Journal of Historical Sociology Volume 10 Issue 1 1997 [Doi 10.1111%2F1467-6443.00029] K.a....

Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. 10 No. 1 March 1997ISSN 0952-1909

© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997.Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

England, France and their North AmericanColonies: An Analysis of Absolutist StatePower in Europe and in the New World

K.A. STANBRIDGE

Abstract Using Michael Mann's concepts of "despotic" and "infrastructural" power asa starting point, this paper examines how the political associations between the stateelite and dominant groups in "absolutist" England and France gave rise to statemechanisms that resulted in their exercising very different sorts of power, both athome and in their respective North American colonies. It is determined that the systemof governance that defined the infrastructural power of the English state was lessconducive to trans-Atlantic rule than the system that defined the combined despotic/infrastructural power of the French state. The analysis shows how the socialrelationships that comprise the structure of a state come to define the source andcharacter of state power, and how the durability of those relationships can have alasting effect on the exercise of state power.

* * * * *

It is now generally recognised that the powers held by the so-called"absolute" monarchs of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century WesternEurope were much more limited than the term implies. Processesfavouring the centralisation of military and fiscal power, and theadministrative centralisation that those processes necessarilyentailed, helped the crown to emerge as the most powerful ofinfluential groups in these countries. The ability of monarchs towield these new powers was, however, mitigated by the governingapparatus through which they ruled. States of this era consisted oftwo separate yet related components: a state elite – the monarch andhis or her immediate retinue of ministers and councillors – whooccupied the political centre and primary power position ofgovernment, and a network of politicised, semi-autonomous, agentsthat appeared between the centre and civil society. The latter wererepresentatives of dominant groups in society – nobles, clergy,knights, burgesses and other traditional power-holders who stillheld sway over inhabitants in the localities – that were called uponto assist in the rule of the country. Thus, the very groups with whichthe state elite competed to acquire supreme power in the realm alsomanned the political apparatus through which the state elite ruled.So the power of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century states was not"absolute." It varied 1) with the degree to which the state elitedominated other powerful groups in society, and 2) with the capacityof the state elite to induce representatives of these same groups toadminister royal directives.

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© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997.

These two components of "absolutist" state power are captured ina typology of state power put forth by Michael Mann (1986: 169-170;1988: 5-6; 1995: 59). The first component corresponds to what Manncalls the distributive or "despotic" power of the state, and is measuredby the scope of activities that the state elite can undertake withoutroutine negotiation with dominant groups in civil society. The moreautonomous is the state elite from other important groups in society,the more despotic power the state elite holds. The second componentrepresents the collective or “infrastructural” power of the state, thepower that derives from the institutional capacity of the state topenetrate territories and implement political decisions. The moreable are the state elite and the dominant group members staffing thestate apparatus to administer central directives, the greater is theinfrastructural power of the state.

I believe Mann's distinction is important because it acknowledgesthat state power is not unidimensional. Notions of "strong" and"weak" states are not as straightforward as is often maintained. AsMann tells us, the power of most modern states represents acombination of these two forms of power. One must establish the"mix" of despotic and infrastructural power exercised by a given stateto obtain a true picture of its power.

With regard to the powers of seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuryWestern European states, however, Mann is unequivocal. He maintainsthat "absolutist" states had "pronounced despotic but littleinfrastructural power." He argues that, although the state elite mayhave been able to act autonomously, the semi-autonomous nature ofstate agents of this period so inhibited the ability of the politicalcentre to coordinate state activities that the infrastructural power ofthese states was negligible (Mann 1995: 60). The gradual developmentof a number of what Mann terms "logistical techniques," including adivision of labour between the state's main activities, the growth ofliteracy, the standardisation of coinage, weights and measures, andthe improvement of communications and transportation, expandedthe infrastructural power of these states (Mann 1988: 9). The modernstate, with its huge infrastructural range, represents the culminationof these processes.

This depiction of "absolutist" state power is problematic. Thatstates of this era held less infrastructural power than do modernstates is unquestionably true. But the crown and its agents didnevertheless manage to raise armies, collect taxes, initiate colonisingventures, and otherwise impose themselves on their respectivepopulations to an unprecedented degree. Dismissing, as Mann does,the infrastructural powers of seventeenth- and eighteenth-centurystates as negligible contributes little to our understanding of howthese states managed to administer state business in spite of therelative autonomy of their agents.

29England, France and their North American Colonies


If, however, we were to abandon Mann's notion of infrastructuralpower as the outgrowth of certain evolutionary processes and insteadaccept infrastructural power as a feature of all states, I believe theresulting analysis would show that the power of "absolutist" stateswas more complex than Mann allows. Like modern states, states ofthe seventeenth and eighteenth centuries would be understood toexercise a "mix" of the two sorts of power. The aim would then be toestablish the extent to which the state elite were autonomous fromdominant groups in civil society, or held despotic power, and toassess how the state elite and dominant groups (in their roles as stateofficials) coordinated their activities to implement state directivesand exercise infrastructural power.

The following is just such an examination of the "absolutist" statesof England and France, and the polities of their respective NorthAmerican colonies. I hope to show that the distinction betweendespotic and infrastructural power not only provides a good way inwhich to understand the powers wielded by the English and Frenchstates during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but helpsaccount for some of the differences in how these states governed theirterritorial possessions in the "New World," and the difficultiesencountered in doing so.

The process of political unification was evident in England as early asthe tenth century. Anglo Saxon, then Norman, monarchs developedand refined administrative and coercive measures that allowed themto subjugate rival regional interests and erect a "national" system ofgovernance. By 1100, no earl or baron had enough land or power tothreaten the political centre; by the end of the twelfth century thesovereignty of the monarch was comparatively secure (Birnbaum1981: 72; Brewer 1989: 3-4; Campbell 1980; Myers 1964: 141-142;Sayer 1992: 1393-1394; Strayer 1970: 36-44).

As in most European countries, a "parliament," manned byrepresentatives of the most powerful groups in society, emerged toreinforce monarchical decisions and expedite enforcement of royalrulings. The fourteenth century was the most formative in theEnglish case. England's Parliament was not plagued by the regionaland social discord that undermined the strength and unity of manyof the assemblies on the continent. Parliament became the primarybody through which the king would consult with local powers andconflicts were resolved. Acting together, the king, lords and commonsrepresented a substantial concentration of power, able to pass andimplement royal policy with sizable force (Brewer 1989: 4-5; Elton1974: 30-31, 37-38, 50; Miller 1970; Spufford 1967: 1-2, 16; Strayer,1970: 45; Myers 1964: 143-144, 150-151).

Although early Parliaments served to enhance and enforce royal

30 K. A. Stanbridge


power, the assemblies also represented a potential institutional focusfor opposition to the crown (Brewer 1989: 4; Elton 1974: 31). This factbecame increasingly evident over the course of the fourteenth andfifteenth centuries as the political, legislative and financial functionsof Parliament increased (Russell, 1973: 91-94). Ironically, theconditions responsible for the emergence of a strong central powerholder in England were the same factors that contributed to thewaning of monarchical autonomy. To enhance their power over therealm, English monarchs had authorised that representatives ofdominant groups take part in the political decision-making process.England's most influential subjects thus became an integral part ofthe polity at an early date. The absence of regional particularism,which helped unify the assembly in their support of royal decrees,became the basis for collective Parliamentary opposition to thecrown. The subjugation of regional powers and the early developmentof a "national" system of governance meant that Parliamentaryopposition from the thirteenth century usually took the form of morepowerful, nation-wide demands, rather than narrow, particularistclaims (Myers 1964: 147). Although the ability of monarchs tomanage it varied (Clark 1986; Fryde 1970: 14-30; Sayles 1974: 134-135), by the sixteenth century, Parliament – created to serve as aninstrument of the king – became a virtual partner in the activities ofroyal government.

