Jurado Oblicon
Transcript of Jurado Oblicon
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BOOK IV
OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS
TITLE I — OBLIGATIONS
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to
give, to do or not to do.1
Concept of Obligations. — Evidently, the above definition of
an obligation is adopted from Sanchez Roman’s classic definition of
an obligation as “the juridical necessity to comply with a prestation.”2
Manresa, on the other hand, defines it as a “legal relation established
between one person and another, whereby the latter is bound to the
fulfillment of a prestation which the former may demand of him.’’3
It must be observed, however, that obligations may be either
civil or natural.4 A civil obligation is one which has a binding force inlaw, and which gives to the obligee or creditor the right of enforcing it
against the obligor or debtor in a court of justice. This is the obligation
which is defined in Art. 1156 of the Code. A natural obligation, on
the other hand, is one which cannot be enforced by action, but which
is binding on the party who makes it in conscience and according to
1New provision.24 Sanchez Roman 53.38 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 21.4 Art. 1423, Civil Code.
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OBLIGATIONS
the natural law.5 Thus, when an action has prescribed in accordance
with the statute of limitations, a natural obligation still subsists,
although the civil obligation is extinguished. This may be illustratedby the following example: If A has a right of action, evidenced by
a promissory note, to collect one thousand pesos from B, and such
promissory note prescribes after the expiration of ten years from
the time it accrues,6 although the latter is no longer bound to pay
the obligation in accordance with the statute of limitations, he is
still bound to pay in accordance with equity and natural law.7 It is,
therefore, clear that a civil obligation and a natural obligation may
be distinguished from each other as follows:
(1) A civil obligation is based on positive law, while a natural
obligation is based on equity and natural law; and
(2) The former is enforceable in courts of justice, while the
latter is not.8
Requisites of Obligations. — An obligation has four essential
requisites. They are:
(1) A juridical or legal tie, which binds the parties to the
obligation, and which may arise from either bilateral or unilateralacts of persons;
(2) An active subject known as the obligee or creditor, who
can demand the fulfillment of the obligation;
(3) A passive subject known as the obligor or debtor, against
whom the obligation is juridically demandable; and
(4) The fact, prestation or service which constitutes the object
of the obligation.9
The form in which the obligation is manifested is sometimes
added as a fifth requisite. As a general rule, however, it cannot be
considered as essential. Obligations arising from law, quasi-con-
tracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts do not
require any form whatsoever, yet there can be no question regard-
53 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 2394-2395.6 Art. 1144, Civil Code.7 Agoncillo vs. Javier, 38 Phil. 424; Villaroel vs. Estrada, 71 Phil. 40.8 Art. 1423, Civil Code.9Giorgi, Teoria de las Obligaciones, Vol. 1, p. 13; 3 Castan, 7th Ed., p. 20.
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ing their validity or binding force. It is only in obligations arising
from certain contracts that it becomes essential. Thus, in a con-
tract involving a donation of personal property whose value exceedsP5,000.00, the law requires that the donation and the acceptance
shall be made in writing;10 in a contract of sale of a piece of land or
any interest therein through an agent, the law requires that the
authority of the latter shall be in writing;11 in a contract of simple
loan or mutuum, the law requires that any agreement with respect
to interest shall be expressly stipulated in writing;12 in a contract of
antichresis, the law requires that the amount of the principal and
of the interest shall be specified in writing;13 in a contract involving
a donation of immovable property, the law requires that the dona-tion shall be made in a public document, while the acceptance shall
be made either in the same deed of donation or in a separate public
document;14 in a contract of partnership where immovable property
or real rights are contributed to the common fund, the law requires
that the contract shall be in a public instrument to which an inven-
tory of the property or real rights, signed by the partners, must be
attached;15 in a contract of chattel mortgage, the law requires that
the personal property which is the subject matter of the contract
shall be recorded in the Chattel Mortgage Register as a securityfor the performance of an obligation;16 and in a contract involving
the sale or transfer of large cattle, the law requires that the sale or
transfer shall be registered.17 Non-compliance with such formalities
would have the effect of rendering the contract or agreement void or
inexistent.
Classification of Obligations. — The following is the primary
classification of obligations under the Civil Code:
(1) Pure and conditional (Arts. 1179-1192).
(2) With a period (Arts. 1193-1198).
(3) Alternative and facultative (Arts. 1199-1206).
10 Art. 748, Civil Code.11 Art. 1874, Civil Code.12 Art. 1956, Civil Code.13 Art. 2134, Civil Code.14 Art. 749, Civil Code.15 Arts. 1771, 1773, Civil Code.16 Art. 2140, Civil Code.17Sec. 22, Act No. 1147; Art. 1581, Civil Code.
GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1156
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(4) Joint and solidary (Arts. 1207-1222).
(5) Divisible and indivisible (Arts. 1223-1225).(6) With a penal clause (Arts. 1226-1230).
There are, however, other classifications of a secondary char-
acter which can be gathered from scattered provisions of the Civil
Code, such as:
(1) Legal, conventional and penal;18
(2) Real and personal;19
(3) Determinate and generic;20
(4) Positive and negative;21
(5) Unilateral and bilateral;22
(6) Individual and collective;23
(7) Accessory and principal.24
The following, on the other hand, is the classification of
obligations according to Sanchez Roman:25
(1) As to juridical quality:
(a) Natural — when the obligation is in accordance with
natural law.
(b) Civil — when the obligation is in accordance with
positive law.
(c) Mixed — when the obligation is in accordance with
both natural and positive law.
18 Arts. 1158-1162, Civil Code.19 Arts. 1163-1168, Civil Code.20 Arts. 1163-1166, Civil Code.21 Arts. 1167-1168, Civil Code.22 Arts. 1169-1191, Civil Code.23 Arts. 1207, 1223, Civil Code.24 Arts. 1166, 1226, et seq., Civil Code.258 Sanchez Roman 20-40.
