Journal of Crowd Safety and Security Management JCSSM

Journal of Crowd Safety and Security Management An online journal Vol. 2, No 2, October 2012

Journal of Crowd Safety and Security Management

JCSSM

An online journal Vol. 2 No 2, October 2012


Editorial Board Professor Ben Challis, Buckinghamshire New University Dr Ben Clayton, Buckinghamshire New University Professor Gil Fried, University of New Haven-USA Mark Hamilton, G4S Secure Solutions (UK) Ltd

Professor Chris Kemp, Buckinghamshire New University Professor Patrick Smith, Buckinghamshire New University Dr Mick Upton, The International Centre for Crowd Management and Security Studies Dr Eugenia Wickens, Buckinghamshire New University Phil Wood, MBE, Buckinghamshire New University

Published Volumes

- Volume 1, No. 1, February 2009 - Volume 1, No. 2, December 2009 - Volume 2, No. 1, December 2010 - Volume 2, No. 2, October 2012

Notes for Contributors

Practitioners‟ work based projects should be emailed as Word attachments to the Journal‟s Editors where they will be summarised and edited.

Articles for a double blind review should be emailed to the Journal‟s Editors as Word attachments. The first page of the manuscript should include the title of the paper and the author's name, affiliation, address, telephone number and email-address. The second page should contain the title of the paper, an abstract (150 words) and up to five key words.

Correspondence will be only with the first author.

References and citations should follow the BNU Harvard style (latest version available on request). However ensuring accuracy and compliance is the responsibility of the authors.

Subscription Subscription to the Journal of Crowd Safety and Security Management – An Online Journal is currently free. Contact Us Ali Bakir (Editor in Chief) [email protected] Stuart Kirk [email protected] Owen Grainger-Jones [email protected]

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Editors’ Statement The Journal of Crowd Safety and Security Management – An Online Journal (JCSSM) is an educational, industry oriented journal which is designed to serve as a forum for practitioners, scholars, and students who are actively engaged in the academically fledgling industry of crowd safety and security. The Journal seeks primarily to publish:

a) Summarised and edited versions of practitioners‟ work-based projects. The aim is to share and disseminate the findings of these projects to a wider audience. Practitioners‟ projects are selected, not necessarily because of their methodological rigour or the significance of their findings, rather they are chosen because of the relevance and importance of their work to the current development in the industry. Although practitioners‟ projects are summarised and edited, the responsibility for the rigour of the research and the validity and reliability of the findings remains with the authors.

b) Good quality well developed industry-based research articles after subjecting them to

double blind reviews. In addition, the Journal will publish essays, discussion and research notes, book reviews, and commentaries. The overriding aim of the Journal is to contribute actively to the professionalisation of the crowd safety and security industry by creating a platform which encourages dialogue between the industry and academia, and promotes research and good practice.

The Journal is published twice yearly, and the Editors will strive to include in each issue:

Abridged and edited practitioners‟ work-based projects Articles subject to double blind reviews (up to 8000 words) Research notes and discussions (description of work in progress. Industry views (perspectives from practitioners) Book reviews Commentaries News, events, education fora, conferences, seminars Note: We have increased the word limit of the refereed articles and removed it from the section “Other articles, research notes and commentaries” to give authors more room to express and discuss their ideas.


Contents: Introduction by Professor Chris Kemp (p5) Practitioners’ work-based projects (edited and abridged):

1 Media security: Is the story worth the risk? Neil Swinyard-Jordan June 2010 (pp. 6-13) 2 The effect of high-speed communication on crowd attendance and behaviour at events Eric Stephen Stuart May 2010 (pp. 14-21) 3 The impact of weather-related hazards on risk assessment strategies for open-air events in Central Europe Sabine Funk May 2010 (pp. 22-34) 4 A study into competence, training and reputation of event safety stewards in Denmark Morten Therkildsen May 2010 (pp. 35-47) Other articles, research notes, and commentaries 5 An exploratory study into market demand for work-based and e-learning education programmes in Crowd Safety Management Owen Grainger Jones May 2010 (pp. 48-62) 6 Review of pedestrian and evacuation simulations Professor G. Keith Still August 2011 (pp. 61-73) 7 Concert patron safety Professor Gil Fried and Dr Andrew Milsten August 2011 (pp. 74-85)

8 Simulation-aided planning for events Ulrike Merz, Tobias Kretz, Markus Wiersch, Carola Schulz, Peter Vortisch June 2011 (pp. 86-104)


INTRODUCTION

Professor Chris Kemp

May 2012

The Journal of Crowd Safety and Security Management was created to support the development of innovative practice, scholarly activity and solid research delivery in the areas of crowd management and security. The first three volumes have been well received and this Journal is a crucial part of the International Centre for Crowd Management and Security Studies‟ drive to support safer events and festivals. The team has worked hard on this issue to enable further research and scholarship in this area to be viewed by both educational and industrial partners throughout the world. With the Olympics in London fast approaching the development of knowledge and the support of research in this area is crucial to create legacy activities that can be utilised in a range of superscale events across the world including the Brazilian World Cup, the Commonwealth Games and both the Rugby Union and Rugby League World Cups. Looking at recent events such as the Oxford and Cambridge boat race, The Love Parade and the nightclub incident in Northampton England it is easy to see why this type of Journal is so important. It is easy to believe that there is a panacea for all of the event disasters, which have happened. However, it is clear that the type of elements which impinge on the safety of events are so many and varied and so difficult to predict that constant updating of knowledge and research is the only way to ensure the safety of people at events. Of course it is impossible for us to negate risk altogether however, it is possible for us to put in place risk assessment and management tools which can be utilised to reduce the dangers at events and to reduce the liabilities of those delivering such events if used properly. Vigilance, constant updating and never taking things for granted are all key in helping people to organise events in a safe and efficient manner. Crowd management and security companies are constantly updating their training and education to try to come to terms with the ever-changing dynamics of the event. Through such developments new technology and training methods are applied to help support those making operational, tactical and strategic decisions. The more datasets that are to hand for the decision makers and the more historic knowledge of the event process that those making decisions have the more able they are to make immediate decisions if an aspect of an event starts to go wrong. It is this area that the University is at the moment designing research activities so that we can support companies across the world in being able to support their events in a more efficient and effective way. I hope that you enjoy reading this volume of the Journal as once again the editorial team and those providing papers have created a rich tapestry of interwoven threads across the industry.


1 MEDIA SECURITY: IS THE STORY WORTH THE RISK?

Neil Swinyard-Jordan

June 2010

Abstract The aim of this study was to examine Media Security teams and their methods of operating in both developing and high risk countries around the world. It sought to review those elements regarded as essential for an effective media story and how this balances with the need to ensure their personal safety and protection. High value news stories are often gained from dangerous situations, but effective risk assessment and comprehensive planning before, during and after the „piece to camera‟ (PTC) is thought to be essential. Adequate planning and preparation require the completion of hostile environment training by all staff. It has been shown that where there is an option to have a security individual or team, then this should be taken up. Regular rotation of all personnel is found to be essential to ensure individuals remain focused without becoming excessively stressed or complacent. In planning a story in a high risk location the entire team has to be involved. This encompasses not only the details of the media piece to be covered, but also the specific roles of team members, in terms of technical and security aspects. Planning for the PTC includes agreement as to who has the final authority to determine if the risks are too great and the opportunity for a story will have to be lost.

Introduction

The large number of international journalists covering conflicts is intensifying competitive pressures; this can push them to take unwarranted risks. The Institute of War and Peace (2004) stated that “during the last decade 346 journalists have been killed doing their job”.


Such incidents may be the result of unavoidable, unpredictable accidents, or stem from a failure to adequately analyse the risks to safety and security. The Institute of War and Peace (2004) training manuali addresses journalism safety. It provides advice on what should be done to minimise risk. Security training courses are now available for media personnel but these can lead to a false sense of security and a failure to adequately consider the potential threats of each situation. Despite such guidance, many journalists still work without proper preparation, adequate health insurance or training for dangerous encounters. No set of principles, training course, or handbook can guarantee a journalist‟s safety but the risks and mitigating factors for each unique story opportunity must be considered before the „operation‟ begins.

In February 2007, the author was taken hostage in Baghdad with a very well known BBC journalist and several employees. Although only a short period of captivity, it raised the question of how much journalists will risk for their exclusive story or picture. When does the risk exceed the value of the story and how do you identify when this point has been reached?

Method

Research on media security commenced with a detailed literature review, which included publications produced by organisations set up for the safety of journalists. Interviews were conducted with 39 individuals who work, or have worked, for the BBC. These included 16 Reporters, 3 Cameramen, 1 Engineer, 5 Producers, 13 Security Advisors and 1 Logistics Manager, providing a holistic insight into media security from both sides of the camera.


Findings and discussion

What is Media Security?

Media security is the physical and personal security of members of the press, whether they are presenters, cameramen, producers, members of the radio and/or written journalism profession. Security advisors CG & SK explained that the modus operandi for the BBC was modelled on the work of undercover intelligence units operating in Northern Ireland at the height of the „troubles‟. Use of non-descript, old vehicles that do not draw attention allows the media team to move more freely around their desired location. Considerable effort is invested by the BBC to ensure that their vehicles are not noticeable and weapons are carried discreetly. The security team members will often assist in setting up the „piece to camera‟ (PTC), or holding sound equipment. This ensures they remain close to the people they are protecting and the casual passer-by is less likely to identify the security staff and wonder what is going on. Reporter NA stated that “the security team are always thought of as crew members, not as security at all” and this inclusion in the team is important. Physical security is required in order to protect infrastructure, whether rented or purchased by a media company in a high threat location, such as Baghdad. This usually comprises of a bureau/broadcast areas plus accommodation. Within the bureau security office, an operations room will be set up, with CCTV cameras showing all access and weak points reporting back to a bank of monitors. Teams out on the „ground‟ will be monitored by radio communication and GPS signal. Security advisor HS stated that “in the event of an emergency the security plan is put into action as second nature. This may involve an evacuation procedure or simply a way of locking down the location and waiting for the danger to pass or holding it off until support arrives.”


In comparison, few members of the written press have any form of security, whether working as individual freelancers or as permanent staff contracted to a large broadsheet. Radio journalists are much the same; however, those working for the BBC will fall under the in-house security team umbrella and will usually deploy to high risk areas with a dedicated security advisor.

What makes a good story? To provide an effective media news story there are certain elements and values that need to „come together‟ in order for it to be effective and desirable. These include:

Frequency - events that occur suddenly and fit well with the news organisation's schedule are more likely to be reported than those that don‟t.

Meaningfulness - the ability of the audience to relate to the topic

Conflict - opposition of people or forces resulting in a dramatic effect.

Negativity - bad news is more newsworthy.

„News value‟ determines how much prominence a news story is given by a media outlet and the attention it is given by the audience. Boyd (1994) states that “News journalism has a broadly agreed set of values, often referred to as „newsworthiness…”. It is not universal and can vary widely between different cultures. In Western countries, decisions on the selection and prioritisation of news are made by producers on the basis of their experience and intuition. Galtung and Ruge (1965) showed that several factors, such as conflict and frequency are consistently applied across a range of news organisations. Schlesinger (1987) include areas that are politically, morally and legally sensitive and Ryan (1991) states "there is no end to lists of news criteria" (p.31).

In order to get a good story the journalist must usually operate in direct danger or areas of high risk. It is at this point that the story has to be looked at and the security issues must be matched against achieving the aim. Two seasoned reporters, MJ and DL both agreed with these proposals and noted that “younger reporters are doing more of the dangerous work, however, they are kept firmly in check by the Producer or Bureau Chief (usually a senior Producer). To go against the agreed plan can result in that individual being replaced”. Producers cannot risk being personally liable for an enthusiastic individual who leaps into a situation without fully considering the ramifications of their actions.

Factors to be considered in planning a high risk story Training One of the first things to be considered when planning a high risk story is the training of the Media Team. This is preparation for those individuals who will be working in a high risk or high threat area, rather than the technical training needed in order to operate the associated equipment. It is an understanding of the environment, its potential threats and an awareness of how to act or react to an incident. This is commonly called Hostile Environment Security Training (HEST). HEST for the BBC includes classroom based lectures and day long practical exercises, delivered over three to five days and specifically tailored for the location to be worked in. The BBC has an in house HEST team and according to HD and GJ, two of the regular instructors:


The course has to be constantly changed, threats change and there may not be the need for specific lessons on building security for instance, if you‟re operating alongside the military…Or if the threat of abduction or being taken hostage is high then, rather than give a standard forty minute classroom lesson we may spend a night carrying out a practical exercise, trying to induce certain feelings and stages of capture that personnel could find themselves in.

The BBC has the resources to carry out this training, however, independent freelance journalist struggle to afford the course, at costs of £3000 to £4,000. Hence freelancers often take on assignments without a real understanding of what to expect.

Permanent Specialist Security Team The BBC has identified that, in many high risk situations, it is essential to have staff focused on security threats who are not distracted by the technical aspects of the story. In early 2003, reporter MJ was covering the early stages of the second Gulf War; the team of three had been operating in the region for some time and for the preceding two days were subject to regular Iraqi artillery fire. MJ decided to report from as close to the frontline as possible and took a local Kurdish soldier with them. The team drove to an area recently vacated by the Iraqi Army and pulled off the road. As soon as they got out of their vehicles explosions began and two of the team were hit, one fatally. Unknowingly they had pulled off the road into an overgrown minefield, which the local soldier had not known about. MJ stated they were focused on the story and a possible artillery attack, but hadn‟t considered minefields. He suggested that, had a member of the BBC‟s permanent security team been with the team, the vehicle would probably not have been allowed to pull off the road. The security officer would be more likely to recognise the potential threat as he/she would be focused on the environment and security issues, rather than the potential story.

Final Authority If the media team is to include a security advisor there is an obvious need to clarify who has the final authority for a high risk story to be covered? In early 2007, a BBC team was working in Baghdad. They wanted to finish a film in an extremely high risk part of Baghdad. This required detailed risk assessments, authority from key locals, and the deployment of the full in-house armed security team. The security team drove around the area declaring it quiet and once local permissions were received; „London‟ gave the final authority for the story to be covered. As the team pulled up to the location and got out of the vehicles, they were surrounded by more than 50 armed militia. They were taken hostage whilst release negotiations were carried out. Once released, the media crew, less the security advisor, left Baghdad the next day. The area was immediately placed out of bounds by the BBC and procedures were examined. It transpired that procedures had been followed and could not be faulted. Local authority figures had promised security and no amount of planning, risk assessing, final authority or any other security practices would have averted this incident. It has to be recognised that not every eventuality can be covered. The BBC procedures direct that on the ground the security advisor has the final say. This can create tensions with strong personalities who don‟t perceive the same level of risk. It is


essential that final authority is agreed by the team prior to departure and fully supported on the ground. Liaison Successful and positive liaison is essential in gaining access to unique situations and locations, particularly where there is military activity and the threat is high. Security Advisor CW was working with the BBC team covering the conflict in Georgia two years ago. He explained,

My role was constant liaison for the first five days we were in the country. As a former Royal Marine I was able to understand military body language, when and how to approach checkpoints, who to speak to at places we wanted to film at and build relationships throughout my time there both on the Russian side and the Georgian side, with military, police forces and civilian authorities.

