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A Report on the Intervention

in the 2015 Amreli Flood

Centre for Social Justice

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Contents

Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. 3

Summary ......................................................................................................................... 4

Key Recommendations .................................................................................................... 5

About CSJ‟s Coastal Campaign........................................................................................ 6

Aims and Objectives ................................................................................................. 7

Methodology ............................................................................................................. 7

The Circle ............................................................................................................... 10

Background ................................................................................................................... 11

Amreli Flood........................................................................................................... 12

Frameworks for the Analysis .......................................................................................... 14

Theoretical Framework ........................................................................................... 14

International Framework ......................................................................................... 18

Constitutional Framework ....................................................................................... 23

Disaster Management Framework ........................................................................... 24

Findings of the Research ................................................................................................ 27

Mitigation and Preparedness ................................................................................... 27

Response and Relief ................................................................................................ 31

Recovery, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation .......................................................... 39

Actions .......................................................................................................................... 44

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 46

Vulnerabilities of Certain Groups ............................................................................ 47

Rights of Victims and Expectations from the State .................................................. 53

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Summary

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Previous Disaster Related Work

CSJ has been engaged in disaster management related work ever since the 2001 Gujarat Earthquake. Mr.

Gagan Sethi of the organisation was also appointed as the rapporteur for monitoring human rights

violations during the relief and rehabilitation efforts, post the 2001 earthquake that took place in Kutch.

We became part of a large network of organisation called „the Kutch Navnirmanabhiyan‟ which

coordinated civil society efforts towards disaster recovery. At the time, we were in constant engagement

with the government trying to ensure that the schemes and policies announced address the ground

realities. Suggestions made by us are reflected in the Earthquake rehabilitation policy framed by the

Government of Gujarat. We also helped monitor the process of distribution of rehabilitation package,

developing our own design for the purpose that we have subsequently utilised for other similar

disasters.

An output of the process was a comparative study of various relief codes and a Model Disaster Code for

the state which was proposed by us. This experience helped us in our efforts with respect to the 2002

riots, which was a human disaster and we played a similar role of influencing policies and ensuring

implementation.

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Background

s known to many, India remains quite vulnerable to natural disasters owing to its geo-climatic

conditions.1 According to a report prepared by the Union Government, “60% of [India‟s]

landmass is prone to earthquakes of various intensities; over 40 million hectares is prone to floods;

about 8% of the total area is prone to cyclones and 68% of the area is susceptible to drought.”2 Every

year, India is witness to multiple occurrences of disasters in its many various regions. The November-

December Coramandal Coast (South India) Floods, the August Assam Flood, the June and July Gujarat

Floods were the major calamities that struck over 2015. The April Nepal Earthquake too resulted in

widespread casualties on this side of the International border. The year also saw droughts being declared

in ten States, most severe in their impact in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh.3

The recent UNISDR Report titled The Human Cost of Weather Related Disasters 1995-2015 confirms

the high extent of the damage due to weather related disasters in India.4 Between 1995 and 2015, 805

million people in India have been affected by these, a number second only to China.5 The report also

points out the high risk of flood damage in India with around 6,500 people dying as a result of it, just in

the year 2013.6

The risks of cyclones, floods and droughts in particular, have been escalated in recent years by climate

change.7 This is still not to say that disasters of greatest magnitude cannot sometimes be caused by

human actions. Apart from chemical disasters of the scale of the Bhopal Gas leak, certain natural

disasters such as the 2013 Uttarakhand landslide have seen the damage considerably up-scaled due to

1 Disaster Management in India, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, pg 3 (2005) available at

http://www.unisdr.org/2005/mdgs-drr/national-reports/India-report.pdf. 2 Id. 3 Sayantan Bera, Three drought-hit states to get Rs. 6,794 crore in central assistance, LIVEMINT (December 30, 2015)

available at http://www.livemint.com/Politics/nSSYZszzbaZzyQR0zzVraO/Three-drou

ghthit-states-to-get-Rs6794-crore-in-central-ass.html; Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Odisha,

Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Rajasthan, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh were the ten states. 4 The Human Cost of Weather Related Disasters 1995-2015, CENTRE FOR RESEARCH ON THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF

DISASTERS, UN OFFICE FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION (November, 2015)

http://www.unisdr.org/2015/docs/climatechange/COP21_WeatherDisastersReport_2015_FINAL.pdf 5 Id. at 18. 6 Supra note 4 at 14. 7 Deepanwita Niyogi, „India is likely to experience strong relative impacts of climate change', DOWN TO EARTH (July 6,

2015) available at http://www.downtoearth.org.in/interviews/-india-is-likely-to-experience-strong-relative-impacts-of-

climate-change--50420; and KS Rajgopal, Chennai floods due to climate change?, The Hindu (December 13, 2015)

http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/energy-and-environment/chennai-floods-due-to-climate-change/article7980332.ece

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human contribution. And though all disasters are not entirely avoidable, the loss of human life and

property can be considerably reduced when States take steps towards having management mechanism in

place.

Robust mechanisms will equip people to handle disaster situations better as well as call on government

officials to mitigate dangers of the calamity and steer people to safety and normalcy during and after

such a calamity. Human life and well being can equally be protected by extending quick relief to the

victims of disaster. The Amreli flood just as other disasters did this year, raised questions about the

efficacy of the established system of the disaster management.

Amreli Flood

ccording to the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority in its official report, Amreli district

received a rainfall of 2580 mm on 24th June 2015 which was four times of the annual average

over the last ten years.8 The human death toll in Amreli Districts was at least 47 as confirmed by the

administration with many still missing.9 Around 585 villages were reportedly affected in some way and

110 villages saw some damage and 73 villages were severely affected.10

GSDMA also records the

number of damaged houses to be 3988, the loss of crops to be spread over around 13,700 hectares and

erosion to soil in over 9200 hectares.11

Significant damage to the state infrastructure was also recorded.

The damage was far greater than what was recorded by GSDMA.

Unfortunately for the State, the disaster in Amreli was followed by another flood in a month‟s time in

North Gujarat which led to the death of over 70 people as some reports said.12

The Government of Gujarat declared a relief package of Rs. 300 Crores, after three weeks of the flood,

on 14th July with the damage assessment still underway in the District.13

Against the norms of

8 Amreli Flood Report, GUJARAT STATE DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY, i (June, 2015) available at

http://gsdma.org/documents/Amreli_Flood_Report_GSDMA_7.7.pdf 9 Two more bodies recovered in Amreli, flood death toll goes up to 47, INDIAN EXPRESS (July 6, 2015) available at

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/gujarat/two-more-bodies-recovered-in-amreli-flood-death-toll-goes-up-to-47/ 10 Supra note 8 at 3-4. 11

Supra note 8 at 10-11. 12 Gujarat floods: 72 people dead, over 81,000 cattle perished due to heavy rains, FIRSTPOST (August 5, 2015) available

at

http://www.firstpost.com/india/gujarat-floods-72-people-dead-over-81000-cattle-perished-due-to-heavy-rains-

2380592.html 13 Gujarat government announces Rs 300 crore package for flood-hit regions, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (July 14, 2015)

available at

http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-07-14/news/64405837_1_150-crore-300-crore-relief-package

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assistance from the SDRF and NDRF circulated by the Union Home Ministry, the State Government‟s

relief package went further by raising the quantum of assistance under some heads of damage, and

including within their policy, farmers with land holding of more than two hectares.14

The Government

also made special provisions offering assistance to small and medium business owners as well as

offering low interest loan facilities.15

Despite of the expanse of the relief package, owing to the usual

issues of implementation, the ground situation at Amreli failed to reflect earnestness on the part of the

Government and its functionaries.

14 CLS/102015/431/S3 dated 15/07/2015 15

PRCh/102015/519356-Ch dated 15/07/2015

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Research Design

Aims and Objectives

his intervention began with the aim of inquiring into the implementation of the relief package

announced by the Government of Gujarat for the victims of the Amreli flood and studying the

conditions that the victims were living in. Experience has shown that while the Governments announce

relief packages that appear generous, they remain poorly implemented and after the public attention has

subsided, victims find themselves left abandoned. It is desirable to have an independent assessment of

the Government efforts keeping the Government and its functionaries in check. This kind of engagement

of the civil society is a crucial aspect of democracy.

Centre for Social Justice‟s larger objective has been to evaluate the disaster management system

consisting of disaster management legislations, plans, policies and institutions and how this system

actually functions. The intervention is also an effort towards remedying the deficiencies that are found

in the system, an effort made by way of our recommendations for policy changes and its better

implementation, and also furthering a rights discourse on disaster relief and recovery in India. This is

with the hope that damage to human life and surroundings from natural disasters can someday be

radically minimised.

