Dimatulac vs. Villon, GR127107, 10/12/98Facts: The heirs of SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac filed a complaint for Murder againstMayor Santiago Yabut, et. al. before the MTCC of Macabebe, Pampanga. Warrants of arrests were issued by the judge of said court for the arrest of the accused. The writ also directed the latter to file their counter-affidavits, but among the 17 who were impleaded, only four, namely, Evelino David, Justino Mandap, JuanMagat and Francisco Yambao, of the 17 accused were arrested while only Francisco Yambao submitted his counter affidavit. Finding probable cause, the same judgedirected the Clerk of Court to forward the entire records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for further action. Thereafter, despite the fact that the accused were still at large, Pampanga Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Alfonso-Flores conducted a reinvestigation, in which she found that the Yabuts and one of the accused, John Doe Danny, to the exclusion of the other accused, were in conspiracy with one another, but that the offense committed was only homicide, not murder. Petitioners appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Information for Homicide was filed before RTC in Macabebe, Pampanga, against the Yabuts and a Danny. The Information, although dated 29 January 1996 was signed by Provincial Prosecutor Manarang on February 27, 1996, that is, a day before its filing in court. The private prosecutor filed for a Motion to Issue a Hold Departure Order(HDO) against all accused and an Urgent Motion to Defer Proceeding followed by the opposition of the Yabuts. Judge Roura deferred resolution of the Motion to issue HDO until all the accused who are out on bail be arraigned, but denied the motion to defer proceedings as he found no compelling reason. DOJ Secretary Teofisto Guingona resolved the appeal in favor of the petitioners and held that treachery was present and ordered the Prosecutor of San Fernando Pampanga to amend the information filed against the accused from homicide to murder and to include Fortunato Mallari ass accused in the amended information. Issues: 1. Whether or not the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Motion for Reinvestigation by Private Respondents against whom Warrants of Arrest were issued but who had not yet brought into the custody of the law. 2. Whether or not the Judge Villon acted in excess of jurisdiction in proceeding with the arraignment and in denying petitioners motion to set aside arraignment and reconsideration thereof despite his knowledge of the pendency of the appeal and the submission of vital evidence to prove that murder and not homicide was committed by the accused.

Held: 1. Yes. Warrants for the arrest of the Yabuts were issued by the MCTC, with no bail recommended for their temporary liberty. However the Yabuts were not arrested; neither did they surrender. Hence, they were never brought into the custody of the law. Yet, Asst. Provincial Fiscal Alfonso Reyes, either motu proprio or upon motion of the Yabuts, conducted a reinvestigation. Since said accused were at large, AlfonsoReyes should not have done so. Alfonso-Reyes allowed the Yabuts to submit their counter-affidavits without first demanding that they surrender because of the standing warrants of arrest against them. In short, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the Yabuts to make a mockery of the law in order that they gain their provisional liberty pending trial and be charged with the lesser offense of homicide. 2. Yes. The Supreme Court held that Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion when, in his order of 26 March l996, he deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure order until "such time that all the accused who are out on bail are arraigned" and denied the motion to defer proceedings for the reason that the "private prosecution has not shown any indication that the appeal was given due course by the Secretary of Justice." To hold that arraignment is a prerequisite to the issuance of a hold departure order, said the Court, could obviously defeat the purpose of said order

GEORGEL.KAW vs JUDGEADRIANOR.OSORIO, A.M.No.RTJ-03-1801,2004.FACTS: Respondent demandedP100, 000 in exchange for a favorable judgment in criminal cases for estafa filed by the complainant. Complainant paid P40, 000 with the balance payable upon promulgation of judgment. Respondent also extracted money from Complainant on various occasions, such as ,his birthday, his sons project, his wifes wake. Complainant heard rumors that the alleged mastermind of the accused had bragged that he would be acquitted having supposedly paid Respondent P1,000,000. When asked to inhibit from the case, Respondent denied such motion and ultimately rendered judgment acquitting the alleged mastermind (though convicting the other co-accused). ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not the respondent is liable for violating the Canon of Judicial Ethics.

Respondent is FINED P40,000.00 for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and c Canons of Judicial Ethics to be deducted from his retirement benefits. Having retired upon reaching the mandatory retirement age of 70, it is no longer possible to impose the penalty of dismissal or suspension on him. While Respondent may not necessarily be held liable for extortion and graft and corruption as it was not substantially proven, he should be

made accountable for violating Code of Judicial Conduct that prescribes that, a judge should avoid impropriety and appearance of impropriety in all activities (CANON2), a judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Rule2.01), a judge should regulate extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial duties (CANON5),a judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone except as may be allowed by law (Rule5.04). Respondent judges conduct fell short of the standard expected of a magistrate of the law. His act of inviting complainant and his wife to his birthday party corroded public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, considering that complainant had a pending case in his sala. A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial. Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this image. Respondent was not only aware of the money given by Complainant on the occasion of his wifes death, he signed the back of the check and even encashed it. This contravenes the Canons of Judicial Ethics that expressly provides that a judge should not accept any present or favors from litigants or from lawyers practicing before him. No position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can be the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as an epitome of integrity and justice.