This understanding of the military proved essential. Detailed Team Planning All members of the BBC production and security teams are involved in planning an assignment and will work in the hostile environment for no more than four to six weeks. Rotation is essential to allow individuals to switch off from the constant threat.

The eight man in-house security team has a broad range of experience which maximises the skills and experience which can be utilised for each unique situation. The team comprises of an ex- Royal Military Police Close Protection Officer – they are considered to be the military experts in Close Protection (CP) work in hostile environments around the world. There are three ex British Special Forces Group soldiers who completed a military CP course and bring small team tactics, covert work and drills experience to the role. Finally a former New Zealand SAS soldier plus three ex- Royal Marines all have in depth hostile environment military experience and four years or more work experience with commercial companies and the BBC High Risk Newsgathering Team. In addition there are four main planners and management personnel based in London.

There is a huge variety of technical and HEST experience within the production crew. The producer/ reporter/cameraman may be very senior and familiar with the location or it may be their first time in a hostile environment. This mix of personalities and backgrounds is essential to ensure an effective, knowledgeable and experienced team. The involvement of all staff in planning ensures common understanding of actions to be taken in the event of an incident.

Conclusion

In conclusion, media security is viewed as essential to minimise the risk to the media crew and ensure that the external, physical, personnel and story aspects are all given adequate consideration. A high value news story is often gained from dangerous situations but an effective risk assessment and comprehensive planning before, during and after the PTC is felt to be essential to prevent loss of life and potential financial damage to the employer. Adequate planning and preparation is believed to include completion of hostile environment training by all staff to enhance the awareness of individuals to potential dangers and to


promote correct action if something does go wrong. It has been shown that where there is an option to have a security individual or team, then this should be taken up. Security advisors can remain focused on crew safety and not distracted by the detail and production of the media story. The study also found that positive, effective liaison needs to be carried out at every opportunity; it opens doors and can be a tool to enhance safety in extreme circumstances. It can provide timely and accurate information that may be crucial in deciding a location or timing for a story. A good balance of skills and experience in the team, of both production and security personnel, is found to enhance the opportunity for liaison and also maximise the likelihood that someone has a solution for a unique challenge. It is also argued that regular rotation of all personnel is essential to ensure individuals remain focused without becoming excessively stressed or complacent. Finally, the study showed that in planning a story in a high risk location the entire team has to be involved, not only to encompass the details of the media piece to be covered, but also the specific roles of team members, in terms of technical and security aspects. Planning for the PTC is argued to include agreement as to who has the final authority to determine if the risks are too great and the opportunity for a story will have to be lost. As planning cannot take into consideration every eventuality, the art, this study suggests, is to minimise the risk and ensure that all personnel are able to respond positively and effectively to danger when it arises. Whilst there will always be pressure for the media to get the unique story, with high news value, findings from cases in this study indicates that no story is worth risking the loss of a human life. It is recommended that further research is undertaken to determine if the factors applicable to security of BBC media crew are also relevant to other large corporations, such as CNN. In addition, there is a need to examine the security of the freelancers who often cannot afford HEST or the luxury of a permanent security advisor. They are often in greater danger and if injured, or taken hostage it may be some time before anyone is notified of their predicament. How can they enhance their personal security at minimum cost, whilst still achieving the exclusive story that will provide their income? Similarly more detailed research could be conducted to compare the various training courses available and how they are regarded by the different media companies.

References

Boyd, A. (1994) Broadcast Journalism,Techniques of Radio and TV News. Oxford: Focal Galtung, J. & Ruge, M. H. (1965): The Structure of Foreign News. The Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 2, pp. 64-91; online edition http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/2/1/64 Institute for War and Peace Reporting. 2004a. Reporting for change: A handbook for local journalists in crisis areas (Chapter 14 Journalism Safety) [internet]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Journal_of_Peace_Research

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Journal_of_Peace_Research

http://www.jstor.org/view/00223433/ap020006/02a00040/0

http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/2/1/64


Available at: http://southsudaninfo.net/wp-content/uploads/reference_library/14_iwpr_training_manual.pdf [Accessed 1 February 2010]. Institute for War and Peace Reporting. 2004b. Reporting for change: A handbook for local journalists in crisis areas [internet] Available at: http://southsudaninfo.net/wp-content/uploads/reference_library/00_iwpr_training_manual.pdf [Accessed 1 February 2010]. Ryan, C. (1991) Prime Time Activism: Media Strategies for Grassroots Organizing Boston: South End Press Schlesinger P. (1987) Putting 'Reality' Together, 2nd edition London: Methuen

http://southsudaninfo.net/wp-content/uploads/reference_library/14_iwpr_training_manual.pdf





2 THE EFFECT OF HIGH-SPEED COMMUNICATION ON CROWD ATTENDANCE AND BEHAVIOUR AT EVENTS

Eric Stephen Stuart

May 2010

Abstract This research project considered the consequences of media and marketing forces on those attending events. It sought to assess the impact on crowd numbers, and the mood and behaviour of those attending. The key methods used were a survey to establish the likelihood of response to influences of certain groups. This was supplemented by interviews with two industry experts. The investigation showed that there are factors occurring in society that might impact upon event audiences. The first of these is the increasing willingness of people, especially younger people, to travel to events that interest them. The second is the ability of people to travel to events. In a generally more affluent society with people having access to transport, it is feasible they may be more likely to travel to be entertained. Marketing media needs to be monitored closely on the build up to any event to ensure carefully laid safety plans are not impacted by the arrival of excessive numbers. Furthermore, to ensure public safety at events, a structured means by which such media is monitored and responded to must be established.

Introduction

This research project looks into the impact of high-speed communication and media influence on public safety at events. It aims to: ascertain if modern media methods and the speed of transmitted news impact on people‟s behaviour; discover whether news and other media can „direct‟ people to attend events; examine if, as a result, there is a likely increase in numbers attending such events; discuss if the numbers and behaviour are likely to have an impact on public safety at events; consider if organisers should be monitoring such media; and consider if a legislative approach to planning for events would assist in increasing public safety at those events. There appears to be a growing number of events worldwide where anticipated public attendance seems not to match the number arriving on the day (Still, 2010). In planning any event, competent organisers and authorities assess the estimated numbers of people attending, crowd profile, and likely behaviour of the crowd (Health and Safety Executive, 2000). This is in order to ascertain the level of physical and human resource needed for public safety, as advised in Managing Crowds Safely, HSG154, Health and Safety Executive (2000). The Event Safety Guide clearly states the need for effective planning that includes the prevention of hazards and risks through identification, elimination or control (Health and Safety Executive, 1999). “During the planning stage it should be compulsory to include crowd condition monitoring, or the plan should be rejected” (Still, 2010, p2). Crowd behaviour modification is a vital area; Kemp, Hill, Upton, & Hamilton (2007) argue that the information supplied to a crowd in advance of an event affects the items they bring, and ultimately, their behaviour at that event. Clutterbuck (1973) states that it is highly unlikely that a happy, satisfied crowd will turn


riotous unless motivated by the need to change a significant part of that event, or it becomes otherwise stimulated by external forces. Still (2010, p1) defines “crowd crazing” as being the term used when a “promoter or marketing group hypes a product (or offer) in order to create a large, excited crowd.” He describes the practice as „very dangerous‟ when not undertaken in conjunction with careful crowd management strategies and cites the phenomenon as being responsible for many deaths around the world.

Method

People behave in different ways under stress, especially in crowd situations (Nygren, 2007), and whilst this study attempts through quantitative analysis to explain some of that potential behaviour, observations are also made and expert views sought to help understand such behaviour. Quantitative methods were in the form of a questionnaire that was administered to a wide profile of people. Forty-nine surveys were returned, and although this is a small sample, the results were useful and supportive of the qualitative data obtained from observation and interviews. Two expert participants were interviewed: Dr G Keith Still, a professor of crowd dynamics and Phillis Dorris , who has worked for ten years in „online marketing‟ as part of the Derren Brown online marketing team along with the television company „Channel 4‟. Mr Brown and his team are engaged in television illusion and Neuro Linguistic Programming (NLP) and similar influences that might be used by marketing companies to influence crowds and crowd behaviour. To try to ensure that the outcome of one interview did not influence the other, the interviews took place some weeks apart and answers were checked by an independent party.

Findings

The interview with Dorris indicated that some people are capable of, and are, being influenced to behave in a certain way. Questioned as to what percentage could be influenced, she cited a television show by Derren Brown. In this show he tried to persuade people that they were „stuck‟ to their chairs. Dorris states, “around thirty five per cent of the people polled were stuck to their seat”. The phenomenon is developed by Professor Still who outlined some Neuro Linguistic Programming (NLP) techniques called anchoring and triggering, explaining that “these are well documented in a number of marketing/NLP books. It creates a sense of association and motivation to attend”.

The prospect of such powerful influences is impressive,. this is especially so when considering the optimum group size to influence; Dorris continues,. “The live shows are around 1500 people, this is a good size”. A crowd of that size, in a public place, influenced to behave in a certain way, would be highly problematic in a public order context. If thirty-five percent could be influenced, then genuine „crowd control‟ could be achieved.


It is broadly accepted now, by those involved in crowd control that only a small proportion of a crowd needs to begin to misbehave unchecked for others to follow suit. This is known as the emergent norm theory (Turner and Killian, 1957, 1987). In short, unchecked behaviour, witnessed by others, is then copied as they consider it to be more acceptable. This is precisely what occurred on 3 April 2010. American Apparel advertised a sale through social networking sites. 2,000 people attended and long queues formed. Reports suggest the queues were orderly until two males decided to „jump ahead‟, causing others to break away from the queue to try to get to the doors (BBC News Channel, 2010). The disorder that ensued led to ten officers being injured (Fittes, 2010). It follows therefore, that if an external influence can affect even a small proportion of a crowd that portion can then impact the behaviour of some, if not all, of the remainder of the crowd. Questioned in relation to an age group that might be more susceptible to such tactics, Dorris suggests that those over the age of fourteen have a propensity to „follow suit‟ more, and that “seventeen to twenty four” is the age group that would maximise success in influencing a group.. This is consistent with analysis of the research, which suggests that the age group of ten to thirty is the most likely to be influenced by a media campaign. Disregarding gender, only eighteen per cent of those over thirty had acted upon a mobile communication message to change their plans. Forty per cent of those under thirty had acted in such a way. All forty-seven respondents stated they had mobile phones or similar devices. This is indicative of just how many people now have immediate access to information. Whilst only about thirty percent had any form of „news alerts‟ set up on the phone, a similar percentage (albeit not necessarily the same groups) acknowledged that they had changed plans because of news from their phone. Broken down by gender, only six per cent of responding males claimed to have been influenced in this way compared to forty three per cent of responding females. This statistic must be treated with caution though, as the age range of the male group was considerably older than the females‟, and this loading may have skewed the figures. Asked if they might travel to see a hero, or person of great interest to them, as a result of a phone message, only forty six percent of male respondents agreed they would, compared to eighty-seven percent of females. This aggregated to seventy five percent of all respondents, some willing to travel up to 200 miles but with an average of about twenty six miles.


Females prepared to travel by age group

Unlikely to travel

10 to 20

21 to 30

31 to 40

51 to 60

41 to 50

Dorris was able to show that spending on online advertising has increased from five percent to twenty five percent in just five years. This increase in spending by some four hundred per cent, in such a relatively short business timeframe, clearly shows how advertisers are cognisant of the power of modern media.

The phenomenon of crowd crazing is not new but instant knowledge of incidents or events, and therefore the numbers responding, is Professor Still states “it is a feature of popular culture and growing rapidly as both marketing and media reach more people on the e-chatter”. In July 2002, around 60,000 people were expected to attend a concert for „Fat Boy Slim‟ (Norman Cook) on Brighton beach. Over 250,000 actually attended the event after unprecedented radio reporting and reports in newspapers, internet and magazines. None of this had been noted by, or brought to the attention of, the Safety Advisory Group who had insisted it was a low profile event and numbers would not be excessive (Brighton and Hove Council, 2002) Major issues occurred throughout the day and were exacerbated in the evening when a turning tide began to trap thousands on the beach. The debrief paper shows that all the warning signs were present indicating that this was likely to be a far larger event than planned. Still explained; “This event is a great case study on how marketing reaches masses. The event plan needs to consider this kind of crazing (larger than expected numbers), in another location this could have been catastrophic”. Another incident on 7th April 2005, which followed the death of Pope John Paul II, documented by Stuart (2005), is an example of serious underestimation of numbers. No one anticipated that people would drive from Poland and throughout the UK for a commemorative event. Initial estimates were of fewer than 1,000, and with the prospect of a non-conflictive crowd attendance, a relatively young and inexperienced command and policing team were selected. These officers were tested when over 20,000 arrived. Important lessons were

Males prepared to travel by age group

Unlikley to travel

51 to 60

21 to 30

31 to 40

10 to 20


learned, that modern communications and transport freedom was seriously impacting on previously tried and tested methods of estimating numbers. During research for this study, a potentially dangerous flashmob incident was advertised. In newspapers and websites around London, „Dead Man Running‟ began to advertise £5,000 „cash drop‟ at Liverpool Street Railway Station (View London.co.uk 2010). The event was reported to the authorities and action taken to prevent it. The „stunt‟ was rescheduled at short notice and took place in Trafalgar Square on 5th March. Angry members of the public later complained that they had wasted hours waiting for the event, which consisted mostly of fake and monopoly money being dropped (Bertoncini, 2010). The consequence of this „stunt‟ indicates that it is not simply the attendance of additional numbers at an event that is of concern, but also the mood and expectation of those attending. Here, it is worth discussing the impact of media upon the Beijing Olympic Torch Relay in London on 6th April 2008. In the twelve months leading up to the arrival of the Olympic Flame, whilst it was clear that a level of anti Chinese protest was always going to occur, the protest was mostly low key. However, 10 March 2008 was the 49th anniversary of the Lhasa uprising and riots of 1959 that had led to the exile of the Dalai Lama. Tibetan monks had seized on the „Olympic opportunity‟ to protest and to march against the Chinese. Within weeks, dozens were dead and the world‟s media was reporting how unarmed civilians had been shot dead by Chinese police (BBC News Channel, 2008). From the first „Torch Lighting‟ at Wembley, to the lighting of the cauldron hours later in North Greenwich, the procession was subject to unlawful and often violent protest. What appeared odd at the time was that those causing the abuse almost appeared embarrassed and ashamed of their actions just seconds after the flame had passed. Still explains this as “bystander behaviour”, one of the phenomena of crowd psychology; “namely that the acceptable norms are suspended in the situation and crowd norms take temporary precedence (it‟s OK as others are doing it too)”. This behaviour is indicative of the emergent norm theory (Turner and Killian, 1957, 1987) discussed previously. The link that draws all of these events together is the lack of predictability of crowd size and behaviour that came about as a result of advertising campaigns, deliberate or otherwise. Still espouses a belief that the issue is not necessarily the numbers of people that arrive at an event, but the space to put them in and their arrival profile. That profile would include the mood in which they arrive. At the incidents referred to above, those charged with trying to keep crowds safe failed to anticipate numbers or mood, through a lack of accurate information. In many of the cases, the numbers and mood have been affected by media influences. Where the crowd exists, there is also a loss of individualism within that group. Whilst Le Bon (1995) has been discredited in some quarters, his work formed the only theory of crowds for many years. His belief that those within a crowd lost all sense of individuality is now generally no longer accepted, but his theory on the power of the crowd is still supported (Drury and Reicher, 1999). In essence, there is a strong belief that individual identity is replaced by social identity within a crowd environment (Stott and Reicher, 1998). Asked about the difficulties with crowds at large scale events, Assistant Commissioner Chris Allison of the Metropolitan Police London responded: “People use the cover of the crowd to do stuff that they would never have the bottle to do as an individual, but when they were in that crowd


they felt they had the power to do it, they had the mentality, they were willing to take a step further”. In its „key messages‟ section of a recent three hundred-page report entitled “Understanding Crowd Behaviors” (Cabinet Office, 2009), the Emergency Planning College lists seven factors for successful crowd management. Included within these are the needs for: Thorough planning and preparation, adoption of a system wide approach, coordination between all agencies, and communication with the crowd. Each one of these factors will be impacted by crowds arriving in numbers and a mood not anticipated by organisers or authorities. The report acknowledges there is still considerable work to be done (Cabinet Office 2009).

