Enjoyment

Richard Warner, Sean Stidd, and Steven Wagner

Enjoyment is an intellectual height philosophers have failed to scale.

The path is plain. We must account for two facts: we feel enjoyment, and we

appeal to it in justifying and explaining action. The problem is that

philosophers routinely give pride of place to one fact while regulating the

other to a secondary role, if they give it any significant role at all. This is

unfortunate and surprising. It is unfortunate that we lack an adequate

account of a concept that plays a central role in evaluation and practical

reasoning. It is surprising that a central concept should go for so long so

inadequately analyzed. We seek to remedy this lack.

Our central idea is that enjoyment consists in a causal harmony: an

activity or experience causes you desire it and simultaneously causes you to

believe that that desire is satisfied.1 To capture the feeling of enjoyment, we

require that the desire be felt and the belief, occurrent. We address the

justificatory/explanatory aspect by noting that the belief/desire pair is typically

(but importantly not always) a reason to act in ways that ensure the existence

or continuance of the enjoyed experience or activity.

We construct our account by completing the following biconditional:

x enjoys φ if and only if ... ,

where φ is an individual, non-repeatable experience or activity. Our talk of

experiences and activities is just a convenient way to describe the range of

1 A similar idea appears in Kant: “The consciousness of the causality of a representation in respect of the state of the subject as one tending to preserve a continuance of that state, may here be said to denote in a general way what is called pleasure.” Critique of Judgement, James Creed Meredith translation, Oxford University Press, 1952.

Enjoyment

items that is our primary concern. We merely have in mind the rough and

ready distinction enshrined in ordinary talk and thought. Even so, the

restriction of values of ‘φ’ to experiences and activities may still seem

problematic since we obviously enjoy things that are not experiences and

activities: wine and works of art, for example. But, of course, you can enjoy

wine only if you taste it, and the painting, only if you look at it. In general,

where y is something other than an experience or activity, you enjoy y if and

only if you enjoy φ, where φ is a suitable experience or activity involving y.

Desire, Belief, and Quantification

To state our account, we need to quantifying over individuals and

properties in desire and belief contexts. To this end, we adopt the standard

Quinean convention. Where ‘[’ and ‘]’ are the left and right corner quotes, a

singular term [t] may be substituted salva veritate for a term [t'] in the

context [ ... desires (believes), of t, that . . .] given the true identity [t = t’].

We need one further refinement. Imagine you are enjoying the experience of

tasting bittersweet chocolate. The bitter sweetness pervades a gustatory

field that captures your attention, and it is this bitter sweetness you desire.

We will express this by saying that you desire, of the experience, under the

feature bittersweet, that it should occur. A similar point holds for activities.

We adopt the same conventions for belief for the same reason. When

one of believes that a particular ongoing experience or activity realizes a

certain array of features, we will say that one believes, of the experience or

activity, under that array, that it is occurring.

2

Enjoyment

Desire and the Need for More

We take it for granted that you enjoy φ only if you desire to have or do

φ.2 We understand ‘desire’ in the broadest possible sense to include such

diverse sources of motivation as values, ideals, needs, commitments,

personal loyalties, and patterns of emotional reaction.3

It is clearly not a sufficient condition for enjoying φ that you desire to φ.

