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Chapter 6

TilE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS IN CHILDHOOD

The development of scientific concepts[10] in the school-age child is primarily apractical issue of tremendous importance for the school's task of irlStrucling the childin a system of scientific concepts. However, it is also an issue of tremendous theoreti­cal significance. Research on the development of scientific concef>ts (i.e., true con­cepts) will inevitably clarify the most basic and esseOlIal general lawsof con'cept for:­mation. TiIis problem contains the key to the whole history of the cbild's mental de­velopment. It must, therefore, be our point of departure in studying the child's think­ing. Until recently, however, this problem has remained almost entirely unexplored.Our knowledge of the development of scientific concepts is extremely limited. Ourown experimental research, which we will cite freqnently in the present chapter, isamong the first systematic studies of the issue.

Tllis researeh (carried out primarily by Shif5) was a comparative study of the de­

velopment of scientific and everyday concepts in school·age children. Shifs basic taskwas to carry out an experimental evaluation of Our working hypothesis concerning theunique characteristics of the development of scientific as opposed to everyday con­cepts. A second basic concern was the more general problem of the relationship be­tween instruction( 11] and developmenl. TIle attempt to study (he actual developmentof the child's (hi nking in the course of school instruction grew from several basic as­wl11ptions: (1) in general terms, concepts or word meanings develop; (2) scientific con­cepts are not learned in final form -- they too dcvelop; (3) findings based on the studyof everyday concepts cannot be generalized to scientific concepts; and (4) the problem35 a whole must be studied experimentally. A special experimental method was devel·oped. SubjeCls were presented with problems thaI were structurally isomorphic, butwhIch differed in that they incorporated materials based on either scientific or every­day concepls. Using a series of pictures, the experimenrer told a story that ended witha ,eIHence fragment broken off at the word "becamc" or "aldlOugh." This procedurewas ~upplel1lenled by clinical discussion in order to establish levels of conscious reOec·lion on cause-effect relationships and relationships of implication with bOlh scientificand real-world material.

The piclures illustrale(\ a sequence of events based either on materials [roInles~()l1s in the social science program or common occurrences in everyday life. Prob-

TIlinkillg and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts 169

Grades[l IV

% Com pleted sentences

\l,lhen the author uscs phrases such as 'spontaneous thjlllUng' or 'sporllaneous concept,: he is refer­Clng (0 phellumena th~l develop through the child's practical activity and immediate .ocial interac·tion, not to those Ihal develop wtth hi. acquisition of a system of knowledge through instruction.Edlior', note.

lclllS based on everyday events required children to complete sentences such as:"Kolya went to the 1l10vie theater because... ," 'The train left the tracks because... ," or"Olya still reads poorly, although ...." Based on this model, several problems were alsoconstructed using materials frolll the educational prograills of second and fourth gradechildren.

As a supplementary Illode of gathering data, we observed lessons of primaryschool children that were specially organized for this purpose.

The findings frolll this study lead to several conclusions concerning both the nar­row issue of the development of scientific concepts and the broader issue of the devel­opillent of thinking in school-age children. A comparative analysis of the results foreJch age group dell1on~tra(es that with the appropriate educational program the devel·Oplllent of scielltljic concepts Olltstrips tile development of spoll/aneotls concepts.' Thewblc provides empirical support for this conclusion.

The table shows: (1) that there is a higher level of conscious awareness[12] ofscicntific than everyday concepts, and (2) that there is a progressive development ofscientific thinking which is followed by a rapid increase in levels of performance wilheveryday concepts. This indicates that the accumulation of knowledge leads directly toan Increase in the level of scientific thinking and [hat this, in turn, influences the de­vclopmem of spomaneous thinking. This demonstrates the leading rote of insLruc\ionin the development of the school child.

TIle category of adversative relations ('aILhough') develops genetically muchslower than the categolY of causal relations ('because') and presents a picture inGrade IV similar to that of causal relations in Grade II. This is also associated withthe charactcristics of the materials used ill the educational program.

TIlese data lead to an hypothesis concerning the unique processes involved in ther development of sciemific as .opposed to everyday concepts. TIle development of scien·

lific concepts begins wi,!I t!le verbal definition. As part of an organized system, this ver­bal definition descends to the concrete; it descends to the phenomena which the con­cept represents. In contrast, the everyday concept tends to develop outside any defi·nlte system; it tends to move upwards toward abstraction and generalization.

The development of the scientific social science concept, a phenomenon that oc­curs as pan of the educational process, constilUtes a unique form of systematic cooper-

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ation between the teacher and child. TIle maturation of the child's higher menialfuncLions occurs in this cooperaLive process, that is, it occurs through the adult's assis­tance and participaLion. In the domain of inLerest to us, this is expressed in the growthof the relativeness of causa) thinking and in the development of a certain degree ofvoluntary control in scientific thinking. This elemenL of voluntary control is a productof the instntClional process itself. The earlier maturation of scientific concepts is ex­plained by the unique form of cooperation between the child and the adult that is thecentral element of lhe educational process; it is explained by the fact that in this pro- (cess knowledge is transferred to the child in a definite system. This is also why thelevel of developmenL of scientific concepts forms a zone of proximal possibilities forthe development of everyday concepts. The scientific concept blazes the trail for theeveryday concept. It is a form of preparatory instntctjon which leads to iLs develop­ment.

TIlUS, at a single stage in the development of a single child, we find differingstrengths and weaknesses in scientific and everyday concepts.

Our data indicate thal the weakness of the everyday concept lies in its incapacity I

for abstraction, in the child's incapacity to operate on IL in a voluntary manner. Wherevolition is required, the everyday concept is generally used incorrectly. In contrast, Ihe I

weakness of the scienLific concept lies in its verbalism, in its insufficient saturation withthe concrete. This is the basic danger in the development of the scientific concept.The strength of the scienLific concept lies in the child's capacity to use it in a voluntarymanner, in its "readiness for action." TIlis picture begins to change by the 4th grade.l1le verbalism of the scientific concept begins to disappear as it becomes increasinglymore concrete. This has its influence on the development of spontaneous concepts aswell. Ultimately, the two developmental curves begin to merge (Shif, 1935).

How do scientific concepts develop in the course of school instruction? What isthe relationship between instruction, \earning, and the processes involved in the inLer­nal development of scientific concepts in the child's consciousness? Are these simplytwo aspects of what is essentially one and the sante process? Does the process in­volved in the internal development of concepts follow instruction like a shadow followsthe object which casts it, not coinciding with it but reproducing and repeating itsmovement, or do hoth processes exiSt in a more complex and subtle relationship whichrequires special investigation?

In contemporary child psychology, we find two answers to these questions, First,we find the position that scienlijic co/zcepls do /lot have their own inlernallristory, thatthey do not undergo a process of development in the true sense of the word. Rather,they are simply learned or received in completed form through the processes of under­~tallding. learning, and comprehension, They are adopted by the child in completedform from the domain of adult thinking. From this perspective, the problem of thedevelopment of scientific concepts is essentially exhausted by that of leaching scienLificconcepts to the child and by that of learning concepts. This is the most widely ac­cepted -- indeed the generally accepted -- perspective ou this issue in contemporarychild psychology. Until recently, it has provided the foundation for the conStruction ofmost theories and methods of school instruction.

Even the most rudilllentary scientific critique makes the theoretical and practicalinadequacy of this view apparent We know from research on concept formation thaLthe concept is not simply a collection of associative connections learned with the aid ofmemory. We know that the concepl is not an automatic mental habit, buL a complexalld tme act of thinking that cannot be maStered through simple memorization. Thechild's thought must be raised to a higher level for the concept to arise in conscious·ness. At any slage of its development, the concept is an act ofgeneralizmion. The most

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170 Thinking and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts 171

important finding of all research in this field is that the concept .. represented psy­chologically as word meaning -- develops. The essence of the development of the con­cept lies in the transition from one structure of generalization 10 another. Any wordmeaning, at any age, is a generalization. However, word meaning develops. When thechild first learns a new word, the development of ils meaning is nOt completed but hasonly begun. From the outset, the word is a generalization of the most elementary type.[n accordance with the degree of his development, the child moves from elementarygeneralizations to higher forms of generalization. 111is process is completed with theformation of true concepts.

nle development of concepts or word meanings presupposes the development ofa whole series of functions. It presupposes the development of voluntary attention,logical memory, abstraction, comparison, and differentiation. 111ese complex mentalprocesses cannot simply be learned. From a Iheoretical perspective, then, there is lit­tle doubt concerning the inadequacy of the view that the concept is taken by the childin completed form and learned like a mental habit.

The inadequacy of thi~ view is equally apparent in connection with practice. Noless than experimental research, pedagogical experience demonstrates that direct in­struction in concepts is impossible. It is pedagogically fruitless. The teacher who at­te mpts to use this approach achieves nothing but a mindless learning of words, anempty verbalism (hat simulates or imitates the presence of coneepts in the child. Un­der these conditions, the child learns not the concept but the word, and this word istaken over by the child through memory rather than thought. Such knowledge turnsoul to be inadequate in any meaningful application. This mode of instruction is thebasic defect of the purely scholastic verbal modes of teaching which have been univer­sally condemned. ft substitules the learning of dead and empty verbal schemes for themastcry of living knowlcdge.

Tolstoy, who had an eXlcaordinary understanding of the nature of the word and itsmeaning, saw wilh both clarily and precision the futility of attempting to transmit con­cepts dircetly from teacher 10 student. He understood that it is impossible to transferword meaning mechanically from one head to another throngh other words. Tolstoyexperienced the futility of this approach iu his own teaching. He attempted to teachchildren literary language by firsl translating the children's words into the language ofthe tale and then translating the language of the tale into a higher level of language.He concluded that it is impossible to teach students literary language as one commonlytcaches them French, through forced explanation, mcmorization, and repetition.

Tolstoy writes:

We must recognize tho, tile frequency witil wilieil we ilave tried Ihi. ap·proach iu the past Iwo ruonlhs and the direct fcPUlS10li it encountered jn (heswdculS pr()ve~ that II W~lS mistaken. These expcrilncnts have conYinccd meIhat even for a talented leneiler, il is impossible 10 explain the meaning of aword. The eXpl"ndllOnS Iha( \Inloleuled leaehers .,e so foud of CannOI b"more succc.:;sful. To cxrl.HIt a wo[(1 .such as ~lJnpression," you must replace iteilher wilh another eqlliOlly incomprehensible word Or wilh a whole series ofv.'urd~ whose connection wilh it is ilS incomprehensible as the word itself(1903, p. 141)

\lie find [rulh and enol' Illixed in equal mcasure in Tolstoy's calegorical posItion onthi, i"ue. The correct aspect of hi, pOSition is that which flows directly from the expe­rience of any [cacheI' who IS ;,Irllggltng like Tolstoy and who analyzes the word asc"rdully. In Tolstoy's OWIl word" the Iruth in tillS posilion consists in Ihat fact th,ll:

il i, rarely lbe word itself Ihal is incomprehensible (0 Ihe sludent.Ralher, the child locks the coneepl lhat the word expres~es. The word i. ai­mosl al~'ays ready when Ihe eoncepl is ready. The relation,hip of (he word10 though I and the 10rmaiioD 01 new concepts is such a complex, my'Jer;ous,and dclicJle process of Ihe spirit thai any i.olerference wilh it is a powerfUl,awkward (orce which relards development (ibid).

n1e truth of this position lies in the fact that concepts or word meanings develop andin the fact that (his developmental process is complex and delicate.

The incorrect 35pect of this position, which is a direct expression of Tolstoy's gen­eral views on the issue of instruction, lies in his exclusion of any possibility of directinterference in this mysterious process. Tolstoy atlempts to represent the process ofconcept development in terms of its own internal laws. He iso!ates the development ofconcepts from instruction. This condemns the teacher to extreme passiveness in thedevelopment of scientific concepts. This position emerges with particular clarity inTolstoy's categorical formulation of his position, in his statement that "any interferenceis a crude, awkward force which retards developmenl."

However, T?btoy understo.od t~at not all f~rms of inter~erence retard conceptdevelopment. It IS only crude, direct JIlterference IJ1 the formalJon of concepts -- inter­ference which attempts to move in a straight line along the shortest distance betweentwo points -- that leads to injury. A different form of interference, a more subtle,complex, and indirect method of instruction, will lead this developmental process for­ward to higher levels. Tolstoy writes:

Il is importanl (0 give Ihe pupil the opportunity. 10 acquire new conceptsand words from Ihe general meaning of speech. The chitd heOfs or rends aword thai be docs not understand in a phrase Ihat be docs. Later, he hearsor reads It agaiu ill another phrase. Tbrough this process, he begins to ac­quire some vague understanding of it. Ultimately, be begin, to feel the ne.cessity of using Ibis word. Once he bas used it, the word and coneept aremade hIS own. There are a thousand olher paths to this same end. [remaineOIl\llneed, however, thai conseionsly transferring new concepts or wordforms (0 Ihe pupil is as futile as allempting to teaeb Ihe child 10 walk throughinstruction in {he law» of equj~briunl. Any aHempt of this k.ind will nOl onlyfail to moVe Ihe pupil toward the desired goal, bUI will interfere wilh thatproce"" m"ch like (he crude hand of a Illall who allempts 10 build a OowerfrOUl pelals slill conlained within a bud because he wants (0 sec i( bloom(ibid, p. t46).

111US, Tolstoy believes that there are a thousand paths other than that character­istic o~ tradition~1 scholastic instruction through which we can teach new concepts tothe child. He rejects only one path, the direct and crude mechanical eonstruction ofthe new word from its "petals." Tolstoy'S argument on this issue is correct. I! is in­deed, indisputable, supported by both theory and practice. However, Tolstoy ascribes(00 much SIgnificance to the natural and accidental. He ascribcs too much significanceto the work of vague representations and feelings, to (he internal process of conceptformation closed off within itself. He underestimates the potential for direct inlluenceon lhis process. Stated more generally, he exaggerates the distance between instrllc­tion and developmeol.

However, in {he present context, we are interested primarily in the kernel of truth{hal is COntained in his position thaI the atlempt to develop the new concept from its"J?etHls" is. like {.rying 10 teach a child to walk in accordance with the laws of eCluilib­num. TIm POSition IS absolutely correc\. The path from the cliild's first encounler

172 Thinking and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts 173

wilh a new concepl to the momenl when the word and concept are made the child'sown is a complex internal mental process. This process incll~des t~e gradual develop­ment of und~rSlanding of the new word, a process that beginS with ~)l1ly the vaguestrepresenlat;on. il also includes the child's initial use of the word. HIS actual mastcryof the word i.; only the final link in this process. We attempted to express what.ls es­sentially the same idea in our argument lhat, when the child firsllearns the meaning ofa new word, the process of development has not been completed bUI. has only begun.

Our research in pursuit of the hypothesis stated at the beglnmng of tillS chapter~hows that the paths through which we can teach concepts to the chlld nre not limitedto the thOllsand to which Tolstoy refers. Conscious instruction of the pupil in new con­cepts (i.e., in new forms of the word) is not only possible but may ac~ually be theSOl/rce for a higher foml of developmcnr of the clllid s own concepts, partlwlarly thoJe(11IIt have developed in rhe child prior 10 cOllSciollS instruction. Ou r research demon­strates thnt it is possible to work directly on C'()ncepts in school instruction. It alsoshows, however. lhat this constitutes not the end but the beginning of the developmenlof (he scientific concept. [t does nOI exclude the processes of developmenl but gIvesthem new directions. It places Ihe processes of instruction and development in newnnd maximally propitious rclntionships. . . .

[t is important to note that when Tolstoy speaks of the concept illS always m con­nection with [he problem of leaching li[~rary language to the child. Tolstoy is not con­cerned with the concepts that the child acqulres in learning a system of sciemificknowledge, but with words and concepts that are woven into the sam~ fabric as thosethat have developed in thc child. 1l1e examples that he uses make thiS apparent. Hespeaks of explaining and interpreting words such as "impression" or "tool." In contrastto the scientific concepts with which our research is concerned, these words and con­cepts are not learned as pnn of a well-defined system. Naturally. we must consider 10

what extent Tolstoy's arguruents can be extended to the processes involved in the for­mation of scientific concepts. To address this issue, we must explore the commoncharacteristics of the processes involved in the formation of scientific concepts nndthose involved in the formation of tile concepts that Tolstoy had in mind because theyemerge from the child's own everyday life experience, we will refer to the latter aseveryday concepts.

By differentiating scientific and everyday C'()ncepts in this way, we do no.t resolvethe issue of whether this differentiation is objectively justified, Indeed, a baSIC task ofour research is to clarify the issue of whether tb~re is any objective difference betweenthe processes involved in the development of scientific concepts and those involved inthe development of other types of concepts. Ii such a difference does exist, we mustclarify its nature. We must. also identify obj~ctive differences which can provide afoundation for the cOll1pnrntive study of the processes involved in the development ofscientific and everyday concepts. The task of this chapter is to show thal this diSlinc­lion is empirically warranted, theoretically justified, and heurislically fruitful. ys taskis to show (hat it must function as Ihe corner slone of our workmg hypotheSIS. Wemllsl demonstrnte that scientific concepts develop differently Iilan everyday concepts, thatthe development of these two types of concepls does not foH~w the sa~e path. There­fore the task of Ollr experimentnl research Includes acqutrlng emplncal support for,he ;)osiliOn that there is a difference between the development of scientific nnd ~v­eryday concepts . ..It also requires the acquisition of data that will permit tiS to clanfythe precise nature of this difference. ..'

This differentiation of scientific and everyday concepts IS baSIC to our lVorkmg hy-pothesis and our statemenl of the research problem. It is not, however, genernlly ac-

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cepted by contemporary psychologists. In fact, it eontradic1s the most widely heldviews on the mailer. We should, therefore. attempt to clarify and support our position.

We mentioned earlier Ihat (here are currently two positions on (he issue of howscientific concepts develop in the course of school instruction. As we have pointedollt, the first position consists of a complete rejection of any internal development inthc emcrgence of scientific concepts. We have already attempted to point out the in­adequacy of this perspective. There is. however, a second position on this issue. Thisposition .. currently the more widely accepted of the two .. is based on I.he idea (hutthe development of scientific concepts differs in no essential way [ro/11 that of Iile COil­

cepts which develop in the course of the child's own experience. 'nlis perspective sug­gests that. there is no basis for the differentiation of these developmental processes.From this perspective, the process involved in the development of seientific conceptssimply repeats the most basic and essential aspects of the process through which ev­eryday concepts develop. The critical question at this point is whether this second po­sition is well-founded.

If we review the scientific literature, it quickly becomes apparent (hat nearly allstudies of concept formation in childhood have focused on the development of whatwe call everyday concepts. As we mentioned earlier, our work is one of the first sys­tematic allempts to study the de,velopment of scientific concepts. All Ihe establishedlaws and regularities of the development of the ehild's concepts have been derivedfrom studies of everyday concepts. In spite of the differences in the internal conditionsunder which these two types of concepts develop. these findings have been extended tothe domain of the child's scientific thinking. No altempt has been made to verify tilevalidity of such an extension. That the extension of these findings to the domain ofscientific concepts has occurred without any attempt to assess its validity is primarilY afunction of the fact that the question of the propriety of this extension has never beenraised.

Recently, several particularly insightful researchers (ineluding Piaget) have foundthat they could not ignore this question. Moreover, when the problem presented itself,these researchers were obliged to differentiate sharply between representations thatdevelop primarily through the operation of the child's own thought and those thatarise under the decisive and determining influence of knowledge the child acquiresfrom those around him.

Piaget refers to the first of these two types of representations as spontaneous rep­resentations.

Piaget demonstrated that these two types of repre~~ntations have a good deal ineommon, They both: (1) man..ifest a resistance to external suggestion; (2) have deeproots in tbe child's thought; (3) manifest a certain commonality among children of thesame age; (4) are maintained in the child's consciousness over a period of severalyears (giving way 1O new concepts gradually rather than disappearing suddenly); and(5) manifest themselves in the child's first true answers. These characteristicsdifferentiate these two types of representations from suggested representations andfrom answers that are provided to the child through leading questions.

[n our view, these positions are correct. They reeognize thai the child's scientificconcepts (whiciJ clearly belong to the second group of representations discussed by Pi­ngel) undergo a true process of development rather than arising spolltaneously. Thisis made clear by the five features of these representations listed above. Piaget goesfurther and deeper {han other researchers inlO the problem whieh iniereSfS us. Heeven recognizes thnt t!lis group of concepts can become an independent object of in­vestigation.

174 TIlinking and Speech6. Developmenl of Scientific Concepts 175

IIowcver, Piaget makes several mistakes lhal detract from the positive aspect .ofhis argument. Three illierre!(]rcd aspects of Piagel's lI:ought are lI1ist(]k~/l and of specl~1

interesl to us. The first concerns the potenllal for mdependent studies of the chlld snonspontaneous concepts and the facl that these c?ncepts ~ave roots deep in thechild's thonght. Piagel is inclined to a make an assertion that directly contradicts t~ese

iucas. He asserts thal it is only the child's spontaneous concepts and representallonswhich can serve as the source of direct knowledge of the unique qualities of the child'sIhoughl. In Piagel's view, Ihe child's nonspolHaneous concepts (concepts formed un­der the influence of the adulls who surround the child) reflect not so much the charac­tenstics of the child's thinking as the level and character of the adult lhought thal thechild has learned. In this assertion, Piaget contradicts his own argument that the childreworks the concepl in learning it. He contradicts the notion that the specific charac­teristics of Ihe child's own Ihought are expressed in the concept in the course of thistransformation. Piagcl tends to argue that Ihis applies only to spontaneous concepts,gcnerally failing to see that it is equally true of nonspontaneous concepts. This consli­tutes the firsl mistake in Piaget's lhought on these issues.

Piagel's second mistake nows directly from the first. Once it is accepted thaI thechild's nonsp0ntaneolls concepts do not renect the eharacteristics of the child'sthought, and that these characteristics are contained oilly in the child's spontaneousconcepts, we are obliged to accept tbe notion that between spontaneous and nonspon­taneous concepts there exists an impassible, solid, eternal barrier which excludes anymUlual innuence. This notion is accepted by Pinget. Piagel succeeds in differentiatingspontaneous and nonspontaneous concepts, but does not see that they are nnited in asingle system that is formed in the course of the child's mental development. He seesonly the break, not the connection. As a consequence, he views the development ofconcepts as a mechanical combination of IwO separate processes, processes which havenothing in common and move, as it were, along two completely Isolated or separatechannels.

Inevilably, tbese lWO mistakes tangle Piagel's theory in contradiclion and lead toa third mistake. On the one h'lLJd, Piaget asserts that the child's nonspontaneOlls con­cepts do [Jot reOect the characteristics of his thought. He asserts that [his privilegebelongs exclusively to spontaueous concepts. TIlis implies that knowledge of thesecharacteristics of the child's thought can have no practical significance, since the ac­quisition of nonspontaneous concepts is not dependent on them. On the other hand, abasic thesis of his theory is the recognition that tbe esseuce of the child's mental de­velopment lics in the progressive socialization of the child's thought. As we have seen,one of the basic and most concentrated contexts for the formation of nonspontaneousconcepts is school instruction. If we accept Pbget's views on this matter, the processinvolved in the socialization of thought that we find in instmction (among the mostimportant processes in the child's development) turns out to be entirely independentof the child's own internal processes of intellectual development. On the one hand,the internal development of the child's thought is deprived of any significance in ex­plaiuing lhe socialization of the child in inStruction. On the other, the socialization ofthe child's thought (which moves to the forefront in the process of instruction) is rep­resented as unconnected with the internal development of the child's representationsand concepts.

TId, contradiction constitutes lhe weakest link in Piaget's theory and is the pointof departure for our critical analysis of his theory in the present study. Consequently,bOlh lhe Iheoretical and practical aspecls of lhis contradiction deserve to be consid­ercd in more dctail.

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The theoretical a,pect of this contradiction has ils roots in the way Piaget repre­sents the problem of inslruction and development. Piagel does not develop his idcason lhis issue explicitly, touching on them only in passing. Nonetheless, a clear positionon this issue is a postulate of fundamental importanee for the struclure of his theory.In fact, his thcory as a whole stands or falls with lhis postulate. Our task is 10 isolateand develop Ihis aspect of Piaget's theory in order to COntrast it with the correspondingaspect of our own hypotheses.

Pinget represents the child's mcntal development as a process in which the ellGr,

acrenstics of the cilild's tilor/gilt gradually die oUi. For I'iaget, lhe child's mental devel­opment consists of the gradual replacement of Ihe unique qualilies and characteriSticsof the child's thought by the more powerful thought of the adult. The beginning of thechild's mental devclopment is represented in terms of the solipsism of the infant. Tothe extent that the child's adapts to adult thought, this infantile solipsism gives way tothe egocentrie thought of the child. Egocentric thought is seen as a compromise be­tween the characteristies of the child's consciousness and those of adult lhonght. TIdsis why egocentrism is stronger in younger children. With age, the characteristics of thechild's thought begin to disappear. They are replaeed in one domain after anotherand ultimately disappear entirely. The developmental process is not represented asthe continual emergence of new charaeteristics of thought, of higher, more complex,and more developed forms of thought on the foundations of more elementary andprimary forms of thinking. Rather, development is portrayed as a process throughwhich one form of thought is gradually and continuously being forced oul by another.TIle socialization of thought is viewed as an external, mechanical process in which thecharacteristics of the ehild's thought are forced out. [n this sense, development iscomparable to a process in which one liquid -- forced into a vessel from the ontside h

replaces another thaL had previously filled the vessel. A red liquid is continuallyforced into a vessel that contains a white liquid. TIle white, which represents the char­acteristics that are inherent to the child at the beginning of the developmental process,is forced out as the child develops. It is foreed from the vessel as it increasingly be­comes filled with the red liquid. In lhe end, the red liquid inevitably fills the enlirevessel. Development is rednced to the dying oul of the characteristics of the child'sthinking. What is new to development arises from without. The child's characteristieshave no constructive, positive, progressive, or formative role in the history of his men­tal development. Higher forms of though I do not arise from the characteristics of thechild, but simply take the Iheir place. According to Piaget, this is the sole law of Lhechild's mental developmenl.

If we extend Piagel's thinking on these issues, it becomes clear that the relalion,ship between instruction and development is represented as one of antagonism in theprocess of the formalion of the child's concepts. From the oUlset, the child's thinkingis placed in opposition 10 adult thought. One does not arise from the other; one ex­cludes tbe olher. It is not only that the nonsponlaneous concepts acquired by the childfrom adults have nOthing in common with his spontaneous concepts. In a variety ofways, the former are in direct opposition to the latter. No relationships are possiblebetween lhe two except continual antagonism and connict, except the gradnal and can­tinnal replacement of spontaneous by nOllspontaneons concepts. One mnst be doneaway with so that the other can take ils place. Thus, during the entire course of thechild's development, two antagonistie groups of concepts mnst e,ust. All that changeswith age is their quantitative relationship. One prevails al lhe outset, but with thetransition from one slage to another the quantity of the other increases progressively.In connection with school instruction, lhe nonspontaneous concept begins to replacethe spoulaneou;, concept. TIlis oceurs between the ages of eleven and twelve. In

Thinking and Specch 6. Development of Scienlific Concepts 177

['Iaget's view, this cOll1pleles the child's menial development. TIle formation of Irueadult concepts, lhe deci,ive act of the whole drama of development and one thai ex·tends over the enure epoch of l11aluHllion, is droppe(j from the child's history as a Sll­periluolls or unnecessary chapter. Piagel argues that a~ each step in the ~e~elopment

of Ihe child\ representations we encounter a real confllc( between the child s though!unci the lhought of those around him. He argues that this conflict leads (0 a systematicdeformation in the child's mind of that which is received from the adult. 1n accor­dance with this theory, development is reduced to a continual conflict between [(Ilrago­nistic /omn of Ihinking; il is reduced 10 the eSlablishment of a unique compromise b~­

tween Ihese (wO forms of thinking al each stage in (he developmental process. Timcompromise changes with each slage in the process, a process in which the child's ego­centri,m ultimately dies Olil.

From a practical perspective, this contradiction in Piaget's Ihinking makes it im­possihle to apply findings from the study of lhe child's spontaneous conce,pts to the de­velopment of Ids nonspontaneous concepls. On t!le one hand, the chIld s .nonspo!1ta­neous concepts (especially those that are formed In the process of school Instnlctlon)have nothing in common with the development of the child's own thought. On theolher, an atlempt is made to transfer tlie laws of development characleristi~of spo~ta­neous conccpls to the development of concepts that results from school Instmclion.We find ourselves in an enchanted circle.

This emerges with parlicular clarily in Piagel's article entitled 'The Psychology ofIhe Child and the Teaching of History." I-Iere, Piaget argues that if nurturing thechild's historical understanding presupposes the presence of a critical or objective ap­pro~ch, if it pre,upposes an understanding of interdependencies, relationships, and,1,I!lility, there is no better basis for determining the teehniques to be used in teachinghislolY than the study of the child's ,pontaneou~ intellectual state, howe:er naive andin,igllificant that intellectual state may seem (Plaget, 1933). ~owever. In thiS arli<:le,tlie study of Ihe child's spontaneous intellectual Slate leads ~Jaget to t~e c~?c1uslon

thai that which constitutes lhe basic goal of lhe teachmg of history -- thiS cntlcal andobjeclive approach and this understanding of interdependencies, relations, and stahil­ity -- is foreign to the child's thoughl. On the one hand, we find .t~e argument .t~at thedevelopment of spontaneous concepts cannot explain the acquIsItion of sClenllflc con­cepts. On the olher, we find the argllment that there is nothing more important for thetechnique of teaching than the study of the child's spontaneous slate. Piaget resolvesthis practical contradiction in terms of the antagonism that .exists between ins(:uctionand dcvelopmerH. Knowledge of the spontaneous state IS Important because It musthe supplanted in the process of instruction. We must understand it in the same sensethat we must understand an enemy. TIle ongoing conflict between adull thought(which is the foundation of teaching in school) and the thought of the child must beunderstood in order to improve teaching lechniques.

The goal of thc present sludy, the primary motivation for the constmction and ex­perimental verification of our working hypothesis, is essentia.lIY to overcome thesethree limitallOns in what is one of the best contemporary theones of the developmentof the child's thoughl.

Our firsl hasic assumption is the direci opposite of Piaget's first mistaken thesis.Tilc development of nOJl.opontaneoUJ concepts (particularly scientific concepts, whichwe conSider it high, pure, and, both theoretically and prac(i~ally, impon~n.t type ofnon'pontancou, concept) will manifest all the basiC q~~lltatwe charaetensl/cs of tltechild's lIlOlIgltt at a given stage of development. ThiS posItion IS ~ased on th~ l?ea (halodell/iftc wlleepls are /lot simply acquired or IlJelllorized b! the eli.rld an~ usJllmlated byhi.1 I/lClnO})' bllt arise ({nd ore formed thrOllgh an extraorduwry effon of IllS own Ihouglrt.