Methodology

entre for Social Justice through its initial survey conducted between 7th and 16

th September, 2015

reached out to 16 affected villages in three of the most affected Talukas in Amreli: Bagasara,

Vadiya-Kukanvav and Liliya. Eight of the villages selected were those adjacent to the highways and

main roads, and 8 of the villages were those which did not lie on any of the main roads. Considering

these as the main criteria, 8 of the 16 villages were around the top of the list of most affected villages in

the flood and 8 villages were around the bottom. These criteria were chosen to make the sample diverse

and representative of villages differently placed in terms of damage. The 16 villages were Gawadka,

Juna Vaghaniya, Khari, Paniya, Babapur, Chanpathal, Nana Gokharvada, Mota Gokharvada, Jamka,

Khijadiya, Mota Ujala, Sanadi, Vavdi, Khakhariya, Vankiya and Vitthalpur.

In the 8 villages where the number of affected families was relatively less, we sought to cover all those

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who were affected while in the villages with greater damage, it sought to cover about 20% of the

affected families.

We interviewed 1055 persons with the help of 9 volunteers and 5 supervisors. The interviews were

based on a set of predetermined questions printed out in a form on which the responses were also

recorded. The form is part of the annexures. Each question references entitlements that were part of the

package announced by the Gujarat Government.

The research was action oriented. In the process of gathering data whenever the victims expressed any

need, we drafted applications for them and had them sent. These applications were for the demands of

resurveying, processing claims, legal assistance from DSLA inter alia, depending on the needs of the

victims.

We also talked to government officials at the District and Taluka levels including the District Collector,

District Development Officer, Chief Medical Officer, Superintendent of Police, Secretary of the Amreli

District Legal Services Authority, and Amreli and Vadiya-Kukanvav Taluka Development Officers. In

the villages, we interviewed the Sarpanch when available. This exercise was to verify that they were

aware of the functions they are obligated to discharge and the extent to which they discharged them. We

also got crucial insights into how they perceived their own work during the flood.

We file applications under the Right to Information Act for obtaining data from the official records on

the damage and the relief distributed, policies and plans that are not available in the public domain, and

reports that reveal the actions undertaken by various government officials.

On a second visit on 9th and 10

th December, group discussions took place in three villages: Chandgarh,

Devaliya and Vitthalpur, to reassess the situation after more than 5 months of the floods with the focus

on the agricultural labourers, those who had lost their houses and those who had not suffered damage to

their agricultural lands.

Centre for Social Justice works with a defined entitlement and availability framework that is called „the

Circle‟. The Circle is brought into action with the process of identification and assessment of issues

internally (step 1). This leads to increasing of awareness and filing of individual claims and then to the

monitoring of claims and their follow up (steps 2 & 3). This is followed by the conversion of individual

issues into a collective issue (step 4). The Circle is brought into conclusion by addressing larger policy

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concerns to prevent such issues from recurring (step 5).

At the centre of this framework is the analysis of whether laws and policies relevant to a particular issue

do not exist at all, exist but are not implemented, or exist but work against already vulnerable groups

carried out in light of fundamental rights and international instruments. A similar three step analysis is

carried out for responsible institutions. These analyses requiring in large part desk work form the second

part of the research.

The Circle

Identification and Assessment of Issues

Increasing Awareness and Filing of Claims

Monitoring and Follow up of Claims

using RTI and Otherwise

Converting Individual Problems into

Collective Issues

Identifying and Addressing Policy

Concerns

Laws & Policies 1. Exist but not implemented 2. Do not exist

3. Work against the vulnerable

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Findings

he rainfall of 2580 mm that Amreli received on 24th June, 2015 was excessive by any measure. In

comparison, the average annual rainfall in the district is only 609 mm according to official

records. This rainfall was the result of a deep depression that developed on 23rd June in the north-east

Arabian Sea. The resultant flood was reported to be the worst that the district had seen in ninety years

although not much is known about this other big flood ninety years ago. Even with a low average

rainfall however, flooding of low lying areas in Amreli is not exactly a rare occurrence, taking place

every year or every couple of years. Some of the people CSJ interviewed reported damage to their

farmlands in the previous monsoon as well. There were also those who had faced clogging of water in

their homes on previous occasions. The immoderate rainfall on 24th June can be imagined to have then

caused a far greater damage.

It is understood that the magnitude of the rains and the damage could not have been foreseen by the

administration but a flood risk zone identification carried out by the Gujarat State Disaster Management

Authority sometime in the last decade as part of the creation of the Gujarat Hazard Risk & Vulnerability

Atlas does disclose flood vulnerability of the river basins in the district. The State Disaster Management

Plan 2015-2016 prepared by GSDMA notes: “Concentrated runoff resulted by heavy rainfall cause flash

floods in the small river basin of Saurashtra and Kutch because of their fairly impervious catchments

(rocky or black cotton soils) and steep sloping upper catchments.”16

It goes on further, “The flood prone river sections were identified from settlement level analysis. Flood

prone river sections in Saurashtra extend to the upper basins due to the presence of dams which have to

resort to emergency discharge during heavy rainstorms.”17

The Plan claims that much of Gujarat is, in

fact, flood prone.

16 Supra note 36. 17

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Flood Hazard Risk Zonation- Gujarat Hazard Risk & Vulnerability Atlas- GSDMA

Likewise, the District Disaster Management Plan also accepts Amreli‟s vulnerability to floods and other

natural disasters. It even recorded one death due to floods in 2014. It has further admitted to an

insufficient capacity in dealing with bigger disasters.

The vulnerability atlas was prepared by GSDMA so that risk reduction activities could be carried out by

it and the State Government.18

Neither the knowledge of vulnerability nor the intention to reduce it ever

18

Supra note 36.

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translated into concrete steps towards mitigating disasters. When you consider the National Disaster

Management Authority guidelines on floods that spell out clearly the steps to be undertaken by the State

Government and Disaster Authorities towards mitigating flood, the omissions are difficult to explain.

The steps that the Flood Guidelines ask the State Governments and the State Disaster Management

Authorities to take are: studying the efficacy of structural measures and carry out these measures; carry

out other non-structural measures; modernising and strengthening flood forecasting and warning

systems, building capacities of government officials and communities, installing robust response

systems; and preparation of flood management plans and their implementation.19

These particular

measures were required to be taken in phases and completed by 2012.

The structural measures include construction of embankments, improvement of river channels,

improvement of drainage systems, desilting of rivers, treatment of catchment areas and afforestation,

anti-erosion works, improving capacity of dams, regulating reservoirs, etc.20

The need for studying the

utility of these measures before carrying them out has been expressed by NDMA since some of the

measures are counterproductive in many cases.

The non-structural measures include importantly, implementing flood plain zoning regulations or

enacting a legislation for flood zoning in order to regulate construction and other human activity in flood

plains. A model flood plain zoning Bill is a part of the Guidelines. These also cover creating flood

shelters and flood proofing of buildings which can act as shelters.

With the exception of implementing flood response systems in the form of the Incident Command

System (ICS), working of which may itself need reviewing, the Government of Gujarat and GSDMA

has done very little to absolutely nothing in carrying out said measures. While the State has

conspicuously never taken an initiative to enact a flood plain zoning law, the absence of regulations or

even plans thereof, studies for implementing structural measures anywhere in the State, or a dedicated

flood management plan has been confirmed by us through an RTI query to the GSDMA.

The forecasting system, if any, in the district of Amreli, had not worked and some of the District

Officials confirmed to us that they received information only once the flooding had begun, from the

19 Supra note 35. 20

Supra note 35.

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officials at village level. No warning was received by people in most of the affected villages, as they

recount. When asked about any kind of training given to them to effectively deal with disasters, a man in

Chandgarh pointed in the direction of a board put up by authorities that apparently read the measures to

be taken during a flood situation. CSJ could not find anyone who had been given a training to deal with

the floods.

The people of Amreli and the authorities alike were found severely underprepared for a disaster of this

scale yet, they would have still found themselves in trouble if the scale of the flood was much smaller.

The unforeseeability and the magnitude of the disaster cannot work as an excuse when the State

Government and GSDMA has shown unwillingness to carry out clear instructions. All disasters are, after

all, unforeseeable by varying degrees and State Governments should be required to show at least some

initiatives in order to escape responsibility. Regions such as South Gujarat are perhaps more vulnerable

to floods than Saurashtra and the State Government actions (or lack thereof) leave these regions

thoroughly exposed to tragedies. States repeatedly show unwillingness to take Central guidelines

seriously but if this results in avoidable damage, the responsibility must be pinned down on the State

Government and other authorities.

A possible reason for the neglect of these clearly laid down guidelines is that the State of Gujarat has not

implemented the Disaster Management Act, 2005 and does not seem to be in a mood to do so. In 2013,

CAG published its report on “Performance Audit of Disaster Preparedness in India” in which it assessed

the disaster management capabilities of central bodies and various States.21

It was noted at the time that

the State Executive Committee, which is supposed to be the executive body of the State Disaster

Management Authority had yet to be constituted in Gujarat. The District Disaster Management

Authorities, the executive bodies in each district too had not been established in the state.22

In Amreli thus, the disaster management system does not function as DDMA instead has a slightly

ambiguous system under which most of the responsibilities have been delegated to an officer sitting at

the District Emergency Operation Centre or the District Development Officer. Unsurprisingly, the

District Collector at Amreli appeared unaware of his responsibilities and the progress of the relief

21 Performance Audit of Disaster Preparedness in India, COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR GENERAL OF INDIA (2013)

available at http://164.100.47.132/paperlaidfiles/HOME%20AFFAIRS/Disaster-Preparedness%20-%20English%20-

%20Highrised.pdf 22 CAG noting several problems in India‟s disaster mitigation and preparedness mechanism found that, “NDMA‟s project

management capacity was deficient. As a result, none of its mitigation and vulnerability mapping projects was completed.”

