Judith Butler - Subjection, Resistance, Resignification

8/21/2019 Judith Butler - Subjection, Resistance, Resignification

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82 Circuits of Bad Conscience

of rec oi l . Con s c i en c e i s thus f i gure d as a bo dy wh i c h takes

itself as its object, forced into a permanent posture of negat i v e n arc i s s i s m or , more prec i s e ly , a n arc i s s i s t i c a l ly n our i s hed

s elf -beratemen t ( then , mi s taken ly, i den t i f i ed wi th a n arc i s s i s

ti c stage).

C o n s i d e r — a s a p a r t i n g s h o t — h o w t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y e f f o r t s

t o r e g u l a t e h o m o s e x u a l i t y w i t h i n t h e U . S . m i l i t a r y a r e t h e m

s elv es the regulatory format i on of the mas c ul i n e s ubj ec t , on e

w h o co ns ec ra te s hi s i d e n t i t y t h r o u g h renunciation as an act of

speech: to say "I am a homosexual" is fine as long as one

als o promises "and I don't intend to act." This, the suppression

an d s us ta i n i n g of homos exual i ty i n an d through the c i rc ular

pos ture by whi c h a body ut ters i t s own ren un c i at i on , ac c edes

to i t s regulat i on through the promi s e . But that per format i v e

utteran c e , howev er c ompelled , wi l l be s ubj ec t to i n fe l i c i ty , to

s peaki n g otherwi s e , to rec i t i n g on ly ha lf the s en ten c e , deform

i n g the promi s e , re formulat i n g the c on fes s i on as def i an c e , re

m a i n i n g s i l e nt . T h i s o p p o s i t i o n w i l l d r a w f r o m a n d o p p o s e

the power by whi c h i t i s c ompelled , an d thi s s hort c i rc ui t i n g

of regulatory power c on s t i tutes the pos s i bi l i ty of a postmoral

ges ture toward a les s regular f reedom, on e that f rom the per

spective of a less codifiable set of values calls into question the

va l ue s o f m o r a l i t y .

r

Subjection, Resistance,

Resignification

Between Freud and Foucault

M y p r o b l e m i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e i m p l i c i t

s y s t e m s i n w h i c h w e f i n d o u r s e l v e s p r i s o n e r s ; w h a t I w o u l d

l i k e t o g r a s p i s t h e s y s t e m o f l i m i t s a n d e x c l u s i o n w h i c h

we p r ac t ic e w i t h o u t k n o w i n g it ; I w o u l d l i k e to m a k e th e

c u l t u r a l u n c o n s c i o u s a p p a r e n t .

— F o u c a u l t , " R i t u a l s o f E x c l u s i o n "

C

on s i der , i n Discipline and Punish, the paradoxi c a l c harac

ter of what Fouc ault des c r i bes as the s ubj ec t i v at i on ofthe pr i s on er . The term "s ubj ec t i v at i on " c arr i es the paradox i n

itself: assujetissement den otes both the bec omi n g of the s ubj ec t

an d the proc es s of s ubj ec t i on —on e i n habi ts the f i gure of au

ton omy on ly by bec omi n g s ubj ec ted to a power , a s ubj ec t i on

w h i c h i m p l i e s a r a d i c a l d e p e nd e n cy . F o r F o u c a u l t , th is p r o

c es s of s ubj ec t i v at i on takes p lac e c en tra l ly through the body.

In Discipline and Punish the pr i s on er 's body n ot on ly appears

as a sign of gui l t an d tran s gres s i on , as the embodi men t of pro

hi bi t i on an d the s an c t i on for r i tua ls of n ormali zat i on , but i s


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84 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification

framed an d formed through the d i s c urs i v e matr i x of a j ur i d i

cal subject. The cl aim that a disc our se "f or ms" the bod y is nos i mple on e, an d from the s tar t we mus t d i s t i n gui s h how s uc h

"formi n g" i s n ot the s ame as a "c aus i n g" or "determi n i n g, " s t i l l

less is i t a notion that bodies are somehow made of discourse

pure an d s i mple . 1

Foucault suggests that the prisoner is not regulated by an

exterior re la t i on of power , whereby an i n s t i tut i on takes a pre-

gi v en i n di v i dual as the target of i t s s ubordi n at i n g a i ms . On

the c on trary, the i n di v i dual i s formed or , ra ther , formulated

through hi s d i s c urs i v e ly c on s t i tuted " i den t i ty" as pr i s on er .

Subjection is, li terally, the making of a subject, the principle

of regulat i on ac c ordi n g to whi c h a s ubj ec t i s formulated or

produc ed. Suc h s ubj ec t i on i s a ki n d of power that n ot on ly

u n i l a t e r a l l y acts on a g i v en i n di v i dual as a form of domi n a

tion, but also activates or forms the subject. Hence, subjection

i s n e i ther s i mply the domi n at i on of a s ubj ec t n or i t s produc

t i on , but des i gn ates a c er ta i n ki n d of res tr i c t i on in p r o d u c t i o n ,

a res tr i c t i on wi thout whi c h the produc t i on of the s ubj ec t c an

n ot take p lac e , a res tr i c t i on through whi c h that produc t i on

takes p lac e . A lthough Fouc ault oc c as i on al ly t r i es to argue that

h i s t o r i c a l l y juridical p o w e r — p o w e r a c t i n g o n , s u b o r d i n a t i n g ,

pregiven subjects— pr ec ed es produc t i v e power , the c apac i ty ofpower to form subjects, with the prisoner it is clear that the

s ubj ec t produc ed an d the s ubj ec t regulated or s ubordi n ated

are on e, an d that c ompuls ory produc t i on i s i t s own form of

regulat i on .

Fouc ault warn s aga i n s t thos e wi thi n the l i bera l t radi t i on

w h o w o u l d li be ra te th e pr i so n e r f r o m th e pr is o n' s o p pr es si ve

confines, for the subjection signified by the exterior institution

of the prison does not act apart from the invasion and manage

men t of the pr i s on er 's body: what Fouc ault des c r i bes as the

Between Freud and Foucault 85

ful l s i ege an d i n v as i on of that body by the s i gn i fyi n g prac t i c es

of the pr i s on — n am ely , i n s pec t i on , c on fes s i on , the regula r i za-

t i on an d n orma li za t i on of bod i ly mov e men t an d ges ture , the

di s c i p l i n ary regi mes of the body whi c h hav e led femi n i s ts to

c on s ult Fouc ault i n order to e laborate the d i s c i p l i n ary produc

tion of gender. 2 The prison thus acts on the prisoner's body,

b u t it do es so b y f o r ci n g th e p r i s o ne r to a p p r o x i m a t e a n i d e a l ,

a n or m of behav i or , a m od el of obedi en c e . Thi s i s ho w the

pr i s on er 's i n di v i dual i ty i s ren dered c oheren t , tota l i zed, made

i n to the d i s c urs i v e an d c on c eptual pos s es s i on of the pr i s on ; i t

i s , as Fouc ault i n s i s ts , the way i n whi c h "he bec omes the pr i n

c i p le of hi s own s ubj ec t i on . " 3 Thi s n ormat i v e i dea l i n c ulc ated,

as it were, into the prisoner is a kind of psychic identity, or

w h a t F o u c a u l t w i l l c a l l a "s o u l ." B ec au se th e s o u l is a n i m p r i s

oning effect, Foucault claims that the prisoner is subjected "in

a more fun damen ta l way" than by the s pat i a l c apt i v i ty of the

prison. Indeed, in the citation that follows, the soul is figured

as i t s e l f a k i n d of s pat i a l c apt i v i ty , i n deed, as a ki n d of pr i s on ,

w h i c h p r o v i d e s th e ex t er io r f o r m o r re g u l a t o r y p r i n c i p l e o f

the pr i s on er 's body. Thi s bec omes c lear i n Fouc ault ' s for mu

lat i on that " the ma n des c r i bed for us , wh om we are i n v i ted to

free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection [assujettisse

ment] muc h more profoun d than hi ms elf . . . the s oul i s theprison of the body" (30).