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2. As to parties:
(a) Unilateral and bilateral — unilateral, where onlyone party is bound, and bilateral, where both parties are mu-
tually or reciprocally bound.
(b) Individual and collective — individual, where there
is only one obligor, and collective, where there are several ob-
ligors. The latter may be joint, when each obligor is liable only
for his proportionate share of the obligation, or solidary, when
each obligor may be held liable for the entire obligation.
3. As to object: (a) Determinate and generic — determinate, when the
object is specific; generic, when the object is designated by its
class or genus.
(b) Simple and multiple — simple, when there is only
one undertaking; multiple, when there are several undertak-
ings. Multiple obligations may be conjunctive, when all of the
undertakings are demandable at the same time, or distribu-
tive, when only one undertaking out of several is demandable.Distributive obligations, on the other hand, may be alterna-
tive, when the obligor is allowed to choose one out of several
obligations which may be due and demandable, or facultative,
when the obligor is allowed to substitute another obligation for
one which is due and demandable.
(c) Positive and negative — positive, when the obligor
is obliged to give or do something; negative, when the obligor
must refrain from giving or doing something.
(d) Real and personal — real, when the obligation con-
sists in giving something; personal, when the obligation con-
sists in doing or not doing something.
(e) Possible and impossible — possible, when the ob-
ligation is capable of fulfillment in nature as well as in law;
impossible, when the obligation is not capable of fulfillment
either in nature or in law.
(f) Divisible and indivisible — divisible, when the obli-gation is susceptible of partial performance; indivisible, when
the obligation is not susceptible of partial performance.
GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1156
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(g) Principal and accessory — principal, when it is the
main undertaking; accessory, when it is merely an undertaking
to guarantee the fulfillment of the principal obligation.
4. As to perfection and extinguishment:
(a) Pure — when the obligation is not subject to any
condition or term and is immediately demandable.
(b) Conditional — when the obligation is subject to a
condition which may be suspensive, in which case the happen-
ing or fulfillment of the condition results in the birth of the
obligation, or resolutory, in which case the happening or ful-fillment of the condition results in the extinguishment of the
obligation.
(c) With a term or period (a plazo) — when the obligation
is subject to a term or period which may be suspensive or from
a day certain, in which case the obligation is demandable only
upon the expiration of the term, or resolutory or to a day certain,
in which case the obligation terminates upon the expiration of
the term.
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
1. Law;
2. Contracts;
3. Quasi-contracts;
4. Acts or omissions punished by law; and
5. Quasi-delicts.26
Sources of Obligations. — In Roman law, the sources of
obligations are: (1) contractu; (2) quasi-contractu; (3) male fi cio;
and (4) quasi-male fi cio.27 These sources are preserved in the Civil
Code with the addition of law or lege.28 The addition of lege as an
independent source of obligations, however, has been criticized as
theoretically erroneous. Thus, according to the Supreme Court:
26 Art. 1089, Spanish Civil Code, in amended form.278 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 35.28 Art. 1157, Civil Code.
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“This enumeration of the sources of obligations supposes that
the quasi-contractual obligation and the obligation imposed by
law are of different types. The learned Italian jurist, Jorge Giorgi,criticizes this assumption and says that the classification embodied
in the Code is theoretically erroneous. His conclusion is that one
or the other of these categories should have been suppressed and
merged in the other. (Giorgi, Teoria de las Obligaciones, Spanish
Ed., Vol. 5, Arts. 5, 7, 9) The validity of the criticism is, we think,
self-evident and it is of interest to note that the common law makes
no distinction between the two sources of liability. The obligations
which in the Code are indicated as quasi-contracts, as well as those
arising ex lege, are in the common law system merged into thecategory of obligations imposed by law, and all are denominated
implied contracts.’’29
Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not pre-
sumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or in
special laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by the
precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what
has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.30
Obligations Arising from Law. — Unlike other obligations,
those derived from law can never be presumed. Consequently, only
those expressly determined in the Civil Code or in special laws are
demandable. These obligations shall be regulated by the precepts
of the law which establishes them, and as to what has not been
foreseen, by the provisions of Book IV of the Civil Code.31
How can we determine whether an obligation arises from
law or from some other source, such as a contract, quasi-contract,criminal offense or quasi-delict? It must be noted that in the birth or
generation of an obligation, there is always a concurrence between
the law which establishes or recognizes it and an act or condition
upon which the obligation is based or predicated. According to
Manresa, when the law establishes the obligation and the act or
condition upon which it is based is nothing more than a factor for
determining the moment when it becomes demandable, then the law
29Leung Ben vs. O’Brien, 38 Phil. 182.30 Art. 1090, Spanish Civil Code.31 Art. 1158, Civil Code.
GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1158
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itself is the source of the obligation; however, when the law merely
recognizes or acknowledges the existence of an obligation generated
by an act which may constitute a contract, quasi-contract, criminaloffense or quasi-delict and its only purpose is to regulate such
obligation, then the act itself is the source of the obligation and not
the law.32 Thus, if A loses a certain amount to B in a game of chance,
according to Art. 2014 of the Civil Code, the former may recover his
loss from the latter, with legal interest from the time he paid the
amount lost. It is evident that in this particular case the source of
the obligation of B to refund to A the amount which he had won from
the latter is not a contract, quasi-contract, criminal offense or quasi-
delict, but the law itself.33 The same can also be said with regard tothe obligation of the spouses to support each other,34 the obligations
of employers under the Labor Code,35 the obligations of the owners of
the dominant and servient estates in legal easements,36 and others
scattered in the Civil Code and in special laws.
Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the
force of law between the contracting parties and should be
complied with in good faith.37
Obligations Arising from Contracts. — A contract is a
meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself,
with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.38
As a rule, contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that
moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what
has been expressly stipulated but also to all of the consequences
which according to their nature may be in keeping with good faith,
usage and law.39 These contracts are commonly called consensual
contracts. Once the contract is perfected, the valid contract has theforce of law binding the parties to comply therewith in good faith,
where neither one may renege therefrom without the consent of the
other. (Tiu Peck vs. CA 221 SCRA 618 [1993]) There are certain
328 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 48.33Leung Ben vs. O’Brien, 38 Phil. 182.34 Art. 291, Civil Code; Pelayo vs. Lauron, 12 Phil. 453.35Bautista vs. Borromeo, 35 SCRA 119.36 Arts. 634, 687, Civil Code.37 Art. 1091, Spanish Civil Code, in modified form.38 Art. 1305, Civil Code.39 Art. 1315, Civil Code.
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contracts, however, called real contracts, such as deposit, pledge
and commodatum, which are not perfected until the delivery of the
object of the obligation.40 Whether the contract is consensual or real,the rule is that from the moment it is perfected, obligations which
may be either reciprocal or unilateral arise. Reciprocal obligations
are those where the parties are mutually or reciprocally obliged to
do or to give something; unilateral obligations, on the other hand,
are those where only one of the parties, the obligor, is obliged to do
or to give something.
Unlike other kinds of obligations, those arising from contracts
are governed primarily by the agreement of the contracting parties.This is clearly deducible not only from the nature of contracts, but
also from Art. 1169 of the Code which declares that such obligations
have the force of law between the contracting parties and should
be complied with in good faith. “Compliance in good faith’’ means
performance in accordance with the stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions of the contract. Consequently, the Code recognizes
the right of such contracting parties to establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order orpublic policy.41 Good faith must, therefore, be observed to prevent
one party from taking unfair advantage over the other party. In
the case of Royal Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 608
(1986), it was ruled that evasion by a party of legitimate obligations
after receiving the benefits under the contract would constitute
unjust enrichment on his part. However, in default of an agreement,
the rules found in the Civil Code regulating such obligations are
applicable.42
Art. 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts
shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 1, Title XVII, of
this Book.43
Obligations Arising from Quasi-Contracts. — Quasi-
contracts are those juridical relations arising from lawful, voluntary
40 Art. 1316, Civil Code.41 Art. 1306, Civil Code.42 Art. 1305, et seq., Civil Code.43New provision.
GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1160
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and unilateral acts, by virtue of which the parties become bound
to each other, based on the principle that no one shall be unjustly
enriched or benefited at the expense of another.44 The most importantof these juridical relations which are recognized and regulated
by the Civil Code are negotiorum gestio45 and solutio indebiti.46
Negotiorum gestio is the juridical relation which arises whenever a
person voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the
business or property of another without any power or authority from
the latter.47 In this type of quasi-contract, once the gestor or of ficious
manager has assumed the agency or management of the business or
property, he shall be obliged to continue such agency or management
until the termination of the affair and its incidents,48 exercising such
rights and complying with such obligations as provided for in the
Code.49 Solutio indebiti, on the other hand, is the juridical relation
which arises whenever a person unduly delivers a thing through
mistake to another who has no right to demand it.50 In this type of
quasi-contract, once the delivery has been made, the person to whom
the delivery is unduly made shall have the obligation to return the
property delivered or the money paid.51
The Civil Code provides other instances of quasi-contract.Examples are those found in Articles 2159, 2164 to 2175.
In the case of Perez vs. Palomar, 2 Phil. 682, it was significantly
noted that in a quasi contract where no express consent is given by
the other party, the consent needed in a contract is provided by law
through presumption (presumptive consent). Presumptive consent
gives rise to multiple juridical relations resulting in obligations for
delivery of the thing and rendering of service.
Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising from offenses shall
be governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of
Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2,
44 Art. 2142, Civil Code.45 Art. 2144, Civil Code.46 Art. 2154, Civil Code.47 Art. 2144, Civil Code.48 Ibid.49 Arts. 2144-2152, Civil Code.50 Art. 2154, Civil Code.51 Ibid.
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Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of
this Book, regulating damages.52
Obligations Arising from Criminal Offenses. — As a rule,
every person liable for a felony is also civilly liable.53 This principle
is based on the fact that, generally, a crime has a dual aspect — the
criminal aspect and the civil aspect. Although these two aspects are
separate and distinct from each other in the sense that one affects
the social order and the other, private rights, so that the purpose of
the first is to punish or correct the offender, while the purpose of the
second is to repair the damages suffered by the aggrieved party, it
is evident that the basis of the civil liability is the criminal liabilityitself.
Please note, however, that there are offenses and special crimes
without civil liability. Examples are crimes of treason, rebellion,
illegal possession of firearm and gambling. But a person who is not
criminally liable may still be civilly liable.
Idem; Enforcement of civil liability. — In general and
prior to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000, the following
rules are observed in the enforcement or prosecution of civil liabilityarising from criminal offenses:
(1) Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party (i) expressly waives
the civil action, or (ii) reserves his right to institute it separately, or
(iii) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
(2) Independent civil action. — In the cases provided in
Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
52 Art. 1092, Spanish Civil Code, in amended form.53 Art. 100, Revised Penal Code. This rule, however, is subject to the rules stated
in Arts. 101, 102 and 103, Revised Penal Code.
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(3) Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all casesnot included in the preceding rules, the following rules are observed:
(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the sameoffense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal
action has been commenced, the civil action cannot be instituteduntil final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;
(b) If the civil action has been filed ahead of the criminalaction, and the criminal action is subsequently commenced, thecivil action shall be suspended in whatever stage before final judgment it may be found, until final judgment in criminal
action has been rendered. However, if no final judgmenthas been rendered by the trial court in the civil action, thesame may be consolidated with the criminal action uponapplication with the court trying the criminal action. If the
application is granted, the evidence prevented and admittedin the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproducedin the criminal action, without prejudice to the admission ofadditional evidence that any party may wish to present. In case
of consolidation, both the criminal and the civil action shall be
tried and decided jointly;
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry withit extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from adeclaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civilmight arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to
the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in themanner provided by law against the person who may be liablefor restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for thedamage suffered.