England's political past influenced the type of power the Englishstate came to exercise during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.The military concentration happening on the European mainlandduring the early- and mid-1600's was less evident in England.Whereas in France and Spain armies experienced almost continuousgrowth during this period – military troops in the former numbered155,000 in 1635 and 279,000 by 1678 (Finer 1975: 101) – England'smilitary history was characterised by a succession of suddenexpansions of troops to meet emergencies, followed by a reduction inthe size of the army in peacetime (Barnett 1970: xix). Only during theInterregnum and the rule of James II did numbers exceed 30,000(Brewer 1989: 8; Rogers 1977: 17). And in contrast to its continentalcounterparts, the English state failed to establish a standing armybetween the fifteenth and late seventeenth centuries (ibid. 1989: 8).Like other powers, England called upon hired mercenaries for foreignexpeditions, but relied on the militia, as opposed to regular nativeforces, for domestic defence (Brewer 1989: 9; Finer 1975: 101-102,112-113).

Parliament's recalcitrance had much to do with the inability ofEngland's monarchs to establish a standing army during this period.The powerful elites in the assemblies instituted barriers to thedevelopment of a strong, centralised military, withholding or placing



conditions upon the monarch's right to raise funds for the maintenanceof troops. By preserving the fiscal dependence of the crown, Parliamentsof the seventeenth century kept England out of most European warsof the same period. Support of the militia also ensured that themonarch could not increase his or her despotic power over civilsociety using a standing army. Militia commanders were usuallymagnates themselves and thus easier for members of Parliament tocontain than crown-controlled officers (Brewer 1989: 137-138, 139;Finer 1975: 120; Russell 1973: 103; Smith 1955: 316-320).

Of course history tells us that, despite continued Parliamentaryopposition to military centralisation, England did take part in thehuge campaigns of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.Faced with the threat of other major powers, a standing army wasfinally, albeit reluctantly, approved by Parliament after 1688 (Rogers1977: 17). Thereafter, the English army and navy trebled in size(Brewer 1989: 29; Finer 1975: 122-123); military expenditures roseto about 80 percent of total state expenditures during some periodsof the eighteenth century (Brewer 1989: 137; Mann 1980: 193). Butmembers of Parliament still regarded the existence of a standingarmy with suspicion during this period and continued to keep a closeeye on any attempt by the crown to increase its control over themilitary. Most military expenditures continued to go to themaintenance of the navy and the subsidisation of hired troops forforeign campaigns, and towards the militia. As well, Parliamentratified the The Bill of Rights in 1689, legislation that required thatParliament approve the maintenance of a standing army in times ofpeace. And influentials in Parliament continued their traditionalpattern of granting funds for troop increases during times of war andreducing them when peace broke out (Brewer 1989: 29-31, 43-44;Finer 1975: 123-124; Hayter 1978: 20, 22; Rogers 1977: 17-19, 31;Smith 1955: 368). So, although the demands of war impelled Englishinfluentials to concede a more centralised military, they still managedto limit the extent to which the state elite could use the armed forcesas a means to increase its autonomy and despotic power.

Many monarchs exploited the new opportunities to acquire wealthand financial independence wrought by the centralisation ofcommercial activities. The central administration of domestic exchangeand production, as well as international trade, allowed the crown togarner revenue from indirect taxes and royal monopoly grants(Brewer 1989: 144; Corrigan and Sayer 1985: 66; Kimmel 1988: 134,148-149, 165). Throughout the seventeenth century, theParliamentary representatives of the country's dominant groupstried, with varied success, to control the crown's access to thesefunds and check its expansion of despotic power (Kimmel 1988: 143,151, 165-166; Maitland 1963: 90-94; Smith 1955: 315). As the power

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of Parliament grew, however, influentials in the assemblies wereincreasingly able to limit the fiscal autonomy of the English stateelite. By 1660, the granting of royal monopolies was prohibited,and the crown's right to regulate economic activity withoutrecourse to Parliament was suspended (Corrigan and Sayer 1985:81-82). After 1688, it was the assemblies that determined themeans by which the crown could raise revenue (Brewer 1989: 88).They also came to acquire greater control over the type of taxesthat the monarch could impose, favouring those over whichParliament had greatest control (Beckett 1985; Brooks 1974;Mathias and O'Brien 1976). It is true that some kings stillmanaged to circumvent the assembly and raise independentrevenues. But the degree to which the state elite could engage insuch activity was hindered considerably by the power of dominantgroups in Parliament.

Interestingly, the same historical particularities that gave rise toconditions that eventually inhibited the despotic power of the stateelite in England allowed for the development of an administrativeapparatus through which monarchs of this period were able toexercise considerable infrastructural power. The absence of regionalrivals allowed for the development of a "national" system of ruleemanating from the crown. As the central branches of administrationbegan to emerge and operate "outside" the king's household (Maitland1963: 12-13; Spufford 1967: 4-5; Strayer 1970: 37-40), Englishrulers did not have to struggle to accommodate local authorities toroyal directives, or provide mediators to interpret (or override)regional customs and privileges, like the rulers of more heterogeneouscountries on the continent were forced to do. Directives wereformulated at the centre and imposed uniformly, across regions andsocial ranks, by local influentials (Brewer 1988: 373-374; Brooks1974; Marcham 1960: 51-52; Sayer 1992: 1405-1407). By callingupon the men of the counties to serve as state officials, England'sstate elite also avoided the development of the heavily-staffedadministrative system that would have been required to act as anintermediary between national and local claims (Strayer 1970: 47-48, 73-74). The connection between local agents of the state and thepolitical centre in England was enhanced by the existence of a strongand unified national assembly. The men who served as countycoroners, sheriffs, justices of the peace, assessors and tax collectorswere represented in Parliament or served in the assembliesthemselves. Participation in political decision-making fostered theallegiance of influentials to the English form of governance, which,in turn, facilitated the implementation of royal policy in each county.Staunch support of national directives was evident even at theparish level (Kent 1995).



All this is not to say that English government administration wasexceptionally efficient or free of corruption. Local officials werenotorious for acting in their own interests, and centre-peripheryrelations were not always cooperative (Braddick 1996; Lander 1989).Further, it was not only loyalty toward the English form of governancethat encouraged influentials to seek state service. Governmentoffices were often accompanied by honours and privileges, like theright to collect certain taxes or rent crown lands at preferential rates(Maitland 1963: 175). But, as we shall see, these practices were notas ingrained in, nor as crucial to the operation of, the English stateapparatus as they were the French political system. Although theymay have provided added incentive for people to seek crown service,they were less a basis of dominant group allegiance than a constant"white noise" accompanying English rule, activities that wererecognised as unacceptable by Parliament and many state officials(Brewer 1989: 16-19). It was the widespread legitimacy enjoyed byParliament and the central government that facilitated theimplementation of and adherence to national rulings, and defined theexercise of infrastructural power by the English state.

By the "absolutist" era, Parliament had established itself as thepartner of the monarch in the negotiation of royal directives; theEnglish state elite were unable to act without the approval ofdominant groups through Parliament. The state elite in England heldlittle despotic power. Once formulated, however, directives could becarried out without further negotiation, by a network of agents whothemselves had helped determine the content of the policies. Thepower exercised by the English state was largely infrastructural.