Suppose you desire to undergo dental treatment. In our canonical form: you

desire, of your current experience, under the feature needed dental

2 For discussion see, Richard Warner, Enjoyment,” Philosophical Review, 1980; J.C.B., Gosling, Pleasure and Desire: The Case for Hedonism Reviewed, Oxford University Press, 1969; Timothy Schroeder, “Pleasure, Displeasure and Representation,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31, 4:507-30 (2001). Compare Leonard D. Katz, “Hedonic arousal, memory and motivation,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5, 1:60 (1982) (arguing that desire is a contingent result of the experience of pleasure).3 The desire to φ need not exist prior to one’s enjoying φ. We conceive of a desire as a state that not only causes one to seek what one lacks, but to persist once one finds it. This will seem counterintuitive to those who see desire as related to a "perceived lack," but it should cause no problems to those who think of desires as states that move us to action. See, for example, Brian O'Shaughnessy, The Will (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 2, p. 295f.: "A brief word on desire. When action occurs, it is in the final analysis this phenomenon that underlies all of the workings of the act generative mental machinery." Thus desire is what explains my acting so as to maintain ongoing experiences and activities whose occurrence I want, even when I know such experiences are occurring (compare quotes from Hobbes below). O'Shaughnessy characterizes desire as a "striving towards an act of fulfillment" (2, p. 296). In this, he agrees with Aristotle; the root meaning of Aristotle's most general word for desire-'orexis'-is "a reaching out after." Plato is one source of the "perceived lack" view (see Symposium, for example). This view is indefensible as a general characterization of desire. The problem is revealed by Hobbes. In Leviathan, Hobbes characterizes desire as an "endeavour . . . toward something which causes it," but he restricts the use of 'desire' to cases in which the object of desire is absent. However, he then notes: "that which men desire, they are also said to LOVE: and to HATE those things for which they have aversion. So that desire and love are the same thing; save that by desire, we always signify the absence of the object; by love most commonly the presence of the same. So also by aversion we signify the absence; and by hate, the presence of the object" (Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, ed. Sir William Molesworth [London: John Bohn, 1939]). Surely, Hobbes is right. If desire requires the absence of the object, we need a word for that attitude that is just like desire except that its object is present-the attitude that explains why one would resist removal of the object. Remove the object and this attitude is 'desire'. But then why not just say that 'love' and 'desire' are just the same state-whether the object is present or absent? Or at least say that 'love' and 'desire' are instances of some single generic desire-state? As Hobbes says, "love and desire are the same thing."

3

Enjoyment

treatment, that it should occur. However, dental treatment is for you an

ordeal of discomfort and anxiety. You desire to undergo your current

experience only as a means to the end of adequate dental health, and you

most certainly do not enjoy the experience. The obvious response is to

distinguish between desiring something for its own sake and desiring

something only as a means to an end. To desire that p for its own sake is to

desire that p and not to desire it merely for the sake of some other end q.4

To desire that p merely for the sake of q is to desire that p, and desire that q,

where one would not desire that p if one did not desire that q or believe that

realizing p was a means to realizing q.5

4 What does it mean to say that one desires, of φ, under A, that it should occur for its own sake? What is the “it”? Our answer: φ’s realization of A. What one wants for its own sake is that φ should realize A.5

The definitions have to be applied with some finesse, as the following example (due to Sean Stidd) shows. A romantically inclined charlatan is infatuated with a woman and desires to marry her for its own sake. He also desires to marry as a means to getting money from her grandfather. Depending on the grandfather’s ultimate opinion of him, he will pay him a sizable sum either as a dowry or to disappear. The charlatan woos the woman, but finds the wooing boring and desires to do it only for the sake of marrying her and getting the money. So: the charlatan does not desire to woo the woman for its own sake; however: he desires to woo her, and desires the money, but it is not true that he would not desire to woo her if he did not desire the money. He would woo her for the sake of marrying her. The example shows we need to be careful in applying the definition. It is true that the charlatan, and he desires to woo her, and desires to get the money and/or marry her, and would not desire to woo her if he did not desire the disjunctive state of affairs of marrying her or getting the money, or did believe that wooing her was a means to that disjunctive state of affairs. A more precise approach: using ‘desires φ/A’ as short for ‘desires, of φ, under A’, we have

x desires φ/A merely for the sake of ψ1/A1 or . . . or ψn/An if and only (1) x desires φ/A and desires each of ψ1/A1 . . . ψn/An; (2) x believes that φ’s having A is a means to ψ1’s having A1, and . . . and ψn’s having An; (3) x would not desire φ/A if x did not desire at least one of ψ1/A1 . . . ψn/An or did not believe that φ’s having A was a means to at least one ψ i ‘s having Ai.

And:x desires φ/A its for the sake if and only if x desires φ/A and x does not desire φ/A merely for the sake of some ψ1/A1 or . . . or ψn/An.