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule III of the Revised Rules of CriminalProcedure 2000, however, it is stated that except for civil actions
provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, thecivil action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. The actioncontemplated, as pointed out by Justice Oscar Herrera in his
Treatise on Criminal Procedure, is a civil action arising from a crime
if reserved or filed separately and a criminal case is filed if it has to
be suspended to await final judgment in the criminal action.
The rule clarifies that, “During the pendency of the criminal
action, the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot
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be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended
shall not run.’’ Otherwise stated, the period of prescription of the
civil actions under Section 3 of the aforementioned rules shall not besuspended because they can be instituted separately. This refers to
civil actions arising from the offense charged which have not been
reserved or civil actions that have been filed ahead of the criminal
action but have been suspended. (Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Treatise
on Historical Development and Highlights of Amendment of Rules
on Criminal Procedure, February 2001).
(4) Judgment in civil action not a bar. — A final judgment
rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liabilityis no bar to a criminal action.
(5) Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition
for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of
a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the of fice of
the fiscal (prosecutor) or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for
trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal
action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000
provides for the elements of a prejudicial question. They are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action which involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
Section 7 limits a prejudicial question to a “previously insti-
tuted civil action’’ in order to minimize possible abuses by the sub-
sequent filing of a civil action as an after thought for the purpose ofsuspending the criminal action. (Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Treatise
on Criminal Procedure, February 2001)
At a glance, therefore, the following are the salient changes
brought about by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000,
as more specifically discussed hereunder by Justice Herrera in his
Treatise on Criminal Procedure:
a. The rule changes the 1985 rule as amended in 1988.
Under the 1985 Rule, the action for recovery of civil liabilityarising from crime including the civil liability under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
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from the same act or omission are deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, orinstitutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from
the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
b. Under the former rule, a waiver of any of three civil
actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the res-ervation of the right to file any of said civil actions separately
waives the others. This is no longer provided for. The reserva-
tion and waiver refers only to the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not
include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even with-
out a reservation.
c. The rulings in Shafer vs. Judge, RTC of Olongapo
City, 167 SCRA 376, allowing a third-party complaint, and the
ruling in Javier vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA
376, as well as Cabaero vs. Cantos allowing a counterclaim are
no longer in force. Under the 2000 Rules, these pleadings are
no longer allowed. Any claim which could have been the subject
thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
d. The rule also incorporated Circular 57-97 on the
filing of actions for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22mandating the inclusion of the corresponding civil action for
which the filing fee shall be paid based on the amount of the
check involved. In other cases, no filing fees shall be required
for actual damages.
Idem; Id. — Effect of acquittal. — If the accused in a
criminal action is acquitted of the offense charged, can a civil action
for damages based on the same act or omission still be instituted?
This question requires a qualified answer. If the acquittal of theaccused is based on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action to recover damages based
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on the same act or omission may still be instituted.54 In such case,
mere preponderance of evidence shall be suf ficient in order that
the plaintiff will be able to recover from the defendant.55 On theother hand, if the acquittal is based on the ground that he did not
commit the offense charged, or what amounts to the same thing, if
the acquittal proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the
subsequent institution of a civil action to recover damages is, as a
general rule, no longer possible.56
Idem; id. — Effect of independent civil actions. — As a
rule, the civil action to recover damages from the person criminallyliable is not independent from the criminal action. This is true even
where it has, to a certain extent, been separated by the injured
party from the criminal proceedings either by reserving his right to
file a separate civil action or by commencing the action to recover
damages ahead of the criminal action. In the first, the right to file a
civil action shall depend upon the result of the criminal action, while
in the second, once the criminal action is instituted, the action to
recover damages shall be suspended.57 There are, however, certain
exceptional cases or instances under the Civil Code where the civil
action to recover damages is entirely separate and independent from
the criminal action, although the act or omission which is the basis
thereof may be a criminal offense. They are: first, where the civil
action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a criminal offense or felony;58 and second, where the
law grants to the injured party the right to institute a civil action
which is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.59 As
a matter of fact, we can even go to the extent of saying that thesecases or instances also constitute the exceptions to the rule that if
the accused in the criminal action is acquitted on the ground that he
did not commit the offense charged, the subsequent institution of a
civil action is no longer possible.
54 Art. 29, Civil Code.55 Ibid.56Sec. 3(c), Rule 111, New Rules of Court.57Sec. 3(b), Rule 111, New Rules of Court.58 Arts. 31, 177, Civil Code.59 Arts. 32, 33, 34, Civil Code.
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OBLIGATIONS
With regard to the first, it must be noted that where the civil
action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a criminal offense or felony, such action mayproceed independently of the criminal action and regardless of the
result of the latter.60 It is evident that in such case the basis of the
civil action may be an obligation arising from the law, contract,
quasi-contract, or quasi-delict. Thus, a postmaster, who has been
charged criminally for malversation of government funds under
his custody, may still be made a defendant in a civil case for the
recovery of the funds, not on the ground of malversation, but on
the ground that under Sec. 633 of the Revised Administrative Code,
he can be held accountable therefor.61 The basis of the civil action
in such case is not the obligation arising from the criminal offense
of malversation, but the obligation arising from the law. Similarly,
if a passenger in a certain bus institutes a civil action to recover
damages from the operator of the bus line for injuries sustained in
an accident, such action is separate and distinct from the criminal
prosecution of the driver for criminal negligence and may, therefore,
be continued regardless of the result of the latter. Consequently,
he can still recover damages even if the driver is acquitted in thecriminal action, because it is clear that the action in such case is
based on culpa contractual and not on the act or omission of the
driver complained of as felony.62 The same principle is also applicable
if the offense charged constitutes what is known as culpa aquiliana
or quasi-delict under the Civil Code.63 In such case, the injured party
can always institute a civil action to recover damages independently
of the criminal action and regardless of the result of the latter. This
is so even granting that the accused is acquitted in the criminal
action either on the ground of reasonable doubt or on the groundthat he did not commit the offense charged. The reason for this is
that the basis of the civil action is no longer the criminal liability of
the defendant, but a quasi-delict or tort.64
60 Art. 31, Civil Code.61Tolentino vs. Carlos, 39 Off. Gaz., No. 6, p. 121.62San Pedro Bus Line vs. Navarro, 94 Phil. 840; Bernaldes vs. Bohol Land Trans.
