ward a

reappraisal of

liam the Great,

duke of Aquitaine

q995-1030)

Bernard S. Bachrach

William, duke of Aquitaine and count of Poitou, has won a glowing reputation from historians for his personal piety and his active support of religious re- form. Scholars have given him the sobriquet ‘the Great’, and he is traditionally regarded as one of those over-mighty subjects whose fame and power eclipsed their less accomplished Capetian contemfio- raries. ,4s count and duke, however, William clearly had responsibilities that went beyond support of the Church. In the present study an effort has been made to examine the more se6ular aspects of William’s career to see if, in fact, he justly &serves to be considered one of the outstandingjfgures of the early eleventh centu y.

Scholars are unanimous in their appreciation of William the Great. Ko accomplishment seems to have exaped him. His authority in Aquitaine is described as uncontested, his military talent is applauded, and his inde-

pendence of the Capetian monarchs is re-

garded as absolute. His support of the Church is seen as multifaceted: he is crelr’lited with immense gifts to ecclesiastical institutions of all kinds both within Aquitaine and abroad ;

he is described as an advocate of monastic reform and a builder of churches. He is said

to have convoked church councils and de- cre82d the peace of God. His personal religious devotion is considered to have been all-

embracing; he made yearly pilgrimages to holy places (Pfister 1885 : 283-5 ; Luchaire 1901:70-l; Richard 1903:139-220; Lot 1904 : 7 l-3 ; Flach 19 17 : 563ff. ; Boissonade 192’6 : 5 l-2 ; Dhondt 1948 : 225 ; Bonnaud- Delamare 1962 : 4 15-82 ; Garaud 1964 : 30-l ;

Kienast 1968a : 203-4; Dez 1969 : 37; Brisset 1972:441-60; Duby 1972:215; Labande 1973 : 136-53). Recently, his position was summarized thus : “ . ..Count William in his capacity as duke of Aquitaine was the dist.inguished ruler of one of the largest princi- palities in Western Europe, exchanging am- bassadors with, among others, the German Em.peror and the kings of England and Cast i le, and treating as an equal with the king of France. His piety, his unusual intellectual leanings, and the firmness of his rule awed cogl.temporaries and have given him the epi- that William the Great’?

A careful examination of the evidence used by the above-mentioned scholars indicates

clearly that their consensus takes its tone and m.rch of its substance from the encomium devloted to William by his admiring contempo- rary A&mar of Chabannes in his Chronicon

(Chavenon 1897 : 162-3). Ademar’s reputa- tion for truth telling and honesty was attacked even by his contemporaries (Saltet 193 1: 160- 2; Callahan 1976: 257). However, my doubts concerning the accuracy of the prevailing

Joti of Medievd Histosy 5 (1979) : 1 l-21 @J North-Hollabnd Publishing Company 11

view were stimulated particularly in the course of a recent study that examined rela- tions between Fulk Nerra, count of Anjou, and VVilliam, in whrch the latter fared poorly (Bachrach 1976:ll l-22).

Although it seer-Is that a reassessment of William’s career is long overdue, it should be emphasized from the start that he was far from being a nonentity. It is clear that William was a pious son of the Church who made regular pilgrimages to holy places and was highly regarded by reform-minded clergy (Brisset 1972:452ff.; Cowdrey 1970:51-2). William was clearly one of the leaders of the peace movement, for which he convoked church councils (Bonnaud-Delamare 1964: 437-51; Cowdrey 1970: 59), and a vigorous foe of heresy (Labande 1973 : 137) ; he was also an open-handed giver to ecclesiastical institu- tions and an active builder of churches (Bris- set 1972 :452ff.).

It is clear that personal piety and support for the Church were not all that might be needed if a magnate would serve his family and do what was required of him as count or duke. Those secular political figures of the early middles ages who won respect from their contemporaries and lasting fame from posterity did so in part, at least, as a result of their accomplishments in military affairs. Whether one examines the careers ofhistorical figures like Clovis and William the Conqueror or of semi-legendary ones like Ring Arthur and Roland the military element plays a fundamental role. Even celebrated clericai figures like Saint Germanus of Auxerre and Bishop Odo of Bayeux earned a reputation in part on the battlefield. The former, for example, is called by Bede and Nennius dm belhze (Prinz 197 1: 42ff.), and the latter not only played a conspicuous role in the Norman

invasion of England but, thanks to the Bayeux Tapestry, can still be seen wielding his mace at Hastings (Stenton 1957 : plates 50,68). Among early medieval figures like Charlemagne, King Alfred, and Otto I who won from historians the sobriquet magma, military prowess and political success have played a dominant role.