In France, the development of a centralised state occurred muchlater, and at a slower rate, than in England. France was composed ofmany separate principalities that had been acquired in a piecemealfashion over the course of centuries by means of conquest, negotiation,inheritance and marriage. These areas embodied a myriad oflanguages, cultures, and institutions (Behrens 1985: 11; Birnbaum1981: 59-60; Briggs 1977: 2). Despite France's diversity, however,the French king had, by the thirteenth century, emerged as theprimary power holder within this far-flung domain. Rather than tryto overpower particular interests, French monarchs had procuredthe loyalty of regional elites by allowing provinces (in varying degrees)to keep their own customs and institutions. The crown then appointedmen from outside the region to serve as royal officials in the mostimportant positions (Beik 1985: 37; Briggs 1977: 104; Collins 1988:22-26; Major 1962: 115; Mousnier 1974: 607-608; Strayer 1970: 50-51, 53-54). "Branches" of royal institutions were erected in conqueredterritories in the same way (Major 1962: 116).

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As in England, a more centralised assembly emerged in the earlyfourteenth century in France as an adjunct of royal power. But theFrench Estates General were reflective of the more particularist characterof France, and the weaker and more recent consolidation of the Frenchrealm. Gatherings of the Estates General were fraught withdisagreements and disputes between provinces and members of differentsocial ranks, undermining this body's usefulness to the crown (Myers1964: 144-147). In contrast, provincial estates remained strong andunified within their territories (Mousnier 1974: 609-610; Myers 1964:149-150). Increasingly, crown consultation with dominant groups tookplace at the local, rather than the national, level (Myers 1964: 152n;Wolfe 1972: 20-21). The Estates General were continually bypassedand assembled only in rare emergencies (Major 1962: 116). By the endof the fifteenth century, the French national assembly had becomeredundant, useless as a tool for crown negotiation of royal policy (Briggs1977: 6). Without a strong central assembly with the authority tonegotiate on behalf of the entire realm, the monarch's power to passpolicy and bind all citizens uniformly to royal decisions was hampered.

Whereas the strength of Parliament eventually came to diminishthe autonomy of the English monarch, the weakness of France'scentral assembly helped the French ruler emerge as a strong powerfigure during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Successivemonarchs took advantage of France's political divisiveness andsimply ceased convoking regular estates in province after provincebetween the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries (Mousnier 1974:610-611). In most provinces, the estates were simply allowed todisappear, or, if they continued to exist, were deliberately ignored bythe crown (Briggs 1977: 123; Wolfe 1977: 42). Of course the Frenchking still had to obtain the cooperation of his most influentialsubjects in order to rule effectively. "Non-periodical" or irregularestates survived everywhere, and smaller assemblies of notableswere also frequently called by the king for specific purposes: militaryleaders were gathered if the king wished their support or adviceregarding military concerns; economic issues were discussed withtown deputies (Lloyd 1983: 71, 101; Major 1962: 124; Mousnier1984: 229-234; Mousnier 1974: 611; Wolfe 1972: 45, 177, 222-223).Further, the Paris and provincial parlements continued to presentremonstrances concerning royal directives down to the Revolution.More than judicial bodies, the parlements traditionally held anadministrative role in local government, passing judgement onmatters that they deemed important for public order. The crowncould, and often did, overrule decisions made by these bodies. But nomonarch ever questioned the right of the parlements to remonstranceand to register royal directives in the provinces (Behrens 1985: 47-48, 98; Doyle 1987; Moote 1962; Myers 1964: 149-150). But not even



the powerful magistrates of the parlements could alter the actions ofthe French state elite alone. Without recourse to a political body inwhich dominant groups could present a unified opposition to crownpolicy, the power of these groups remained diffuse and weak inrelation to the authority of the crown. Meanwhile, bereft of any othercoherent institution of a national form, the king became the focus ofFrench loyalties. The Hundred Years War and the prolonged Englishmenace reinforced the authority of the monarchy, and saw the crownemerge as the only state institution worthy of allegiance (Llobera1994; Myers 1964: 148; Strayer 1970: 53).

As in the case of England, France's political history influenced thetype of power the French state came to exercise during the "absolutist"period. In the absence of Estates General strong enough to contest royaldecisions, French monarchs of the fifteenth century were less inhibitedthan English rulers in their efforts to assemble a standing army.Although the nobility opposed the establishment of permanent peacetimeforces in 1441, the crown faced few obstacles when, four years later, itcreated the first standing army in Western Europe since Roman timesand promptly imposed an annual levy of 1.2 million livres for itsmaintenance (Collins 1988: 28; Lynn 1980: 569; Myers 1964: 148-149;Wolfe 1972: 36-37). Of course, as in other states of this period, not alltroops were under direct contract with the French king. The crowncontinued to call on regional authorities to raise and lead troops downto the end of the seventeenth century (Finer 1974: 87-89). Further,control exercised by kings of this period over the royal standing armyvaried with the allegiance of its officers and the crown's ability tomaintain discipline, limitations that were still evident in the eighteenthcentury (Behrens 1985: 42; Briggs 1977: 3; Major 1962: 118-119). Butafter 1445, the monarch determined the size and character of France'sarmed forces without having to negotiate with French influentials. Bythe late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, crown control over themilitary was thus well-established, so monarchs were essentially freeto expand and centralise the royal army at will (Briggs 1977: 148;Martin 1990; Symcox 1990). The seventeenth century witnessed thenumber of French troops swell from 55,000 in 1610 under Henry IV to400,000 at the end of the century (Lynn 1980: 568).

The despotic power of the French crown was also evidenced by itscapacity to take advantage of the centralisation of fiscal activities.The crown intervened constantly in the French economy throughoutthe seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, granting subsidies,monopolies and tax exemptions to favoured entrepreneurs to establishor promote certain industries or trade (Behrens 1985: 119-120;Birnbaum 1981: 62-63; Briggs 1977: 68-70; Schaeper 1990: 28-40).Having established control over both direct and indirect taxes by themid-fifteenth century, the crown enhanced its financial position even

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further by manipulating tax rates and the conditions under whichthey were applied. Existing taxes were elaborated and expandedupon, new taxes were introduced, and crown agents were dispensedto the provinces to collect the levies (Dent 1973: 20-21, 35; Doyle1978: 314; Mathias and O'Brien 1976: 626, 630-631; Matthews1958: 8, 20-24, 38-39, 48; Mousnier 1984: 65). Granted, the easewith which the crown was able to do this varied across the provinces.Direct and indirect tax rates had to be negotiated in some areas, mostnotably in the pays d'etats, the provinces that had retained theirestates. But the pays d'etats made up only two-fifths of the realm. Themajority of the provinces were assessed taxes by the crown andassociated agents (Behrens 1985: 73, 75; Dent 1973: Chapter 1;Matthews 1958: 23-26; Wolfe 1972: 47-51; 313). The French stateelite also acquired additional funding from a variety of sources: fromprivate financiers, who used their personal credit to engage capital tolend to the crown; from provincial bodies and the clergy; from the saleand maintenance of offices; even from the officers and tax farmersresponsible for collecting and remitting royal taxes (Behrens 1985:70, 72; Dent 1973: Chapter 2; Matthews 1958: 13-16, 32; Mousnier1984: 36-52, 66). Without a strong institutional focus to contestthese and other activities, dominant groups in France were unable tocheck attempts by the crown to achieve fiscal autonomy.

