ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP and RAMIR M. DIMALOTANG, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, SIMEON A. DATUMANONG and THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Political Law; The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power; It establishes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of acts of the political departments; Requisites for the exercise of judicial power.The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. It establishes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty. Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of judicial power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity. Fifth, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Same; Same; Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute; Grounds to strike down acts of the political departments of government.In seeking to nullify acts of the legislature and the executive department on the ground that they contravene the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. As held in Taada v. Angara, where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. But in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition questioning acts of the political departments of government, the Court will not review the wisdom, merits, or propriety thereof, but will strike them down only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion.

Same; Same; Definition of Legal Standing or Law Stands; Petitioner must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from a mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. He must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.

Same; Same; Court is inclined to take cognizance of a suit although it does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interests are involved.Following the new trend, this Court is inclined to take cognizance of a suit although it does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interests are involved. In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal stance on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.

Same; Same; Petitioners can legitimately challenge the validity of the enactments subject of the instant case.As the two offices have apparently been endowed with functions almost identical to those of DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is likely that petitioners are in imminent danger of being eased out of their duties and, not remotely, even their jobs. Their material and substantial interests will definitely be prejudiced by the enforcement of D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999. Such injury is direct and immediate.

Thus, they can legitimately challenge the validity of the enactments subject of the instant case.

Same; Statutes; The organic acts are more than ordinary statutes hence the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute such as R.A. 8999.The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional autonomy scheme. While they are classified as statutes, the Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute, such as R.A. 8999 in this case. The amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite. [Disomangcop vs. Datumanong, 444 SCRA 203(2004)]

Constitutional Law; Election Law; Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao; Synchronization of Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao with the National and Local Elections (RA 10153); While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution.While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.272

Same; Same; An autonomous region is considered a form of local government in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution.From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Articlethe article wholly devoted to Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution.

Same; Same; Synchronization of Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao with the National and Local Elections (RA 10153); The Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.

Same; Same; The House of Representatives and the Senate gave full recognition to the Presidents certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153.The House of Representatives and the Senatein the exercise of their legislative discretiongave full recognition to the Presidents certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our power of judicial review.

Same; Same; Synchronization of Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao with the National and Local Elections (RA 10153); The supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands.

Same; Same; The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act.The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution.

Same; Same; What RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local governments and is technically a reiteration of what is already reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections by express constitutional recognition.RA No. 7166 already provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national and congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local governments (with the exception of barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is already reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections by express constitutional recognition.

Same; Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.

Same; Election Laws; Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); Both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other.In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole country, while regional autonomyas the term suggestsdirectly carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.

Same; Same; Same; Since elective Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their

274 term through a holdover.Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmea v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 (1991): It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time.

Same; Same; Same; Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision.Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers.

Same; Same; Same; Commission on Elections; COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant.The constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant.

Same; Same; Same; In the same way that the term of elective Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands.In the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happena term of less than two yearsif a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.

Same; Same; The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed.The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.

Same; Same; Since the Presidents authority to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

Same; Same; Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao; Synchronization of Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao with the National and Local Elections (RA 10153); RA No. 10153 provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail.The legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be readin the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.

Same; Same; While autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with independence.While autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national policies set by the national government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous determination. (for CONCOM)

Same; Same; Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate.We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that synchronization demands.276

CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Election Law; Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao; Synchronization of Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao with the National and Local Elections (RA 10153); View that the synchronization of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) elections with the national and local elections under RA 10153 is constitutional.I vote to declare RA 9333 constitutional, and RA 10153 partly unconstitutional. The synchronization of the ARMM elections with the national and local elections under RA 10153 is constitutional. However, Sections 3, 4 and 5 of RA 10153 authorizing the President to appoint OICs in place of elective ARMM officials are unconstitutional. Save in newly created local government units prior to special or regular elections, elective officials of local government units like the ARMM cannot be appointed by the President but must be elected in special or regular elections. Hence, respondent COMELEC should be ordered to hold special elections in the ARMM as soon as possible.

Same; Same; Same; View that pending the assumption to office of the elected Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Governor, the President, under his general supervision over local governments, may appoint an officer-in-charge in the office of the ARMM Governor.Pending the assumption to office of the elected ARMM Governor, the President, under his general supervision over local governments, may appoint an officer-in-charge in the office of the ARMM Governor. Such appointment is absolutely necessary and unavoidable to keep functioning essential government services in the ARMM.