Beso vs. Judge Daguman,AM#MTJ-99-1211, 1/28/2000Facts: In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar. In his comment, the respondent judge alleged that the marriage of the complainant had to be solemnized in Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar because : 1) physically indisposed and unable to report to his station in Sta. Margarita; 2) complainant said she had to fly abroad that same day; 3) that for the parties to go to another town for the marriage would be expensive and would entail serious problems of finding a solemnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or sponsors; 4) if they failed to get married on August 28, 1997, complainant would be out of the country for a long period and their marriage license would lapse and necessitate another publication of

notice; 5) if the parties go beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it would complicate her employment abroad. ISSUE: Held: GUILTY. The authority of a judge to solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his area of jurisdiction. Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, and the circumstances of this case do not fall in any of these exceptions. Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when he failed to register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman. Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which provides: "It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificates not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. xxx" Lastly, a judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The records show that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judges part. This Court reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of business. It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court because he is after all the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions. Whether or not the respondent is liable for violating the Canon of Judicial Ethics.

Versoza vs. Judge Contreras, AM#MTJ-06-1636, 3/12/2007Facts: Julio B. Verzosa charged Judge Manuel E. Contreras of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Ocampo, Camarines Sur with Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave Misconduct

(Harassment and Oppression), and Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, relative to Criminal Case No. 2071, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Rodrigo E. Candelaria." Verzosa alleges that he is a forest ranger of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Protected Area Office. While conducting surveillance on treasure hunting activities in Mt. Isarog Natural Park, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, he and his co-forest rangers discovered an open pit left in damaged condition, allegedly in violation of Republic Act No. 7586. They likewise found and confiscated in favor of the Government two metal chains used to overturn huge stones in the treasure hunting site. He found out later that the alleged treasure hunters were led by a certain Jose Credo (Credo) a.k.a. "Labaw" and Basilio Sumalde (Sumalde) a.k.a. "Moren". The Executive Director of the DENR Region V Office thereafter ordered Verzosa to continue monitoring the said treasure hunting site. Because of his involvement in the treasure hunting activities and on the basis of the testimony of Credo, he was implicated as an accessory in Criminal Case No. 2071 against Rodrigo Candelaria (Candelaria), et al. for robbery. The said case arose from the alleged information relayed by Judge Contreras to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Officers of Ocampo, Camarines Sur which led to the arrest of the principal accused. Judge Contreras did not inhibit himself from conducting the preliminary investigation despite his proven bias against all of the accused, in apparent violation of the guiding principles of Judicial Ethics and Responsibilities. Verzosa was not among the persons on board the truck when the same was apprehended by members of the PNP. On the basis of the affidavit executed by Credo, Judge Contreras hastily issued an order for Verzosa's arrest. After the information reducing the charge from robbery to simple theft was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur, Judge Nilo Malanyaon, in an Order dated September 13, 2004 dismissed the case due to lack of probable cause. Judge Contreras is the mastermind behind the treasure hunting activities in Ocampo, Camarines Sur and the robbery case for which complainant was implicated as an accessory was a way of harassing anybody who opposes the activities. Issue: Whether or not Judge Contreras should be sanctioned for violation of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Held: YES. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

The issue of whether a judge should voluntarily inhibit himself is addressed to his sound discretion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, which provides that a judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for a just or valid reason other than those mentioned in the first paragraph. However, respondent failed to consider the proscription under Rule 3.12(a) of Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct. In Oktubre v. Velasco, citing Perez v. Suller, the court held that the rule on disqualification of judges under Rule 3.12 and Section 1, Rule 137 [S]tems from the principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A Judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived to be susceptible to bias and partiality. The rule is intended to preserve the peoples faith and confidence in the courts of justice. True, a judge should possess proficiency in law so that he can competently construe and enforce the law. However, it is more important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him have confidence in his impartiality. Indeed, even conduct that gives rise to the mere appearance of partiality is proscribed. Records reveal that Judge Contreras had prior knowledge of the looting and dismantling at the PLDT Tower in Ocampo, Camarines Sur and he was instrumental in the apprehension of the robbers. Judge Contreras should have been aware of the impropriety of conducting the preliminary investigation considering that Rule 3.12(a), Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge from taking part in proceedings where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Judge Contreras ignored said rule, warranting disciplinary sanction from this Court. Judge Contreras should have inhibited himself from conducting the preliminary investigation, it did not render as void the act of Judge Contreras in issuing a warrant of arrest. He acted within the bounds of the then existing Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which provides, inter alia, that without waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