William’s talents as dux belhwn are not difficult to evaluate. During the early part of 995, he acceded to the request of his uncle, Count Odo I of Blois, and began preparations to aid him by attacking Anjou. Count Fulk Nerra of Anjou tried to blunt the effect of this alliance by seeking aid from his cousin-in-law. Count Aldebert of La Marche and Ptrigord. The latter responded by invading Poitou ;

he proceeded to capture and destroy William’s frontier stronghold of Gensay. Aldebert then moved against Poitiers and encamped some two miles outside the city walls to await rein- forcements. The local levy of Poitiers attacked Aldebert’s camp and was decisively defeated. Aldebert proceeded to lay siege to and capture Poitiers itself (Bachrach 1976 : 14) ” The first phase of this campaign which was intended to focus upon an offensive thrust by William’s forces into Anjou ended in a debacle of defensive ineptitude.

The second phase of &is campaign saw William still on the defensive and devoting his energies to rebuilding the stronghold at Gencay. While William was putting the finishing touches to the work at Genqay, Aldebert, who was returning to La Marche after having captured Tours, laid siege to the newly repaired fortification. It is clear that Aldebert cal tured Gensay and destroyed ir a second time. Apparently, however, after the battle was over and after Aldebert had re- moved his k;.rrnor, one of his defeated enemies

12

tool the opportunity to kill the count with a we&aimed arrow (Chavenon 1897 : 156-7).

In the third phase of the campaign William secured the support of King Robert. The corsnbined forces of Framia and Aquitaine

spent a long time besieging the stronghold of Bellac which was successfully defended by a

magaate named Abbo Drus. Wit.1 the failure to take Bellac, Robert returned to the north, and Wiiliam led a huge army against the

stronghold of Brosse which was held by Guy, viscount of Limoges. The viscount did not permit William’s forces to establish an effec-

tive siege at Brosse but with a picked force of fighting men he attacked the duke. William’s forces were decisively defeated and the siege was broken (Chavenon 1897 : 156-7~.

Thus WilliaLm’s one and only extended military campaign ended in dismal failure. He lost GenGay twice and saw it destroyed both times; the levy of Poitou was decisively defeated and the city was captured. He failed in two sieges (Bellac and Brosse) and was beaten in the open field by Viscount Guy. In this campaign William demonstrated little grasp of strategy or tactics. He committed a basic strategic error in permitting himself to be drawn into a war on his northern border when he well knew that his enemy had allies on Poitou’s southern border. William seems to have had no specific plans for fighting a two-front war and dashed from place to place failing in cne encounter after another. Tactic- ally, William permitted his levies to attack Count Aldebert’s fortified camp when they should have remained within their own fortifications at Poitiers. When he laid siege

to Brosse, William apparently failed to estab- lish lines of circumvallation and thus the enemy wa.s able to attack and rout his forces.

William’s one major battle in the field was

fought in August of 1006. A large force of Vikings landed on the Psitevin co,ast at Saint- Michel-en-l’Herm, beached ,their boats, and proceeded to ravage the countryside. Upon learning of the invasion, William is said to have gathrered a substantial force of picked fighting men and moved against the enemy camp. He arrived at the coast shortly before nightfall and. ordered his men to set up fortified camps facing the Vikings. The latter, assuming that the Aquitanians would attempt to attack their camp in a mounted assault, spent the night digging pits all around their own positio. i. They covered these ditches with branches and sot; s to camouflage them (Chavenon 1897 :

17(+-7). At the break of day, William formed up his

ho:r*semen into several ranks and, taking his pls..r::e with large numbers of important men

in dhe first rank, led a pell-me11 cha.rge against thf, Viking camp. The Aquitanian horsemen we’c’e caught in the carefully disguised ditches an4 were thrown from their mounts. The rear ranks of horsemen could not pick their way thidnough the mass of floundering mounts, spi-awling riders weighted down by their arnor, and the dangerous pits; they had to dismount. The momentumof the Aquitanians’ attack was broken and they retired from the field. More than thirty of William’s more noble fo!!t?wers are said to have been taken prisoner, :jtnd the duke himself only escaped through the help of some brave followers (Chavenon 1897:176-7).