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This implies that the development of scientific concepts must manifest the characteris­tics of the child's thought. This assumption is fully supported by our experimental re­search.

Our second ;\ssumption is also in opposition to Piaget's. A5 the purest type ofnonspontaneous concept, scientific concepts not only manifest fealures lhat are theopposite of those manifested hy spontaneous concepts but mani fest features that areidentical to those manifested by spontaneous concepts. TIle boundary that separatesthese two types of concepts is fluid. In the aclual course of development, it shifts backand forth many times. If we are to make some assumption at the ou tSet, it must be theassumption lhat [he development of spontaneous and scientific concepts are closelyconnected processes that eontinually influence one another. On the one hand, the de­velopment of scientific concepts will depend direetly on a particular lel/el of matura­tion of spontaneous concepls. There is evidence for this in our practical experience.The development of scientific concepts becomes possible only when the child's spon­taneous concepts have achieved a certain degree of development. This level of (level­opment is characteristically allained hy the beginning of the school age. On the otherhand, the emergence of higher types of concepts (e.g., scientific concepts) will in­evitably influence existing spontaneous concepts. These two types of conccpts are notencapsulated or isolated in the child's consciousness. They are lIot separated from oneanother by an impenetrable wall nor do they flow in two isolated channels. They in­teract continually. 11lis will inevitably lead to a situation where generalizations willI acomparatively complex stmclure -- such as scientific concepts -- elicit changes in thestnlcture of spontaneous concepts. Whether we refer 10 the development of sponta­neous concepts or scientific ones, we are dealing with the development of a unifiedprocess of concepl formalion. TIlis developmental process is realized under varyingexternal and internal condilions. lJy its very nature, however, it remains a unified pro­cess. It is not a function of stmggle, conflict, and antagonism between two mutuallyexclusive forms of thinking. Once again, if we do not shy away from the results of theexperimental rescarch, wc will find that this assumption is fully supported by the data.

Finally (in Opposilion to Piagel's mistaken and contradietory third position), wewould argue lhat -- in the process of concept formation -- the relationship between lheprocesses of instruction and development must be irruneasurably more complex andpositive in nature lhan the simple antagonism proposed by Piaget. II is reasonable toanticipate that research will show that instmction is a basic source of the developmenlof Ihe child's concepts and an extremely powerful foree in directing this process. Thisassumption is based on the generally accepted facllhat instmction plays a decisive rolein determining the entire fate of the child's mental developmenl during the school age,including the development of his concepts. Further, scientific concepts can arise in thechild's head only on rhe foundation provided by the lower and more elementary formsof generalization which previously exist. TIley cannot simply be introduced into theehild's consciousness from the outside. Again, this third and final assumption is sup­ported by the research findings. This position on the issue allows us to assess the use­fulness of psychological research on the child's concepts for teaching and instructionfrom a perspective that is very different from Piagel's,

We will atlempt 10 develop these lheses in more detail laler. First, we must ad­dress the issue of what evidence is required to justify our distinction belween sponta­neous or everyday concepts on the one hand and nonspontaneous or scientific con­cepts on the other. Of COtlfse, we could rely exclusively on empirical verification of1his distinction. [n panicular, we could cile the results of the experimental studies prc­sented in the presenl book. TIlese studies provide direct evidence that these twO typesof (;OnCepls produce different results in tasks that require identical logical operations.

178 Thinking and Speech 6. Development of ScienLific Concepts 179

They indicate that Lhey manifest di fferent levels of development at one and the samel1loment in one and the ,ame child. 1l1is alone would be sufficient to justify the diS­Linction oeLween spontaneous and nonspontaneous concepts. However, to conSLructour working hypothesis and explain this disLinction in theoretical terms, we must con­'Ider the facwrs which permit Led us to anticipaLe the difference between these LWOtypes of concepts. Thesc consideraLions fall into four groups.

Tlie First Croup: Here we are concerned with our empirical, experiential knowl­edge rather Lhan experimental research. First, we cannot ignore the fact Lhat the in­ternal and external eondlLions under which development occurs differ for Lhese twogroups of concepts. Scientific concepts have a differenL relaLionship to the child's per­sonal experience than spomaneolls concepts. In school instrucLion, concepts emergeand develop along an entirely different path thel[1 they do in the child's personal expe­rience. 111e internal motives Lhat move the child forward in the formaLion of scientificconcepts are completcly different than Lhose that direct his thought in the formation ofsponLaneous concepts. When concepts are acquired in school, the child's thought ispresented with differenL tasks Lhan when his thought is left to itself. In sum, scientificconcepts diffcr from spontaneous concepts in thaL they have a differellt relafiollSliip 10

tlie child's e.rpen"ence, in that they have a different relationship to (he object that theyrepresenL, and in that they follow a different path from birth to final formation.

Second, similar empirical considerations force us to recognize that the strengLhs:Ind weaknesses of spontaneous and scienLific concepts are very different in the schoolchild. Just as the strengLh of the scientific concept is the weakness of the everydayconcept, the strength of the evcryday concept is the weakness of the scientific. Wilenwe compare the child's definitions of everyday concepts with the definitions of scien­tific concepts lhat he produces in school, we find that the laLter are immeasurablymore complex. A difference· in (he sLrengths of these two types of concepts emergesclearly here. The child formulates Archimedes' law beller than he formulates hisdefinition of what a brOlher is. nlis obviously renects the different developmentalpaths thaL have led to the fornlalion of these concepts. The child has learned the con­cepL of "Archimedes law" differently than he has learned the concept of "brother." Thechild knew what a hrother was, and passed through many stages in the developmenL ofthis knowledge, before he learned to define the word "brother" (if he ever had the oc­ca,ion to learn Ihis). The development of the concept, "brother," did not begin with ateacher's explanation or with a scientific formulation. This concept is saturated withLhe child's own rich persona! experience. It had already passed through a significantpart of it, developmental course and Ilad exhallsted much of the purely empirical con­tent it eonLains before the child encountered it in definitiou. Of course, this was notIhe case with Ihe concept that underlies "Archimedes' law."

Tile Secolld CrOllp: We arc conce rncd here with theoretical considerations andwill begin with aile on which Plaget himself depends. As evidence of the unique char­acter of the child's concepts, Pillget cites Stern's demonstration that not even speech islearned by the child through simple imiLation, that not even speech is borrowed by thechild in completed form. 'nle basic principle underlying Stern's argumenlS is therecognition that the originality and uniquene,s of the child's speech cannot emergethrough the child's simple adoption of the language of those around him. Pinget findshim,elf in full agreemcnl with Lhis principle. It is his view that the child's thought iseven more original and unique than his language. The role of ImiLaLion as a formallvefactor is obviously of less ,ignificance hcre than in speech development.

Piaget's theSIS that the child's thought is more unique than his language wouldseem indispuLable. Given this, it seems reasonable to assume thaI the higher forms ofthoughL characteristic of the formation of scientific concepts must be even moreunique than Lhose thal are characterisLic of the formation of spontaneous concepts. InOLher words, everything that Piaget has to say abou Lspontaneous concepts in this con­nection must apply LO scientific concepts as well. It is difficult to believe that the childlearns scientific concepts without reworking them, that they simply drop into his mouLhlike hot cakes. Like the forruation of spontaneous concepts, the fonnalion ofscientificCO/lCepfS is nor compleled bur only begun aI tlie momenf when the child learns lire firstmeanings and tenns thaL function as their carriers. This is a general law of the devel­opment of word meaning. It applics equally to the development of spontaneous andscientific concepts. The key is Lhat there is a fundamental difference in the initialmoments of the formation of these two types of concepts. This thought can be clari­fied Lhrough an analogy (although, as the further development of our hypothesis andresearch will show, this is someLhing more than a simple analoh'Y).

It is well known thaL the child learns a foreign language in school in a completelydifferent way Lhan he learns his native language. Few of the empirical regularities orlaws characteristic of the development of the native language are repeated when a for­eign language is learned by the school child. Piaget is right when he argues lhal adultlanguage does not represent for the child what a foreign lanh'Uage represents for theadult. Specifically, it is not a system of signs Ihat corresponds point for point with a sys­tem of concepts that have already been acquired. Learning a foreign language is pro­foundly different from learning a native language. This is partly because a set of fullyformed and developed word meanings already exist in the former case. These wordmeanings are simply translated into the foreign language. Tn oLher words, this is partlya function of the relative maturity of the native language itself. It is also partially afunction of the fact tbat the foreign language is learned under entirely different inter­nal and external conditions, of the fact that (he conditions that characterize (he learn·ing process differ profoundly from those that characterize the learning of the nativelanguage. Differelll developmental paths, followed under different conditions, cannotlead to identical resulLS.

It would he odd if the process involved in learning a foreign language in schoolreproduced that involved in learning the native language, repeating a process that hadoccurred earlier under entirely different conditions. NoneLheless, the profound differ­ences between the,e processes must not divert us from the fact that they are both as­pects of speech development. The processes involved in the development of writtenspeech are a third variant of Lhis unified process of langnage development; it repealSneither of the twO processes of speech development mentioned up to this point. Allthree of these processes, the learning of the native language, the learning of foreignlanguages, and the developmenL of written speech interact with each other in complexways. This renects their mutual memberShip in a single class of genetic processes andthe internal unity of Lhese processes. As we indicated above, the learning of a foreignlanguage is unique in that it relies on the semantic aspect. of the native language.Thus, the instruction of the school child in a foreign language has its foundation in hisknowledge of the native language. Less obvious and less well known is the fact that theforeign language influences the development of the child's native language. Goetheunderstood this influence clearly. In his words, he who does not know at least one for­eign language does nol know his own. 1l1is idea.is fully supported by research.Learning a foreign language raises the level of development of the child's nativespeech. His conscious awareness of linguistic forms, and the level of his abstraction oflinguistic phenomena, increases. He develops a more conscious, voluntary capacity to

IHO Thinking and Speech 6. Development of Scicntiflc Concepts 181

lI~e words as tools of tholight and as means of expressing ideas. Learning a foreignlanguage raises the level of Ihe child's native speech in much the same way that learn­ing algebra raises the level of hiS arithmetic thinking. By learning algebra, the childcomes to understand arithmetic operations as particular instantiations of algebraic op­erations. TIlis gives the child a freer, more abstract and generalized view of his opera­tions with concrete quanti lies. Just as algebra frees the child's thought from the graspof concrete numerical relations and raises it to the level of ruore abstract thought,Icarning a foreign language frees the child's verbillthought from the grasp of concretelinguistic forms and phenomena.

1l1US, research indicates that: (J) the learnlllg of a foreign language both dependson the child's native speech and inl1uences it; (2) the course of its development doesnot repeat that of natlve ,peech; and (3) the strengths and weaknesses of nalive andforeign languages differ.

We have every reaSon 10 believe that an analogous relationship exists betweeneveryday and scientific conccpts. Two significant considerations support this notion.FIrst, the development of all concepls (both spontaneous and scientific) is part of themore general process of speech development. The development of concepts repre­sents the semantic aspect of speech development. Psychologically, the development ofconcepts and the developmen( of word meaning are one and the same proeess. Aspart of the general process of linguistic development, it can be anticipated that the de­velopment of word meanings will manifest the regularities that are characteristic of theprocess as a whole. Second. in their most essential features. the internal and externalconditions involved in the development of foreign languages and those involved in thedevelopment of scientific concepts coincide. Perhaps more significantly, they differfrom the conditions involved in the development of the native language and sponta­neOll' concepts in much the same way. In both cases, illstmcrion emerges as a new fac­tor in development. In (hi, way, just as we differentiate sponlaneous and nonsponta­neous concepts, we can speak of spontaneous speeeh development with the native Ian·guage and nonspontaneolls speech development with the foreign language.

If we compare the results of the research discussed in the present book with psy­chological research on foreign language learning, thy analogy we are presenting here isfully supported.

A theoretical consideration of no less importance is the fact that scientific and ev­eryday concepts have different relationships to the object or act that is represented inthought. 'nle development of these two types of concepts presupposes differences inthe inlellectllal processes which underlie them. In receiving instnIction in a system ofknowledge, the child learns of things thal are not before his eyes, things that far exceedthe limits of his actual and or even potential immediate experience. To this extent, thelearning of scientific concepts depends on the concepts developed through the child'sown experience in the same way that the study of a foreign language depends on thesemantics of his native speech. Just as the learning of a foreign language presupposesa developed system of word meanings, the learning of a system of scientific conceptspresupposes the widely developed conceptual fabric that has emerged on the basis ofthe spontaneous activity of the child's thought. Finally, learning a new language doesnot begin with the acquiSition of a new orientation to the object world. It is not a rep­etition of the developmental process that occurred in the acquisition of the native lan­gU<Jgc. The process hegins with a speech system that has already been learned, a sys­tcm that ~land<; hetween !he newly learned language and the world of things. In thesame seme, le~rning a system of scientific concepts occurs only through a similar formof mediation between the conceptual ,ystem and the world of objects, only throughother conccpts lhal have already developed. This process of concept formation re-

quires entirely different acts of thought, acts of thought which are associated with freemovemelll in the concept system, with the generalization of previously developed gen­er~lizallons, and wllh a more conscIOus and volu ntary mode of operating on these ex­)Sling concepts.

The Third Group: Here we are concerned with heuriStic considerations. Contem­po~ary psychological research knows only two modes of investigating concepts. Onereltcs on. rather superfiCIal methods but deals with the child's actual concepts. TIleolher rehes On Ilnmeasurably more sophisticated modes of analysis and experimenla­tlOn but deals only With concepts lhat are formed under artificial experimental condi­lions and des)gn~ted With what are initially meaningless words. The immediatemethodologieal task in thiS. fi~ld of research is to move from the superficial study of ac­tual eonceplS and lhe SOphlsllcated study of experimental concepts to the sophisticatedstl~dy of actual concepts. 'The significance of research on the development of scien­tlftc concepts becomes apparent in this connection. On Ihe one hand, scientific can­~epts are aetual concepts. At thesaille time, however, they are formcd before our eyesm much the same way thaI expenmental concepts are. 'Thus, scientific concepts com­bine the advantages of the two existing modes of research. 'They allow us to use ex­pen mental means of analysis in slUdying the birth and development of actual concepts.

The FOllrth Group: Here we are concerned with practical considerations. Earlierwe questioned the notion that scientific concepts are simply learned or memorized:We are obhgated, however, 10 analyze the nature of instruction and its central role inthe emergence of scientific concepls, In arguing that the concept is not simply learnedas a mental habIt, we meant 10 suggest that the relationship between i/lS/ruclion and tlied.!!Velopmenl of scientific concepts is more complex than the relQ/ionship belWeen instruc­tlO/1 Gild thefonnalion of Iwbifs. TIle immediate practical task of our research is to un­derstand thiS more complex relationship. TIle working hypothesis we are developingmust open a path for the resolution of this problem,

Only by clarifying the complex relationships that exist between instruction and thed~velopment of scientific concepts can we escape from [he contradictions in whichPlagel's thought is cntangled. To his misfortune, Piaget saw nOlhing in (he richness ofthese relanonshtps other than conflict and antagonism.

These are the mOSt significant of the consideralions that caused us to frame ourresea~ch around the differentiation of scientific and everyday concepts, The basicque:t1on that we will attempt 10 add ress in our research can be formulated in the fol­lowillg. way: Are the paths along which the concepts "brother" and "exploitation" de- (velop Idenllcal or dIfferent? Does the second concept simply repeat the developmen­tal path of the fIrst, With the developmental process mauifesting Ihe same characteris­tICS, or does IlllS concept have a distinct mental character? We must state an assump­lion that IS fully supported by the results of our empirical research: These concepts willdiff.er both 111 the paths thai (herr development takes alld in their mode of functioning,1111s fllldmg opens up cxtremely rich pOlenttals for the study of the mutual influcnce ofthese two aspects of concept formation in the child,

. Having rejected the notion ~Iwt scientific concepts do not develop, we are facedWith two tasks. First, on the baSIS of experimental data, we must assess the validity ofthe nOllon that sClcnllflc concepls follow the s.ame developmental path as everydayeoncepts. Second, on an equally emplflcal baSIS, we must assess the extent to whichther~ is jnstification f~)r the thesis that the development of scientific concepts hasnOI.\JlIlg In common with the development of spontaneous concepts, tha! it tells tiS

182 Thinking and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts liB

nothing about lhe unique nature of the child's though!. Our research will resrond tobOihthese questions in the negative, demonstrating that neither of these assumptionsis corrohorated by the empirical dala. It will demonstrate the existence of a third al­lernalive which grasps the actual, complex, and two-sided relationship between scien­tific and everyday concepts.

The only means we have for discovering this third alternative is to compare scien­tific concepts with everyday concerts, to compare a type of concept that is only nowbeginntng to be systematically studied with a type of concert that has already beenSltHlied extensively. In other words, {he only means we have for discovering chis thirdHllernalive is to move from Ihe known to the unknown. However, such a comparativestudy requires a clear differentiation of these twO types of concerts. Relationshirs canexist only between things that do not coincide with one another. A thing can have norelationship with itself.

2

To study the complex relationships between the development of scientific and ev­eryday concepts, we must consider the scale to be used in making this comparison.That is, we must clarify the characteristics of the school-age child's everyday concepts.Piaget has demonstrated that the essential characteristic of the child's thinking andconcepts at this age is his incapaciry for reflective awareness of relations that he can usecorrectly when no reflective awareness on his part is reqnired, that is, when he actsspollianeor.sly (lnd alJlOJl1(1(ically. Tn Piagel's view, il is egocentrism that prevents thechild's conscious awareness of his own thought. Piaget offers a simple example to il­lustrate the influence of tbis lack of conscious awareness on the developmem of (hechild's concepts. Specifically, Piaget asked children between seven and eight years ofage what the meaning of the word "because" is in a sentence such as: "T am not going toschool tomorrow because I am sick." The majority an.swered: 'That means that he issick." Others maintained that: 'That mean.s that he will not go to school." In short,these children simply did not have the capacity for conscious awareness of the word'sdefinition, although tlley are able to use the word spontaneously.

The child's incapaCily for conscious awareness of his own thought or for estab­hshing logical connections with conscious awareness extends through the age of elevento [welve years (i.e., through the first school age). The child manifests an incapacityfor the logic of relationsbirs and substitutes his own egocentric logic. Between sevenand twelve year, of age, these difficulties carry over inlo the verbal plane. Tn this way.forces (hat wcre present before this stage now,influence the child's logic.

fuuctionally, the child's irIcapacity for conscious awareness of his own thought isreflected in a basic characteristic of his logic. TIle child is capable of several logicaloperations when they arise sponraneously in the course of his thought. He is not, how­ever, able to carry out completely analogous operations if they must he carried OU(

....nth volition and intention. Children of seven years were asked how the followingphrase should be completed: "The Inan fell from the bicycle because...." They gener­ally failed aL Lhis Lask. They frequently comrie led the phrase in the following ways:"He fell from the bIcycle becau,e he fell and was then badly injured." ''The man fellfrolll the bicycle because be was sick and therefore they picked him up from the,treel." "Decause he brokc his arm and his leg." At this age, the child is incapahle ofestablishing a causal connection intentionally and voluntarily. He uses the word"because" correctly and meaningfully in spontaneous or nonvoluntary speech hut is in­capahle of being conoclously <lware that the phrase cited in the previous paragraph

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refers to lhe cause of the child's absence from school, that it does not refer 10 the iso­lated facts of non-attendance and illness, In spite of his incapacity for consciousawareness, however, the child does understand the meaning of the phrase; he under­stands simple causes ,lrld relationships. He does not, however, become consciouslyaware of this understanding. When he uses the conjunction "bec<lusc" spontaneouslyhe uses il correctly bUl he cannol apply it intentionally and voluntarily. Thus, we callestablisb the internal dependency of these two phenomena in the child's thought on apurely emrirical basis. The clJild\ thought lacks conscious awareness and is nonvoli­tional in nature. !L is characterized by unconscious understanding and spontaneousapplication.

These two characteristics of the child's thinking are closely linked with its ego­centric nature. They also lead 10 other characteristics of the child's logic that aremanifeSted in his incapacity for the logic of relationships. They dominate the child'sthinking throughout the school age. In development, which consists of thc socializa­tion of thought, we find a gradual disappearance of these phenomena. The child'sthought is freed from egocentrism.

How does this occur? I-low does the child achieve conscious awareness of his owntbought? How does he master it? Piaget relies on rwo psychological laws to explainthis process. While he did not formuiate these laws, they provide the foundation forhis theory.

The first is the law of conscious awareness formulated by Claparede. Through aseries of extremely interesting experiments, C1aparede demonstrated that consciousawareness of similarity appears later in the child than conscious awareness of differ­enee. The child behaves in consistent ways vis-a-vis similar objects. He experiencesno need for conscious awareness of this consistency in his behavior. He acts in accor­dance with similarity earlier than he thinks it oul. In contrast, the differenccs that existbetween objeets result in nonadaptive behavior on the part of the child. 1ltis non­adaptive behavior elicits conscious ret1ection. This led C1aparede to what he calledthe law of conscious awareness. The more we use a given relationship, the lower thelevel of our conscious awareness of it. We are consciously aware only to the extentthat we are unable to accommodate or adapt. The more extensively a relationship isused in our automatic behavior, the more difficult it is for us to be consciously awareof it.

Still, this law tells us nothing of how conscious awareness is realized. It is a func­tional Jaw. It indicates only whetber the need for conscious awareness is present orabseil[ in a given individual. The structural issues remain unclarified. What is themeans of this conscious awareness'? What impediments does it encounter? To an.swerthese questions, another law -- the law of displacement -- is introduced. To becomeconsciously aware of an operation, it must be transferred from the plane of action tothe plane of language; it must be recreated in imagination such that it can be ex­pressed in words. This displacement of the operation from the plane of action to theplane of thought is accompanied by the same difficullies and complications tllat wereencountered when the operation was first learned on the plane of action. Only thetempo changes; tbe rhythm remains the same. This reproduct.ion on the verbal planeof the difficulties encountered in learning operations on the plane of action constitutesthe essence of the second structural law of conscious awareness.

We will brieOy analyze each of these laws and clarify the actual source and sig­nificance of the lack of conscious awareness in the school-age child, of the non>{oli­tional natu re of his operations with concepts. We will also altempt to clarify how thechild auains consciou5 awareness of his concepts and achieves the intentional voli-tional use of concepts. '

IS4 Thinking and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts 185

Slnc~ Pingct himsclf noted lhe fundamental inadequacy of Claparede'.s law ofcomcious awarcness, our crilical analysis of these laws can be bnef. Stated slmply~ tocxplain lhe emergence of conscious awareness exclusively in ter.ms of the need for LI ISmuch lhe same as explaining lhc developmenl of fcathers In birds by referrtng to thefact thai birds need feathers to ny. This kind of explanation rcpresents a great slepbackward in the development of scicnlific thought. It is base~ on lhe assumption thata crealive capacity capable of producing that which is needed IS present III the need It­self. This conception of conscious awareness assumes the absence of any develop­ment. It implies that conscious awareness is preformed and ah;ays ready to emer~e.

Perhaps it is not the child's encounter with the nonadaplive chara~ler of hiS be­havior and thc resulting need for conscious awareness that causes .111m to bcc~m~aware of relationship; of difference before he be.comes ~w.are. of rela~lonshlps of SImi­larity. Perhaps conscious awareness of relatIOnshIps of sllTulanty recjllIfes a more c?m­plex structure of abstractions and concepts than. the conscIous. awareness. of relallon­ships of differcnce. We conducted research which su~p~rts thiS pe~speclive. Exp~n­menIal analysis indicatcs that conscious awarencss of simIlarity reqlllres the formalionof a concept or generalization which represents the objects betw.een which lhe. rela­lionship exists. Conscious awarcness of difference does no.t reqllll.e the forma lion ofsuch a concept; it can arise in a entirely different way. TIllS explallls the la~er devel­oplllcnt of conscious awareness of relations.hips ~f similarity Ihal was eSlabltshe~ em­pirically by Claparede. That the sequence 111 which thes~ tw.o concepts emerge IS Ihereverse of that in which they emerge 011 the plane of actIOn IS merely one example ofanothcr, more general phenomenon. For example, we were able to establish exp.eri­mentally that lhis same reversed sequen~e i~ inhcrent in Ihe developrr;ent of ~eanlllg­ful perception of the objecl and the aCl1on. Children respond to acnons earher Ih.anto differentialed objects, but they give meaning to or comprehend the object earlierthan the action. The action develops in lhe child earlier than autonomous perception.However, meaningful perception leads lhe development of meaningful action by anenlire age grade. Analysis indicates that lhis is a function of internal causes related tolhe nature of tile child's conccpts and their development.

Of course, one could argue that -- as a fuuctionallaw -- Claparedc's law c~nn~(

explain the structural aspect of the problem. This.would imply tha~ the key question IS

only whether it provides a satisfactory cxplanallon of the functional aspect of theproblem, that is, whether it is sufficient for Piaget's purposes. The essence of Plaget'sargument on this issue is found in thc piclure he draws of th~ develop~ell( ~f conceptsill children between seven and twelve years of age. According to Plagel, It IS dunngthis pcriod that the child runs lip against the fact that his thought operations are notadaptive to adult thought. ll1e childexperiences fai~ure and defeat which re~ecls theinadcquacy of his logic. He bangs hiS jorehead agaIn.st a wall. In Rousseau swords,these bumps imprinted on the child's forchead are hiS best leacher. The.yengenderthe ncel! for conscious aW(lrenes,<, and this need magically opens up conscIouS aware­11C5, and volition in the u,<,e of concepts.

Is it pOSSible that the higher level of concept devel~pment which is ;onn~cted withcomCIOllS aw,lrencss arlScs only as a con>equence of failure and deteat. Is II actual~yLhe case I hat sll'lking ones head againsL a wall and the bump thal resulls are the child s

A !>inglc group or piClure, were shown In twO groups of prcschool chlldre~ who were equivaknt Inage and level of development One YOliP uCled alii the tWnIS.lh.l wcre ,lIu"'.Led In Ihe senc.I orplc(ure." prc::.cnlcd to [hc,,'. rc\'~a1ing lbt: pH:lurcs' conlcll( In aCI~on. The dllldrcn In the o~hcr groupwere asked In re\oLe Lhe conlenl of the pictures ve/hally, revealing the ",uclurc or meanIngful pu·cept;r",. In aCIIOu, Ille cluldrcn reproduced the contenl or the picture rlllly. Willi verballran.lIll'S·

$Ion, however, Ihey .lImply enulllcr;lled Ihe objecls.

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only teachers as he moves along this developmental path? Is it possible that the non­adaptiveness and inadequacy of the child's spontaneous thought is the source of thehigher forms of abSlr:lction that are eharacteristic of concepts? If these questions areformulated, jt immediately becomes apparent that only a negative answer is possible.Just as we cannot explain the emergence of conscious awareness in lerms of the child'sneed for ii, we cannot explain lhe child's mental development in terms of tilebankruptcy and failure of his thought.

The second law Piaget incorporates into his explanation of conscious awarenessalso requires analysis. The mode of genetic explanation fundamental to this law is ex­tremely widespread. The foundation for its explanation of the later stages in the de­velopmelll of a given process is the principle of the repetition or reproduction of Iheevents or laws characteristic of the earlier stages in the development of the same pro­cess. It is this mode of explanation that is used, for example, when the development ofthe school ehild's written speeeh is explained by claiming that it parallels the develop­ment of oral speech. Of course, when this explanatory principle is applied, the psy­chological differences between the two processes are overlooked. This principle im·plies that the dynamics of tbe development of one process must repeat or reproducethose of the other. 111e result is lhat Ihe differences belween rlie Iwo processes which area [unclion oIlhe Iacil/lat the laler process occurs on a higher level are ohscured hy theirsimilarities. The result is that we have a representalion of the proccss of developmentnot as a spiral but as a process that continually moves around in a single circle. How­ever, we are nOt concerned with the detailed analysis of this explanatory principle inthe present eontext. At this point, our concern is its value as a means of explaining theemergence of conscious awareness. Since Piaget himself recognizes lhe futility of try­ing to explain the emergence of conscious awareness on the basis of Claparede's law,we mUSt ask whether lhe explanatory principle on which Piaget does rely -- the law ofdisplacement -- has more explanatOly power.

The very content of lhis law makes it apparent thaI its explanatOly value is notmuch greater than that of the firs\. In essence, it is a law of repetition or reproductionof lhe characleristics of previous forms thought in a new developmental domain. Evenif we were to assume Ihat this law is correct, it does not answer the critical question. Itcan only explain why the school child's concepts are nol characterized by consciousawareness or volition. The lack of conscious awareness and volition that were presentin thc logic of the preschooler's action reappears in the school child's thought.

l11is law cannot, howcver, help us answer the question that Piagel poses: How isconscious awareness realized? It cannot help us understand the nalure and source oflhe transition from concepts that are not characterized by conscious awareness totl10se thaI are. In this respecl, the second law is identical to the first. ll1e first maypossihly help 10 explain how the absence of need leads 10 the lack of conscious aware­ness. It cannot explain how the emergence of need produces conscious awareness.The second law can perhaps satisfactorily answer the queslion of why lhe concept isnOI characterized by conscious awareness in the SChool-age child. It C:lnnot explain lheernergence of conscious awareness of concepts. This, however, is precisely lhe prob­ICIll we necd to answer since development consists of the progressive emergence ofconscious awareness of concepts andthoughl operations.

111ese two laws do not resolve the problem; they constitute il. It is nOI that theyoffer incorrect or inadcquate explanations of the development of conscious awareness.The problem is that they offer no explanation. We must attempt to formulate a tenta­tive explanation of this funl!amental aspect of the school child's mental development,an aspect that is closely connected with lhe basic problem of our experimental re­search.

Thinking and Speech 6, Development of Scientific Concepts 187

rir~t, however, we mllst consider whether Piaget -- relying on these two laws u

has corrcctly explained why the school child's concepts are not characterized by con­scious awareness. Of COllrsc, this question is closely connected with the issue of moredirecl interest to m, the issue of how conscious awareness is realized. These are twoa~(Jects of a single general problem, specifically, lhe problem of how fhe Iramit;onfmlll co/lcepts Ihat (Ire not c!laracterized by col/scious awareness fO tllOse fllat are occurs.The very statement of the issue of how conscious awareness is realized depends onhow we answer the question of why conscious awareness is absenl. If we resolve thefirst issue on the basis of Piaget's two law>, we must search for the resolution to the~econd on the same theoretical plane where Piaget sought it. If we reject Piaget's res­olution of the first question and ~ucceed even tentatively in identifying a different res­olution, our search for tIle resolution to the second problem will take on an entirelydifferent orientation.