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process.

A PIL was also filed before the Supreme Court based on the CAG report back then asking for the DM

Act to be implemented by the Centre, NDMA, seven States including Gujarat. It is known that notices

were issued to the respondents asking for the Act to be implemented in “letter and spirit”.23

The State of Gujarat continues to implement the older GSDM Act, 2003. Purely on Constitutional

grounds, the later DM Act, 2005 should prevail over the GSDM Act since they both concern a subject

not in any of the three lists in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and by default, the Parliament

that has the power to make laws on residuary subjects. Gujarat should have therefore replaced the earlier

structures with those prescribed by the Central Act. The hard consequence of not adopting the DM Act is

that some of the crucial functions that this act outlines have been ignored. The implementation of

NDMA‟s Flood Guidelines for instance would have been a statutory function of the DDMA but without

a DDMA, no body has been made responsible to carry this part of the function out. Similarly, since the

SEC has not been notified, there is little clarity if all or any of the specific powers given to SEC,

particularly those that relate to mitigation, are currently being carried out. This situation raises serious

questions of accountability.

It is true that there was a substantial failure to carry out of any mitigation related activity, that this had

fundamentally to do with the non-existence of adequate structures is one way to understand it. On the

whole, this is not a simple failure to perform statutory duties but one that, very likely, led to the violation

of fundamental right against deprivation of life.

Response and Relief

istrict Administration put up a sincere first response to the flood. According to the GSDMA

Report, the Air Force operating from their Jamnagar base assisted them when called upon. The

deployment of two helicopters on the day of the flood could not have been adequate and this was

subsequently increased to four on the following day. Two teams of NDRF also arrived on the night of

the flood and by the following day three teams were in deployment. Report shows that 254 people were

23 SC asks Centre to implement Disaster Management Act, FIRSTPOST (September 23, 2013) available at

http://www.firstpost.com/india/sc-asks-centre-to-implement-disaster-management-act-1128081.html

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airlifted and in all, 614 people were rescued and 5500 people were evacuated. The evacuation and

rescue figures do tell us that the response saved the lives of many but considering that over 1,37,000

were severely affected, the figures appear small. This is supplemented by the testimonies of a large

number of victims, whether it was that they were stuck on the terrace of their houses for days or that

they had to rescue themselves from dire situations and find shelter in the homes of their friends and

relatives living in a different village.

Report also shows that 41,000 water packets and 11,500 food packets were distributed and if this was

correct, the number is still quite small. Because there were no relief camps in operations during and after

the flood, these services were not available to a much larger number of victims. This has been confirmed

by senior District officials and persons who are responsible for camps on paper. Basic services could not

have, in any way, reached a significant portion of the affected population, something also confirmed by

the interviewees.

Nonetheless, to its credit the response teams worked hard to have the basic services such as electricity,

healthcare and road connectivity was restored within a few days at most places. Necessary public

infrastructure also did not take very long to be repaired though some of the roads do continue to lie in

their unrepaired states. The Primary Health Centre at Kukanvav which was completely flooded was back

in operation the following day. People in most villages visited by us were aware of primary health

camps taking place in their villages though not everyone accessed it. The Health and Medical

departments in the District let us access documents that show deployment of quick medical response

teams that arrived from outside the district.

The relief operations began with an initial assessment that was carried out at the village level. A second

damage assessment survey was later carried out based on which the relief sum was evidently decided.

This was done by taluka (block) level officers. The biggest howlers were made at this stage of the relief

process. A reasonably high number of persons (269 people or 25%) attest that the survey teams did not

even visit their homes or localities. Many said that the teams only visited houses closest to the main

road.

Caste based discrimination has been very apparent in the process. Dalit colonies and some OBC

colonies in many villages were those that were completely left out from the survey. This has been the

case in Chandgarh and Kukanvav.

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In Kukanvav, several persons from the Dalit and Devipujak colony24

were sitting in protest against the

neglect by the State Government. Kishorebhai Solanki, a Devipujak was one of the persons from the

colony who had joined the Amreli MLA Paresh Dhanani in his fast-unto-death.25

On 18th August,

Kishore self-immolated on the road when his family of agriculture labourers was away working. It took

Kishore‟s death for taluka level officers to finally notice his colony and they soon carried out its survey.

While Kishore‟s family did eventually receive relief, most of the other families in the colony had to

continue to wait. When met with and asked about the suicide, the Kukanvav Taluka Development

Officer and an associate said that they should not be faulted for the death since Kishore had not made a

petition to them expressing his desire to kill himself. If he had, they would have carried out a survey

earlier.

Harsukhbhai Makwana, a dalit agricultural labourer hung himself to death when relief refused to come.

This reason is reported in the initial report of the Police and is what is maintained by his uncle and other

kins. Their caste and occupation may not be co-incidental. The suffering out of the flood fell

disproportionately in the laps of particular sections of the society and this is abetted by State‟s policies.

The report will deal with this aspect a little later.

Even where the surveys were carried out, people were denied adequate or any relief. Adequacy here is

defined by entitlements under the relief package not normatively. The discrepancies are severest in cases

of assistance for loss or damage to house and for damage to crops and agricultural land. In CSJ‟s survey,

only 173 of the 982 people who suffered damage to their houses received any assistance. 691 of the 982

were people who had either completely or substantially lost their homes.

372 people had suffered from serious damage (loss of 3 inches or more of top soil) to their farmlands yet

none of them had received assistance. Similarly, crop loss of over 33% was suffered in farms of 352

people and only 6 had received assistance for this. 8 out of these 454 people who had lost their animals

received assistance. This was at a time when senior district officials claimed that 60% of the people had

already received farm assistance and 90% had received other assistance. Frequency tables based on the

data collected are a part of the Annexures.

24 25 Congress MLA Paresh Dhanani goes on fast-unto-death to demand relief package for flood-hit Amreli, THE INDIAN

EXPRESS (July 10, 2015) available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/congress-mla-paresh-dhanani-goes-

on-fast-unto-death-to-demand-relief-package-for-flood-hit-amreli/

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Three months after the initial survey, the situation had virtually not improved. CSJ met some of these

people again in December and January and none of them had received assistance.

An assistance of Rs. 7000 for loss of household goods and a cash dole, as CSJ discovered were the most

commonly distributed items. There were however 376 and 259 entitled persons respectively, who did

not receive even this. The problem with the distribution of cash dole was that administration found it

convenient to distribute it uniformly for 10 days.

Cash dole is given for subsistence against the loss of livelihood and there were many whose livelihood

continued to be jeopardy. If the administration had to make a crude calculation of the cash dole period, it

should have decided on 30 days, given that this is the “default” period for cash doles under the Central

Government‟s norms of assistance. The period itself is extendable to 60 days first, and then further if

State Executive Committee decides so depending on the ground condition. Instead of monitoring

progress, the cash dole was prematurely capped at ten days on the second day of the flood, official

circulars reveal. Amreli district and indeed many residents deserve a far greater livelihood assistance.

The state of normalcy has not in fact returned till the time this report goes into publishing.

It was the Taluka level officials who should bear most of the responsibility for the fiasco that was the

relief process. The Kukanvav TDO according to residents of the taluka left Kukanvav on the day of the

flood only to return after two months‟ leave. Responsibility cannot be evaded by the District officials

including the District Collector and the DDO, on whom the DC had entrusted the responsibility of the

process. There was a clear failure of supervision at this level.

As mentioned earlier, the State Government had expanded the scope of relief beyond the norms of

assistance set by the Central Government. The relief policy gave some respite to medium and large

farmers who were earlier excluded. It also came up with a special assistance to small and medium

business owners in addiction to offering them loans on low interest rates.

Assistance for loss of crop, damage to business, as well as loan facilities etc. are essentially special

livelihood protecting measures befitting certain occupational groups. The assistance for damage to land

may be argued to benefit a larger population including everyone whose livelihood is dependent on it

such as sharecroppers and agricultural labourers. The relief policy excludes any measure directed

towards protecting livelihood of certain groups of people. These groups include mainly agricultural

labourers, sharecroppers and cattle rearers.

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The assistance for loss of animals is capped at 3 large milch animals and 30 small animals. Cattle rearers

at any time might have 100 or more heads of cattle and the relief package does not take the occupation

into account. Cattle rearers ought to be a special category in themselves and a sensitive policy would

have closely tailored relief for all major occupational groups.

Agricultural labourers having no control over the production forces are, by and large still completely

unemployed. Between June to December, when a family of four could make Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 80,000,

most had only earned a maximum of Rs. 10,000 this time and many still completely unemployed. This

situation is expected to persist for another agricultural season. For agricultural labourers who lost their

homes, the circumstances were extreme. A family of six in Motha Gokharvada faced severe damage to

their house and were not given any kind of assistance for this. They took a loan and now all adult

members of the family will do provide labour to pay off their debts in an arrangement which in

definition is bonded labour.