With their charge shattered, many of their leaders captive, and the duke less than eager for another encounter, the Aquitanians re- mained in camp for the rest of the day. AS night fell and the tide came in, the Vikings boarded their ships and sailed away with their booty ancl their prisoners. Later William

13

ransomed the prisoners for a large sum of gold and silver (Chavenon 1897 : 176-7).

A critical evaluation of William’s perfor- mance at the battle of Saint-Michel-en- 1’Herm indicates that he repeatedly failed to take elementary precautions: he did not send out scouts to reconnoiter the enemy’s position or to monitor their movements during the night; and he did not employ skirmishers to keep the enemy from regaining their ships with the prisoners. William apparently made no effort todestroy theVikingships which lay high and dry on the beach and were very probably vulnerable to fire arrows. The Aquitanians under William’s leadership lacked caution in committing themselves to the attack accord- ing to at least one contemporary (Chavenon 1897 : 176-7). It may be noted in this context that William should have suspected that the Vikings had dug traps to thwart his horsemen. Such traps were used throughout the early middle ages both by the Vikings and their continental enemies. In fact, Count Conan og’ Rennes had employed this same tactic in the well-publicized battle of Conquereuil only fourteen years earlier (Bachrach 1970: 51ff., 1972:135-6; Merlet 1896344; Prou 1886: 30-Z).

Throughout the remainder of his reign William saw remarkably little military action. The sources indicate that he was involved in a few sieges of minor importance. In all of these efforts that have left some surviving record the actual conduct of the military side of the matter seems to have been ieft to one of the duke’s supporters. The most frequently men- tioned of these is Count William of AngoulCme who commanded tht duke’s army even when he was present in Ihe field (Chavenon 1897: 163-5, 185-6; Martindale 1969 : 542, 545,

547; Richard 1903: 157).

In defense of William it may be pointed-out that his failure in the extended military campaign of 995-997 occurred while he was an !.nexperienced youth y&o had only recently assumed the responsibilities of power. It &might further be observed that his defeat by the Vikings at Saint-i!chel-en-1’Herm took place in the wake of a surprise attack. In addition, one might argue that the sparse source materials preclude any definitive con- clusion concerning William’s military talents. Finally, it might be hypotheaded that William’s subsequent avoidance of large-scale military operations was a matter of policy based, perhaps, on the lessons he learned as a result of his earlier defeats.

Any judgment concerning William’s per- formance must in a certain measure be comparative. Conveniently, the military career of Count Fulk Nerraof Anjou, who was WilEam’s contemporary and neighbor, is reasonably well-known, Fulk assumed sole possession of the countship of Anjout in 987 at tl-te age of sixteen, and for the next five years, acgainst substantial odds, he succeslsfully car- ried on a two-front war. This conflict ended with Fulk’s decisive victory at the battle of Conquereuil in 992. Despite his youth and in- experience, Fulk Terra proved himselfto be a vigorous and aggressive military tactician and strategist. Yet, Fulk fought only two large- scale battles in the field during his fifty-three year career. In short; it should be emphasized that siege war%are and raiding were f&r more common than any hother kind of fighting during the early eleventh century in the ‘West’ of France (Halphen and Poupardin 1913: 233-5; Halphen 1901~7-48, :906:9fl’.; Gui- llot 1972a:15-55; Bachrach 1975:111-22).

Although there are fewer sources for William’s reign than on: would like to have,

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the corpus of material is not inf:rior to what we have for Fulk Nerra. It seems to me that we are as well informed about William’s military activity as we are about Fulk’s military acti-

=&y. In addition, I think it would be fair to

suggest that if William had won any not’+ worthy victories or performed will as a tact i- cian or as a strategist, Ademar of‘ Ghabannes, who provides most of our evidence for his career, was clearly partial to him, and W,U

sophisticated about military matters, wou’i d not have suppressed such information (Bach- rach 1975: 561-9). In support of the tra& tional view of William, one might emphasize the sparseness of the sources or speculate tlat the truth about the duke’s military career has somehow been lost to us. It might seem prel”b

eralble to hypothesize that perhaps William consciously pursued a policy of avoiding military activity either because he learned the lesson of his early defeats or because he realized that he larked military talent. Nevertheless, I think it is safe to observe that by comparison with his father William Iron Arm, who won his sobriquet on the field of battle, and his neighbor Fulk Nerra, William was not a man of great military prowess.