Conclusions

This research suggests that the media and marketing messages circulated prior to events can significantly affect the attendance at those events and impact upon their mood and behaviour. There is currently no formalised method for assessing the extent of the media impact on events. Furthermore, there is no guidance or help to suggest what research organisers, licensing authorities, or those assessing the safety of events, should undertake. For some organised and most licensed events, Safety Advisory Groups (SAGs) will take place and may question the advertising and marketing policies on their impact on the event. In many of the cases discussed though, no such SAG exists. This study thus recommends that SAGs should be compulsory across the UK, they should be regulated and have appropriate expertise for the event being planned. They should also have agreed principles for examining likely attendance. A larger research project into the impact of media and marketing on attendance and behaviour is required. The survey should consider impacts by age groups, sex and willingness to attend events. This would give a far better picture of the likelihood of unexpected numbers attending at events. A further research project should ascertain the national picture in relation to the status of SAGs. A survey of all local authorities should be conducted to discover exactly how many have SAGs as a statutory body that examines all events. National recommendations are needed regarding the necessity and frequency of SAGs, the training and skills of those who attend, and standardisation of agenda that includes media and marketing impacts upon the event. One proposal could be that any event of any nature where the numbers are likely to exceed 500 or 1000, should be subject to formal notification to the local authority and police, for consideration of SAG to be established.

References

BBC News Channel (2008) Police „shot at Tibet protesters‟ [online]. BBC. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7307382.stm [Accessed on 2 January 2010].


BBC news Channel (2010) American apparel sale closed in London after scuffles [online]BBC. Available form http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8601361.stm [Accessed 4 April 2010] Bertoncini, A. (2010) Short-changed? 'Dead Man Running Cash drop‟ film publicity stunt leaves some disappointed [online] . West End Extra. Available from. http://www.westendextra.com/news/2010/mar/short-changed-dead-man-running-cash-drop%E2%80%99-film-publicity-stunt-leaves-some-disappointed [Accessed 6 march 2010) Brighton and Hove Council. (2002) Operation Omaha – Operational Debrief. Unpublished Cabinet Office. (2009) Understanding crowd behaviour. [Online] Emergency planning college. Available from: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/228106/guideforreaders1.pdf [accessed 23 Oct 2009). Clutterbuck, R. (1973) Protest and the urban guerrilla. London: The Camelot Press Limited. Drury, J. and Reicher, S. (1999). The intergroup dynamics of collective empowerment: Substantiating the social identity model of crowd behavior. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 2, 381-402 Fittes, A. (2010) Metropolitan Police Initial Debrief Report, American Apparel incident. Unpublished. Health and Safety Executive. (1999) The Event safety guide. 2nd ed. Norwich: HSE Books. Health and Safety Executive. (2000) Managing crowds safely 2nd edition: a guide for organisers at events and venues. Norwich: Her majesty‟s stationary office. Kemp, C. Hill, I. Upton, M & Hamilton, M. (2007) Case studies in crowd management. Cambridge: Entertainment Technology Press.

Le Bon, G. (1995). The crowd: A study of the popular mind. London: Transaction Publishers. (Original work published in 1895).

Nygren, M. (2007) Simulation of human behaviour in stressful crowd situations. MSc. Thesis, The Royal Institute of Technology School of Computer Science and Communication. Stuart, E. (2005) Metropolitan Police Debrief Report, Polish commemoration of Pope John Paul II Funeral, unpublished. Still, K. (2010) Crowd Crazing [online]. Crowd Dynamics. Available from http://www.gkstill.com/CrowdCrazing.html [Accessed 2 March 2010]. Stott, C and Reicher S (1998) Crowd action as intergroup process: introducing the police perspective, European Journal of Social Psycology, Available from


http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199807/08)28:4%3C509::AID-EJSP877%3E3.0.CO;2-C/abstract [Accessed 2 March 2010]. Turner, R. H. and Killian, L. (1957). Collective Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Turner, R. H. and Killian, L. (1987). Collective Behavior (3rd Edition.). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. View London.co.uk (2010) Dead man running free money at Liverpool Street [online]. View London.co.uk. Available from http://www.viewlondon.co.uk/whatson/dead-man-running-free-money-at-liverpool-street-s-article-9345.html [Accessed 22 February 2010].

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199807/08)28:4%3C509::AID-EJSP877%3E3.0.CO;2-C/abstract

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199807/08)28:4%3C509::AID-EJSP877%3E3.0.CO;2-C/abstract


3 THE IMPACT OF WEATHER-RELATED HAZARDS ON RISK ASSESSMENT STRATEGIES FOR OPEN-AIR EVENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

Sabine Funk

May 2010

Abstract This research project addresses the most common weather-related hazards such as thunderstorms and heat, which can have dangerous consequences. It provides an insight into the audience and production managers‟ perception of weather hazards and the problems faced by the latter. Interviews were conducted and questionnaires issued to try to gain a better understanding of the topic and the problems faced by both production managers and the audience. The findings of this limited investigation show that the common approach of “post-disaster improvisation” has to be changed to “pre-disaster planning”. Both production managers and the audience felt that knowledge of the risks of severe weather was necessary to affect behaviour; for the audience this would change their behaviour and for the production manager it would assist in making plans to deal with the risks. Both groups also felt that information and communication are key factors for everyone who has to deal with the impact of severe weather. The research shows that weather-related impacts often result from organisational, structural, or communication failures between both sides of the event - production and audience.

Introduction

The research project deals with the impact of weather-related hazards on risk assessments for open-air events in Central Europe. It seeks to discover what type of hazards arise from severe weather at open-air events, how the audience reacts to these hazards and what the implications are for an event's risk assessment. For the purpose of this paper the definition of severe weather given by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) will be used:

“Dangerous meteorological (…) phenomenon, of varying duration, with risk of causing major damage, serious social disruption and loss of human life, requiring measures for minimizing loss, mitigation and avoidance, and requiring detailed information (…) to be distributed as soon as possible to the public and responsible authorities.” (WMO, 2004)

Considering weather-related incidents in Central Europe during the summer seasons 2006 – 2009 and following a definition of risk as a combination of severity and probability, the first question addressed in this paper is which kind of weather phenomena can be assessed as a hazard for open-air festivals. Secondly, are the production management and festival audiences willing and able to react to these hazards. As a production manager of an open-air festival, weather is a topic of essential interest. Having also worked at an event where two people died by a lighting strike, improving the understanding of the impacts of extreme weather became a driving force for this study.


The weather factor Impacts of weather-related hazards need to be seen as risks that can be managed and not as unavoidable „Acts of God‟ as some promoters refer to it, especially after deadly incidents. Of course there will always be situations that no one is able to predict or assess – but there are other situations, so called weather related incidents, which actually result from improperly built structures or a lack of planning and organisation. Denying this means losing the chance to learn and prevent similar situations from happening. The knowledge of incidents related to the impacts of severe or extreme weather has increased during the last few years. This may be a result of climate change worsening weather conditions in Central Europe and/or improved media coverage. This can be evidenced by not only searching for key words like “severe / extreme weather” or “thunderstorm” in combination with “festival” or “event” at the homepage of the video portal youtube (www.youtube.de) but also when looking at newspapers and magazine articles, which are for example collected in the European Severe Weather database, available from

(www.essl.org/ESWD/). Conferences dealing with production safety or crowd safety1 feature the topic on their agendas and insurance companies are starting to offer special insurance covering “weather as life threatening danger”, “Insurance against loss in sales due to enduring rain” for example2. The reason this research is important is that the weather phenomenon is not yet properly reflected in published literature and guidance. During the last few years a considerable amount of literature has been published giving very detailed and specific guidance on many aspects of crowd management, crowd safety and health & safety for the event industry. In contrast there is only general and limited guidance on the factor of “weather”. Kemp (2004) points out that both an increase of heat or rainfall could cause problems (p 14), Tarlow (2002) enumerates some points about reducing the risk of electrical storms (p 162) and the HSE Event Safety Guide (1999) finds “weather, e.g. excessive heat /cold/rain” (p 32 : 193) on the list for an event risk assessment. In all publications, weather seems to be a universal factor which has to be considered within a risk assessment for an event however the coverage of this topic is not sufficient. It is reduced to abstract warnings and general statements that weather can have problematic or even dangerous impacts on an event (HSE Event Safety Guide 1999; Tarlow, 2002). In 2007 Kemp published the outcomes of a series of health & safety seminars by the European Festival Organisation YOUROPE and found “climate issues” and related topics (pp 180 – 187) were some of the key factors with which festival organisers have to deal. Even in a new publication regarding the Management of crowd safety at outdoor street/special events by Kemp, Moore and Mellor (2010) where “weather was identified as an aspect of significance for outdoor events” (p IX) very little guidance is given in the checklist.

1 IPM – International Production Meeting, London, March 11th & 12th /

Yourope's 9th Health & Safety Seminar, Groningen, January 14 and 15

2 Available from http://www.erpam.com accessed 04.05.2010

http://www.essl.org/ESWD/

http://www.erpam.com/


Risk Assessments and resulting crowd management plans for open air festivals will not be adequate without a deeper look at the consequences which can arise from the impacts of extreme weather. Among professionals working in the field of crowd safety there is increasing concern that the number of weather-related incidents will rise, not only due to changing climate but also due to the increasing number of open-air events of all kinds throughout Europe and the World.

Method

Both qualitative and quantitative methods were used to gather primary research data. Secondary research was also undertaken to provide background information especially on meteorology and audience behaviour. Problems and limitations of the research During the early part of the investigation two problems arose: Firstly, while carrying out pilot interviews and questionnaires with the chosen target group “promoter”, it soon became obvious that this group wouldn‟t offer helpful answers and information. The reasons for this were that the promoters referred to their production managers as being the experts on site and only gave very vague answers especially when it came to negative experiences. Secondly, information about the number of people being injured due to weather related incidents was unreliable. This was due to the fact that statistical information about deaths could easily be researched in the media, whereas the number injuries could only be given by the promoters. Even where the numbers were known it could not be stated clearly if an injury was weather related or not. Research sample It was initially decided that data would be collected from individuals who were members of the European festival organisation YOUROPE. Due to the creditability of this organisation it was felt the data would be more reliable than using other sources.

The quantitative data was collected by means of a questionnaire from the audience by publishing a link on different festival online platforms (forums, facebook groups) and making it possible for everyone to respond (respondent-completion) online.

The quantitative data collected by means of a questionnaire, completed by production managers, was a purposive sample - respondents had to have experience as production managers of open-air festivals in the time period 2006-2009.

The qualitative data collected from both groups via interviews was a purposive sample - experience with open-air festivals in the time period 2006-2009. Data collection Interviews According to Silverman, interviews seek to find out how individuals “perceive things” (2010, p.190). This was an important factor for interviewing both production managers and members of the audience because it was crucial to gather information about their perceptions of weather as a hazard.


Data collection took the form of in-depth interviews with seven people working or who have previously worked as production managers for open-air events and with twelve people having experience as visitors of open-air festivals. Two pilot interviews were carried out for each target group.

Interviews were held in English and German and took between one and two hours. A checklist ensured that the same questions were asked for all interviews. They were recorded digitally, translated and transcribed in word format. The anonymity of all interviewees was maintained.

Questionnaires Data collection took the form of questionnaires provided online to members of the audience and individuals working or who have previously worked as production managers for open-air events. Pilot questionnaires were carried out with members of both target groups - both resulted in minor changes in the structures of the questionnaires. Questionnaires were provided through “Surveymonkey” (available from http://www.surveymonkey.com) in German and in English. The link for the audience, with a short introduction, was posted in different festival forums and in festival groups on the social network platform Facebook (available from http://www.facebook.com).The initial sample of the audience was 342 people. The link for Production Managers was sent to them personally but with the possibility to forward to others. The initial sample of production managers was 21. Not all respondents answered all questions, some of the questions allowed multiple answers, the percentage was calculated based on the number of completed answers to the question (n).Both questionnaires were developed to collect self-reported data and consisted of a combination of closed and open questions. All online questionnaires were answered anonymously.

Data analysis

The closed questions of the questionnaires were analysed with tools provided by “Surveymonkey”. Open questions from the questionnaires and interviews were analysed manually. Though very time-consuming this provided an in-depth familiarity with the data which helped when evaluating the findings. A data collection sheet was designed to categorise answers to open questions. Primary Research was supplemented by an analysis of relevant secondary sources, i.e. documents referring to meteorology, crowd management and crowd safety.

Findings A large proportion, 78% of the audience3 and 86% of the production managers4 who were interviewed or who answered the questionnaires had experienced adverse weather of different kinds.

