Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal...

27
Judicial Decision-making

Transcript of Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal...

Page 1: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Judicial Decision-making

Page 2: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Legal ModelTraditional model of applying “the law”

to facts of case

Assumes that the law is discoverable

Often sufficient for most trial judges or intermediate appellate judges

Does not work for “hard cases”, esp at appellate level

Page 3: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Legal RealismAttack on legal model beginning in 1880s

with O.W. Holmes, high point in 1930s

Demonstrated that the law did not determine outcomes in interesting cases, but only in routine ones

Unfairly attacked as amoral, rather than attempt at explanation

Page 4: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Legal Model

FactsFind

relevant precedents

Determine relevant

similarities/differences

Apply rule of law from

earlier precedents

DecisionNew Rule

of Law

Page 5: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Political Model

Attitudes

Judicial Vote

Role Orientations

Institutional Context

Page 6: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Attitudinal ModelFocuses on the question of why do

judges vote the way they do

Looks for individual differences in background and ideology

Often classifies judges by membership in blocs that vote alike

Developed to analyze Supreme Court

Page 7: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Attitudinal ModelJustices’ votes are a function of their

policy preferences

This is self-defining, often common sense: Justice Scalia votes conservative over 70% of the time, so he’s a conservative

Justices sometimes cast votes are inconsistent with their ideology

Page 8: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Ideology and Partisan Appointment

Page 9: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that
Page 10: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Voting Behavior of Justices, by Party

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Liberal Votes

Brennan

White

Marshall

Blackmun

Rehnquist

Stevens

O'Connor

Scalia

Souter

Thomas

Breyer

Ginsburg

Page 11: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Marshall, Pacelle, Ludowise, Court of Laws or Super Legislature?

Finds that presidential ideology is single largest measureable influence

Also strong support for legal model because of norm of precedent

Also significant finding that group dynamics (strategic model) tempers attitudinal preferences

Page 12: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Role TheoryAssumes that judges consider the

different roles that they may play in position

May act differently in different cases

Values come from nature of job, rather than own political preference

Examples: policy-making, problem-solving, administrator

Page 13: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Small Group TheoryMartinek discusses re: Appeals Court

panels of 3

Group dynamics may influence decision, not just background, but also status relative to other members

Strong group norms around consensus, dissent are also possible

Page 14: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Strategic ModelAppellate panels only

Views judges as policy makers strategizing to achieve preferred outcome

May not vote for 1st position when vote for 2nd or 3rd position leads to better outcome

Intuitive as political model, but adds complexity to explaining judicial behavior

Page 15: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Jurisprudential RegimesCurrent empirical approach to thinking

about use of precedent

Attempts to track degree to which courts (esp. lower courts) change behavior after important decisions

Shows how precedent becomes part of legal language and culture, influencing decisions

Page 16: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Problem of Judicial ActivismIdea that judges move beyond law

and proper role

Assumes that law is a known thing

May be criticism of judge’s movement beyond proper role, but more commonly disagreement with result

Page 17: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that
Page 18: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

What Americans WantJames Gibson, 2009

Page 19: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that
Page 20: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Major Schools of Constitutional Interpretation

Strict Construction (Meese)

Original Intent/Understanding (Scalia)

Contemporary Ratification (Brennan/Marshall/Souter)

Representation Reinforcement

(John Hart Ely)

Page 21: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Strict Construction Politically appealing/intellectually

appalling

Assumes Constitution has literal meaning/ “Protestant” vision of interpretation

Simplistic vision of language

Great for easy questions, useless for difficult questions

Page 22: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Original Intent/UnderstandingAuthority derives from authorship

Focuses on meaning when written (Intent) and ratified (Understanding)

Assumes ability to determine original meaning

Assumes that original meaning provides answers to current questions

Better at vetoes than positive answers

Page 23: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Contemporary RatificationJudges must read texts to reflect current

problems, understandings

Original Intent is hubris

Judges’ job is to decide, SC & OI don’t answer many questions

Constitution’s meaning reflects history as unfolding of principles, not frozen

Weakness: whose contemporary values?

Page 24: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Activism Ranking (Rehnquist Court)

Page 25: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that
Page 26: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that

Decisions overturning Federal or State & Local Laws by Ideology

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Federal

State/Local

Page 27: Judicial Decision-making - University of Utahdlevin/jud_pro/... · Judicial Decision-making. Legal Model. Traditional model of applying “the law” to facts of case Assumes that