The cash dole, in most cases the only relief that the labourers received was barely adequate. The same

family in Motha Gokharvada were given a cash dole of a grand total of Rs. 520, not even the amount for

ten days that was being uniformly supplied. It didn‟t help that it was a family of Dalits. Dalits in

Chandgarh were also given cash dole for merely two days. In the case of Vitthalpur, CSJ noted that

while all of the agricultural labourer population was unemployed five and a half months after the flood,

the land owners of the same village had resumed cultivation in over 60% of their lands. This is because

the cultivators in this village employed migrant labourers to work in their fields for lower wages. The

agricultural labourers in Vitthalpur were employed by cultivators outside the village. The problems of

the migrant labourers will also be dealt with later.

Agricultural labour is one of the biggest occupational group in Amreli. It is also dominated by the more

vulnerable sections. According to Census of 2011, around 31.95% of the all workers in Amreli are in

agricultural labour.26

The percentage is at 46.78% for women workers. For dalits, the number is at high

at 70%. In contrast, only 7% Dalits are cultivators, those who may have their livelihood protected.27

Rest of the agricultural labour population must mainly be made up of OBCs. A neglect of this

occupational group coupled with existing caste and gender structures, has the potential to increase the

26 District Census Handbook-Amreli, DIRECTORATE OF CENSUS OPERATIONS GUJARAT (2011); 31.80% of all workers are

categorized as other workers that may include non-agricultural labour. 27

Though there might still be no guarantee of this.

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inequality between classes, genders and castes. As it stands, the agricultural labourers have been the

most affected, and dalit and women agricultural labourers find themselves in the intersection of

vulnerability.

As alluded to earlier, it is perhaps not a coincidence that the two persons committing suicide were

agricultural labourers from Dalit and other marginalised sections. The strain felt by these groups is

indeed the worst.28

It is CSJ‟s case that the extension of assistance for the protection of certain

occupations was arbitrary and discriminatory. It thus fails the test of reasonable classification under

Article 14 of the Constitution. A law may create a classification for its applications but it must always be

based on reasonable and intelligible differentia, the differentia must have a rational basis and the

differentia must have a nexus with the object of the law. The Government resolutions mentioning the

items of assistance is a law itself. It is section 12 of the DM Act that supplies objects to the Government

resolutions and the items therein and it includes “restoration of means of livelihood.”. Further, equal

protection under Article 14 applies to grants of privilege and largess as these affect rights of persons.

According to the Supreme Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India

and Ors. [AIR 1979 SC 1628] “every action of the executive Government must be informed with reason

and should be free from arbitrariness.”

The assistance grant (“law” for the sake of simplicity), is in violation of Article 14 since the differentia

does not have a rational basis and has no nexus with the object of the law which is restoration or

protection of livelihood in general. The only basis offered by the Government officials is that it is

difficult to identify agricultural labourers. This hollow reasoning is sought to be applied to sharecroppers

as well. It may require some effort but Census does manage to identify people practicing different

occupations. Social Impact Assessment which identifies the interest holders, under the Land Acquisition,

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act of 2013 covers not just land owners but other people whose

livelihood depend on land. This allows the process to be inclusive. This was a shift away from a regime

that tied interests necessarily to ownership and documentary proofs. LARR has shown the possibility of

taking broader interests into account and this must be replicated in other instances of law making.

The law also indirectly discriminates against constitutionally protected groups such as Scheduled Castes

28 J Zhang, Psychological tensions found in suicide notes: a test for the strain theory of suicide, Archive of Suicide

Research, Vol. 12(1), 67-73 (2008); Zhang has proposed a strain theory of suicides. Of the four strains that lead to suicides,

he names deprivation strain and coping strain as two.

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and OBCs and is thus suspect in the context of Article 15. Even if the classification appears neutral, by

fact of the societal structures that are reflected so strongly in practice of occupations in Amreli, a

protected group begins to be impacted disparately. One can also point to Section 61 of the DM Act that

prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex, caste, community, descent, or religion in the relief

process, to say certain occupational communities (and these actually form communities in the village),

have been discriminated against.

Section 12 of DM Act refers to the need of creating special provisions for widows and orphans. Norms

of assistance defined by the Centre and the GRs of the State both omit this clause. The arbitrariness and

weaknesses of the relief package are failures of both the Central Government and the State Government

and these require to revised. In the aftermath of disasters when relief process mainly and directly

benefits some groups who also happen to be already better off, this furthers inequality.

In Amreli district, the land owners, on the whole, already enjoyed a position of privilege as well as

control over the land resource. Even with the failure of the implementation process, they have been able

to resume cultivation on some part of the land employing a lesser number of people. Not many of them

could claim to have faced problems of survival. They may be worse off but not as much as the

agricultural labourers. The agricultural labourers in Amreli on the other hand face severe unemployment

today. Since they barely made their ends meet even before the flood, it is their survival that is at stake

here.

During a situation of disaster, none of the fundamental rights ought to be abrogated, this includes also

the right to life. The right to life found under Article 21 has been taken to mean the right to a dignified

life, much more than a mere existence [Maneka Gandhi v. UOI]. This right, by way of subsequent

judgements of the Supreme Court has now taken a wide meaning that includes such things as the right to

livelihood [Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180], right to shelter [Chameli

Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1996 SC 1051] and right to maintenance and improvement of public health

[Vincent Parikurlangara v. UOI, AIR 1987 SC 990].

The right to rescue, relief and rehabilitation after a natural disaster has also been in recognised as an

aspect of Article 21 by the Gujarat High Court in the post-2001 Gujarat Earthquake case of B.J. Diwan

v. State of Gujarat [AIR 2002 Guj 99].

While most of the human rights articulated under UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR are already part of our

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fundamental rights framework, the contents of these can give a wider meaning to these guarantees as

well as a wider understanding of the duties of the States to protect them. The practice of referring to

International human rights instruments for this purpose has been adopted by the higher courts in India.

Article 25(1) of the UDHR for instance states: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate

for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical

care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,

disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”

This should mean that in a situation like a disaster that is beyond the control of the victims, they will

continue to have the right to security and in all cases, a right to an adequate standard of living adequate.

It flows that the State must play its part in the protection of these rights.

A liberal expression of the rights which are affected during natural disasters figures in the IASC

Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters. These rights are:

(i) rights related to physical security and integrity (e.g. protection of the right to life and the right to be

free of , arbitrary detention, and threats to these rights);

(ii)rights related to basic necessities of life (e.g. the rights to food, drinking water, shelter, adequate

clothing, adequate health services, and sanitation);

(iii) rights related to other economic, social and cultural protection needs (e.g. the rights to be provided

with or have access to education, to receive restitution or compensation for lost property, and to work);

and

(iv) rights related to other civil and political protection needs (e.g. the rights to religious freedom and

freedom of speech, personal documentation, political participation, access to courts, and freedom from

discrimination).29

Domestic laws of various countries including India‟s own, have adopted these guarantees in different

ways. US, for example enacted the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act in 1988 and

one of its provisions allows an unemployment benefit to be paid to a person rendered without work after

29 Protecting Persons Affected by Natural Disasters, INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATURAL DISASTERS (June, 2006).

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a disaster and this assistance could last till as long as the unemployment persists with an outer limit of

26 weeks.30

One could say this is not a guarantee considering the discretion of the President involved

but it is nonetheless a proactive measure mindful of the livelihood interest that is affected and absent

from the laws of other countries such as India. It is important to both identify measures such as these

and ensure their enforceability.

In the case of Amreli, even the enforceability of the relief policy was obstructed at times by arbitrary

documentary requirements. The administration kept ration card as the limiting criterion for identifying

beneficiaries for all kinds of losses. First, such a criterion had no backing in law. Second, the criterion

was completely arbitrary considering the object of relief. Third, if such a criterion is employed, the

purpose of assessment and survey which is identification .of actual loss and beneficiaries, is defeated.

The rigid use of this criterion has resulted in the complete denial of assistance to the significant migrant

population from outside the State and many of the locals who lost their ration cards during the same

flood. CSJ also found several cases where members of a family who had two separate houses were given

assistance for damage to only one house since they had a common ration card. It is only

commonsensical thus to distribute relief against actual loss and not create an artificial hurdle for people

to cross before they are given relief. Even if the migrant population is domiciled in other parts of the

State or outside the State, or do not possess any ration card, the law cannot discriminate against them.

Recovery, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation

ost-disaster recovery is an oft forgotten part of the disaster narrative. After the media frenzy is over

and people have been given immediate relief, another struggle has begun for a large part of the

population. An unfair recovery phase just following an inequitable relief process will further widen the

gap between the rich and the poor. On the other hand a fair and just recovery may bring people out of

poverty and reduce the wealth gap. In states such as Bihar and Assam where floods occur almost every

year, the recovery phase has the potential to bring the destructive flood cycle to an end.