A l t h o u g h F o u c a u l t is sp e ci fy in g th e su bj e ct iv at io n of th e

pr i s on er here , he appears a ls o to be pr i v i legi n g the meta

phor of the prison to theorize the subjectivation of the body.

W h a t ar e w e to m a k e o f i m p r i s o n m e n t a n d i n v a s i o n as th e

pr i v i leged f i gures through whi c h Fouc ault ar t i c ulates the pro

c es s of s ubj ec t i v at i on , the d i s c urs i v e produc t i on of i den t i t i es ?

I f d i s c ours e produc es i den t i ty by s upplyi n g an d en forc i n g

a regulatory pr i n c i p le whi c h thoroughly i n v ades , tota l i zes ,


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an d ren ders c oheren t the i n di v i dual , then i t s eems that ev ery

" i den t i ty , " i n s ofar as i t i s tota l i z i n g, ac ts as prec i s e ly s uc h

a "soul that imprisons the body." In what sense is this soul

"muc h more profoun d" than the pr i s on er hi ms elf? D oes thi s

mea n that the s oul preexi s ts the bo dy that an i mates i t? H o w

are we to un ders tan d s uc h a c la i m i n the c on text of Fouc ault 's

theory of power?

R ather than an s wer that ques t i on d i rec t ly , on e mi ght for the

p u r p o s e s o f c l a r i f i c a t i o n c o u n t e r p o s e t h e " s o u l , " w h i c h F o u

c ault ar t i c ulates as an i mpr i s on i n g frame, to the ps yc he i n the

p s y c h o a n a l y t i c s e n s e . 4 In the psyche, the subject 's ideal corre

s pon ds to the ego-i dea l , whi c h the s uper-ego i s s a i d to c on

sult, as it were, in order to measure the ego. Lacan redescribes

thi s i dea l as the "pos i t i on " of the s ubj ec t wi thi n the s ymboli c ,

the n orm that i n s ta l ls the s ubj ec t wi thi n lan guage an d hen c e

w i t h i n a v ai l ab l e sc h em es o f c u l t u r a l i n t e l l i g i b il i t y . T h i s v ia b l e

an d i n te l l i g i ble be i n g, thi s s ubj ec t , i s a lways produc ed at a

c os t , an d whatev er res i s ts the n ormat i v e deman d by whi c h

s ubj ec ts are i n s t i tuted remai n s un c on s c i ous . Thus the ps yc he,

w h i c h i n c l u d e s th e u n c o n s c i o u s, i s v e r y di ff er en t f r o m th e

s ubj ec t : the ps yc he i s prec i s e ly what exc eeds the i mpr i s on i n g

ef fec ts of the d i s c urs i v e deman d to i n habi t a c oheren t i den

tity, to beco me a coheren t subject. The ps ych e is wh at resists

t h e r e g u l a r i z a t i o n t h a t F o u c a u l t a s c r i b e s t o n o r m a l i z i n g d i s

c ours es . Thos e d i s c ours es are s a i d to i mp r i s on the bo dy in thesoul, to an i mate an d c on ta i n the body wi thi n that i dea l f rame,

and to that extent reduce the notion of the psyche to the opera

t i o n s o f a n e x t e r n a l l y f r a m i n g a n d n o r m a l i z i n g i d e a l . 5 Thi s

Fou c au lt i an mov e appears to t reat the ps yc h e as i f i t rec e i v ed

un i la tera l ly the e f fec t of the Lac an i an s ymbo li c . The t ran s pos i

t i on of the s oul i n to an exter i or an d i mpr i s on i n g frame for the

b o d y va ca te s, a s it w e re , th e i n f e r i o r i t y of th e b o d y , l e a v i n g


that inferiority as a malleable surface for the unilateral effects

o f d i s c i p l i n a r y p o w e r .

I am i n par t mov i n g toward a ps yc hoan alyt i c c r i t i c i s m of

Fouc ault , for I thi n k that on e c an n ot ac c oun t for s ubj ec t i v a

t i on an d, i n par t i c ular , bec omi n g the pr i n c i p le of on e 's own

s ubj ec t i on wi tho ut rec ours e to a ps yc h oan a lyt i c ac c oun t of the

format i v e or gen erat i v e e f fec ts of res tr i c t i on or prohi bi t i on .

Moreov er , the format i on of the s ubj ec t c an n ot fu l ly be thought

— i f i t e v er c a n b e — w i t h o u t r e c o u rs e t o a p a r a d o x i c a l l y e n

abling set of grounding constraints. Yet as I elaborate this cri

t i que , s ome roman t i c i zed n ot i on s of the un c on s c i ous def i n ed

as n ec es s ary res i s tan c e wi l l c ome un der c r i t i c a l s c rut i n y, an d

that c r i t i c i s m wi l l en ta i l the reemergen c e of a Fouc ault i an per

s pec t i v e within ps y c hoan alys i s . The ques t i on of a s uppres s ed

p s y c h o a n a l y s i s i n F o u c a u l t — r a i s e d b y F o u c a u l t h i m s e l f i n t h e

referen c e to a "c ultura l un c on s c i ous " quoted i n the ep i graph

to thi s c ha pte r—m i gh t be ra i s ed mo re prec i s e ly as the pro b

lem of loc at i n g or ac c oun t i n g for res i s tan c e . Where does res i s

tan c e to or i n d i s c i p l i n ary s ubj ec t format i on take p lac e? D oes

the reduc t i on of the ps yc hoan alyt i c a l ly r i c h n ot i on of the ps y

c he to that of the i mpr i s on i n g s oul e l i mi n ate the pos s i bi l i ty

of res i s tan c e to n ormali zat i on an d to s ubj ec t format i on , a re

s i s tan c e that emerges prec i s e ly f rom the i n c ommen s urabi l i ty

b e t w e e n p s y c h e a n d su bj ec t? H o w w o u l d w e u n d e r s t a n d s u c h

res i s tan c e , an d would s uc h an un ders tan di n g en ta i l a c r i t i c a l

rethi n ki n g of ps yc hoan alys i s a lon g the way?