For Piagel, the source of the lack of consciolls awareness of conceptS in the schoolchild lies in the earlier SI ages of the child's developmenl when the lack of consciousaW,lreness dominated the child's thought to a much greater eXlent. By the timc thechild enters school, one part of his mind is freed from this dominance; another re­mains under it, innuence. As we descend the developmental ladder, conscious aware­ness extends the range of its dominance of the child's lhought. In the world of the in­fant, conscious awareness is absent. Piaget characterizes the infant's consciousuess aspure solipsism, In accoldance with the degree of the child's development, solipsismgives way to socialized thought withoUl struggle or opposition, This socialized thoughtis characterized by conscious awareness and has its source in the more powerful, en­croaching thought of the adult. Solipsism is displaced by the child's egocentrism, whichis a compromise belween lhe child's own thought and the adult thoughl that he haslearned.

Thus, Piagel represents rile lack of collScious awareness we find in the concepts ofthe school,age child as a residual of (I dying egocentrism which preserves its influence inthe emerging processes of verbal thought. In Ihis manner, Piaget's explanation of thelack. of conscious awareness of concepts incorporates the notion of the child's re~ioual

autism as well as that of the inadequate socialization of thought Tile question weOlUSt address, then, is lhat of whether the child's lack. of conscious awareness of con­CeptS is a direct function of the egocentric character of his thinking.

Given what we know of Ihe mental development of the school-age child, this the­sis seems doubtful. 111eoretical considerations would certainly cause us to question itsvalidity. Empirical research directly refutes it.

Before moving to a crL(ical analysis of this issue, however, a second issue must beclarified. Specifically, we must consider how' the path that leads to conscious aware­ness of concepts is represented within this framework. As we said, a given explanationof the lack of conscious awareness inevitably leads to single mode of explaining itsemergence. Piaget nowhere speaks to this issue directly because it was not a problemfor him, However, given his explanation for the lack of conscious awareness of con­cepts in the school child and his theory as a Whole, his conception of thc course of de­velopment is clear. This is precisely why Piaget did not Lhink. it necessary to dwell onthe question.

In Piaget's view, con,ciollS awareness is realizeo through lhe displacement of thercmnanlS of verbal egocenl/l~rn by social or matllre lhought. Conscious ,lwarenessdoes nOl arise a, a ncces,ary higher stage in concept development. It is introducedfroll1 ",it!luu!. One mode of ,1Clioll simply supplants the other, Just as a snake throwsnrf his skin to glOw another, thc child throws off or discards one mode of thinking sothat he might learn another. This gra,ps the essence of Piaget's view of the emergence

",

of conscious awarenes~. This issue does not require the introduction of any laws. 111elack of consciou~ awareness of concepts is explained, It is a function of the very naturethe child's thought. However, conscious awareness of concepts exists outside; it existsin the atmosphere of social thought that surrounds the child. It is learned by the childin completed form when Ihe antagonistic tendencies of his own thinking no longer in­lerfere,

At this point, we can consider both these closely connected prOblems: (1) the ini­lial laek of cOllscious awareness of concepts, and (2) the snbsequent emergence of con­scious awareness of concepts. Piaget's resolution of these problems is inadequate inboth theoredcal and practical terms. An explanation of the Jack of conscious aware­ness of concepts in the child that relies on the notion that the child is incapable of con­scious awareness in any context, an explanation that relies on the notion that the childis egocentric, is negated by the fact that the focal point of development for the school­age child is the emergence of {he higher menfal fllllCfions, filnUiollS wllich are distin­guished precisely by inteliectualizatiOJl and mastery, by cOflJcious awareness and volition,

For the ScllOo1-age ehild, the focal 'point of development is the transition fromlower forms of attention and memory to voluntary attention and logical memory.Elsewhere,G6 we have argued that to the extent we can speak of voluntary atteution wecan also speak of voluntary memory and that to the extent we speak of l,ogical memorywe can also speak of logical attention. This reflects the fact that the intellectualizationand the mastery of functions are merely two aspects of one and the same process, Werefer [0 this process as the transition 10 the higher mental functions. We master agiven function to the degree that is intellectualized. 'The voluntary ~ature of the activ­ity of a funclion is Ihe reverse side of its conscious awareness. To say that memory isintellectualized in the school-age child is to say that voluntary remembering emerges,To say lhat attention in the sehool-age child becomes voluntary is to say (as Dlonskiihas correctly noted) that it beeomes more and more dependent on thought or imellec!.

In the spheres of attention and memory, then, the sch~ql chil<;l fl.\anifests a capac­~YJor ~onscious awareness and voluntary behavior. Indeed, the emergence of this ca­R.aci~y is~hc cent~<ll feature of mental development durillg the school age. We cannot,therefore, explai n the school child's lack of conscious awareness of concepts or the in·voluntary nature of these concepts in lerms of the general incapacity of his thought forconscious awareness and mastery, thaI is, in (erms of his egocentrism.

However, one fact established by Piaget is beyond dispute. The school child is notconsciously aware of bis own concepts. How do we explain the school-age child'smanifestation of a capacity for conscious awareness or mastery of important intellec­tual functions such as memory and aUention while he is incapable of the mastery or (conscious awareness of his Own thinking? How do we explain the fact that during the jischool age all the intelleclUal functions except intellect are intellec(ualized and be- 'come volitional?

To resolve Ihis paradox. we must consider the basie laws of mental developmentin children of this age. Elsewhere,67 we have considered the changes in the connec­tions and relatlon~hips among funcdons that occur in the course of the child's menIaldevelopment. In thaI context, we were able La demonstrate empirically that lhe child'smental development consists not so much in the development or maturation of sepa­rate functions as in changes in the connections and relationships among these func­tions, Indeeo, the development of each mental funetion depends on these changes ininterfunctional relationships. Consciousness develops as a whole. With each newstage in its development, its inlernal structure -- the system of connections among itsparts -- changes. Development is nOI a sum of the changes occurriog in each of lhe

11\8 'Thinking and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts 189

~cparale ftlncti()n~. Rathcr, lhe fate of cach functional part of consciousness dependson changes in the whole.

Of course, the idea that conscioll~ness is a unified whole with the separate func­tions cxiMing in insoluble connection WIt h one another is nothing new for psychology.lndecu, II is as old as psychology itsclf. Ncarly all psychologists note that the mentalfunclion~ act in unbroken connection with one another. Remembering presupposeslhe activity of allcntion, perception, and the attribution of meaning. Perception re­quires auention, recognilion (or memory), anclundemanding. In both traditional anucontemporary psychology, however, this concept of the functional unity of conscious­ness -. of the insoluble connections among the various aspects of its aClivity -- has con­,Istently remained on the periphery. Its most imponant implications have not beenrecognizcd. Moreover, psychology drew inferences from this concept chac seem to bein uirect opposition to those that should flow from it. Having established the interde­pendency of functions (i.e., having cstablishcu the unity of the activity of consciousawareness) psychology continued to study the activity of the separate functions, ignor­ing their relationships. It continued to treat conscioLlsncss as a collcction of functionalparts. This tendency of gencral psychology was transferred to genetic psychology. Asa consequence, the development of thc child's consciousness was represented as theSLIm of the changes occurring in the separate functions. Even here, the primacy of thefunctional parts over consciousness as a whole remained the supreme dogma. To un­(1erstand how this occurred, we must consider the implicit postulates that provided thefoundation for this lrauitional conception of Ihe interconnection of functions and theunity of consciousness.

iii TradItional psychology taught that the mental functions always act in unity withone anothcr (perception with memory and attention, etc.) and it is in this that con­~ciousness is unified. However, it implicitly supplemc nted this idea with three pOStu­lales: (I) that these conneclions among functions are constant., unchanging, and unin­fluenced by development; (2) that these connections operale consistently and identi­cally in lhe activity of each function and that they can, tllerefore, be removed from theanalytic frame (i.e., they do not have to be taken into account in studies of the sepa­rate functions); and (3) that these connections are jnessential and that the develop­ment of consciollsnes~ must be understood in terms of the development of its func­tional parts; though the functions are interconnected, the stability of their connectionsgives them an entirely autonOmous nature, an independence in their development andchange. The libcration of psychology from these postulates represents the liberationof psychological thought from the functional forms of analysis that imprison it.

As we have suggCSteu, all three of lhese posrulates are false. These interfunc­tional conncclions and relationships are ncither conSTant nor inessential. They cannotbe placed outside the analytic frame within which psychological investigations are car­rieu oul. Change in these interfunclional conncctions, -- change in the junctional((mClure Of COJlSCIOI.lSneSJ _. is the mail! and cell/ral contellt of the entire process of men­ral developlllent. That which ~erved as a postulate for traditional psychology must be­COllle psycholob'Y'S central problem. Traditional psychology proceeded from the pos­rul,lle that lhe mental functions are connected and did not pursue the question further.Neither the nnlurc of lhesc interfunctional connections nor their dcvelopment becamean object of invesllgation. For the new psychology, this change in interfunclional con­neclions and relationships becomes the cemra! prohlem. If we fail to resolve thisproblem, we will nOl be able lO understand the changes we observe in {he isol'liedfunctioils. This conception of dcvclopllicilial change in the Structure of consciousnessnHlq be eOllsiuered if we are (0 resolve the question that interests us in the presentCllnlexl, the quesllon of how the school-age child bccomes consciously aware of atten-

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tion and memory, and gains voluntary control ovcr them while his inlellect remainsou tside conscIous awareness.

. It is a gencral law 01' development that conscious awareness and mastery charac­terize only thc hlgber slages of the development of a given function. It arises cOlnrar­auvely late and must be precedcd by a stage where conscioLls awareness is absem as~age where there is no volition in lhe application of a given form of conscious activ/ty.For conscIous awareness of ~ function to be achieved, thc individual must first possesswhat he IS [0 become con.sclOusly aware of. If we are to master something, we musthave at our disposal whalls to be subordinated to our will.

The first stage i.n the development of consciousness in infancy is characterized bya lack of differentiation III the separate functions. This stage is followed by two olhers.These.are lhe stage of early childhood and the stage of the preschool age. Early child.hood IS chara.clenzed by th~ d~velopment and differentiation of perception. In thisstage, perception lS the domlnallng function of activity and of the development of con­~clousness as a.whole. In th~ preschool agc, the development of memory is dominant.nJUs, by .the lIme the transl\lon to school age occurs, perception and memory areco.mparatlvely developed, creating a basic prerequisite for mental development duringthiS stage.

. If we consider lhe ~act that atl~nt.ion is a function of the structuring that is per­ceived and represented III memory, It lS apparent thal when the child reaches schoolage he has comparatively. mature. forms of allention and memory at his disposal. Hehas what he must now gam consCIOus awareness of and master. 'This is why consciousawareness and voluntary control are characteristics of memory and attention that ad­vance t? the foref.ront during this phase of the child's development.

This. makes It. equally clear why the school child's concepts remain involuntaryand outSide COnsClOUS awareness. To become consciously aware of something andmaster It you must first bave it at your disposal. However, concepts, or more properlypreconcepts (we prefer this designation for these concepts of the school child sil1c~~hey have nOt yet allained the higher degree of development), emerge for the fjr~t timeIn .the s~hoo~-age child. They mature only during this period. Prior to this stage, the 'child thmks In general representations or complexes (a term we have used elsewhereto refer to tbe structure of generalizations that dominates the preschool period). Sincepreconcepts emerge only dUTlng the school age, it would be odd if the school child at­~arned conscIOus awareness or mastery of them. 'This would mean that consciousnessIS not only capable of becoming consciously aware of its functions (i.e., of masteringthem) but of creating them from nothing before they develop.. These are the theo.retlcal considerations that cause us to reject Piaget's explana-

tion of lhe lack of conSCIOUS awareness of conccpts. At this point, we mus( turn to theresearch data. We must come to understand the natu re of conscious awareness to beable to clarify the ~nanner that conseious awareness of attention and memory emerges.We must do thiS If we are to be able to specify the source of tbis lack of consciotlSawareness of concepts, the path by which the child ultimately allains this consciousawareness, and the sense in which conscious awareness and mastery are two aspects ofthe same process.

Rese~rch ~cll~ LIS thaI conscious awareness is a very special process. We will at­tempt to. {dentlfy lIS ge~eral feat.urcs. At the outset, we must pose the first and them~st basiC que~tlOn: Wllat does It mean to become "consciously aware." 111is phrasehas two meanlllgs, and Se~I?US contusion has arisen because Claparede and Piagelhave confused them. SpeCifically, Claparede and Piaget have confused FreUd's termi­noloh'Y and the terminol0?y more characteristic of general psychology. When Piagelspeaks of a lack of consCIOUS awareness in thc child's thought, he does not mean {O

II)() Thinkiug and Speech6. Development of Scientific Concepts 191

im[1ly that the child is not conscious of what is occurring in his consciousness; he doesnot mean to imply that the child's thinking is unconscious, Piaget assumes thaI con­,ciou~ness play, a role in the child's thought, hut not to the end, In the bcginning, inIhe infant's solip,isln, we do have unconscious thought. Ultimately, conscious social­ricd thought is allaincd. In the interim, we have several stages that are represellted byPiaget ill term, of thc gradual dying out of egocemrism and the gradual growth of so­cial iorms of thinking. Each of these middle stages represents a certain compromisebetween the illLlnl's unconscious autistic thought and the adult's social consciousthought. What then, does it mean to say that the thought of the school child lacks con­scious awareness? For Plaget, it means that the child's egocentrism is accompanied hya certain degree of UIlCOIl,ciollslless. It means that thought is characterized by con­scious awareness hut IlOt consistently. Thought contains elements of both the con­scious and the unconscious. Piaget himself recognizes that one is on slippery groundwit h the concept of "unconscious reasoning," If we view the development of con­~ciousness as the gradual transition from the unconscious (in Freud's sense) to fullconsciousness, this represenlatioll of the process is correct. However, Freud's rescarclJeSlablished that the unconscious -- which is carved out from consciollsness n emergescOlTlparatively late. In a cenain sense, it is a product of the development and differen­tiation of con~ciousness itself. Therefore, there is a great difference betweeu the con­cepts of "unconscious" and "lack of conscious awareness," Lack of conscious awarenessi~ nOI simply part of the conscious or unconseious, It does not designate a level of con­sciousness, It designates a different process in the activity of consciousness. I tic aknot. I do it consciously. [cannot, however, say precisely how I have done it. My ac­tion, which is consciolls, turns out to be lacking in conscious awareness because my at­tention is directed toward the act of tying, nol on how I carry out that act. Conscious­ness always represents some piece of reality, The object of my consciousuess in thisexan1ple is thc lying of the knot, that is, the knot and what I do with it. However, the

, actions thaI I carry out in lying the knot -- what I am doing n is not the objeet of my. consciousness. However, it can become the object of cOfL~ciousnesswhen there is con­

scious awareness. Conscious awareness is an act of consciousness whose object is theactivity of consciousness itself.'

Piage('s research has shown that introspection begins to develop significantly onlyin the school age. Further research has shown (hat as introspection develops some­thing occurs that is analogous to what occurs in the development of external percep­tion and observation during the transition from infanl)' to early childhood. It is wellknown that the most important change iu eXlernal perception during this period is thatthe child makes the transition from nonverbal and therefore noruneaningful pcrcep­tion to meaningful and verbal object perception. The same can he said of introspec­tion at the begiuning of the school age. The child makes the transition from nonverbalto verhal introspection. He develops internal meaningful perception of his own men­(a) processes. However, whether it is external or internal, meaningful perception isgeneralized or abstracted perception. Consequently, the tramition to verbal introspec­tion represents tire initial generalizat;oll or ahstraction of intemal menta! fonns of activity,This tran~ition 10 a new type of internal perception represents a transition to a higherform of internal mental activity. To perceive something in a different way, means toacquire new potentials for acting with respect to it. At the chess board, to see differ­ently is to play differcntly. By gc neralizing the process of activiry itself, I acquire the

In the pr<:sehoo! age, the ehild i, a~ketl"Do you know whal your name i,?: antllhe ehild answers:MKol)'n ~ He is. nOI cnnsciou,S)y aware. of the f,tcllhlit the focus of lhe question is nol what he is calledhUl wh~fher or liar he k'lOfVS his name. He knows his nam<.:. but is not consetously awan.: of hiseopacllY in {his (tspeel.

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potential for new relationships with it. To speak crudely, it is as if this process hasbeen isolated from the general activiry of consciousness. I am conscious of the factthat I rememher. I make my own remembering the objcct of consciousness. An isola­lion arises here, In a certain sense, any generalization or ahstraction isolates its oh­ject. T.!Jis is w_ht .conscious awareness .. understood as generalization -- le;ldsdireclly

to mast~ry. (i-'-fI~us, Ihe J{J/.Il1datiorr of cOllscious awareneSI is the genemliwtioil or abstraction of

the menial processes, which leads to their Inrotery. Instnlclion has a decisive role in this ..(process. Scientific concepts have a unique relationship to {he object. This relationshipis Illcdimed through other concepts that themselves have an internal hierarehical sys-tem of interrelationships. It is apparently in this domain of the scientifie concept lhatconscious awareness of concepts or the generalization and mastery of eonceplsemerges for the first lime. And once a new structure of generalization has arisen inone sphcre of thought, it can -- like any structure u be transferred without training toall remaining domains of concepls and thought. Thus, cOllscious awareness elltersthrough Ihe gate opened up hy Ihe scienlific concept.

Two aspects of Piagel's theory are worth noting in this context. The very natureof spontaneous concepts is defined by the fact that they laek conscious awareness.Children have the capaciry to operate spontaneously with spontaneous concepts butlack (he capacity for conscious awareness of them, We have seen how this is tnle ofthe child's concept "hecause." The spontaneous concept is characterized by a laek con­scious awareness. Attention is always directed toward the object that the spontaneousconcept represeuts rather than on the act of thought that grasps that object. Nowherein Piaget's work do we fiud the tbought that "spontaneous" is a synonym for "laek ofconscious awareness" when we are referring to concepts. TIlis is why Piaget limits thehistory of the child's thought to the development of spontaneous concepts. TIlis is alsowhy he fails to understand how conscious awareness of concepts can emerge in thechild's spontaneous thought other than from the outside.

While conscious awareness is absent in the spontaneous eoneept, however, it is a \basic characteristic of scientific concepts, The second of the twO aspects of Piaget's \.theory that we said were worth noting in this context is related (0 this fact. All Piage'L'sresearch leads to the idea that the decisive difference between spontaneous and nOIl­

spot/laneous concepts, and Ihe difference between spontaneous and scientific cOllcepts inpartiClllar, is Ihal spontaneous concepts are given outside any system. Following Piaget'srule, if we want 10 find the path from the child's nonspontaneous eoncept to the spon­taneous representation that is hidden behind it, we must free that concept from anytrace of a system. Isolating the concept from the system in which it is included and inwhich it is connected with all other concepts is the ultimate methodology recom­mended by Piaget for the liberation of the mental orientation of the child frorn hisnonspontaneous concepts, Piaget demonstrated in practice that this desystematizalionof I he child's coucepts is the best means for obtaining the kinds of answers from chil­dren that fill his books. It is obvious that the presence of a concept system is signifi­cant for the nature and structure of each individual concept. The concept becomessomething different -- a complete change in its psychological nature occurs u as soonas it is taken in isolated form. Its nature changes as soon as it is torn from the systemof eoncepts and placed in a simpler and more immediate relationship to the object.

On this basis alone, we can state the core of our hypothesis (we win discuss thishypothesis in lIlore detail later in summarizing our experiments): Only witllin a systemcan the concept (/cqui~1! collSciou;s_a~areness and a voluntary nature. COIlScious aware­ness alld IIle presellce of (l system are syizony/ns When we are speaking of concepts, just ro'

192 Thinking and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts 193

Spollt(llJ(:ity, lack or consciolls awareness, and rhe absence of a system are I/lree differentlI'oras for designating tile nature of tlie cllild's ~oncepr. .

This follows directly from what we said above. If conscIous awareness meansgcner;\Iiz;ltion, it is obvions thaI generalization, in turn, means ~ot~ing other than theformation of 1I higher concept (Oberbegriff - ubergeordneler Begriff) In a system of gen­eralization that includes the given concept as a particular case. However, if a higherconcept arises above the given concept, there mllst be several subordinate conceptslhal include it. Moreover, the relationships of these other subordinate concepts 10 (hegiven concept must be defined by the system cre.ated by the hig~er concept. If thiswere 1101 so, Ihe higher concept would not be hIgher than the given concept. ThiShigher conccpl presupposes both a hier<lrchical system and con.cep.ls subordinate andsystematically related to the given concepl. Thus, the ~enerallzatlon of t~e co~cept

leads 10 its localization within a definite system of relalionshlps of generaltty. 1 heserelationships arc the foundation and the most natural and important connectionsamong concepts. Thus, at one and the same time, generalizalion implies the consciollsawareness and the systematization of concepts.

What Piaget himself has to say makes it c1car that a system is significant for theinternal nature of the child's concepts. Piaget notes that the child manifests lillie sys­tematicily, connectedness, or deduction in his thought. TIle need to avoid contradic­tion is foreign to him. He places assertions alongside one another rather than synthe­sizing tbem. He is satisfied with synthetic schemes rather than submitting problems toanalysis. In other words, the child's thought is closer to a collection of theses Dowingsimultaneously from actions and dreams than to adull thought, thought which is con-

~ scious of itself and has a syStem.We will try (Q show somewhat later tilat all tile empirical laws and regularities es­

tablished by Piaget in connection with the child's logic apply only within the domain ofthe child's unsystematizcd thought. Tiley apply only to concepts taken outside any sys­tem. This is the common cause of all the phenomena Piaget describes. To be sensi­tive to contradiction, one must do more than simply place judgments in a seqnence.These judgments must be logically synthesized. The capacity for deduction is possibleonly within a definite system of relationships among concepts. TIle phenomena de­scribed by Piaget follow from the absence of such as system as inevitably as a shot fol­lows pressure on the trigger of a gun.

However, only one issue is of intcrest to us at this point. We are interested indemonstrating that the system .. and the conscious awareness that is associated with it.- is not brought inw the domain of the child's concepts from withom; it does not sim­ply replace the child's own mode of forming and using concepts. Rather, the system it­self presupposes ;I rich and mature form of concept in .the child. TIlis form of conceptis necessary so that it may become the object of conscIous awareness and systema!lza­tion. We are interested in demonstrating that the first system .. a system that emergesin the sphere of scientific concepts .. is transferred structurally to the domain of every­day concepts, rcstructuring the everyday concept and changing its internal nature fr~m

above. The dependence of scientific concepts on spontaneous concepts and their In­fluence on them stems from the unique relationship that exiStS between the scientificconcept and its object. As we said, this relationship is characterized by the fact that itis /IIedialed through other concepts. Conseqtjetltly, ilt its relalionship 10 the object, che sci-

, en/ijic concept includes a relationship co anolher concepl, that is, it includes the most ba­sic element of a concept system.

Thus, because it is scientific ill nature, the scientific concept assumes some posi­tion within a system of concepts. 1l1is system defines lhe relationship of scientific can-

cepts to othcr concepts. The essence of any scientific concept was defined in a pro­found manner by Marx:

If the form in which a thing is manifCSled and ils e:;scnce Wert in directcorrespondence, seieuec would be unnecessary (Man: and Engels, Collee/cdWorks, v. 25, char· 2, p. 384).

In lhis statement, Marx touches on the essence of the scientific concept. TIle scientificconcept would be superfluous if it reflected lhe object in its exlernal manifestation asan empirical concept. The scientifie concept necessarily presupposes a different rela­tionship to the object, one which is possible only for a concept. However, as we haveshown above, the relationship to the object that is characteristic of the scientific con­cept presupposes the presence of relationships of concepts to one another. It presup­poses a system of concepts. From this vantage point, we ean say that the concept mllstbe seen as part of the entire system of the relationships of generality Lhal define itslevel of generality, JUSt as a stitch must be seen as part of the fibers that lie it to thecommon fabric. Al the same time, it becomes apparent that the distinction betweenspontaneons and nonspontaneous concepts in the child coincides logically with the dis­tinction between empirical and scientific concepts_

We will relurn to this problem again. In this context, we will limit ourselves to asingle illustration. It is well known that more general concepts arise in the child ear­lier than more specific ones. Thus, the child usually learns the word "flower" earlierthan the word "rose." In this eontext, however, the concepl of "flower" is not actuallymore general that the concept of "rose"; it is merely broader. When the child bas mas­tered only a single concept, its relationship to the object is different than it is after hemasters a second. However, even after he masters a second concept, there is a longperiod during which the concept of "flower" continues to stand alongside, rather thanabove, the concept of "rose." The former does not include the latter. The narrowerconcept is not subordinated. Rather, the broader concept acts as a substitute for thenarrower one. It Slands alongside it in a single series. When the concept of "flower" isgeneralized, the relationship between it and the concept of "rose" changes as well. In­deed, there is a change in its relationship with all subordinate concepts. This marksthe emergence a eoncept system.

We return again, then, to the point where we began our discussion, that is, to theinitial question posed by Piaget: How does conscious reflection arise? We have at­tempted to clarify why lhe school child's concept lacks conscious awareness and how itacquires conscious awareness and a volitional nature. We found the source of the lackof conscious awareness of concepts not in egocentrism but in the absence of system inthe child's spontaneous concepts. This is why spontaneous concepts lack consciousawareness and volitional control. We found that conscious awareness is realizedthrough the formation of such a system, a system which is based on specific relations ofgenerality among concepts. We also found that conscious awareness of concepts leadsto their volitional control. By its nature, the scientific concept presupposes a system.Scientific concepts are the gale through which conscious awareness enters the domainof the cbild's concepts.

It has become clear to us why Piaget's theory is powerless to answer the questionof how conscIOus awareness is realized. Piaget's theory bypasses the scientific con­cept. All thai is reOecled in his theory are the laws and regularities characteristic ofconcepts as they exist outside any system. In Piaget's view, the child's concept can be­come the object of psychological investigation only when any trace of systematicity isremoved from it. This makes [t impossible to explain how conscious awareness is re­alized. As a consequence, Piaget's theory is relevant only within the narrow limits of

Thinking and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts 195

nOIl,y,temic concepls. To rcsolve the problem thal Piaget posed, the .Iys/elll that Pi­aget tosscd out along the routbide JnUSt become lhe focus of our work.

J

The previous sections illustrate lhe extraordinary importance of scientific con­cepts for the development of the child's thinking. II is in this domain that thinking firstcrosses the threshold that separates preconcepts from true concepts. This is a criticalpoim in Ihe development of the child's concepts and is the focus of our research. Wehave seen, however, that this issue is merely one aspect of a more general problem, aproblem that we will consider briefly in this section.

In essence, {lie problem of IJOmpOIl/CIIleOI.LS COllcep/s •• of scientific cOilceprs ill par­ticlilar -- is rhe problem of ;/lS(!llcliOfl and development. ~~ntaneous conc~pts createtlie potential for the emergence of nonspontaneous concepts iL!Jhe process of instruc­lion. lnstru,:,t[gr: is the sourcc of the developr:1ent of this new type of concept. Thlls;­the prOblem of spo'nlaneous and nonspontaneous concepts is a special case of themore general problem of instruction and development. Isolated from this more gen­crul context, the problem of spOnUlne()US and nonspontaneous concepts carulOt be cor­rectly stated. At the same lime, a comparative analysis of the development of scien­tifiC and everyday concepts provides an empirical foundation for addressing the moregeneral problem of the relationship between instruction and development. It providesdata on a limited and specific manifestation of the relationship between instruction

tgand development that allow liS to evaluale our general conception of this relationship.In this sense, our working hypotheSIS and the experimental research that it has pro­duced have implications (hat extend beyond the boundaries of the narrow issue of con­cept development to the more general problem of the relationship between instnlctionand development.

We will not outline the problem of instruction and development in any extendedform nor attempt even a tentative resolution of it in the present contexl. We have ad­dressed this issue elsewhere. However, since this problem constitutes the frameworkfor the focus of the present investigation and is in a certain sense its objecl, several ha­sic issues must be addressed. Witliont attempting to oUlline all the attempts to resolvethis question that have emerged in the history of our science, we will consider threethat are currently of significance for Soviet psychology.

The first perspective on lhe relationship between instruction and developmentlhat we will consider is probably the most widely accepted. It is based 011 the assump­tion that illstmclion and developme/lt are (WO dislinct and essenrially independent pro­ces.\(~s. Within this framework, tlie child's development is conceptualized as a processlhat is subordinant 10 natural lu\vs. The child develops in accordance with a mattlfa­lional model. Instruction is understood as an external utilization of the potef11ials thatemerge in development. The typical expression of this perspective in the analysis ofthe child's mental c1eveloprnelH is the atlempt to isolate that which is a function of de­velopment from that wliich is a function of inslnlction. The fact thaI not a single in­vestigator has succeeded in lhis ta,k is generally allribuled to limilations in researchmelhod. The atlempt is made 10 compensate for these inadequacies of methodthrough the power of abstraction. It is on this basis that the child's intellectual charac­teristics are differentiated into ,hose which: (1) arise from development, and (2) owetheir origin 10 instruction. It is generally assumed lhat a normal and high level of de­velopment can be attained Wilhollt1f1struclion. It is assumed that children will develop,ill the higher forms of thinking attainable by man without school instl1lction, that they

.~

will manifest all lhe intellectual potentials manifested by children who have receivedschool instruction.

11\is theory more often takes a somewhat different form which begins with therecognition of an indisputable dependency that ex.ists between instruction and devel·opment. Development creates lhe potentials while inSlnlclion realizes them. The re­lalionship between these proeesses is represented in much the same way that pre­form.ism represents the relationship between dispositions and development. Disposi­tions contain the potentials (hat are realized iu development. Here again, we find thenotion that it is development itself that creates potentials that are then realized in in­struction. Instruction is COrlstructed over a framework provided by /11a(Llralioll. As it isconceptualized within this framework, the relationship between instruction and devel­opment can be compared to the relationship between produetion and consumption.Instruction consumes the products of development. rt lIses them and applies them tolife. There is a one-sided dependency between development and instruction. Instruc­tion depends on development while development is not influenced by instruction.

In accordance with this theory, then, it is sufficient to recognize that a certainlevel of maturation in certain menta] functions is a prerequisite for instruction. It isimpossible to teach a one year old to read or a three year old to write. Consequently,analysis of the mental processes involved in instruction is reduced to the clarificationof the types of functions and the degree of maturation necessary for instruction to oc­eLir. Instruction in writing can begin if the child's memory has reached a level of de­velopment Ihat makes it possible for him to remember the letters of the alphabet, ifhis attention has developed to the extent that it can be maintained on matters of littleinterest to him for a given period of lime, and if his thinking has matured to the pointthat makes it possible for him understand the relationships between sounds and thewritten signs that symbolize them.

Though this perspective recognizes a one-sided dependency of instnlclion on de·velopment, this dependency is conceptualized in purely external terms. Any intcrnalinterpenetration or interconneccion hetween these processes is excluded. Though itapprox.imates reality more closely than other members of this class, this is why wegroup tbis theory vvith those which begin with the postulate of the independence of in-.struction and development. To the extent that this is the case, the kernel of truth thatis contained in this theory becomes lost in the mass of falsehoods that lie at the corc ofthis entire group of theories.