There are several important principles articulated in various International frameworks that may inform

the recovery process on the ground. Surprisingly, many of these principles have been integrated into

India‟s disaster policies and plans. The Amreli District Disaster Management Plan adopts the

30

42 U.S.C. 5177

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International Strategy for Disaster Reduction‟s definition of recovery which is, “decisions and actions

taken after a disaster with a view to restoring or improving life and assets of the stricken community,

while encouraging and facilitating necessary adjustments to reduce disaster risk.”31

It goes on to say, “Recovery and reconstruction (R&R) or comprehensive rehabilitation is the last step in

cycle of disaster management. In addition, this is the phase of new cycle, where the opportunity to

reconstruction and rehabilitation should be utilised for building a better and more safe and resilient

society.”32

Later, the need for reestablishment of adequate housing is clearly laid out in the section on

long term recovery program under the plan.

National Policy of Disaster Management has treated the incorporation of disaster resilient features to

„build back better‟ as the guiding principle of the reconstruction process.33

This follows developments in

the International scene since 2004 that have now culminated in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk

Reduction34

featuring „building back better‟ as one of the key priorities for States and the international

community.

The concept also finds mentions in the State Plan and the District Plan. The reconstruction approach that

these policies and plans have adopted is the „owner driven‟ approach. There is a good justification

behind adopting this instead of a government led approach or what is called an „agency driven

reconstruction‟. The problem with the latter approach according to a World Bank Report titled Safer

Homes, Stronger Communities35

, is that it gives the control over the process to Government contractors

who may use „exogenous building technologies‟, incompatible designs and construction materials, etc.

The owner and community participation is limited by the approach and it will usually lead to their

dissatisfaction with the result.

An owner driven reconstruction approach is on the other hand is participatory and the owners will

ultimately have the control over designs, construction materials. Even if the owners rely on contractors

31 Supra note 37. 32 Supra note 37. 33

National Policy of Disaster Management, NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY (2009). 34 At the Third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in March 2015, UN Member States and

other stakeholders adopted the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 to replace the previous Hyogo

Framework. Sendai Framework expects the outcome of: “...substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives,

livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses,

communities and countries.” 35 AK Jha et al., Safer Homes, Stronger Communities: A Handbook for Reconstructing after Natural Disasters, THE

WORLD BANK, pg 96 (2010) available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2409

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to carry out the construction, there will be accountability to the owners. This ensures, as the World Bank

Study suggests, highest levels of satisfaction.36

Unfortunately, various levels of the Government seem to have an unclear understanding of this

approach. The relief policies adopt a purely „cash approach‟ under which the State merely provides a

cash assistance for the loss of homes. ODR approach differs from this in the way that it involves both

technical assistance to the owners and Government oversight. It is more suited to achieving the objective

of building back better and resilient houses. A cash approach, whether or not the assistance is adequate

might leave people as vulnerable against future disasters. But where the assistance is inadequate and the

financial conditions of the victims are already poor, the victims cannot just build back better, they

cannot build back at all. This is also the case in Amreli. The reconstruction process is not helped by the

prices of commodities having risen after the disaster.

While ODR approach has been tried in India before such as after the 2001 Gujarat Earthquake,

Governments continue to use cash approaches most commonly despite its lessons. According to a paper

that recounts the experience of the cash approach, “...after the severe floods in Bihar of 2008, the

Government of Bihar gave cash compensations to the flood victims who lost their houses. Two years

after, the floods the Government of Bihar realised that the cash compensation did not allow people to

build back disaster resilient houses and thus recently started a large-scale owner-driven housing

reconstruction programme.”37

What Amreli needs is the adoption of an ODR approach, one that is consistent with International

frameworks and our policies, one that ensures the outcome of more resilient homes and community, and

one that also gives effect to constitutional guarantee of shelter under Article 21.

For this the Government might have to supervise reconstructions, give technical inputs, for partnerships

with NGOs, facilitate materials at an affordable rates and, in cases, revise the assistance. Under the relief

package, the Government currently gives an assistance of Rs. 9,000 for the loss of a hut. The assistance

can only enable, if at all, the reconstructions of huts. Considering that the people who live in huts are

36 37 Jennifer Barenstein, The role of communities in post-disaster reconstruction. A call for owner-driven approaches,

TAFTERJOURNAL N. 50 (August, 2012) available at

http://www.tafterjournal.it/2012/08/01/the-role-of-communities-in-post-disaster-reconstruction-a-call-for-owner-driven-

approaches/

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already those with the least means, this meager assistance will in no way ensure resilience against future

floods.

The district administration has also passed on the opportunity to use existing housing schemes such as

the Indira Awaas Yojna and Mukhyamantri Awaas Yojna to ensure people have safer homes after the

flood and they need only refer to their own disaster management plans for this suggestion.

Restoration of livelihood is the other important part of the recovery process and the administration has

shown similar indifference towards this. The DDMP again discloses the need for the efforts to restore

jobs that were lost and restore the economic base of the disaster areas as part of the long term recovery

programme and yet again the administration has failed to live up the goals it has set for itself. The plan

itself is deficient in carving out more concrete measures to protect livelihood but MNREGA finds a

place at one place in the plan.

In Amreli, a large part of the rural population is in agricultural labour and the impact on this group has

been noted earlier in this report. Had Amreli implemented the MNREGA properly, it would have taken

some pressure off land. However CSJ failed to find any agricultural labourer in Amreli to have ever

received work under the Act, though there were some who had job cards under it.

The administration and the Panchayat could have implemented the Act in the aftermath of the disaster

and initiated a process of identifying beneficiaries but by all account the administration was

unsympathetic to the livelihood issue. The utilisation of MNREGA will be one path to restoration and

perhaps only a short term one. This itself may not guarantee the long term recovery of the agriculture

labourers. MNREGA can be clinically used to carry out repair work in every village. There are tracts of

land where houses stood on which reconstruction is not possible. Using the Act to have the land leveled

serves dual purposes.

There are of course several other groups facing a similar livelihood crisis. The Gujarat Earthquake

Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Policy launched by the Government of Gujarat had gone some way in

protecting livelihood of many occupational groups. The Government set up funds for self employed and

cottage industries, Handloom-Handicrafts parks and organise vocational training programs for artisans

and workers. There was of course nothing in particular for agricultural and other labourers but needs in

all situations ought to be assessed locally. In Amreli, the livelihood needs are different and the State is

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expected to assess these before making recovery and rehabilitation plans, both in the short term and the

long term.

The effective rehabilitation of groups such as sharecroppers and agricultural labourers might require

ensuring that the agricultural fields are fixed in time and this involves more than mere cash assistance to

farmers. There are of course many farmers, most of them small, who also find themselves struggling.

Many farmers tell CSJ that after the cyclones of 1982, the Government had the land leveled and repaired

at their own cost. It is perhaps possible to use NREGA for this purpose.

A measure such as this appears prudent from the point of view of not only securing livelihood of

families dependent on land but also of ensuring food and economic security of the region. The Rabi

harvest season, when wheat is grown in the area is ongoing. The crops have not been doing well, many

farmers tell CSJ. Overall output is expected to be acutely reduced. The Kharif harvest of cotton

supposed to start in July had already fared worse. Food security remains compromised in the region for

many reasons. Right to food is another fundamental right that CSJ has found abridged. With those

without the means of livelihood already finding it difficult, the ration.

Finally, coming to healthcare which is another primary right, there are both positive and negative things

to report. As mentioned, there were health camps at several places and there were no reported epidemic

of any kind. What was perhaps forgotten was psycho-social counseling in the recovery phase although

there are clear references to this in our policies for a reason that was visible in the suicide of Meeraben

Ravrani. Meeraben left her house during the flood and returned to find a part of it damaged. This led her

to experience severe mental and emotional distress, according to her family. She continued to be in

distress for about two weeks without any medical assistance. On 20th

July, she set herself on fire and

passed away within a few days at the Government Hospital in Rajkot. Her death can only be considered

a failure of the guarantee of life under our Constitution.

What follows is that while we know that the recovery processes carried out by the Government must

both take care of the basic rights and ensure inclusivity in these processes, the Government in the case

of the recovery process in Amreli seems to have failed on both of these counts. The State and Central

Government will do well by taking a look at the Sendai Framework. The framework makes investment

in disaster risk reduction one of the four priorities for States. Towards this, the framework asks the

States, “[t]o strengthen the design and implementation of inclusive policies and social safety-net

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mechanisms, including through community involvement, integrated with livelihood enhancement

programmes, and access to basic health-care services, including maternal, newborn and child health,

sexual and reproductive health, food security and nutrition, housing and education, towards the

eradication of poverty, to find durable solutions in the post-disaster phase and to empower and assist

people disproportionately affected by disasters;”

The framework accepts the importance of recovery period as well as the period when there is no

practical threat of a disaster in building resilience for future potential disasters. The offices of the

disaster agencies must work round the year and any policies and laws that Governments take towards

guaranteeing fundamental rights and equality must be with the mind to have them preserved as much as

possible even during the worst disasters.

