Judiciary Dept Poli1 Digests

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PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE IN

POLITICAL REVIEW

DIANE STEFFI GUILLAMON

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

JURISDICTION

DIAZ V. CA

On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed with the

Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the approval of the sound value

appraisal of its property in service. The Asian Appraisal Company valued the

property and equipment of DLPC as of 12 March 1990 at One Billion One Hundred

Forty One Million Seven Hundred Seventy Four Thousand Pesos

(P1,141,774,000.00).

On 6 December 1992, ERB approved the application of DLPC after deducting

Fourteen Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P14,800,000.00) worth of

property and equipment which were not used by DLPC in its operation.

On 6 July 1992, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before the

Supreme Court assailing the decision of ERB on the ground of lack of jurisdiction

and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

In our resolution of 8 September 1992, the Supreme Court referred the case for

proper disposition to the Court of Appeals which subsequently dismissed the petition

on the ground that (1) the filing of the petition for review with the Supreme Court

was a wrong mode of appeal, and (2) the petition did not comply with the provisions

of Supreme Court Circular 1-88 in that (a) it did not state the date when the

petitioners received notice of the ERB decision, (b) it did not state the date when the

petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, and (c) it inconsistently alleged

different dates when petitioners supposedly received the denial of their motion by

ERB.

On 18 December 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that

our resolution of 8 September 1992 was a directive for the Court of Appeals to

disregard the above circular.

In its resolution of 24 March 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for

reconsideration for lack of merit.

RULING: The predecessor of the Energy Regulatory Board was the Board ofEnergy created under P.D. No. 1206. Appeals from the decisions of the Board of

Energy were appealable to the Office of the President. However, under the InterimRules Implementing the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, final decisions,orders, awards or resolutions of the Board of Energy were made appealable to theIntermediate Appellate Court (Sec. 9).

When the New Constitution took effect, Sec. 30, Art. VI, thereof provided that "Nolaw shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court asprovided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence." On 8 May 1987,the President promulgated E.O. No. 172 creating the Energy Regulatory Board toreplace the Board of Energy. Under Sec. 10 thereof, "[a] party adversely affected bya decision, order or ruling of the Board . . . may file a petition to be known as petitionfor review with the Supreme Court."

On 27 February 1991, the Supreme Court promulgated Circular No. 1-91, par. (1) ofwhich specifically provides that the proper mode of appeal from any quasi-judicialagency, including ERB, is by way of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.

Since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the advice and concurrence ofthis Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it cannot bedeemed to have amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 . Consequently,the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases from the Board of Energy, nowERB, remains.

If the appeal is brought to either Court (Supreme Court or Court of Appeals) by thewrong procedure, the only course of action open to it is to dismiss the appeal.

Prior to Circular No. 1-91, there was Circular No. 2-90 dated 9 March 1990, Item No.4 of which states that "[a]n appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed". Paragraph (d) ofsaid Circular also provides that "[n]o transfer of appeals erroneously taken to theSupreme Court or to the Court of Appeals to whichever of these Tribunals hasappropriate appellate jurisdiction will be allowed.




POLITICAL REVIEW


Consequently, the Court of Appeals was correct when it held that the SupremeCourt's Resolution dated September 8, 1992, referring "this case to the Court of Appeals for further disposition" was not a directive for this court to disregard theabove circulars and precedents. Rather the said SC resolution could mean only thatthis court should dispose of the subject petition in conformity with, and not in

violation of, those circulars and precedents

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS V. CA

BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.’s application to amend its BOI

certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from

―glazed floor tiles‖ to ―ceramic tiles‖.

Opositor Mariwasa moved for reconsideration of said BOI decision. This motion

having been denied, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.

The CA temporarily restrained BOI from implementing its decision. This TRO lapsed

by its own terms [20 days] after its issuance, without CA any preliminary injuction.

Petitioner filed Motion to Dismiss Petition and to Lift Restraining Order on the

ground that the CA has no appellate jurisdiction over the BOI case, the same being

exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant with to Art. 82 of the Omnibus

Investments Code of 1987. The CA denied motion to dismiss. Thus, a petition for

certiorari and prohibition was filed before SC.