* I I

William inherited from his father William Iron Arm a strong base of comital power in Poitou. The latter had preserved and en- hanced the powers and prerogatives that the counts of Poitou had traditionally exercised. He kept the vas;. majority of fortifications in the region under his control and only per-

m itted new stron ghol’ds to be erected with his pl~rmission. William Iron Arm did not nermit

the castellzns to usurp the count’s customary

rights over the fkee population, and the

vicalii and viscounts who were charged with

the ‘duty of doing the count’s business tended to do SO faithfully. In short, the administration of tlhe pagus as the basis of public authority was preserved by William Iron Arm (Garaud i 964 : SO-5) .

VsEl’liam the Great began his reign in a

rather unfortunate manner with three years of unsuccessful warfare. This conflict was brought to an end by an agreement with Fulk Nerra by which William married Aldemode, the cousin of the count of Anjou (Bachrach 1976: 14). Angevin penetration of Poitou on a large scale followed. Fulk either took control of existing fortifications or built new ones at Loudun, Mirebeau, Moncontour, Faye-la- Vin’euse, Beauprdau, Chemille, Montrevault, Montjean, Saint-Florent-le-Vieil, Passavant,

Tour-Landry, Maulevrier, Montfacon, DouC, and MontreuiU3ellay (Bachrach 1976: 113- 21). In other parts of Poitou, Fulk’s friends and relatives controlled Parthenay, Genqay, Thsuars, Melle, and Cheneche (Beech 1964: 44K ; Martindale 1969 : 542 ; Bachrach J 975 :

119; Chavensn 1897 : 163-5, 185-6). Thus in a period of about thirty years Fulk Nersa expanded Angevin dominat’on over most of thy: northern third of Poitou and laid the strategic base for Geoffrey Martel’s conquest in 1033 (Bachrach 1976:120-2).

.Although the position of William’s family as dukes of Aquitaine traditionally was con- siderably weaker than its position as counts of Poitou, scholars generally agree that in the former capacity they exercised considerable power over the bishoprics south of the Loire. Historians ;lso agree that the duke’s ability to exercise usurped regalian rights over the Church ixxreased substantially after the accession of Hugh Capet (Garaud 1960 :364ff. and Brisset 1972:443ff.). It seems, however,

15

that William the Great dissipated ducal resources and lost prerogatives that his father had enjoyed. For example, William Iron Arm exercised sole contrr..sl over the appointment of the archbishop of Bordeaux who was metropolitan for tk : important Aquitanian sees of AngoulCme, Poitiers, Saintes, and P&igueux (Richard 1903:126, 34; Garaud 1960: 364; and compare Higounet 1963: 91- 2). Probably by 1010 when Seguin was appointed and certainly by 1027 when Geofim II was selected, William found it c necessary to share control of the power to choose the archbishop with the duke of Gascony (Chavenon 1897:194-5). It is even possible that King Robert had a hand in the appointment of Geofiey If since the new archbishop was nagione Francurn (sic) .2

Wipiam Iron Arm’s domination of the arch- bishopric of Bordeaux and his power over the Church in Aquitaine permitted him the opportunity to transfer the diocese of Limoges from the jurisdiction of the archbishop of Bourges to the archbishop of Bordeaux (Fontette 1965 : 5536) m William the Great succeeded in following his father’s policy in this matter in 1014 (B&set 1972:445-6), but in 1023 he was thwirrted by King Robert and his illegitimate half-brother Gauzelin, arch- bishop of Bourges :,Pfister 1885:196-7; Fon- tette 1965 : 557). Control over the diocese of Limoges thus, in etiect, passed from the dukes of Aquitaine to the royal house.

In secular affairs too there are many instances of the eraion of the ducal position under William as c ?mpared with that of his father. For example, VVilliam the Great, as we have seen, received support from William Taillifizr, count of AngoulCme, for routine military campaigns. To obtain this support William the r&eat gave William

Taillifer substantial resources including the viscounties of Melle and Rochechouart, the hor,ors of ChCnechC, Chabanais, Rufifec, and Co:nfolens along with many other holdings and strongholds in Angoumois, Poitou, and Aunay (Chavenon 1897:163-5, 183-6; Bous- sard 1957 : 24). William the Great’s policy of alienating substantial resources to 0btai.n support helped to establish the house of William Taillifer as one of the most important in Aquitaine (Depoin 1904 : 19-25 ; Boissonade 1935 : 2 1 ff.) . William Taillifer further en- hanced his own position by marrying the daughter of Fulk Nerra, and F1qlk’s grandsons succeeded their father as count of AngoulCme (Chavenon 1897 : 163-5 ; Boussard 1957 : 24 ; compare Depoin 1904 : 22).