French particularism had allowed the French crown to acquireconsiderable despotic power. It also gave rise to a state administrationvery different from that in operation in England. The strength of localinstitutions meant that central departments, although they still held"supreme" power over the realm, had to be duplicated in (rather thansimply extended to) each province so that variations in law andcustom could be recognised and incorporated into provincial rulings(Lloyd 1983: 49-52; Major 1962: 116; Wolfe 1972: 16-17). Differencesin provincial strengths also led to differences in the assessment andimposition of taxes (Behrens 1985: 19). Hesitant to call uponprovincial elites with questionable loyalties, the French state eliteassigned officers from outside the region to act as servants of the statewithin each province and to mediate between central and localinterests (Strayer 1970: 52). The most important of these crownservants were the intendants, but also present were crown-appointedtax farmers, who were used to levy most indirect royal taxes, and non-local officials who collected direct taxes and performed other duties(Briggs 1977: 124-125). All this meant that the French crownrequired a disproportionately larger number of government agentsthan did the English crown. At the end of the sixteenth century, therewere 1200 crown servants in England, one for every 4000 inhabitants;in France, there were 40,000 officers, one for every 400 inhabitants(Brewer 1989: 15).



Yet, despite all these apparent obstacles to rule, the king of Francedid manage to exercise a good deal of infrastructural power. InEngland, direct participation in government by dominant groups inParliament fostered their allegiance to the English form of governance,and so facilitated the implementation of royal directives. In theabsence of such a mechanism, the French state elite enticed dominantgroup members into state service and encouraged their loyalty byoffering them perquisites in exchange for their allegiance. Manyoffices, particularly those at the higher levels of the government,military and judicial hierarchies, conferred hereditary nobility; thosethat did not were usually a stepping stone to noble status (Behrens1985: 50-51; Mousnier 1974: 130, 221-222, 148-150). With noblestatus came a number of other social privileges: exemption from thetaille, for example, as well as preference in appointments to royalhousehold offices and civil and ecclesiastical dignities (Bien 1987:93-94; Collins 1988: 7; Mousnier 1974: 124-131). The loyalty ofinfluentials that were not involved directly in the state administrationwas fostered through the sale of profitable monopolies and supplycontracts, and the opportunity to act as bankers to the crown or taxcollectors (Behrens 1985: 70-71; Briggs 1977: 5; Dent 1973: Chapter6; Matthews 1958: 13-16). By the “absolutist” period, many of theseindividuals and their families also had access to the honours,privileges and offices that were once the exclusive domain of thenobility (Behrens 1985: 52, 54, 71; Bonney 1981: 18; Dent 1973:Chapter 7; Mousnier 1974: Chapter 5). The relationship between theFrench state elite and the dominant group members acting asservants of the state was thus one of mutual dependence: by offeringrewards for royal service, the king secured the necessary cooperationof dominant groups; government service provided influential subjectsthe primary means to social and financial advancement.

This does not mean that France’s state administration alwaysworked smoothly. The French method of superimposing royal agentsovertop of existing administrations could result in conflict (Behrens1985: 139). And much has been written about the limits on the powerof the French state elite to compel state agents who owned theiroffices to act in accordance with royal directives. (See J.S. Morrill(1978), for a review of several works on the limits of French“absolutism”). But the military and fiscal power wielded by Frenchkings during this period remains the most convincing evidence of theeffectiveness of the French political apparatus and the magnitude ofthe state’s infrastructural power.

Although seventeenth- and eighteenth-century French monarchshad to contend with the concerns of dominant groups, the latter’sdivisiveness had undermined their ability to resist the will of theFrench state elite. In the absence of any effective dominant group

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resistance, the French state elite exercised considerable autonomy inthe military and fiscal realms. The French state elite held a significantamount of despotic power. The capacity of the French state elite toexercise infrastructural power was also great, but the way in whichthat power was exercised differed from the English system. TheFrench governing apparatus was based on a relationship of mutualdependence between the state elite and state officials. Frenchregionalism may have hindered the ability of local influentials toimpact on crown decision-making, but state service secured thembenefits that encouraged them to act on behalf of the crown anyway.

The type of power exercised by the English and French states in theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries was shaped by the relationshipbetween the state elite and dominant groups as it had becomeembodied in the structure of each state. Let us now examine how thatrelationship, and the type of power that it defined, were constitutedin their colonies in North America.

Until the mid-1600’s, the English crown played a relatively minorrole in the colonisation of America. It confined itself to grantingconcessions to private individuals and companies allowing access toland for settlement (Rutman 1971: 108; Ubbelohde 1968: 10-11). Asa result, early colonisation lacked uniformity. Each area developedaccording to the particular motives of their founders, and colonialinstitutions reflected the unique social and organisational structuresof the founding groups (Leder 1972: 34-64; Rutman 1971: 45-46;Simmons 1976: 13-17, 25-47; Ubbelohde 1968: 14-15). It is true thatsome form of representative assembly was established by powerholders in all the colonies to facilitate rule and attract settlers andinvestors (Koenigsberger 1989: 146; Rutman 1971: 108-111). Butthe scope of power and the requirements of membership of thesebodies differed from settlement to settlement, depending on thenature of the organisation in charge. Further, each colony grew inrelative isolation from the mother country and from other settlements.The presence of king’s agents in all the colonies, collecting duties andenforcing the odd trade regulation (Abbot 1975: 58), had little effecton most colonial governments. And ideological and structural disparitycombined with geography to discourage communication among thecolonies. Left to their own accord, each colony developed andfunctioned much like a small independent nation (Leder 1972:68-77; Rutman 1971: 111-112).

The Restoration saw the end of American colonial“quasi-independence” and the English state enacted directives duringthis period that differed markedly from policy undertaken in the past.In 1660 it imposed what was to be the first of a series of mercantilisttrade directives that did not relent until the revolution. Imperial



agents were dispensed to a number of colonies to collect the newexactions (Abbot 1975: 54, 58; Rutman 1971: 59-61, 111-112;Simmons 1976: 51-52, 55, 169; Ubbelohde 1968: 25-27). Theresponsibilities of existing central agencies, such as the CustomsService and the Treasury, were expanded to include the Americancolonies, and new agencies, namely the Colonial Board and the Boardof Trade, were created to oversee colonial matters (Abbot 1975:57-58, 70; Rutman 1971: 112-113; Simmons 1976: 54-55; Steele1968; Ubbelohde 1968: 26-27; Williams 1964: 14). These changeswere accompanied by attempts on the part of the English state toacquire greater control over the administration of the colonies. Theimperial government began to revoke previous colonial arrangementsand abolish established institutions with the intention of unifyingcolonial rule (Abbot 1975: 58-59, 68; Leder 1972: 77-80; Rutman1971: 113-114; Simmons 1976: 55-56; Ubbelohde 1968: 29-31). TheGlorious Revolution saw the end of the Stuarts’ “colonial experiment,”and the colonies resumed their separate existences (Leder 1972:94-97; Rutman 1971: 117-118; Simmons 1976: 163; Ubbelohde1968: 41-43). These authoritative measures were not without theirconsequences, however. By the early eighteenth century all colonialadministrations approximated the imperial model. Each was ruledby an executive, in most cases crown-appointed, consisting of agovernor, a council or “second house,” and an elected assembly ofinfluential colonials (Abbot 1975: 59, 60; Leder 1972: 97; Simmons1976: 245-248; Ubbelohde 1968: 78-79). Although the crown hadfailed to consolidate colonial rule, it had managed to standardise theway in which each province was administered.