Petitioner’s contention is that Circular No. 1-91 cannot be deemed to have

superseded Art. 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 226)

because it is in the nature of substantive act of Congress defining the

jurisdiction of courts pursuant to Article VIII Sec.2 of the Constitution, while

the Circular is a rule of procedure which this Court promulgated pursuant to

its rule-making power under Article VIII Sec 5 (5)

Petitioner questions the holding of the Second Division that although the right

to appeal granted By Art. 82 of the Code is a substantive right which cannot

be modified by a rule of procedure, nonetheless, questions concerning where

and in what manner the appeal can be brought are only matters of procedure

which this Court has the power to regulate.

Mariwasa counters that whatever ―obvious inconsistency‖ or ―irreconcilable

repugnancy‖ there may have been between BP 192 and Art 82 of EO 266 on the

question of venue for appeal has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the

Supreme Court, which was promulgated four years after EO 266 was promulgated.

W/N the SC has the power to prescribe rules to eliminate unnecessarycontradictions and confusing rules of procedure?

YES. The SC, pursuant to its Constitutional power under §5 (5), Article VIII of

the Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and

procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of BP 129, issued

Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing the appeals to the CA from final

orders or decisions of the CTA and quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate

unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of procedures.

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, although a circular is not strictly a statute or law,

it however has, the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. InInciong vs. de Guia, a circular of the SC was treated as law.

The argument that Art 82 of EO226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91

because the former grants a substantive right which, under the Constitution, cannot

be modified, diminished or increased by the SC in the exercise of its rule-making

powers is not entirely defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argues that Art

82 of EO226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and

in granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such appeal can

be brought. These latter portions simply deal with procedural aspects which the SC

has the power to regulate by virtue of its Constitutional rule-making powers.

Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Art82 of EO226 insofar as

the manner or method of enforcing the right to appeal from the decisions of the BOI

is concerned. Appeals from the decision of the BOI, which by statute was previously

allowed to be filed directly with the SC, should now be brought to the CA.

EN BANC AND DIVISION CASES

FORTICH V. CORONA




POLITICAL REVIEW


Office of the President, issued through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torresrendered a Decision which approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four(144)-hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area.

On March 29, 1996, alleged farmer-beneficiaries of the contested parcels of land

staged a dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike front of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The strike stirred nationwide attention that even church leadersand some presidential candidates tried to intervene for the strikers’ ―cause.‖

President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised toresolve their grievance within the framework of the law. This led the Office of thePresident, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue theso-called ―Win-Win‖ Resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying itsearlier Decision after it had already become final and executory. The saidResolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area onlyto the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred(100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation(NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners who claims ownership of the land in question(by virtue of TCT 14371 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon),opposed said resolution and urged the Supreme Court to annul and set aside the―Win-Win‖ Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of theDepartment of Agrarian Reform from implementing the said Resolution. The Courtruled in favor of the petitioners. Undeterred, respondents filed a motion forreconsideration. The Supreme Court, on November 1998, issued a Resolutionwherein it voted [two-two] with finality the denial of respondents’ separate motionsfor reconsideration ratiocinating that more of the impoverished of society will bebenefited by the agro-economical development of the disputed land which theprovince of Bukidnon and the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon intend to undertake.

Subsequently, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed theirMotion For Reconsideration Of The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And ForReferral Of The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer ForIssuance Of A Restraining Order)In their respective motions for reconsideration, both respondents and intervenorspray that this case be referred to this Court en banc . They contend that inasmuch astheir earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated April 24, 1998) wereresolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision, i.e., three,

was not met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be decided by thisCourt en banc , relying on the following constitutional provision:

“Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with theconcurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations

on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrenceof at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, thecase shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laiddown by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified orreversed except by the Court sitting en banc”

W/N the November 1998 two-two Resolution should be reffered and voted on by theCourt En Banc?