Co., 7 SCRA 276.63 Art. 2176, et seq., Civil Code.64 Art. 2177, Civil Code; Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607; Dyogi vs.
Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095; Calo vs. Peggy, 103 Phil. 1112; Stanvac vs. Tan, 107 Phil. 109.
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With regard to the second, it must be observed that there are
five exceptional cases or instances, in addition to that which is stated
in Art. 31 of the New Civil Code, where the law itself expresslygrants to the injured party the right to institute a civil action which
is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. They
are: (1) interferences by public of ficers or employees or by private
individuals with civil rights and liberties,65 (2) defamation,66 (3)
fraud,67 (4) physical injuries,68 and (5) refusal or neglect of a city or
municipal police of ficer to render aid or protection in case of danger
to life or property.69 In all of these cases or instances, although the
act or omission may constitute a criminal offense in accordance
with our penal laws, the injured party may institute a civil actionto recover damages which is entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action. Once the action is instituted, then it may proceed
independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.70
Idem; id.; id. — Effect of failure to make reservation. —
Section 2 of Rule 111 of the New Rules of Court states: “In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate anddistinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided that the
right is reserved as required in the preceding section.’’ The insertion
in the foregoing provision of the phrase provided the right is reserved
as required in the preceding section, resulted in a debate among
academicians which lasted for more than twenty years.
Finally, interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court,
in Garcia vs. Florido,71 declared:
“As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent actcausing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime
or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual.
65 Art. 32, Civil Code.66 Art. 33, Civil Code.67 Ibid.68 Ibid.69 Art. 34, Civil Code.70 Arts. 32, 33, 34, Civil Code.7152 SCRA 420. This case was also cited and quoted in Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91
SCRA 113.
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OBLIGATIONS
The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter isa distinct and independent negligence, having always had its
own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of theview that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based
upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminalproceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result
of the latter. Hence, ‘the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with
reference to Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary
to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articleswere drafted and are intended to constitute as exceptions to
the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111.
The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an
unauthorized amendment of substantive law.’ x x x’’
Again, in Abellana vs. Marabe,72 the Supreme Court declared:
“The restrictive interpretation x x x does not only result
in its emasculation but also gives rise to a serious constitutional
doubt. Article 33 is quite clear: ‘In case of x x x physical injuries,
a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from thecriminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only preponderance of evidence.’ That is asubstantive right not to be frittered away by a constructionthat would render it nugatory, if through oversight, the
offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for
damages in a civil suit. x x x The grant of power to this Court
both in the present Constitution and under the 1935 Charterdoes not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of
substantive right. It is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to
avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as
would give rise to a constitutional doubt. x x x The law as an
instrument of social control will fail in its function if through aningenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm,
particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to
a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an allegedright.’’
Thus, in Elcano vs. Hill,73 where the first defendant had
been previously charged with the criminal offense of homicide and
subsequently acquitted on the ground that his act is not criminal,
7257 SCRA 106.7377 SCRA 98.
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because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with a mistake, the Supreme
Court held, despite the fact that the plaintiffs (who are the parents
of the alleged victim) failed to make a reservation of their rightto institute the civil action separately, that such acquittal of the
defendant in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability
for quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code; hence, that
acquittal is not a bar to the civil action against him. The same
ruling was applied in Mendoza vs. Arrieta.74 In effect, the procedural
requirement provided for in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the New Rules
of Court is not mandatory.
Removal of Reservation Requirement For IndependentCivil Actions
Accordingly, Section 2 of the New Rules of Court was likewise
amended to read as:
“SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.
— In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may
be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance ofevidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.’’ (Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000).
Under the former rule, the foregoing actions may only be
allowed if there is a reservation, or were filed ahead of the criminal
action. (Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Treatise on Criminal Procedure,
February 2001).
Art. 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall
be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of the
Book, and by special laws.75
Obligations Arising from Quasi-Delicts. — As it is used
in this part of the Civil Code, the term “quasi-delicts”76 refers to all
of those obligations which do not arise from law, contracts, quasi-
7491 SCRA 113.75 Art. 1093, Spanish Civil Code, in amended form.76In Spanish law, “cuasi-delitos’’ is sometimes known as “culpa aquiliana’’ or
“culpa extra-contractual.’’
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OBLIGATIONS
contracts, or criminal offenses.77 Thus, using Art. 2176 of the Civil
Code and decided cases as bases or anchors, it may be defined as the
fault or negligence of a person, who, by his act or omission, connectedor unconnected with, but independent from, any contractual relation,
causes damage to another person. It is, therefore, the equivalent of
the term “tort” in Anglo-American law.78
Idem; Persons liable. — Obligations arising from quasi-
delicts are demandable not only from the person directly responsible
for the damage incurred,79 but also against the following:
(1) The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, themother, with respect to damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company;
(2) Guardians, with respect to damages caused by the minors
or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and who live
in their company;
(3) The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise, with respect to damages caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or onthe occasion of their functions;
(4) Employers with respect to damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry;
(5) The State, when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the of ficial to whom the task
done properly pertains; and
(6) Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades, with respect to damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.80
It must be noted, however, that the responsibility of the above
persons or entities shall cease if they can prove that they have
77Report of the Code Commission, p. 161.78See Elcano and Elcano vs. Hill and Hill, 77 SCRA 98.79 Art. 2176, Civil Code.80 Art. 2180, Civil Code.