Over the next several decades, the governments of each colonycame to resemble the political profile of the metropolis even more.Like Parliament in England, the elected assemblies gradually cameto dominate provincial politics in America. They fought for and gainedsole taxing power in their regions and American influentials in thelower houses continually sought to curb the authority of theirprovincial executive and establish themselves as an integral part ofthe decision-making apparatus (Abbot 1975: 107-110; Leder 1972:97, 127-130; Rutman 1971: 120; Simmons 1976: 173, 248-253,173). By 1763, control of each province was centred in the assembly,the elected houses operating like “mini-parliaments” in relation to theauthority of the colonial executive (Rutman 1971: 122-124). Americansalso came to influence politics at the imperial level, albeit lessdirectly. Although they did hold some seats in Parliament, theirpower was felt most forcefully through colonial agents and incooperation with interests in the metropolis. As early as 1643, anddown to the American Revolution, interest groups in America engagedthe services of, or collaborated with, individuals and organisations of

40 K. A. Stanbridge


similar purpose overseas to lobby Parliament and sway royal policy(Brown 1970; Kammen 1970; Olson 1992; Simmons 1976: 241-242;Steele 1986: 242-250).

The Seven Years’ War saw another dramatic shift in Britain’smilitary, fiscal and administrative policies in the American colonies.Over the course of the war, large numbers of British regulars weresent to America. After 1760, Britain maintained its militarycommitment in North America, stationing troops in Quebec, CapeBreton, Florida, and other areas to protect its newly acquiredterritories from possible French, Spanish or aboriginal threats.Although British regulars had always been present to some extent inthe colonies, the mother country had, until this point, relied on thecolonists to provide for the lion’s share of their defence. Americansnow encountered a significant imperial military presence on their soil(Abbot 1975: 117; Leder 1972: 146; Rutman 1971: 153-154; Simmons1976: 291, 307). Economic reforms were also launched. Saddled witha huge war debt, and needing to mollify British influentials whorefused to contribute further to the great exactions required for thesupport of the North American colonies, the British state turned tothe American colonists to help pay their fair share of the cost of thewar (Abbot 1975: 117-118; Leder 1972: 146-148; Rutman 1971: 144,154-155; Simmons 1976: 293, 296, 297). So great was its need forfunds that the British state, once traditional taxing and collectionoptions were exhausted, began to infringe upon the traditional rightof colonial assemblies to control taxation within their own territories(Leder 1972: 149-151. 155-158, 161-162; Rutman 1971: 157-158,161; Simmons 1976: 296-297). It also began to expand its regulatoryauthority into areas other than trade and further restrict the powersof the assemblies in order to strengthen the political and administrativepower of the metropolis in America (Leder 1972: 158, 171-172;Rutman 1971: 162-163; Simmons 1976: 298, 301-306, 339-340).

The British state’s decision to impose more authoritative military,fiscal and governing policies coincided with a growing animositybetween American and British interest groups. Changes in theoperation and character of these groups began to drive a wedgebetween the British and American sides of the lobbies.Communications between interests declined; colonials ceased usingLondon agents and organisations to lobby for them and began topetition Parliament directly. A fierce competition between British andAmerican groups for the favours of Parliament and the crown ensued.After 1765, the influence of American groups in Parliament wanedconsiderably (Brown 1970; Kammen 1970; Koehn 1994: 120n; Olson1992).

The response of American influentials to the British state’s shift incolonial policy and to their own loss of power in both the colonial and



imperial assemblies grew increasingly hostile over the course of thepre-revolutionary period. General resistance to British directives wasaccompanied by a gradual increase in collective action, both withinand across provincial lines (Leder 1972: 152-153, 157, 177-180;Simmons 1976: 301, 308-318, 349). The passage of the Stamp Actgave rise to a number of revolts in 1765 and prompted the meetingof the Stamp Act Congress, a group consisting of representativesfrom nine provinces brought together to petition the British state onbehalf of all the colonies for the repeal of the Act (Leder 1972: 153;Rutman 1971: 158; Simmons 1976: 309-310). The Stamp ActCongress was the first of an increasing number of instances whendominant groups in the American colonies would come together inopposition to acts passed by the British state. The Townshend Dutiesof 1767 gave rise to another collaborative colonial boycott of Britishtrade and goods the following year (Leder 1972: 161; Simmons 1976:316). And the emergence of “committees of correspondence”throughout the colonies in the early 1770’s was in response toattempts by the British state to emasculate the powers of the colonialassemblies (Rutman 1971: 163, 168; Simmons 1976: 311, 335).American elite cooperation culminated in The First ContinentalCongress, which met in Philadelphia in 1774 to denounce and urgedisobedience toward British acts (Leder 1972: 174-176; Simmons1976: 346). The Second Continental Congress met a year later, andremained in session throughout the ensuing war, assumingorganisational and fiscal control of continental military forces andother governmental functions (Leder 1972: 183-184; Rutman 1971:170, 172, 176). By December, 1775, royal and proprietary governmentshad been abolished in all the colonies except New Jersey, Pennsylvaniaand Maryland; none remained in July, 1776 (Rutman 1971: 172).Imperial authority had been replaced by an inter-provincial alliance.

Imperial governance in the American colonies was less an extensionof the British system of rule than its reconstitution on aprovince-by-province basis. In each colony, the despotic power of theBritish state elite (i.e. the colonial executive in most colonies) waschecked by dominant groups in the provincial assemblies.Participation in political decision-making encouraged the cooperationof the colonial notables manning the governing apparatus, facilitatingthe implementation of policy and, hence, the exercise of infrastructuralpower.

However, American influentials lacked an institution in which theycould come together and resolve their grievances with the Britishstate elite collectively. Although they did have a say in Parliament,their involvement in imperial politics was indirect, expressed via theirconnections with interests in the metropolis. The importance of sucha body to the exercise of infrastructural power in America became

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clear when the British state decided to pursue a more overtly despoticpolicy in the colonies during and after the Seven Years’ War. Colonialdissatisfaction with imperial directives was expressed forcefully inthe local assemblies. In the absence of a political institution throughwhich dominant groups in America could vent their hostilitiescollectively, however, opposition remained diffuse and largelyineffective. And any hope that a unified American opposition could belaunched in Parliament waned as the already tenuous Anglo-Americanties that had linked colonial influentials to Parliament weakened. Itwas not until this time that representatives of dominant groups inAmerica began to cross provincial boundaries and negotiate with theimperial state collectively. The results of this collaberation are wellknown. The infrastructural power of the British state as manifestedin the New World ultimately proved inadequate to the task of rulingthe American colonies.