4

Enjoyment

Simplicity argues for the following account: one enjoys φ under A if and

only if one φ’s, and one desires, of φ, under A, that it should occur for its own

sake.6 The condition is not sufficient, however, as the following example

shows.7 You have never been deep-sea fishing, but have long had a desire to

do so for its own sake, and are now in fact engaged in that very activity, and

you of course believe that you are. That belief combines with your standing

desire to go deep sea fishing to yield the desire, of your present activity,

under deep-sea fishing, that it occur for its own sake. You are not, however,

enjoying the activity under the feature deep-sea fishing. You find the activity

distasteful. You get seasick; you are disgusted by the crowded, noisy deck

from which you must fish; you are repelled by the necessity of barehandedly

catching the small, live fish used for bait, and you are even more repelled by

the fact that, once you have succeeded in grabbing the bait, you have to

impale the struggling fish by the gills on your hook. But your desire to fish

survives this initial shock, and you continue to fish even though you admit to

yourself that you are not enjoying it. You only continue to fish in the hope

that you will enjoy it. In the present, however, your desire to fish is waning.

It persists, but it persists despite your reactions, and it is only the hope that

things will change that keeps it alive.

It easy to construct similar examples. You just need (1) a preexisting

desire to have a type of experience or engage in a a type of activity for its

6 See Richard Brandt, “Hedonism” in Donald Borchert (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Gale 2005, and Chris Heathwood, “The Reduction of Sensory Pleasure to Desire,” Philosophical Studies 2007, vol. 133; pp. p. 32 (“a sensation S, occurring at time t, is a sensory pleasure at t iff the subject of S desires, intrinsically and de re, at t, of S that it be occurring at t”). 7 The example is adapted from Richard Warner, Freedom, Enjoyment, and Happiness: An Essay on Moral Psychology, Cornell University Press, 1987, and Richard Warner, “Enjoyment,” The Philosophical Review, October 1980, 507-26.

5

Enjoyment

own sake; (2) the belief, of a particular instance of the experience or activity,

under an array of features A, that it is now occurring; and (3) the resulting

desire, of the experience or activity, under A, that it should occur for its own

sake, where (4) the desire in (3) persists for a while in spite of, not because of

the particular experience or activity. These examples to show that it is not

sufficient to count as enjoying φ, under A that one φ’s and desires, of φ, under

A, that it occur for its own sake. The examples are convincing because the

relevant desire persists, in spite of, not because of, the experience or activity.

Transforming this feature into its opposite transforms the example into

one of enjoyment, and generalizing from transformation yields an account of

enjoyment. Thus: suppose a large fish suddenly strikes your line, and all of

your attention is immediately focused on the fight to land it. Your seasick

feeling, your impinging awareness of the crowded deck, and your qualms

about catching the live bait are instantly eclipsed by the excitement of the

fight; moreover, after you have landed the fish, you find that you are no

longer seasick. The deck no longer seems inhospitably crowded but full of

cooperative people who are congratulating you on your catch. Even catching

and hooking the live bait now seems just one of those necessities which

disquiet only the uninitiated. You find now that you want to fish not in spite

of, but because of your experiences. You are—as you now realize—enjoying

it.

We interpret the “not in spite of, but because of” causally. This appeal

to causation is to be understood in the context of everyday causal

explanations. The identification of causes in such explanations is highly

pragmatic. For example, when eight-year-old Sally asks her mother why the

6

Enjoyment

mill wheel turns, her mother replies that the wheel turns because the water

trikes it. When Sally, now an undergraduate, is working on a similar

homework problem for her Physics course, her answer includes a calculation

of the friction in the mill’s system. With causation so understood, we suggest

that after the large fish strikes your line, but not before, there is an array of

features A meeting these conditions: your activity of deep-sea fishing causes

you to believe, of that activity, under A, that it is occurring; and, to desire, of

that activity, under A, that it should occur. Thus, the activity not only causes

you to desire it for its own sake, it also ensures the—at least apparent—

satisfaction of that desire by causing you believe that you are getting exactly

what you want.

Generalizing, we have

x enjoys φ under A if and only if

(1) x φ’s;

(2) x's φing causes x

(a) to believe, of φ, under A, that it occurs, and

(b) to desire, of φ, under A, that it occur for its own sake.8

Note that (b) reads “occur” not “continue to occur.” To see why, consider

enjoying writing the last word of an essay. Writing the last word is

necessarily an activity that occurs in a relatively short time span; if it takes a

year for one to “write the last word,” then whatever one is doing, it is not, in

any normal understanding of the phrase, writing the last word. Thus, when

one enjoys writing the last word, one does not desire the impossible: that

8 This account is adapted from Richard Warner, Freedom, Enjoyment, and Ha, Richard Warner, “Enjoyment.” Wayne Davis adapts and criticizes Warner in “A Causal Theory of Enjoyment,” Mind, 91 (1982). pp. 240-256. For Warner’s response, see Davis on Enjoyment: A Reply, Mind, October 1983, 568-72.