In what fol lows , I wi l l as k two di f feren t ki n ds of ques t i on s ,

on e of Fouc ault , an d an other of ps yc h oan al ys i s (app lyi n g this

t e r m v a r i o u s l y t o F r e u d a n d t o L a c a n ) . 6 F i rs t , i f Fouc ault

un ders tan ds the ps yc he to be an i mpr i s on i n g e f fec t i n the s er

v i c e o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n , t h e n h o w m i g h t h e a cc o u nt f or p s y c h i c

res i s tan c e to n ormali zat i on ? Sec on d, when s ome propon en ts


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of ps yc hoan alys i s i n s i s t that res i s tan c e to n ormali zat i on i s a

fun c t i on of the un c on s c i ous , i s thi s guaran tee of ps yc hi c res i s

tan c e merely s le i ght of han d? More prec i s e ly , i s the res i s tan c e

u p o n w h i c h p s y c h o a n a l y s i s i n s i s t s s o c i a l l y a n d d i s c u r s i v e l y

produc ed, or i s i t a k i n d of res i s tan c e to, an un dermi n i n g of ,

s o c i a l a n d d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n as such? C o n s i d e r t h e c l a i m

that the un c on s c i ous on ly an d a lways res i s ts n ormali zat i on ,

that ev ery r i tua l of c on formi ty to the i n j un c t i on s of c i v i l i za

tion comes at a cost, and that a certain unharnessed and un-

s oc i a l i zed remai n der i s thereby produc ed, whi c h c on tes ts the

appearan c e of the law-abi di n g s ubj ec t . Thi s ps yc hi c remai n der

s i gn i f i es the l i mi ts of n ormali zat i on . That pos i t i on does n ot

i mply that s uc h res i s tan c e wi e lds the power to rework or re-

ar t i c ulate the terms of d i s c urs i v e deman d, the d i s c i p l i n ary i n

ju nc ti o ns b y w h i c h n o r m a l i z a t i o n o cc u rs . T o t h w a r t th e i nj u nc t i on to produc e a doc i le body i s n ot the s ame as d i s man t l i n g

the i n j un c t i on or c han gi n g the terms of s ubj ec t c on s t i tut i on . I f

the un c on s c i ous , or the ps yc he more gen era l ly , i s def i n ed as re

s i s tan c e , what do we then make of un c on s c i ous a t tac hmen ts to

s ubj ec t i on , whi c h i mply that the un c on s c i ous i s n o more free of

n ormali z i n g d i s c ours e than the s ubj ec t? I f the un c on s c i ous es

c apes f rom a g i v en n ormat i v e i n j un c t i on , to what other i n j un c

t i on does i t form an at tac hmen t? What makes us thi n k that the

un c on s c i ous i s an y les s s truc tured by the power re la t i on s that

pervade cultural signifiers than is the language of the subject?

If we find an attachment to subjection at the level of the un

c on s c i ous , wha t ki n d of res i s tan c e i s to be wroug ht f ro m that?

Ev en i f we gran t that un c on s c i ous res i s tan c e to a n ormal

i z i n g i n j un c t i on guaran tees the fa i lure of that i n j un c t i on fu l ly

to constitute its subject, does such resistance do anything to

a lter or expan d the domi n an t i n j un c t i on s or i n terpel la t i on s of

subject formation? What do we make of a resistance that can


on ly un dermi n e, but whi c h appears to hav e n o power to re-

ar t i c ulate the terms , the s ymbol i c terms —to us e Lac a n i an par

lan c e—by whi c h s ubj ec ts are c on s t i tuted, by whi c h s ubj ec t i on

is installed in the very formation of the subject? This resistance

establishes the incomplete character of any effort to produce

a s ubj ec t by d i s c i p l i n ary mean s , but i t remai n s un able to re-

ar t i c ulate the domi n an t terms of produc t i v e power .

Before c on t i n ui n g thi s i n terrogat i on of ps yc hoan alys i s ,

howev er , le t us return to the problem of bodi es i n Fouc ault .

H o w a n d w h y i s r e s i st a n c e d e n i e d t o b o d i e s p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h

d i s c i p l i n a r y r e g i m e s ? W h a t i s t h i s n o t i o n o f d i s c i p l i n a r y p r o

duc t i on , an d does i t work as e f f i c ac i ous ly as Fouc ault appears

to imply? In the final chapter of the first volume of The His

tory of Sexuality, Fou c aul t c a l ls for a "hi s tory of bod i es " wh i c h

w o u l d i n q u i r e i nt o "t he m a n n e r i n w h i c h w h a t i s m o s t m a

ter i a l an d v i ta l i n them has been i n v es ted. " 7 In thi s formula

tion, he suggests that power acts not only on the body but also

in the body, that power n ot on ly produc es the boun dar i es of a

subject but pervades the inferiority of that subject. In the last

formulat i on , i t appears that there i s an " i n s i de" to the body

w h i c h ex is ts b ef o re p o w e r ' s i n v a s i o n . B u t g i v e n th e r a d i c a l ex

ter i o r i ty of the s oul , ho w are we to un de rs ta n d " i n f er i o r i ty "

i n F o u c a u l t ? 8 That i n fer i or i ty wi l l n ot be a s oul , an d i t wi l l

not be a psy che , but what w il l i t be? Is this a space of pu re

malleabi l i ty , on e whi c h i s , as i t were , ready to c on form to thedeman ds of s oc i a l i zat i on ? Or i s thi s i n fer i or i ty to be c a l led ,

s i mply, the body? Has i t c ome to the paradoxi c a l poi n t where

Fouc ault wan ts to c la i m that the s oul i s the exter i or form, an d

the body the interior space?

A l t h o u g h F o u c a u l t w a n t s o n o c c a s io n t o re fu te th e p o s s i

b i l i t y o f a b o d y w h i c h i s no t p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h p o w e r re l a

t i on s , s omet i mes hi s explan at i on s requi re a body to mai n ta i n a


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mater i a l i ty on tologi c a l ly d i s t i n c t f rom the power re la t i on s that

take it as a site of investment. 9 In deed, the term "s i te" s eem

i n gly appears i n thi s phras e wi thout warran t , for what i s the

re la t i on between the body as site an d the i n v es tmen ts whi c h

that site is said to receive or bear? Does the term "site" stabi

l i ze the body i n re la t i on to thos e i n v es tmen ts , whi le def lec t i n g

the ques t i on of how i n v es tmen ts es tabl i s h, c on tour , an d di s

rupt what the phrase takes for granted as the body's "site"

(i .e. , does the term "site" deflect the project of Lacan's "mirror

s tage")? What c on s t i tutes an " i n v es tmen t , " an d what i s i t s c on

s t i tut i n g power? D oes i t hav e a v i s ua l i z i n g fun c t i on , an d c an

w e u n d e r s t a n d th e p r o d u c t i o n o f th e b o d i l y eg o i n F r e u d as

t h e p r o j e c t e d o r s p a t i a l i z e d m o d a l i t y o f s u c h i n v e s t m e n t s ? 1 0

In deed, to what exten t i s the body's s i te s tabi l i zed through a

c er ta i n proj ec t i v e i n s tabi l i ty , on e whi c h Fouc ault c an n ot qui te

d e s c r i b e a n d w h i c h w o u l d p e r h a p s e n g a g e h i m i n t h e p r o b

lemat i c of the ego as an i magi n ary fun c t i on ?

Discipline and Punish offers a different configuration of the

re la t i on between mater i a l i ty an d i n v es tmen t . There the s oul

i s taken to be an i n s trumen t of power through whi c h the

b o d y is c u l t i v a t e d a n d f o r m e d . In a se ns e, it ac ts as a p o w e r -

laden s c hema that produc es an d ac tua l i zes the body. We c an

un d ers t an d Fou c aul t ' s re ferenc es to the s oul as an i mpli c i t re

w o r k i n g o f th e A r i s t o t e l i a n f o r m u l a t i o n in w h i c h th e s o u l i s

un ders tood to be the form an d pr i n c i p le of the body's matter .11

Fouc ault argues i n Discipline and Punish that the soul becomes

a n o r m a t i v e a n d n o r m a l i z i n g i d e a l a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h t h e

b o d y is t r a i n e d , s h a p e d , c u l t i v a t e d , a n d i nv e st e d; it is a h i s

t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c i m a g i n a r y i d e a l (idéal spéculatif) u n d e r w h i c h

the body i s mater i a l i zed.