FUlldamelllal to this conception of the independence of the processes of instruc­tion and development is a notion that has received little attention until recently. 111isnotion concerns the issue of sequence as it relates to the processes of inSlnlction anddevelopment. This Iheory resolves this basic issue of sequence vvith its assumptionlhat instluction rides on the tail of development, that development must complete cer­tain l:ycles or stages or bear eertain fnlits before instruction is possihle.

Of course, this notion contains a certain element of truth. There are certain de­velopmental prerequisites that must be met before successful instruetion can begin.New forms of instruction are without question dependent ou (he completion of certaincyclcs in the child's development. "n1ere is a lower threshold prior to which instructionis not ~·possible. However, this dependency is not the most important characteriSlicof the relationship between instruction and development. It is of seeondary impor­tance. The attempl to represent it as the central issue, or, indeed, as (he whole issuc,leads 10 several misunderstandings and mistakes. Specifically, it has been assumedthat instruction reaps the fruit of the child's maturation while it has no significance fordevelopment. The child's memory, allention, and thinking develop to the level wherethe child can be instructed in writing and arithmetic. In response to the question of

1% Thinking and Speech 6. Devclopment of Scientific Concepts 197

whcth~r instructing the child in writing or arithmetic affects his memory, attention, orthinking, however, traditional psychology suggested that these processes always changewhc? they are exercised whatever form that exercise may I~ke. The course o~ devel­opmcnt itself, however, does not change as a consequence of Instruction. Nothll1g newemcrges in thc child's menial development when we teach him to write. The child wehave when we finish is idcnt ical 10 the one we had when we began, with the sole excep­tion thaI he is literate.

This perspeclive completely dominated traditional educational psychology, in­cluding Meu01ann's well known work. Piaget pushes this perspective to ItS logicallimit. I Ie assumes that Ihe child's Iilillkillg inherently passes tilrough certain stages alldphases oj wi/ether or /l01 Ire receives ills/ruction. That the child receives instruction hasno direct impact Oil the developmental process. It is not in any way unified with theprocesses of the child's own thinking. It is external to them. The teacher must viewthe autonomous characteristics of the child's thinking as a lower threshold that deter­mines the possibilities which exist for instruction. When the child develops new poten·tials for thinking, new types of instnlction will be possible. For Piaget, the index of thelevel of the child's thinking is to he found nOt in what the child knows or what he isable \0 learn but in his capacity for thinking in a dOlUain where he has no knowledge,l-lere, instruction and development or knowledge and thinking are placed in the'sharpest possible Opposilion. Proceeding from this thesis, Piaget presents the childwith problems from domains where his lack of knowledge can be assumed. The un­dc rlying premise is that if we ask the child ahout things that he may know, the resultswe receive may represent not the child's thinking but his knowledge. Spontaneous

l:5 concepts which arise in the child's development are therefore considered the proper'" indices of his thinking. Scientific concepts. which have their source in instruction, can·

not be used as indices in lhis way. In this opposition of instruction and developmentwe are brought once again IQ Piaget's basic premise: Scientific concepts do notemerge from spontaneous concepts or transform them; they force them out and re­place them.

The second perspective on this issue is diametrically opposed to that we have justoutlined, Here, inslructiorr alld development are merged. The two processes are identi­fied. This perspective first developed in the educational psychology of WillfamJames.68 James attempted to demonstrate that the format.ion of assoeiations andhabits lies at the foundation of both instruction and mental development. Of course,when these processes are identified, there is no foundation on which to differentiatethem. This thesis ine",itably leads to the declaration that instruction is development,that instruction and development are synonymous.

1l1e foundation for this Iheory is provided by associationism, the concept thatprovided (he basis for the whole of traditional psycholol,'Y. The rebirth of this conceptin educational psychology is now reprcsented by the "last of the Mohicans," that is, byThorndike and the reOexoiogists69 who have translated the concept of association intothe language of physiology. This theory represenls the development of the child's in­tellect as a sequcntial and grad\J~11 accuOlulalion of conditioned reOexes. [t representslilSlrllction in precisely the same way. The result is the conception that instruction anddevelopment arc synonymous. The child dcvelops to the extent that he is taught. De­vclopment is instruction; instruction is development. Rather than untying the knot"'hlch represents the relation~hip hctwcen instruction and development, the first the­ory CU t~ iL. This theory recognizes no relalionship hetween the tWO processes. Thissecond theory eliminates or avoids this knOl entirely. Since they are one and the samething, the issue of the relationship hctween instructIOn and development or the natureo( this relationship cannot anse.

",'.1.,

There is a third group of theories that have been particularly influential in Euro­pean child psychology. These theories attempt 10 rise above the extremes inherent inthe two perspectivcs outlined above, they attempt to sail between the Scylla andCharybdis. The result, however. is typical of theories that attempt (0 occupy a middleground between two extreme perspectives. This third group of theories fails to gain aposition abOl/e the other two and assumes a position between them. To the extent thaIit overcomes the extremes of one perspective, it assumes the extremes of the other. Itrises ahove the first false theory by yielding to some extent to a second which is equallyfalse. It overcomes the extremes of the second hy yielding to the first. This type oftheory has an inherent duality, By occupying a position hetween two contradictoryperspectives, it leads 10 a certain unifIcation of (hese points of view.

This type of position is taken by Koffka. From the outset, he makcs it clear thatdevelopment always has a dual characler and that it is necessary to distiuguish devel­opment as maturation and development as instnJction. Of course, this implies that wemust recognize each of the two extreme positions in turn. (hat we mmt unify them.The first perspective is based on the concept that the processes of development and in­struction are independent of one another. Koftka reiterates this position, arguing thatdevelopment is maturation whieh has it own internal laws independent of instnJCtion.The second perspective is based on the concept that instruction is development. Kof­fka literally reiterates this position.

If the first theory cuts the knot rather lhan untying it and the second eliminates oravoids it entirely, Koffka's theory tightens the knot further. Koffka's position not onlyfails to resolve the issue but confuses it. It lifts itself upward to the level of the princi­ple which underlies the mistake that is common to both the first two groups of theo­ries. to the level of the principle that produced their shared misstatement of the proh·lem. Koffka's theory proceeds from a fundamentally dualistic understanding of devel­opment. Development is not represented as a unified process. TIlere is developmentas maturation and development as instructiou. In three respects, however, Koffka'sthinking moves us beyond the other two theories.

1. TIle unification of these two contradictory perspectives requires the assumptionthat there is a mutua] dependency between the two types of development, that is, be·tween maturation and instruction. This assumption is included within Koffka's theory.Koff1<a establishes that maturation dcpends on the functioning of the organ and con­sequently on the development of its function in instruction. In turn, maturation movesinstruction forward by opening up new potentials. Thus, instruction has some inOu·ence on maturation and maturation has some influence on instruction. This "some" is,however, left entirely uninterpreted in Koffka's theory. His theory does not go beyonda general recognition of this mutual inOuenee. Rather than making it an object of in·vestigation, Koffka is satisfied with merely postulating the mutual dependency be·tween these two processes.

2. 11lis third theory also leads to a new understanding of instruction. ForThorndike, instruction is a meaningless mechanical process which produces its resultsthrongh trial and error. For stnlctural psychology, irwruction represents Ihe emergenceoj new structures and the development of old ones. Since the process of structural de­velopment is recognized as primary .- recognized as an independent prerequisite forinstruction -- this theory suggests from the outset that instruction has a meaningfulstructural character. The fundamental characteristic of any structure is that it is inde­pendent of the elements lhal form it, of the concrete material that provides its hasis.[ts fundamental characteristic is its potential for being transferred to Olher material.Thus, if the child forms a struclure or learns an operation in the course of inslruction,he has acquired more than the potential of reproducing that structure or operation.

198 Thinking and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts 199

lie has acquired much greatcr potentials that extend to the domains of othcr struc­tures. We have given the child a penny's worth of instruction and the consequence hasbeen a dollar's wonh of development. A single step in instruction can represent ahundred steps in development. lllis constitutes the most positive feature of this newtheory. This theory teaches us to see the difference between instruction which pro­Vides only what it provides directly and instruction which provides more. Learning totype may not change the general structure of consciousness. Learning a new mcthodof thinking or a new type of slrucmre produces a great deal more than the capacity toperform the narrow activity that was the object of instruction.

3. The third positive feature of this new theory is a direct function of the secondanc! is relatcd 10 the issue of the seq\lence of instruction and development. lllis issuerundamentally distinguishes this third theory from the first two.

We have seen that the first theory takes the position that instruction follows onIhe tail of development. first there is development and only then instruction. Thesecond theory cannot even state this question because the two proccsses are identifiedor merged with one another. In practical terms, however, the second theory proceedsfrom the presupposition thai imtruClioll and development proceed syncronically astwo parallel processes, tllal developmcnt follows instruction step for step just as ashadow follows the object which casts it. To the extent that it unites these two per­spcctives and differentiates maturation and instruction, the third theory preserves boththese representations of the temporal connections between instruction and develop­men1. However, it supplementS them with something fundamentally new which stemsrrom its conception of instnlction as a structural and meaningful process. We have

~ ~een that within this framework inSlnlction can give more to development than is pre-sent in its direCt results. Applied to one point in the child's thought, it altcrs and re­structures many others. Its developmental consequences may be distal as wcll asproximal. fnsrnlctioll is nut limitecl to trailing after development or moving stride for siridealong with if. Ii call move ahead of development, p/.i.Shillg it further and elicifillg new for­nWliom. This insight has unmeasurable importance and value. It atones for many ofthe inadequacies of Koffl;:a's eclectic theory, a theory which accepts all three of thelogically conceivable temporal relationships between instruction and development asequally plausible and significant. In spite of their differences, the first and second the­ories lead \0 the conclusion that instruction changes nothing in development. Thus,this third theory leads to an entirely new problem, a problem that is extremely impor­tant for the hypothesis that we are developing.

lllOugh in many respects entirely new, this problem also represents a relurn [0 avcry old issue in psycholoh'Y and educ,tlion, an issue that has almost been forgotten.This return docs not represent the rebirth of the conceptions associated with the origi­nal expression of the problem, conccptions whose inadequa~"y has long since beendemonstrated. Ilowever, as is frequelllly the case in the history of scientific thought,the reanalysis of a theory from the new perspectives which science has achievcd leadsto thc restoration of several corrcct positions that were found not only in the oldertheory that is being reanalyzed but in theories that preeeded it.

We are referring here to the theory of formal discipline, a theory usually associ­ated with the name of Herban.70 Fundamelllal (Q the concept of formal discipline is(he notion that therc are educational subjects which provide something more than theknowledge anu skills thai. constitute the subject ilself. These subjeets cOntribute to thedevelopmenl of the child's general mental capacities. Proponents of this theory distin­guished educational suhject, in terms of their relative significance as formal disci­plines. Though itself progressive, this perspectivc led educational practice to reac­tionary forms of teaching, thc most direct instantiation of which were the German and

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Russian classical gymnasiums. In the gymnasium, a great deal of attention was focusedon the study of the Lalin and Greek languages. This was done not becanse it wasthought to be imponant for life, but because it was thought that the study of thesesubjects facilitated the child's general mental development. In the Rea/sehu/e, thissame significance was attributed to the teaching of mathematics. Just as ancient lan­guages were thought to provide for the development of the mental capacities requiredin the humanitarian sciences, mathematics was thought to provide for the developmentof Ihe mental capacities needed in the practical [scientific and technieal) disciplines.

The total demisc of the theory of formal discipline was partially a function of theundeveloped state of the theory. Thc primary factor in its demise, however, was itsfailure to correspond with the practical tasks of the new bourgcois pedagogy. It wasThorndike who emerged as the major ideologist here. In a series of studies, he at­tempted to show that the concept of formal discipline was a myth or legend, that in­struction does not have any long term influences on development. In this research,ThormHke cOlOpletdy rejected the concept that there is any dependen~"y between in­struction and development. llle theory of formal discipline had a correct premonitionof this dependency but depicted it largely in caricature. Thorndike's position, how­ever, is convincing only to the extent that it deals with the caricatured exaggerationsand distortions of this dependen~"y that were developed within the theory of formaldiscipline. He does not even address the core of the idea, mueh less destroy it.Thorndike's conclusions are not convincing primarily because he failed to overcomeIhe false statement of the problem that is contained in the teachings of Herbart's fol­lowers. He attempts to refute these ideas by assuming the same position and using thesame tools they did. The result is that he refutes not the ideas that lie at the eore ofthis old teaching but only those which constitute the husk that covers it.

In theoretical terms, Thorndike approaches the problem of formal disciplinewithin a framework which assumes that everylhing in instruction influences everythingelse. Thorndike raises the question of whether studying the multiplication tables willinfluence the capacities to chose a mate or understand anecdotes. In answering thiskind of question in the negative, Thorndike demonstrates only what we knew from theoutset. In neither instruction nor development does everything inflnence everythingelse. Influcnces cannot have a universal range. They cannot link points of instructionand development that have nothing of a mental nature in common. He is absolutelywrong, however, when he extends this perfectly correct thesis and conclndes thatnothing influences anything. Thorndike merely demonstrated that instruction whichinfluences functions that have nothing in common with the functions that underlieQ[her forms of activity or with the functions of thinking will nOt have any influence onthese other forms of activity. This thesis is beyond dispute. It does no I, however, clar­ify the question of whether instruction might have some inflnence on functions whosemental natures are similar (i.e., either identical or closely related). Thorndike has notresolved the question of whether instruction can facilitate the development of a cer­tain systcm of functions or the study of subjects that dcpend on related mental pro­cesses. lllOrndikc's rejection of the concept of formal discipline is valid only where weare dealing with functions that are combined in a meaningless way.

'TIluS, 'TIlOrndike's conclusions are valid only if we are concerned wirh meaning­less combinations of functions. On what basis does he extend these conclusions to (hechild's instruction and development as a whole? Why does his finding that everythingdoes not inOuence everything convince him that nothing influences anything? The an­swer to thcse questions lies in the general theoretical conception that nnderlies allThorndike's work. ln accordance with this conception, there are no combinations intlje activity of consciollsness other than meaningless ones. Within this framework, all

20(J Thinking and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts 201

instruction and development are reduced to tile mechanical formation of associativeconnections. Tllat is, all the activities of consciousness are connected in a single man­ner. The learning of the Illultiplication tables is connected with the understanding ofanecc..lotes in the same way that the formation of algebraic concepts is connected withthe underslanc..llng of the law~ of physics. We know, however, Ihat this is nol the case.In the activity of consciousness, slructured and meaningful collilections and relationsc1omin'lte. 'llle presence of meaningless conneclions is more Ihe exceplion than therule. This view is fnndamelllal to contemporary psychology. If we accept it, all thethunc..ler and lightning that Thorndike atlemplS 10 hring down on the teaching of for­mal disciple strikes his own theory. Thus, though he does not recognize it, Koffkamust to some degree return (0 the coneept of formal discipline. Koffka representsSIrllctural psychology, and structural psychology rejects the very core of the associativeconception of (he chilc..l's instruction and menial development.

Even Korlla, however, overlooked a second mistake in 11lOrndike's critique ofIhe theory of formal disci[)line. In his attempt to refute Herbart's conception,TllOrndike resol'led to experimentation on extremely narrow, specialized, and, there­fore, elementary func.tions. He provic..led subjects with practice in discriminating [helengths of line segmems and then studied how this form of instruction influenced theircapacity to discriminate the size of angles. Of course, no influence was found. 111 iswas a function of two factors. First, Thorndike did not teach his subjects material ofthe type typical of school in;,tructioll. No one has ever argued that teaching someoneto ride a bicycle, to swim, or play golf (forms of activity that are much more complexthan the discrimination of the magnitude of angles) has any significant influence onthe general development of Ihe cbild's mind. Such an argument has been made onlywith respect to the study of subjects such as arithmetie or the child's native language,only with respect to complex subjects Ihat are linked to Ihe entire system of mental11H1ctions. 11lat Ihe discrirruriation of line lengths has no direct influence on the dis­cllmination of angles provides no basis for the assumption that the study of the nativelangtwge -- and Ihe general development of the meaningful aspect of speech that is as­sociated with it -- is not linked in some way to the study of arithmetic. 11lOrndike hasdemonstrated only that there are two kinds of instruction. One is epitomized by tbeformation of specialized, narrow skills. This form of instruction is often encounterec..lin I he professional adult instruction. The other form of instruction is typical of child­hood and incorporates whole complexes of mental functions. It leads to the develop­ment of entire domains of the child's thinkiug. TIlis form of instruction clearly influ­ences similar, related, or even identical mental processes. For the first form of instruc­tion, formal discipline is more ihe exception than the rule. It is a fundamental law ofthe second form of instruction.

Moreover, as we have seen, the activity that 11JOrndike used in his experiments isassociated with what i> structurally among the lowest. most elementary, and ·simplesthi nctions. In COniraSt, schOOl instruction is associated with the higher mental func­tions. 11\eir complex structure distinguishes these mental functions from those studiedby Thorndike. More importantly, however, they are distinguished by the fact ibat theyarc entirely new forrnalions and by the fact that they are complex functional systems.Given wllal we know of the higher mental functions, it is apparent that the potentialfor formal discipline in the dom,lln of tile higher processes which arise in the course oftile child's cullural development is fundamentally different from its potential in thedomain of elementary processes. The homogeneity of the structure of the higher men­tal fu nClions and tile unily of their origin convinces us of this. We have noted that all

" the higher functions have a homogeneous basis. They become higher functions be­cause the subJecl ~~~~~.50~:c.ious awareness and -mastery ()f the_~_. As we said ear-

lier, logical memory can be called voluntary memory just as voluntary allention can becalled logical attention. We would add here that both these functions can be calledabstract as opposed to concrete, paralleling the way we generally distinguish abstractand concrete forms of thought. Thorndike's conception, however, rejects the notion ofa qualitative difference between the higher and lower processes. It is the assumptionthat these processes arc identical in nature that convinces Thorndike that he is justi­fied in using studies of instruction that deal exclusively with the elementary processesin his allempt to resolve the question of formal discipline in the domain of school in­struction.

4

Having prepared the necessary theoretical foundation and analyzed the questionfrom a critical perspective, we can now attempt to outline our own perspective on it.We will rely on four groups of sludies that lead us to a unified conception of the prob­lem of inslrl.lction and development. Basic to our approach is the concept that instnlc­tion and development are neither tWO entirely independent processes nor a single pro­cess, In our view, they are two processes with complex interrelationships. We con­ducted a series of studies to explore these relationships and these studies provide theempirical foundation for our hypothesis.

M we said, this research is unified in its concern with the general problem of therelationship between instruction and development. Its basic task was to explore thecomplex relationships between instruction and development by focusing on the workthat the child does in school, that is, by focusing on reading and writing, grammar,arithmetic, the natural sciences, and the social sciences. A variety of specific issueswere explored. We looked at the child's mastery of the decimal system in associationwith the development of the number concept, at the development of conscious aware­ness of mathematical operatiOns in solving problems, and at the conSlntction and res­olution of problems by primary school children_ TIlis research increased our under­standing of the development of oral and written speech in the first school age, helpedus to identify stages in the development of the understanding of transferred wordmeaning, provided data on the influence that the learning of grammatical structureshas on the course of mental development, and clarified the relationship between thenature of the social and the natural sciences in school. Thus, some aspect of the gen­eral issue of the relationship between instruction and development was addressed ineach of these slUdies.

The most important issues that we were able 10 address through this researchconcerned; (1) the maturity of specific mental functions when instruction begins; (2)the influence of instruction on their development, the temporal relationship betweeninstruction and development, and; (3) the nature and significance of instruction as aformal discipline.·

1. The first series of studies deall with the issue of the maturity of the mentalfnnctions that provide the foundation for instruclion in basie school subjects such asreading, writing, arithmetic, and natural science. Though the first group of theoriesdiscussed above maintain that these functions must mature before instruction can be­gin, this first series of sludies consistently indicated that they do not, even though in­struction may be proceeding smoothly. We will clarify this point using the example ofwritten speech.

Vygolsky used lite Iltesis rescarch of his stlldcnls ar Ihe Leningrad pedagogical ;nstilllle herc.--Edi­wr's no(c.

202 Thinking and Spcech 6. Dcvelopmellt of Scientific Concepts 203

Why IS wrillen speech so difficult for the school child? Why, at several siages, isthere a difference of six 10 eight years in the speech age for written and oral speech?The most COllllllon explamllion tor this is bascd on the assumption that because writ­ten ~peech i~ a new function it must repeat the basic developmental stages that oralspcech has already passed through. Thus, the eight year old's written speech will besimilar to the two year old's oral speech. It has even been proposed that the age levelfor wrilten spccch should be me2.Sured from Ihc point when instruction begins in ordcr10 establisll this correspondence bCTWeen written and oral speech.

TIlis explanation is clearly unsatisfactory. The two year old uses comparativclyfew words and a primitivc synta.,\; because his vocabulary is still poor and because hehas not mastered complex sente nce structures, The vocabulary of the school child'swritten speech, however, is not poorer than that of his oral speech. They are one andthe same vocabulary. 'The sym.ux and the grammatical forms of written and oralspeech are also the same. The child has already mastered them by the time he reachesschool. 11ms, the poverty of vo..::abulary and the undeveloped syntax thal explain theprimillve nalurc of oral spccch if] the Iwo year old cannot explain the primitive natureof the school child's written spc-cch. This analogy does not adequately explain thelargc disparity in the schOOl child's wrillen and oral speech,

Rescarch indicates that the development of written speech does not reproducethat of oral speech. Any similarity that exists between the two processes is externaland symptomatic rather than e~~ntial. Written speech is more than the translation oforal speech into the written sign... Mastering written speech re'lllircs more than learn­ing the techni'lues of writing. Ocherwise, we would expect that once these mechanismsof written speech wcre learned, written speech would be as rich and developcd as oralspeech; the {\>,iO would be as sirrillar as the translation is to the original. TIlis is nOL thecase however.

Written speech is an enti.reny unique speech function. Its structure and mode offunctioning are as different from those of oral speech as those of inner speech arefrom external speech. Even the most minimal level of de~do..pm~nU!iwritten sp~cch

requires a hish degree 3rabslradIJon. WiTtlell-SpeedfTacks intonation and express~[tlacks31ltheasiiectsof speech that are reflected in sound. Written speech is speechin thonght, in representations. h lacks the most basic feature of oral speech; it lacksmaterial sound.

The result is that the psychological conditions characteristic of written speech arevery different from those of oral speech, Through oral speech, the child has achieveda rathcr high level of abstractmn with respect to the object world. With writtenspeech, the child is prcsented winh a new task. He must abstract from the sensual as­pect of speech itself. I'[e must C!love to abstracted speech, \0 speech that uses repre­senLations of words ralhcr than words them~elves. In this respect, wrillen speech dif·fers from oral speech in the S2-me way tbat abstract thinking differs from graphicthinking. 11lis means that written speech cannot repeat the developmental stages oforal speecb. The abstract nature nf written spcech -- the fact that it is thought ratherthun pronounced -- represcnts ooe of the greaLe~t difficulties encountered by the childIn his mastery of writing. Those ""ho continue to assume that the critical problcms arefactors such as the underdevelopment of the small musculature and factors associatedwith the techni'lues of writing faiJllO see the root of the problem.

Wrillell spcech is more ahs::ract than oral speeCh in other rcspccts as wcll. It isspeech without ,In interlocutor. 'Tllis crcates a situation completely foreign to the con­vcrsational speecll tile child is accustomed to. In written speech, those to whom the,pecch is dirccted are either ab$~nt or OUI of contact with the writer. Written speechis specch-monologue. It is a cOr7\'ersaLion with a while sheet of paper, with an imugi-

Ilary or conceptualized interlocutor. Still, like oral speech, it is a conversational situa­lion. Written speech re'luires a dual abstraction from the child. It re'luires an abstrac­tion from the auditory aspects of speech and an abstractio~ from the iOlerl9cutor.'lli'is·is the second of the basic difficulties the school child encounters in his mastery ofwritten speech. Speech thai lacks real sound (speech that is only reprcsented orthought and therefore rcquires the sylllbolizatiou of sound n a second order symbol­inlion) will be more difficult lhan oral speech to the same degree that algebra'is moredifficult for the child than a ritlunctic. Written speech is the algebra of speech. llleprocess of learning algebra does not repeat that of arithmetic. It is a new and higherplane in the development of abstract mathematical thought thai is constructed overand rises above arithmetic thinking. In the same way, the algebra of speech (i,e" writ­ten spcech) introduces the child to an abstract plane of speech that is constructed overthe developed system of oral speech.

Moreover, rhe nw/ives tlral would cause one (0 resort (0 wn'lIen speech are even lessaccessible 10 rhe child when he begiltJ 10 learn 10 wrile. AI; is true of any new form of ac­tivity, the motivation for speech and the need for it is fundamental to its development.The need for oral communication develops throughout infancy. It is a basic prerequi­site for the first mcaningful word. To the extent that this need has not matured, wefind delays in speech dcvelopment. When School iustruction begins, however, theneed for written speeCh is comparatively undeveloped. When he begins to write, theschool child does not sense the nced for this new speech function.

TI\e relevance of the notion that motivation generally precedes activity to the spe­ci,1l difficulties that the child encounters in the mastery of written speech is not limited ,to the ontogenetic domain. Every conversation and phrase is preceded by a speech 'motive. This motive is the source of the affective inducements and ueeds that feed theactivity, With evelY moment, the situation that is inherent in oral speech creates themotivation for each turn of speecb; it creates the motivation for each segment of con­versation or dialogue. 11le need for something produces the request. The questioncreates the answer. 1l1e expression brings the retort and the failure to understand ­the clarification. A multitude of similar relationships between speech and motive arefully lIetermincd by the situation inherent in real oral speech. Thus, oral speech isregulated by the dynamics of the situation. It flows entirely from the situation in ac­cordance with this type of situational-motivational and situational-conditioning pro­cess, With written speech, on the other hand, we are forced to create the situation or n

more accurately n to represcnt it in thought. The use of written speech presupposes afundamentally different relationship to the situation, one that is freer, more inde-pendent, and more voluntary. " '. '. .

---- '111e child must ~ct'wllh more volition with written speech than with oral speech.TIlis is a gcneral thread that links the distinguislLing characteristics of written speech.Even the sound form of the word must be differentiated in written speech, while withoral speech it is pronounced automatically and without any differentialion into sepa­rate sounds. In saying a word, the child is not conscious of how he pronounces thesound. I-Ie does not intentionally pronounce each separate sound. With written Ispeech, however, hc mUSt become consciously aware of the word's structure. He mustpartition it and voluntarily recreate it in written signs.

We find an analogous situation with the child's activity in forming phrases, [nwriting, he constructs the phrase in the same voluntary and intcntional way as he cre­ates the word from scparate letters. That is, the child's syntax is as voluntary as hisphonetics. The sCll\antic aspect of written speech also requires voluntalY work onword meanings. It requires that they be arranged in a particular syntaC1ic ,lnd phoneticsequence. TIlis rcflccts the fact that writtcn speech stands in a (Iifferent relationship to

204 111inking and Speech 6. Deyelopment of ScientifiC Concepts 205

inner speech than docs oral speech. Whil~ the_q~y~loPfll~.nt of external speecll.pr.e:cedes the geYelopl].lent of inne~ speech, wntten speech e~erges on!y after the dey!<l­Qpment (~LUle_ lallCf, WrItten. spe~ch presupposes the eXistence of Inner speech.. A~­cording to Jack~on and lJead,i1 wntlen speech IS tlle key to Inner speech. 11le tr<1~SI­

tion from ioner 10 written speech reqUIres what we have called voluntary semanllcs,which is associated with the volllntary phonetics of wrilten. s~eech. The grammar ofthought characteristic of inlier and written speech do not C?lI1clde; the me~rungful syn­t<LX of inner specch is completely dlffercnt from that of eIther oral or wrl~ten speech.Entirely differefll laws govern the construction of the whole and .of meamngful u.ntts.In a certain sense, the syntax of inner speech is the polar opposite of that of wntlenspeech. The synta>: of oral speech stands somewhere between these two pol.es. .

I nner speech is maximally contracted, abbreVIated, and telegraphic. Wr~tten

speech is ma>:imally expanded and formal, eyen Ino.re so tha~ oral speech. \Vrtttenspeech does not contain el.lipses whi.le inner speech IS fdled with them. Syntactically,Inner speech is almost enllrely predlcallve. In oral (audIble) speech, syntax becomespredi<.:atiye where the subject and related pans of the sentence are known to the In­lerlocutors. This is consistcfll with the nature and structure of mner speech. With in­ner speech, the subject -- indeed tbe whole c~nversalional s!tuation -- is. known to theindividual who is thinking. Here, speech consists almost enurely of pr~dlc~tes. We .donot h,we to tell ourselyes what this speech is about. 1l1al IS always Implied, formmgthe background of consciousne~s. 111is explains the predicative nature of ilU1er speech.Eyen if inner speech were made audible to the outsider, onJy the speaker would un­derstand it. No one ebe would know the mental field in which it Oows. Inner speechis therefore, completely idiomatic. .

, In contrast, writtcn speech requires the situation to be established in full detad soit can be understood by lhe interlocutor. Wrillen speech is the mosl expand.ed ~orm .of~peech. Eyen lhings lhat call, be omitted i.n oral speech mustbe made expliCit 111 Wfll­

ten speech. Written speech must be maxlrually compr:henslhle to the other. EYery­thing must be laid out fully. This transition from a maxlma,uy contracted. Inner speech(i.e., from speech for oneself) to a maximally expanded wnllen speech (I.e.: to speechfor the other) requires a child who is capable of extremely complex.QP~r.~\(QDS...JlL1..1g:

yolulltary construction o~ t)le fa~ric?f meani!1g.. .. . . .The second basic characteTlSllc of wnlteu speech (I ,e., ItS greater cOn.lclOu.mess) IS

closely linked with its voliliolWl /latllre, Wundt noted that the intenlion~1 and con­scious nature of written speech is among the mosllmp0rlant features that dlstmgulshesit from oral speech. In his view, the difference bet:Yeen the deyelopm.ent of languageand of writing is that the latter is directed by conscIOusness and Intention almost frOOlthe oulset. 1l1is is why change in sign systems C3n be volu ntary (~ In the developmentof cuneiform writing systems for example) while the processes IIlvolved In languagechange are always unconscious. .

In our research, we were able to establish lhat this is as true of the ontogenesIs ofwrilteu speech as il is of its phylogenesis. From lhe very begilU1i~g, consci?usness andimention direct the child'~ written speech. The child learns the Signs of written speec.h

I and the use of these signs <.:onsciously and volitionally. In contrast, oral s~eech ISlearned and used unconsciously. Wrilleo speech forces the chtld to act more lI1,teIlec­lually. [I requires conscious awareness of the.very process of speaking. The motives ofWI ilten speech arc more abstrnct, imellectualtstlc, and separated from need. .