3 n=354

http://www.surveymonkey.com/

http://www.facebook.com/


Audience: questionnaire: Did you ever experienced severe weather while visiting open-air festival? n=342

Knowledge & Perception During the interviews with both groups it soon became obvious that the planning for weather related impacts was based on personal experience. 75% of the audience5 and 86% of the production managers6 answered that “own experience” was their main source of knowledge that would influence their behaviour. This was supplemented by quantitative research of those who had experiences. 57% of production managers who had incidents with structures or people related to severe weather and 58%7 of the audience who had the experience of feeling unsafe due to bad weather, have changed their perception of the topic after the incident. Relying on their experiences, 67% of the audience8 considered themselves adequately prepared, and 58%9 think that weather is not a dangerous hazard. In contrast only 18% of the production managers10 felt adequately prepared and 86%11assessed weather as a dangerous hazard for open air festivals. This is to a degree supported by meteorological literature - according to the WHO Regional Office for Europe

“extreme weather events will continue to pose additional challenges (…) in terms of risk management and the reliability of infrastructure (…) and others. Every effort should therefore be made (…) to put in place evidence based interventions and where necessary precautionary measures to limit

4 n=28

5 n=12

6 n=7

7 n=302

8 n=285

9 n=285

10 n=28

11 n=28

23.60%

31.40%

22%

52.80%

28.50%

9.10%

23.30%

16.20%

7.40% 3.60%

1.00% 0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%


the impacts on the environment.” (Cited in Kirch, et al, 2005 : p XVIII; emphasis added)

However personal experiences alone are not sufficient evidence, further information is needed. Menne (2005) points out that there is still no common understanding about what measures are needed and no comprehensive European data base. He states:

“With better information, the emphasis in disaster management could shift from post-disaster improvisation to pre-disaster planning.” (Kirch et al, 2005 : p XXXVI).

General weather related problems Both production managers and audience were asked what problems have they had with severe weather. The production managers naturally have a long list, the audience on the other hand have had fewer problems – a contrasting result to the findings discussed above. General problems named by more than 35% of production managers:

no tested emergency plans

no emergency plans for staff (leading to dangerous situations for staff working under severe weather circumstances)

communication problems with other companies working on site etc

not enough shelter / no places of safety

behaviour of the audience

communication problems with the audience o technical – for example at night / on campsites o perception and ignorance

not enough budget to realise proper measures

lack of knowledge

no support / understanding from promoter General problems named by more than 35% of audience members:

no places of safety / no shelter

no adequate clothing (even when checking forecasts)

no warnings from promoter

“no problems – it‟s a festival and weather is weather” Weather-related hazards The WMO considers the weather to be severe or extreme in the following events: Thunderstorms and the phenomena that accompany them, heavy rain, strong wind/ wind gusts, hail, lightning, flash floods, and extreme temperature. Production managers and audience concurred with some of these categories; they perceived the weather to be most dangerous at an open-air festival, if there is high winds, thunderstorms, enduring rain, and hail.

Considering the definition of risk as the probability that an adverse event will occur and including the consequences of that event, Ebi (2005, cited in Kirch et al, 2005, pp 47-56) calls for different strategies for high probability events with low consequences and for low probability events with high consequences.


However the assessment of “enduring rain” as a dangerous event shows, that especially for the audience, both categories seem to be important. One of the interviewees suggests the following explanation,

“It‟s not really dangerous due to injuries, but you‟ll get so frustrated and f**ked off when it won‟t stop raining the whole day. You‟re freezing and you know that you get a cold when you‟re at home. It‟s more dangerous for your personal morale”

This perception cannot be neglected by production managers or crowd managers because organising 30,000 people in a state of low morale can easily turn out to be a problem when it comes to a situation where the co-operation of the audience is needed. Thunderstorm Looking at the festival seasons 2006 – 2009, thunderstorms were wide spread over Europe. But as thunderstorms are complex phenomena with multiple accompanying variables (heavy rain, lightning, strong wind gusts), a closer look is needed. The main reasons for assessing thunderstorms as dangerous were given in the interviews:

fast development / no preparation time

local wind gusts / collapsing structures

lightning strikes /”because they are dangerous for everything”

can lead to a panic (fear of lightning strikes) Lightning strikes According to UCAR (University Corporation for Atmospheric Research), lightning strikes kill more people than any other kind of bad weather. But because lightning usually kills people one at a time, it tends to be underrated as a hazard12. Only 21% of the audience13 assessed lightning strikes as dangerous – mainly because no one had any relevant experiences:

“I‟d be more likely to win the lottery” “there are so many structures around – why should it hit me?”

But this perception misses an important factor which makes lightning strikes dangerous: more people are killed by a high-voltage current reaching out from a lightning bolt than by being struck directly14. This is considered more of a hazard by production managers, especially by those who work on green fields and who had to think about natural hazards such as trees. Interviewees had experiences of people seeking shelter under trees – although in one case messages were given to the audience not to do that. High winds Looking at the incidents 2006 - 2009, high winds were the cause of fatalities in some of them, for example

12 http://www.ucar.edu/communications/factsheets/Lightning.html accessed 23.04.2010 13

n=336 14 (http://www.ucar.edu/communications/factsheets/Lightning.html accessed at 23.04.2010

http://www.ucar.edu/communications/factsheets/Lightning.html

http://www.ucar.edu/communications/factsheets/Lightning.html


Canada, Big Valley Jamboree Festival : stage collapse (one death)

Slovakia, Pohoda Festival : tent collapse (two deaths)

Germany, Southside 2007 : tent collapse (one death) High Winds are assessed as the most dangerous weather phenomenon by production managers, even if structures are built properly, according to building regulations and standards, local wind gusts can have a disastrous impact, not only on big but also on small structures. All production managers interviewed offered at least one example of the consequences of high winds:

brandings / banners on towers and fences (sometimes installed by agencies without being checked by the production team)

material not properly stacked (eg wooden pallets)

wet mesh (getting heavy and loosing the ability to let wind pass through)

merchandise tents, bar tents, concession stands: not properly secured by the owners

Although 40% of the audience15 thought that high winds were extremely dangerous, there also appears to be a sort of “danger–seeking” atmosphere around this phenomenon. This is evidenced by findings on the internet portal YouTube, where videos and commentaries show a common message: THIS IS FUN:

“EPIC! What a weekend”16

“hehe that was so cool”17

“The camping was almost destroyed by the wind...but was good fun” / “the space created by the blown away tents made way for some great parties”18

Hailstorms According to the Tornado and Storm Research Organisation (Torro)19, hailstorms, normally lasting between 2 and 15 minutes, have been the cause of costly and deadly events throughout history. As hailstorms are relatively infrequent and not even known in some parts of Europe, only 14% of the audience20 and 25% of the production managers21 thought that a hailstorm was dangerous. However, when considering the incidents resulting from hailstorms, they must the rated as the most dangerous weather phenomenon for open-air events because no other phenomenon is able to cause a panic like a hailstorm does. Fruin (1993) cites the example of

15

n=314 16

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyO5Z4MK-rE accessed 23.04.2010

17http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hIcGv-Omets&feature=related accessed 23.04.2010 18

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=08QYNP13VbE&NR=1 accessed 23.04.2010 19 (available from http://www.torro.org.uk/site/hail_extremes.php accessed at 23.04.2010 ) 20

n=314 21

n=28

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MyO5Z4MK-rE

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hIcGv-Omets&feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=08QYNP13VbE&NR=1

http://www.torro.org.uk/site/hail_extremes.php


a sudden violent hailstorm in Katmandu in1988, where 30,000 people tried to flee from the hailstones and more than 100 died and 700 were injured. Though these people did not die from hailstones alone, it can be assumed that rain instead of hail would not have led to such a panic. Hailstorms also have a considerable financial impact according to one of the world‟s leading insurance companies Deutsche Rück in 2006 two short and very heavy local hailstorms in Southern Germany caused more than 100 injuries and 150 million Euros of damage to structures. Enduring rain / flooding Considering the relatively small number of injuries due to enduring rain it is not assessed to be dangerous, but can lead to an increased stress level both with audience and staff. One production manager said that it‟s hard to motivate staff to work safely in enduring rain:

“They rather want to finish work in a hurry and don‟t care about safety. The Atmosphere in general is difficult due to an increasing amount of frustration which accompanies enduring rain.”

When enduring rain is accompanied by flooding the situation is dependent upon the preparedness of the promoter. As long as there is the possibility for a warm shower or a dry place to stay (as could be seen perfectly at Roskilde Festival 2007) the audience does not really complain:

“it‟s part of the open-air feeling” “if you can‟t stand this, you should not go to an open-air festival” “if it‟s too hard, I sleep in my car – so there‟s no problem at all”

Rain also is something that 85% of the audience is prepared for, either by bringing rain jackets and rubber boots or:

“bringing freezer bags to put around my stockings“ “bringing folding shovel to dig a ditch around my tent“ “bringing rubbish bags to be prepared to slide through the mud“

This last quote highlights an issue which was discussed by the production managers: people sliding through the mud, dancing in the mud or throwing mud at themselves; 10% of the audience think this is really fun. In these conditions campsites have all kinds of waste and other emissions on the ground that cannot be seen. Behaviour like this is extremely dangerous leading to injuries such as, cuts, bruises, electrical shock and skin irritations from such things as emissions on the ground, waste, insects or animal bites. Heat Heat is a less known form of severe weather. This was also expressed by one production manager who stated:

“I think the most difficult one is heat as nobody would allow you to cancel a show because of heat”

This was especially true for the festival season of 2006 as the whole of Europe was hit by an extreme heat wave.


Only 21% of the production managers22 and 30% of the audience23 assessed heat as dangerous – but with regard to crowd management plans for festivals it is a factor of paramount importance for security and the medical services. Heat can cause hypothermia, heat cramps, heat strokes, dehydration and sunburns both to audience and staff. Especially in dense crowds in front of the stage where there is no air movement which is necessary to dissipate heat, dangerous situations can arise. Additionally, the “use of drugs such as alcohol or amphetamines may predispose subjects to heat illness by changes in physiological effector mechanisms and by changes in behaviour.” (Havenith 2005, cited in Kirch et al, 2005, p.77) As a method to cool down 18% of the audience suggested using drizzling water – a measure which all production managers agreed was ineffective.

“it only gives them the feeling of being fresh and they do not drink or even leave……. They‟re still dehydrated and overheated and they should feel that they are.”

37 % of the audience thinks that the promoter should provide free drinking water on the whole festival site – a measure which is discussed among the production managers. On the one hand it is regarded as a good service and welfare measure - on the other there is a strong feeling that the audience should take care of itself and that providing free drinking water is something no one would expect anywhere else– especially as the promoter normally gets income from selling drinks. 21% of the audience suggested that providing cheap drinking water would be a good idea – a suggestion which is supported by most of the production managers as a good compromise that promoters may be able to live with. The question of warnings When asked what the audience expects from the promoter, „early warnings‟ was an important factor in the audience‟s expectations. 78% suggested that the promoter should give early information and 100% of the production managers thought that the audience expect warnings.

This is also supported by the literature, for example Menne (2005, cited in Kirch et al, 2005, pp 265 - 272) states that “early warning is widely accepted as a crucial component of disaster risk reduction”. Fruin (1993, p _ ) speaks of a “duty to warn”.

“a legal view of crowd management responsibilities requires that crowd participants be informed of foreseeable dangers associated with crowd behaviours and /or assembly facilities.”

Though there was the unquestioned opinion that warnings are necessary, problems arose around the question of when the information and warnings should be published and what kind of information should be given. Some production managers‟ responses:

“warn them too early, no one would react – and if they did react, I‟d get problems with the promoter when people go home too early”

22

n=28 23

n=314


“what shall we tell them? Go to their cars? Stay in the tents? Go home?” Everything we say can have consequences to their health”

Some audience responses:

“I don‟t know if I would react to a warning – it depends upon the program” “Of course warnings are a good thing, but unless the promoter can offer shelter – what should we do?”

Although it might be difficult to implement, Ebi (2005, cited in Kirch et al, 2005, p.48) suggests:

“Although disasters due to adverse weather and climate events cannot be entirely prevented, primary prevention, particularly development of early warning systems, can reduce the number of adverse health outcomes that occur during or following an event. Current primary prevention activities, where they exist, are generally limited to (…) inform the public what to do (and not do) during or immediately following an event (…) an effective early warning system should both reduce vulnerability and increase preparedness”

Conclusions

The purpose of this research was to ascertain the perceptions of production managers and audiences of the most common weather hazards.

The findings show that there is a general understanding by both groups of the hazards of weather at open-air festivals but that the assessment of the hazard is strongly dependent upon the individual‟s personal experience.

Among the obvious hazards are thunderstorms, with its accompanying variables (rain, wind, hail, lightning strike). In addition heat has to be considered, although at first sight this does not seem to be a dangerous hazard.

The findings also suggest that, in addition to properly built structures, communication is a key factor in both pre-disaster planning and post-disaster management. Only when everyone involved has a clear understanding of what might happen is there a chance that emergency plans – if they exist - can be realised. It is hoped that this limited investigation will serve as a basis for future studies leading to a deeper understanding of the impact of weather-related hazards on open-air events. More research is necessary to look at the different variables of “severe weather” in detail for better preparation and planning. In summary there is a need to have a better understanding of the impact of severe weather, improved risk assessment and therefore preparation for open-air events.


References

Deutsche Rück (2009) Sturmdokumentation 2008. Düsseldorf : Deutsche Rück. (translation & explanation by the author: “stormdocumentation 2008”. “Deutsche Rück” is Germany's biggest re- insurance company) Ebi, K.L. (2005) Improving public health responses to extreme weather events. Cited in Kirch, W.; Menne, B. and Bertollini, Roberto (eds.) (2005): Extreme weather Events and public health responses. New York: Springer. pp 47 - 56 Fruin, John J (2002) The causes and prevention of crowd disasters. Originally presented at the First International Conference on Engineering for Crowd Safety, London, England, March 1993.Revised for crowdsafe.com, January 2002. Havenith, G. (2005) Temperature regulation, heat balance and climatic stress. Cited in Kirch, W.; Menne, B. and Bertollini, Roberto (eds.) (2005): Extreme weather Events and public health responses. New York: Springer. pp 69 - 80 HSE (1999) The Event Safety Guide. London: HMSO.

Kemp, C. and Hill, I.(2004) Health and safety aspects in the live music industry. Cambridge: Entertainment Technology Press.

Kemp, C.; Hill, I.; Upton, Mick; Hamilton, Mark (2007) Case studies in crowd management. Cambridge: Entertainment Technology Press.

Kemp C, Moore T and Mellor P (2010) A review of the Management of crowd safety at outdoor street/special events. Norwich UK, HSE Books

Kirch, W.; Menne, B. and Bertollini, Roberto (eds.) (2005): Extreme weather Events and public health responses. New York: Springer.