Thi s "s ubj ec t i on " or assujetissement i s n ot on ly a s ubordi

n at i on but a s ec ur i n g an d mai n ta i n i n g, a putt i n g i n to p lac e


of a subject, a subjectivation. The "soul brings [the prisoner]

to ex i s ten c e" ; n ot un l i ke i n Ar i s tot le , the s oul , as an i n s tru

men t of power , forms an d frames the body, s tamps i t , an d i n

s tampi n g i t , br i n gs i t i n to be i n g. In thi s formulat i on , there i s

n o body outs i de of power , for the mater i a l i ty of the body—

i n d e e d , m a t e r i a l i t y i t s e l f — i s p r o d u c e d b y a n d i n d i r e c t r e l a

t i on to the i n v es tmen t of power . The mater i a l i ty of the pr i s on ,

Fouc ault wr i tes , i s es tabl i s hed to the exten t that (dans la mesure

ou) i t i s a v ec tor an d i n s trumen t of power . 1 2 Hen c e , the pr i s on

is materialized to the extent that it is invested with power. To be

grammati c a l ly ac c urate , there i s n o pr i s on pr i or to i t s mater i

a l i zat i on ; i t s mater i a l i zat i on i s c oexten s i v e wi th i t s i n v es t i ture

w i t h p o w e r re l at io ns ; a n d m a t e r ia l i t y is th e ef fe ct a n d ga u ge

of thi s i n v es tmen t . The pr i s on c omes to be on ly wi thi n the

f i e ld of power re la t i on s , more s pec i f i c a l ly , on ly to the exten t

that it is saturated with such relations and that such a satu

rat i on i s format i v e of i t s v ery be i n g. Here the body—of the

pr i s o n er an d of the pr i s on —i s n ot an i n depen d en t mater i a l i ty ,

a static surface or site, which a subsequent investment comes

to mark, s i gn i fy upon , or perv ade; the body i s that for whi c h

mater i a l i zat i on an d i n v es t i ture are c oexten s i v e .

A l t h o u g h th e s o u l is u n d e r s t o o d to fr a m e th e b o d y in Disci

pline and Punish, Fo uc au lt s ugges ts that the prod uc t i on of the

"s ubj ec t" takes p lac e to s ome degree through the s ubordi n a

t i on an d ev en des truc t i on of the body. In "Ni etzs c he, G en ealogy, Hi s tory, " Fouc ault remarks that on ly through the de

s truc t i on of the body does the s ubj ec t as a "d i s s oc i ated un i ty"

appear: "the body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by

lan guage an d di s s olv ed by i deas ) , the loc us of a d i s s oc i ated

s e lf (adopt i n g the i l lus i on of a s ubs tan t i a l un i ty) , an d a v ol

u m e i n p e r p e t u a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . " 1 3 The subject appears at the

expen s e of the body, an appearan c e c on di t i on ed i n i n v ers e re-


6/12

9 2 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification

lation to the disappearance of the body. The subject not only

effectively takes the place of the body but acts as the soul

w h i c h fr a m es a n d f o r m s th e b o d y i n ca p ti vi t y . H e r e th e f o r m

i n g an d frami n g fun c t i on of that exter i or s oul works aga i n s t

the body; i n deed, i t mi ght be un ders tood as the s ubl i mat i on

of the body i n c on s equen c e of d i s p lac emen t an d s ubs t i tut i on .

In thus redes c r i bi n g the body i n Fouc ault , I hav e c lear ly

w a n d e r e d in to a p s y c h o a n a l y t i c v o c a b u l a r y o f s u b l i m a t i o n .

W h i l e th er e, le t m e po se a q u e s t i o n to r e t u r n to th e is su e o f

s ubj ec t i on an d res i s tan c e . I f the body i s s ubordi n ated an d to

some extent destroyed as the dissociated self emerges, and if

that emergen c e mi ght be read as the s ubl i mat i on of the body

an d the self be read as the bo dy 's gho stl y form , then is there

s ome part of the body whi c h i s n ot pres erv ed i n s ubl i mat i on ,

s ome part of the body whi c h remai n s un s ubli mated?

Thi s bodi ly remai n der , I would s ugges t , s urv i v es for s uc h a

subject in the mode of already, i f not always, having been de

stroyed, in a kind of constitutive loss. The body is not a site

on whi c h a c on s truc t i on takes p lac e; i t i s a des truc t i on on the

oc c as i on of whi c h a s ubj ec t i s formed. The format i on of thi s

s ubj ec t i s a t on c e the frami n g, s ubordi n at i on , an d regulat i on of

the body, an d the mode i n whi c h that des truc t i on i s pres erv ed

(i n the s en s e of s us ta i n ed an d embalmed) in n o r m a l i z a t i o n .

I f , then , the body i s n ow to be un ders tood as that whi c h n ot

on ly c on s t i tutes the s ubj ec t i n i t s d i s s oc i ated an d s ubl i matedstate, but also exceeds or resists any effort at sublimation, how

are we to understand this body that is , as it were, negated or

repressed so that the subject might live? One might expect

the body to return i n a n on -n ormali zable wi ldn es s , an d there

are of c ours e momen ts i n Fouc ault when s omethi n g l i ke that

happen s . But more of ten than n ot , i n Fouc ault the pos s i bi l i ty

of subversion or resistance appears (a) in the course of a sub-


j ec t iv a t io n th at ex ce ed s th e n o r m a l i z i n g a im s b y w h i c h i t is

mobi l i zed, for example , i n "rev ers e-di s c ours e , " or (b) through

c on v ergen c e wi th other d i s c urs i v e regi mes , whereby i n adv er

t e n t l y p r o d u c e d d i s c u r s i v e c o m p l e x i t y u n d e r m i n e s t h e t e l e o -

l o g i c a l a i m s o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n . 1 4 Thus resistance appears as the

effect of power, as a part of power, i ts self-subversion.

In the theor i zat i on of res i s tan c e , a c er ta i n problem ar i s es

w h i c h co n ce rn s p s y c h o a n a l y s i s a n d , b y i m p l i c a t i o n , th e l i m i t s

of s ubj ec t i v at i on . For Fouc ault , the s ubj ec t who i s produc ed

through s ubj ec t i on i s n ot produc ed at an i n s tan t i n i t s tota l i ty .

Instead, i t is in the process of being produced, i t is repeat

edly produc ed (whi c h i s n ot the s ame as be i n g produc ed

an ew agai n an d aga i n ) . I t i s prec i s e ly the pos s i bi l i ty of a repe

t i t i on whi c h does n ot c on s ol i date that d i s s oc i ated un i ty , the

s ubj ec t , but whi c h prol i ferates e f fec ts whi c h un dermi n e the

forc e of n ormali zat i on . The term whi c h n ot on ly n ames , but

forms an d frames the s ubj ec t—let us us e Fouc ault 's example

o f h o m o s e x u a l i t y — m o b i l i z e s a r e v e r s e d i s c o u r s e a g a i n s t t h e

v e r y r e g i m e o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n b y w h i c h it i s s p a w n e d . T h i s is ,

of c ours e , n ot a pure oppos i t i on , for the s ame "homos exual i ty"

w i l l b e d e p l o y e d fi rs t i n th e s er vi ce o f n o r m a l i z i n g h e te ro se xu -

a l i ty an d s ec on d i n the s erv i c e of i t s own depathologi zat i on .