The French crown, like its English counterpart, did not partakedirectly in the colonisation of North America until the mid-seventeenthcentury. It confined itself to granting land and trade monopolies toindividuals and companies, who were largely responsible for fundingoverseas ventures. Like the American colonies the colonisation ofNew France began as a private, usually commercial or religious,enterprise (Eccles 1990: 34; McInnis 1982: 39; Stewart 1989: 10;Trudel 1973: 187-188). But New France did not, during its period of“quasi-independence,” experience the kind of development thatoccurred in the English settlements to the south. Its populationremained low because of the failure of trade companies to satisfysettlement requirements, and because its primary industry, the furtrade, required very little labour (McInnis 1982: 34-35; Trudel 1973:251-252). Conflicts in Europe spilled over onto the American continent,and were responsible for the failure of a number of colonisationventures (Boulle 1981: 103-104; Eccles 1969: 27-28; McInnis 1982:35-37; Trudel 1973: 172-180). Indian wars often blocked fur-traderoutes, the colony’s economic lifeline, and Iroquois attacks discouragedwork outside established centres, hindering the clearing andsettlement of new land (Eccles 1964: 3-4; McInnis 1982: 39-41;Stewart 1989: 10; Trudel 1973: 217-227, 270-272). The depressedcondition of the European fur market after 1650 further underminedthe colony’s economy. By the 1660’s, it was experiencing extremeshortages of grain and other foodstuffs, and its administration wasplagued by power struggles (Trudel 1973: 272-277).

In 1663, Louis XIV and his Minister of Marine, Jean BaptisteColbert, turned their attentions to their possessions in North America.New France was declared a royal province, and the control ofadministration, justice, territory and trade in that colony was



transferred from the financially destitute Company of the HundredAssociates to the crown (Eccles 1990: 59; Eccles 1964: 6; McInnis1982: 45-46; Trudel 1973: 279). Royal troops were immediatelydeployed to New France to deal with the Iroquois threat (Eccles 1990:65, 69-70, 116-117; Eccles 1987: 111, 112-113; Eccles 1964: 24-25;McInnis 1982: 46; Stanley 1960: 13-20; Stewart 1989: 11-12). Crowncapital poured into the colony to aid in establishing new industriesand government restrictions were placed on the fur trade in attemptsto improve the self-sufficiency and economic diversity of the province(Eccles 1990: 79-80, 85-91; Eccles 1964: 52-53, 54-55, 63, 109-110;McInnis 1982: 59-60). The crown also launched a massive programof state-subsidised settlement that offered a variety of perquisites tocolonists to encourage population growth (Eccles 1990: 80-81;Eccles 1969: 53-54; Eccles 1964: 47-48; McInnis 1982: 54-58;Stewart 1989: 12-13). Policies of a similar nature were pursued by theFrench crown until the Conquest (Eccles 1990: 130-131; Eccles1964: 211-212, 217; Miquelon 1988).

Crown takeover wrought administrative changes as well. After1663, New France was governed directly by the crown, just like anyother possession of France. Accordingly, it was assigned a royaladministration, composed of a governor-general, local governors inAcadia, Montreal and Trois-Rivières, an intendant, a bishop, and fiveappointed officials. Although as a body they were given authorisationto promulgate laws and dispense justice in the colony, the king andhis ministers retained ultimate power over colonial activities, andcould change or nullify any ruling passed by the council (Eccles 1990:70-72; Eccles 1964: 28-33; McInnis 1982: 48-49; Stewart 1989: 12).No form of representative assembly was established in the newprovince (McInnis 1982: 48). Authorities of New France were knownto call meetings of influential colonists to discuss the colony, butthese assemblies were held only for specific purposes, much like theperiodic consultations that took place in France, and were not regularor connected in any way. Further, members were not elected, butchosen by the governor (Eccles 1990: 74; Reid 1946).

Crown control of New France opened up new opportunities forinfluential individuals on both sides of the Atlantic to involvethemselves in state service and so enter the system of privileges thatconstituted the French form of governance. As in France, court andfamily connections proved crucial to obtaining high governmentoffice (Eccles 1964: 65, 77; Miquelon 1987: 249). Although mostcolonial civil servants were already of noble status (Eccles 1990: 72),experience in the colonies improved their chances at promotion in themetropolis (Miquelon 1987: 247; Reid 1946: 23). Their privilegedpositions in the colony also provided them a means to increase theirwealth, furnishing them with many opportunities to engage in

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profit-making pursuits (Eccles 1990: 90-91; Eccles 1964: 55-56, 64,103-108, 140, 189, 211-212; Miquelon 1987: 250-251). WhereasFrench influentials dominated the civil service in New France,colonials monopolised the military. In 1687, the crown approved thatCanadians be appointed officers of the Troupes de Marine, NewFrance’s main military force (Stanley 1960: 21-25; Steele 1969: 16).Thereafter, military service became the avenue of choice by whichwealthy colonials advanced themselves and their sons (Eccles 1990:117-119; Eccles 1987: 114-117; Stewart 1989: 15). In addition toacquiring noble status, military officers, like their counterparts ingovernment, enjoyed profits from trade (Bosher 1987: Chapter 4;Eccles 1990: 103, 120, 127; Eccles 1987: 119; Eccles 1964: 204,210). Favoured French and Canadian merchants and financiers alsobenefited from crown control of New France. As holders of leases orsubleases on trade, they collected taxes and duties on colonialexports, activities that garnered them considerable profit (Eccles1990: 88-89; Eccles 1964: 101-102; Miquelon 1987: 58-61). Otherstook advantage of their connections with the French state to acquirelucrative contracts to supply and maintain the French military in thecolony (Bosher 1988: 444; MacDonald 1971: 131). Colonial tradersthen used their wealth to purchase ennobling offices, and althoughfew ever reached the upper ranks of French society, many managedto improve their and their family’s positions in the French hierarchy(Bosher 1987: 60-65).

The network of state service even extended to the clergy and thecoureurs de bois. In return for maintaining trade routes and goodrelations in the west, French missionaries received authorised accessto Indian souls and the coureurs de bois the opportunity to legitimatelypursue their interests on the territorial fringes of French NorthAmerica (Eccles 1987: 35). Politicians, military officers, missionaries,merchants and traders – all of these individuals were part of theimperial network of influence operating in New France. And, as inFrance, all roads led back to Paris and the crown.

Whereas the British method of rule was reconstituted in theAmerican colonies, the administration and governance of New Francewas an extension of the French system. The despotic power of thestate elite was evident at royal takeover when the crown, with little orno consultation with groups in France or in the colony, immediatelyestablished a strong military presence in the province, seized controlof its economic development, and instituted an administration thatmirrored systems operating in other French provinces at the time.Infrastructural power was also exercised in much the same way as inFrance. The imperial network that bestowed social and financialprivileges to influentials in exchange for crown service was simplyexpanded to include the colony. Already accustomed to operating



over considerable distances, the French form of governance waswell-suited to rule in the New World.

New France fell to the British in 1759. In 1763, a royal proclamationdeclared that Canada was to be remade into a British colony (Brunet1963: 7; McInnis 1982: 135; Neatby 1966: 16, 33). Of course theBritish state could not implement any new directives without the helpof colonial influentials. In this case, it had to secure the cooperationof both the newly-arrived British and the Canadians to rule thecolony. It was the last group with which the British state was mostconcerned. More than ninety-five percent of the population of the St.Lawrence Valley was Canadian and Roman Catholic at the time ofBritish takeover (Brunet 1963: 7; Francis et al. 1988: 172), yet it wascrucial that their allegiance be secured.

Canadian seigneurs, merchants and ecclesiastics were accustomedto a system of governance in which state service was rendered inexchange for financial and social rewards. Influential Britons, on theother hand, were used to a system that incorporated representativesof dominant groups directly into state operations. The latter wereanxious to influence policy in the new territory through a colonialassembly. The British state was in the difficult position of having toappease both groups.