Same; Same; Same; View that the second sentence of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA 9054 authorizing Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) elective officials to hold over until the election and qualification of their successors is unconstitutional.On the other hand, I vote to declare unconstitutional the second sentence of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA 9054 authorizing ARMM elective officials to hold over until the election and qualification of their successors. Such hold over violates the fixed term of office of elective local officials under the Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; View that RA 9333 and RA 10153 are separate, stand-alone statutes that do not amend any provision of RA 9054.To fix the date of the succeeding regular elections, Congress passed several measures, moving the election day as it deemed proper. Like RA 9333 and RA 10153, these enactments merely filled a void created by the narrow wording of RA

2776734. RA 9333 and RA 10153 are therefore separate, stand-alone statutes that do not amend any provision of RA 9054.

Same; Same; Same; View that the 2/3 vote threshold in Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 effectively ensures the near immutability of RA 9054, in derogation of Congress plenary power to amend or repeal laws.The 2/3 vote threshold in Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 effectively ensures the near immutability of RA 9054, in derogation of Congress plenary power to amend or repeal laws. Unless the Constitution itself mandates a higher vote threshold to enact, amend or repeal laws, each House of Congress can do so by simple majority of the members present who constitute a quorum.

Same; Same; Same; Synchronized Elections; View that Congress power to provide for the simultaneous holding of elections for national and local officials does not encompass the power to authorize the President to appoint officers-in-charge in place of elective local officials.Congress power to provide for the simultaneous holding of elections for national and local officials, however, does not encompass the power to authorize the President to appoint officers-in-charge in place of elective local officials, canceling in the process scheduled local elections. To hold otherwise is to sanction the perversion of the Philippine States democratic and republican nature.

Same; Same; Same; View that the appointment by the President of officers-in-charge (OICs) in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of RA 10153 is not authorized under the Constitution.In ratifying the Constitution, the Filipino people authorized the President to appoint sectoral representatives for a limited period. However, the appointment by the President of OICs in the ARMM under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of RA 10153 is not authorized under the Constitution but is in fact in violation of the Constitution that the Filipino people ratified overwhelmingly.

Same; Same; Same; View that the President may appoint an officer-in-charge in the office of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Governor pending the holding of special local elections in the ARMM.The President may appoint an officer-in-charge in the office of the ARMM Governor pending the holding of special local elections in the ARMM. The appointment of such officer-in-charge is absolutely necessary and unavoidable because someone must insure that essential government services continue to function in the ARMM.278

Same; Same; Same; View that the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) officials to be elected in the special ARMM elections shall hold office until 30 June 2013.The ARMM officials to be elected in the special ARMM elections shall hold office until 30 June 2013, when the terms of office of elective national and local officials covered by the synchronized elections also expire.

VELASCO, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Election Law; Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao; Synchronization of Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao with the National and Local Elections (RA 10153); View that the Congress power to provide for the simultaneous holding of elections for national and local officials does not encompass the power to authorize the President to appoint officers-in-charge in place of elective officials.That the [C]ongress power to provide for the simultaneous holding of elections for national and local officials x x x does not encompass the power to authorize the President to appoint officers-in-charge in place of elective officials x x x. To hold otherwise is to sanction the perversion of the Philippine States democratic and republican nature, and so sustain the holdover of the incumbent ARMM officials pending the election and qualification of their successors.

Same; Same; Same; View that neither Sec. 2, Art. XVIII or Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution contains any provision against a holdover by an elective local official of his office pending the election and qualification of his successor.Neither Sec. 2, Art. XVIII or Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution contains any provision against a holdover by an elective local official of his office pending the election and qualification of his successor.

Same; Same; Same; View that a holdover is not technically an extension of the term of the officer but a recognition of the incumbent as a de facto officer.It should be considered that a holdover is not technically an extension of the term of the officer but a recognition of the incumbent as a de facto officer, which is made imperative by the necessity for a continuous performance of public functions.

Same; Same; Same; View that the alternative choice to allow the President to appoint the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Governor pending the holding of the special elections is not only intrinsically infirm but also constitutionally invalid.The alternative choice to allow the President to appoint the ARMM Governor pending the holding of the special

279 elections is not only intrinsically infirm but also constitutionally invalid for violating the only limitation provided by the Constitution when it conferred on Congress the power to create the local offices of the ARMM.

Same; Same; Same; View that an approval of the holdover of the incumbents pending the election and qualification of their successors is a ratification of the constitutional right of the people of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) to select their own officials.The appointment of a person by the President thwarts the popular will by replacing the person who has been previously elected by the ARMM electorate to govern them. On the other hand, an approval of the holdover of the incumbents pending the election and qualification of their successors is a ratification of the constitutional right of the people of the ARMM to select their own officials.