The respondents and intervenor’s prayer is untenable:

It is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for

decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained.Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, therequired three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion forreconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the aforequotedprovision speaks only of case and not matter.

The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition ofcases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. Theonly way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc . Onthe other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and thelosing party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division toresolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case

undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of thefailure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for itsreconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion forreconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered andmust therefore be deemed affirmed.

THE COURT based this ruling by distinguishing between cases and matters:

CASES MATTERS

―Decided‖ ―Resolved‖




POLITICAL REVIEW


NOTE: The Court Apply the doctrine of reddendo singula singulis[By referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression toits appropriate object.(Black’s Law Dictionary)]

APPLICATION: The two-two ―Resolution‖ (matter) of November 17, 1998 in effect

was a dismissal. Corollary to that, the ―Decision‖ sought to be reconsidered was

arrived at by a unanimous vote of all five (5) members of the Second Division of theCourt. Consequently, the present motions for reconsideration necessarily partake of

the nature of a second motion for reconsideration. Since the Win-Win Resolution

was declared null and void in the April 24, 1998 Decision, the March 29, 1996 OP

Decision (Resolution) was accordingly upheld and thus vested appurtenant rights to

the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of Bukidnon and other

parts of the country who stand to be benefited by the development of the property.

SUPERVISION OF THE JUDICIARY

DOLALAS V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Petitioners, Judge Ana Maria I. Dolalas, Evelyn K. Obido and Wilberto B. Carriedo -Presiding Judge, Clerk of Court and Clerk II, respectively of the MTC of Kabasalan,Zamboanga del Sur, were charged ―administratively‖ by Benjamin Villarante, Jr. for―miscarriage of justice, dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, unnecessary delay in theadministration of justice and for failure to prosecute Criminal Case for anunreasonable length of time‖ before public respondent Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.

The letter-complaint addressed to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao aroseout of said criminal case of alarms and scandals filed against private respondent bya police officer. Private respondent alleged that after submitting his counter-affidavit, there has been no pre-conference, arraignment or pre-trial held orconducted by petitioner judge. Private respondent claimed that the said criminalcase was maliciously filed by one P/Sgt. Salutillo in connivance with petitioner judge. Private respondent also claimed that said criminal case has beenunnecessarily delayed in that P/Sgt. Salutillo and petitioner- judge ―totally failed toprosecute‖ their own malicious action within a reasonable length of time thusprejudicing the constitutional right of the former to an impartial investigation and afair and speedy trial.

Petitioner was basically being charged with ―undue delay in the disposition of thesaid criminal case‖ filed before petitioner’s court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman may take cognizance of thecomplaint against petitioner for purposes of investigation and possible prosecutionin accordance with its mandate under Section 13 (1) and (2) of Article XI of the 1987Constitution for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Petitioner-judge contends that the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to

initiate an investigation into the alleged ―undue delay in the disposition of the case‖as said charge relates to a judge’s performance of her official duties over which theSupreme Court has administrative control and supervision, as mandated underSection 6, Rule VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Public respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao contends that referral to the Supreme Court is not essential in this caseas what will be investigated is not whether there was undue delay in the disposition,which it admits is administrative in nature. What is sought to be determined iswhether or not any undue delay in the disposition of the alarms and scandals caseresulted in injury to private respondent through manifest partiality, evident bad faithor gross inexcusable negligence and/or undue advantage to any party, in violation ofthe Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

RULING: The complaint against petitioner-judge is basically administrative innature. Petitioner-judge is being charged with having violated Rule 1.02, Canon1 and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

The resolution of the administrative charge of unduly delaying the disposition of thesaid criminal case involves the determination of whether, in resolving the alarms andscandals case, petitioner-judge acted in accordance with the guidelines provided inthe Rules of Court and in the Administrative Circulars in pursuance of the idealsembodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Such is clearly an administrativematter. Unquestionably, this Court is mandated under Section 6, Article VIII of the1987 Constitution to assume administrative supervision over all courts and thepersonnel thereof.

―Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in theSupreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel,from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowestmunicipal trial court clerk. It is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judge’s and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the properadministrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. Noother branch of government may intrude into this power.

Public respondent Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner onthe powers granted to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not onlyruns counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory




POLITICAL REVIEW


powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewiseundermines the independence of the judiciary.‖

MANIAGO V. CA

Ruben Maniago – owner of shuttle buses used in transporting employees of theTexas Instruments, (Phils.,), Inc. from Baguio City proper to plant site in Loakan,Baguio City

[ Jan. 7, 1990] one bus figured in a vehicular accident with passenger jeep ownedby private respondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road

[March 2, 1990] Criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage toproperty and multiple physical injuries filed with RTC Baguio City, Br.III againstManiago’s driver Herminio Andaya

[April 19, 1990] Civil case for damages filed with RTC Baguio City, Br.IV

Maniago moved for the suspension of the proceeding in the civil case be denied byTC; Reasons:

1. pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of theCriminal action and

2. Maniago was not the accused in the Criminal case

But the trial court, in its order dated August 30, 1991, denied petitioner's motion on

the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed

independently of the criminal action, in addition to the fact that the petitionerwas not the accused in the criminal case.

Maniago filed petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with CA, Maniago contends civilaction could not proceed independently of the criminal case because no reservationof the right to bring it separately had been made CA dismissed petition1.

1 Garcia v Florido and Abellana v Marave, held: independent civil action for damages allowed even

though no reservation to file it has been made

Certain provisions of the Civil Code state that responsibility for fault or

negligence under the above-quoted provisions is entirely separate and

distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal

Code.

However, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, while reiteratingthat a civil action under these provisions of the Civil Code may be broughtseparately from the criminal action, provides that the right to bring it must bereserved.

CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: W/N the filing of a separate civil action is a matter of procedure? [NOTE:W/N Rule III, §§1 and 3 are beyond the rule making power of the Supreme Courtunder the Constitution.]

RULING: IT IS PROCEDURAL IN NATURE. Indeed the question on whether the

criminal action and the action for recovery of the civil liability must be tried ina single proceeding has always been regarded a matter of procedure and,

since the rule making power has been conferred by the Constitution on this

Court, it is in the keeping of this Court.

The requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought it must be

reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only

regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure. The

requirement is merely procedural in nature

CIVIL CASE MAY NOT PROCEED. §1 quite clearly requires that a reservation

must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability,otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case

APPLICATION

NO SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION WAS MADE. In the present case, the criminalaction was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the driver been convictedand found insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable fordamages. But if the right to bring a separate civil action (whether arising from thecrime or from quasi delict) is reserved, there would be no possibility that the




POLITICAL REVIEW


employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be nopronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused. In such a case the institutionof a separate and independent civil action under the Civil Code would not result inthe employee being held liable for the same act or omission.

PEOPLE V. ESPARAS

Esparas was charged with violation of DDA for importing 20kg of shabu. Afterarraignmentand pleading not guilty, she escaped from jail and was tried in absentia.She was found guilty andwas sentenced to death. She remains at large at present.This is the issue.

Issue: Whether the Court may proceed to automatically review Esparas’s death sentencedespiteher absence.

RULING: Yes. In US v. Laguna (1910), the Court held that its power to review adecision imposingthe death penalty cannot be waived either by the accused or bythe courts. There, the Court said,mainly, that the judgment of conviction (capitalpunishment of death) entered on trial is not final,cannot be executed, and is whollywithout force or effect until the cause has been passed upon bythe Supreme Court.TC acts as a commissioner who takes the testimony and reports the same totheCourt with its recommendation. A decision of TC does not become final unlessand until it has been reviewed by the Court. An accused who was sentenced withthe highest penalty is entitled un-der the law to have the sentence and all the factsand circumstances upon which it is founded placed before the Court, as the highesttribunal of the land, to the end that its justice and legalitymay be clearly andconclusively determined. Such procedure is merciful. It gives a second chanceforlife. Neither the courts nor the accused can waive it. It is a positive provision of thelaw that brooks no interference and tolerates no evasions. (The Court here appliedSec. 50, Gen. Orders No.58.)