The British stationed a standing army in Quebec after the Conquestto deal with American and aboriginal incursions, and maintained itsmilitary presence in the colony, as well as the cost of its maintenance,until the 1840’s. Already leery of the province’s military governor,James Murray, Quebec’s British inhabitants accused the Britishstate of authorising autocracy in the new colony. In contrast, theseactions were endorsed by Canadian influentials and inhabitants,who were accustomed to living with a standing army on their soil(Eccles 1987: 124; Neatby 1966: 21, 145). Opportunities for FrenchCanadians to acquire military postings in the colony were, however,withdrawn with the onset of British rule. Now British, instead ofFrench, military men and imperial agents exploited their positions ofpower to enhance their personal profit (Francis, et al. 1988: 167,169).

The tax farming method of revenue collection, once the source ofprofit for Canadians, was replaced with a more centralised systemreminiscent of that imposed on the American provinces. Imperialagents directly responsible to the Treasury Board in London weredispatched to the colony to collect taxes and duties (Neatby 1966: 96).Commerce in the colony quickly came under the control of wealthyBritons. Unable to compete with incoming British merchants, manyCanadian fur traders merged with their wealthier counterparts aslesser partners. This relationship worked reasonably well for several

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years, but by 1770, all colonial ventures were controlled byBritish merchants, who held the majority of political clout, capitaland credit in the colony (Eccles 1969: 151; Francis et al. 1988:172, 186; Iguarta 1990: 263; McInnis 1982: 149-152; McNaught1988: 47; Neatby 1966: 73-75). Britons also came to hold themajority of the monopolies on trade in fur and fishing, and therights to supply military posts (Neatby 1966: 64-65, 66-68,Iguarta 1990: 263-266). Canadians who had hoped to cash in onthe departure of wealthy French merchants were relegated to asubordinate position in the colony’s economy.

It was the organisation of Quebec’s administration, however, thatwas to have the most divisive effect on the colony’s dominant groups.Initially, as outlined in the Proclamation of 1763, government andadministration in Quebec was to mirror operations in other Britishcolonies in North America. But the province’s new governor soondiscovered that the implementation of many of the Proclamation’sdirectives would prove problematic. The legislation called for theestablishment of a full-blown assembly in Quebec (Lawson 1989: 33,39-40; Marshall 1971: 46-47). But the English Test Act barred themajority French-Roman Catholic population from public office (Brunet1963: 7; McInnis 1982: 155). The subjection of 70,000 Canadians tothe rule of a tiny minority of Anglo-Protestants would not only havebeen, as officials in London argued, a travesty of the Britishrepresentative system, but the governor himself was loathe to handover power of the colony to a handful of Protestant merchants whoseviews he personally detested (Eccles 1969: 144-145; Francis et al.1988: 172; Lawson 1989: 40, 55; McInnis 1982: 156-157; Neatby1966: 30, 35). With the approval of the British state, the new governordecided to ‘temporarily’ postpone the election of an assembly andlegislate by appointed council only. This ‘interim’ measure lastedthirty years and several administrations (Brunet 1963: 7; Neatby1966: 33).

The institution of British law was also a concern. Canadianshad little understanding of British law, and many fell victim toexploitative British judges and officials, who held no respect forCanadians’ customs or language (Brunet 1963: 7; Eccles 1969:155-156; Francis et al. 1988: 167). Rather than outrightly imposeBritish law on the new colony, therefore, in 1764 Murrayimplemented a system of law courts that, although patterned onthe British system, sought to amalgamate the two forms of justice(Francis et al. 1988: 167-168; Lawson 1989: 48-50; Marshall1971: 48-49; Neatby 1966: Chapter 5). And, although Murray didconcede to the demands of Britons with regard to land claims andregistration, seigneurial land-holding was maintained (McNaught1988: 48; Neatby 1966: 63).



Nearly all of the above actions taken on the part of the British stateprovoked negative reactions from either Canadian or Britishinfluentials. In some instances, they raised the ire of both groups.Predictably, the British state’s decision to postpone the election of anassembly in the colony did little to endear Britons to the newadministration. From the onset of British rule in Quebec, Britishmerchants and notables in the colony complained bitterly of Murray’srule and agitated for the establishment of an elected assembly(Brunet 1963: 7-8; Francis et al. 1988: 172; Lawson 1989: 53-54,111; McInnis 1982: 157, 159-160; McNaught 1988: 48; Neatby 1966:38, 132-133). Murray’s arrangement of the colony’s legal systemcame under fire from both the Canadians and the British. Britishgroups complained of the vaguely defined allowances made toCanadian law, charging that their ambiguity threatened Britons’ fullenjoyment of “liberty under British laws” (Lawson 1989: 51-52;Neatby 1966: 99). Canadian influentials feared that, despite Murray’sallowances for French-Canadian justice, British law wouldnevertheless be officially applied in all courts, subjecting Canadiansto untold legal abuses (Francis et al. 1988; Neatby 1966: 128). And,although the adoption of British land registration practices pleasedBritish influentials, it drew indictments from Canadians (Neatby1966: 130). Canadians also expressed their dissatisfaction at havingbeen left out of the British patronage system. They requested thattheir main avenue for upward mobility under the French regime berestored, and that some Canadians be taken into the king’s service(Francis et al. 1988: 173; Iguarta 1990: 268-269). It became clearthat if the imperial state was to secure both Canadian and Britishcooperation in the new colony, an alternative system had to beestablished.

The Quebec Act of 1774 stipulated that Quebec would continue tobe ruled by a governor and council only. The council was, however,enlarged, and some positions were made available for CanadianRoman Catholics of the governor’s choosing. Although British criminallaw was retained, the Act confirmed and strengthened the practice ofFrench civil law in the colony, and legally confirmed the seigneurialland-holding system and seigneurial dues (Eccles 1969: 157, 161-162;Francis et al. 1988: 174; McInnis 1982: 160; McNaught 1988: 49).

The Quebec Act did little to mollify grumbling Britons, whosegrievances, it seemed, had barely been considered (Brunet 1963: 13;Eccles 1969: 162; Francis et al. 1988: 174, 186; Neatby 1966: 137).This time, however, their position was strengthened by the arrival ofseveral thousand wealthy and influential Loyalists in the early 1780’sfrom the now-independent American colonies (Brunet 1963: 11-12;McInnis 1982: 181-186; McNaught 1988: 57-59; Stewart 1989: 19).The Act ultimately proved to have a divisive effect on influential

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Canadians (Brunet 1963: 12-13). The legislation received the supportof the Canadian clergy, seigneurs and notables, who had beenpetitioning the British government for these concessions, and forwhom it was essentially designed (Francis et al. 1988: 187; McNaught1988: 49; Neatby 1966: 127, 133). The Act restored to these Canadiannotables some of the privileges that they had enjoyed under Frenchrule. Other Canadians agreed with their British counterparts that theAct needed amending. However, they disagreed on how to achievegreater influence over the administration of the colony. Conservativesdesired some slight modifications to the Act: an increase in theprestige and power of those who functioned within the Britishsystem, perhaps by demanding greater Canadian participation ingovernment. There also emerged a growing party of reformists, madeup of Canadian merchants, notaries, lawyers and the like, with thesupport of some seigneurs and higher clergy, who totally rejected theAct and joined the British in their demands for an elected assembly.They believed that the French-Canadian cause, the retention ofCanadian religion, language, and culture, could be better served bya Canadian representative body. The struggle between these variouspower groups continued into the late eighteenth century (Brunet1963: 13-15; Francis et al. 1988: 189-190; McInnis 1982: 186-188).In 1791, the British state decided once again to amend the colonialconstitution.