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observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.81
Idem; Requisites of liability. — In actions based on quasi-
delicts, before the person injured can recover damages from the
defendant, it is necessary that he must be able to prove the following
facts:
(1) The fault or negligence of the defendant;
(2) The damage suffered or incurred by the plaintiff; and
(3) The relation of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by theplaintiff.82
Idem; Quasi-delicts and crimes. — Quasi-delicts and crimi-
nal offenses are sometimes dif ficult to distinguish from each other.
However, they may be distinguished from each other in the follow-
ing ways:
(1) Crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delicts are
only of private concern;
(2) The Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act,
while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs
the damages incurred;
(3) Generally, there are two liabilities in crime: criminal and
civil. In quasi-delict, there is only civil liability; and
(4) Crimes are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the
former are punished only if there is a law clearly covering them,
while the latter include all acts in which any kind of fault ornegligence intervenes.83
Idem; Scope of quasi-delicts. — In Elcano vs. Hill (G.R. No.
L-24303, May 26, 1977), the Supreme Court held that quasi-delicts
include acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the
penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Using the exact language
of the Court, “it is ‘more congruent with the spirit of law, equity
and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress,’ to hold, as
81 Ibid.82Taylor vs. Manila Electric Co., 16 Phil. 8.83Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607.
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OBLIGATIONS
we do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to fault or negligence,
covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent.’’
The above pronouncement of the Supreme Court is
startling. It expands the coverage of quasi-delicts beyond what
was originally contemplated by the lawmaker.
Under the general plan of our law on obligations, the scope
of obligations arising from the law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
and acts or omissions punished by law is well-defined. Their
boundaries are clearly delineated and drawn with precision. It
is only with respect to obligations arising from quasi-delicts thatthere is a problem and this is natural because of the very nature
of such obligations. Under our system of liabilities, quasi-delicts
must necessarily be a sort of “dumping ground’’ or “garbage can’’for all kinds of actionable wrongs not falling within the purview
of the four sources of obligations. As we look at it, the original
plan envisaged by the lawmaker is as follows:
The coverage of quasi-delicts which do not overlap with
crimes under the Revised Penal Code and special laws (and
which we can very well call the general rule) are: first, negligentacts or omissions not punishable as criminal offenses; second,
intentional quasi-delicts or torts, such as those regulated by
Arts. 19, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28 and 1314 of the Civil Code; andthird, the so-called strict liability torts where there is neithernegligence nor intent to cause damage or injury, such as in the
case contemplated in Art. 23 of the Civil Code or in the case of
actionable nuisances under Arts. 694 and 705 of the Civil Code.
The coverage of quasi-delicts which overlap with acts
or omissions punishable under the Revised Penal Code (and
which we can very well call the exceptions) are: first, criminalnegligence; and second, acts or omissions punishable as crimesunder the Revised Penal Code but the Civil Code expressly
declares that the civil action arising therefrom is separate and
independent from the criminal action. (Arts. 31, 32, 33 and 34 of
the Civil Code)
We believe that the above arrangement was deliberately
planned. Thus, according to the Code Commission in its Report:“The Commission also thought of the possibility of adopting
the word ‘tort’ from Anglo-American law. But ‘tort’ under thatsystem is much broader than the Spanish-Philippine concept
of obligations arising from non-contractual negligence. ‘Tort’ in Anglo-American jurisprudence includes not only negligence, but
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also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, falseimprisonment and deceit. In the general plan of the Philippine
legal system, intentional and malicious acts are governed bythe Penal Code, although certain exceptions are made in the
Project.’’ (Report, pp. 161-162)
Idem; Character of remedy. — In Padua vs. Robles,84 in his
concurring opinion, Justice Barredo declared: “It is by now beyond
all cavil, as to dispense with the citation of jurisprudence, that a
negligent act, such as that committed in this case, gives rise to at
least two separate and independent liabilities, namely (1) the civil
liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liabilityarising from civil negligence or the so-called culpa aquiliana.
These two concepts of faults are so distinct from each other that
exoneration from one does not result in exoneration from the other.
Adjectively and substantively, they can be prosecuted separately
and independently of each other, although Article 2177 of the Civil
Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent
act or omission, which means that should there be varying amounts
awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in effect,
only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff had alreadybeen ordered paid an amount in one case and in the other case the
amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in the second case
only to the excess over the one fixed in the first case, but if he had
already been paid a bigger amount in the first case, he may not
recover anymore in the second case.’’
The above opinion was confirmed in Elcano vs. Hill.85 Thus,
according to the Supreme Court: “Consequently, a separate civil
action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not heis criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that
the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged criminally,
to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two assuming that the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of
the civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
8466 SCRA 485.8577 SCRA 98.
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OBLIGATIONS
as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by
a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused.”
However, in Mendoza vs. Arrieta,86 a more recent case, there was
a return to the old doctrine of selection of remedies. In this case, the
Supreme Court categorically held that since the offended or injured
party had chosen the remedy of proceeding under the Revised Penal
Code by allowing the civil action to be impliedly instituted in the
criminal action, and since the court had expressly declared that the
fact from which the civil liability did not exist, therefore, the civil
action for damages subsequently commenced by said injured partyagainst the defendant has already been extinguished in consonance
with Sec. 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. And even if plaintiff’s
cause of action against defendant is not ex-delicto, the end result
would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal
case that defendant’s acquittal was not based upon reasonable
doubt.
Thus, the problem is still very much with us. The debate rages
on.
Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario
73 Phil. 607
This case come up from the Court of Appeals which held
the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages forthe death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro
Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936,
on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal,there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate
Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided byPedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its
passengers, 16-year-old Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from
which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against
Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he wasconvicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one
year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court
in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a
separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals af firmed
8691 SCRA 113.
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the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. SeverinoGarcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March
7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance ofManila against Faustino Barredo as the sole proprietor of the
Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8,1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages
in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the
date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of
Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interestfrom the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that
Fontanilla’s negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was
driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to
Barredo’s responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
“* * * It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla’s employer.