WRIT OF AMPARO

SEC OF NATIONAL DEFENSE V. MANALO

On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo (hereafter referred to as

―Raymond‖) and Reynaldo Manalo (hereafter referred to as ―Reynaldo‖) were

abducted by military men belonging to the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit

(CAFGU) on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the New

People’s Army (NPA). After eighteen (18) months of detention and torture, the

brothers escaped on 13 August 2007.

On 23 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo filed a Petition for Prohibition,

Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to stop themilitary officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other

basic rights. In a Resolution dated 24 August 2007, the Supreme Court ordered the

Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Armed

Forces of the Philippines (AFP), their agents, representatives, or persons acting in

their stead, and further enjoined them from causing the arrest of Raymond and

Reynaldo. Forthwith, they filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat

Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant

Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs.

While the aforementioned case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took

effect on 24 October 2007. Raymond and Reynaldo subsequently filed a

manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing peti tion as amparo petition.

On 25 October 2007, the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23 August 2007

Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule. The Supreme Court likewise granted

the Writ of Amparo and remanded the petition to the Court of Appeals to conduct the

summary hearing and decide the petition.

On 26 December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of

amparo. The Court of Appeals ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the

Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and

unofficial investigation reports as to the custody of Raymond and Reynaldo, confirm

the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and

produce all medical reports and records of Raymond and Reynaldo while under

military custody.

Aggrieved, the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP filed

an appeal with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:




POLITICAL REVIEW


1. Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is sufficient for amparo

petitions.

2. Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the right to security of

a person may be invoked.

RULING:

1. It depends on the credibility and candidness of the victims in their statements.

2. No.

1. ON EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON AMPARO PETITIONS

Effect of the nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the quantum of

evidence required – With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the

torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the

information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and

the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their

written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other

evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks

they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military

officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against

them comes as no surprise.

2. ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO PETITION

Permutations of the Right to Security – A closer look at the right to security of

person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right. First, the right

to security of person is ―freedom from fear.‖ In its ―whereas‖ clauses, the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that ―a world in which human

beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want

has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.‖ Some

scholars postulate that ―freedom from fear‖ is not only an aspirational principle, but

essentially an individual international human right. It is the ―right to security of

person‖ as the word ―security‖ itself means ―freedom from fear.‖ Article 3 of the

UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological

integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as

a general rule, one’s body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant.

Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced

disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may

constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As

the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in

criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are

an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.

Third, the right to security of person is a gua rantee of protection of one’s rights by

the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the

guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987

Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and

guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right

to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State

―guarantees full respect for human rights‖ under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987

Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the

Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is

rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights

especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective

investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to

victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or

their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.

Freedom from fear as a right – In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,

―freedom from fear‖ is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or securityis the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a

cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless

to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one

person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of

character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is

more correct to say that the ―right to security‖ is actually the ―freedom from threat.‖

Viewed in this light, the ―threatened with violation‖ Clause in the latter part of Section

1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the

earlier part of the provision.




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Deprivation of liberty is not necessary before the right to security may be invoked –

While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty

under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist

independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a

deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated 26 December 2007.

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORP V. CA

On January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of

P2,000,000.00from private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank and to secure

payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land located

at Marilao, Bulacan.

On July 11, 1983, the mortgage was foreclosed for non-payment of the loan,

a sheriff'ssale was held without re-publication of the required notices after the

original date for theauction was changed without the knowledge or consent of the

mortgagor. UCPB was thehighest and lone bidder and the mortgaged lands were

sold to it for P3,558,547.64.

On August 29, 1983, UCPB sold all its rights to the properties to private

respondentManuel Co, who on the same day transferred them to Golden Star

Industrial Corporation,another private respondent, a writ of possession was issued

to it on November 4, 1983.