Menne, B (2005) extreme weather events: what can we do to prevent health impacts? Cited in Kirch, W.; Menne, B. and Bertollini, Roberto (eds.) (2005): Extreme weather Events and public health responses. New York: Springer. pp 265 – 272 Silverman D (2010) Doing Qualitative Research London: SAGE Publications.

Tarlow, Peter E. (2002) Event risk management and safety. New York: Wiley event management series, Wiley & Sons.

World Meteorological Organization (WMO) (2004) Workshop on severe and xxtreme events forecasting. Workshop Paper. Toulouse: WMO. www.wmo.ch/pages/prog/www/DPS/Meetings/.../Doc3-1(1).doc


http://www. youtube.de (accessed 30th November 2009) http://www. essl.org/ESWD (accessed 30th November 2009)


4 A STUDY INTO COMPETENCE, TRAINING AND REPUTATION OF EVENT SAFETY STEWARDS IN DENMARK

Morten Therkildsen

May 2010

Abstract This study looked at the present standard of training and competence of safety personnel working at events in Denmark. The research instruments were questionnaires administered to stewards and audience, and interviews with national and international experts from the event safety industry. More than 300 Danish stewards and 400 people attending concerts and events participated in the survey. The findings suggest that: the steward training program in place is not documented properly and not all stewards participate in it; the industry has a minimum safety standard and that regular security guards do not live up to that standard; official training programs for stewards are welcomed by the industry and stewards, provided that the industry has a say in the creation of these programs; and that events in Denmark are considered safe, but a continuous development in safety is recommended. There is also a general welcome for an official on job training program that is relevant for the event industry, provided that it keeps the possibility for volunteers to stay in the industry.

Introduction

This study is concerned with the training of stewards working at events, concerts and festivals in Denmark. It sought the perceptions of crowd safety working crew of the safety standard in the industry, and their views on the need for an official training program; it also sought the views of audiences at events. Ambrosius (2009a) found no requirements of


training for concert stewards, and a working group of the National Commission of the Danish Police has recently recommended that all security personnel working at events must be authorised and receive seven weeks of training (Ambrosius, 2009b). This would suggest that there is a lack of training. However, as no proper research in the training standard has been conducted; vital questions remained unanswered over whether the industry has a minimum standard that it adheres to; and whether this standard is adequate as perceived by stewards, audience, security managers, and foreign experts. This research is thus timely, and may be useful to the police national commission working group and training institutions. The study also looked at the training setup in Norway, Holland, Switzerland, Germany, and England in order to compare the Danish standards; to gain knowledge of the required safety training; and to help in suggesting new standards, if needed. The study will not cover sport stewards, as a law regarding their training has recently been passed, although, some of these stewards work regularly at concerts and will, therefore, be part of the survey. In 2000 a recommendation for instituting relevant courses for volunteers and stewards working at festivals was made by a working group set up by the Danish Government following the accident at Roskilde Festival on July 14th 2000 where nine young men died (The Ministry of Culture, 2000). The Norwegian Safety Hand Book for Running Concerts and Festivals (Danielsen, 2006) stressed the importance of the competence and experience of safety personnel in planning an event. The 2003 Licensing Act introduced in England, Kemp et al. (2007) claimed, brought the industry and academia closer together, and marked the start for the Degree courses in Crowd Management. In Denmark there are currently three training programs that lead to a license in safety and security. For security guards, the program is 15 days and contains training in law, conflict management, personal safety, reporting, guarding, first aid and basic firefighting. An addition of five hours training qualifies a security guard to be licensed as football steward. The Security guard program is offered to people who guard properties, transfer money, and receive alarm signals or supervise companies. (Ministry of Justice, 1986) It is also for people who provide close protection, but not for safety personnel. For doormen, the program is eight days training in law, service, conflict management, first aid, and basic firefighting evacuation. The doorman program is more relevant to events; however, it lacks event education, and is designed for doormen at bar and discotheques. Football stewards, on the other hand, receive 25 hours training in law, good hosting, personal protection, cooperation with authorities and colleagues, evacuation procedures, searching, and conflict management. Part of this program contains event education, focusing on managing crowds and audiences. This program was developed in cooperation with the Danish Football association, and is only available to football clubs. In addition, there is an official two-day course in crowd control, focusing on training in evacuation procedures, radio communication, command and control structure, and other crowd control topics. Although this course is available, less than 100 students attended the course in 2009 (Uddannelses Guiden, 2010). Some festivals and concert promoters in Denmark might have their own training in place. The Guide to Safety at Outdoor Music Events (Department of Justice and Department of Culture [n.d]), however, suggested that proper training and development of appropriate competences are made available to the safety personnel and that a log book documenting these competences is provided. Hopefully this research will show that the recommendations following the tragic death of nine young men in July, 2000, had been implemented, and that proper training and documentation in the area are provided by crowd safety personnel working in Denmark.


Method

This study adopts a pragmatic, qualitative and quantitative research as they complement each other (Veal, 1992). Craig (2009) pointed out that quantitative research is used when a researcher involves a large number of subjects with the purpose of quantifying behaviours; qualitative research, he added, involves a small group or an individual. This study used quantitative research in the form of self – administrated questionnaires on the internet. Face-to-face questionnaires were also used, as it is a relatively simple and straight forward approach to study beliefs (Robson, 1993). The quantitative research was conducted in two phases that ran simultaneously and involved event safety stewards and audiences at events. Stewards were asked what kind of training they have, whether the training can be documented, and if they believe they are competent to do the job. A link to an internet based self – administered questionnaire was sent to event safety stewards. The link was distributed via festivals, football clubs and event companies; all providing safety on regular basis at concerts and events. This was the best way to reach a large number of stewards in a short time period. 442 Danish event safety stewards participated and at least 350 full answers received. In addition, nonparametric data was collected with the use of a Likert scale (Craig, 2009), asking audiences attending a concert a series of questions regarding their views of the stewards and safety in general. The data was collected by using a face–to–face questionnaire, where the response rate, according to Robson (1993), is medium/very high. However, reaching the audience turned out to be more challenging than expected. A lack of relevant events in the few months where the research was undertaken decreased the opportunity to reach the audience. A team of volunteers assisted in collecting responses from audiences at two events; in total this provided the research with 298 responses. Due to the lack of events a self – administered questionnaire was created on the internet, and a link to this questionnaire was distributed via friends and co-workers; 163 additional full responses were received. In total 461 persons answered questions about their opinion on event safety in Denmark. Qualitative research was also undertaken, interviewing a small number of selected people, having with them a “conversation with a purpose.” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The purpose of these interviews was to get professionals opinion on the standard of event safety and, especially, on the training standard in Denmark. Face to face semi-structured interviews were held with two heads of security personnel from the industry in Denmark. A semi-structured interview was chosen as this gave the interviewer the possibility to get the answers that were needed in a short time, but still allowed room for expanding the area of which issues could be discussed (Robson, 1993). These individuals were chosen because of their unique work and inside knowledge of the industry, as both work with event safety on a very regular basis. In order to avoid only interviewing people who hire, train or otherwise are responsible for the standard of the training for the Danish Stewards, a few foreign representatives were also interviewed. The third interviewee is a cofounder of an official training program in a European country and an author of a training book for event safety officers. The interview


was unstructured and could be compared to a lengthy intimate conversation (Robson, 1993) as it took place backstage at a concert in Holland. The fourth interviewee, who used to work as Head of Security for a very well known international rock band, shared his insight on Danish safety standard. This interview took place in England and was semi- structured. In addition to these face to face interviews five other Head of Security personnel from Denmark, Norway, Holland, Switzerland, Germany and one representative from a university in England who teaches crowd safety management, were asked by email about the training and the safety standard in their countries. As all of the above interviewed persons are very well known in the industry it has been decided to keep their names anonymous.

Findings and discussion

Several of the people interviewed in this research claim that the background of a security guard does not meet the necessary qualifications of an event safety steward, and as one interviewee noted: “For some sick reason legislation considers a regular security guard higher than an event security officer, therefore any security guard can work at events.” Figures 1 and 2 show, that 72% of the Danish stewards, who responded, have more than one year of experience and 55% of them worked at more than five events in 2009. A significant number of stewards work at large numbers of events and have several years experience within event safety. Flemming Schmidt from Livenation (cited in Ambrosius, 2009), who promotes concerts in Denmark, explained that the present system ensures continuity and experience amongst the stewards. The large number of events operated by the stewards would support this statement, and as one of the Danish heads of security who participated in this research mentioned; “Although they are voluntary workers they burn for their job. It is a way of living, as I see it.”

Another interviewee thought highly of the Danish stewards‟ dedication and insight: “Event Denmark should be happy that there are so many stewards who want to do this work. If they are paid or not they are dedicated in relation to the work they do and they keep the wheels turning.”

Figures 1 and 2 show the experience of the Danish stewards who participated in the survey


Figure 1. Figure 2.

Ambrosius (2009) also wrote that the audience should have certainty that stewards are trained and licensed for the work. The survey showed that 58% of the participating stewards have received the training to become football stewards and 26% of them are trained as security guards (see Fig. 3). As mentioned in the introduction a security guard can obtain the football stewarding license with additional training, which indicates that some stewards have more than one license.

Figure 3. The percentage of Danish stewards who are licensed

In relation to the use of the crowd control program, two interviewees felt that the program did not teach the student what was needed. One interviewee retorted: “The training does not live up to what it should”; the other interviewee added: “There is a huge difference related to who teaches the course. There have been situations where the teacher was not really competent

28%

24% 21%

27%

How many years have you been working as

events saftey …

1

2-3

4-5

More than 5

45%

27%

14%

14%

How many events have you worked at during

2009?

0-5

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16-25

more than 25

14 10

41 12

6

17

74 84

43

0

20

40

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Danish Security guard Danish Doorman Danish Football steward

no

I have the training but not the license

Yes


to teach. There are of course some teachers that are competent but the courses need to be more stringent”. Expressing a view about trainers, another Interviewee stated:

“Training is only as good as the trainer, and if the trainer hasn´t gone out of the office or out of the controlled environment and gone to different scenarios to see how different procedures work. In my head, you know, they are only half a trainer. A lot of the people who train stewards, at least in the UK, are agency based staff who only teach a specific style.”

Interviewees also felt that the training program for the security guards is not suitable for the event industry as it was created for security in malls and retail shops. The two Danish heads of security said that they have implemented their own training programmes. On the question of the type of event safety training received, this research showed that more than 60% of the stewards received training in all the surveyed aspects, except self defense and band profiling; and more than 80% received training in first aid (see Fig. 4). Frank Bill, the security companies‟ representative in the National Commission of the Danish Police working group, believed that safety personnel should at least be trained in first-aid (cited in Ambrosius, 2009). This survey showed that most of the stewards have first-aid training. Also, filtering the answers shows that 53 of 361 (14.7%) stewards have received no training at all, supporting Ambrosius, argument that some stewards are untrained.

Figure 4. The percentage of stewards who have received education in specific areas within event safety The Guide to Safety at Outdoor Music Events (Department of Justice and Department of Culture. [n.d]) suggests that it should be possible to document the right training and competences, and as figure 5 shows most of the stewards have received training, and are able to document training hours, but also a significant amount of the training cannot be documented.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

no

not sure

yes


Figure 5 Training hours received by Danish stewards

The Dutch system is setup to undertake training to become an Events Security Officer. This takes 24 hours of theory training, six to eight hours of home studies and 10 events with practical training where a trainer is assigned up to 6 students at one time. Relating to the quality of the Danish stewards, an interviewee stated:

“There exists no long term vision, there is no educational system that is being forced by governmental bodies, there is no quality system, this lack is not the fault of the operational stewards, they work in a great manner, but they need crystal clear goals and objectives in their work at events otherwise their work will always stay as it is until an accident happens.”

There is a significant number of stewards believing that an official safety education for personnel working at all types of events is needed (see Fig. 6).

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

30.0%

35.0%

40.0%

0 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-60 61-80 More than 81

Able to document

Not able to document


Figure 6 Danish steward´s opinion on event safety education

Two intervieweesindicated that the company they work for is interested in promoting a training education programme, provided it is relevant; they believe that the security guard program is not very relevant. One of these interviewees stated:

“The authorities should involve the enormous knowledge bank in this country, and abroad for that matter, and let them create an education on equal terms as it was done with the training program for football stewards in Danish Football Association (DBU). The heads of security from selected football clubs, together with DBU, sat down and evaluated what should be taught. What kind of demands should be given to the stewards? The same should be done with this.”

He also emphasised that since they introduced their own training program they had a significant drop in the number of evictions and physical handling of guests, and that the statistics showed a 70% drop in the number of police reports taken at the venue. One of the interviewees felt that flexibility and retaining volunteer safety stewards are important: “If a system is too complex it might limit the possibility for festivals, smaller events and such to stay in business.” Expanding education for security guards with 4 weeks on job training (Ambrosius 2009) might support the training within the event industry, but it will create a more complex training program. And as Spokesman for Skanderborg Festival, Poul Martin Bonde pointed out that Skanderborg Festival might not continue if all their volunteer stewards were to attend security guard training. The four interviews rated between 5 and 7 on a scale from 1 to 10, 10 being the best. Also, the majority of respondents (76%) who attend concerts and events either strongly agreed or agreed that stewards knew what they were doing, and only 10 % disagreed.


Figure 7. 76% of the audience agree that Danish stewards know what they are doing

Furthermore, 92% of the stewards felt that they were qualified to fulfill their task as safety personnel. Stewards also indicated that the Dutch and English practice where experience with a trainer must be obtained before working independently is a good one, pointing to the importance of retaining volunteers in the industry. This should also inform the new system suggested by the working group of the National Commission of the Danish Police to have flexibility to ensure that the present staff stays active.

Figure 8. 92% of Danish stewards felt qualified for their task in 2009

A significant number of stewards (46%) felt that some of their colleagues were unqualified. Some recurring comments demonstrated this feeling, such as; “large events working with a lot of stewards”, “new stewards at work”, and “working in areas of the country where events are seldomly held”.

34%

42%

14% 9%

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-5%

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35%

45%

Strongly agree

agree no opnion disagree strongly disagree

I am certain the staff know what they are doing

2% 7%

92%

Did you work at events in 2009 where you felt that you were unqualified to fulfill …

yes - that has happened several times

yes - that has happened once


Figure 9. 46% of Danish stewards have felt that some of their colleagues were unqualified

Managing a large event requires more stewards than smaller ones. According to one interviewee, a large event might have more than 500 stewards, and this means that the level of experience and knowledge for the average steward is low. The same type of experience pattern occurs, when events are held in areas where they do not often arrange events, An interviewee pointed out that

“…the authorities in Copenhagen are used to events and have the necessary routine procedure in evaluating if events are planned in a safe manner. However, when an event is arranged in other parts of Denmark, where the authorities are not used to see these types of events, authorities tend to have less experience; the same applies for the safety staff. Experience is a significant part of planning the events safely.”