Sison vs. Judge Caoibes, Jr., AM #RTJ-03-1771, 5/27/2004FACTS: Complainant, an MMDA traffic enforcer issued a ticket for traffic violation against Respondents son, notwithstanding the fact that, the latter introduced himself as a son of a

judge. Complainant claimed that Respondent issued an order requiring him to appear and explain the traffic incident and that when he failed to comply, he was cited in contempt and ordered arrested. Complainant further claimed that he was only discharged after he admitted before Respondent that he made a mistake and that the traffic incident was all a misunderstanding. Respondent vehemently denied the accusations saying that he was merely preserving the dignity and honor due to the courts. He explained that, at the time Complainant flagged down his son, the latter was on official business, that is, on an errand for Respondent, to which Complainant reportedly uttered, Walang Judge, Judge Caoibes sa akin; kahapon nga, abogado ang hinuli ko. ISSUE: Whether or not, the respondent judge is liable for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct. HELD: Respondent DISMISSED from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations for serious impropriety unbecoming a judge in violation of Canon2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Initially, Respondent appeared to be justified in holding Complainant for contempt, due to the latters refusal to comply with his Order. However, it is not lost upon this Court that Complainant was not a party to any of the cases pending. What triggered the contempt charge was, in fact, the traffic violation incident involving Respondents son. Since the incident involved his own son and the matter was personal to him, Respondent should have refrained from ordering Complainants arrest and detention. That Respondent insisted that Complainant personally file his comment in court gives rise to doubts as to the motive behind it. Respondent Judge was not justified to so consider Complainants act and remarks as thereby displaying arrogance towards and deliberate disregard of the usual respect, courtesy and accommodation due to a court of law and its representative. As a public official himself, Respondent knew that Complainant was only doing his duty of enforcing evenly the particular traffic regulation against swerving in to a one-way street from the wrong direction, regardless of the office or position of the violators father. Respondent and his son should have challenged the issuance of the traffic violation receipt pursuant to the pertinent rules if they did not agree with the basis of the apprehension and also administratively charged Complainant for any unwarranted act committed. Since neither was done by them, but, on the contrary, both ultimately accepted the validity of the apprehension, as borne out by the retrieval of the drivers license and payment of the corresponding fine, it follows that Respondent had the consciousness that his son was at fault, instead of Complainant.

Dionisio vs. Hon. Escano,AM#RTJ98-1400, 2/1/1999Facts: Escano posted an advertisement for waitresses and singers to work at his restaurant at the RTC bulletin board. He also conducted interviews for this in his sala. He was later caught when a reporter from Hoy Gising! taped an interview which revealed that he intended to operate a drinking pub with scantily clad waitresses. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge is liable for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct Held: SUSPENDED. Rules 2.00, 5.02 and 5.03 provide that a judge should avoid impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety. He should also refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the courts impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with lawyers and litigants. He should also manage financial interests so as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification. Finally, the halls of justice should not be used for unrelated purposes.

Galang vs. Judge Santos,AM#MTJ-99-1197, 5/26/1999Facts: Respondent Judge was a judge and the publisher/columnist for a tabloid; he was also a writer for another paper. Galang charges him with using his columns to ventilate his views. He has repeatedly used insulting and inflammatory language against the governor and the provincial prosecutor and legal adviser. ISSUE: Held: Whether or not Judge is has compromised his duty with his conduct.

JUDGE DISMISSED. While Santos has the right to free speech, his writing of vicious editorials compromise his duties as judge in the impartial administration of justice. They reflect both on his office and on the officers he ridicules. The personal behavior of a judge in his professional and everyday life should be free from the appearance of impropriety. Improper conduct erodes the public confidence in the judiciary.