Same; Same; Same; View that the authority granted the President to appoint the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Governor cannot be excused by an expanded interpretation of the Presidents power of general supervision over local governments.The authority granted the President to appoint the ARMM Governor cannot be excused by an expanded interpretation of the Presidents power of general supervision over local governments in Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution, as it is basic that general supervision does NOT authorize the President or any of his alter egos to interfere with local affairs.

Same; Same; Same; View that the President cannot fill the executive and legislative Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Offices by appointment, even temporarily and pending the holding of the special elections.The President cannot fill the executive and legislative ARMM Offices by appointment, even temporarily and pending the holding of the special elections. Such action will not only be outside the scope of his constitutional authority to do so, but also further violates the principle of local autonomy, nullifies the will of the electorate, and contravenes the only limitation set by the Constitutionthat the offices of the executive and legislative ARMM officials be elective and representative. [Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines, 659 SCRA 270(2011)]

PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Constitutional Law; Writs of Prohibition; The writ of prohibition is appropriate to test the constitutionality of election laws, rules and regulations.The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate to Test the Constitutionality of Election Laws, Rules and Regulations. The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty. True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. These, however, do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations.

Same; Delegation of Powers; There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units.There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, only x x x an Act of Congress can create provinces, cities or municipalities.

Same; Election Laws; Each City with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least have one representative in the House of Representatives.There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.

Same; A province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.A province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the citys population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.

Same; Congress; Delegation of Powers; The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones.Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995), we held that the power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.

Same; Same; An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.

Same; Same; Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress. On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the next national elections from the effectivity of the law.

Same; Same; The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself.Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on regional autonomy, nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.

Same; Local Autonomy; Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the constitution.It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x. The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established within the framework of the Constitution. This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

Same; Same; The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.We rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.

Same; Republic Act No. 9054; Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 declared unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities.Wherefore, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.

TINGA, J., Dissenting and Concurring Opinion:

Courts; Appeals; It is cardinal that the Courts power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied with: 1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; 2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; 3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and 4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.It is clear that both petitioners rely on constitutional issues in support of their petitions as they posit that under the Constitution Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to its own separate legislative district. It is cardinal that the Courts power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.Election Laws; Semas prior avowal that she was running for the Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City legislative district, and her campaign for election to that district, belie the existence of injury on her part caused by the COMELEC resolution that affirmed that very legislative district.It would indeed be difficult to assess injury for purposes of locus standi on the part of Sema by reason of the assailed COMELEC Resolution, which after all, reaffirms the very legislative district whose seat in Congress she had sought to be elected to. Her standing to raise the present petition is materially affected by her express consent and active campaign for election from the legislative district which she now seeks to invalidate. A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act or statute must show not only that the law is invalid, but also that he or she has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, that party has been or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he or she is lawfully entitled. Semas prior avowal that she was running for the Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City legislative district, and her campaign for election to that district, belie the existence of injury on her part caused by the COMELEC resolution that affirmed that very legislative district.

Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); The COMELEC does not have the requisite power to call elections, as the same is part of the plenary legislative power.Marquez does not have a valid cause of action before this Court. His prayer is to compel the COMELEC to provide for new congressional elections for Cotabato City.The relief sought does not lie simply because Rep. Dilangalen, by virtue of his electoral victory, lawfully represents the City in addition to the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. From another perspective, the COMELEC does not have the requisite power to call elections, as the same is part of the plenary legislative power. Only Congress, which was not impleaded as a party to Marquezs petition, has the power to set congressional elections only for Cotabato City, if ever. Even assuming that Congress was impleaded, it would be improper for this Court to compel Congress by judicial fiat to pass a law or resolution for the holding of such elections.

Constitutional Law; Delegation of Powers; A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegare potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated).The Constitution expressly vests legislative power in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives. Traditionally, the delegation of Congress of its legislative powers had been frowned upon. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegare potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.