Thi s term wi l l c arry the r i s k of the former mean i n g i n the

lat ter , but i t would be a mi s take to thi n k that s i mply by s peak

i n g the term on e e i ther t ran s c en ds heteros exual n ormali zat i onor bec omes i ts i n s trumen t .

The r i s k of ren ormali zat i on i s pers i s ten t ly there: c on s i der

the on e who i n def i an t "outn es s " dec lares hi s /her homos exu

ality only to receive the response, "Ah yes, so you are that, and

on ly that . " Whatev er you s ay wi l l be read bac k as an ov er t

or s ubt le man i fes tat i on of your es s en t i a l homos exual i ty . (On e

s hould n ot un deres t i mate how exhaus t i n g i t i s to be expec ted


7/12


to be an "out" homos exual a l l the t i me, whether the expec

tation comes from gay and lesbian allies or their foes.) Here

Fouc ault c i tes an d reworks the pos s i bi l i ty of res i gn i f i c at i on , of

m o b i l i z i n g p o l i t i c a l l y w h a t N i e t z s c h e , i n On the Genealogy of

Morals, c a l led the "s i gn c hai n . " There Ni etzs c he argues that the

us es to whi c h a g i v en s i gn i s or i g i n a l ly put are "wor lds apart"

from the us es to whi c h i t then bec omes av a i lable . Thi s tempo

ra l gap between us ages produc es the pos s i bi l i ty of a rev ers a l

of s i gn i f i c at i on , but a ls o open s the way for an i n augurat i on

of s i gn i fyi n g pos s i bi l i t i es that exc eed thos e to whi c h the term

has been prev i ous ly boun d.

The Fouc ault i an s ubj ec t i s n ev er fu l ly c on s t i tuted i n s ubj ec

tion, then; it is repeatedly constituted in subjection, and it is

in the possibility of a repetition that repeats against i ts origin

that s ubj ec t i on mi ght be un ders tood to draw i ts i n adv erten t ly

en abli n g power . From a ps yc hoan alyt i c pers pec t i v e , howev er ,

we m i g h t as k w h e t h e r th is p o s s i b i l i t y of re si st an ce to a c o n

s t i tut i n g or s ubj ec t i v at i n g power c an be der i v ed from what i s

" i n " or "of" d i s c ours e . Wha t c an we make of the way i n whi c h

discourses not only constitute the domains of the speakable,

b u t ar e th em se l ve s b o u n d e d t h r o u g h th e p r o d u c t i o n of a co n

s t i tut i v e outs i de: the un s peakable , the un s i gn i f i able?

From a Lac an i an pers pec t i v e , on e mi ght wel l ques t i on

w h e t h er th e ef fe cts of th e ps y c h e c an be s a i d to be e xh au st ed

in what can be signified or whether there is not, over and

agai n s t thi s s i gn i fyi n g body, a domai n of the ps yc he whi c h

contests legibility. If, according to psychoanalysis, the subject

is not the same as the psyche from which it emerges and if, for

Foucault, the subject is not the same as the body from which it

emerges, then perhaps the body has come to substitute for the

ps yc he i n Fouc ault—that i s , as that whi c h exc eeds an d c on

foun ds the i n j un c t i on s of n ormali zat i on . Is thi s a body pure


and simple, or does "the body" come to stand for a certain

operat i on of the ps yc he, on e whi c h i s d i s t i n c t ly d i f feren t , i f n ot

di rec t ly oppos ed to, the s oul f i gured as an i mpr i s on i n g e f fec t?

Perhaps Fouc ault hi ms elf has i n v es ted the body wi th a ps y

chic meaning that he cannot elaborate within the terms that he

us es. H o w does the proc es s of s ubj ec t i v at i on , the d i s c i p l i n a ry

produc t i on of the s ubj ec t , break down , i f i t does , i n both Fou

c ault i an an d ps yc hoan alyt i c theory? When c e does that fa i lure

emerge, and what are its consequences?

C o n s i d e r t h e A l t h u s s e r i a n n o t i o n o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n , i n w h i c h

a s ubj ec t i s c on s t i tuted by be i n g ha i led , addres s ed, n amed. 1 5

Fo r the most part, i t seems, Al thu sse r bel iev ed that this socia l

d e m a n d — o n e m i g h t c a l l i t a s y m b o l i c i n j u n c t i o n — a c t u a l l y

produced the kinds of subjects it named. He gives the example

of the pol i c eman on the s treet ye l l i n g "Hey you there! , " an d

c on c ludes that thi s c a l l i mportan t ly c on s t i tutes the on e i t ad

dresses and sites. The scene is clearly a disciplinary one; the

pol ice man 's cal l is an effort to br ing som eone back in line . Yet

w e m i g h t al so u n d e r s t a n d it in L a c a n i a n te rm s a s th e c a l l o f

s ymboli c c on s t i tut i on . As Althus s er hi ms elf i n s i s ts , thi s per

format i v e e f for t of n ami n g c an on ly attempt to br i n g i t s ad

dressee into being: th ere is alw ays the risk of a certa in misrecog-

nition. If one misrecognizes that effort to produce the subject,

the produc t i on i ts e l f fa l ters . The on e who i s ha i led may fa i l to

hear, misread the call, turn the other way, answer to anothername, insist on not being addressed in that way. Indeed, the

domai n of the i magi n ary i s demarc ated by Althus s er as pre

c i s e ly the domai n that makes misrecognition po s s i ble . The n ame

is called, and I am sure it is my name, but it isn't . The name

is called, and I am sure that a name is being called, my name,

b u t it is in so m eo ne ' s i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e sp ee ch , o r w o rs e, it is

s omeon e c oughi n g, or wors e , a radi ator whi c h for a momen t


8/12


approximates a human voice. Or I am sure that no one has

noticed my transgression, and that it is not my name that is

b e i n g ca l l e d , b u t o n l y a c o u g h i n g pa ss er b y, th e h i g h p i t c h o f

the heat i n g mec han i s m—but i t i s my n ame, an d yet I do n ot

recognize myself in the subject that the name, at this moment,

i n s t a l l s . 16

Con s i der the forc e of thi s dyn ami c of i n terpel la t i on an d

mi s rec ogn i t i on when the n ame i s n ot a proper n ame but a

s oc i a l c ategory, 17 an d hen c e a s i gn i f i er c apable of be i n g i n ter

preted i n a n umb er of d i v ergen t an d c on f l i c tua l ways . To be

hai led as a "woman " or "J ew" or "queer" or "Blac k" or "Chi

c an a" may be heard or i n terpreted as an a f f i rmat i on or an

i n s ult , depen di n g on the c on text i n whi c h the ha i l i n g oc c urs

(where context is the effective historicity and spatiality of the

sign). If that name is called, there is more often than not

s ome hes i ta t i on about whether or how to res pon d, for what

i s a t s take i s whether the temporary tota l i zat i on per formed

b y th e n a m e is p o l i t i c a l l y e n a b l i n g o r p a r a l y z i n g , w h e t h e r th e

forec los ure , i n deed the v i olen c e , of the tota l i z i n g reduc t i on

of i den t i ty per formed by that par t i c ular ha i l i n g i s pol i t i c a l ly

s trategi c or regres s i v e or , i f para lyzi n g an d regres s i v e , a ls o en

abl i n g i n s ome way.