Another interviewee stated that “even a large event in the middle of Copenhagen might be arranged by people who have not decided who is responsible for what, and that affect the safety.” Experience also has a negative side, A third interviewee claims: “people responsible for safety may not react in the required way, instead they do things because it has been done this way for decades. There is no willingness to develop and event safety is money driven and not primarily quality driven”. Frank Bill (in Ambrosius 2009) acknowledged that the demand for higher training is partly financially driven. He feels that prolonged training and licensing will create a better sense of security for the citizens. Nevertheless, on general event safety in Denmark, 88% of the stewards think that Danish events are safe. The comments that are attached to the steward‟s answers feature lack of education and focus as main issues.

11%

35% 54%

Did you work at events in 2009 where you felt that one or more of the other

event safety personnel were … Yes - that has happened often

Yes - that has happened once

No


Figure 10. Most audience believe events are safe. Figure 11. Most stewards believe events are safe

One Interviewee, who has visited Denmark several times with more than one band and at festivals, indoor venues, large and smaller venues all around Denmark, rated the Danish safety compared to the rest of the world as: “probably quite high. Probably… It depends on the artist but I would probably say a 7. I would never give much more to be honest, because there is always training requirements, there‟s always managing errors and that sort of stuff.” He is challenged by another interviewee who stated:

“If it was not for the few dedicated fireballs it would have been to hell, just to use a minor polite word. I can see many venues, large as well as small, where safety does not matter the most unless there is a person pushing and putting pressure on, and saying that this is what needs to be done. The way of thinking is not seen in Denmark... one does not include safety in the business case for the event.”

Conclusion

The findings suggest that there is a steward training program in place, although it is not documented properly and not all stewards participate in it; the industry does have a minimum safety standard, and that regular security guards do not live up to that standard; that official training programs for stewards are welcomed by the industry and stewards, provided that the industry has a say in the creation of these programs; and that events in Denmark are considered safe, but a continuous development in safety is recommended. The findings also show that Danish stewards who participated in this research are very experienced, as 72% of them have worked as steward for more than a year and 55% in more than five events in a year. It is also apparent that there is a training system in use, and that some kind of training is in place, although, much of the training is undocumented, suggesting that the

29%

61%

4% 5% 1%

32%

56%

6% 5% 1% 0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

I believe attending events is safe (456 answers)

I feel safe at events (455 answers)

88%

12%

Do you believe that events in your

country are run in a safe way? (351

answers)

Yes

No


recommendations of the Guide to Safety at Outdoor Music Events (Department of Justice and Department of Culture. [n.d]) are not instituted. There is also a general welcome for an official training program that is relevant for the event industry, provided that it keeps possibility for volunteers to stay in the industry, as experience is important in planning events (Danielsen, 2006). There is also recognition that self instituted training programmes indicate that the industry has a minimum standard that they wish to fulfill. Although, 90% of the audience and 88% of the stewards questioned believe events in Denmark are safe, nevertheless, there is a general feeling that the industry needs an official event safety training program, and that a regular security guard is not considered competent for event work. Further and more thorough research is required covering a larger area of Denmark, and larger number of different events. As the stewards participating in this research represent suppliers working on a regular basis in the industry, they might not have given a full view of the steward‟s competence and training level in areas of the country where fewer events are held. The findings also point to the need for benefiting from experts within event safety in Denmark and internationally in creating a new on job training and education programme to ensure that new stewards are competent before acting on their own.

References

Ambrosius, T (2009a) Concert security does not need education. [online]. MetroXpress. Available from: http://www.metroxpress.dk/dk/article/2009/10/14/22/3652-83/index.xml [Accessed 20 May 2010]. Ambrosius, T (2009b) Higher standards for concert security. [online]. MetroXpress. Available from: http://www.metroxpress.dk/dk/article/2009/11/03/22/5046-83/index.xml [Accessed 20 May 2010]. Craig, D. (2009) Action research essentials. San Francicso: Jossey-Bass. Danielsen, I. (2006) Sikkerhetshåndboken: For avvikling av konserter og festivaler. Bergen: Norsk Rockforbund. Department of Justice and Department of Culture. [n.d] Guide to safety at outdoor music events. Denmark: Department of Justice and Department of Culture. Kemp, C., Hill, I., Upton, M. and Hamilton, M. (2007) Case Studies in Crowd Management. Cambridge: Entertainment Technology Press. Lincoln, Y.S. & Guba, E.G. (1985) Naturalistic inquiry. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Ministry of Justice. (1986) Executive order regarding security business. (LBK 1986: 149) Copenhagen: Ministry of Justice. Robson, C (1993) Real world research. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing

http://www.metroxpress.dk/dk/article/2009/10/14/22/3652-83/index.xml

http://www.metroxpress.dk/dk/article/2009/11/03/22/5046-83/index.xml


The Ministry of Culture. (2000) Cultural profile: Rock Festival Safety. (Chairperson: Ms. Anne Knudsen). Copenhagen: The Ministry of Culture. Uddannelses Guiden (2010) AMU educations [online] Available from http://www.ug.dk/uddannelser/arbejdsmarkedsuddannelseramu/serviceerhvervene/vagtservice/grundlaeggende_crowd-control.aspx?holdid=326579 [Accessed 20 May 2010]. Veal, A.J. (1992) Research Methods for Leisure and Tourism: A practical guide. Essex: Longman.


5 AN EXPLORATORY STUDY INTO MARKET DEMAND FOR WORK-BASED AND E-LEARNING EDUCATION PROGRAMMES IN CROWD SAFETY MANAGEMENT

Owen Grainger Jones

May 2010

Photo: Bucks New University

Abstract This exploratory study examines the needs of adult learners in the crowd management industry for distance learning educational provisions. The perceptions of a convenient, purposive sample of industry and student practitioners were sought. Four versions of a questionnaire consisting mainly of open-ended questions were administered to this sample via email. The findings suggest that there is a noticeable growth of events, and increased professionalisation needing crowd safety management skills and requiring better provision of distance learning education. There are also indications for a growing demand for crowd management education from outside the UK, driven by a perceived high UK safety standard, and quality Crowd Safety Management distance learning programmes. The findings also suggest that legislation and civil lawsuits contribute to fostering a favourable climate for Crowd Safety Management education. Reduced cost associated with workshop and more flexible programme of study is seen as attractive to employers and students. The findings also point to a concern that distance learning may cause a loss of peer to peer learning and relationship development, which may need to be addressed by the design of any distance learning programme. Key issues appear to revolve around pedagogical and delivery issues, all requiring further research.

Introduction

The growth and professionalisation in the leisure industry, in particular the contemporary events industry (Getz, 1997; Bowdin et al, 1999), has led to an ever increasing number of


courses in various disciplines within the wider events management field. Whilst there is a good number of event marketing and event production oriented programmes of education, there has been until recently very little research into the safety management of audiences and visitors to mass spectator events. The development of what is increasingly termed as „Crowd Safety Management‟ (Upton, 2007) has largely been led by industry practitioners' publications from concerned Government departments, and a small group of authors, for example; Fruin (1971), Department of Culture Media and Sport (2008), Frosdick and Walley (1997), Health and Safety Executive (1993, 1999 and 2000), Kemp et al (2004 and 2007), Still (2000) and Upton (2007). The demand for educational courses for Crowd Safety Management practitioners led in 2004 to the setting up of a Foundation Degree (FdA) course in Crowd Safety Management at Buckinghamshire New University (formerly, BCUC). The lack of a wider availability of information and knowledge in Crowd Safety Management (CSM) theory and practice has led to a growing number of event professionals from the UK and abroad to study the subject; a good number of leading crowd safety management practitioners have undertaken studies in CSM through the University. Here the workshop based model, or what is termed blended learning (Salmon, 2006), has been only partially successful in widening participation due mainly to issues of geographic location and the students‟ own employment circumstances. Furthermore, whilst much learning and reflective practice take place among workshop cohorts, this learning is not being truly integrated and disseminated within the wider student body and the events industry. This study is inductive and exploratory (Brassington & Pettitt, 2003: 216); it attempts to assess the potential for CSM distance learning courses and the changes that might be needed to successfully bring together students from wider geographic, cultural and professional backgrounds into the CSM programmes of Buckinghamshire New University. It does this by exploring the size and health of the UK events market, perceptions of the need for CSM education programmes, likely education requirements of CSM organisations, reflections of graduates FdA CSM on syllabus and delivery, and opinions and thoughts of current students on the FdA CSM programmes.


Photo: Bucks New University

Literature Review

Event and crowd management literature Whilst much has been written about the social and economic impacts of events and events tourism, surprisingly little has been written about visitor or crowd management. Yeoman et al (2004) state, “There are few texts that endeavour to cover the requirements of managing visitors at a festival or event. This is strange when one considers how the satisfaction of this intangible product, more than any other, is so dependent on the collective experience of people who spend an extended period of time in close proximity to each other” (p. 65). Literature to address the apparent omission of CSM has started to develop with books such as Sport Facility Planning and Management (Farmer et al, 1996), Event Management and Event Tourism (Getz, 1997), Event Management (Bowdin et al, 1999), Successful Event Management (Shone & Parry, 2001), Event Risk Management and Safety (Tarlow, 2002) and Festival & Events Management (Yeoman et al, 2004). However, this literature and others are lacking in both substantial CSM content and focus on training and education of crowd management workers. Fruin (1971) cited in Upton (2007) defined crowd management as distinct from crowd control in that it involves “The systematic planning for, and supervision of the orderly movement and assembly of people. It involves the assessment of the people handling capabilities of a space prior to its use. It also includes the assessment of the projected levels of occupancy, adequacy of means of ingress and egress, processing procedures such as ticket collection and expected types of activities and group behaviour”. Crowd control is defined as simply the “restriction or limitation of group behaviour” (Upton, 2007: p72). This definition underpins CSM writing in key academic text books such as, Sports & Safety Management by Frosdick and Walley (1997), Health & Safety Aspects At Live Events (Kemp et al: 2004), A Comparative Study Of Two Major Music Events (Kemp et al: 2004), Case Studies In Crowd Management (Kemp et al: 2007) and From Rome To Rock N Roll by Upton (2007).


However, whilst valuable in developing and widening knowledge of CSM, these publications tend to have events types that are the focus of the narrative and, therefore, none can be identified as the definitive publication on the management of crowds. The subject of training and education in CSM is to some extent explored in Frosdick and Walley (1997) as part of a discussion on the need for the further development of the Football Safety Officers training and need for professional qualifications. Upton (2007) discusses the industry issues behind the development of the FdA CSM, but as „From Rome To Rock „N‟ Roll‟ was written in 2006/07, it does not provide information on the widening student profile in recent years and the greater numbers of tour security managers or overseas students who have been undertaking their studies with Bucks New University. Published Guidance in the forms of The Guide To Safety At Sports Grounds (Department of Culture Media and Sport, 2008), The Event Safety Guide (HSE, 1999), Managing Crowd Safety In Public Venues (Au S, et al, 1993) and Managing Crowds Safety (HSE, 2000) have been available for some time, but while The Guide To Safety At Sports Grounds has been periodically updated, most recently in 2008, neither The Event Safety Guide nor Managing Crowds Safely have been updated in recent years. The Event Safety Guide was last updated in 1999 and Managing Crowd Safely in 2000; thus these documents do not contain or reflect recent developments in the management of crowds and events. However, it is worth noting that although published seventeen years ago much of the best practice recommendations in Managing Crowd Safety In Public Venues (Au S, et al, 1993) remain as pertinent now as when published, and that these publications provide some useful discussion on the need for staff training. Key reports on crowd disasters such as: the Lord Justice (LJ) Moelwyn Hughes report on the Burden Park Stadium disaster in 1948, the LJ Wheatly report on the Ibrox Stadium disaster in 1971, the LJ Popplewell report on the Valley Parade Stadium disaster 1985 and the LJ Taylor report on the Hillsborough Stadium disaster in 1989, are all readily available and provide essential learning. Themes and recommendations contained in these reports have provided not just the legal and moral impetus for the development of CSM training and education but also many of the areas of best practice and methodology apparent in Guidance Documents, such as; The Guide To Safety At Sports Grounds and The Event Safety Guide. Also available, albeit with a little searching, are reports on crowd disasters that offer detailed information on the sequence of events that surrounded and led up to the particular crowd disaster, these reports include: The Riverfront Arena Cincinnati USA 1979, The Monsters Of Rock Concert Castle Donnington 1988, The Arad Festival Israel 1995, The Roskilde Festival 2000, The Ellis Park Stadium South Africa 2001, The Dig Day Out Concert Sydney Australia 2001. Event industry trade magazines such as IQ, Access All Areas, Live UK, Audience Magazine, Venue Safety and Security Magazine and Main Event Magazine; all feature crowd related topics and stories on a regular basis and to a lesser extent, even titles such as Event Solutions Magazine and Total Production International feature crowd management related articles periodically. Online resources include The Journal of Crowd Safety & Security Management, The International Centre for Crowd Safety and Security Studies, Crowd Dynamics. Com., Safe Concerts.com, CrowdSafe.com, Major Events International.com, Event Industry News.co.uk,


Security Oricle.com and IAAM.com; all feature news and articles related to Crowd Safety Management to a greater or lesser degree. Other sources of available learning materials on crowd related topics are radio and television documentaries; recent examples include: documentaries on the fire at the Valley Parade football ground Bradford 1985, the crowd crush at the Hillsborough football ground Sheffield 1989 and the crowd disaster at the Le Mans motor race France 1955. Also a recent source for articles and resources that is of increasing importance is BBC Online, YouTube, and other news media or social media sites. Adult and blended learning literature The other key area of literature of relevance to this exploratory study is that of education literature that discusses, or focuses on adult and blended learning. Whilst none of the authors featured below have written about education within the events industry or crowd management sector, the generic issues and themes provide insight into the topic of adult learning and the development of what has increasingly been termed flexible and distributed learning. Ramsden (2003: 19) claims that “study undertaken for the love of learning is the outcome for which the lecturer must strive to achieve”. Whilst this is a laudable aim, it could be suggested that it fails to recognise the primary motivations of many adult learners. Feedback from the CSM students suggests that they are highly motivated by their work environment and that they view their study as interesting and perhaps career advancing, but at all times supplementary to their professional roles. This situation seems to concur with the theories on the motivation of adult learners put forward by Knowles (1973) that “adult learners are motivated to learn to the extent that they perceive the learning will help them better perform tasks that they will confront in life” (1973: p82). This should not be viewed as necessarily a bad thing, as for most people, and clearly for this group of students, their professional lives are very important to them (Grainger-Jones, 2008). Whilst a desire for personal development, undoubtedly, acts as a motivating factor (Maslow, 1948), the likelihood is that the desire to obtain an academic qualification in CSM is a reflection of the competitive nature of the employment market within the events industry; as Boud and Garrick 1999: p104), state “There are few places left for employees at any level who do not continue to learn and improve their effectiveness throughout their working lives”. The issue of recognition of skills and learning from within the workplace is important to the student group as a whole and qualifications that recognise the student‟s abilities in a formal framework is attractive to both students and employers. The role that education can play in the formal recognition of learning is a key issue, quoting Jarvis (1998) Brownhill (1998: 60) writes; “Education is a public phenomenon and provides public recognition of the learning that it provides”. On the topic of what work place learning is, writers such as Boud and Garrick (1999) and Tosey and McNair, cited in Jarvis (2001) seem to concur that whilst “There is no single theory of work place learning; instead there are various theories covering different facets” (Boud & Garrick, p. 6). Tosey and McNair, citing Raelin (2000: 96), consider that work-based learning can however be distinguished from traditional classroom learning in a number of ways:

Firstly work-based learning is centred around reflection on work practices; it is not merely a question of acquiring a set of technical skills, but a case of reviewing and learning from experience. Secondly work-based learning views learning as arising from


actions and problem solving within a working environment, and thus is centred on live projects and challenges to individuals and organisations. Work-based learning sees the creation of knowledge as a shared and collective activity, one in which people discuss ideas, and share problems and solutions. Also work-based learning requires not only the acquisition of new knowledge, but the acquisition of meta-competence – learning to learn.