There is no proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent the damage. (See p. 22, appellant’s brief.)In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who
had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile
Law and speeding (Exhibit A) — violations which appeared in
the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to the publicand to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under
the provisions of Article 1903 of the Civil Code.’’
The main theory of the defense is that the liability ofFausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence,
his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil
action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable,
Barredo cannot be held responsible in this case. The petitioner’sbrief states on page 10:
“* * * The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is beingsued for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanillato prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words,
the Court of Appeals insists on applying in this case Article1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in
Chapter 11, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes
said article inapplicable to a civil liability arising from a crime
as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 ofBook lV of the Civil Code, in precise words of Article 1903 of the
Civil Code itself, is applicable only to “those (obligations) arising
from wrongful or negligent acts or omissions not punishable by
law.’ ’’ The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed
thus:
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OBLIGATIONS
“* * * We cannot agree to the defendant’s contention.The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is
not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor(the crime of Pedro Fontanilla), but an obligation imposed in
Article .1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in theselection or supervision of his servant or employee.”
Speaking through Justice Bocobo, the Supreme Court held:
“The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs
may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo,
thus making him primarily and directly responsible under
Article 1903 (now Art. 2180, New Civil Code) of the Civil Code asan employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that
Fontanilla’s negligence being punishable by the Penal Code,
his (defendant’s) liability as an employer is only subsidiary,
according to said Penal Code, but Fontanilla has not been sued
in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To
decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has,
in the minds of many, confused and jumbled together delitos
and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or
negligence under Articles 1902-1910 (now Arts. 2176 to 2194,
New Civil Code) of the Civil Code.
“Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or
“culpa aquiliana’’ is a separate legal institution under the Civil
Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Upon this
principle, and on the wording and spirit of Article 1903 of the
Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers
may be safely anchored.
x x x “It will thus be seen that while the terms of Article.1902
of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the driver’s
negligence in the instant case, nevertheless Article 1093 limits
cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions “not punishable by law.’’ But
inasmuch as Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes
not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence,
the fault or negligence under Article 1902 of the Civil Code has
apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes
the “confusion worse confounded.’’ However, a closer study
shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligentacts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos
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or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causingdamages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under Articles 1902-1910
of the Civil Code.
x x x
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separateindividuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil
Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between
civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault of negligence under
Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the samenegligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from
a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for
fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render
it inescapable to conclude that the employer — in this case the
defendant-petitioner — is primarily and directly liable under
Article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked
should ordinarily be suf ficient to dispose of this case. Butinasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little
understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate
their foundations.
“Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in Article 366 punishes
not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold
that Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law according to the literal import
of Article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual
life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through
any degree of negligence — even the slightest — would have to
be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising
from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain
for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to
the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurdand anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws,
disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit
that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law
to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancientorigin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or
cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in Articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
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OBLIGATIONS
“Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case,proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in
a civil case, preponderance of evidence is suf ficient to makethe defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonabledoubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible
in a civil action under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
“Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make de-
fendant’s liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver andexhaust his (the latter’s) property first, would be tantamount
to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome
method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy un-
der our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which
is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defen-
dant under Article. 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law
is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the
procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive
of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that profes-
sional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usuallydo not have suf ficient means with which to pay damages. Why,
then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through
this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure?
In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and
facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
“At this juncture, it should be said that the primary
and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen
and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in
order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employerswho principally reap the profits resulting from the services of
these servants and employees. It is but right that they should
guarantee the latter’s careful conduct for the personal and
patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, “they
should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness,
others for their poor selection and all for their negligence.” And
according to Manresa, “It is much more equitable and just that
such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director
who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not
upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection
and who used such employee because of his confidence in the
principal or director.” (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also
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base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principleof representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos
says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before thirdpersons the employer and employee “vienen a ser como una sola
personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quienle emplea y utiliza” (“become as one personality by the merging
of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and
utilizes him.”) All these observations acquire a peculiar force
and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there isneed of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners
of motor vehicles.
“Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions ofboth the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which
has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres
already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character
and ef ficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grownup a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the
civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there
is another remedy, which is by invoking Articles 1902-1910 of
the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed byour laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and
nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on
culpa aquiliana or extra-contractual.
“In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals should be and is hereby af firmed, with costs against the
defendant-petitioner.’’
Elcano vs. Hill
77 SCRA 98
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City dismissing the complaint of plaintiffsfor recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,
married at the time of occurrence, and his father, defendant
Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence,
for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, of whichwhen criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted
on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack of
intent to kill, coupled with a mistake. According to the Supreme
Court, speaking through Justice Barredo:
“As We view the foregoing background of this case, the twodecisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the
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acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action forcivil liability was not reserved?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the
Civil Code be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding theundisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of,
Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence
from his father, was already legally married?
“The first issue presents no more problem than the need
for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual character,
criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation
which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs.
Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on thebasis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature
of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of theSupreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and
earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can
result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also
under the Civil Code.
“Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon
a reading of x x x Garcia — that the concurrence of the PenalCode and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only
acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts — deeper
reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements
therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends tofault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to
the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919,
supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent
act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force hereat the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations which
are derived from acts or omissions, in which fault or negligence,not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter
II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)’’ And it isprecisely the underlined qualification, “not punishable by law,’’
that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an undesirable
construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that
“killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth life’’ hence, the rulingthat “(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother
and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito,
which is conserved and made enduring in Articles 1902 to 1910of the Spanish Civil Code.’’ And so, because Justice Bocobo was
Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original
text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code,
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which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses theterm, “not punishable by law,’’ thereby making it clear that the
concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal incharacter or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or
negligent. Thus, the corresponding provision to said Article 1093in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, “Obligations
derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions
of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book (on quasi-delicts), and by
special laws.’’ More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 ofthe new code provides:
“ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinctfrom the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.’’