On September 6, 1984, NICOS and the other petitioners, filed their action

for "annulmentof sheriff's sale, recovery of possession, and damages, with prayer

for the issuance of apreliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction."

On April 30, 1986, Golden Star and Evangelista filed a 7-page demurrer to the

evidencewhere they argued that the action was a derivative suit that came under the

jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission; that the mortgage had

been validly foreclosed;that the sheriff's sale had been held in accordance with Act

3135; that the notices hadbeen duly published in a newspaper of general circulation;

and that the opposition to thewrit of possession had not been filed on time. No

opposition to the demurrer having beensubmitted despite notice thereof to

the parties, Judge Nestor F. Dantes considered itsubmitted for resolution.

The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly

and distinctlyexplain how it was reached by the trial court. They also stress that thesheriff's sale wasirregular because the notices thereof were published in a

newspaper that did not havegeneral circulation and that the original date of the

sheriff's sale had been changedwithout its consent, the same having been allegedly

given by a person not authorized torepresent NICOS. Complaint was dismissed.

June 6, 1986, the petitioners complaint was dismissed.

A careful perusal of the challenged order will show that the complaint was dismissed

notonly for lack of jurisdiction but also because of the insufficiency of the evidence

to provethe invalidity of the sheriff's sale. Regarding this second ground, all the trial

court did wassummarily conclude "from the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff"that the sheriff'ssale "was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3,

Act 3135." It did notbother to discuss what that evidence was or to explain why it

believed that the legalrequirements had been observed.

ISSUE: W/N there was factual or legal basis for the decision to justify its reviewand affirmance in the CA. W/N there was a violation of the constitutionalrequirement.

RULING: It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation beinformed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons

that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment isrendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justificationwhatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he mayappeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should bereversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the lawon which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and isespecially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possibleerrors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.

It is important to observe at this point that the constitutional provision does not applyto interlocutory orders, such as one granting a motion for postponement or quashing




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a subpoena, because it "refers only to decisions on the merits and not to orders ofthe trial court resolving incidental matters."

The order in the case at bar does not come under either of the above exceptions. Asit is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on

the merits, it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctlystating therein the facts and the law on which it is based.

It may be argued that a dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction is not considered a judgment on the merits and so is not covered by the aforecited provision. There isno quarrel with this established principle. However, the rule would be applicable onlyif the case is dismissed on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction and not when someother additional ground is invoked.

PRUDENTIAL BANK V. CASTRO

Acting on the letter-appeal, dated June 6, 1988, filed on behalf of respondent Judge

by his children, seeking clarification of the Decision of June 5, 1986, on whether ornot the Order of this Court forfeiting all of said Judge’s retirem ent benefits and pay"exclude the monetary value of his accumulated leave credits which he earnedduring his thirty six (36) years of service in the government, the last eleven (11)years of which were spent in the Judiciary," and praying that the same be soexcluded considering their need for funds for the continuing medication ofrespondent Judge, now afflicted with liver cancer on its terminal stage, the CourtRESOLVED, out of humanitarian considerations, and following the precedent inCathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Hon. Romillo, Jr., 143 SCRA 396 [1986]), to AMENDthe first paragraph of the dispositive portion of its Decision of June 5, 1986, to readas follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Respondent Judge is hereby ordered dismissed from the service, with forfeitureof all retirement benefits and pay and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branchof the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. He may, however,enjoy all vacation and sick leave benefits that he has earned during the period of hisgovernment service. This decision is immediately executory." (Revisionitalicized)chanrobles virtual lawlibrar

POWER TO CONTROL EXECUTION OF DECISION

ECHEGARAY V. SEC OF JUSTICE

Leo Echegaray was convicted for the crime of rape of the 10 year old daughter of

his common law spouse.

He was to be executed by lethal injection.

The SC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) staying the execution of LeoEchegaray scheduled on the same day.

The Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing, inter alia, that theaction of the Court not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but alsoencroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

ISSUE: W/N SC has the power to control execution of decision

RULING: The SC still has jurisdiction over the case. The finality of the judgment

does not mean that the SC has lost all its power over the case.