The Althus s er i an us e of Lac an c en ters on the fun c t i on of the

i magi n ary as the perman en t pos s i bi l i ty of misrecognition, that

i s , t h e i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y b e t w e e n s y m b o l i c d e m a n d ( t h en ame that i s i n terpel la ted) an d the i n s tabi l i ty an d un predi c t

abi l i ty of i t s appropr i at i on . I f the i n terpel la ted n ame s eeks to

ac c ompli s h the i den t i ty to whi c h i t re fers , i t begi n s as a per

format i v e proc es s whi c h i s n ev er theles s dera i led i n the i magi

n ary, for the i magi n ary i s s ure ly preoc c upi ed wi th the law,

s truc tured by the law, but does n ot i mmedi ate ly obey the law.

For the Lac an i an , then , the i magi n ary s i gn i f i es the i mpos -


s i b i l i t y o f t h e d i s c u r s i v e — t h a t i s , s y m b o l i c — c o n s t i t u t i o n o f

i den t i ty . Iden t i ty c an n ev er be fu l ly tota l i zed by the s ymboli c ,

for what i t fa i ls to order wi l l emerge wi thi n the i magi n ary as

a d i s order , a s i te where i den t i ty i s c on tes ted.

Hen c e , i n a Lac an i an v e i n , J ac quel i n e R os e formulates the

un c on s c i ous as that whi c h thwarts an y e f for t of the s ymboli c

to c on s t i tute s exed i den t i ty c oheren t ly an d fu l ly , an un c on

scious indicated by the slips and gaps that characterize the

w o r k i n g s of th e i m a g i n a r y in l an gu ag e . I q uo t e a pa ss ag e

w h i c h ha s be ne fi tt ed m a n y o f u s w h o h av e so u gh t t o f i n d

i n ps yc hoa n alys i s a pr i n c i p le of res i s tan c e to g i v en forms of

s oc i a l rea l i ty:

The unconscious constantly reveals the "failure" of identity. Because

there is no continuity of psychic life, so there is no stability of sexual

identity, no position for women (or for men) which is ever simply

achieved. Nor does psychoanalysis see such "failure" as a special-

case inability or an individual deviancy from the norm. "Failure" is

not a moment to be regretted in a process of adaptation, or devel

opment into normality,. . . "failure" is something endlessly repeated

and relived moment by moment throughout our individual histories.

It appears not only in the symptom, but also in dreams, in slips of

the tongue and in forms of sexual pleasure which are pushed to the

sidelines of the norm. . . . there is a resistance to identity at the very

heart of psychic life. 18

In Discipline and Punish, Fouc ault pres umes the e f f i c ac y of

the s ymboli c deman d, i t s per format i v e c apac i ty to c on s t i tute

the subject w h o m it name s. In The History of Sexuality, Vol

ume l, however, there is both a rejection of "a single locus

o f R e v o l t " — w h i c h w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y i n c l u d e t h e p s y c h e , t h e

i m a g i n a r y , o r t h e u n c o n s c i o u s w i t h i n i t s p u r v i e w — a n d a n

af f i rmat i on of mult i p le pos s i bi l i t i es of res i s tan c e en abled by

pow er i t s el f . For Fouc ault , res i s tan c e c an n ot be outside the law


9/12


i n an other regi s ter ( the i magi n ary) or i n that whi c h e ludes the

c on s t i tut i v e power of the law.

there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of

all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plu

rality of resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that arepossible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage,

solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to

compromise, interested, or sacrificial; by definition, they can only

exist in the strategic field of power relations. But this does not mean

that they are only a reaction or rebound, forming with respect to

the basic domination an underside that is in the end always passive,

doomed to perpetual defeat. 19

Thi s las t c ar i c ature of power , a l though c lear ly wr i t ten wi th

Marc us e i n mi n d, rec a l ls the e f fec t of the Lac an i an law, whi c h

produc es i t s own " fa i lure" a t the lev e l of the ps yc he, but whi c h

c an n ev er be d i s p lac ed or re formulated by that ps yc hi c re

s i s tan c e . The i magi n ary thwarts the e f f i c ac y of the s ymboli c

law but c an n ot turn bac k upon the law, deman di n g or e f fec t

i n g i t s re formulat i on . In thi s s en s e , ps yc hi c res i s tan c e thwarts

the law in its effects, but cannot redirect the law or its effects.

R es i s tan c e i s thus loc ated i n a domai n that i s v i r tua l ly power

less to alter the law that it opposes. Hence, psychic resistance

pres umes the c on t i n uat i on of the law i n i t s an ter i or , s ymboli c

form and, in that sense, contributes to its status quo. In such a

v i e w , re si st an ce a pp e ar s d o o m e d t o p e r p e t u a l de fe at .

In contrast, Foucault formulates resistance as an effect ofthe very power that it is said to oppose. This insistence on

the dual pos s i bi l i ty of be i n g both constituted by the law and

an effect of resistance to the law marks a departure f rom the

Lac an i an framework, for where Lac an res tr i c ts the n ot i on of

s oc i a l power to the s ymboli c domai n an d delegates res i s tan c e

to the i magi n ary, Fouc ault rec as ts the s ymboli c as re la t i on s of


power an d un ders tan ds res i s tan c e as an e f fec t of power . Fou-

c ault 's c on c ept i on i n i t i a tes a s hi f t f rom a d i s c ours e on law, c on

c e i v ed as j ur i d i c a l (an d pres uppos i n g a s ubj ec t s ubordi n ated

b y p o w e r ) , to a d is c o u rs e o n p o w e r , w h i c h is a f i el d o f p r o d u c

t i v e , regulatory, an d c on tes tatory re la t i on s . For Fouc ault , the

s ym bol i c produc e s the pos s i bi l i ty of i t s ow n s ubv ers i on s , an d

thes e s ubv ers i on s are un an t i c i pated e f fec ts of s ymboli c i n ter

pel la t i on s .

The n ot i on of " the s ymboli c " does n ot addres s the mult i

p l i c i ty of power v ec tors upon whi c h Fouc ault i n s i s ts , for

power i n Fouc ault n ot on ly c on s i s ts i n the re i terated e labora

t i on of n orms or i n terpel la t i n g deman ds , but i s format i v e or

p r o d u c t i v e , m a l l e a b l e , m u l t i p l e , p r o l i f e r a t i v e , a n d c o n f l i c t u a l .

Moreov er , i n i t s res i gn i f i c at i on s , the law i ts e l f i s t ran s muted

i n to that whi c h oppos es an d exc eeds i t s or i g i n a l purpos es . In

thi s s en s e , d i s c i p l i n ary d i s c ours e does n ot un i la tera l ly c on s t i

tute a subject in Foucault, or rather, i f i t does, i t simultaneously

c on s t i tutes the c on di t i on for the s ubj ec t 's de-c on s t i tut i on .