In summarizing this hrief discussion of our study of the psychology of wnltenspeech, we can ~ay Ihal (he mental functions which form writ ten speech are funda­mentally different from those which form oral speech. Wrttten speech IS the algebra(If ~peech. It is a more difficult and a more complex form of Intentional and conscIOUS

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speech aClivity. Two conclusions follow: (1) this explains the radical difference be­tween the child's oral and wriuen spcech (this difference is a function of differences intbe leyei of dcyelopll1cnt required by actiYities that are spontaneous, iuvohllllary, andwithout conscious awareness and those lhat are abslTact, voluntary, and characlerizedby conscious awareness); and (2) when irlSlmelion in written speech begilU, Ihe basicmenla! jl/ncliom Ihal Iinderlie il are /l01 fully developed; indeed, Iheir deve/opmell/ !ws/lot yel begllIJ. Instruction depends on processes that have not yet matured, processesthat haye just entered the first phases of their development.

TIlis laller point is supported by rescarch in other areas, Iustruclion in arithmetic,grammar, and natural science do not begin when the appropriate functions are mature.On the contrary, Ihc immaturity of lhe required mental functions at the beginuing ofthe instructional process is a general and basic law in all domaius of school instruction.Since this emerges mO~1 clearly in the analysis of instruction in grammar, we will limitour discussion to this single issue in the present section. Our analysis of the acquisi­tion of scientific concepts will be deferred to subsequent sections.

Sioce grammar would seem the least necessary or useful school subject for thechild, the issue of the value of instruction in grammar is methodologically and psy­chologically complex. Arithmetic proyides the child with new abilities. By acquiringknowledge of arithmetie, a chIld who once lacked the ability to add or divide now haslhis ability. Instruction in grammar does not seem to proyide the child with new ca­pacities in this sense. 11le child has the capacity to decline and conjugate before hecomes 10 school. What does he learn from instruction in grammar? This is the argu­ment that underlies the "agrammatical" moyement which suggests that grammarshould be removed from the Jist of school subjects because it is unnecessary, because itprovides no new speech capacities. If we analyze instl1Jction in grammar and writtenspeech, however, we find that it has tremendous significance for the general develop­ment of the child's thought.

Of course, the child is able to decline and conjugate long before he arrives atschool. For all practical purposes, he has already acquired the entire grammar of hisnative language. Nouelheless, while he declines and he conjugates, he does not knowthat he declines and conjugates. This actiYity has been acquired in a purely stl1JeturalmalU1er, in much tbe same way he has learned the pbonetic constituents of the word .If you ask the young child to pronounce a specific combination of sounds such as "sk,"he will not be able 10 do it. This kind of voluntary articulation is difficult for him. Inthe word "Moscow," however, he pronounces these same sounds freely and nonyoli­tionally. Within a defined stlllclure, the sOtluds emerge spontaueous]y in the ehild'sspeech. Outside speech, howeYer, these same sounds are not available to the child.The child is able 10 pronoullce a given sound, but he is nol able to pronounce il volilion­al/y. This is the common characteristic of all the speech operations of the child who ison the threshold of school age.

This means that the child has certain speech capacities, but he does not know thaihe has them. These operations lack conscious awareness. 111is is reOected in the factthat the child possesses them only when they are used spontaneously or automatically,when they are used in situations where they are elicited by the slructllre of the situa­tion. Outside Ihis structure, the child is not able to do what he can within it. That is,he is not able to do Yolitionally, consciously, and intentionally what he is able to dowithout voluntary control. As, a consequence, he has limited use of his capacilies.

Once again, lack of conscious awareness and the nonvolitional nalure of thechild's capacities turn out to be two sides of a single phenomenon. This is characteris­lic of the child's grammatical skills such as his capacities to decline and conjugate.TIle child uses the correct case and the correct yerb form in the Slruelure of a partiCII-

~()6 Thinking and Speech6. Development of Scientific Concepts 207

lar phrase. Ire docs nOl, however, consider Ihe facl Ihat such forms exist. He cannOl,tht:refore, decline or conjugate a verb fully. TIle preschool child possesses all the hasi.cgramnlalieai and syntaclic forms. He does ~OI acquire fundamenlal~y new grarr~ll1al.l­

calor synlactic Slructures in school Instrucllon. FroUl this perspecllve, Instruction 111

gr,lI11mar is indeed a usele~s undertaking. What the child does learn in school, h~w­

t:Vt:I, is conscious awareness of what he does. He learns 10 operate on the foundationof his capacilies in a volillonal manner. His capacilY moves from an unconscious, au­tomatic plane to a voluntary, intentional, and conscious plane. Inslruclion In wrilten~pccch and grammar playa fundamental role in this pro~ess. . .

Given wh1\! we already know of (he character of wnllen speech, no elaboration ISrequired to see the importanct: of tbis conscious awareness of speech -- Ihis maSlery ofit n for lhe mastery of wrilten speech. The development of conscious awareness andmastery arc both necessary for wrillen speech. When learuing to spell words thaI arespelled phonelically, the child gains conscious awareness tbal a word such as "fasl"contains the sounds F-A·S-T, thai is, he gains conscious awareness of his own activilyin the produclion of sound; he learns to pronounce each separate element of Ihesound struClUre voluntarily. In the same way, when the child learns 10 write, he begins10 <10 with volition what he has previously done without volition iu the domain of oralspeech. Thus, both grammar and w~iling provide the child with the potential of mQ't;ing!C! a higher level in speeCh de~elopmenl. .. Only two schOOl subjects, writing and grammar, have been conSIdered here.

Ilowever, research on any of the basic school subjects would show the same thing:Thought has nol fully malured when instruction begins. We can now make an evenmore interesling eonclusion on lhe basis of our studies. If we consider lhe psychologi­cal aspects of school instruction, we will see that it constantly revolves around whal arethe basic new formations of the sehool age n conscious awareness and maslery. Wecan show that the most varieo subjects of inslruction have a common foundation in Ihechild's mind. Moreover, Ihis common foundalion is a basic new formation of theschool age, a formation Ihal develops and matures in tbe process of instruction itself.

Jfts developmental cycle is not completed before this age. The development of the psy­chological bases of school iflsrmctioll do not predate illStmction; t!ley develop in an LIIl­

broken internal connecfioll IVith il.2. Om second group of studies were coucerned with the issue of Ihe temporal

relationship helween the processes of instruction and development. Research hasshown that instruction always moves ahead of development. The child hecomes profi­cienl in certain skills before he learns to apply them consciously and volitionally.There is always a divergence between school instruction and the developmenl of thecorrespondin" functions. These processes nder run in parallel.

TIle edu~ational proccss has its own sequence, logic, and complex organization. Itprogresses through lectures and excursions. In today's class there will be one lesson, intomorrow's another. Tbis process is regulaled by programs and schedules. 11 would bea tremendous error to as~ume thai there is a complete correspondence between theexternal structure of the educational process and the internal structure of the devel­opmental processes that it brings to life. It would ?e a mistake to think that the pupil:sfailure in arithmetic in a given semester necessanly corresponds wllh the progress 111

his internal developmental semester. If we represent bOlh the educational process andthe development of lhe menial functions that are directly involved in lhal process aseurves (as we have attempted to do in our experiments), we find thai these curvesnever coincide. nleir reiationship is exlremely complex.

We usually begin Ihe leaching of arithmetic with addition and end wilh division.There is an internal sequence in lhe statemenl of'all arilhmetic knowledge and infor-

mation. From lhe developmental perspective. however, the various features and com­ponents of this process may have an enlirely different significance. It may be that thefirst, second, lhird, ant! fourth componenlS of arithmelic instruclion are inconsequen­tial for the development of arithmetic thinking. Some fiflh component may be deci­sive. At this point. the dcvelopmenl:J\ cl1l've may rise sharply and begin to run aheadof the inslnlClional proce~s. What is learned thereafter may be learned in a entirclydifferent way. Here, there is a sudden shift in (he role of instruction in development.TIle child has finally understood somelhing, finally learned something essential; a gen­eral principle has been clarified in this "aha experience." Of course, the child mustlearn the subsequent components of Ihe program. [n an important sense, however,lhey may already be contained in what he has learned. In each subject, there are es­sential, constituting concepts. If the course of development coincided completely withthat of instruclion, every point in the instructional process would have equal signifi­cance for uevelopmenl. The curves that represent irLstruction and developmenl woulucoincide. Every point in the curve representing inslflletion would have a mirror imagein lhe curve representing development. Research indicates that Ihis is nOt the case. Inbolh instruclion and development, there are critical moments. 'nlese moments governthose which precede and follow it. Tllese points of transition on the two cUlves do notcoincide but display complex interrelationships. Indeed, as we said before, there couldbe no relationship between instruction and development if the twO curves were to fuse.

Development has a different tempo than instruClion. What we have here is a sit­uation inherent in any scientific attempl to establish a relalionsbip between two re­lated processes that must be measured in accordance with different units of measure­ment.

The development of conscious awareness and volition cannot coincide with theschool's program in grammar. The period required by Ihe educational program forlearning to decline substantive nouns will not necessarily coincide with that requiredfor the internal development of the conscious awareness or mastery of speech. Devel­opment is not suhordinated to the school program. [\ has its own internal logic. Agiven lesson in arithmetic will not correspond wilh a given stage of development, witllthe development of voluntary allention for example. Still, instruction in arithmelicmay have a fundamental influence on the movement of allention from the domain ofthe lower mental functions to that of the higher. In Ihe literal meaning of the word, in­struction and development are incommensurable. In school, lhe child does not learnthe decimal system as such. He learns to write numbers, aud, mulliply, and solveproblems. Nonelheless, some general concept of the decimal system does develop.

The general implications of our second group of studies can be summarized in thefollowing way: At the moment a given arithmetic operation or scientific concept is ac- Iqui red, the development of Ihis operation or concept is not completed. TIle curve rep- j

resenting its development does not correspond with lhat representing the school pro- (gram. Instruction moves ahead of development.

3. The Ihird group of studies dealt with an issue similar to that addressed by1l1Orndike in his experiments on the lheory of formal discipline. However, our ex­periments were carried Out with higher ralher than elementary mental functions. Ourexperiments deall wilb school instruction rather than with the discrimination of linesegmenlS or the magnitude of angles. In other words, we transferred the experimentto a domain where a meaningful connection might be expecled betwcen the subjects ofinslruction and the menial functions thaI playa role in them.

These studies have shown that [he various subjects of school inStruction inleraCtwith each other in the course of the child's development. Development is a muchmore unified process Ihan would be indicated by Thorndike's experiments, where de-

201\ Thinking and Spcech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts 209

vel0!lmcnt takcs on an ;ltomiSlic character. Thorndike's experiments indicated thatIhe development of eaeh 1>11 of knowledge and each skill consists in the formation ofindependent chains of association, th;lt cannot f:leilitate the development of other as­,oci;ltivc chains. Each proccss of development is independent and isolated. Each oc­Cllr, in an idcntical manner in accordance with the law of associations. Our researchh:\S shown that the child's mental development does not occur in accordance with thesystem of SCllOOI subjects ill this way. Arithmetic does not result in the developmen~ ofcertain functions while written speech le:lds to the development of olhers. There IS aC0l111110n mental foundation 10 various aspects of these subjects. Conscious awarenessand mastery cmerge in lhe same way with instruetion in grammar or written speech.They playa significant role in arithmetic instruclion and will take a central position inour analySIS of scientific concepts. Tire child's abstract thinking develops ill a/l Iris/e)SO!lS. lIS dcvelopment does not move in separate channelS eorresponding to theschool subjects.

There is a process of instruction which has its own internal structure, it own se­quence, and its own emerging logic. Atlhe same time, in the head of each. pupil, lhe.rei, an internal network of processes which are c:llled to hfe and mOllvated In schoo! Ill­

struction. These have their own logic of development however. Among the basic tasksof the psychology of school instruction is to elarify this internal logic, the internalcourse of development that is called lO life by a particular course of instruction. Threef;lcts Jlave been solidly established in our experiments: (1) there is signifieant common­ality in the mental foundations underlying instruction. in the various scho?1 subjeclstll;lt is alone sufficienl (0 insure the potential for the lOfluence of one subject on lheother (i.e., there is a formal aspect 10 each school subject); (2) instruction influencesthe development of the higher mental functions in a manner that exceeds the limits ofthe specific content and material of eacl1 subject. Once again, this provides supportfor the idea of a formal discipline which is different for each subject but common toall. [n attaining conscious awareness of case" the child maSlers a structure that islransferred to other domains that are not directly linked with cases or grammar; and(3) the mental functiollS are inlerdependem and interconnected. I3ecause of the foun­dation which is common to ullthe higher mental functions, the development of volun­tary attention and logical memory, of abstract thinking and scientific imagination, oc­curs as a complex unified process. TIle common foundation of all the higher mentalfunclions is conscious awareness and mastery. The development of this foundation isthe primary new formation of the school age.

4. Our fO\lflh group of studies deall with an issue that is new for contemporarypsychology hut fundamental to the problem of instruction and development in theschool-age child. ,

Psychological research on the problem of instruction is usually limited .to. estab­lishing the level of lhe child's mental development. The sole baSIS for determllllllg thISlevel of development are tasks lhat tbe child solves independently. This means that wefocus on what the child has and knows today. Using this approach, we can establishoilly what has already millured. That is, we can determine only the level of lhe child's(1('(11111 development. To determine the state of the child's development on this basisalone, howcver, is inadequate. Tll,~_sta(e of development is never dcfine~~y htwh~.!­

h~lS matured. If the gardener decides only to evaluate the matnred or harvesteo fruitsof rhe apple tree, he cannOI determine lhe state of his orchard. Maturing trees mustaho he taken into consideration. The psychologist must not limit his analysis to func­lion, that have matured. He must consider tbose Ihat are i!l_ the process of ma~l!riDg.

If be is to fully evaluate the state of the child's development, the-psychologist must

,"

I

'I

considc.r.. not.only the actual leve.l of <.lcyelopmem but the zone qf pr:oximal dc'Velop­II;~;'I. How can this he accomplished?--When we determine the level of actual development, we use tasks that require in­dependent resolution. These tasks function as indices of fully formed or fully m;l(uredfunctions. How, then, do we apply this new method? Assume that we have oeter­mined the mental age of two children CO be eight years. We do not stop with this how­ever. Rather, we attempt to delermine how each of these children will solve tasks thatwere meant for older children. We assist each child through demonstration, leadingqt.'E~li~~~ and by introducing the initiiil ekirlen~s of the ta~k.'s ~91uEQ.n. With this help-or collaboration from the adult, one of these chIldren solves problems characterIStIC ofa twelve year old, while the other solves problems only at a leve.ltypical of a nine ycarold. 111is difference hetween the chilo's mental ages, thiS difference between thechild's ac(~;Tleiie(oTdeveropmen'i"and 'the bel of performance'ili'<ii-l1e-'iidiieves inCOTlahora(iQ~l ;Tlil' t-he aeJuII, 'derines_the zone of proxiaial~~:-'.~.l.QPrn.~nl. In this exam­·p!C,tfie-zone can be expressed by the number "4" for one ~hilO and by lhe number "1"for the other. These children are not at the same level ot mental development. Thedifference between these two children reflected in our measurement of the zone ofproximal development is more significant than lheir similarity as reflected in their ac­tual development. R~! in<.lica.~.~J!!~~ fh.{k9.lJ~ ofprpximal deve/opm(Jn!, hp·r !rlore~cance or IIlC dYrll3.!!.~i£S of i'E!lIectua! d~e.!!?p:l1_enJ. anfl.for fltf1 suc~~~s. 9/1!!§tTJJCIIOIltl.!.~ctl~(lrreve!.9.f dev.~QP.!!'-(:.[It. . ...

To explain this, we cile the well known facl that WIth collabora\lon, dlreellon, orsome kind of help the child is always able to do more and solve more difficult (a~ks

that he C;ln independcnlly. Wllat we have here is only an example of this general rule.An explanation, however, must go further. It mUSt identify the causes that underliethis phenomenon. _I<ootccl in~l\.di.lio)1aLpsych~loh'Y!. a,s_ ,,:.el.l as in the everyday con­sciousness is a view of Imitation that assumes it is a purely mechanical activity. FromlhlSperS~-iglv.:e".~·-s9111tjo~Q-'tliai.ls uot reached independently is not considered an in·<fexorsymplom of the development of the child's intellect. It is assumed that the cbildCiii'ilmliale a~y{fl(ii·g. What I can do by imitation says nothi(l~ about my own mind. (tcannot be used in assessing clevelopmt;nl. 'J]1js_ ~~_wJs f~I.~~.: ... '\. .

It is well establishe<.l that the child can i!!.1jJ~!..C<..9Jl)y w.b.i!! lies wit~I~. !l)~ zone_o~ hiSown intellectu!D..QQ!~mLal IfI am not-iible to play chess, I wilT"not be able to playamatch even if a chess master shows me how. If I know arithmetic, but run into diffi­culty with the solution of a complex problem, a demonstration will immediately lead tomy own resolution of the problem. On the other hand, if I do not know higher math­ematics, a demonstration of the resolution of a differential equation will not move myown thoughl in thai direction by a single step. To imitate, there mUSI be some possi­bility of mov~_~~haLL:ando to what I canriOl:---------·-· ~.... ". - -. _. ....

"-lTiiSanows us to Introduce an addendum 10 what we said earlier concerning col­laborative work and imitation. We said that in collaboration the child can always domore than he can independently. We must add lhe stipulation that he cannol do in­finitely more. What coll~_b9IJ1.\j9}1.f.QD.!.Ij'-!.U_I~S t<?_~!l~_c!~ild~~ performa~e-is restrictedto limi15'wnich arc determined by. !..h~!?~_9( his development and his intellectual po·tenfial:' In collaboration, the-etiild turns out to be stronger und more able {ban in in­

-depen<ient work. He advances in terms of the level of intellectual difficulties he isable face. However, there always exists a definite, strictly lawful distanee that deter­mines the differential between his performance in independent and collaborativework.

Our research dcmonstrates that the child does not solve all unresolved problemswith the help of imilation. He advances only up to a cerlain limit, a limil which differs

210 Thinking and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts 211

for dlffercnt childrcn. As our example indicated, this ceiling may be very low for onechild and significamly higher for another. If an individual could imitate anything irre­spective of the SWle of hi> development, both these children would have solved all theproblems With eCJual facililY. Of course, this was not the case. In collaboralion, thechild solves problems lhal are proximal {O his level of development with relative ease.Further on, however, (he difficulty grows. Ultimately, problems bccome too difficultto rcsolve even in collaboration. The child's potential for moving from whal he can do10 what he can do only in collaboration is the most sensitive index of the dynamics ofdevelopment and the degree of success that will come to characterize the child's men­lid aClivlly.

Kohler cncountered this problem in his well known experiments on the chim­panzee where he asked whether animals have the ability lO imitate the intellectual ac­tions of other animals. Kohler considered the CJuestion of whether the rational, goal­oriented operations of thc apes are not simply resolutions of problems that they havelearned through imitation, resolutions completely inaccessible lO the animals them­selves. His experiments demonstrated that an animal's imitative potential is strictlylimited hy his intcllectual potentiul. In other words, the ape (Le., the chimpanzee) Canmcaningfully carry out through imitation only what he can carry out independently.Imitation does not move the chimpanzee further along in the domain of intellectualoperations. Of course, through training, the ape can learn to carry out much morecomplcx operatIons than would have heen accessible LO its own mind. Here, however,the operation is carried out automatically and mcchanically as a meaningless habit. Itdoes not conStitute a rational and meaningful solution of a problem. Comparativepsychology has established sevcral indices that allow us [0 distinguish intellectual,meaningful imitation from aUlOmatic copying. In the first case, the resolution of aproblem is learned suddenly -- once and forever. It does not require repetilion. Theerror curve falls steeply and .suddenly from one hundred percent to zero. Every indica­tion of an independent, intellectual solution is manifested. This solution is altained asa consequence of grasping the structure of the field, of grasping the relationshipsamong objects. With training, however, learning proceeds by trial and error. 111elearning curve represenllng mistaken solutions falls slowly and stcadily. Learning re­quires frequenr repetition. The lraming process manifests no meaningfulness and nounderstanding of structural relations. II is realized blindly and without structurc.

This fact is of fundamental significance for the psychology of instruction. It is sig­nificant that in none of the thrce theories of instrUCtion that we have reviewed in thischapler is any hmdnmental distinction made hetween the instruction of animals andthc imtrllclion of people. The same explanatory principle is applied to training andimtruclion. Even on the basis of what we hilve said here, however, it is clear that thereis n fundamental difference bctween these processes. Not even the most intelligentanimal can de\'elop his intelieCtllaJ capacities through imitation or instruclion. HeCilnll0{ learn anything tlJ~ll is fundamcntally new. TIe can learn only through training.

If we comiclcr II1,truclioll in this spccifically human sense, animals cannOI he il1­structul.

In contr"st, devclopment based on coIJahor;\tion and imitation is lhe source of allthc spccifically buman characteristics of consciousness that develop in thc child. De­velopment hased Oil inSll'Uclion is a fundamental facl. Therefore, a central feature forthc psychological study of instruction is the analysis of the child's potential to r<lisehimself to a higher intellectual level or development through collaboration, to movefrom whal he ha, to what he docs not have through inliwtion. This is the ~igl1ificance

of imtructlon for development. It is abo is the content of (he concept of the zone ofprOXimal dcvelopment. Ul1derstood in a hroad sense, imitation is the source of in-

struction's influel1ce on developmenl. The child's instruction in speech, and school in­struction generally, is largely a function of imitation. In school, the child receives in­struction not in what he can do independently but in what he cannot yet do. He rs­ceives in~truction in what is acc~ssihle to him in collaboration wilh, or under tllegwd­ance' or: a teacher. This is'a fundamental characteristic of instruction. 1l1erefore, thezone of proximal development -- which determines the domain of transitions that areacccssible to the child -- is a defining feature of the relationship hetween inStructionand developmcnt. , '

What lies in the zone of proximal development at one stage is realized aud movesto the.I.eye! of actual development at aSec6nd. Tn olher words, what the child' is ableto doin collaboration today he will be able to do independently tomorrow. Instructionand development seem to be related in the same way that the zone of proximal devel­opment and the level of actual developmeot are related. The only instruction which isuseful in childhood is lhat which moves ahead of development, that which leads il.However, it is only possible to teach a child when he is able to learn. Instruction ispossiQ]~ fH)ly ,where there is a potential for imitation. This means that instruction mustb'e--Oriented to the lower threshold of the developmental cycle which has alreauy oc­curred. Still, uevelopment depends not so much on matured as maturing functions,since it always hegins with what has not yet matured in {he child. The potentials forinstruction are determined by the zone of proximal development. Returning to omexample, we can say thaI the potentials for instruction will be different with these twochildren even though their mental ages are identical. Their potentials for instlUetionwill be different because the zones of their proximal development are so different. Asthe research cited above has shown, any subject of school instruction always builds ona foundation that has not yet fully matmed.

It could be argued that if written speech requires volition, abstraction, and otherfunctions that have not yet matured in the school child, we need to delay instlUctionuntil these functions begin to mature. Pr".ctical experience demonstrates, however,that instruction in writing is among the most important subjects in the child's earlyschool career and that it elicits the development of functions that have not yet ma­tured. Thus, when we say that instruction should rely on the zone of proximal devel­opment rather (han on mature functions, we are not prescrihing anything new for lheschool. We are simply freeing omselves from an old delusion that implies that devel­opment must complete liS cycles for instruction 1O move forward. This perspective re­quires a fundamental change in the kinds of pedagogical conclusions that should bedrawn from psychological research. Psychologists have focused on the question ofwhether a child i$ sufficiently mature for instruction in reading or arithmetic. Ofcourse, this question retains its validity. It is important to determine the lower thresh­old of instruction. The issue is not exhausted by this question however. It is equallyimportant to determine the upper threshold of instruction. Productive instruction canoccur only within the limits of these two thresholds. Only hetween these thresholds dowe find thc optimal period for instruction in a given subject. The teaciler Il1llSt orienthis work /l01 0/1 yesferday's development in the child but on tomorrow's. Only then willhe be able to use instruction to bring out those processes of development that now liein the zonc of proximal developmcnt.

It is well known thaI when the complex system dominated school instntetion it wassaid 10 be based on "pedagogical foundations." It was argued thaI this system corre­sponded 10 the characteristics of the child's thinking. The statement of the issue herewas false itl th;ll it was based on the assumption that instruction must he oriented onyesterday's d~velopmen{, on {he characteristics of the child's thinking that have al­ready m;llured. The complex system led to the reinforcement of that which the child

212 Thinking and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts 213

must leave behind with his arrival at school. The orientation was (owards the thinkingthaI the child is able to do independently. No consideration was given to the child'spotcntial to move from what he is ahle to do 10 what he is not. The slate of dcvelop­ment was evaluated In the tradition of the foolish gardener, the gardener who consid­ers only the fruit that has ripened. No consideration was given 10 the fact that instnlc­tion must C;lfIY development forward. No consideralion was given to the wne ofproAimal development. The orienl:l(ion was toward the path of least resistance, to­ward thc child's weakness rather than his slrength.

It is important [0 recognize that the forms of thinking which correspond to thecomplex systcm are lhosc of the child who comes to school with functions that ma­tured during thc preschool age. In introducing the complex system into thc school, weare introducing a syslem of instruction compatible with the inlellect of thepreschooler. For the first four years of school instruction, we are reinforcing theweakest aspects of the preschooler's thinking. -nlis system of instruction does not leadthe child's dcvelopment forward but rides its tail.

I laving concluded this account of our research, we can now attempt to outline lhepcrspective on the relationship between instruction and development that emergesfrom It.

We have scen lhat instruction and development do nOt coincide. TIley are twodifferent processcs with very cOlnplex interrelationships. !ns~:!:!£1i0I1.i.H2!.!tx....~~f!!1wilenII moves ahead 91 deve~opll1enl. "YJI~n it do~s, it impellso.r wakellf..{-l.whole Jiii[!lS or[zIJlCIIOt!.S Ihal ace /II a siage of!.r.!..QlurattOJ1 lying Itl II!e zont: of proximaLdev.e{QP1Uelll.1l1is is the major role of instruction in development. This is'what distinguishes lh~:­strllction of lhe child from tile training of animals. This is also what distinguishes in­strl]ction of thc child which is directed toward his full development from imtruction inspeCialized, technical skills such as typing or ridiog a bicycle. The formal aspect ofcach school subject is that in which lhe inlluence of instruction on development is rc­<'dlzed. Instruclion would be completely unnecessary if it merely utilized wbat had al­ready maturcd in the developmental process, if it were not itself a source of develop­ment.

1l1crefore, instruction is maximally productive only when it occurs at a certainpoint in the zone of proximal development. Many modern educators (i,e., Fortune,Monlessori, and olhers) refer to this as a sensitive period. The eminent biologist, deVries11., used the phrase "sensitive period" 10 designate a period of onlOgenetic devcl·opment he identificd in hb studics. During these periods, he found that the organismis particularly scnsitive [() particular types of influences. AI a critical point, the influ­ence may eilcli profound changes that have an impact on the whole of development.­At another point in the developmeutal process, these same conditions may have no in­Ouence 011 development or thcy may even have an effect that is lhe opposite of whalIhey would have had during the sensitive period. lllis concept of sensitive periodslargely coincides with we have In mind when we speak of oplimal periods for instruc­tion. There ;Ire, however, two differences between these concepts: (l)We have at­lcmpted to dctermlne the nature of these periods not ouly empirically but cxperimen­I,llly and thcoretically and have found the explanalion for scnsitivity to a specific typeor Illstructlon in the concept ot' tlie zone of proximal development (this has provided LIS

will1 the potc;nlial 10 Identify lhcse periods). (2) Montessori and others tend rely on adirect biofogicill analogy between lheir concepts of scnsitive periods; they tend 10equaIc the scmitlve period; identified by de Vries in his sludies of the lower animals,lnrJ thosc lh;\t wc find in complcx human devc!(,pmcntal processes such as those iu­volved in lite developlnent of written ;pcech.

In contrast, our rcsearch demonstrates that these sensitive periOdS are associated rwith the social processes involved in the development of the higher mental functions.These mental functions are an aspect of the child's cultural development and havetheir source iu collaboration and instruction. Montessori's findings are valid. Shedemonstrated, for example, that wilh instruction in writing involving children as youngas four-and-a-half and five years of age we find a fruitful, rich, and spontaneous usageofwrillen speech Ihat is not found when instruction begins later. Montessori refers tothc abundant, explosive display of written speech that is observed at (his age as"explosive writing." This is lhe basis for hcr conclusion thaI lhis is an optimal or sensi­tive period for writing instrllClion.

We lind similar situations with any subjecl of instruction that has a sensitive pe­riod. The critical question concerns the nalUre of these sensitive periods however.During a sensitive period, certai!, conditions n pa.rlicularly certain types of instructionn can !!1[]Qenct.: development. This is because the corresponding cycle 'of developmenti~ _~Ly,el.c0n:tp'l~t.e. \Vh.~n_ this cycle of ~evelopm~nt is complete, these same condi­lions may .l~ave no sign_ificanl effec( ori"Qeve]opment. For a given period to he sensi­tive. iq::~pecifjc conditions, the corresponding processes of development must not havebeen complet~d. This coincides with the empirical data found ill our research.

"When' we observe the child's development and instruction in school, il becomesapparent that each subject demands more than the child is capable of, leading the Ichil~_~~f)' 2~ltactivities thatTo'r'Eelj:[liiJQ'.Tise_ aqov~ _hin1~~If,. This is always the case\Y1T!L\:l~!J1Jh'y .. sfI1001 inslruct,i.Q_n. The child begins to learn 10 write when he does notyet have the mental functions that are required for written speech. II is for preciselythis reason that instruction in written speech calls these [unctions to life and leadstheir development. This is true of all productive instruction. The incompetent child ina group of competent children will be delayed in his development and in the relativesuccess of his mental activity. So will the competent child in a group of incompetentchildren. For one of these children the problem lies in the fact that instruction is LOOdifficult-- for the other in the fact that it is too easy, TIlese opposing conditions leadto the same result. In both cases, instruction occurs outside the zone of proximal de­velopment, below it in one case and above it in the other. It is as fruitless to teach thechild what he is not able to learn as it is to teach him what he can already do indcpen­dently.

We can identify characteristics of instruction and development that are unique tothe school age, since instruction and development do not begin when the child comesto school. Instruction occurs on all levels of the child's development. As lVe shall seein the following seclion, however, instruction takes on forms thaI are specific to eachage level. Fu rlher, at each of these levels, instruction has a uruqlle relalionship to de­velopment.