With a similar outlook, the framework also stresses on sustainable development as an important guiding

principle. According to the framework, “The development, strengthening and implementation of

relevant policies, plans, practices and mechanisms need to aim at coherence, as appropriate, across

sustainable development and growth, food security, health and safety, climate change and variability,

environmental management and disaster risk reduction agendas. Disaster risk reduction is essential to

achieve sustainable development...”38

While the claim is that disaster risk reduction leads to sustainable development. Yet, we find the reverse

to also be true even as sustainable human development focusing on the objectives of ensuring the right

to livelihood, housing and food as well as the right to equality help communities cope with disasters

better.

38

Supra note 28.

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Conclusion

his report has been an attempt to bring to light the conditions of the victims of the Amreli flood

and the functioning of the disaster management system in relation to the flood. The Amreli flood

was certainly much less destructive than the November-December Coramandel Coast floods that

ravaged Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Puducherry taking ten times as many lives. The latter tragedy

getting the attention it did is understandable and there is only so much sense in a comparison.

Yet, Amreli flood and the experiences of the victims should be talked about because they could provide

lessons that other disasters may not. The Coramandel Coast floods were reported by the media and

writers as urban disasters since much of the impact was felt by Chennai. There were important lessons to

be taken away that concern urban planning. The rural impact of the floods was less talked about. Amreli

on the other hand has lessons to offer about dealing with rural tragedies. This report does not have much

to say about rural planning, there is a feeling that this area is ignored by experts on the subject and it is

necessary to take it up. However, this report does focus on the structure of rural societies particularly the

vulnerable groups within and its relation to floods.

Besides this, this report also focuses on group and individual character of the suffering caused by

disasters. The magnitude of a disaster seen in terms of numbers is perhaps not as relevant when there are

severe violation of individual and group rights.

In the end, all disasters and similar interventions speak to usual defects of the implementation of relief

policies and usual oversights of the recovery processes. If the action oriented research behind this report

helps remedy these, it will make the research valuable in itself. Yet, if researches and reports like this

one manage to push (or hopefully, alter) the present discourse on disaster risk reduction and

management and effect changes in laws and policies, it will surely be a big victory for civil society. It

will also, CSJ believes, lead to a safer and happier society.

The two main themes of this report were (i) the relation of the vulnerabilities within the structure of

rural societies with disasters; and (ii) the rights of the victims and the duties of the State towards the

victims. It might be useful to recapitulate some of the points made and also throw up some new ones.

Vulnerabilities of Certain Groups

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ulnerability is tied into the meaning of disasters, the word signifying an overlap of a threatening

event („hazard‟) and existing vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities would include those of physical

infrastructure but also those owing to societal structures. As a disaster management report by the Central

Government also puts it:

“Poverty and risk to disasters are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing. The poor section of the society is worst affected in case of disaster. The situation further aggravates due to the

compulsion of the poor to exploit environmental resources for their survival, increasing the risk

and exposure of the society to disasters, in particular those triggered by flood, drought and landslides. Poverty also compels the poor to migrate and live at physically more vulnerable

locations, often on unsafe land and in unsafe shelters. These inhabitations of the poor at such

locations are either due to the fact that there is no other land available at reasonable cost or it is

close to the employment opportunities. The inhabitations of the poor people on marginal land are prone to all types of disasters. The type of construction of these houses further deteriorates the

condition. These dwellings made up of low cost material without giving much consideration to

technical aspect are easy targets of various hazards.”39

It does reveal a entrenched understanding of vulnerability so it is sad that government‟s relief policies

have seldom reflected this or do much to reduce the pressure on the poorest. Within the poorest sections,

certain socio-economic groups are likelier to face an elevated risk of disasters. A variety of factors

including the region, the kind of disaster decide what groups are most affected and these might face

risks in distinct ways. In India, women, children, dalits and other marginalised castes will commonly

figure amongst these. Landless agricultural labourers in most parts of the country will be one of the

occupational groups that is vulnerable. In the regions, which sees people migrating from other parts of

the country, the migrant population is also quite vulnerable. As mentioned, all of these groups suffer in

distinct ways as they did in Amreli, and they deserve to be examined separately.

Agricultural Labourers: The plight of the landless agricultural labourers in Amreli has been detailed in

this report. The district has a significant population of agricultural labourers and the number for those

that have fallen victim to the flood is also subsequently high.

Their vulnerability comes primarily from their landlessness which gives them little control over the

resource they depend on. Landlessness and engagement in manual labour is considered as one of the

seven indicators of rural deprivation according to the Census and at 5.37 Crore rural households, the

39 Disaster Management in India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, pg 14 (May, 2011) available at

http://www.undp.org/content/dam/india/docs/disaster_management_in_india.pdf

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largest category.40

The intersection of this with any of the other indicators, it is said, invites far graver

circumstances than what the Census data would read on the surface.41

In Amreli, a household of agricultural labourers finds seasonal employment in the field for 6-8 months,

earning perhaps Rs. 70,000 on an average. The harvest of cotton that usually starts around July failed to

take off in the disaster affected areas of Amreli and consequently this left the agricultural labourers

without work. Indeed, the farmers also suffered from loss of crops as well as soil erosion, a higher

relative income and savings would have helped out in their struggles. This is less true for smaller

farmers with land holding of less than one hectare. The agricultural labourers who can even otherwise

manage mere sustenance, find survival during the floods. Many of the farmers after 6 months of the

calamity, have managed to resume cultivation in a part of their lands, leading to some prospective

income, the sheer number of people in agriculture labour and the number of people dependent on one

person‟s land ensures the relative deprivation of this group.

Government‟s own relief policies do little for agricultural labourers. While cultivators can get assistance

for loss of crop and land, labourers do not get any for the loss of work owing to loss of crop. Ownership

of the means of production continues to be the determinant of entitlement and that widely debunked

„trickle-down‟ effect seems to be the principle (if one were to read the policies most charitably.) It is

another thing that the relief distribution to farmers has been made a mess of by the administration

leading to a distress for both these groups. Even if the cultivators can be helped, this will not uplift the

labourers.

Policies should protect all interests that are tied to loss of property but fundamentally target livelihood

loss. This is at least the stated purpose of providing relief under our law. One thing to note is that when

in a recovery phase, a group is attempted to be compensated (to use it broadly) and an already deprived

group is ignored, this has the potential to further income inequality. This, besides policies to secure

livelihood of all, targeted policies to deal with inequality are necessary for sustainable economic growth,

if one is searching for a developmental narrative. The reason tied to protection of fundamental rights

could also stand alone.

40 Provisional Data of Socio Economic and Caste Census (SECC) 2011 for Rural India Released, PRESS INFORMATION

BUREAU, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF FINANCE (July 5, 2015) available at

http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=122963 41 Landlessness key to rural deprivation, census says, THE TIMES OF INDIA (July 13, 2015) available at

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Landlessness-key-to-rural-deprivation-census-says/articleshow/48047026.cms

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Dalits: Involvement in landless agriculture labour and being a member of SCs or STs are both indicators

of deprivation under the SEAC. If the two overlap, the relative deprivation is instantly higher. As

reported, 70% of all working Dalits in Amreli are agricultural labourers, whether main or marginal, and

only 7% of the Dalits are cultivators. Of the non-working population, likely to not being in the working

age group, most might still be dependent on members of their family in agriculture labour. Dalits in

Amreli are hence intrinsically linked to this occupation and the vulnerabilities of the occupation

naturally affect the Dalits.

The other ways that Dalits are affected is by the conditions of their living and rural spatial divides. That

most Dalits live in Amreli live in kaccha houses (a third deprivation indicator under SEAC) is an

observable fact if the Census/SEAC does not report on this. Dalit households are also likely to be

located on the periphery of a village and face the first impact of floodwater onslaught, a fact supported

by people‟s versions of the event. These facts resulted in pervasive destruction of their houses. This is

seen in the case of the recent flood in Tamil Nadu, particularly in the Cuddalore district, where a

research suggests that an overwhelming majority of the houses, livestock and crops belonged to Dalit

housholds.42

As CSJ‟s survey shows, the number for people who received assistance for damage to their homes was

very low and Dalits will be forced to carry a bigger share of this burden. Of course, the assistance

provided is inadequate to build a complete house, a fact betrayed by the sight of unfinished houses

across villages in Amreli. When the assistance, if at all received, is not adequate and the income is low

by virtue of their occupations, there is scant hope of putting back together a house that is safer against a

future hazard. This leads to a increased vulnerability in the following critical season.

That societal disease of caste discrimination, made itself visible in the survey process and many

residential colonies of Dalits and other marginalised castes were ignored in the survey process. Some of

the specific examples have been cited in this report. Another survey carried out after the flood in Tamil

Nadu reveal related patterns of discrimination against Dalits.43

42 “No Respite For Dalits in Disaster Response, Tamil Nadu”: Report of Initial Findings from Immediate Needs

Assessment and Monitoring Responses towards Affected Dalit Communities, NATIONAL CAMPAIGN ON DALIT HUMAN RIGHTS

AND SOCIAL AWARENESS SOCIETY FOR YOUTHS (December, 2015) available at http://reliefweb.int/report/india/tsunami-2015-

floods-no-respite-dalits-disaster-response-tamil-nadu-report-initial 43 J Balasubramaniam, Caste Discrimination in Relief: Tamil Nadu Floods 2015, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY, Vol.