7

Enjoyment

one’s writing the word should continue beyond writing the last word; one

simply desires that it happen.

Enjoyment and Reasons for Action

We explain the explanatory-justificatory aspect of enjoyment by

focusing on the “of φ, under A” belief/desire pair: such pairs are typically

reasons to have or do φ. But isn’t this already to take a wrong step? When φ is

an activity, it makes sense to think of the belief/desire pair as a reason to φ,

but how are we to understand ‘reason to φ’ when φ is an experience?

Reasons for action guide our voluntary choices, but—so the objection goes—

we do not choose our experiences, we just have them. It is of course just

false that we do not choose our experiences. Having an experience is

typically under your voluntary control in two ways: you may be able to

determine both whether it occurs and how long it endures. You can control

whether you have the experience of tasting the wine by taking or not taking a

sip, and you can control the duration of your taste experience by how deeply

you drink. By ‘a reason to have an experience’, we mean a reason to

exercise control in one of the above ways.

But even if reason for action is the right concept, haven’t we chosen

the wrong belief/desire combination? If we want to illuminate the

explanatory/justificatory dimension of enjoyment, shouldn’t we be focusing

on the general desire for enjoyment and the various expectation that arise

that one will enjoy some particular experience or activity φ? That would be

mistake. To explain reason-providing role of the desire for

enjoyment/expectation of enjoying φ, we need to appeal to the reason-

8

Enjoyment

providing role of the “of φ, under A” belief/desire pair involved in the

enjoyment itself. To explain why, we need an account of reasons for action.

We need the account in any case; otherwise, our suggestion that the

belief/desire pairs are typically reason is a mere gesture toward a possible

explanation of the explanatory/justificatory aspect of enjoyment. We sketch the

account we have in mind, beginning with the observation that ‘reason for

action’ is ambiguous.

Reasons may be belief/desire pairs that motivate a particular person to

act in a certain way, and that the person takes to justify, at least to some

degree, acting in that way. We label such reasons first-person reasons. A

first-person reason for a person to perform some action A is a belief/desire

pair that plays, or in appropriate circumstances would play, a certain role for

that person in motivating and justifying doing A. First-person reasons

contrast with reasons that—even if they do not do so—should motivate a

person to perform an action, and that the person should regard as providing

at least some degree of justification for doing so. We will call such reasons

third-person reasons. Third-person reasons may be reasons for a particular

person, or group of persons, or all persons.9

We focus on first-person reasons. We take it to be clear that there is a

characteristic motivational-justificatory role is associated with first-person

reasons. We will not offer any further description of that role, except for the

following. We assume that a belief/desire pair is a first-person reason for one

9 Our first-person/third-person reason distinction corresponds more or less to the popular internal/external distinction. Debates about the objective or subjective nature of reasons connects to two features in our account: the meaning of 'justified' in the account of first-person reasons, and the meaning of 'should' in the definition of third-person reasons.  We take the agent-neutral/agent relative debate to be about third-person reasons and what sorts of relativizations they permit.  

9

Enjoyment

to perform an action φ only if one believes it provides (at least some degree

of) justification for doing φ. We guide our actions by the light of the

justifications we take our first-person reasons to provide. We may lament

that the light is weak, all too subject to distorting factors such as prejudice,

and that such light as it does give is too frequently disregarded, but it is the

light by which we proceed nonetheless.

The link between first-person reasons and justification explains why

we described the “of φ, under A” belief/desire pairs as typically reasons to

have or do φ. The “typically” is required because you can enjoy φ when the

relevant belief/desire pair does not serve as a reason. A detailed canvassing

of the distinction between the two cases would illuminate the reasons for action

dimension of enjoyment. Here we consider just one example to show why

the belief/desire pairs do not always function as first-person reasons.