For CSM education to be successfully assimilated into a wider education framework, industry practitioners and academics must be provided with both the mechanisms and opportunity to reflect upon the working practices. In his paper, „A Constructivist Approach To Online College Learning‟, Rovai (2004) provides one model that might fulfil these requirements, where he calls for a shift in study paths and education programmes better suited to workers and adult learners needs. Rovai identifies the key issue of geographic location as being one that can be overcome by the careful design and delivery of an education programme. He further explains that the design and delivery of the programme must also strive to assist the sharing of peer to peer learning which will both create a climate conducive to supportive learning and independent „autonomous learners‟. Salmon (2006) supports Rovai‟s model and highlights how „Constructivist‟ approaches to learning might help shape quality distance learning programmes. Salmon sets out a five-stage model that provides a „scaffold‟ for a structured and paced programme of e-tivities. E-tivities is the name Salmon gives for the online activities that both the tutor and students participate in which the author claims result in a more meaningful and empowering learning where the “participant can become responsible for their own learning and that of their group” (Salmon, p. 33). Although information technology lends itself to this form of education it could be unwise to view this technology as the answer to all the problems inherent in distance or blended learning courses. In a booklet titled „Tutoring Online: Using CMC to Support Learning‟, the Open University counsels that “just because CMC (Computer-Mediated Communication) exists does not mean that it must be used for every purpose. There may well be times when other, more traditional, media would work better” (Phillips et al, 2000: 12).

Research Methodology

The research is inductive and exploratory; data for qualitative analysis is collected from a purposive and convenient sample of CMS students and practitioners. The aim is to identify problems rather than provide solutions (Brassington & Pettitt: 2003: 216) and to gain insight. This primary source of data will be analysed alongside secondary data on the market potential for CMS courses. Four different sets of self-completion questionnaires (Fink, 1995) were designed and administered via email to four different groups of preselected respondents; each questionnaire was designed for the particular respondent group and each respondent group representing an area for investigation. Naturally, in preselecting respondents an element of bias was introduced into the research. However, Brassington and Pettitt (2008) describe this form of preselection as „judgemental sampling‟ and state that an advantage of this form of preselection is that the respondents have been chosen because they were “felt to represent better sources of the required information” (2008: 245). The questions were open-ended (Brassington & Pettitt) so that the respondents could answer as they saw fit.


For reasons of the geographic locations of the respondents and their busy and often highly mobile professional lives it was felt that emailing the questionnaires to the respondents was the most achievable form of acquiring information. Such research methodological design might justifiably be open to the criticism that the questionnaire was designed to suit the adopted research method (Brassington & Pettitt, 2008: 247). The first group consists of individuals who were chosen for their long experience within the wider events industry, or their position within an organisation in the industry. The questions set were slightly altered in the light of each of the respondent‟s unique perspective and position within the events industry. Five questionnaires were sent out and four responses were received. The second group were senior managers within CSM organisations, chosen to gain an insight into their organisations‟ training and education requirements. These respondents were graduates of the FdA CSM and some presently undertake, or have undertaken, teaching duties on the FdA CSM programme. Seven questionnaires were sent out and five responses received. The third group of respondents were graduates of the FdA CSM programme, chosen to provide their reflection and insight into the programme, its delivery and the access to education it had provided. A pilot questionnaire was sent to three graduates, and this was developed into the final version which was sent out to sixteen graduates; eight responses were received. The fourth group of respondents were all current students on the FdA CSM and included a large number of overseas students, thus providing an opportunity for examination of issues encountered with distance learning, studying in a second language and within a UK centric programme. This helped gain insight into the thoughts and motivations of the current students, particularly those who were unable to attend a number of the workshops. The respondents were a mixed group of 1st and 2nd year students. Ten questionnaires were sent out and seven responses were received. All respondents attended workshops. The secondary data and „desk top‟ (Housden, 2008) research included much exploratory analysis of available sources of information, such as; market intelligence, trade organisations and government department reports, with a view of identifying facts and figures and emergent themes with regard to the size and health of the UK events industry. As the event industry is an emergent and often fragmented sector of the UK economy, it is highly unlikely that available data and information will be all encompassing or comprehensive. Bowdin et al (1999: XV) also found that “definite data are not available, due to the complex nature and diversity of the industry”. Perhaps the best that can be achieved is a perception of the size and health of the UK events market and likely market potential for CSM students. Sources of secondary data and information on the events industry, included: pertinent reports from the business intelligence sector, the Department of Culture Media and Sport (DCMS), the Office of National Statistics (ONS), and the various trade organisations, such as; the Event Industry Alliance (EIA), the Association of Conference and Exhibition (ACE), Concert Promoters Association (CPO), and the Association of Festivals Organisers (AFO). This study also made use of; data gleaned from reports on the numbers of Licence and Temporary Event Notices applications, data on the numbers of attendees at music events,


data on the economic impact of various sectors of the events industry, such as; live music and performing arts, exhibitions, conferences and sports. Drawing from this literature, the study attempts to derive figures for the number of events held within the various sectors of the industry, some possible figure for attendance numbers, and market potential in terms of some estimated number of trained event stewards and crowd safety managers. The researcher acknowledges that the data sets used were incomplete because of; timescale over which the research was conducted, the focus of the research on a particular segment of the UK events market, and others. Within these limitations, the researcher drew together what information and data existed from four key sectors: Festivals, arenas, football stadia, and music and entertainment venues. Assessing the scale of the UK events market and the size of the UK audience hosting capacity proved to be very complex. Because of the exploratory nature of this study, the researcher acknowledges that the adopted methodology, the assumptions made in the analysis, and the findings may all be open to criticism. However, in the absence of alternative options the researcher was compelled to utilise prior learning and experience in exercising judgements on a number of occasions.

Findings

As the event and crowd safety management industry is largely a practitioner led sector, the views and opinions of leading figures within the sector are of primary importance to this research and have therefore been sought. This research was based in the first instance on responses to questions set by the researcher and emailed to respondents. As each respondent holds a significant position within the events and crowd management industry, the researcher feels that their responses represent a valid view of the thoughts and concerns of the UK crowd management industry in 2010. A number of themes emerged from these responses. Growth of events Three respondents stated that in their opinion there had been a growth in the number of events and an increase in their size and. One respondent was of the opinion that an area of particular note was the “marked increase in the number of outdoor events in the last ten years”. Three respondents felt that there had been a widening of the type of events being held and that there are now more parades, carnival and multi day festival events. Increased professionalisation Respondents generally believed that events have become more professionalised in recent years; three respondents saw legal issues as the drivers for the development of new industry initiatives. All respondents thought there were now more event specific education and training programmes; a respondent commented that the “last 5 years has seen a dramatic upswing in the quality and level of training”. On the subject of specialised event and crowd management related education and training, the respondents concurred that there was a need for both vocational and academic input into these programmes; one respondent attributed the change in industry attitudes in favour of crowd management education to the Roskilde crowd disaster in 2000.


High UK safety standard Not all respondents had formal links with international event organisations but on the topic of event safety standards abroad, one respondent stated that overseas practices had shocked his organisation‟s members. Another respondent felt that the UK has the highest standards of event safety and that this should be capitalised upon. Demand for CSM distance learning programmes Respondents had little knowledge of the existence of any events education or training programmes outside of UK. However, one respondent viewed Germany to have a high quality of events industry education. Respondents also felt that quality distance learning courses would open up access to education for events professionals and be taken up by workers and companies within the events sector. Such programmes, respondents elaborated, would prove attractive to events industry professionals; three respondents felt that issues of flexibility, course design, IT and multimedia resource were key components in the success of these programmes. Some respondents affirmed that distance learning education provision would be attractive to employers. However, one respondent stated that while distance learning was suitable to education type programmes; it was not suitable for training type programme. Demand for crowd management education from outside the UK. Respondents noted that there was a lack of credible crowd management courses around the world and that there could be significant demand for such education programmes. One respondent stated that he would like to see less commercial interests and a more altruistic approach to the FdA CSM, whilst another saw content and outcome as the most important factors. Other respondents also viewed content suitability and relevance to the contemporary and global event industry as key issues. Drivers to educate industry employees All respondents perceived a general need for crowd management education within the events industry. A respondent noted: “There is now a clear perception by all stakeholders in the industry that crowd management skills must be developed from an educational perspective assisted by work place experience”. Another respondent called for different levels of training and education in CSM from basic level 2 stewarding type qualifications to level 4, 5, 6 qualifications in crowd safety management. Respondents also felt that the organisations they work for required a crowd management education provision for staff; their perceived percentage staff requirement ranged from 5% to 99% of the workforce. Higher level 4, 5 and 6 education requirement attracted responses which varied from 2% of the entire workforce to 100% of all supervisors, and to 50% of all full time employees. Furthermore, respondents saw legislation, civil law suits, industry standards and client demands as the main drivers. Other drivers mentioned include staff desire for self and career development and also company ethos. Suitability, accessibility, and pedagogy of CMS courses The respondents were generally positive about the course syllabus, describing it as pertinent and extensive. One respondent however felt that whilst the overall syllabus is generally good it requires reviewing and that a third year of study is required for graduates of the FdA CSM programme. The workshops were considered to be of the right duration but that some workshops were more of interest than others. One respondent stated that the UK academic year being unsuitable for students in the Southern Hemisphere. Tutors and speakers


generated comments from two respondents on the issue of commercial interest becoming apparent within some workshop sessions. The Assessment system was felt by all to be unsatisfactory; comments included the issue of deadline extensions and slow feedback responses. The objectivity of the marking was considered by one respondent to be questionable. The quality of Information and communication had both positive and negative responses. Positive aspects included the communication with teaching staff, whereas negative aspects revolved around perceived lack of information to assist with passing the module assignments. The online resources (Blackboard) produced some varied comments; from desiring to be able to have career long access to the system, to the limited usefulness of the audio files and frustration with the quality of these files. The respondents‟ experiences with University staff were generally positive but the administration of assignment submissions and finances was a cause of frustration, as was the poor state of the workshop venue in 2007/09. With regard to whether the graduates felt they had developed academically or that the FdA CSM had been of benefit to their career, all responses were very positive and saw the qualification as opening up new business opportunities; also that they gained confidence through the study and obtaining the qualification. Course accessibility. On the subject of how Bucks New University could make the course more accessible, the overseas respondents felt that shifting some of the focus from English legal and working practice to incorporate other cultures‟ working practices and experience would increase the attractiveness of the course. Interestingly one respondent suggested that entry level requirements for the course should be raised and that the course made more challenging by, for example, better integration of areas such as crowd psychology into the programme. Distance learning (VLE) versus workshop attendance The respondents who attended the workshops considered their employment roles as the single biggest factor that influenced their attendance. These respondents stated that one of the advantages of attending the workshops was developing relationships with both their peers and the module tutors. The negative factors regarding attendance seem to concern the location of the students in relation to the university and the associated time and cost. Three respondents considered Blackboard as being a primary and „vital‟ study resource and two respondents had used the audio files of lectures provided through the university‟s Virtual Learning Environment. In contrast, a respondent experienced considerable problems with access to Blackboard and the timely arrival of support and information. In terms of the improvements that Bucks New University might consider, respondents suggested a mixture of video conferencing or podcasting workshop days, improving sound quality of audio files and blackboard access, and better use of the peer to peer learning opportunities afforded by the forum facilities in Blackboard. One respondent stated that for him a key improvement would have been the ability to interact with the tutor about the assignment brief in a timely fashion. The need for the development of better learning resources for distance learners was seen as important by three respondents; one respondent also saw a need for the crowd safety industry to discuss and communicate ideas. All respondents felt that better distance learning resources would attract new students to the university.


Additional comments included one respondent based in Australia who felt that the FdA CSM syllabus needs to address the issue of local laws and regulations to attract serving police officers to the course. Another respondent called for a third year of study so that the FdA can be „topped up‟ into a BA (Hons). Yet, another thought that the university is failing to make venues and the wider industry fully aware of the FdA in Crowd Safety Management. All respondents found interactions with tutors and peers aided their learning. They, however, were frustrated with early finishing on the second workshop day. A few respondents seemed to want more content, and a few mentioned the poor quality and low academic standard of the presentations All the respondents who were not able to attend workshops made use of the Virtual Learning Environment (Blackboard), where reading material, audio files and other new media resources were available. Respondents found the posted material useful and interesting. One respondent did not use the audio files because he had difficulty with understanding the tutors‟ spoken English. Respondents also made a wide array of suggestions on what the university could do to improve the distance learning materials and support. One respondent suggested that a document search function would be useful as would a 24 hour help line; another felt live web streaming of workshops might be useful. Other comments included better use of forums and better presentation of documents in an appropriate academic style. Almost all the respondent thought that better online resources would attract a new profile of distance learners.