The Constitutional, or Canada, Act divided the old Province ofQuebec into two separate regions: Upper Canada, an area with amajority of Loyalists and other Britons; and Lower Canada, wheremost of the inhabitants were French-Canadian. The Quebec Actremained in place in the lower province, and the preservation of theseigneurial system, French law and Catholicism was reaffirmed. Theupper province was granted British justice and a British freeholdland tenure system. Each province was outfitted with a governor, anda bicameral legislature, made up of a Legislative Council and anelected assembly (Brunet 1963: 15; McInnis 1982: 190-191; McNaught1988: 61-62).

The reaction of British groups to the new Act was mixed. Britishmerchants in the Upper Province were pleased with the new legislation.Those Britons in Quebec, Montreal and Trois Rivières, however, whohad long lobbied for the repeal of the Quebec Act, found themselvescut off from their counterparts in the Upper Province and still subjectto Canadian laws, land tenure practices and religion (Brunet 1963:15-16; Francis et al. 1988: 191; McNaught 1988: 61-62). Despitetheir minority position, however, the British inhabitants of the LowerProvince were confident that they would come to control thegovernment of that region now that they had finally acquired theirrepresentative body.



Except for the few influentials who had benefited from the governingsystem under the Quebec Act, Canadians were largely satisfied withthe new colonial constitution. Despite the considerable influence ofthe British executive, Canadians learned to make use of therepresentative system, and soon came to dominate the assembly inLower Canada (Brunet 1963: 16; Francis et al. 1988: 244-245;McNaught 1988: 62, 67, 86-87; Stewart 1989: 23-24).

The first three decades after the British conquest of New Francesaw as many attempts by the British imperial state to reconcile twoconflicting systems of rule. The military, economic and governingpolicies that developed immediately following the Conquest hadmuch in common with the despotic nature of rule under the Frenchimperial state. But the vast system of privilege that had once linkedFrench Canadians to the crown, the source of the French state elite’sinfrastructural power, was dismantled and replaced by a systemdominated by British subjects and relations. With the passage of theQuebec Act in 1774, the British state restored some of the privilegesthat Canadian dominant groups had enjoyed under French rule. Butthe growing number of wealthy and influential British subjects inQuebec were joined by British notables in the metropolis in theirdemands for a full reconstitution of the British form of governance inthe colony. The Constitutional Act of 1791 represented yet anotherattempt by the British state to reconcile the disparate interests ofdominant British and French groups. This time, the imperial stateappeared to have abandoned attempts to meld British and Frenchforms of governance and instead segregated the two systems bydividing the province along ethnic lines. Although many of theconditions contained in the Quebec Act remained in place in the lowerprovince, the imperial government’s decision to allow for electedassemblies in both the Canadas established permanently a form ofgovernance in the colony more akin to that associated with theexercise of British state power than French state power. Attempts tocombine the two forms of government had failed, undermined by thetenacity with which both British and Canadian influentials sought toestablish the system of governance to which each had beenaccustomed.

The preceding analysis reveals that the type of power exercised by thestate in England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries wasquite different from the sort of power exercised by the French state.The English state elite – the monarch and his or her immediateretinue of ministers and councillors – wielded little despotic power;the state elite in France was comparatively autonomous. And whereaseach state possessed considerable infrastructural power, the politicalapparatus through which that power was exercised was different.

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These differences were evident in the way in which these statesruled their colonies in North America. The French state elite exercisedpower in New France in much the same way as in provinces in the OldWorld, appointing royal representatives to the government to carryout despotic directives, and extending across the Atlantic the networkof privilege that linked state servants to the crown, the basis of Frenchinfrastructural power. The power exercised by the British state ineach of the American colonies was also consistent with its power inthe metropolis. Attempts by the British state elite to increase despoticpower through colonial representatives were countered by Americaninfluentials in the provincial assemblies. Infrastructural power wasexercised in each province through a network of agents (colonialnotables) who had helped determine the content of the policies theywere charged to implement.

That the French method of rule, in particular the manner inwhich infrastructural power was exercised, was more conduciveto colonial rule than the British form of governance was true fora number of reasons. The French system of governance arose asthe most effective means by which the political centre couldexercise power in a vast and heterogeneous realm. Alreadyaccustomed to operating over considerable distances, it wascomparatively easily adapted to colonial rule. The efficacy of theFrench system did not go unnoticed by contemporaries. JamesMurray was surprised that the French had been able to rule sucha vast colony so cheaply and with so few men (Eccles 1987: 137).In contrast, the British method of rule, especially the way in whichinfrastructural power was exercised, reflected the smaller, morehomogeneous character of the country in which it developed.Dependent as it was on the actual presence of influentials in thecentral assembly, it was not so much extended as reproduced ineach of the colonies. As a result, the focus of influentials inAmerica was different than that of notables in New France.Influentials in the French colony, like their counterparts inFrance, acquired power and prestige through their associationwith the crown. This secured their allegiance to the metropoliswhich facilitated imperial rule in the province. In contrast, therewas little but informal ties to link American elites to the imperialstate. Influential Americans gained their power instead fromparticipation in provincial politics, especially in the assemblies.Their allegiance to the British form of participatory governancemay have been firm, but their loyalty toward the metropolis itselfwas moderated by their attachment to provincial politics.

It could be said that the British state elite in America was faced witha task that had confronted French state elite for centuries: that ofconsolidating the rule of several distinct provinces, each with



established authorities and institutions. The French crown had beenable to undermine the powers of the provincial estates through itsrepresentatives in the regions, while still retaining the necessaryloyalties of regional elites by means of rewards and privileges. Incontrast, the representatives of the British state elite in America wereunable to overpower influentials in the colonial assemblies.Furthermore, a legacy of parliamentary politics first in Britain, thenAmerica, precluded the implementation of an infrastructuralapparatus in the colonies that did not allow for the participation ofdominant groups in government decision-making.

Had the British infrastructural apparatus been reconstituted atthe continental level, and an American ‘parliament’ been establishedfrom the outset, perhaps British rule in America would have beenmore effective. Colonial opposition to British directives could havebeen aired and dealt with within the imperial governing system.There would have been no need for colonial influentials to engage incollective action outside the realm of the existing state. Furthermore,the participation of American elites in imperial politics would havebeen more direct, encouraging their allegiance to the metropolis. It isinteresting that at least one eighteenth-century American believedthat the creation of a continental parliament could have relieved thepre-revolutionary tensions building between the colonies and themother country (Calhoon 1989). Of course at the time the colonies’dependent status precluded the establishment of a political bodyanalogous to Britain’s Parliament in America. That “parliaments”were established later in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and othercolonies, however, says that imperial officials recognised eventuallyhow crucial was this institution to the exercise of British infrastructuralpower.

Finally, it is clear that the relationships that comprised the Britishand French forms of governance were quite durable. This wasperhaps most evident in Canada after the Conquest. The Britishstruggle to accommodate both methods of rule in their new provinceshowed not only the differences between the British and Frenchforms of governance, but their incompatibility as well.

State power is irrevocably linked to the structure through which thatpower is exercised. The structure, in turn, is the crystallisation ofpast interactions between individuals and groups. Using MichaelMann’s concepts of infrastructural and despotic power as a startingpoint, I have shown how the social relationships that comprise thestructure of a given state come to define and shape the source andcharacter of its power, and how the durability of those relationshipscan have a lasting effect on the way in which that state is able toexercise power.

52 K. A. Stanbridge


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