Same; Same; The strict application of the non-delegation doctrine has in recent times, been relaxed, if not minimized altogether, particularly in the context of regulatory jurisdiction of administrative agencies.The strict application of the non-delegation doctrine has, in recent times, been relaxed, if not minimized altogether, particularly in the context of regulatory jurisdiction of administrative agencies. In every industrialized nation, administrative agencies, which are generally part of the executive branch, have been granted considerable lawmaking power. Given the volume and variety of interactions in todays society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodiesthe principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their specialized fieldsthe authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. In the context of delegation of legislative powers to local governments, a noted authority on the subject has this to say: The state legislative powerthat is, the exercise of the policy-making judgment and discretion on state matters that state constitutions vest and recognize in the legislaturecannot be delegated to some other person or body but must rest with the legislature itself. Thus, the legislature cannot delegate to a commission the power to determine the form of government, powers and functions of proposed municipalities since these matters require legislative judgment. But the details of organization of its own government can be left to a municipality, limited only by general state law; and such basic state powers as the police power, taxing power, and power of eminent domain can be, and almost always are, delegated to local governments for their use for local purposes. The rule against delegation of state legislative authority is no barrier to the delegation of powers of local self government to local units. x x x

Same; Same; Nothwithstanding the exceptions that have been carved to the rule of non-delegation, it bears notice that while our Constitution broadly endows legislative powers to Congress it also specifically conditions the emergence of certain rights, duties and obligations upon the enactment of a law oriented towards such constitutional predicate.Notwithstanding the exceptions that have been carved to the rule of non-delegation, it bears notice that while our Constitution broadly endows legislative powers to Congress it also specifically conditions the emergence of certain rights, duties and obligations upon the enactment of a law oriented towards such constitutional predicate. These include the prohibition of political dynasties as may be defined by law, the reasonable conditions prescribed by law relating to full public disclosure of all the States transactions involving public interest; the manner by which Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired; the date of regular elections for members of Congress; the manner of conduct of special elections to fill in congressional vacancies; the authorization of the President to exercise emergency powers; the system for initiative and referendum; the salaries of the President and Vice-President; the creation and allocation of jurisdiction of lower courts; and on many other matters of grave import.

Same; Same; As to those powers which would normally fall within the plenary legislative power, the Constitution has decided to doubly emphasize that it is the Congress which is so empowered to perform such tasks.May these specified functions be delegated by Congress to another body? These specific functions are non-delegable, for they are textually committed by the Constitution to Congress. Perhaps it is possible to segregate these particular functions to those which would, even absent constitutional definition, anyway fall within the plenary legislative power, and those which are not plenary in nature but were especially designated to Congress by the Constitution. Still, in either case, only Congress, and no other body, can carry out that function. As to those powers which would normally fall within the plenary legislative power, the Constitution has decided to doubly emphasize that it is the Congress which is so empowered to perform such tasks. With respect to the non-plenary functions assigned to Congress, it is clear that the assignment implies the delegation by the Constitution to Congress of specific, wholly original functions.

Same; Same; Local Autonomy; The guarantee of local autonomy is actualized through a local government code that delineates the structure and powers of local governments, and through constitutional measures that entitle local government units to generate their own revenue stream and assure the same to their fair share in the national internal revenue.Section 2, Article X guarantees that the territorial and political subdivisions in the Philippines shall enjoy local autonomy. The guarantee of local autonomy is actualized through a local government code that delineates the structure and powers of local governments, and through constitutional measures that entitle local government units to generate their own revenue stream and assure the same to their fair share in the national internal revenue. Local government rule, in constitutional contemplation, is a live being that exists to counterbalance the rule of the national government, and is not a mere palliative established in the Constitution to soothe the people with the illusion of having a more direct say in their governance.

Same; Local Autonomy; The idea behind the constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions.In Disomangcop v. Datumanong, 444 SCRA 203 (2004), the Court explained at length the vital constitutional purposes of local autonomy: x x x According to Commissioner Jose Nolledo, Chairman of the Committee which drafted the provisions, it is an indictment against the status quo of a unitary system that, to my mind, has ineluctably tied the hands of progress in our country . . . our varying regional characteristics are factors to capitalize on to attain national strength through decentralization. The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions. These cultures, as a matter of right, must be allowed to flourish.

Same; Same; On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions.On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].

Same; Same; It should be emphasized that local autonomy cannot be in denigration of the Constitution.Unfortunately, the majority gives short shrift to the considerations of local autonomy, even as such paradigm partakes of a constitutional mandate. If anything, these provisions should dissuade against a reflexive dismissal of the provisions of the Organic Acts. It should be emphasized that local autonomy cannot be in denigration of the Constitution. It is repeatedly emphasized within Article X that the grant of local autonomy and the subsequent exercise of powers by the autonomous government must remain within the confines of the Constitution. At the same time, if there is no constitutional bar against the exercise of the powers of government by the autonomous government in Muslim Mindanao, particularly by the Regional Assembly, then there is no basis to thwart the constitutional design by denying such powers to that body.