Thomas Gouge’s intensely religious upbringing instilled in him the

conviction that a man should not feel erotic desire for another man. The

adolescent Gouge nonetheless enjoys looking at his best friend under an

array of features A indicative of sexual attraction. Thus, in terms of the

definition of enjoyment, he believes, of his experience of looking at his friend,

under A, that it is occurring, and he desires, of the experience, under A, that

it should occur for its own sake. Gouge’s religious convictions, however, lead

him to conclude that the belief/desire pair does not provide even the most

miniscule degree of justification for looking in a sexual way at his friend; he

views the desire as an alien invader to be resisted and destroyed, not a

citizen of the realm of desires capable of providing him with a justification for

action. Even though the relevant belief/desire pair does not serve as a first-

10

Enjoyment

person reason for Gouge, he does enjoy looking at his friend in a sexual way.

He regards the enjoyment in the same way in regards its constituent

belief/desire: a temptation Satan has placed in his path. But he enjoys

nonetheless.

The example shows why we should reject the plausible view that the

desire for enjoyment and the expectation that you will enjoy φ under A is

always a first-person reason to φ. Unless you expect the relevant “of φ,

under A” belief/desire pair involved in an enjoyment of φ to function as a first-

person reason, the desire to enjoy and the expectation of enjoyment will not

combine to serve as a first-person reason.

Call the enjoyments in which the belief/desire pair serves as a first-

person reason first-person-reason enjoyments. They figure prominently in

our lives because what is of actions generally is true of our enjoyment-

seeking actions: we try to perform those for which we find some at least

some degree of justification in our belief/desire pairs. First-person-reason

enjoyments merit detailed investigation, but our goal is to illustrate how our

account combines and explains both the felt and reason-for-action aspects of

enjoyment. Accordingly, we turn to enjoyment as a feeling.

In the definition of enjoyment that we gave earlier, we did not require

that the desire be felt or that the belief be occurrent. The consequence is

that the definition states a necessary but not a sufficient condition. To

explain why, we first need to explain what we mean by a felt desire and an

occurrent belief. We do so by examples.

Felt Desire and Occurrent Belief

11

Enjoyment

Felt desire. Imagine quenching a demanding thirst with a drink of

water. Before you drink, you desire, of your future experience φ of drinking

the water, under quenching your thirst, that it should occur for its own sake;

moreover, you feel the desire as an insistent, attention-riveting craving to

drink. When you drink, you continue to desire, of your now presently

occurring experience φ, under quenching your thirst, that it should occur.

Occurrent belief. Occurent beliefs are those beliefs present to

consciousness in more or less the way your belief that you are now reading

this sentence is currently before your mind. Occurrent beliefs vary greatly in

the way they are present to consciousness, and the variation accounts in part

for the variations in the feeling of enjoyment. Imagine your belief that you

are experiencing the taste of the Kung Pao Chicken is before your mind as a

consciousness-gripping complex of sensations. Compare the belief that you

are experiencing understanding, insight, and affirmation as you read the lines

from Faust. The belief is before your mind with an assent-compelling clarity,

an experience that differs in feeling from the consciousness-gripping

sensations that comprise the Kung Pao Chicken belief. Like felt desires,

occurrent beliefs also vary in intensity. Suppose, for example, that early in

the day you receive some good news—that you do not need the operation

that your doctor first thought you would. For the rest of the day, the belief

that the operation is unnecessary lingers on the periphery of self-

consciousness. Although it is not always before your mind in the way that

your belief that you are now reading this sentence is currently before your

mind, you nonetheless have it "in mind" all day. It contrasts in this way with

your belief, for example, that your grandmother was not married to Mussolini.

12

Enjoyment

You are never, during the entire day, aware even in the slightest degree of

that belief.

The Feeling of Enjoyment

To motivate the felt desire/occurrent belief requirement, consider two

examples. The thirst quenching case is the first. As you drink, you continue

to have the felt desire, of your now presently occurring experience φ, under

quenching your thirst, that it should occur; however, the sensations attendant

on drinking the water transform the feeling of insistent craving into a felt

embracing of the watery relief, an embracing you desire for its own sake, not

just as a means of alleviating the urge to drink. The experience makes you

continue to want it, and it also makes you occurrently believe, of the

experience, that it is occurring. The experience makes you aware of the

complex of sensations comprising the experience of the watery relief. The

sensations are present to your consciousness in—more or less—the way that

your awareness that you are now reading these words is present to your

consciousness. In this way, you occurrently believe, of φ, under quenching

your thirst, that it is occurring.