W h a t is b r o u g h t in to b e i n g t h r o u g h th e p e r f o r m a t i v e ef fe ct o f

the i n terpel la t i n g deman d i s muc h more than a "s ubj ec t , " for

the "subject" created is not for that reason fixed in place: i t

b e co m e s th e o c ca s io n fo r a fu rt he r m a k i n g . In d e e d, I w o u l d

add, a subject only remains a subject through a reiteration or

rearticulation of i tself as a subject, and this dependency of the

s ubj ec t on repet i t i on for c oheren c e may c on s t i tute that s ub

je ct 's i nc o h er en ce , it s i n c o m p l e t e ch ar ac te r. T h i s r e p e t i t i o n or , be tt er , it e r ab il i t y th u s b ec o m e s th e n o n - p l a ce o f s u b v e r s i o n ,

the pos s i bi l i ty of a re-embodyi n g of the s ubj ec t i v at i n g n orm

that c an redi rec t i t s n ormat i v i ty .

C o n s i d e r t h e i n v e r s i o n s o f " w o m a n " a n d " w o m a n , " d e

pen di n g on the s tagi n g an d addres s of the i r per forman c e, of

"queer" an d "queer , " depen di n g on pathologi z i n g or c on tes -


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tatory modes . Both examples c on c ern , n ot an oppos i t i on be

tween reac t i on ary an d progres s i v e us age , but ra ther a pro

gressive usage that requires and repeats the reactionary in

order to e f fec t a s ubv ers i v e reterr i tor i a l i zat i on . For Fouc ault ,

then , the d i s c i p l i n ary apparatus produc es s ubj ec ts , but as a

c on s equen c e of that produc t i on , i t br i n gs i n to d i s c ours e the

c on di t i on s for s ubv er t i n g that apparatus i t s e l f . In other words ,

the law turn s aga i n s t i t s e l f an d s pawn s v ers i on s of i t s e l f whi c h

oppos e an d prol i ferate i t s an i mat i n g purpos es . The s trategi c

ques t i on for Fouc ault i s , then , how c an we work the power

re la t i on s by whi c h we are worked, an d i n what d i rec t i on ?

In his later interviews, Foucault suggests that identities are

f o r m e d w i t h i n c o n t e m p o r a r y p o l i t i c a l a r r a n g e m e n t s i n r e l a

t i on to c er ta i n requi remen ts of the l i bera l s ta te , on es whi c h

pres ume that the as s er t i on of r i ghts an d c la i ms to en t i t lemen tc an on ly be mad e on the bas i s of a s i n gula r an d i n j ur ed i den

t i ty . The more s pec i f i c i den t i t i es bec ome, the more tota l i zed

an i den t i ty bec omes by that v ery s pec i f i c i ty . In deed, we mi ght

u n d e r s t a n d t h i s c o n t e m p o r a r y p h e n o m e n o n a s t h e m o v e m e n t

b y w h i c h a j u r i d i c a l a pp ar at u s p r o d u c e s th e fi e l d o f p o s si b l e

pol i t i c a l s ubj ec ts . Bec aus e for Fouc ault the d i s c i p l i n ary appa

ratus of the s ta te operates through the tota l i z i n g produc t i on

of i n di v i duals , an d bec aus e thi s tota l i zat i on of the i n di v i dual

exten ds the j ur i s di c t i on of the s ta te ( i . e . , by t ran s formi n g i n di

v i d u a l s i nt o su bj ec ts of th e st at e) , F o u c a u l t w i l l c a l l fo r a re

maki n g of s ubj ec t i v i ty beyon d the s hac kles of the j ur i d i c a l law.

In thi s s en s e , what we c a l l i den t i ty pol i t i c s i s produc ed by a

s tate whi c h c an on ly a l loc ate rec ogn i t i on an d r i ghts to s ub

je ct s t o t a l i z e d b y th e p a r t i c u l a r i t y th at co ns ti tu te s th ei r p l a i n

tiff status. In calling for an overthrow, as it were, of such an

arran gemen t , Fouc ault i s n ot c a l l i n g for the re leas e of a hi d

den or repres s ed s ubj ec t i v i ty , but ra ther , for a radi c a l maki n g

T Between Freud and Foucault 101

of s ubj ec t i v i ty formed i n an d aga i n s t the hi s tor i c a l hegemon y

of the juridical subject:

Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to

refuse what we are. We have to imagine and build up what wecould be to get rid of this kind of political "double bind," which is

the simultaneous individualization and totalization of modern power

structures. . . . The conclusion would be that the political, ethical,

social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate us

bo th fr om the state , an d fr om th e stat e's in st it ut io ns , bu t to li be ra te

us from the state and the type of individualization which is linked to

the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the

refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us

for several centuries. 20

Tw o s ets of ques t i on s emerge fr om the abov e an alys i s . F i rs t ,

w h y ca n F o u c a u l t f o rm u l a te re si st an ce i n r e l a t io n t o th e d i s c i p l i n ar y power of s exual i ty i n The History of Sexuality, whereas

in Discipline and Punish d i s c i p l i n ary power appears to deter

mi n e doc i le bodi es i n c apable of res i s tan c e? Is there s omethi n g

about the re la t i on s hi p of sexuality to power that c on di t i on s the

possibility of resistance in the first text, and a noted absence

of a c on s i derat i on of s exual i ty f rom the d i s c us s i on of power

and bodies in the second? Note that in the History of Sexuality

the repres s i v e fun c t i on of the law i s un dermi n ed prec i s e ly

through bec omi n g i ts e l f the obj ec t of erot i c i n v es tmen t an d ex

c i ta t i on . D i s c i p l i n ary apparatus fa i ls to repres s s exual i ty pre

c i s e ly bec aus e the apparatus i s i t s e l f erot i c i zed, bec omi n g the

oc c as i on for the incitement of sexuality an d, therefore , un doi n g

i ts own repres s i v e a i ms .

Sec on d, wi th thi s t ran s ferable property of s exual i n v es t

men ts i n mi n d, we mi ght as k what c on di t i on s the pos s i bi l i ty

Fou c aul t in v i tes , that of re fus i n g the type of i n d i v i dua l i t y c or

re la ted wi th the d i s c i p l i n ary apparatus of the modern s tate?


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r


A n d h o w d o w e a cc o u nt fo r attachment to prec i s e ly the ki n d

of s ta te- l i n ked i n di v i dual i ty that rec on s ol i dates the j ur i d i c a l

law? To what exten t has the d i s c i p l i n ary apparatus that a t

tempts to produc e an d tota l i ze i den t i ty bec ome an abi di n g

obj ec t of pas s i on ate a t tac hmen t? We c an n ot s i mply throw of f

the i den t i t i es we hav e bec ome, an d Fouc ault 's c a l l to " re fus e"

thos e i den t i t i es wi l l c er t a i n ly be met wi t h res i stan c e . I f we re

je ct t h e o re t ic al l y th e s o ur c e o f re si st an ce in a p s y c h i c d o m a i n

that is said to precede or exceed the social, 21 as we must, can

we r e f o r m u l a t e p s y c h i c re si st an ce in terms of the social w i t h o u t

t h a t r e f o r m u l a t i o n b e c o m i n g a d o m e s t i c a t i o n o r n o r m a l i z a

t i on ? (Mus t the s oc i a l a lways be equated wi th the g i v en an d

the n ormali zable? ) In par t i c ular , how are we to un ders tan d,

n ot merely the d i s c i p l i n ary produc t i on of the s ubj ec t , but the

d i s c i p l i n a r y c u l t i v a t i o n o f an attachment to subjection?