Same; Same; Delegations of Powers; Considering the constitutional mandate of local autonomy for Muslim Mindanao, it can be said that such delegation is in furtherance of the constitutional design.May such power be delegated by Congress to a local legislative body such as the Regional Assembly? Certainly, nothing in the Constitution bars Congress from doing so. In fact, considering the constitutional mandate of local autonomy for Muslim Mindanao, it can be said that such delegation is in furtherance of the constitutional design.

Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 9054; Attuned with enhanced local government rule, Congress had, through Rep. Act No. 9054, taken the bold step of delegating to a local legislative assembly the power to create provinces, albeit prudently withholding any ability to create legislative districts as well.It bears reemphasizing that the Constitution also actualizes a preference for local government rule, and thusly provides: The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. Attuned with enhanced local government rule, Congress had, through Rep. Act No. 9054, taken the bold step of delegating to a local legislative assembly the power to create provinces, albeit prudently withholding any ability to create legislative districts as well.

Same; Same; Republic Act No. 9054; The subsequent passage of Rep. Act No. 9054 granted to the Regional Assembly the power, function and responsibility to create provinces and other local government units which had been exercised by the National Government.Section 17, Article X states that [a]ll powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government. The original Organic Act for Muslim Mindanao did not grant to the regional government the power to create provinces, thus at that point, such power was properly exercised by the National Government. But the subsequent passage of Rep. Act No. 9054 granted to the Regional Assembly the power, function and responsibility to create provinces and other local government units which had been exercised by the National Government.

Same; Republic Act No. 9054; It bears noting that there is no contention presented thus far that the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan was not in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code (LGC), thus this aspect of unconstitutionality of Rep. Act No. 9054 may not be material to the petitions at bar.It bears noting that there is no contention presented thus far that the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan was not in accordance with the criteria established in the LGC, thus this aspect of unconstitutionality of Rep. Act No. 9054 may not be material to the petitions at bar.

Same; Congress; Congress does not have any express or plenary legislative power to create legislative districts, except by reapportionment.How exactly does a legislative district come into being? In theory, Congress does not have any express or plenary legislative power to create legislative districts, except by reapportionment. Under the Constitution, such reapportionment occurs within three years following the return of the census, but this Court has likewise recognized that reapportionment can also be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. Still, even in exercising this limited power through the constitutionally mandated reapportionment, Congress cannot substitute its own discretion for the standards set forth in Section 5, Article VI. And should general reapportionment made by Congress violate the parameters set forth by the Constitution, such act may be invalidated by the Court, as it did in Macias v. COMELEC, 3 SCRA 1 (1961).

Same; Same; The Constitution clearly provided that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members unless otherwise provided by law.The Court has previously recognized that such law increasing the membership of the House of Representatives need not be one specifically devoted for that purpose alone, but it may be one that creates a province or charters a city with a population of more than 250,000. In Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994), the Court pronounced that the law converting Mandaluyong into a city could likewise serve the purpose of increasing the composition of the House of Representatives: As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; The power to increase the composition of the House of Representatives is restricted by the Constitution to a law passed by Congress, which may not delegate such law-making power to the Regional Assembly.I have already pointed out that when the Constitution specifically designates a particular function to Congress, only Congress may exercise such function, as the same is non-delegable. The power to increase the composition of the House of Representatives is restricted by the Constitution to a law passed by Congress, which may not delegate such law-making power to the Regional Assembly. If we were to rule that Congress may delegate the power to increase the composition of the House of Representatives, there would be no impediment for us to similarly rule that those other specific functions tasked by the Constitution to Congress may be delegated as well. To repeat, these include gravely important functions as the enactment of a law defining political dynasties; the enactment of reasonable conditions relating to full public disclosure of all the States transactions involving public interest; the manner by which Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired; the date of regular elections for members of Congress; the provision for the manner of conduct of special elections to fill in congressional vacancies; the authorization of the President to exercise emergency powers; the prescription of a system for initiative and referendum; the salaries of the President and Vice-President; and the creation and allocation of jurisdiction of lower courts.