This dynastic alliance between AngouEme and Anjou may be seen to have weakened William the Great’s position in Aquitaine. Thus, in about 1018 we find that King Robert, who was closely allied with Fulk Nerra at the time, reasserted royal control over the bishopric of Angouleme (Boussard 1957 : 24; compare Lmbart de la Tour 1890: 25 l-2). William the Great also found it neces- sary to grant substantial resources in Aqui- taine directly to Fulk Nerra. For example, Ful k obtained the strongly fortified ci&as of Saintes and numerous fortifications through- out the Saintonge. Thus much of western Aquitaine was dominated either by Fulk Nerra or by his son-in-law (Faye 1853 : l-2 1; Jean le Saintongeais 1904 : 33Off., 405ff. ; Bachrach 19763116; compare Richard 1903:149, 187).

Both in Poitou a,nd in Aquitaine preroga- tive.3 that William tie Great had inherited from his father slipped away. One must agree with Marcel Garaucl who has shown in his thorough monograph on the castellans of” Poitou that the vast majority of chateaux

16

escaped comital control during this period and that William lost the prerogatives that the count traditionally had exercised over free

men through the loyal service of the viscounts and the vicari It should be emphasized that

Angevin strength south of the Loire increased many-fold at William’s expense (Bachrach 1976 : 115-2 1). In 1033, only three years after William the Great’s death, his son and successor William the Fat found himself in a very weak position vis&vis the Angevins and

was decisively dc%ated at the battle of Mon- contour by Geoffrey Martel the son of Fulk

Nerra. William the Fat was captured by Geoffrey and spent most of the remainder of his life in prison; the Angevins ruled Poitou and exercised extensive influence throughout Aquitaine during this period (Halphen 1906 : 57-9; Guillot 1972a:52-3; Bachrach 1976:

119-22). The general pir:tL re of the fragmentation of

comital or ducall power during the later tenth and early eleventh centuries will come as no surprise to those who are acquainted with J& F. Lemarjgnier’s observations on the “dissolu- tion oft he pagus” and Georges Du by’s classic study of this phenomenon in M%connais (Lemarignier 1951:401--10; Duby 1953: 139ff.). Briefly, it is generally agreed that the local unit of Carolingian administratioil, the pagus or civitas, continued to function into the later tenth century when it too began to be

morselled up into smaller pieces. This process saw the emer!;ence of the castellan based in his stone tower as the new fundamental unit of territorial power. Under the early Capetians it is maintained that the role of the casteliar grew mere important while public authority and rova I power faded in significance with in-

creasir g rapidity (Lemarignier 195 1: 40 1 ff.) . As thir: process developed, private jurisdiction

emerged as dolninant and the r(Flation between the lord and his jdelis became the nexus of political power (Duby 1953 : 149-79).

The careers of WiPliam Iron Arm and his son William the Great provide insight into

the process of change described above. For example, William Iron Arm exercised publ~ authority through his viscounts and vicadi but he also was recognized 3s lord by the castellans of Poitou and also by many of the greater magnates of Aquitaine (Garaud 1937 : 426-9; Lemarignier 1951: 402, n.2). With re- gard to thecastellans who are described as Wil- liam’s fide/es in the sources., William claimed very wide powers but recognized few if any obligations. As Garaud has shown, William the Great lost the traditional public powers his father had exercised. When, however, William the Great tried to demand no less vast control over hiscfideles than his father had demanded he was successfully opposed. For example, in dealing with Hugh of Lusignan, William found it necessary &O lie, cheat, bribe and foreswear Znself in order to dupe or trick hisjdelisinto doing as he asked.4 Through ‘these methods Wi!liam w&s able to curb the self-styled Chiliarch’s more ambitious schemes for self-aggrandizement. But in the end, the wily Hugh obtained an agreement from William for a settlement that increased rather than decreased the wealth, power, and prestige of the house of Lusignan (Martindale