Compare Hannibal, a law professor, who is intentionally humiliating his

students by ridiculing their attempts to answer questions that even the best

of them have no hope of understanding. He desires to humiliate them for its

own sake, and the more he does it, the more that makes him want to. The

activity also causes him to believe that he is succeeding in humiliating them;

he monitors the students’ reactions, and that complex perceptions causes

the belief. Hannibal fulfills the definition: his questioning activity causes him

13

Enjoyment

to believe, of that activity, under an array A including the feature humiliating

the students, that it is occurring, and to desire, of the activity, under A, that it

should occur for its own sake.

Suppose however that the desire is not felt and the belief is not

occurrent. Hannibal is completely unaware of what he is doing. He tells

himself and others that he teaches in the traditional “Socratic” style, and that

he is raising the self-esteem of the students by leading them on a journey of

intellectual discovery. He thinks that he helps them see that they do not

understand and then leads them to understanding and that the achievement

gives them greater self-esteem. Does Hannibal enjoy humiliating the

students? We think not. This is not to deny that we might quite properly

answer, “Why does Hannibal humiliate his students?” with “He enjoys it.” We

would be ascribing the relevant belief/desire pair to him to explain his

behavior. However, the cases that lie at the core of our concept of

enjoyment are felt desire/occurrent belief cases. When we aim at enjoyment,

after all, we are aiming at experiencing the satisfaction of our desires. We are

not seeking the bloodless “enjoyments” that Hannibal illustrates,

“enjoyments” of which occur without our feeling them.

We submit that the feeling of enjoyment consists in all cases of having

the felt desire to φ for its own sake at precisely the same time that one

occurrently believes that one is φing. The variations how the desires feel and

how the beliefs manifest themselves account for the fact that there is no one

feeling F such that one enjoys something only if one feels F. The feeling of

enjoyment varies greatly. Compare the watery relief of satisfying an urgent

thirst; sexual gratification; a sudden whiff of perfume; learning that one has

14

Enjoyment

received a fervently hoped for grant; the thoughts, associations, and feelings

aroused by reading the following lines from the end of Faust, spoken by the

angels when they snatch Faust from Mephistopheles: “Wer immer strebend

sich bemüht,/Den können wir erlösen.”

Despite the variation, the temptation is strong to say that all

enjoyments somehow feel “the same.” Indeed, some insist acknowledge that

there is no one feeling F such that one enjoys something only if one feels F,

but they still insist that all enjoyments exhibit a particular felt quality, a

“hedonic tone.”10 The “tone” is supposed to be some more generic quality

that variety of feelings in enjoyment all instantiate. Hedonic tone theories

have a quite difficult time saying what that generic quality is beyond the

utterly unexplanatory “the generic quality all feelings of enjoyment exhibit by

virtue of being feelings of enjoyment.” Our account meets hedonic tone

theories halfway. There is a generic, feeling-related pattern all enjoyments

instantiate. They all exhibit a felt desire/occurrent belief combination playing

the required causal role. This generic pattern is not fully introspectible

however, as introspection will not reveal whether the causal requirement is

fulfilled.

Enjoyment and Value: Completing the Outline

As we have described them so far, enjoyments divide into two types:

those in which the belief/desire pairs serve as a first-person reason, and

those in which they do not. To complete our outline of the varieties of

enjoyment, we note that first-person-reason enjoyments subdivide into two:

10 C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956; Roger Crisp, Reasons and the Good, Oxford University Press, 2006.

15

Enjoyment

those in which we value what we enjoy, and those in which we do not. To see

the point of the subdivision, recall that a belief/desire pair is a first-person for

someone only if that person believes it provides (at least some degree of)

justification for having or doing φ. We assume that we explain and justify

such beliefs by appeal to what we value. We do not however think that if you

believe a particular belief/desire pair provides (at least some degree of)

justification for having or doing φ, then you value your φing. The link

between justification and value is looser than that. Thus, we think it is

possible, for example, for you to first-person-reason enjoy the experience of

tasting the combination of canned tuna fish and catsup without valuing your

tasting it. Motivating and defending these claims requires a detailed

explanation of the notion of valuing we are invoking, and we defer that task

to another time. We conclude with our view of the basic typology of

enjoyments. A fully adequate account of enjoyment would examine the

elements of this typology in detail.

16

Enjoyment

17