Same; Republic Act No. 9054; Even as Section 19 of Rep. Act 9054 constitutionally authorizes the Regional Assembly to create provinces, there are legal limitations that constrict the discretion of that body to exercise such power.Even as Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 9054 constitutionally authorizes the Regional Assembly to create provinces, there are legal limitations that constrict the discretion of that body to exercise such power. I had earlier identified as unconstitutional the discretion of the Regional Assembly to create local government units based on a lower standard than that prescribed under the LGC. Another clear limitation is that the creation of provinces cannot be authorized without the ratification through a plebiscite by the people affected by such act, a requirement imposed by the Organic Act itself and by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. [Sema vs. Commission on Elections, 558 SCRA 700(2008)]

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations

Constitutional Law; Presidency; Congress; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; Power of Inquiry; Executive Privilege; Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, its aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation while Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and complementary to each other, they should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, its aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are different.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 22.This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of compulsory process. Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 22. The Courts pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), is clear: When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad; To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President such as the area of military and foreign relations.In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 299 SCRA 744 (1998), this Court held that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 360 SCRA 132 (2001), there is also a recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), the concept of presidential communications privilege is fully discussed. As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements of presidential communications privilege.Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit: 1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power. 2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President. 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right of Congress or any of its committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the peoples right to public information.The right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the peoples80

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right to public information. The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the peoples right to information.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to information must be balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts.The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification in their exercise of power a right properly belonging to the people in general. This is because when they discharge their power, they do so as public officials and members of Congress. Be that as it may, the right to information must be balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate interplay of executive-legislative powers and privileges which is the subject of careful review by numerous decided cases.

Same; Same; Same; Executive Privilege; For the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter.We now proceed to the issuewhether the claim is properly invoked by the President. Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter. A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a precise and certain reason for preserving their confidentiality. The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly. Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the President. That is more than enough compliance. In Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.With regard to the existence of precise and certain reason, we find the grounds relied upon by Executive Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not to leave respondent Committees in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that an allegation81

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be made whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc. The particular ground must only be specified. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive. The following statement of grounds satisfies the requirement: The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, 481 SCRA 1 (2006), the Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondent committees actions constitute grave abuse of discretion for being arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of law.A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not an unwilling witness. He manifested several times his readiness to testify before respondent Committees. He refused to answer the three (3) questions because he was ordered by the President to claim executive privilege. It behooves respondent Committees to first rule on the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their finding thereon, instead of peremptorily dismissing his explanation as unsatisfactory. Undoubtedly, respondent Committees actions constitute grave abuse of discretion for being arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of law. The same quality afflicted their conduct when they (a) disregarded petitioners motion for reconsideration alleging that he had filed the present petition before this Court and (b) ignored petitioners repeated request for an advance list of questions, if there be any aside from the three (3) questions as to which he claimed to be covered by executive privilege.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts; The Courts mandate is to preserve the constitutional principles at all times to keep the political branches of government within constitutional bounds.In this present crusade to search for truth, we should turn to the fundamental constitutional principles which underlie our tripartite system of government, where the Legislature enacts the law, the Judiciary interprets it and the Executive implements it. They are considered separate, co-equal, coordinate and supreme within their respective spheres but, imbued with a system of checks and balances to prevent unwarranted exercise of power. The Courts mandate is to preserve these constitutional principles at all times to keep the political branches of government within constitutional bounds in the exercise of their respective powers and prerogatives, even if it be in the search for truth. This is the only way we can preserve the stability of our democratic institutions and uphold the Rule of Law.

PUNO, C.J.,Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Presidency; Congress; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; The separation of powers between the branches is not absolute.The 1987 Constitution separates governmental power among the legislative, executive and judicial branches to avert tyranny by safeguard(ding) against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other. However, the principle of separation of powers recognized that a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively; hence, the separation of powers between the branches is not absolute.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; One device of the legislature to review, influence and direct administration by the executive is legislation and the corollary power of investigation; The standard justification for an investigation is the presumed need for new or remedial legislation, hence, investigations ought to be made in aid of legislation.Patterned after the U.S. Constitution, the Philippine Constitution structures the government in a manner whereby its three separate branchesexecutive, legislative and judicialare able to provide a system of checks and balances. The responsibility to govern is vested in the executive, but the legislature has a long-established power to inquire into administrative conduct and the exercise of administrative discretion under the acts of the legislature, and to ascertain compliance with legislative intent. This power of congressional oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over implementation of legislation it has enacted. Oversight may be undertaken through review or investigation of executive branch action. One device of the legislature to review, influence and direct administration by the executive is legislation and the corollary power of investigation. The standard justification for an investigation is the presumed need for new or remedial legislation; hence, investigations ought to be made in aid of legislation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Power of Contempt; Legislative power of investigation includes the power of contempt or process to enforce; The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person.Included in the legislative power of investigation is the power of contempt or process to enforce. Although the power of contempt is not explicitly mentioned in the provision, this power has long been recognized. In the 1950 landmark case Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950), the Court held, viz.: Although there is no provision in the Constitution, expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquirywith process to enforce itis an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite informationwhich is not infrequently truerecourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; 71 L. ed, 580; 50 A.L.R., 1) The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheaton, 204; 5 L. ed., 242) (emphasis supplied)84

