Mandamusbefore this Court, took a route that is antagonistic to prevailing rules and jurisprudence.  

 

WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant Petition for Mandamus is DISMISSED.  Costs against petitioner.

 SO ORDERED.