At this point, we will limit ourselvcs to a review of the general implications ofwhat we have said. In our discussion of written speech and grammar, we have seenthat there is a comlnon foundation to the mental aspect of instruclion in the hasieschool subjects_ All the major mental functions that actively participate in school in­struction are associated with tile important new formatious of this age, that is, withconscious awareness and volition, These are the features that disli nguish all thehigher menIal functions thaI develop during this period. Thus, the schOOl age is theoptimal period for instmcliou. II is a sensitive period for those subjects that dependon conscious awareness or volition in the mental functions. Consequcntly, instructionin lhese subjeCls provides the ideal conditions [or the development of the higher men­tal functions which are in the zone of proximal development during Ihis period. In­struction has a dcclsive inllllence on the course of devclopment because these func-

214 Thinking and Speecb 6. Development of SClen[ific Concepts 2J5

5

Figure 2 Curves of development for everyday and scientific concepls.

First, it might be argued lhat establishing causal dependencies in the domain of scien­lific concepls is easier for child because of his school knowledge; that is, it might beargued that hi; difficulty with similar problems based on everyday concepts is a ftlnc­lion of inadequate knowledge. This explanation must be rejected inlmediately. Re­search methods excluded any potential for influence from this factor. Piaget had se­lected materials thut excluded inadequacy of knowledge as a factor in the cbild's res­olutlon of the problem. There is no question that the objects and relationships in Pi­aget's experiments (and in our own) are familiar to the child. The task with which thechild is faced is that of completing phrases that are taken from his own everydayspeech. TIle phrases in the experiments have simply been broken off in the middleand therefore require supplementation. Similar phrases, that are properly con­structed, are encountered constantly in the child's spontancous speech. The inade­quacy of this explanation becomes particularly apparent when one considers that per­formance improves when scientific concepts are incorporated intn the task. The ehildperforms better on tasks based on scientific concepts (i.e., tasks that require the estab­lishment of causal dependencies between facts and concepts from the social sciences)thu.n on la'iks that require the establishment of simjlar relationships between conceptsand facts from his everyday experience. It seems unlikely that this is a function of thechild's familiarity with the material involved, that he is less familiar with falling off abicycle or the destruction of a ship than with class stnlggle, exploitation, or the ParisCommune. Clearly, the child has greater experience and knowledge of the objects andevents represented by everyday concepts.

To explain this phenomenon, we must clarify the natnre of the difficulty the childhas in finishing a phrase such as that mentioned above. There is only one answer (0

this question. This task requires the child to do with conscious awareness and volitionwhat he does spontaneously and without volition many times each day. The child usesthe conjunction "because" correctly. If a child of eight or nine years saw a bicyclist fallin lhe street, he would never say that the bicyclist fell and broke his leg because theytook him to lhe hospital. However, this is precisely the kind of thing that was said inthe experiments. We have discussed the differences between volitional and nonvoli­tional modes of carrying out all operation. The child who uses the conjunction"because" irreproachably in his spontaneous speech may still lack conscious awareuessof the concept. He uses this relationship in speech earlier than he acquires consciousawareness of it. The voluntary nse of structures that he has mastered in appropriatesituations of use is still inaccessible to him. The child lacks sometbing that is criticalfor the correct resolution of these problems; he lacks conscious awareness and volilionin the use of his concepts.

We must now ask what kinds of operations the problems which include materialsthat were taken from the social sciences demand from the child. Here. the child tendsto complete the phases in the following way: "In the USSR it is possible to have aplanned economy because there is no private property; all the land, factories, andpower stations are in the hands of the workers and peasants." Assuming this questionhas been addressed in the educational program, the child knows the appropriatecausal relationship. Of course, he also knows why lhe ship sinks and why the bicyclistfalls. What is it thaI he does when he answers this question taken from the social sci­ences?

We think that the operation that the school chjld carries out in solving this prob­lem can be explained in the following way. First. lhe operation has a hiswry. It wasnot constructed duriug the experiment. The experiment can be seen as a final stage ina long process that can only be understood in connection with those thaI precede it.TIle teacher, working with the school child on a given question, explains, informs, in-

EverydaycorH..epl~

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DeVelopmental Processes in SolVingProblems with Scientific and

"Everyday" ConceplsScnlence:s for comptetion SCnlcnces fo{ completIonwilh (he cOllJum::!ion with the conjunction"because" "although"/ lij j

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tions have nOt yet maW red at the beginning of the school age and because instmctionorganizes their further development and panially determines their fale.

It is imronant to stres;, however, that the same can be said of the development ofscicntific concepls. The basic characteristic of their development is that they havetheir source in school instnlction. Therefore, the gencral problem of instruction anddevelopment is fundamental 10 the analysis of the emergence and formation of scien­tific concepts.

We will begin with the analysis of a basic facl which has been established throughthe comparative study of the school child's scientific and everyday concepts. A naturalfirst step in any attempt 10 clarify the unique characteristics of scientific conceptswould be to compare them with the child's everyday concepts. In taking this approach,we take {he path from the known to the unknown. The child's everyday concepts havebeen extensively stl1clied. The desire to see how they compare with scientific conceptsis natural. To do this, we need to construct what are structurally identical experimen­tal tasks lhat can be based OIl either scientific or everyday concepts. As we antici­paled, this type of research leads to the finding tbat these two kinds of concepts do notmanifest identical levels of development. Depending on whether the operation is car·ried out on the basis of scientific or everyday concepts, the cbild will manifest differentcapacities to grasp relationships of causation and dependency or relationships of im­plicalion. Comparative analysis of scientifie aud everyday concepts within a single agegroup indicates [hat -- with an appropriate educational program -. the development ofscientific concepts outstrips that of spontaneous concepts. In scientific concepts, weencounter higher levels of thinking than in everyday concepts. In a task involving thecompletion of a sentence cut off at the word "because" or "although," the rate of sue·cess for scientific concepts is consistently higher than it is in tasks based on everydayeonccpts (Figure 2),

This finding requires clarification. How do we explain the increased levels of suc­cessful task performance characteristic of problems based on scientific concepts?

21h Thinking and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts 217

qui~cs, corrects, and ~()rces lh~ chi~d himself 10 explain. All this work on concepts, thecntlre process of their formntlOJl, IS worked OUI by the child in collaboration with theadll~ in instr~ction. N~~. wh~n ~he child solves a problem, what does it requires ofhll1l. It requires the ablllly 10 lmllale and solve the problem wilh the help of leachereven thougl we do not have an actllal situation of collaboration at this moment. The~'luation lies in the past. Here, the child must make independent use of the results ofthat earlier collaboration.

'nle fundam~nla~ difference bet~een the problem which involves everyday con­cepts and thaI which Il1volves sClenllflc concepts is that the child solves the latter withthe teachers help. When we say that the child acts on the basis of imitation, we do notmean that he looks another person in the eye and imitates him. 1f today I see some­thlI1g and tomorrow do it, I do il on the basis of i.JIli~a~iqn. Whel1lhe 'school -childsolves a problem at home on the hasls of a model that he has beeu shown in class heconlinues 10_ act in col/aborat.ion, though ~t the moment the teacher is not standingn.ear hIm. From a .psychologlcal perspective, the solution of Ihe second problem isSimilar 10 thiS solution of a probleln at home. It is a solution accomplished with the

11

teacher:s help. 'nlis help -- this aspect of collaboration -- is invisibly present. [I is con­tained In what looks from the outside like the child's indepcndent solution of (heproblem.

. V!e find, then, that t\t,ro fundamentally different operations are demanded of thechild In hiS pe~orm~nce on thes~ problems. In a problem involving everyday conceptshe must do wHh ~olJ~JOn somethlflg that he does with ease spontaneously. In a proh­lem involVIng SCientific concepts, he mUSI be able to do in collaboration with theteacher something that he has never done sponlaneously. This is the only explanalionof Ihe differences in the performance levels on these t\vo types of problems. We knowthat the child can d.o mo~e in collaboration than he can independently. If it is true thaIthe SO\1Itlon of SOCIal sCience problems is a coven fonn of collaboration, it becomesapparellt why successful performance on these problems outstrips performance onproblems that are based on everyday concepts.

. We .can" now dis:uss a second importan.t finding: TIle problems involving theconJu.ncll~n although produce an enllrely dlfferenl patlern of performance in chil­dren In tIllS same school grade. Here, the curves representing the successful resolutionof pr~blems based on scientific concepts and everyday concepts merge. This can beexpl~ll1ed by the fact tl.lat .the category of adversative relationships malures later in the~hlld s spol1laneous thlllkll1g than that of causal r~lati?nships. Spontaneous conceptsIn IlllS domain have not yet malllred enough for sCientific concepts to rise above them.As we have noted, one can gain conscious awareness only of what one has; one cansuborchnate only those funclions lhat are active. Since at lhis age the child hasworked out the spontaneous application of the concept "because," he can become con­SCiously aware of it and use it voluntarily in cbllaboration. However, if he has not mas­tercd the relationshlP.s expressed by the conjunction "although" in his spontaneousthinking, he cannot gain conscIous awareness of it in his scientific thinking. He cannotgalll COnsCIOUS awareness of what he does not have. He cannot master functions thatare absent.. In. ~~lis situation.. the curve representing successful solution of problemsbased on ~clcntdlc cOllceplswlH be as low as that representing everyday concepts.

A third Irnportam finding IS Ihal the curve representing correct performance ontasks jnv~lving everyday concepts rises rapidly and eventually approaches the levelreprcsentmg problems hased on scientific concepts. Ultimately, the wo curves merge.Evcryday concepts overtake scientific concepts, attaining the same level of develop­ment. 1lle possibility that the mastery of scientific concepts influences this develop­ment ill the child's spol1laneous conccpts is obvious. Everyday concepts are restruc-

lured under (he inlluence of the ch'ld's mastery of scientific coneepts. 111is becomesmore convincing when we realize that lhe process involved in the formation and de·velopmel1l of conccpts mUSt be structural in nature. This means that when the childmasters the structure that is associated with conscious awareness and mastery in nnedomain of concepts, his efforts will not have to he carried out anew with each of thespontaneous concepts thaI were formed prior to the development of this stnlcLUre.Rather, in accordance with basic structural laws, the struclure is transferred 10 theconcepts which developed earlier.

'nlis as,ertion is supported by a fonrth research finding: The relationship be­lween everyday and scientific concepts with wbich we are familiar from our dala oncausal relationships is found in the category of adversative relationships with fourthgrade children. There is a sharp difference between the curves representing suecessfulperformance on lhe rwo types of problems. Performance levels on problems based 011

scientific concepts again outstrip those associated with everyday concepls. Somewhatlater, we again find rapid improvement in the level of performance on problems basedon everyday concepts. This level quickly approaches that characteriStic of perfor­mance associated with scientific concepts. Again, the two curves ultimately fuse.ll1t1s, performance levels on tasks based on scientific and everyday concepts manifestthe same regtllarities and relationships when the operations involve the conjunction"althougb" as they did when the operations involved the conjunction "because." Thereis, however, a wo year delay. 'n1is supports our contention that tliese regularities -­though hased on Ihe description of particular concepts -- are general laws. They arenot dcpendent on the year in which they occur or the type of operations wilh whichthey are connected.

These findings seem to allow us to clarify the most important aspects of a ques­tion of great interesl to us, namely, the question of the relationship berween scielllificand everyday concepts in the first momcnts of the development of a given system ofknowledge. TIley allow us to clarify the key point in the development of the variouskinds of concepts with a certain degree of certainty. Relying on what we know aboulthe natures of these kinds of concepts, we can hypothetically represent the curve ofdevelopment of spontaneous and nonsponlaneous concepts by moving from this keypoint.

These findings lead to the conclusion that lire delle!opmelll of scientific and spon­taneous concepts take opposite paths. We can now answer the question we raised ear­lier concerning how concepts such as "brother" and "exploitation" develop by sayingthat they develop in reverse direclions.

1l1is is a key point of our hypothesis.The child gains conscious awareness of spontaneous concepts at a comparatively

late point in the developmental process. His abilities for the verbal formulation anddefinition of concepts and his volitional use of the concept in eStablishing complexlogical relationships wilh other concepts are not presem in the initial stages of the de­velopmental process. The child knows things. He has a concept of the object. Whatthe conccpt itself represents remains vague for the child however. He has a concept of I

the object and is consciously aware of the object that is represented in the concept.He is not, however, consciously aware of the concept itself. He does nOt have con­scious awareness of the acl of thought that allows him to represent the object. In con­trast, the developmenl of scientific concepts begins wilh that which remains most un·derdeveloped in the spontaneous concept over the whole of Ihe school age. It beginswith work on the concept itself. It begins with work on lhe concept's verbal definition,with opcrations lhat presuppose the nonspomaneous application of this concept.

21H Thinking and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts 219

Ilere we can see the child's uniClue lbough simplified understanding of serfdom. It ismorc a repre~enta{ion or image than a scientific concept in the true sense of the word.-fllC situation is completely different with a concept such as "brother." The child's in­c<lpacily to rise above the situational meaning of this word, his inability LO approachthe concept "brother" as <In abSl ract concept, and his incapacity to avoid logical con­tradictions wilile opcrating with It, arc the dangers present in the devclopment of ev­eryday concepts.

The developmcmal p,lths takcn by the child's spontaneous and scientific conceptscan be schematically represented ;IS two lines moving in opposite directions. One

Scientific concepts begin their life at a level that the development of the child'$spontaneous conccpts has not yet reached. Work on the new scientific concept in in­struction requires the very operations and relationships that are impossible for thechild of tllis age. (Piaget has shown thot even a concept such as "brothcr" manifests thislimitation up \0 the age of eleven or twelve years).

nle strengths and the weakncsses of everyday and scientific concepts differ. nlestrength of the school child's concept of "brother" is that it has undergone a long pathof development and that his concept exhausts the greater part of the empirical contentof the concep!. This is precise.ly the weakness of his scientific concept. The strength ofthe scientific concept (i.e., concepts such as "Archimedcs' law" or "exploitalion") alsoturns OUI to be the weakest aspect of the everyday concept. nle child has outstanding~J]owledge of what a brother is and this knowledge is saturated with experience.However, when he must solve an abstract problem such as those we find in Piagel'sexperiments (e.g., the problem about "the brother of a brother"), the child becomesconfused. He is powerless to operate with this eoncept in a nonconcrete situation.This was demonstrated clearly in Piaget's work.

When the child learns a scientific concept, he quickly begins to mastcr the opera­tions that are the fundamental weakness of the everyday concept. He easily definesthe concept, applies it in various logical operations, and identifies its relationships 10

other concepts. We find lhe weakness of the scientific concept where we fiud thestrength of the evcryday concept, that is, in its spontaneous usage, in its application tovarious concretc situations, in the relative richness of its empirical content, and in ilsconnections with personal experience. Analysis of the child's spontaneous concept in­dicates that he bas more conscious awareness of the object than of tbe concept itself.Analysis of his scientific concept indicates tbat he has more conscious awareness of theconcept than of lhe objcct thal is reprcsented by it. nlerefore, the threat to satisfac­tory concept development differs fundamentally for scientific aud everyday concepls.

Examples can easily be found that support this assertion. In answer to the ques­tion of what a rcvolution is, third grade sludents who had just covered the period from1905 to 1917 answered Ihat: "Revolution is where the oppressed class wages war withthe .oppressing class." It is called a civil war. The citizens of a single country wage waragalllst each other." TIle development of the child's consciousness is reflected in theseanswers. We find class criteria in them. However, tbe depth and fullness of the stu­dent's conscious awareness of this material is qualitatively different than that of adults.

nlis assertion can be clarified by lhe following example:

moves from above to below while the other rises from below to above. If we designateIhe earlier developing, simpler, and more elementary characteristics as lower and thelater developing, more complex characteristics (those connected with conscious~\wareness and volition) as higher, we can say that Ihe child's spontaneous concepts de­velop from below 10 above, froln tile more elemenlary and lower e/larae/enslies 10 tilehigher, while his scicllliflc concepts develop from abo~e 10 below, from tile more comple.x:and hig/lcr characlelir/ics ro Ihe m?re elementary. Tlus difference I~ the develop.ment. 01scientific and everyday concepts ts closely assOCIated With their different relationshIpsto thc ohject, an issue we discnssed earlier.

nle birth of [he spontaneous concept is usually a2sociated with the child's imme­diate encounler wilh things, things that are often explained by adulLs but are nonethe­less real things. Only through a long developmental process does the child attain con­scious awareness of thc object, of the concept itself, and the capacity to operate ab­stractly with the concept. In contrast, lhe birth of the scientific concept begins not :vithau immediate encounter with things but with a mediated relationship to the obJee!.With the spontaneous concept, the child moves from the thing to the concept. Withthe scientific concept, he is forced to follow the opposite path -- from the concept tothe thing. It is no surprise, then, that the strengtb of one type of concept is the weak­ness of the other. In his earliest schoollessoos, the child learns to establish logieal re­lationships belween couceplS. TIle movement of this coucept, is inward. It clears apath to the object and connects itself to the child's experience, absorbing it. Bothtypes of conccpts are located in one and the same child and at more or less the samelevel of development. In the thinking of the child, one cannot separate the conceptsIhat he acquires in scbool from those that be acquires at home. Nonetheless, lheseconcepts have entirely different histories. One concept reaches the level it has at­tained while having uudergone a certain portion of its development from above. TIleotller reaches this levet having completed the lower portion of its developmental path.

Thus, while scientific and everyday concepts move in opposite directions in devel·opment, these processes are internally and profoundly cOllnected willr one anorher. Thedevelopment of everyday concepts musl reach a certain level for the child to learn sci­entific concepts and gain conscious awareness of them. The child must reach aIhreshold in Ihe development of spontaneous concepts, a threshold beyond whtch con­scious awareness becomes possible.

nle child's concepLs of history, for example, begin tlleir development only whenhis everyday concept of tile past is sufficiently differeutiated, only when his life and tilelife of those near to him are placed iu the framework of an initial abstraction of the"before and now" in his consciousness.

However, as is indicated by the experiments discussed above, everyday conceptsare also dependent on scientific concepts. The scientific concept bas undergone thatpart of development which still faces the everyday concept. It is with the scientificconcept that a series of operations that are beyo~d the clllld wh~n h~ IS ope~all.~g wilhconcepts sueh as "brother" begin to emerge. ThIs cannot remHln without slg11lhcancefor the porlion of lhe developmental path that remains [or the everyday concept.Having already traveled the long path of development from below to abo~e, everydayconcepts havc blazed the trail for the continued downward growth of SCientifiC COll­

cepts; they have created the structures required for the emergence of the lower ormore elementary characteristics of the scientific concept. In the same way, havll1gCOveted a certain portion of the path from above to below, scientific concepts haveblazed lhe trail for the development of everyday concepts. llley have prepared theslnlctural ronn3tions necessary for thc mastery of the higher characteristics of theeveryday concept.

"Sor fs were peasanlS who were lhe properlY of lheJdodowncrs.""What was the life of (110 Idndowners like under serfdom?"-Very good. They were all rich. They had (en slOryhous""', many rooms, alld were all well-dressed. They badelectricity"

[SIu<lcni)

IAdI1h][StudeI1i)

220 Tilinking and Speech6, Development of Scientific Concepts 221

The scienlific concept grows downward through the everyday concept and the ev­erydJy concept move, upward through the scientific. In this asse:tion, we a.re only'1~t1ing our experimental findings in more generallerms, Let us review these !lndlngs,The everyday concept must reach a certain level of spontan~ous develo~ment for thesuperior scienllfic concept to emerge, As we have seen, thiS potentia) IS present forthe concept "because" by the second grade while for the concept "although" it onlyemerges in the fourth grade, Everyday concepts, however, move quickly along the up­per section of the path whicb was blazed by scienlific concepts. In this p.rocess, theyare restrnctured in accordance with the structures prepared by the sClenllflc concept.This is renecled in the sharp upward movement iu the curve representing everydayconcepts to the level of thal representing scientific concepts. . ,_

We can now stale our findings in more general terms. The strengtll of tile sClentljlcconcept lies in the higher characteristics Of COl/ceprs, in conscious awareness and volition.In contrast, this is the weakness of the child's everyday concept. TIle strength of tbeeveryday coneept lies in spontaueous, situationally meaningful, concrete applic,alio.ns,that is, in the sphere of experience and the empirical. The development of sClenllflcconcepts begins in the domain of conscious awareness and volition. It grows down­ward into the domain of the concrete, into the domain of personal experience. In con­trast, the development of spontaneous concepts begins in the domain of the concreteand empirical. It moves toward the higher characteristics of concepts, (oward con­scious awareness and volition. The link between these two lincs of development re­flects their true nature, This is the /ink of rhe lOne ofproximal and actual devefoplllent.

It is indisputable thaI. conscious awareness and the volitional use of concepts (i.e.,the characteristics of the school child's spontaneous concepts that remain underdevel­oped) lie entirely within the school child's zone of proximal development, Theycmerge or become actual in his collaboration with adults. This is why the develop­ment of scientific concepts presupposes a cerlain level in the development in spouta­neous concepts, in cOfillection with which conscious awareness and volitiou emerge inlhe zone of proximal development. Scientific concepts restructure and raise sponta­neous concepts to a higher level, forming their zone of proximal development. Whatthe child is able to do in collaboration IOday, he will be able to do indcpendently to­morrow.

Thus, the development of scientific concepts does not coincide with that of s~on­taneous concepts. Precisely because of this, there exist extremely complex ret~tJOn­

ships hetween them. If scientific concepts simply repeated the developmental historyof spontaneous concepts, these relationships would not be possible. The links betweenthe two processes and the tremendous influence they have on one another is possiblebecause their development takes such different paths,

If the development of scientific concept's repeated that of spontaneous concepts,the acquisition of a system of scientific concepts w~uld contribute onl! ~n increase orbroadening of the circle of concepts, only an enrichment of the child s vocabulary.However, our theory and research indicate that scientific concepts provide a segmenlof development which the child has not yet passed through; they indicate that the sci­entifiC concept moves ahead into a zone where the corresponding potentials. have not.yet matured in the child, ll1is allows us to begin to understand that IOstrucuon In SCt­entiflc concepls plays a decisive role in the child's mental development.

13efore we di,cuss the innuencc of scientific concepts on thc child's general men­w! development, we will recomider the analogy between this process and tllat oflearlllllg a foreign language. As this analogy indica~es, th: developmental path wehave outlined for ,cientific concepts is only a slllgie 11Islanllalion of a rnuch broadergroup of developmental proce~ses that have their ~ourcc in systematic instruction.

llle child learns a foreign language in school differently than he learn~ his nativelanguage. Hc does not begin learning his nativebnguage With t~le study o[ the ~Ipha­

bet, with reading and writing, with the COnSCIOUS and Intentional construcllon ofphrases, witli tbe definition of words, or with the stud~ of grammar. Generally, how­ever this is all characteristic of the child's first steps m learnlllg a foreign language.The' child learns his native language without conscious awareness or intention; helearns a foreign language with conscious awareness and intention. The developm~nt

of the native bnguage moves from below to above; the development of the foreignlanguage moves from above to below, With the native language, the lower, more el~­

mentary characteristics of speech arise first. Its more complex .forms devel?p later tnconnection with conscions awareness of its phonetic structure, ItS grammallcal forms,and its volilional use. With a foreign language. it is the higher, more complex charac­teristics of speech that develop first, those that are ass,ociated with conscious aware­ness and inlention. llie more elementary characteristics of speech, those assoeLatedwith the spontaneous and free nse of speech, development later. .

Thus, intellectualistic theories of speech development such as Stern's, theoneswhich assume that the development of speech begins with the mastery of languag<:principles or the relationship between sign and me~ning,. apply only t,o the learning offoreign languages. Further, the strength of the chrld s foreign l:wguage IS the wea!;:ness oJhis native language. Moreover, where tbe native language IS strong, the foreign l.an ..guage is weak. The child's use of the gramm~tical forms of hiS n,atlve language IS 1m ..peccable, He does not, however, have COnsCIOUS awareoess of hLs use o,f these forms.He declines and conjugates but is not consciously aware that he does thiS. He tS gen­erally not able to determine the gender, case, or grammatieal form .Iha.t he applies. e?r­rectly in a given phrase. In the foreigu language, however, the child IS able to dlslln­guish words of masculine and f~minine genders, .From t~e, ou.tset, he has conscIousawareness of the propcr decliuatlollS and grammatical modtflcatLOns.

The same is true of phonetics. The child's use of the auditory aspect of his nativelanguage is beyoud reproach, but he does nOl consider th~ kinds of sounds he is pro­nouncing. As a consequence, it is extremely difficult for hlln to sound out the word, topartition it into its component sounds. With, the foreign langu~ge! however, h~ do~s

this with ease. In his native language, his written speech lags slgmficantly behlOd hISverbal speech. In the foreign language, however, this is generally, not the case. In­deed, the child's wrilten language is often more advanced than hiS verbal language.Once again, the weaker aspects of the native language a.re the str?nger aspects of l~e

foreign and vice versa. The spontaneous use ?f phone,tlcs (what IS call~d pronuncia­tion) is a extremely difficult for the school child who 1S learnmg a foreign language,Free, lively, spontaneous speecb characterized by the rapId and correct applIcation ofgrammatical struclures is attained only with extreme difficulty and only nea,r the .end ofthe developmental process. The development of the native language begins WIth thefree and spontaneous use of speech and ends with conscious awareness and mastery ofthe specch forms, In contrast, the development of the foreign language begins withconscious awareness and volitional mastery of language and culminates in free, spon­taneous speech, The two developmental processes move in opposite directions.

As is lrue of the development of scientific and spontaneous concepts, how~ver,

there is a lIIurual dependence between thcse two paths of development. The conscIousand intentional leaming of a foreign language is obviously dependent on a certainlevel of dcvelopment in the native language, ,llte child alread~ possesses a system ofmeanings in the native language when he begins 10 learn a foreign language. ThiS sys­tem of meanings is transferred to the foreign language. Once again, however, the pro­cess of learning a foreign language clears the palh for the acquisition of higher forms

J f

222 Thinking and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepls 223

of the native language. Learning a foreign language allows the child to undersland hisnative language ,IS a single instantiation of a linguistic system. As a consequenee, Ihechild acquIres (J potenrml for generalizing (he pllellOmelia of Iris native tanguage and forgalillng conscIOUS awareness of his speech operations and mastering them. In thesame sen~e that. algebrn represents the generalization, conscious awareness, and mas­tery D.f arltl:l1lellc. operallons, the development of a foreign language represeOls all ab­straction 01 Iingulstle phenomena and lhe comciolts awareness of speech operations.It represents the tr.anslallon of speech operations to the higher plane of consciousawareness and vO[HlOnal speech. This is what Goethe meant when he said that he whodoes not know at least one other language does not fully know his Own.

. Our discussion of this a~lalogy was motivated by three considerations. First, thisdiSCUSSIon has helped US clallfy and support (he notion that the dynamics of the dcvel­opm~~t of what seem to be identical structures at different ages and under differentcond!llOIlS may -- Indeed must -- differ radically in functional-psychological terms. Inessence, there are only two P?ssibilities for explaining the relationship between thedevelopment ~)f verbal and Wf!lten s~eech, between native and foreign langnages, be­tween the logiC of a~uon and the logIC of thought, and between graphic logic and thelogiC of vcr?al thlOklng. TIlese two possihilities are mutually exclusive. TIle first typeof explanation relies on the law of dISplacement. Here it is assumed that processes ofdevelopment lhat have occurred at earlier stages are repealed or reproduced wilh (hedevelopmerll of more advanced functions; the basic difficulties encountered in earlierprocesses of develop~ent are manifested once again at the higher level. This ap­proach has been applted frequently by psychologists in resolving the problems men­tioned above. Recently, Plaget has renovated this approach and used it as his ace inthe hole. llle second type of explanation provides lhe basis for our hypothesis of Ihezone of prownal development. TIlls form of explanation is based on the notion IhalanalogOlls systems in higher and lower domains develop in contrasting directions. ThisIS the law?f lO(erconnectLons between higher aod lower systems in development. 1l1islaw was discovered, a~d has beeo supporte~, through our studies of the developmentof spootaneous and SCientIfiC concepts, native and foreign languages, and verbal andWl'ltten speech: La~er, we Will attempt to apply it to Piaget's analysis of the develop­ment of graphiC logiC and the logic of verbal thinking as well as to his theory of verbalsyncretism.

On this level, our experiment on the developmeot of scientific and spontaneousconcep.ts IS an "exp~rimentum crucis" in the full sense of the phrase. It permits a finalresolution of the dispute between these two mutually exclusive explanations. TwothlOgS .must be demonstrated. FIrst, we must show Ihar the learning of a scientijic con­cept differs from Ihe leammg ?f a everyday concepl in much the same way that foreignlanguage fear/ZllJg rn school differs from learning a native language. Second, we mustshow t!Jai relationship ~etween the development of the two types of concepts are nmell Ihesame as the relutlonslups between the processes ?f f~reigll alld native language develop­meTl/. It also Important for us to show that SCientifiC concepts are as inadequaLe insome contexts as everyday concepls are in scientific contexts, and that this pattern cor­responds With the fact that the strengths and weaknesses of native and foreign lan­guages are maOlfesled In different contexts.

The second reason we have used this analogy is thaI there is more than an acci­dental correspondence between lhese two developmental processes. Their similarity is~ot m.erely a formal one. TIlese two processes have a profound internal kinship whichkmshlp explalOS the remarkable correspondence between the dynamics of their dcvel­opment. If we focus on the menial nature of the development of these two processes,we filld that they represelll the development of two aspects of a single process, the de-

vetopmen( of two aspects of (he process of verbal thinking_ In foreign languagelearning, the external, sound, and phasal aspects of verbal lhinking are the mostprominent. In the developmenl of scientific concepts, the semantic aspects of this pro­cess come 10 the fore. To a limited extent, learning a foreign language also requiresmastering the semantic aspect of foreign speech, just as Ihe development of scienliriccOllcepls requires the maslery of the scientific language (i.e., the mastcry of scientificsymbnlism). This is particularly importam in learning terminoloh'Y and symbolic sy~;­

terns, as in arithmctic for example. The analogy we have developed should havc led usto expect this from the outset. However, tbe development of lhese two aspects ofspeech, the phasal and the semantic, do not simply parallel one another; each processhas its unique dynamics. Like any amllogy, ours has its limits. The learning of the for­eign and native language have certain simjlarities to Ihe development of scientific andeveryday concepts, but the two selS of processes also differ profolll1dly in many re­spects.

This leads dlreclly to Ihe third consideration that brought us to explore this anal­ogy. As is known, the learning of a foreign language in school presupposes a devel­oped system of meanings in the native language. In learning the foreign language, thechild does not develop the semantic aspect of speech anew. He does oot form newword meanings or learn new concepts of objecls. I-Ie learns new words which corre­spond point for point with the system of concepts that he bas already acquired. As aconsequence, an entirely new relationship of word to object emerges, a relationshipwhich is different from Lhat which we find in the native lilnguage. When the childlearns the foreign word, it is not related to the object in a direct or immediatc way.This relationship is mediated by the words of the native language. Our analogy re­mains in force here because this occurs in the development of scientific concepls aswell. The scientific concept is not related to its object directly. Once again, this rela­tionship is medi(Jled by existing concepts.