51(2) (January 9, 2016).

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To be sure, anything done to benefit the agricultural labourers and those who have lost their homes will

also help a large number of Dalits but there is a scope for a more specific actions such as punishing the

perpetrators of caste discrimination.

Women: Like dalits, some of the problems of women overlap with those of agricultural labourers.

31.95% of all workers in Amreli must be agricultural labourers according to Census data but the

percentage of women employed in this sector is high at 46.78%. 72.62% of women in Amreli are

categorised as non workers, most of them probably contributing as home caretakers.

Women along with senior citizens, children and the disabled form special interest groups within

International frameworks as well as India‟s policies. While there are some special biological needs

associated with gender such as those reproductive and menstrual, much of their vulnerability is

constructed by society. This construction is very much a part of the disaster relief and recovery phases.

Ownership or at least the control over land is exercised by the men. This is true in Amreli. The

assistance for loss of land or in fact any loss of property were given unevenly in the name of the male

members of a household. It could just be that the bank accounts in a household are held by men, itself a

product of gender bias, but for whatever reason, the assistance was received and probably controlled by

men.

In a group discussion that CSJ conducted on the issue of land related assistance, not a single women was

in representation. On other issues, women formed a minority, till their presence was asked for by CSJ.

The lesson from the effort to involve women in the discussion was important. Women are simply not

allowed to be involved in the post-disaster discourse. When women were then given a space to voice

their problems, they were more vocal and articulated different kinds of grievances. The grievances of

men are more usually restricted to the quantum of the assistance fixed by the Government that they did

not receive, it was some of the women whose demands connect directly to fundamental rights. A case in

point is the demand for alternative land for resettlement in Vitthalpur and CSJ‟s report has benefited

from experiences of women.

The responsibility to look after the children, the elderly, the sick and the injured after is usually on the

women as the primary care giver in a family and the work burden increases substantially after a

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disaster.44

The emotional burden also piles on exposing them to issues of mental health. Though

certainly, men being given the gender role of providing for the family also exposes them to similar

problems which leads to the understanding that gender roles contribute heavily to suffering.

Gender equality remains a bigger battle to fight but disaster relief and recovery processes must not

further gender inequalities, these should close these gaps. Any assistance given should empower women

or at least jointly, both. It is also important to have women equally represented in the discourse, the

policies are after all written mostly by men at the behest of men, leaving problems of women ignored or

misunderstood.

Migrants: Admittedly, CSJ has not been able to dig deeper into the issues of the migrants population.

The number of migrant population in the district could not be ascertained in the absence of records

maintained by the State, though most are understood to be labourers. They come from both within the

state as well as from neighbouring states such as Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. Some migrants that it

met told CSJ that they did not receive the benefits under the relief policies primarily, for the lack of

required documents and this appears to be the case across Amreli. It has been pointed out that the

document on the basis of which relief granted was ration card that was locally issued and most migrants

did not possess this. A similar ordeal was faced by those who had lost their documents during the floods

and could not obtain a duplicate ration card.

Intuitively, migrants are also less likely to have permanent houses and this adds to the vulnerability. It

can be more strongly asserted that those in agricultural labour earn less than the local population, which

can explain the demand and supply of migrant labour in rural areas. This is observed in Vitthalpur where

the farmers employed migrant labourers and not the labourers residing in the same village. That a

documentary requirement of ration card is without any sanction of law is one thing, but if migrants did

suffer from loss they should be given assistance in principle. The fundamental rights protection applies

equally to everyone.

Rights of Victims, Expectations from the State and Conceptions of Justice

44 Women and Disaster Relief, HUMANITARIAN COALITION available at http://humanitariancoalition.ca/info-

portal/factsheets/women-and-disaster-relief

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ncidents of natural disasters have consistently questioned the efficiency of the current system of

disaster management. However at a more fundamental level, these incidents question the role of the

State and its responsibilities towards ensuring the rights of its citizens in disaster situations.

As mentioned, the right to livelihood, shelter, health, food and safe drinking water have all been

considered by the Supreme Court as parts of a person‟s right to life under Article 21 at various points of

time. Besides the right of existence itself, these are some of the rights that come to be threatened in a

disaster situation.

The duties of the State in relation to these rights is an uncertain territory. The Supreme Court has fixed a

positive duty of the State to protect right to life and the State too appears to have taken these up by way

of legislations such as National Food Security Act, 2013 and MNREGA, 2005. Certainly, these

legislations may not be crystallisations of fundamental right guarantees in the same way that the Right to

Education Act is, however even if the link between a statutory right created by these laws and the larger

right is tenuous, it can still be easily imagined.

Legislations like the DM Act create new institutions and processes but if these processes are informed

by the fundamental rights, only then will they really be useful. An act like the DM Act that deals with

disaster management, is a legislation that naturally deals with fundamentally rights of people. It is not

enacted for the purpose of creating jobs for civil servants or increasing bureaucratic processes though

this increasingly what it looks like.

The focus is unfortunately on the processes themselves and not the outcome. The outcome of the

disaster management system ought to be achievement of fundamental rights. Everything ranging from

the chosen beneficiaries to the quantum of assistance to the way mitigation of disasters is carried out

lacks an imagination, imagination that is necessary to achieve fundamental rights not offer it lip service.

Of course, it also reeks of indifference.

When one compares progressive International frameworks and India‟s disaster policies, one, again finds

that India has only managed to borrow certain processes and concepts from these but has failed to make

its policies in line with the spirit of the frameworks. This would perhaps require a closer reading and

deeper understanding of frameworks. A close reading of the Sendai framework‟s guiding principles and

set of priorities, will tell you that the framework demands for an outcome oriented system. The primary

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focus of the framework on poverty reduction, inclusiveness and elimination of inequality, sustainable

development and protection of human rights is not even easy to miss.

Certain theories of jurisprudence might also help us determine the extent of State‟s responsibilities. Two

theories are mainly relied upon to justify State‟s active role in a disaster situation, the social contract

theory and the moral theory. These theories have been clearly elaborated in the context of disasters by

Naomi Zack though they have been expressed in some form earlier.45

The Social Contract theory in particular is very useful in evaluating the scope of State‟s responsibility in

a disaster situation take it farther than where Fundamental Rights jurisprudence stands at the moment.

The theory itself imagines the creation of the State as an outcome of an agreement between people most

commonly understood to be living in a „state of nature‟.46

The quality of life in this „state of nature‟ is

disputable but it is without political order.47

When individuals adopt political order, they do so by

surrendering some of their rights in favour of having some of their rights protected by an authority.

Modern Constitutions, particularly the bill of rights within them are considered today as manifestations

of the Social Contract. The Indian Constitution too has been proclaimed by the Supreme Court as one.

In Zack‟s view, a disaster situation resembles a Hobbesian state of nature where the actual physical

destruction is often followed by the “profound breakdown in civil society which is made worse by the

dysfunction of government.”48

This situation according to Zack is a second state of nature which will go

on till Government action restores order. The presence of the Government in people‟s lives, after the

original state of nature ensures that only the Government can restore it. The persistence of this state

could even lead to withdrawal of people‟s loyalty towards the State.

To establish a situation as a second state of nature, the burden will be to demonstrate the absence of

45 Naomi Zack, Philosophy and Disaster, HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS 2, Article 5 (April 2006) available at

https://www.hsaj.org/articles/176 46 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651); John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1689); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Of the

Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right (1762); These are considered to be the foundational texts on the Social Contract Theory. Each theorist differing with each other on several issues. 47 To Hobbes, the life in state of nature was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”. It wasn‟t so bad according to Locke.

To him, it was “a state of perfect freedom of acting and disposing of their own possessions and persons as they think fit

within the bounds of the law of nature... The natural state is also one of equality in which all power and jurisdiction is

reciprocal and no one has more than another.” 48 According to Zack: “The destruction of an existing society‟s material basis of human life does not return human beings

to an original state of nature, because it does not return them to conditions under which self-sufficient survival is possible. It

is not possible to “return” to some manner of “living off the land” after most modern disasters.”

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Government albeit temporary. However, if the a second state of nature is established, obligations of the

State (used interchangeably with the Government) flow quite easily from this fact. Very simply put:

“Any obligation of government concerning second states of nature would have to stem from the basic

principles of social contract theory. The argument based on social contract theory for the obligation of

government to prepare for and respond to disaster would go like this: Government has a continual

obligation to benefit those governed by rendering them better off than they would have been in the first

state of nature. The temporary dysfunction of government in disasters results in a second state of

nature for those governed. Therefore, government has an extended obligation to render citizens better

off than they may be in a second state of nature. That is, government is obligated to ensure adequate

disaster preparation and planning, for all probable disasters, in precisely those ways in which the

public has demonstrated its inabilities.”49

This theory is therefore helpful because once the source of State‟s obligations are reimagined: (a) it

settles the question of why the State has a positive obligation to secure people‟s basic rights (read:

Fundamental rights under the Constitution); and (b) it demands an outcome oriented response by the

State instead of a process oriented response.