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Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements for the Valid Exercise of the Legislative Power of Investigaton and Contempt of Witness for Contumacy.There are two requirements for the valid exercise of the legislative power of investigation and contempt of witness for contumacy: first, the existence of a legislative purpose, i.e., the inquiry must be in aid of legislation, and second, the pertinency of the question propounded.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive Privilege; The privilege is strongest when used not out of a personal desire to avoid culpability, but based on a legitimate need to protect the Presidents constitutional mandate to execute the law, to uphold prudential separation of powers, and above all, to promote the public interest.The history of executive privilege shows that the privilege is strongest when used not out of a personal desire to avoid culpability, but based on a legitimate need to protect the Presidents constitutional mandate to execute the law, to uphold prudential separation of powers, and above all, to promote the public interest. Under these circumstances, both the Congress and the judiciary have afforded most respect to the Presidents prerogatives.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A claim of executive privilege may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.As enunciated in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), a claim of executive privilege may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. The ground involved in the case at bar, as stated in the letter of Secretary Ermita, is Presidential communications privilege on information that might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The scope of Presidential communications privilege is clear in U.S. vs. Nixon.The scope of Presidential communications privilege is clear in U.S. v. Nixon, 415 US 613 (1974). It covers communications in the performance of the Presidents responsibilities of his office and made in the process of shaping policies and making decisions. This scope was affirmed three years later in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Presidential communications are presumptively privileged.In U.S. v. Nixon, the High Court alluded to Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F. 2d 700, which held that Presidential communications are presumptively privileged and noted that this ruling was accepted by both parties in the case before it. In Nixon v. Sirica, the D.C. Court of Appeals, without expounding, agreed with the presumptive privilege status afforded to Presidential communications by its precursor case In re Subpoena for Nixon in the D.C. District Court. The latter case ushered the birth of the presumption in the midst of a general disfavor of government privileges.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To overcome the qualified presumption, there must be sufficient showing or demonstration of specific need for the withheld information on the branch of government seeking its disclosure; Standards to show the specific need.The Nixon Court held that to overcome the qualified presumption, there must be sufficient showing or demonstration of specific need for the withheld information on the branch of government seeking its disclosure. Two standards must be met to show the specific need: one is evidentiary; the other is constitutional.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The claim of executive privilege must be balanced with the specific need for disclosure of the communications on the part of the other branch of government.The claim of executive privilege must then be balanced with the specific need for disclosure of the communications on the part of the other branch of government. The function impairment test was utilized in making the balance albeit it was not the term used by the Court. By this test, the Court weighs how the disclosure of the witheld information would impair the Presidents ability to perform his constitutional duties more than nondisclosure would impair the other branchs ability to perform its constitutional functions.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Court cannot assess the validity of the claim of the Executive Secretary that disclosure of the withheld information may impair our diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China; No absolute explanation offered on how diplomatic secrets will be exposed at the expense of our national interest if petitioner answers the three disputed questions propounded by the respondent Senate Committees.In the case at bar, we cannot assess the validity of the claim of the Executive Secretary that disclosure of the withheld information may impair our diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. There is but a bare assertion in the letter of Executive Secretary Ermita that the context which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. There is absolutely no explanation offered by the Executive Secretary on how diplomatic secrets will be exposed at the expense of our national interest if petitioner answers the three disputed questions propounded by the respondent Senate Committees. In the Oral Argument on March 4, 2008, petitioner Neri similarly failed to explain how diplomatic secrets will be compromised if the three disputed questions are answered by him. Considering this paucity of explanation, the Court cannot determine whether there is reasonable danger that petitioners answers to the three disputed questions would reveal privileged diplomatic secrets. The Court cannot engage in guesswork in resolving this important issue.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The three assailed questions are pertinent to the subject matter of the legislative investigation being undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees.It is self-evident that the three assailed questions are pertinent to the subject matter of the legislative investigation being undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees. More than the Arnault standards, the questions to petitioner have direct relation not only to the subject of the inquiry, but also to the pending bills thereat.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The motive of respondent Senate Committees in conducting their investigation and propounding their questions is beyond the purview of the Courts power of judicial review.In the Oral Argument held on March 4, 2008, petitioner, through counsel, argued that in propounding the three questions, respondent Senate Committees were seeking to establish the culpability of the President for alleged anomalies attending the consummation of the NBN-ZTE Contract. Counsel, however, contended that in invoking executive privilege, the President is not hiding any crime. The short answer to petitioners argument is that the motive of respondent Senate Committees in conducting their investigation and propounding their questions is beyond the purview of the Courts power of judicial review. So long as the questions are pertinent and there is no effective substitute for the information sought, the respondent Senate Committees should be deemed to have hurdled the evidentiary standards to prove the specific need for the information sought.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It appears by tradition, custom and practice, the Senate does not re-publish its rules especially when the same has not undergone any material change.The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation is assailed as invalid allegedly for failure to be re-published. It is contended that the said rules should be re-published as the Senate is not a continuing body, its membership changing every three years. The assumption is that there is a new Senate after every such election and it should not be bound by the rules of the old. We need not grapple with this contentious issue which has far reaching consequences to the Senate. The precedents and practice of the Senate should instead guide the Court in resolving the issue. For one, the Senators have traditionally considered the Senate as a continuing body despite the change of a part of its membership after an election. It is for this reason that the Senate does not cease its labor during the period of such election. Its various Committees continue their work as its officials and employees. For another, the Rules of the Senate is silent on the matter of re-publication. Section 135, Rule L of the Rules of the Senate provides that, if there is no Rule applicable to a specific case, the precedents of the Legislative Department of the Philippines shall be resorted to x x x. It appears that by tradition, custom and practice, the Senate does not re-publish its rules especially when the same has not undergone any material change. In other words, existing rules which have already undergone publication should be deemed adopted and continued by the Senate regardless of the election of some new members. Their re-publication is thus an unnecessary ritual. We are dealing with internal rules of a co-equal branch of government and unless they clearly violate the Constitution, prudence dictates we should be wary of striking them down. The consequences of striking down the rules involved in the case at bar may spawn serious and unintended problems for the Senate.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Contempt; Respondent Senate Committees have good reasons in citing Neri for contempt for failing to appear in the November 20, 2007 hearing.It is worth noting that the letter of Executive Secretary Ermita, signed by Order of the President, merely requested that petitioners testimony on November 20, 2007 on the NBN Contract be dispensed with, as he had exhaustively testified on the subject matter of the inquiry. Executive privilege was invoked only with respect to the three questions Neri refused to answer in his testimony before respondent Senate Committees on September 26, 2007. But there is no basis for either petitioner or the Executive Secretary to assume that petitioners further testimony will be limited only on the three disputed questions. Needless to state, respondent Senate Committees have good reasons in citing Neri for contempt for failing to appear in the November 20, 2007 hearing.