We can extcnd this analogy funher. The lOediating role played by the words ofthe native langJl,lge in establishing the relationship between the foreign word and theobject results in signijicant developments ill the semantic aspect of the native language.Because it can now be expressed in two different words from different languages, thtmeaning of the word or concept is torn from its immediate cOTillection with the:phonological form of the word in the native language. Word n'leaning is thus differen..liated from the sound aspect of speech and acquires a degree of independence. As aconsequence, the child gains conscious uwareness of the meaning as such. The media··lion of the relationship between the scientific concept and the Object by the everydayconcept has simtiar results. As we will see in more detail later, tlte everyday conceptacquires a whole series of new relationships with other concepts as it comes to stand be­tween the scief/lijic concept and its object. Its relationship with the object is also trans­formed in this process.

Problems arise, however, if we attempt to extend this analogy f1Jrther. In learninga foreign language, a system of developed meanings is given from the outset in the na­live language. TIlis existing system is a prerequisite for the development of the newsystem_ In the development of scientific concepts, on the other hand, the ~ysle/ll

emerges only wilh Ihe developmellt of the scientific concept and il is this new ~ystem thailransfomls the child's everyday concepts. This difference is more critical than the kin­ship between these processes because it identifies what distinguishes the developmentof scientific concepts from the development of other new forms of speech such as for­eign languages or writing. This system which emerges wilh the scientific concepl isfundamenlalto the entire hislory of the development of the child's real concepls. Ii is

224 Thinking and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts 225

a chapler of thaI hIstory that is Inaccessible to research hased on the analy~i5 of artifi·cially or experimentally formed concepts.

6

We turn now 10 the central prohlem of our research, the problem of system.There is no question that any COI~~~.g~~.e.r~~izat!?~ Up to this point, how­

ever, we have been dealing with separatc, isolated concepts. We must now ask whatkinds of re/aliorLf r!rere are belween cOllceprs. How is the individual concept -- thiS slllchthat we tear away from a living integral fabric -- intertwined and interwoven with thesystem of concepts present in the child? Only within ,such a syst~m can the conceptarise, live, and develop. 11le concept does nol emerge In the child s mllld like a pea tna sack. Concepts do nOI lie alongside one another or on top of one another with noconnections or relation~bips. If this were the case, thought operations requiring theco-relation of concepts would be impossible, as would the child's world view and theentire complex life of his thought. Moreover, without well-defined relationships t.oother concepls, the concept's exj~tence would be impossible. In contrast to what IS

taught by formal logic, the ~ssence of the concept or generalizatj0 !lJie_s_!10.lLn_ t~~J.rll.­

poverishment but in the enrichment of the real!ty tbat it represents, in the enrichmentof what is given in immediate sensual perception and contemplatlOn, However, thiSenrichment of tile immediale perceplion of reality by generalization can only occur Ifcomplex connections, dependencies, and relationships are estab!ished between theobjects that are represented in concepts and the rest of reality. By Its very nature, eachconcept presupposc~ the prc:senq: of <l certain system of cQ_ns~pts. Outside such a sys-tem, it cannot exist. .

111e study of concept systems at each stage of childhood shows that relationshipsof generality (i.e., differences and relationships of generality: for example, plant,tlower, and rose) are the most basic, natural, and common type of relationship amongmeanings or concepts, It is in this relationship that the nature of the concept is mostclearly reflected. Each concept is a generalization. Therefore, the relationships be­tween concepts are relariollShips ofgenerality. Tlle study of these relationsbips has longbeen among the central problems of logic and the logical aspect of tbis issue has beenadequately developed, The genetic and psychological problems associated with it havenot been adequately developed however. It is generally the logical relationship of thegeneral to the particular that has been studied. What needs to be studie? is the ge­netic and psychological relationships among these types of concepts. This opens uptile grandest and most complete problem of,our research,

In the development of concepts, the child does not follow the logical path fromthe more specific to the more general. The child learns the word "flower" e~rlier thanhe learns the word "rose"; he learns the more general before the more speCific, Whatare the laws that govern this movement of concepts from the general to the specificand from the specific to the general? What laws govern this movement which occursas concepts develop and function in the child's actual living thought? Until recently,this question has remaincd unanswered. In our research on lhe child's actual concepls,we have attempted [0 identify the most basic laws in this domain.

First of all, we were able to show that generaliry (i,e" the difference of generality)does nor coincide willi IIII! levels of slnlClriral generalizQ/ion that we identificd in our ex­perimental studies of concept formation (i.e., the levels associated with syncretic con­cepts, complexes. preconcepts, and tnle concepts),

First, concepls of different levels of generality are possible within any given struc­ture of generalization. For example, concepts with different levels of generality (e.g""flower" and "rose") may be present at the stage of complexes, It mllSt be stipulated, ofcourse, that each relationship of generality such as "flower-rose" will have a differentnature for each Slnlcture of generalization (for the struclures characteristic of com-plexcs and preconcepts for example), . , . ,.

Second, concepts with the same level of generality may be present Wlthln differentstructures of generalization. For example, lhe concept of "flower" may have a generalmeaning that allows it to represent all species of flowers whether the structure is thatof complexes or concepts, Of course, we must stipulate again that the identity of thisgenerality IS only a logical or object identity, not a psychological one. The relationshipof generality that links "flower" and "rose" will differ depending on whether the struc­ture is that characteristic of complexes or concepts, This relationship will be moreconcrete for the lWO ycar old, Here, it is as though the more general concept standsalongside the more specific and acts as a substitute for it. For the eight year old, oneconcept stands over the other; the more general concept includes the more specific.

Thus, there is no direct correspondence between relationships of generality andthe structure of generalizalion. The two are not entirely foreign to each other nor en­tirely unconnected wilh one another. There is a complex mutual dependen<.)' betweenthem. This dependen<.)' becomes accessible w research only when we recognize theabsence of any direct correspondence between them, since no sucll relationship wouldbe impossible if such a correspondence existed. CQ.D.£~R~~~~~~_~~<:J9_~!1~i~~.!.h..s~­

spect to generality may exist in different struclUres of...£~Q..eralizaHon, Similarly, COil­

cepts thaI differ in lheirgeneraiitYmayexlsi-wiillln-a~single structure of generalization.Nonetheless, for cach structure of generalization, there will be different relationshipsof generality. Tllis will be the case both when the concepts appear to be identical inlogical terms and when Ihey appear to be different.

The basic finding of our research is that relationships of generality be[Ween con­cepts are closely associated witb the structure of generalization (i.e" they are closelyassociated with the stages of concept development that we studied in our experimentalreseareh), Each slmclUre of generalization (i.e., syncrelic, complexes, preconcepts, andconcepts) corresponds willl a speCifiC syslem of genera/ily and specifiC types of relation­ships of generalily between general and specific concepts. Eaeh structure of generaliza­tion has a characteristic degree of unity, a characteristic degree of abstraetness or con­creteness, and characterislic thought operations associated with a given level of devel­opment of word meaning.

An example may help clarify this point. In our experiments, a child who rarelyspoke learned the meanings of five words (i.e., chair, table, cabinet, couch, bookcase)with no particular difficulty. He clearly would have been able to extend the series.However, he could nOllearn the word "furniture," Though the child could easily learnany word from Ihe series of subordinate concepts, lhis more general word was impos­sible for him. Learning the word "furnilure" represented something more than the ad­dition of a sixth word [0 the five that the child had already mastered. It representedthe mastery of the relationship of generality. 111e mastery of the word "furniture" rep­resented (he mastery of the child's first higher concept, a concept that would include aseries of more specific subordinate concepls. This meant Ihat the child would have tomaster a new type of relationship between concepts, a venical rather than horizontalrelationship,

111is child wa~ able to learn a new series of words (i.e., shin, cap, fur coat, boots,and pants) but not 10 go beyond this by learning the word "clothes," At a certain stageiii Ille developllleni of word meaning in Ihe c/lild, this kind of vertical movement ir1Volving

f I r

226 111inking and Speech o. Developmcnl of ScientifIC Concepts 227

I

these kinds of relt.lfiOll5hips of generality between concepts is generally inaccessible /0 thechild. Concepts lie in a single series that lacks hierarchical relationships. The rela­iionship of the,e concepts 10 thc object is immediate. They are difl"erentiated entirelyin terms of their image. The objects represcntcd in thern are differentiated in muchthe same way. This can be sccn in the child's autonomous speech, a transitional stageof speech dcvelopment between thc child's preintellectual babbling and the mastery ofadult language.

Wilh a concept system which has a structure where the only relationships possibleare those thai exist betwccn the objects that are retlected in the conceplS, thc child'sverbal thinking will clearly be govcrned by the logic of graphie thinking. Since the onlypossible relationships between these concepts are object relatiouships, it would bemore accurate to say thaI no verbal thinking is possible. At Ihis stage, verballhinkingis dcpendent on graphic object thinking. nlis clcarly identifiable structure of the con­cept system, and the limitations of the thought operations associatcd with it, allows usto isolate lliis as a speCial, pre-syncretic stage in the development of word meaning.This is why tlie appcarance of the first higher concept (e.g., a concept such as"furniwre" or "clothes" that subordinates a series of existing words) is such an impor­tant symptoJll of the development of the meaningful aspect of the child's speech. h isno kss important in this rc~pcct than the appearance of the first meaningful word.With subsequent stages of concept development, relationships of gencrality bcgin [0

be formed. With cach level of development, we find a unique system of relationships.111is is a gencrallaw. It provides the key 10 studying Ihe genetic and psychological

relationships between llie general and the specific in the child's concepts. For each>lage of generalization, thcre is a corresponding system of relationships and generality.Gcneral and specific concepts are ordered in a genetic series in correspondence withthis system. nlllS, in concept development, Ihe movement from the gencral to thespecific or from the spccific to the general is different for each stage in the develop­ment of meaning depending on the structure of generalization dominant at that stage.With the transition from one stage to another, there is a change in the system of gen­cralily and the genetic order of tlie development of higher and lower concepts.

With the higher stages in the development of word meaning -- the higher stages inthe development of relationships of generality -- a phenomenon of fundamental sig­nificancc for all our think.iug emerges. This phenomenon is defined by the law of con­cept equivalence. The law of concept equivalence says that any concept ca.n be repre·sorted through other cOIlCepIJ' ill WI illjin;le number of ways. This law requires some ex­planation.

Imagine that all concepts are distributed at certain longitudes like the points ofthe earth's surface between the North and'South Poles. Concepts are distributed be­tween poles ranging from an immediate, sensual, graphic grasping of tlie object to theultimate generalization (i.c., thc most ahstract concept). Tile IOl1gilude of a CO/Kepidesignates the place it occupies between thc poles of extremely graphic and cxtrcmelyabstract thought about an object. Concepts would then be differentiated in longitudi­nal terms depending on the degree 10 which the unity of concrete and abstracl is rep­resented in each concept. Imagine further that (hc globe sYlnbolizes for us all realitywhich is represented in concepts. We can then use Ihe concept's lal;lude to designatethe place it occupies among other canccpls of the same longitude -- concepts that cor­respond [0 other point:> of reality .. JUSt as the geographical latitude designates a pointon thc eanh's surface in the degrees of the eanh's parallels.

The conccpt's longitude reprc~ents the nllture of the act of thought itself; it repre­~enb the way that lhe ohject is grasped in the concept in terms of the way that the con­crcte and Ihe abstract arc united in it. nle concept's latitude rcprcsents ils relation-

.. '

,,,:.

ship to the object, the link between tbe concept and a particular point in reality. To­gether, its longitude and latitude represent both the act of (hought and the object withWllich it is associaled, that is, they represent the nature of the concept itself. Thus,they include all the relationships of gcnerality in the domain of a given concep\. Theyinclude relationships aloug the horizontal and along the vertical, that is, relationshipsto subordinated concepts and to higher and lower concepts in correspondence with aparticular stage of generality. We will refer to the concept's place in the syslem ofconcepts, as defined by its longitude and latitude, as its measure o/generalily.

The usc of Ihis metaphor requires one stipulation if a fundamental misunder­standing is to be avoided. In geography, the relationships between longitude and lati­tude are lineal. Two lines cross at only a single point, with the meridian and paralleldererrnin.ing their position. This langl.lage of lineal relationships is not adequate to ex­press the more complex relationships characteristic of the concept system. The COil­tenl of the concept that is higher in its longitnde is also broader. It iucorporales awhole section of Ihe lines of latitude of its subordinate concepts which require a wholeseries of points to designate it.

The measure of generality is the foundation for the relationship of the concept 10all other concepts. [t determines lhe potential for transitions from one eoncept to an­other and perrnjt~ the establishment of an infinite number of relationShips betweentheUl. 111is is (he fOllildalion of concept equivalence.

To clarify this idea, we will consider two extreme cases. On the one hand, wehave the child's autonomous speech. Here relationships of generality among conceptsare impossible. On the otller, we have the developed scientific concept -- the conceptof number as it develops through arithmetic instruction for example. rn the first case,concept equivalence is not possible. The concept cannot he expressed through otherconcepts. It c<ln be expressed only by itself. The concept of any number in any systemof calcu lation, on the olher hand, can be expressed in an infinite number of ways. Tilisreflects both the infinite nature of the nnmber series itself and the fact that all of anumber's possible relationships to other numbers are given in its concept. Thus, thenumber one can be expressed as 1,000,000 minus 999,999 or, more generally, as thedifference between any two adjacentllumbers. It can also be expressed as any numberdivided by itself or in an infinite number of other ways. This is a pure example of thelaw of concept equivalence.

In the child's autonomous speech, the concept does not have equivalents. This isbecause it does not have relationships of generality with other eoncepts. There are norelationships of longitude and latitude among them. There are no differing measuresof generality which allow movement from one concept to another.

The law of equivalence is unique for each stage in the development of generaliza­tion. Concepl equivalence is directly dependent on the relationships of generality be­tween concepls and, as we have seen, the later are different for each structure of gen­eralization. Eacll s(n~cture of generalization, tfret!, detemrines Ihe potential for conceplequivalel1ce wi/frin ils domain.

The me<L~ure of generality determines the way that any concept functions. Asphenomenological research shows, this is also true of the experience of concepts.When we name a particular concept (e.g., "mammal"), the nelworks of latitude andlongitude place us at a specific poine In Ollr thought, we have, in effect, occupied adefinite position. We have received an initial point of orientation and we experience areadine,s to move in any direction from this point. Any concept arising in isolation inconsciousness fDrms a group of predispositions toward particular movements ofthought. Thererore, a concept is represented in consciousness as a figme against theground that is provided by the relationships of gcnerality that correspond to it. From

22H TIlinking and Speech6. Development of Scientific Concepts n'l

this ground, we select the requircd path for tbe movement of thought. In functionalterms, Ihen, the measure of generality de/enllines the set of possible operaliom oftflOris"t available for a given concept. As is shown by research on children's conceptddinilions these definilions are the direct expression of the laws of concept eqUIva­lence gove'rning a given stage of the development of word meaning .. In precisel~ thesame way, ,lily opera lion (i.e., any attempt to compare or estabhsh Identlty or differ­ence bctween two IhOtlghts), judgment, or deduCllon presupposes a definlle slructuralmovement ,!long [he network of lines of longiludinal and relationships of latitude be·tween concepts.

Where there is a palhological disintegration of concepts, there is a disturbance in[he measurc of generalily and a disinlegration of the unit~ of abstrac~ and c?l1crete inword meaning. Concepts lose their mea£ure of generality and theIr relationship toOlher concepts (i.e., those that are higher, lower, and within their own series). Themovement of thought begins to occur in a broken, incorrect, and inconsistent line.Thought hecomes alogical and unrealistic lO the .extent that neilher Ihe act throughwhich the concept grasps the object nor lhe relatlonslup of the concepl to the obJeetany longer form a unily. .

As lhe relationships of generality change with each new structure of generahza­tion in the process of development, they elicit changes in all the operations of thinkingaccessible to the child. In particular, the long established independence of the wordfrom Ihe remembered thoLight increases wjth the development of relationships of gen­erality and concept equivalence. 'ne young child is completely reliant on tile literalexpression of the meaning that he learns. To a great extent, the school child already

1 reproduces complex m~aningful C?ntenl independently of the particula.r ver?al expres­sion where he learned II. As relallonslllps of generality develop, lhere IS an Increase IIIthe concepl's independence from the word. Meaning becomes i~cre~ingly i.ndepen­dent of the form in which it is expressed. In general terms, there IS an Il1creasIng free­dom of lile operations of meaning from their verbal expression.

We have long searched for a reliable way to identify the structures of generaliza­lion that characlerize the meanings of Ihe child's actual words, for a bridge thal wouldallow us to move from the study of experimental concepts to the analysis of actual con­cepts. Dy establishing this connection berween the ~·tmctr.:re of generaliuuion Cll1drefa­tiomhips of generality, we have found the key to thIS cfltlcal problem. By studyll1g aconcepl\ relationships of generality, by studying its measure of generality, we obl.ainthe most reliable index of the structure of generalization of actual concepts. Thcre IS ameaning which stands in definite relationships of generality with other mean.in~s. Ithas a specific measure of generality. 'nle nature of the concept (I.e., whether It IS syn­crelic, complexive, or preconceplual) is most, fully revealed in the concept's relation­ships to other concepls. Dy studying the child's actual concep~s (i.e., conc.epts suc~ as"bourgeois," "capitalisl," "landowner," or "kulak"), we can establish Ihe speCifIC relallon­ships of generality thai govern each slilge of developme.nt from syncrellc concepts tolrue concepts. This not only allows liS to rebutld the .bndge between the study of ex­perimental and actual concepls but allows us.to Jnvestl~~te eharactenstlcs of the struc,lure of generalizanon that cannot be sludled In an artlftc~al experiment. .

'ne most Ihat the artificial experiment can prOVide IS a general genetic scheme oflhe haslc stages of coneept development. The analysis of the child's actual conceptsmade il possible for us to study litlie known characteristics of syncrelic concepts, eom­plexes, and preconcepls; it Illade it possible to establish Ihat in each of Ihese spheres ofthinking lherc is a different relationship between the concept and the ~bJect. The ob­ject is also grasped by u different act of thought. .Thus, the two baSIC features Ihatcharacterize the concept manife,t their differences In lhe transItion from one stage 10

Ihe next. This implies thaI the nature of these concepts and all lheir characteristic;differ. A different relationship to the object implies differences in the connections andreialionships that <Ire possible among the objects in thought. A different act of grasp·ing the object In thought implies different connectIOns among t~lol1ghts, that.ls,. differ·ent kinds of mental operations. In each of these spheres, ':~ fwd chara.ctefl~t1cs thaIare a function of the nature of the concept: (1) there is a dllferent relaltonshlp to tIleobject and to the meaning of the word; (~) there are. different relationships of general·ity; ancl (3) there is a different set of possl~le operauons.

Ilowever this investigation of the chlld's actual concepts represents more lhan abridge betwe~n the study of experimental and actual word meaning, more th<ln a wayof identifying new characteristics of concepts. 11m research has fdled a fundame~tal

gap in previous research. As a consequence, it allowed us to reevaluate the theoreucalsignificance of that research. .

[n our earlier research the relationship of the word to the object was analyzedanew with each sl<lge in co~cept development (i.e., with the stages characterized bysyncretic concepts, complexes, and true concepts). We ignored tl~e f~ct that each newstage in tfle development of generalization. de{Jends .on the generalaa/lO.ns foun~ Irl thepreceding stages. A new slage of generalizallOn ans~s 011 the fOl~nd~tlon prov.lded bythe previous stages. It does not emerge from a dlr~cl g~nerallzalJ~n of objects bythought, but from the generalization that was generalized In the prevIOus strueture ofobjects. It ~ris~s_as a gene~;jJiz;l.tj9.n.9f generalizalions.!!o1..il~.!l-. !'.~Vi ITIO~~qf_g~l.l.e~al'

izing isoliite&Qbjects. TIle results of previous efforts of thought whICh are expressed In~izalions that dominate previons stages do ~~t come.t~ naught. They are in­

cluded in the new work of thought. They are prereqUIsites for Il.

As a consequence, Our earlier research could not establish either lhe self-move­ment inJlerenl in (he development of concepts or the internal connections among. thevarious stages of development. In retrospect, it is clear that v:e sh.ould be cntlclzedbeeause we provided for the self,development of concepts while Simultaneously de­riving each new srage from a new external cause. The fundamental. weakness of ourprevious research lies in the absence of any real self-devel?pment, III the absence ofany real connection between the stages of development. This sh~rtconu~g was ~ func­tion of the very nature of the experiment. It excluded any posslblhty of ldentlfyll1g theconneetions between the stages of concept development (I.e., of clarifying the natureof the transitions from one stage to the next) or of discovering the relationships ofgenerality. This is reflected the fact that: (1) the experimenta.1 method required thesubject to do away with the work he had done after e?ch Incorrect resolu.tlOn -­(destroying the previously formed generalization and bcglnlllng work anew With thegeneralization of distinct Objects) and; (2) isolated from the experimental context, theconcepts stood at the level of development characteristic of the child's autonomousspeech; that is, they could be co-related along the horizontal plan~ but they could notbe differentialed along Hnes of longilude. As a consequence, we Inherently saw thesestages as moving along on a single plane rather than as forming a spiral based on a se­ries of connected and ascending circles.

By studying the development of actual concepts, ho:-vever, we were immediatelyprovided wilh a possibility of filling this gap. An analySIS of the de~elopment of thepreschooler's general represenlations (which correspond to lhe experimental concep.tslhat we call complexes) indicated that general representations -- as a ~Igher stage Inthe development of word meaning -- emerge not from the generahzallon of Isolated

This idea i, illustrated by {he gradual developmenl of concepts of history from Ihe inilial gcncraliu·lions of "before" and 'now" and the gradual development of sociological concepls from the initialgeneralizalion, of "among them" and "among u,"

representations but frolll generalizcd perceptions. That is, they emerge from lhegeneralizalions lhat dominated the previous stage. This conclusion, whieh we wcreable to make on the basIs of our experimental research, solved tile whole problem. InOllr ~,[lldy of arithmetic and algebraic concepts, wc establishcd an analogous rel:ltion­ship between new generalizations and those that precede them. I-lere, in studying thetransition from lhe school child's preconcepts \t) the adolescent's concepts, we wereahle 10 establish what is in essence the sallle thing that we established in previous re­~earc1J on the transition frOIll generalized perception to general representations (i.e.,from syncretic conccplS to cOlliplexe~).

A new stage in the developlllelll of generalization is achieved only through the re­formation -- not the nullification -- of the previous stage. The new stage is achievedthrough the gencralization of lhe system of objects already generalized in lhe previoussiage, not through n new generalization of isolated ohjects. The transition from pre­concepts (e.g., the school child's arilhmetic concept) to true concepts (e.g., the adoles­cent's algebraic concept) occurs through the generalization of previously generalizedobjects.

Ti,e preconcept is an abslraction of thc number from the object and, based onthis, a generalization of the object's numerical characteristics. TIle concept is an ab­straction from thc number and, based on this, a generalization of the relationship~ be­tween numbers. The ab~truction and generalization of ones own thought differs fun­dameillally from lhe abstraction and generalization of things. It does not constitutefurther movcment in the same direcllon. It is oot the completion of the initial processof abstraclion and generalization. I I is lhe beginning of a new direction in the move­mClll of thOllght, a (ransilion to a new and higher plane of thought. The generalizationof ones own arithmetic operations and urithmetic thought is something different and;,omething more advunced than lhe geueralization of the numerical characteristics ofobjects that undcrlies the arithmetic concept. Nonetheless, the new concept or gener­alization ariscs on lhe foundation provided by the earlier one. This differenceemerges clearly in tIle fact that lhc growth of algebraic generalizations is accompanicdby a growth in the frecdom of operalions. 111e process involved in the liberation fromlinks wilh the numerical field occurs differently than the process involved in the libera­tion from links with the visnal field. The growth in freedom that occurs with Ihe emer­gence of the algebraic generalization is explained by the potenlial for reverse move­ment from the higher stage to the lower that is inhcrent in the higher generalization;tile lo ....er opera/ion is already viewed as a special case of the higher.

Arithmctic opcration;, are preserved even after algebra is learned. 11lis nalurallyleads to the queslion of what differentiates the arithmetic concept of the adolescentwho has mastered algebra from that of the school child who has not. Research indi­c,ltes that the adolescent views the arithmetic concept as a special case of the moregellcral algcbraic concept. Research also indicates that operations with the arithmeticconcept become freer. l3ecause or its independence from particular arithmetic expres­sions, it is applied in accordance wilh a more general formula.

With the young school child, the arithmetic concept is the final level. There isnothing heyond II. Therefore, movement within these concepts is always \inkedto thecondillons of a speCific arithmetic sitt\<ltiol\. The young school child cannot rise abovethis situation. 1lle adolescent can. TIle adolescent's superior ability in this respect isa function of his mastery of lhe highet' order algebraic concept. We obselved a Similarphenomenon in studies of the transitioll from the decimal system to othcr systcms ofnLlmeration. Thc child le,lrns {() act with the dccimal system before he becomes COll­,ciou~ly aware of it. At this stage, the child has not maslered the ~ystem; he is boundto it.

Conscious awarencss of the decimal system (i.e., the generalization lhat leads toan understanding of the decimal system as a particular kind of numerical system) lead~,

to a potentiu) for voluntary aClion in it or in any other numerical system. The. criteriaof consciou~ness lie~ in the potential for moving freely to anotber system. This repre·sent~ the generalization of the decimal system, the formation of a general coneept ofnumerical systems. Therefore, the transition 10 anothcr system is a direct index of thegeneralizalion of the decimal system. The child moves from the d~cimal. system t? abase five system differently before he has a general formula for dOIng lhls than atterhe has such a formula. 10 this way, research consistently iodicates the existenee ofconnections between higher and lower forms of generalization and of conneetions to

the object through these lower forms.We musl add that this research on the child's actual concepts led to the identifica·

tion of the final link in the chain of transitions from one stage to another which we areconccrned with here. Earlier, we spoke of the link between syncretic concepts andcomplexes in the transition from early childhood to the preschool age. We also dis..cussed the link betweeu preconcepts and concepts in the transition from the schoolchild to the adolescent. Our research on scientific and everyday concepts casts light ona middle link that we have been unable to make up to this point. As we shall see, itpermits IlS to idenlify the same type of depeoden~, in tbe transition from t~epreschooler's general representations to the school child s precoocepts. Thus, the I~­sue of the links aod transitions between the varions stages of concept development I:icompletely resolved. We have resolved the question of the self-movement of devel­oping concepts. lllis question was beyond our grasp in our earlier. research:

TIle study of the child's actual concepts, however, has contobuted stili more. flnot only allowed us to clarify the nature of inler-slage movements in concept develop­ment, but permitted us to address the issue of intra-stage movements y.e., tr.ansition~;

within a single stage). For example, it allowed us to study the tranSitions from onetype of complexivc generalization to another more advanced type. Evcn here, theprinciple of the generalization of generalizations remains in for~e, thou~h it is ex­pressed differently. With transilioos from one phase to the next within a SIngle stage,the relationship to the object characteristic of the previous phase is preserved. Theenlire system of relationships of gencrality is not radically reconstructed in the way it iswith lhe transition from one stage to the next. 10 the transition from one stage to an·other, there is a sharp restructuring of the relationship between the concept and theobjcct as well as a restructuring of the relationships of generality'between concepts.

lllese studies also led us to reconsider the issne of how the transilion from ont'.stage to another occurs in the development of meaniog. The first study led to the as..sUl1lption thaI the new slructure of generalization simply nullified or displ~ced 1I.la!

which preceded it. The previous work of thought was reduced to naught. ThIs Impliedthat the transition to a new stage requires the re-formation of all word meanings Ihatexisted with the previous structure. 1l1is, of course, would be a lruly Sisyphean labor!

This new research, however, indicates that this transition occurs in another way.TIle new ~tructure of generalization is first formed by the child on the basis of only afew concepls. 'Illese concepts are usually newly acqllired, through instruction for ex ..ample. When lhis ncw structure has been mastered, the child can reconstrllct or re ..form the structu re of all previously existing concepts on this foundation. The previollSlabor of lhouolll does not just drop away. The concept is not recrealed with each ncwstage, Each ~eaning is not itself required do all the wo.rk io~ol~ed in the rebu.ilding oflhe structure. As is (rue of all structural operattons In (hlnklng, new prinCiples aremastered on Ihe b3.!>is of severat concepts. These are then transferred thrOllgh str1.1C­tmallaws 10 the entire domain of concepts.

II

210 Thinking and Speech

~.'t

',0

• I

6. Development or Scientific Concepts 231

As we have seen, there are no relationships of generality among concepts in tilechild's autonomous speech (i.e., in the first stage of concept development). As a con­sequence, the only connections between concepts that are possible are those that canbe established in perceplion. At this stage, thinking as an activity independent of pcr­ccption is impossiblc. Thinking as such becomes possible only with the developmentof siructures of generalization and with the emergence of increasingly complex rela­tiOnships of generality among concepts. With the development of this structure ofgeneralization, there is also a gradual spreading of the connec.."tions and relationships

We have seen that Ihe ncw structure of generalization to which the child is ledthrough instruction creates the potential for his thought to move to new and higherplanes of logical operatioos. Sincc the existing concepts are drawn into these opera­tions of thinking, their structure is also changed.

finally, this investigation of the child's actual concepts helped us to resolve an<Iddilional significant (luestion lhat was posed for the theory of thinking long ago. Ithas been known since Ihe work of the Wurzburg schoollhat the connections which de­termine the movement and flow of concepts are nonassociative. For example, Buhlerdemonstrated that remembering a thought or reproducing it occurs in accordance wilhmeaningful con[1ections rather than in accordance with the laws of assoeiation. How­ever, we have still not resolved the question of how it is that connections determinethe now of thought. These connections have been described phenomenologically andextrapsychologically (e.g., as the connection of the goal and the means). In structuralpsychology, an attcmpt was made to define these cOl1Ilections structurally, bUI thisdefinition has two fundamental deficiencies:

I. Given this dcfinition, the connections of thinking are fully analogous 10 thoseof perception, memory, and all other functions. All are subordinated to struc­tural laws. 'Illere is nothing new, higher, or unique to the connections ofthinking when they are compared witb the cOl1Ilections of perception andmemory. The movement and coupling of concepts in thinking becomes in­comprehensible. We cannot say how they differ from the structural couplingcharacteristic of perception and meruory. Structural psychology repeats themistake made by associative psychology. It too begins with the identificationof the connections characteristic of perception, memory, and thinking. It failsto see what is specific to thinking. Traditional psychology began with tbe sametwo principles. With structural psychology, the principle of association ismerely replaced by the principle of structure. The mode of explanation re­mains the same. In this respect, structural psychology took a step backwardfrom the positions of the Wurzburg school. The Wurzburg school had estab­lished lhat the laws of thinking are not identical to those of memory, thatthinking is a special type of activity governed by unique laws. For structuralpsychology, thinking does not have its own special laws. Structural psychologyattempts to explain thinking on the basis of the same laws that govern the do­mains of perception and memory.