196’3:548; Painter 1957:27-32). William’s difficulties in cuerci?ing the same

levels of power, influence, and a lthority over hisjdeZe.s t ha.1 William Irwin Arm had exercised led him in about 1020 to write to Bishop Fulbert of Chartres to ask aiJa)ut the forma

jdeZ.Etatis.5 The learned Illshop u rote back and observed that one who swears faithfulness to

his lord must rj se cause him bodily harm,

betray his secret’s or strongholds, detract from his premg&ves of justice, or hinder his poli- ties. In addition, the lorsi is owed good counsel and support by hisfi&bz Fulbert then observes that the lord must in his turn act in the same way in all things to his~idelis. If the lord fails to do so he will merit being condemned for bad faith just as would a ~&&KS in a similar circumstance and the lord would be con- sidered perfidious and foreswom (Behrends 1976: no. 51). What is important about Fulbert’s reply to William’s letter, as scholars have long recognized, is the reciprocal nature off~jU&atti. William Iron Arm and after him William the Great had tried to keep the flow of obligations moving only toward the lord, but by about 1020, it seems that a body of custom was developing to protect the position, apparently newly won in Poitou, of thej&& (Garaud 1965 : 559-62 ; Gio.rdanengo 19703814).

Those who have traditionally defended William’s greatness may perhaps find some consolation in the view that the “dissolution of the pagus” was not limited lto Poitou or to Aquitaine (Devailly 1973:109-35, 161-96; Fossier 1968b : 477-5 18). They may also find solace in the consemus arnong modem scholars that King Ro’bert, William’s con- temporary, presided over the diminution of royal power (Lemarignier 1965: 64-5). Fur- ther, it may seem a mitigating factor to view William as ensnared by an historical trend or caught in an historicral process.

It should be pointed out, however, that the growing power of castellans in M~coM~~s, Berry, Picardy, or Poitou and the concurrent development of custom to protect the newly- won position of these,%&s from their lords was the work of particular individuals, not the result of the imposition of a depersonalized

law of history. Fideles of William the Great like Hugh of Lusignan, Radulf of Thouars and William of Parthenay were real people with particular talents who subverted comital power in Poitou so as to increase their own wealth and power (Imbert 1864:332-42, 1871:33K; Garaud 1964: 39-43; Martindale 1969:542, 544, 546).

Modern scholars have with good reason vigorously attacked the ‘great man theory of history’ and laid emphasis upon institutions. Yet this corrective has often gone so far that the ‘human element’ is not appreciated. The need for balance is well expressed by Le Patourel ( 1965 : 294) : “we tend to use ab- stract expressions like ‘the expansion ofA.njou’. These are, it goes without saying, no more than a convenient shorthand. To describe the process with any approach to realism would take a long time; but such ‘expansion’ was clearly She work of men, of ambitious, greedy and for zeful men”.

Indeed, Count William of AngoulCme, Fulk Ncrra, and Ring Robert were real people with pclicies and talents that enabled them to deprive William the Great of prerogatives and resources that W!lliam Iron Arm had exer- cised in Aquitaine. Fulk Nerra by contrast with William the Great was not victimized by the “dissolurion of the pagus” or by the development of a body of custom to protect Jideles Erom their lord. Rather Fulk increased his power not only in Anjou but in Tocraine, Maine, Poitou, and Saintonge. In Anjou he reversed the process of dissolution and elimi- nated the viscount of Angers (Bachrach 1976 : 119-21; Halphen 1906 : loo:/. It might be added here in further comparing William the Great and Fulk Nerra that the former ex- perienced difbculties in utilizing monastic re- sources (Monsabert 1936 : 179; Marchegay and

18

Mabille 1869 : 259) while the latter was abl’e to do much as h!e wished (Guillot 1972a : 162ff.). The abbot \Df Cormery was aware that William

was not able to protect the lands of Cormery monastery that were located in Poitou firom Fulk Nerra and thus asked Hing Robert for

help (Bourasse I86 1: 62 -3). Fulk’s supporters in Poitou extorted lands and income firom