According to the Code Commission: “The foregoing provi-
sion (Article 2177) though at first sight startling, is not so novel
or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal
and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal
law, while the latter is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, of an-
cient origin, having always had its own foundation and indi-
viduality separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction
between criminal negligence and culpa extra-contractual or cu-
asi-delito has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court
of Spain and outstanding Spanish jurists. Therefore, under the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be
a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising
from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double recovery.”
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 162.) Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally
refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice
Bocobo about construction that upholds “the spirit that giveth
life’’ rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of
the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of
the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in
character (under Articles .29 to 32) from the civil responsibility
arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised PenalCode, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and
3(c), Rule III, contemplate also the same separability, it is “more
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congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more
in harmony with modern progress,’’ to borrow the felicitous
relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Paci fi c Co., 7Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers
to “fault or negligence,’’ covers not only acts “not punishable by
law’’ but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In otherwords, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule III, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed, by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary
and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in
the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-
delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action
against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of
Reginald’s emancipation by marriage on the possible civil
liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion
that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free
from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the
minor (child),” it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article
399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full
or absolute. Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child’s
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate
or encumber real property without the consent of his father ormother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with
the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.’’
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Now, under Article 2180, “The obligation imposed by Article2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Thefather and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children wholive in their company.’’ In the instant case, it is not controverted
that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient toand dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
“It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the
reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with theiroffending child under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of
the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent
them from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand,the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minoremancipated by marriage may not nevertheless, sue or be suedwithout the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipationdoes not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or doany act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone elseinvites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of aminor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see toit that the child, while still a minor, does not give cause to anylitigation, in the same manner that the parents are answerablefor the borrowing of money and alienation or encumbering ofreal property which cannot be done by their minor married child
without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
“Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 appliesto Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is
now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill hasbecome merely subsidiary to that of his son.
“WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and
the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with theforegoing opinion. Costs against appellees.’’
Mendoza vs. Arrieta
91 SCRA 113
The records show that a three-way vehicular accidentoccurred involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by
Edgardo Mendoza, a private jeep owned and driven by Rodolfo
Salazar and a sand-and-gravel truck owned by Felipino Timbol
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and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of the mishap,two separate criminal actions for damage to property through
reckless imprudence were instituted. The first was institutedby Mendoza against Salazar, while the second was institutedby Salazar against Montoya. There was no reservation madeby both complainants of their right to institute a civil actionseparately. After hearing the two cases jointly, the courtrendered judgment acquitting Salazar on the ground that his jeep was bumped from behind by the truck causing it to collidewith the Mercedes Benz. Montoya, on the other hand, wasconvicted on the ground that his guilt was established beyondreasonable doubt. He was ordered to pay to Salazar the amount
of P972.50 for actual damages to the latter’s jeep. After thetermination of the criminal cases, Mendoza filed a civil case.against both Salazar and Timbol, either in the alternative orin solidum, for indemnification for damages. Upon motions ofboth defendants, the respondent court dismissed the case. Theplaintiff, as a consequence, went up to the Supreme Court bymeans of a petition for certiorari seeking a review of the ordersof dismissal. Speaking through Justice Herrera, the SupremeCourt held:
“We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated
September 12, 1970, dismissing petitioner’s Complaint againsttruck-owner Timbol.
“In dismissing the complaint against the truck-owner,respondent Judge sustained Timbol’s allegations that the civilsuit is barred by the prior joint judgment in Criminal Cases Nos.SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a separatecivil case was made by petitioner and where the latter activelyparticipated in the trial and tried to prove damages against jeep-driver Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not
state a cause of action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuchas petitioner prosecuted jeep-owner-driver Salazar as the onesolely responsible for the damage suffered by his car.
“Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment toconstitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisitesmust concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must havebeen rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subjectmatter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on themerits; and (4) there must be, between the first and secondactions, identity of parties, identity of subject matter and
identity of cause of action.
“It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata
are present. However, we agree with petitioner that there is
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no identity of cause of action between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said
criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted fordamage to petitioner’s car but for damage to the jeep. Neitherwas truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as thetrial Court had put it “the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannotrecover any damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he(Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo Salazarin Criminal Case No. SM-228.’’ And more importantly, in thecriminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of thecivil liability arising from criminal negligence under Article100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is
based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article2176 of the Civil Code. As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al.:
“The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate theseparate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquilianaunder the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there isa distinction between civil liability arising from criminalnegligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibilityfor fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 ofthe Civil Code, and that the same negligent act mayproduce either a civil liability arising from a crime underthe Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault ornegligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.Still more concretely, the authorities above cited renderit inescapable to conclude that the employer, in this casethe defendant-petitioner, is primarily and directly liableunder Article 1903 of the Civil Code.”
“The petitioner’s cause of action against Timbol in the Civilcase is based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in thecomplaint, to wit: that while petitioner was driving his car along
MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned anddriven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his (petitioner’s) lane andcollided with his car; that the sudden swerving of Salazar’s jeepwas caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of FreddieMontoya, Timbol’s employee, who was then driving a gravel-and-sand truck in the same direction as Salazar’s jeep; and that as aconsequence of the collision, petitioner’s car suffered extensivedamage amounting to P12,248.20 and that he likewise incurredactual and moral damages, litigation expenses and attorney’sfees. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action
must consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff’s primary right, i.e., thathe is the owner of a Mercedes Benz; and (2) defendants’ delictor wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff’s primaryright, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner
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Salazar or of Timbol’s employee, Montoya, in driving the truck,causing Salazar’s jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner’s
car, were alleged in the Complaint.
“Consequently, petitioner’s cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed reversible error whenhe dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said casemay proceed independently of the criminal proceedings andregardless of the result of the latter.