Suc h a pos tulat i on may ra i s e the ques t i on of mas oc hi s m—

i n deed, the ques t i on of mas oc hi s m i n s ubj ec t- format i on —yet

it does not answer the question of the status of "attachment"

or " i n v es tmen t . " Here emerges the grammati c a l problem by

w h i c h an at ta c hm e nt ap pe a rs t o pr ec ed e th e su bj ec t w h o

mi gh t be said to "ha ve" it . Yet i t seems cru cia l to su spe nd the

us ual grammati c a l requi remen ts an d c on s i der an i n v ers i on of

terms s uc h that c er ta i n a t tac hmen ts prec ede an d c on di t i on the

format i on of s ubj ec ts ( the v i s ua l i zat i on of l i bi do i n the mi rror

stage, the sustaining of that projected image through time asthe d i s c urs i v e fun c t i on of the n ame) . Is thi s then an on tology

of libido or investment that is in some sense prior to and sepa

rable from a subject, or is every such investment from the start

b o u n d u p w i t h a r e f l e x iv it y th at i s s ta b il iz e d ( w i t h i n th e i m a g i

nary) as the ego? If the ego is composed of identifications, and

identification is the resolution of desire, then the ego is the


res i due of des i re , the e f fec t of i n c orpora t i on s wh i c h, Fr eu d ar

gues in The Ego and the Id, trace a lineage of attachment and

loss.

In Freud 's v i ew, the format i on of c on s c i en c e en ac ts an a t

tac hmen t to prohi bi t i on whi c h foun ds the s ubj ec t i n i t s re f lex

ivity. Under the pressure of the ethical law, a subject emerges

w h o is ca pa bl e o f re fl ex iv it y, th at is , w h o ta ke s h i m / h e r s e l f

as an object, and so mistakes him/herself, s ince he/she is, by

v i r t u e o f th at f o u n d i n g p r o h i b i t i o n , at a n in f in it e d is t an c e f r o m

hi s /her or i g i n . On ly on the c on di t i on of a s eparat i on en forc ed

through prohi bi t i on does a s ubj ec t emerge , formed through

the a t tac hmen t to prohi bi t i on ( i n obedi en c e to i t , but a ls o erot i

c i z i n g i t) . An d thi s pro hi b i t i on i s a l l the mor e s av ory prec i s e ly

b ec au se it i s b o u n d u p in th e na r ci s si st ic c i r c u i t th at w a r d s of f

the d i s s olut i on of the s ubj ec t i n to ps yc hos i s .22

For Fouc ault , a s ubj ec t i s formed an d then i n v es ted wi th a

sexuality by a regime of power. If the very process of subject-

format i on , howev er , requi res a preempti on of s exual i ty , a

foun di n g prohi bi t i on that prohi bi ts a c er ta i n des i re but i t s e l f

b e co m es a f oc us of de si re , t h en a su bj ec t is f o r m e d t h r o u g h th e

prohi bi t i on of a s exual i ty , a prohi bi t i on that a t the s ame t i me

forms thi s s exual i ty—an d the s ubj ec t who i s s a i d to bear i t .

Thi s v i ew di s putes the Fouc ault i an n ot i on that ps yc hoan alys i s

pres umes the exter i or i ty of the law to des i re , for i t mai n ta i n s

that there is no desire without the law that forms and sus

ta i n s the v ery des i re i t prohi bi ts . In deed, prohi bi t i on bec omes

an odd form of pres erv at i on , a way of erot i c i z i n g the law that

w o u l d a b o l i s h e r o t i c i s m , b u t w h i c h o n l y w o r k s b y c o m p e l l i n g

erot i c i zat i on . In thi s s en s e , a "s exual i den t i ty" i s a produc t i v e

c on tradi c t i on i n terms , for i den t i ty i s formed through a pro

hi bi t i on on s ome di men s i on of the v ery s exual i ty i t i s s a i d to


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be ar , a n d se xu al it y , w h e n it is t i e d to id en ti ty , is a l w a y s i n

s ome s en s e un derc utt i n g i t s e l f .

Thi s i s n ot n ec es s ar i ly a s ta t i c c on tradi c t i on , for the s i gn i -

f i ers of i den t i ty are n ot s truc tura l ly determi n ed i n adv an c e . I f

Fouc ault c ould argue that a s i gn c ould be taken up, us ed for

purpos es c oun ter to thos e for whi c h i t was des i gn ed, then he

un ders tood that ev en the mos t n oxi ous terms c ould be own ed,

that the mos t i n j ur i ous i n terpel la t i on s c ould a ls o be the s i te

of radi c a l reoc c upat i on an d res i gn i f i c at i on . But what le ts us

oc c u py the d i s c u rs i v e s i te of i n j ury? H o w are we an i m ated

an d mobi l i zed by that d i s c urs i v e s i te an d i ts i n j ury, s uc h that

our v ery a t tac hmen t to i t bec omes the c on di t i on for our re-

s i gn i f i c at i on of i t? Ca l led by an i n j ur i ous n ame, I c ome i n to

s oc i a l be i n g, an d bec aus e I hav e a c er ta i n i n ev i table a t tac h

men t to my ex i s ten c e , bec aus e a c er ta i n n arc i s s i s m takes hold

of any term that confers existence, I am led to embrace the

terms that injure me because they constitute me socially. The

s e lf -c olon i z i n g t ra j ec tory of c er ta i n forms of i den t i ty pol i t i c s

are s ymptomat i c of thi s paradoxi c a l embrac e of the i n j ur i ous

term. As a fur ther paradox, then , on ly by oc c upyi n g—bei n g

oc c upi ed by—that i n j ur i ous term c an I res i s t an d oppos e i t ,

recasting the power that constitutes me as the power I oppose.

In thi s way, a c er ta i n p lac e for ps yc hoan alys i s i s s ec ured i n

that an y mobi l i zat i on aga i n s t s ubj ec t i on wi l l take s ubj ec t i on

as i t s res ourc e , an d that a t tac hmen t to an i n j ur i ous i n terpel lat i on wi l l , by way of a n ec es s ar i ly a l i en ated n arc i s s i s m, bec ome

t h e c o n d i t i o n u n d e r w h i c h r e s i g n i f y i n g t h a t i n t e r p e l l a t i o n b e

c omes pos s i ble . Thi s w i l l n ot be an un c on s c i ous outs i de of

power , but ra ther s omethi n g l i ke the un c on s c i ous of power

i ts e l f , i n i t s t raumat i c an d produc t i v e i terabi l i ty .

I f , then , we un ders tan d c er ta i n ki n ds of i n terpel la t i on s to

c on fer i den t i ty , thos e i n j ur i ous i n terpel la t i on s wi l l c on s t i tute


identity through injury. This is not the same as saying that

s uc h an i den t i ty wi l l remai n a lways an d forev er rooted i n i t s

injury as long as it remains an identity, but it does imply that

the pos s i bi l i t i es of res i gn i f i c at i on wi l l rework an d un s et t le the

pas s i on ate a t tac hmen t to s ubj ec t i on wi thout whi c h s ubj ec t for

m a t i o n — a n d r e - f o r m a t i o n — c a n n o t s u c c e e d .

Judith Butler - Subjection, Resistance, Resignification

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