By the finality of the judgment, what the Court loses is its jurisdiction to amend,

modify, or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the Court

retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the

jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify

or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final

for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment

becomes final. For after the judgment has become final, facts and circumstances

may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible

The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of

jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution

vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts

as may be established by law. (Section 1, Article VIII 1987 Constitution) To be sure,

the most important part of litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of

evaluation of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of

the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to

prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies

that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its

processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice.




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The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial

power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effect is

the same--- the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. (

cannot be interpreted as denying the power of the courts to control the enforcement

of their decisions after their finality)

What the SC temporarily restrained is the execution of its OWN Decision to give it

reasonable time to check its fairness in light of the supervening events in the

Congress as alleged by the petitioner —it did not restrain the effectivity of a law

enacted by Congress.

The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of adeath convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higherright than the right to life. To contend that ―only the Executive can protect the right oflife of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal andcoordinate powers of the three branches of our government.

TENURE OF JUSTICE/JUDGES

DE LA LLANA V. ALBA

De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition,

seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on

Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which

mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except

the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior

courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It

is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this

character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the

Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of justices and

judges as provided for under the Constitution.

RULING:

What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and

justices from their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their

offices.

Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal

removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must

be made in good faith.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the

office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in

law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would

thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the

question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the

incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to itseffect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.

Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary.

In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in

accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as

incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its

view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is

a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render

advisory opinions.

REMOVAL AND DISCIPLINE

MACEDA V. OMBUDSMAN VASQUEZ

Petitioner seeks the review of the orders of the Ombudsman denying the ex-parte

motion to refer to the SC filed by petitioner and the latter’s motion for

reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other

controverting evidences.

Respondent alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificates of Service.




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Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case since theoffense charged arose from the judge’s/petitioner’s performance of his official dut iesand that the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into theSC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

ISSUE: W/N the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for

the alleged falsification of the a judge’s certification submitted to the SC, andassuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the SC?

RULING: No. In fine, where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court

employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer

action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination

whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their

administrative duties.

It is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s

compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against

them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of governmentmay intrude into this power, without running afoul by the doctrine of

separation of powers.

In the absence of any administrative action taken against the petitioner by the SC

with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the

Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over

all courts and its personnel.

The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a case

before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive

the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itselfa power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges,

as it does, on judicial independence.

Administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding

Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is

only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s

compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if

they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into

this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers

Petition granted.

PEOPLE V. GACOTT

On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No.108) was filed by Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom

and Reyes. The accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal casecontending that since the power to prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act No. 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesahas no power or authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an oppositionpointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been abolished by Letter ofImplementation No. 2, Series of 1972. Despite such opposition, however,respondent judge granted the motion espousing the position that the Letter OfImplementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the ―law‖ contemplated in Article7 of the New Civil Code which can repeal another law such as R.A. 1130. Thus,respondent judge in the assailed order of March 18, 1994 held that the CityProsecutor has no power or authority to file and prosecute the case and orderedthat the case be quashed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to

administratively discipline respondent judge

RULING: To support the Court’s ruling, Justice Regalado relied on his recollection of

a conversation with former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion who was the

Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutional Commission

of which Regalado was also a member.

The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows that

there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that

―the SC en banc shall have the power todiscipline judges of lower courts,‖ is adeclaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the

procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended

that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole

Court since it would result in an absurdity.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is

intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that

the Court en banc can ―order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members




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who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted

therein.‖ In this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and

decided by the full Court itself.

Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the

Court en banc, a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to be imposed

is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a

lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than 1 year or a

fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or both.

Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in

all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or

imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of

cases in the Court, especially inadministrative matters, since even cases involving

the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.

SALARIES

PERFECTO V. MEER

ENDENCIA V. DAVID

NITAFAN V. COMM OF INTERNAL REVENUE

SEE NOTES

Judiciary Dept Poli1 Digests

Documents

Transcript of Judiciary Dept Poli1 Digests