Poitevin monasteries such as Saint-Hilaire, one of WilEiam’s favorites, in return for “protection” (Garaud 1964 : 197-8). By con- tras’t, King Robert’s ability to provide protec- tion was apparently well-regarded by Hugh of Lusignan who sought charters from the monarch for two monastic houses he founded

in Poitou (Painter 1957:32). Modern scholars have seen William of

Aquitaine as a great man. They have empha-

sized his role as a supporter of religious reform, a builder of c:hurches, an advocate of learnin 9;, and1 a leader of the peace movement. William, indeed, was all this and more. Personally, he was pious and embarked on almost yearly pilgrimages lto various holy places. He was highly regarded by important churchmen like

Bishop Fulbert of Chartres and Bishop Leo c+f Vercelli. William helcl the important title of duke of Aquitaine in ;an era when status was not unimportant and his wealth often m[ade

him a generous friend. For many, tlhese virtues have been sufficient to have William considizred among the great.

But there is, as we have seen, another z13de to William’s career that until now has been largely ignored. As a military leader and as ruler of Poitou and Aquitaine, William lost

much of what his family had previously ac- quired. The northern third of Poitou was taken from him., King Robert recaptured royal prerogatives over the Church in Aqui- taine, the house of AngouEme dev&ped

intoa. fc.rmidable power, the castellansusurped

comi ta prerogatives, j&&s won ‘equal treat- mcnf’, and the strategic groundwork was laid :t”or Angevin domination of Poitou and leadership in Aquitaine.

The diminution of William’s reputation, however, would seem to be of greater signifi-

cance than stripping yet one more noble of his undeserved gEoire or of depriving proponents of A,quitanian regional identity, past and present, of a hero. The prevailing scholarly

consensus concerning the weakness of the early Capetian monarchy rests, in part, upon the notion that the kings were inferior to their overmighty subjects; William the Great often serves as the prototype of such men. The early

Capetians have been subjected to exhaustive study, but our apprec:ation of their over- mighty subjects as in William’s case often has rested upon a less intens.+e examination of the cvidcnce. May it not be that the reputations of other great magnates in early Capetian France also rest upon less solid foundations? More significantly, however, since William +he Great (9!)5-1030) is the man most likely to be contrasted with King Robert (996-103 l), may it not be suggested that the Capetian monarch was not as unsuccessful, and was perhaps even more able, than heretofore be- lieved? While the present study has not been intended primarily as a vehicle for the re- habilitation of the reputation of the early Capetians, it does emphasize the importance oi’treating the position of the monarchy in a comparative manner.

JVo tes

1 Beech 1966:204. Richard 1903:139, n. 1, dis- cusses the origins of William’s sobriquet le grand. This study was made possible by a grant from the American Council of Learned Societies for 1973-4.

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a Chavenon 1897: 150-2, 1 Se. The traditional hostility between Aquitaine and Franctir, which had not abated during thii period (Kienast 1968a : 8 1), permits the hypothesis that :‘ne choice of a Frank as archbishop was due to the exercise of northern in- fluence. In trying to date William’s surrender of half the power over the appointment at Bordeaux it seems possible that he did so wl.en he married Jhisca the sister of the duke of Gascony in 1010, the same year that Seguin was appointed archbishop. 3 Garaud 1964:85. It should be pointed out that Garaud admits that William the Great lost preroga- tives and powers that his father had enjoyed. But Garaud argues that William the Great’s losses were not as substantial as those suffered by other counts and dukes during this period. Thus Garaud (1964:29) observes: 1’autoritC comtalc ne subit pas, en Poitou, une dissolution aussi profonde que dans certains r&ions da royaume de France. G,araud’s point of departure is the classic study by Duby (1953). 4 Martindale 1969 : 533,542-7 ; Beech 1966 : 205. The wide-ranging, one-sided claims made by the count over his fi4& are well-illustrated (Martindale 1969 : 543) : Comes vero dixit : “Non eos tibi interrogo propter tuum malum, sed etiam per hoc quod meus tu es ad facere meam voluntatem’. Beech ( 1566 : 206-72, recognizes that William’s claim vis&vis Hugh “yol: are mine lto do my will”, would seem to illustrac dictatorial powers claimed by the counts of Poita, over their J$ik&~. 5 Behrends 1976 : no. 5 1. William’s letter does no survive but Fulbert’s answer does. This I 3tter has bee widely used by scholars (Ganshof 1961:&3-8~. Behrends ( 1976 : no. 51) provides the most recer t edition of il. Fulbert does not use the terms uassus o: vassalus but Behrends insists upon translztingfidelk ZY, “v.“*

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