YARES-SANTIAGO, J.,Separate Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Presidency; Congress; Separation of Powers; Executive Privilege; The doctrine of executive privilege applies only to certain types of information of a sensitive character that could be against the public interest to divulge.The doctrine of executive privilege applies only to certain types of information of a sensitive character that would be against the public interest to divulge. As held in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), the doctrine is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Considering that the privilege is an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, the necessity for non-disclosure must be of such high degree as to outweigh public interest.

CARPIO, J.,Dissenting and Concurring Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Presidency; Congress; Separation of Powers; Executive Privilege; The Constitution does not expressly grant executive privilege power to the President but courts have long recognized implied Presidential powers if necessary and proper in carrying out powers and functions expressly granted to the Executive under the Constitution.Executive privilege is the implied constitutional power of the President to withhold information requested by other branches of the government. The Constitution does not expressly grant this power to the President but courts have long recognized implied Presidential powers if necessary and proper in carrying out powers and functions expressly granted to the Executive under the Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive privilege is not absolute; Interest of protecting military, national security and diplomatic secrets as well as Presidential communications, must be weighed against other constitutionally recognized interests.Exe-89

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Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations

cutive privilege, however, is not absolute. The interest of protecting military, national security and diplomatic secrets, as well as Presidential communications, must be weighed against other constitutionally recognized interests. There is the declared state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest, the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, the accountability of public officers, the power of legislative inquiry, and the judicial power to secure testimonial and documentary evidence in deciding cases.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In conflicts between the Executive and the Legislature involving executive privilege, the Judiciary encourages negotiation between the Executive and Legislature as the preferred route of conflict resolution.The Judiciary, however, will consider executive privilege only if the issues cannot be resolved on some other legal grounds. In conflicts between the Executive and the Legislature involving executive privilege, the Judiciary encourages negotiation between the Executive and Legislature as the preferred route of conflict resolution. Only if judicial resolution is unavoidable will courts resolve such disputes between the Executive and Legislature.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Information covered by executive privilege remains confidential even after the expiry of the terms of office of the President, Cabinet members and presidential advisers.Information covered by executive privilege remains confidential even after the expiry of the terms of office of the Pres