2. The reduction of the connections in thinking to structural connections andtheir identification with the cOl1Ilections characteristic of perception and mem­ory excludes any possibility for Ihe' development of thinking or for under­standing thinking as a higher and unique form of activity. This identification ofthe laws of thought with t}le laws of memory directly contradicts our fIndingsconcerning the emergence of new and higher types of conneetions betweenlhoughts with each ncw stage of concept development.

2JJ6. Development of Scientific Concepts

that form it. Finally, there is a transition to new and higher lypes of c~nnections andmovements among concepts. This fact cannot be ex~lal~ed on the baSIS of structuraltheory and its itself an adequate foundation for reJecung It. ... ., .

We must ask, Lhen, how these cOl1Ilections ~hat are speCIfic to L~mklng d.etermlnethe movement and coupling of concepts. Whi\US the nature of tbls ... connectlQn..Jn ac­cordance with meaning?" To answer these questions, we mu~t move. beyon(1 _th~ .studtof isolated concepts; we must move beyond the study of lhe smgle stitch to the \IlVCSll­gat ion of the fabric of thought. With this, il beeomes apparent that ~p~s ~r~ ~on-__

ted nol by associative threads or In accordance with the structural pnnclples ofnec . I' . I .'percelved or represented images ~u~ i~_~~co_~~_~nc.e_~.!.tl)J.Lel!:_~S~eI1l1\l._JlA!\l~(:, (/1 ac:. "cordance with reialiollShips ofgel1l;r[l7Lty. .' . .

The defillilion of concepts, their comparison and (hffere~l1atlon" the establish­ment of logical relationships among them _. all these opera liOns of thought occurthrough the lines that connect concepts by relationships of generality, through thc lInesthat determine Ihe potential paths of movement from one ~oncept to t~e next. The actof defining a concept is based on the law of concept eqUivalence whlch presupposesthe possibility of lhis kind of movement from one concept 1.0 another. In thls process,lhe longitude and latitude inherent in the concept to be defined .- the ~easure .of ge~-

ality that determines the act of thought contalOed 1Il the conccpt and ItS relatIOnship~~ the object -- is expressed through its conn~ction with. other concepts. In turn, Ihe.seconcepts have their own longitudes and I~tltudes, thel~ own measures of generailtythat contain acts of thought and relatIOnships to the object. Taken as a whole, how­ever, the longitude and latitude of these concepts ar~ the eqUivalent of thc conceptthat has been defined. The comparison or differenLJatlon of c~ncepts ~lso presupposestheir generalization and movement al~ng the lines represent~ng ~elatlO~shlps of gen­erality to a higher concept that subordinates the c~ncep~s whtch are be109 compared.In the same way, the establishment of logIcal relalJ~nslllps among ~oncepts whlch ~efind in the processes of judgment or deduction requIres move~ent 10 accordance WIththese relationships of generality along the horizontal and verllcal axes of the conccpt

system. ., h . dAn example of productive thinking may clarify Ih.ls pOInt. Wert elmer e~on-

strated that the common syllogism -- as represented 10 le~lbooks of fo~mal logIC ~­does not belong to the domain of productive thought.. W.llh the .syllo~lsm, we ulti­mately arrive at what was known from the outset. Nothlllg IS contallled In the conc~u­sion that was not contained in the premises. For the emergence of the truly pr~duct1Yeact for the emergence of thought that leads to something entirely new, that which con­stit'utes our analytic prohlem and is part of stnlcture "A" must u~expe.cted\y ~nterstructure "13". The de,truction of the structUre where the problematiC pOln.t onglOal~yemerged and the transfer of t~is point to a. e?mple~ely dlffe~e~,t ~tructure IS the baSICrequirement for productive thmking. How IS It pOSSIble that X (I.e.,', t\:; prob~em thatwas an element in structure "A") can simultaneously enler structure B , ObVlOusl~, It

becomes nccessary lO go beyond tbe limits of the existing Sll:uct.ural dependenClcs.The prOblematic point must be toro from the structure where Ilts given lIl.our thou.ght.It must then be included in the new struclure. Research mdlcates lhat thIS .IS real~zcdthrough movement along lhe lines of the relation.ships of ~enerality. It IS realizedthrough movemenl to a higher measure of genera.hty, t.o a hIgher ~oncept that standsabove the subordinate structures "A" and "B". It IS as If we are raised above conccpt"A" and then lowcred to concept "B", This unique mode of overco~i~g struclural ~c­pendencies is possible oruy as a consequence of the presence of defuute relatIOnshipsof generality among concepts.

',.

111inking and Speech232

234 TIlinking and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts 235

.We know, howeve~, lilat to each structure of generalizalion there corresponds aspeCifiC system of relatl?ns.hips of generality. This is because generalizalions of agiven structure must eXist III a given. system of relationships of generality. Conse­quently, to each S1rucHlre. of generallzatton, (Ilere corresponds a specific system ofloglca.1 operUlions of ll.llnklng Lilat are possible for that structure. This is among tilemost ImpOrtall.1 laws of .the psycholo~ of concepts. It indicates the unity of the Struc­ture and func!Lon of tlllllklng, lhe 1I1l1ty of (he coneept and (he opera lions which arepnssible for it.

7

We can now altempt t~ clarify the differences between scientific and everydayconcepts In Ilgllt of Our flllthngs. TI~Ujjiif~rence in the psychological nature oft~I'QJ;1E£l_~,col_15ep~i~_~ f\1n~~~fi~~ p~~_~~e or al&~enc~fa~~~~.J21.··CO[l:ceplS stand In a dIfferent relatlOfiSlllp to lhe obJecL when they exist outside a systemthan wh~n they enter one .. The relalionship of the word "nower" to the object is com­pletely dlffere~t for the child who .does not yet know the words rose, violet, or lily thanIt IS for the child who does. Outside a syslem, tile only possible connections betweenconcepts ,!rc Illose that exi~t between lhe objecls themselves, that is, empirical connee­!Lons. ThiS IS tbe source of the dominance of lhe logic of anion and of syncretic con­neC(IOns of IInpresslons In early childhood. Within a system, relationships betweenconceplS begIn 10 emerge .. TIlcse relationships mediate the concept's relationship tothe object through ItS relatIOnship to other concepts. A different relationship belweenthe concept and the obJecl develops. Supra-empirical connections betwee/l concepts be­come possible.

It could be demonstra.ted that all lhe characterislics of the child's thought identi­fied by Piaget, characteristics such as ~yncretbm, insensitivity to contradiclion and Ihetendency to place things alongside one anOLher, stem from the eXlrasyslemic ~ature ofIhe chrld's concepts. As we have seen, Piaget himself understands lhat the essentialdifference belween the child:s spontaneous concept aud tbe concept of the adult is thecx(r<lsysremlc nature ?f Ihe first and (he systemic nature of (he second. This is why Pi­nget argues that to discover the child's spontaneous concepts, his statements must befreed [rom any trace of a system. The principle on which Piaget bases this argument isvahd. Spontaneous cOllceP.ls areb~ nalure extrasystemic. TIle child, says Piaget, is notsystematic. I liS thoughl IS Illsufflclen(\y connected or deductive and the need to avoidcontradiction is generally absent. He lends 10 place judgments together in a seriesr<llher lhan synlheslZlng them: lIe i~ sat.isfied wit.h ~yncre[ic schemes instead of analy­SIS. In other word" the child s thoughl IS more stmilar 10 a collection of lines flowing(rom the aClion orday-dream than it is to the adult's thought (thought which is syslem­atlc and char;lctenze.d by conscious awareness). Thus, in Piagel's view, the absence ofa sy,tem IS an essential feature of the ,ponlaneous concept. Piaget, however, does notundersland that (he nonsy,temic nalure of thesc concepts is not simply one of m<lnyfealures of Ihe child's tllOught, bur tile roOI that gives rise (0 all the characLerisLics orthe child's thinking that Piaget idenllfies.

AII.thc.,e characteristics stem frolll the eXlr;l~yslemic nature of spontaneous con.cefl t, I:.ach of the,e charactensllcs n and the group ~s a whole .- can be explained in(erlll; of lhe relalionshlps of generality characteristic of the cOlllplexive system ofspolllalleou; concepts. The syslem of relationships of generality inherent in the com­plexlvc struclure of Ihe pre>ehooler's conceplS is Ihe key to the enlire phenomenon de­scrihcd <lI1U sllIdied by Piager.

<..

" .

,.. ,"

,;"

We have begun work on a sludy devoted to precisely this issue. In the presentcontext, however, we will address it only schematically. First, the inadequacy of tht;connectedness of the child's thought is a direct expression of an inadequate develop­ment of the relationships of generality among concepts. The inadequate nature of thechild's deductions, in particular, stems from an underdevelopment of the connection.samong concepts along lhe longitudinal axis representing the relationships of general­ity.

We can also show tbal the absence of need to avoid contradiction inherently ap­pears where individual concepts are not subordinated to a single superordinate con­cept. For contradiction to be sensed, the two contradictory judgments must be viewedas particular cases of a single, more general concept- A, we have seen, this type ofrelationship among concepts is absent where concepls are not included in some sys­tem. It is, indeed, impossible.

In Piaget's experiments, the child maintains that a head sinks because it is small atone point, while he c1<lims it sinks because it is large at another. If we consider whatoccurs in our OIVlI thinlUng when we sense a clear conlradiction between these twOjudgments, we can identify the source of the child's inability to sense this contradiction.The contradiction is nOLiced when the concepts expressed iu the eonlradictory judg·menls are included in lhe structure of a single superordinate concept. lL is at this pointthat we sense thaL we have expressed two contradictory judgments about one and thesame thing. Due LO the underdevelopment of the relationships of generality in thechild, however, the two concepts cannot possibly be unified within the single structureof a higher concept. The result is that the child expresses two mutually exclusivejudgments. From his perspective, however, these judgments relate to two differentthings. In the logic of the chifd's thoughl, the only relalionships among concepls thatare possible are those that exist among the objects themselves. Thus, the child's judg­ment is purely empirical in nature. TIlis logic of perception docs not know eontradic­tion. Within this framework, the child is expressing two equally correct judgments.They are contradiclory from the perspective of the adult but not from that of the child.The contradiction ex..ists for the logic of thought but not for the logic of perceplion.The child can support his stalements by citing obvious and irrefutahle observations. Inour own experiments, when we atlempted to make children aware of lhis conlradic­tion, they often responded by saying: "1 saw it myself." Of course, the child actually didsee the small bead sink alone poinl while he saw the large bead sink at another. Thethoughts th<l! underlie his judgments can be reduced 10 the following: hI saw lhat thesmall bead sank." "I saw that the large bead sank." The "because" that appears in tbechild's answer 10 lhe experimenter's queslion does not represent the establishment of acausal dependency. Such a causal dependency is incomprehensible (0 the child. It is,,"<lIher, relaled to the use of "because" that we encountered in our experiments hasedon (be phrases that required completion, a use of lhe term characterized by a lack ofconscious awareness or the capacity for volitional use.

The child's tendency to place concepts alongside one another is the inevitable ex­pression or the absence of the movement of thought belween concepts of higller andlower mea;ures of generality. Likewise, the child's syncretic schemes are a character­istic expressIOn of (he dominance of empirical connections and the logic of perceplionin his thinking. The child takes the connections betwecn his impressions for the con­nections between things.

QlIr research indicates that lhese phenomena are nOI characteristic of tIle child'sscientiric conccpts. I lis scienlifie concepts are nOI subordinated to these laws. Theyrestructure these phenomena. nle struclure of generalization governing e<lch stage ofconcept developmenl determines the corresponding system of relationships of gener-

236 Thinking and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts 237

\f

ality anlong concepts. As a consequence, it also tletermines the operations of thinkingthat are possible at a given stage. This discovery of the common source of all thecharacteristics of the child's thought described hy Piaget leads to a fundamental re­assessment of Pinget's explanation of them. TIle source of these characteristics is notthe egocentrism of the child's thought (i.e., what Piaget saw as a compromise betweenthe logic of dreams and the logic of action). 111eir source lies in the unique relation­ships of generality among concepts that are characteristic of thought that has been wo­ven from spontancous concepts. IL is not that the child's concepts stand further fromreal objecls than the adult's. It is not that they are saturated with an autonomousautistic thinking. The key is that they stand in a different relationship to the objectthan the adult's -- a closer and more immediate relationship.

As a consequence, tbe laws that govern this unique form of thought pertain onlyto the domain of spontaneous concepts. Evcn as they emerge, the scientific conceptsof one and the same child will have different characteristics, characteristics which bearwitness to their different natures. Arising from above, from the womb of other con­cepts, they are born through relationships of generality among concepts that are es-.tablished in the process of inSlruction. By their very nature, scientific concepts includesomething of these rel(ltionships, some aspect of a system of concepts. The formal dis­cipline of these scientific concepts is manifested in the complete restructuring of thechild's spontaneous conccpts. This is why the scientific concept is of such extraordi­nary importance for thc history of the child's mental development.

All this is contained in covert form within Piaget's own theory. By accepting thesepositions, we not only eliminate our confusion concerrring his findings but are able (0

provide an adequate explanation for them. As a consequence, Piaget's whole system isexploded from within by the great force of the data that are packed within it, by datawhich were bound by the chains of erroneous thought. As we have seen, Piaget citesClaparede's law of conscious awarcness. -nlis law says that the more spontaneous theuse of a cOllcept, the less it will be characterized by conscious awareness. Conse­quently, spontaneous concepts - because they are spontaneous -- will be characterizedby a lack of conscious awareuess and be unsuitable for voluntary use. Furthcr, wehave seen that the lack of conscious awareness meanS that generalization will also beabsent. fl means that the system of relationships of generality is underdeveloped.l1lUs. spoII(Qneiry and a lack of comcious awareness of concepts, spoiltaneiry and tlie ex­(rasyslcmic nature of concepts, (Ire Jyllollymous. Correspondingly, nonspontaneous sci­entific concepts, because of what makes [hem nonspontaneous, will be characterizcdfrom the outset by conscious awareness. From the outset, they will be characterized bythe presence of a system. Our entire dispute with Piaget On this issue can be reducedto a single questioIl: Do systemic concepts ,force out extrasystemic concepts, takingtheir place in accordance with the principle of substitution, or do they develop on the

jfoundation providetl by extra-systemic concepts by creating a definite system within

I the existing domain of concepls? 1Jl~~~~<:.m i~ .!l:~ c~L<!!~,~~,E20},~I.~~9_~!licl!,!~. whole hi~tory of concept development in the school age revolves. It IS the new forma­

tioll that arises in the child's thinking as pan of the deve]o'plnent of his scientific con-cepls. It raises his mental development to a higher stage.

The existence of this system that is inlroduced inlO the child's thinking w;th thedevelopment of scientific conceptS helps lO clarify the general theoretical issue of thenature of the relationships thilt exist between (he development of thinking and the ac­qlli~i(ion of knowledge (i.e., the relalion~hips that exist between instruction and devel­opmcnt). As we have said, Pingel divorces the two processes. In his view, the conceptsthat Ihe child learns in school have no significance for research on the child's thought.The characteristics of Ihe child's thought are lost in the characteristics of adult think-

ing with this concept. Therefore, Piaget pursues th~ study of thinking outsi.de the c~n­

text of instruction. He proceeds from the assumpllon that what develops H\ the childin the process of instruction is of no interest for those who are concerned with the de­velopment of the child's thought. For Piaget, instruction and development are In­

commensurahle processes. They are entirely independent and unrelated.Underlying this perspective is a rupture between the analysis of structure and

function in the study of lhonght which has a long history in psychology.In psychology, the earliest studies of thinking dealt only with ils con~ent. [twas

assumed that those who are more advanced in their mental development dIffered tromthose who are less advanced primarily in the quantity and quality of representationsand the number of connections among these representations. The operations involvedin thinking were assumed to be identical at .different developmental stage?,Thorndike's book on the measurement of intellect IS a recent attempt to defend tIllSthesis on a grand scale. 11\Orndike argues that the development of thinking consistsprimarily of the formation of new connections between isolated represe.ntations. He.assumes that a single, unbroken curve can be used to represent the entlr.e process ofmental development, a process that begins with the earthworm and culmmates In thethinking of the contemporary American student. There are few psychologists todaywho would want to defend such a thesis.

As is often the case, the reaction against this perspective led to an exaggeratedmovement in the other direction. It was argued that representations are merely tIlematerial of thought, that they play no decisive role in it. Research was focused on lheoperations of thinking -- 00 its functions. The process th~t occnrs in a man's mindwhen he thinks became the central concern. This perspective was taken to Its loglc.alextreme by the Wurzburg school with their conclusiOn that objects that represent ex­ternal reality (including the word) piay no role in thinking. From this perspective,thinkiog is a purely spiritual act which eonsists of a purely abstract, nonsensual grasp­ing of abstract relationships. On the basis of weir experimental work, researchers whohave pursued lhese ideas have proposed many practical ideas.. They have al~o en­riched our conception of the unique nature of intellectual operallons. The question ofhow reality is reflected or generalized in thinking, however, has simply bee~ ignor~d.

The one-sidedness and fruitlessness of this perspective has become mcreaslnglyapparent. There is now renewed ioterest in the material of thought (once the soleobject of investigation). )~s,.Q!:c9.ml?g clear that ~11<::ti9f!S depen? 00 the _stru~ture ofthat which is thought. Any act of wought must somehow establlsb a connectIOn be­tween-the'various aspects of reality which are represented in consciousness. The waythat this reality is represented in consciousness cannot be without some significance indetermining the operations of thinkiog that will be possible. In other words, the vari­ous functions of thinking are inevitably dependent on that which functions, is moved,and is the foundation of this process.

9tated_YC:~ ~~!.e simpJy~~flillili~o.lJ.h.inki~gQ~P~!1~~lJl.~m<:!U..!.~_gfthought itself. The characler of the operatIOns acceSSible for a given mtellect dependOiiC1ie struct1.lfe of the thoughl that functions. Piaget's work is an extreme expressionof lhis renewed interest in the structure of thought. Piaget, however, takes this interestin structure to an extreme. Like contemporary structural psychologists, he maintainsthat the functions them~elves do not chaoge in the course of development. It is thestructures that change. It is this change in the structure that leads to the acquisition ofnew cbaracteristics by the functions. This return to the analysis of the internal stru(;­ture of the child's thought, to the analysis of its conlent, is fundamental to Piaget'swork.

8

and developnlent _. or of spontancous and scientific concepts ~- future r~search will,how that it is simply a crude simplification of the real compleXIties of the SituatIon.

239

In light of what we have said, the comparativ~ study of everyday ilnd scientific(i.e., social science) concepts and their de~elopment Ln the s:hool age child carned outby Shif has a twofold significance. The fLrst and the most Im~edJale task of Ihls re­search was to provide an experunental assessment of our working hypotheSIS concern­ing the unique developmental path of the sci~ntifi~ concept. l.ts second task was to re­wive the more general problem of the relatIOnship between InstructIOn and develop­ment. We have Ollllincd how this research resolved these two. Issues. A more com­plete discussion can be found in the research report itself. [n thLs contex!, we w1l1 onlysay that these two issues have been saustaclOrLiy resolved on the expenmental planefor the first tjme in this research.

In dealing with these two issucs, however, we must raise two additional issues thatprovide thc neces~ary background for developing researc,h on the hrst two.

First we have the ISSUC of the nature of the child s spontaneous concepts, con­ceptS Iha; have until now been considered the only legitimate obje~t of psychologicalrcsearch on cOllcepts and their development. Second, we have the Issue of the schoolchild's general psychological developme~t, an i~sue that .m~st be resolved 111 somemanner before the narrower issues assoc!Uted With the chtld s concepts and their de­velopment can be investigated. Of course, these latter two isslles cannot ?ccupy thesame position in our research as the first two. ~ey are not at the center. of our atten­tioll. Therefore, our research provides only lIldlrect eYJdence relatll1g 1.0 them.Nonetheless, lhis evidence supports the relevant assumptions we have made In devel-oping our hypothesis. . ..

The most significant aspect of thiS research, however, IS that It leads us to a ~ew

statement of the problcm of concept development i~ the .school-al?e child .. It prOVidesa worklng hypothesis which explains the fJndl1l~s of preYJous studl~s and IS supportedby the findings of the prescnt study. Further, thIS research resultcd In t~e develop;nenl.of methods for studying the child's actual concepts. As a consequence, It reest?blLSheda bridge between the study of experimental concepts and the study o~ the chltd sactualliving concepts. Moreover, it opencd up a new and tremendously Important fleld ofinvestigation that is central to the whole history of the child's mental. deve~op~7nt. Itdemonstratcd how the development of scientific concepts can be studted SCientIfically.

'TIle practical significance of this research is that it created the potential for realpsychological analysis of issues associated. with instructi.on in the system of.sclentlflcconcepts (this analysis was consIstently gwded by the pnnclple and perspecttve of de­velopment). In this respect, this rcsearch is direct{y relevant ~~ educatton. Thoughcrudely and schematically, the findings of this study have clan.fled ~he ll~ture of theprocesses that occur in the head of the pupil in the course of socJaI science lnstnlcllon.

Wc see three fundamental limitations in this research. First, our analySIS focllsed011 the general feallli cs of the child's social science concepts, not on the features spe­Cific to them. TIlal is, in this research, social science concepts were treated more as aprototype for scientific conccpts generally than as ~ particular or unjq~e form o.f scien­tific concept. In these first research efforts In thiS new domain of II1vesttgatlon, wenecessarily began by differentiating scientific and everyday concepts. We attempted todiscover the uniquc charactcristics of scienti[ic concep.ts by studying a smgle fo~m o~scientific concept (I.e., the social science concepl). Unttl we had established the hne Ol

6. Development of Scicntific Concepts

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However, even Pinget docs nOI rcsolve the basic problem, since he fails to elimi­nate the rupture between ~lrl1ctUre ;Lnd function in thought. This is why he divorcesinslruclion from development. When either the structural or the functional aspect ofthought is excluded from analysis in favor of the other, psychological research on theproblem of school instruction is no longer possible. If it is assumed that knowledgeand thinking are incommensurable, any attempt to find a link between instruction anddevelopment will be doomed to failure. In cOlltrast, if we attempt to unite the struc­tural and funcHona! aspects in the study of thinking, that is, if we begin wilh the ideathat what functionS inOuenccs the process of Functioning, the problem not only bc­comes accessible but is solved.

Sinc!:_t~~ ~ne'!.!1.~ng of a word belongs ~o a certain typ~of s~nlc.t~~~,_~~~~erta~nrange of operations will be j)oss!ble_ ~it)lin \pis Wucture. A different range of opera­tions requires adifferent slnlcrure. In the development of thinking we must deal withseveral very complex internal processes thaI change the internal structure of the fabricof thought. TIlere are tIVO aspects thaI we will always encounter in the concrete studyof thinking. Both are of fundamemal imporlance.

The first is the growlil and development of the child's concepts, the developmentof word meaning ill particular. The meaning of the word is a generalization. Theunique slructnre of these generaliziltion~ represents a unique mode of reOecting real­ity in thought. Dlis alrcady implies that there will be dj[ferent relationships of gener­ality among concepts. Finally, different relationships of generality detennine the dif­ferent types of operations lhal are possible for a given form of thinking. TIle modeand character of hillclioning is determincd by the smlcture of that which functions.

~ This is the second critical aspect of any rcsearch on thinking. These two aspects of theproblem are internally connected with one another. Where one is excluded in favor ofIhe other, this is done to the detriment of the investigation as a whole.

Unifying both these aspeclS in a single investigation makes it possihle to see con­nection, dcpendence, and unity where an exclusive, one-sidcd study sees metaphysicalcOnlradiction, antagonism, and pennanent coni1ict, or (in the best case) a possibilityfor compromise between two incommensurable extremes. Our research indicates thatspontaneous and scientific concepts have complex internal connections. In fact, if wefully extend this line of analysis, we find that we will at some point be able to studyboth spontaneous and scientific concepts within a single research u-amcwork. Instruc­:!.0n does not beg!nJH.~chQ9J.J.~~s.Jlrese!!Lin.jh.e_pr.esctJQPLilge as ~ell. We wo~ld n.Q:ticipate that future res.~arch will show th~_ili<.<_s:hild'~.spontaueous .concepts._J\r~!ill:

proclllcC6rQf~school fornl~ Qf ins(rl;!~ililn":-jYSJl!.s scientific cQf}~~p~~.r~tJI~.Qi..~<!~t.2if()rmaUn~tru.£.li9n in scllool. We know thaI the relationship betwcen instruction anddevelopment differs wilh each developmental st<lge. With each stage, the character ofdevelopment changcs and lhe organization of inSlrtlclion takes on a new form. Evenmore significant, howcver, is the fact that the relationship between instruction and de­velopment changes with each st:lge. We have developed this idea in more detail else­whcre. In this conlcxl, we will merely assert that ftJture researchers must remcmberthat the uniC]ue nature of the chdd'~ spontaneous concept; is entirely dependent on therelationship between instruction and development in Ihe preschool age. We will referto this as a transitional spontaneolls-reactive form of instmction sincc it conStilute~ abridge between the sponlancous instruction characteri~tic of early childhood and thereactive instruction common to the school age.

We will not ~I'eculatc funher on the findings of this future research. We havemade only the first ~tep In this new direCtion. While this new approach may scem tonecdlessly complicate what sometimes seems w he the simple questions of instruction

Thinking and Spcech

2·HJ TIlinking and Speech 6. Development of Scientific Concepts 241

demar-calion between scientific and everyday concepts, the differences between thev;\rio\Js types of scienLific concepLs (e.g., arithmetic, natural science, and social scienceconcepts) could not become the fOCll.S of our work. This is inherent in the logic of sci­entific re~earch. We must rlf~tldenllfy the general features of a given domain of phe­nomcna. Only Lhen can beglll to look at the differences which exist within each do­main.. This explains why the concepts analyzed in this research are not the system of ba-

SIC, core concepts that form the foundation of the social sciences, but several individ­ual concepts thaI are not directly connected with one another. TIJese concepts wereselected HI a SImple empmcal manner from the material that constitutes the eduea­tional program. TIlis also explains .why this research tells us more about the generalnatu re of the development of sClenllflc concepts than about the specific characteristicsof social science.concepts. Finally, this explains why these social science eoncepts werenOI compared wHh everyday concepts taken from comparable domains of social life.

'ne second obvious limitation of this work is that it is too general and insuffi­cic~ltly differ:entiated in its approach (0 concept structure, the relationships of general­ity Inherent In a given slf1lcture, and the functions that determine a particular strlJctnreorparticular relationships of generality. As we have seen, the first major limitation ofthiS research made It ImpOSSible to address the internal connections in the system ofSOCial s~lence concepts, although Ihis is a fundamental issue concerning the develop­mcnt of the concept system...The second major limitation of this research had equallyseTlO\lS consequences. SpeCifically, we were not able to adequately develop the entire

~ problem of the concept system,. thaL is, the problem of the relationships of generality.'" A:; we have seen, Ihls pro?lem IS fundamental Lo child development during the school

years. Further, ItS resolution is baSIC to the construction of a bridge between the studyof ~xperimental concepts (with 'th?ir structure) and the study of actual concepts (withtl.1CJf unJly of stru~ture and fun.etlon of generalization of thought operations). Thissllnpilficallon was llltroduced WIth our statement of the research problem. We wereforced to frame the problem .more narrowly than we would have preferred. The result~as what, un~er other.condltlons, would have been an unacceptable oversimplificationI~ our analySIS of t~e Intellectual ~perations that were considered in the experiments.For example, W? .dld not dIfferentiate among various types of causal relationships oramong the emplflcal, psychological, and logical meanings of the word 'because." Pi­ageL'S work was much better than our own in this respect. One consequence of thiswas that phases of development witbin the school age could not be identified. Weconscious~y sa~rificed our capacity to make these distinctions in order to gain precisionand certa~nty III our"atLempt to answer the more basic issue, the issue of the uniquecharacteflsllcs of the dcvelopment of scientific concepts.

Finally, the third deficiency of this research lies in its inadequate experimentaldevelopment of the two issues mentioned above, that is, the issue of the nature of ev­eryday concepts and the issue of the general structure of psychological development inthe ~chool-age child. The issue of the relationship between the structure of the child'slhl~kjng (as described by Pia~c() and the hasic features of everyday concepts (i.e.,their exlrasystemlc and nonvolttional nature) and the issue of the development of con­SCIOUS awareness and volition with the enlerging system of concepts is fundamental tothe gcneral problem of the school child's mental development. Neilher of thesejlroblems has be resolved experimentally. They have nOI cven been Slated in a mannerIhat will allow Ihem LO be subJectcd to experimenlal resolution. A separate study isneedcd for the full development of these Issues. Consequently, our critique of Piagel'sbaSIC pOSH lOllS has lnadequale experimental suppon.

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We have outlined these limitations in our work because they allow us to point tothe new lines of research that emerge beyond the final pages of our reports. In thisway, we also identify this work as a firsl, modest effon in a new and extremely fruitfuldomain of psychological research.

We would also like to acknowledge that this working hypothesis and experimentalresearch emerged somewhat differemly in the research process than they are pre­sented here. The dynamic process of research is always different from the way it is de­scribed and formulated in the scientific literature. Our working hypothesis was notfully constructed before we began our experimental research. Research never beginswith a fully developed hypothesis. In Levine's words, the hypothesis and the experi­ment are two poles of a single dynamic whole. They are constnlcted, develop, andgrow as a single unit. They fertilize one another and move one another forward.

In our view, among tbe most important indices of the plausibiliry and fnJitfulnessof our hypothesis is the faellhat the experimental research and theoretical hypothesis-­(hough developed simultaneously -- led not only to eonsonant bUL to fully unifiedfindings. They provided an illustration of the central point -- the main thought -- ofour entire work. They illustrate (he notion that the development of the correspondingconcept is not completed but only beginning at the moment a new word is learned.The new word is not the culmination but the beginning of the developmenL of a con·cept. TIle gradual, internal development of the word's meaning leads to the matura­lion of the word itself. I-le:_e..'. a:'_ ~!Y·"ihue4_t.!&~ey.e1opme.!!U!Lthk .D1~~nj~,gf.!J.L.!!:~:pect of s~<::b turnJ?9ut 10. be Uieliasic.and-iJecisive processinJhe development Qf .thechlrdTThi.!!~l!J.R..ll.nd.speech. While it has usually been assumed that the concept isready when the word is ready, Tolstoy correctly states that "the word is almost alwaysready when the concept is."

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