Correa vs. Judge Belen,AM#RTJ-10-2242

FACTS: The complainant Atty. Raul L. Correa charged respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba City, Laguna of Misconduct. Complainant narrated that he was one of the Co-Administrators appointed by the court in Special Proceedings No. 660-01C, entitled Intestate Estate of Hector Tan. He revealed that during the hearing of the case, respondent Judge Belen disagreed with various items in the Administrators Report, including the audited Financial Report covering the said estate, and immediately ruled that they should be disallowed. Complainant added that respondent Judge Belen scolded their accountant, branded her as an incompetent, and threatened to sue her before the regulatory body overseeing all certified public accountants. Complainant further claimed that, in the course of the proceedings, he was asked by respondent Judge Belen to stand up while the latter dictated his order on their Administrators Report. Respondent Judge Belen even rebuked him for some mistakes in managing the affairs of the estate, adding that it was regrettable because Atty. Raul Correa is a U.P. Law Graduate and a Bar Topnotcher at that. Complainant described the actuations and statements of respondent Judge Belen as uncalled for, a left-handed compliment, and a grave insult to his Alma Mater. Worse, the complainant stated that the respondent Judge Belen ousted complainant as co-administrator of the estate of Hector Tan. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has a conduct unbecoming of a judge. HELD: Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, Branch 36, finds the respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, GUILTY of Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, the Supreme Court FINED him P10,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Marcos vs. Judge Pamintuan,AM#RTJ-07-2062, 1/18/11FACTS: Judge Reyes in an order on May 30, 1996 dismissed Civil Case No. 3383-R due to forum shopping and ordered that that the Buddha statuette in the custody of this Court be

immediately released to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas in trust for the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas RTC: Denied the separate motions for reconsideration by the parties Judge Pamintuan in an order dated May 9, 2006 set the case for hearing on June 29, 2006 purportedly to formally and finally release the Golden Buddha to its rightful owner. Marcos was one of the subpoenaed parties, being a person with interest in the case. Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate of Rogelio Roxas. However, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be under custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas, or upon the appointment of his estates administrator Also ruled that the Golden Buddha in its custody is a fake one. November 15, 2006: Marcos filed a complaint-affidavit charging Judge Pamintuan with Gross Ignorance of the Law for reversing motu proprio the final and executory order of then Acting Presiding Judge Antonio Reyes in Civil Case No. 3383-R, entitled Albert D. Umali, in his capacity as the exclusive administrator and as President of the Treasure Hunters Association of the Philippines v. Jose D. Roxas, et al. Pamintuan Commented that Marcos should have filed a motion for reconsideration instead of filing an administrative complaint. Marcos, in her Reply-Affidavit, cited Section 1 of Rule 37 which provides that only the aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration within the period for taking an appeal Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Judge Pamintuan be dismissed from the service with the additional penalty of forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government service, including government owned or controlled corporations, for Gross Ignorance of the Law and for violation of Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. Should judgment of lower courts which may normally be subject to review by higher tribunals become final and executory before, or without exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they too become inviolable, impervious to modification. Judge Pamintuan was placed under preventive suspension pending resolution of the administrative case to stop him from committing further damage to the judiciary. Judge Pamintuan moved for reconsideration and eventually filed a Motion for Early Resolution of Motion for Reconsideration and to Submit the Case for Decision. Judge Pamintuan then sent a letter requesting for his backpay and benefits covering the period of his preventive suspension - denied for being premature and for lack of merit ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Pamintuan is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law HELD: Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 3, is DISMISSED from the service Judge Pamintuan should have realized that the trial court did not rule on that point that the Golden Buddha is fake in its May 30, 1996 Order (even in its September 2, 1996 Order) Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct: SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose, to wit: to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Notably, this is NOT Judge Pamintuans first and sole administrative case. Judge Pamintuan was charged with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Violation of the Constitutional Rights of the Accused, Arrogance and Violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and was suspended for 1 year. Having been previously warned and punished for various infractions, Judge Pamintuan now deserves the ultimate administrative penalty dismissal from service.

Heck vs. Judge Santos, AM#RTJ-01-1657, 2/23/2004Facts: This is a disbarment case against Judge Anthony E. Santos, who retired on May 22, 2002, for allegedly violating the Notarial Law before his appointment as judge, on April 11, 1989, or some twenty years ago.

The complaint alleged that Santos subscribed and forwarded, on a non-regular basis, notarized documents since January 1980, when in fact, it was only until January 9, 1984, that he became a duly commissioned notary public. The complaint further alleged that Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after the expiration of his commission in December 1989. Issue: Can a retired judge perform notarial duties without commission? Held: The retirement or resignation of a judge will not preclude the filing thereafter of an administrative charge against him for which he shall still be held answerable if found guilty. It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary and that an administrative complaint against a member of the BAR does not prescribe. The respondent did not object to the complaints evidence neither did he claim that he was commissioned as notary public for the years 1980-1983, nor deny the accuracy of such. He merely answered that there was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register. Judge Santos is thus, found guilty of notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission and is ordered to pay the fine of P5, 000.00. However, considering that the complaint against respondent was filed twenty-four (24) years after the commission of the act complained of and that there was no private offended party who came forward and claimed to have been adversely affected by the documents so notarized, the action for disbarment will not prosper. Respondent, as a retired judge, deserved to enjoy the full measure of his wellearned retirement benefits.