To put it differently, the government reflects the representation of the will of people and they elect

government in order to be governed and in safeguarding their entitlements for a dignified life. The State

is hence duty bound to take positive measures to minimize the effects of disasters and work through

different policies in rehabilitating and restoring the lives of people. Only State can do this. The Social

Contract theory helps the project of full realisation of fundamental rights, it would help the governments

and the courts understand just why is that the State is expected to bear the responsibility to bring victims

of a disaster out of their condition and the ramification of not doing so.

Some theories of justice are perhaps tied to this. John Rawls‟ conception of justice as fairness has been

drawn into the debate by many.50

The conception is based on two principles often referred to as the

Liberty Principle and the Equality Principle.51

The second of these is further a combination of what is

called a Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle and the Difference Principle, with the former taking

priority over the latter. The Difference Principle has been described to say inequalities are to be tolerated

only when they result in greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of the society.52

This is seen

49 Supra note 16. 50 Alcira Kreimer and Margaret Arnold, ed., Managing Disaster Risk in Emerging Economies (2000); 51 John Rawls, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT, 42 (2001). 52

Timothy Beatley, Towards a Moral Philosophy of Natural Disaster Mitigation, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MASS

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as a justification for distributive justice. Surely a situation such as disasters that affects the poor more

than the rich is undesirable and its remedy to this may be compensating the least advantaged groups

more than those above them.

A final point on the question whether compensation is a more appropriate relief device than mere

assistance. Assistance is given only to cover part of the loss. As seen in Amreli, this is often not adequate

if the aim is to ensure that normalcy is returned. For example, even the highest assistance of Rs. 95,000

will not be enough to build a complete and resilient house much less Rs. 9000 given on account of loss

of a hut.

A compensation system might not be appropriate itself if families only receive the cost of a hut if they

were to lose one as this will not ensure resilient shelter in the coming season. The system will have to go

beyond loss but ensure consistence with rights and international frameworks.

This is much easily justified when the fault of the State is apparent. The omissions of the mitigation

measures in the case of Gujarat and its contribution to the damage are somewhat apparent and corrective

justice puts a greater burden on the State to compensate people for their loss. However it is also true that

the principle of no fault liability exists in some spheres of law and this system is justified foremostly by

its need.

EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS, Vol. 7(1), pgs 5-32, pg 14 (March, 1989) available at

http://www.training.fema.gov/hiedu/downloads/ijems/articles/towards%20a%20moral%20philosophy%20of%20naturall%20

disaster%20mitigation.pdf

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Recommendations

To the Amreli District Administration

Having accepted victim‟s grievances under the High Court‟s orders, redress them assuming good

faith, within a reasonable time frame.

Keep the grievance redressal mechanism open until a court appointed system is place and provide

original assessment forms based on which assistance was decided, available at the Taluka offices,

free of cost to enable victims to file grievances.

Carry out well re-assessments in all the affected villages with the proper supervision of either the

District Collector or the District Development Officer.

Dispense with the criterion of asking for Ration Cards to give the relief instead provide relief

against actual loss.

When giving future relief, transfer the amount in the account of an adult female.

Identify particularly Migrant labourers who have not received any assistance due to the

documentary requirements and provide them relief against their losses.

Based on the grievances received, identify major gaps in the implementation of relief and take

actions against Taluka level officers responsible for negligence and deliberate dereliction of duties.

Take strict actions particularly against officers whose actions and omissions amounted to

discrimination.

Through the District Programme Coordinator under the Act, ensure implementation MGNREGA in

the District by providing work to persons with job cards and also restart the process identifying

people for job cards prioritising those whose livelihood has been most affected due to the flood.

Similarly, identify potential beneficiaries from the victims of the flood for housing schemes such as

Indira Awaas Yojna and Mukhyamantri Awaas Yojna.

Identify victims of the flood as beneficiaries under Antyodaya schemes and take any other measures

to ensure security of food and basic means in the District.

To the Government of Gujarat

Implement the Disaster Management Act, 2005 in the states and replace existing structures with the

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structures given under the 2005 Act.

Carry out a flood impact assessment of the regions affected and assess particularly the impact on

livelihood, agriculture, food security, healthcare and overall on development and poverty.

Frame separate flood reconstruction and rehabilitation policies that may be implemented in the two

flood affected regions in Gujarat.

Establish reconstruction guidelines, material banks, public private partnerships and take other

measures to ensure reconstruction of houses keeping in mind the „build back better‟ principle.

Increase the quantum of assistance ensuring that people have safer homes before the coming

monsoon season and in particular provide assistance that is equivalent to that for loss of pucca

house, for the loss of huts.

Provide higher assistance for people unable to rebuild their houses with their own money and

provide benefits under other Government housing schemes ensuring that all victims to have lost

their houses have safe houses before the next monsoons.

Provide special assistance to sharecroppers as well as cattle rearers who have not been accounted

for under the previous package.

Provide cash dole assistance for 30 days to everyone and provide cash dole to people whose

livelihood has or had not been restored till the day it is or was.

Draft and enact a law on Flood Plain Zoning based on the model Flood Plain Zoning Bill circulated

by NDMA.

As one of the few States to not have done so already, implement the National Food Security Act

without any further delays.

To the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority/ State Executive Committee

Assist the flood impact assessment of the situation in Amreli and recommend the provision of cash

dole for a greater period of time till the livelihood has been restored.

As the planning, monitoring and coordinating body for post-disaster reconstruction, draft the

reconstruction and rehabilitation policy and recommend measures to ensure rebuilding of a more

resilient society including material banks, public private partnerships for reconstruction of houses

and to ensure restoration of livelihood by creating temporary and permanent options.

Include concrete measures for rehabilitation in the State Plan and ensure the inclusion of concrete

measures in the District Plans.

Carry out hydrological and morphological studies evaluating the efficacy of structural measures

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including construction of embankments, improvement of river channels, improvement of drainage

systems, desilting of rivers, treatment of catchment areas and afforestation, anti-erosion works,

improving capacity of dams, regulating reservoirs, etc. across the State following the NDMA Flood

Guidelines.

Prepare specific flood management plan for the State and ensure its implementation.

Prepare flood plain zoning regulations till a law on the subject can be passed.

To the Union of India

Amend the Disaster Management Act to include penalty for non compliance of the Act by the

concerned District and State officials.

Adopt a compensation based system of relief instead of inadequate and arbitratry assistance.

At the least, increase the quantum of assistance under the Norms of Assistance keeping in mind the

objective of securing fundamental rights of the victims.

Involve civil society organisations, academics, practitioners in a consultative process for fixing the

assistance making it broader than the consultations carried out by the Finance Commission and

overall consider gradually moving to compensation based system.

To the National Disaster Management Authority

Ensure adherence of the disaster management system to the Sendai Framework keeping in mind the

principles of sustainable development, poverty and inequality elimination and bringing it in line

with Fundamental Rights under the Constitution.

Frame the national guidelines on recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction that has been kept

pending for years by adopting strategies mentioned in the Sendai Framework and other International

best practices and in light of constitutional provisions.

Carry out wider consultative process to frame plans and guidelines including civil society groups

with experience in the process and academics from the sciences and the social sciences.

Ensure the implementation of all NDMA guidelines in every State through their Policies and Plans

and monitor particularly the carrying out of mitigation measures before the oncoming monsoon

season.

Provide inputs to the State of Gujarat in framing the reconstruction and rehabilitation policy for the

Amreli Flood.

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Actions

he present intervention was not designed as purely an academic enterprise, but rather an action

led research. The volunteers that carried out the main survey were trained as paralegals by CSJ

and survey team responsibly drafted applications on behalf of the victims wherever something major

was amiss. These applications were usually collective at the level of every village and kept forward such

demands as surveys where they hadn‟t been carried out before, resurveys where discrepancies were

high, legal aid from the District Legal Services Authority.

The team which included lawyer-supervisors provided free advice to people to enable them to file

individual applications and wherever it was felt that individuals would not be able to do so themselves,

CSJ drafted the applications for them. CSJ team also encouraged people to file RTI queries at

Government offices to find out the status of the assistance that should have come their way.

For people that CSJ could not directly assist at the time, it left them with pamphlets with basic

information of the entitlements under the Government relief package and the phone numbers of its local

office operating jointly with centre of „Nyayika‟, a legal service delivery enterprise. This was an option

many people availed.

CSJ and Nyayika managed to reach a large number of people this way. Since the irregularities in the

distribution process were too many and the issues with the relief and recovery process went very deep,

there was a need to raise these issues collectively.

A couple of petitions are pending before the Gujarat High Court on the issue. An order was passed by

the High Court in these cases asking the District Collector as well as the District Legal Services

Authority to accept applications on behalf of victims that had not been given assistance. Subsequent to

this order CSJ and Nyayika, went back on the ground to create awareness about the said order and

persuade people to file applications to these authorities.

Appendix

T