Conclusion

This exploratory study was set out to ascertain whether there was a demand within the Crowd Management industry for the development of further CSM courses, particularly, distance learning education programmes. A number of themes emerged characterising the market for CSM which have implications for the provision of educational courses. The findings suggest that there is a noticeable growth of events, and increased professionalisation which point to the need for CSM skills and better provision of distance learning education. There are also indications for a growing demand for crowd management education from outside the UK, driven by a perceived high UK safety standard, and quality CSM distance learning programmes. The findings also suggest that whilst the events industry is not immune to the economic downturn, factors such as legislation, civil lawsuits and industry demands contribute to fostering a favourable climate for CSM education. Another important finding is the apparent desire amongst past and present students of the FdA CSM to undertake education programmes in CSM. Reduced costs associated with workshop based study programme in conjunction with a more flexible programme of study are seen as attractive to both employers and students. However the research picked up a clear concern that distance learning could cause a loss of peer to peer learning and relationship development; therefore the design and delivery of any distance learning programme may need to respond to these and other associated concerns. Furthermore, whilst some respondents made good use of distance learning resources such as the audio files, others either did not or were deterred by the poor sound quality of presentations. These issues of concern require further research.


References Au S, Ryan M, Cary M, Whalley S (1993). Managing Crowd Safety in Public Venues: A study to generate guidance for venue owners and enforcing authority Inspectors. Norwich UK: HSE books. Boud D, Garrick J, (1999). Understanding Learning a Work. London: Routledge. Bowdin G, McDonnell I, Allen J, O‟Toole W (1999). Events Management. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. Brassington F, Pettitt S (2003). Principles Of Marketing, 3rd edition. Harlow UK: Prentice Hall. Brownhill B (1998). Life Long Learning in The age of learning, education and the knowledge society. Department of Culture Media and Sport (2008). The Guide To Safety At Sports Grounds, 5th edition. London: TSO Books. Farmer P, Mulrooney A and Ammin Jr R. 1996. Sport Facility Planning and Management. Morgantown WV USA: Fitness Information Technology Inc. Fink A (1995) How to design surveys: The Survey Kit 5, Thousand Oaks, CA USA: Sage Publishing. Frosdick and Walley (1997). Sports and Safety Management. Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann. Fruin J (1971). Pedestrian and Planning Design. Mobile Alabama USA: Elevator World Inc. Getz D (1997). Event Management and Event Tourism. New York USA: Cognizant Communications Corporation. Grainger-Jones O (2008). Facilitating The Learning Of Adult Distance Learners. Unpublished paper written as part requirement for the Certificate in Learning and Teaching in Higher Education. Health and Safety Executive (1999). The Event Safety Guide. Norwich UK: HSE Books. Health and Safety Executive (2000). Managing Crowds Safely. Norwich UK: HSE Books. Housden M (2008). Marketing Research and Information. Oxford UK: The Chartered Institute Of Marketing. Butterworth-Heinemann. Jarvis (2001). The Age Of Learning. London: Kogan Page. Kemp C and Hill I (2004). Health & Safety Aspects At Live Events. Cambridge: Entertainment Technology Press.


Kemp C, Hill I, Upton M (2004). A Comparative Study Of Two Major Music Events. Cambridge: Entertainment Technology Press. Kemp C, Hill I, Hamilton M, Upton M (2007) Case Studies In Crowd Management. Cambridge: Entertainment Technology Press. Knowles M (1973). The Adult Learner. Houston, USA: Gulf Publishing. Maslow, A (1948) Motivation and personality. New York: Harper and Row New York. Philips M, Lunsford J, Hawkins R, Gilmartin K (2000). Tutoring Online: Using CMC To Support Learning. Milton Keynes UK: Open University. Rovai A (2004). A constructivist approach to online college learning. Elsevier. UK: Published in Internet and Higher Education 7.

Ramsden P (2003). Learning To Teach In Higher Education, 2nd Edition. London: Routledge Falmer. Salmon G (2006). e-tivities -The Key To Active Online Learning. London: RoutledgeFalmer. Shone A, Parry B (2001). Successful Event Management. London: Continuum. ISBN 0-8264-5219-9. Still K (2000). Crowd Dynamics. PhD paper available online at http://www.gkstill.com/PhDThesis.html Accessed 26/04/10. Tarlow, Peter E. (2002) Event risk management and safety. New York: Wiley event management series, Wiley & Sons. Upton M (2007). From Rome To Rock N Roll. Cambridge: Entertainment Technology Press. Yeoman I, Robertson M, Ali-Knight J, Drummond S, McMahon- Beattie U (2004). Festival and Events Management, an international arts and culture perspective, Oxford UK: Butterworth-Heinemann.

http://www.gkstill.com/PhDThesis.html


6 REVIEW OF PEDESTRIAN AND EVACUATION SIMULATIONS

Professor G. Keith Still

Augus t 2011

Abstract Simulating emergency evacuations has grown in popularity since the tragic events of September 11

th. Unfortunately there are a large number of modeling, simulation, animation

and computer graphics systems available today – many of which are misleading. Models and simulations fall into two main categories: Microscopic and macroscopic. I highlight the general differences in these approaches outlining the strengths and weaknesses in both approaches. I examine the fundamental principles of pedestrian and evacuation simulations in this paper and guide the reader towards a greater understanding of crowd dynamics and evacuation analysis. A background to modeling and simulations, their purpose and objectives followed by a risk assessment analysis description is presented. I highlight the different types of evacuation scenario that need consideration in choosing a modeling/simulation tool and conclude with a checklist for choosing an evacuation analysis system.

Keywords: Crowd dynamics, crowd safety, evacuation analysis, pedestrian simulation, risk assessment, behavioural based safety

Introduction

Modeling evacuation from complex spaces involves a large number of variables, many of which are unknown and potentially unknowable. How a crowd reacts to an incident is not something that can be easily tested as the nature of an evacuation, and its consequences, are impossible to replicate under controlled conditions without endangering the test subjects (Galea, year; Galea, year; Paulsen, Soma, Schneider, Wilklund, & Lovas, 1995; Thompson & Marchant, 1993, 1995a, 1995b; Ketchell, Cole, …, …, 1993). However, we can learn from past events (Canter, 1980; www.crowddynamics.com/main/crowddisasters.html) study the things that work and those that fail, improve process and understanding – but planning for the unforeseen (such as the tragic events of 9/11) remains an oxymoron. Simulations help us explore the boundary conditions of a problem. For example the best possible time would it take to evacuate X people from Y floors of a multi-story building (Pauls, 1987, 1988; Author, 2001; Author, 2001; Schreckenberg & Sharma, 2001). But evacuation is highly dependant on crowd behavior, communication systems and the nature of the threat, the alert status (which can create over-reaction or the opposite, complacency) and many other variables. Extreme caution is advised on taking the results of a simulation as an absolute safe egress value [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22]. Models and simulations should be considered to have two main purposes: either proof/failure of some theoretical value, or to provide some insight to potential problems. Clearly there is a requirement for simulating an emergency evacuation of the built and complex environment. The egress time is a critical factor in understanding and applying the appropriate evacuation strategy. In general evacuation simulations can be used to explore potential failures in our planning for an emergency or issues that may arise during egress. However, this requires basic and fundamental understanding of the elements of behavioral based safety to be used with any confidence [23, 24].

http://www.crowddynamics.com/main/crowddisasters.html


Modelling techniques The two main categories of modeling techniques are defined as microscopic and macroscopic [25]. Microscopic modeling used some computer simulated agents capable of decision making in a model of the built or complex environment we wish to test. Macroscopic models include the building codes, general flow and distance calculations and available egress widths demonstrating compliance to the building codes. A two stage process should be employed in the process of modeling an evacuation. Begin with the macroscopic process – evaluate the travel distances and route capacity. Should questions arise from this analysis then change resolution to the microscopic level of analysis. Use the process of modeling to gain insight to the nature of the problem – a simple example is to run a shortest path test. Take a map or plan of an area and test a number of initial starting positions. Draw a graph of the travel distance against the occupancy levels. How many people may arrive at the same time, to any specific exit, can tell you a lot about the success of an evacuation of a place of public assembly. The claims of many vendors to “model the range of human behavior” can sound convincing however, in our extensive experience, elements that affect the human behavior such as way finding, demographics, public address and communication systems, dominant personalities (such as a police officer), state of alertness (the evacuation behavior pre- post- 9/11 is very different in tall buildings) can all change the evacuation timings and are not easily modeled. To cut through this maze of conflicting and confusing variables our first criteria for evaluating a modeling system is the vendor‟s claim. It is very easy to read the papers written on a modeling technique and these should be readily available. Conference proceedings such as “Human Behavior in Fires” [12, 13], “Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics” [14, 15] outline various modeling techniques and provide a good cross reference for the specific simulation. Validation of the vendors claim, third party validation and refereed publication separate most of the problems of good/bad simulations currently available. An honest vendor will state their claims clearly and in an easy to understand manner. Beware the “snake oil” pitch of a software vendor and always seek third party validation. Simulating emergency evacuation is a matter of life or death and the garbage in/garbage out principles, fundamental to all computer simulations, should not be underestimated.

Good crowd simulation modelling: Some considerations Egress time Evacuation is a two stage process and this must be defined in any model and/or simulation. The two stages are “reaction time” and “evacuation time”. The former of these is the time it takes the crowd to „start to move‟. Clearly if the reaction time is the second the alarm is raised then the evacuation time is a function of the various egress route capacities and travel distances. However, if the building occupants take time to start to move then the evacuation time will be a function of both the reaction time and the travel distance/route capacity. Sime [26] ran a series of tests on the Tyne and Wear Transport system; his results are show in table 1.


Evacuation

Test

Time to start to move Time to

clear

the station

Appropriateness

of behavior Concourse Bottom

Escalator

1 08:15 09:00 14:47 Delayed or no

evacuation, not all the

people leave Bell Only

2 02:15 03:00 08:00 Users directed to

concourse Staff

3 01:15 07:40 10:30 Users stood at bottom

escalator P.A.

4 01:15 01:30 06:45 Users evacuated

Staff +

P.A.+

5 01:30 01:00 05:45 Users evacuated by trains

and exits P.A.++

Table 1. Results from the Sime evacuation analysis

To summarise his research, the reaction of the crowd, the time to start to move, is highly dependant on the crowd communication system. Most modeling software, simulations and evacuation analysis ignore this important element of behavioral based safety. It is how the crowd reacts to the change in the environment coupled with the information system that can dramatically change the evacuation timings. The different timings above are a matter of perception, following the events of May 11th where many of the building occupants were alerted via blackberry communication systems it was noted that several minutes delay could be added to the above while the message to evacuate propagates through the networks.Clearly evacuation modeling that is travel distance and capacity based has severe limitations in assessing the actual egress time. So one of our first elements to our checklist for a good simulation is the reaction time – does this simulation allow me to test variable initial reaction times? Egress instructions Simple instructions, delivered in a clear and concise manner have a dramatic effect on the evacuation process and, again this is often ignored in modeling and simulation of emergency egress. An example of this critical element in modeling evacuation is illustrated in another of Sime‟s [27] research projects (see table 2).


Lecture

Theatre

% using route

Instructions from lecturer

Entrance Fire

Exit

F 55 45 To leave the room (exit

unspecified)

R 0 100 To leave the room via the fire

exit only

F 62 38 To leave the room (exit

unspecified)

R 30 70 To leave the room (exit

unspecified)

Table 2. Results from the Sime‟s theatre evacuation analysis The aim of the study was to examine the effects of exit position on the exit chosen and time to evacuate. To do this the simultaneous evacuation of two lecture theatres on the ground floor of a building in Portsmouth Polytechnic was monitored. The "front" (F) lecture theatre had its entrance and fire exit in both back corners. The "rear" (R) lecture theatre had the entrance at one corner at the back and fire exit in a corner at the front. In the F theatre the lecturer decided not to tell his "audience" which exit to leave by. A statistical analysis was conducted on the possible relationship between seat position, travel distance moved, exit used and time taken to leave in the F theatre. Observers at each exit recorded frequencies and evacuation times and gave out a questionnaire to each evacuee, which was used to supplement the other data. Of 56 people in the F theatre 55% left by the

entrance, 45% by the fire exit. Sime [27]

As the above experiment demonstrates, empathy or authority announcements can dramatically alter the evacuation time in places of public assembly and, again, this element is often ignored in a simulation of emergency egress. During a security alert at the Birmingham Arena the staff had to call an evacuation. The demographics of the crowd (at a rave – a dance event) were youths ages 18 – 24. Initially, the security staff made an announcement using the venue public address system to evacuate the area immediately. As you may expect the crowd did not react to this announcement. A few minutes later the DJ made an announcement that began the evacuation process; same message but the difference was using an empathy figure instead of an authority figure to deliver the message. How the message is delivered is vital to reducing the „start to move‟ time.

Boundary conditions Modeling and simulation help us understand the lower limits (fastest possible time) and the user is advised to restricted modeling and simulation to the analysis of travel distance, availability and location of exits with respect to the general population, and direction and capacity for optimal egress. We call this process a „spatio-temporal analysis‟ in which the boundary conditions are explored [28, 29, 30] To illustrate this, given a specific occupancy limit and a number of exits, how long would it take for the occupants to reach a place of safety. We can test some or all of the available exits under a range of initial start to move


assumptions and explore the environment. One project, for an international bank, involves 4 stairwells in a 32 story building. We used a commercial simulation to test the what-if scenarios of all exits available and all combinations of 1, 2 or 3 exits (16 tests in total). This uncovered a problem at the South-East exit in which the security system would create a bottleneck if the occupants had to all leave by this exit. Modeling egress using different scenarios under the same assumptions (zero reaction time, all occupants to the same exit) allows the user to explore the potential problems. This application of modeling is firmly in the „insight‟ domain as it throws up a potential problem in relative terms and not as an „absolute‟ egress time. As we have illustrated absolute egress times need to be treated with the appropriate understanding of the evacuation process and communication system deployed [31, 32]. Behavioral based safety Modeling human behavior is, as we have stated above, a complex business and there are many unknown variables, such as, the communication message and delivery [33, 34]. This can have a dramatic affect on the egress rate and we need to include this in our analysis to understand emergency behavior and the evacuation time. Where the simulations are useful are in defining the lower (best) evacuation. We can simulate to define the lower boundary conditions [35, 36, 37], this may prove useful in defining building code compliance and our simulation process begins to take shape as providing „insight‟. We can digitize and environment, measure the travel distances, calculate the capacity using the narrowest point along the route limits and estimate using both a rough cut capacity analysis of flow and density (see table 3) and estimating the additional start to move time depending on our communication systems and methods.

Density Space Space Flow Rate Flow Rate Av.

Speed Av.

Speed

LoS (ped/m2) (m2/ped) (ft2/ped) (ped/min/m) (ped/min/ft) (m/s) (ft/min)

LoS A < 0.27 > 3.24 > 35 < 23 <7 > 1.3 260

LoS B 0.43 to 0.31

2.32 to 3.24

25 to 35

23 to 33 7 to 10 1.27 250

LoS C 0.72 to 0.43

1.39 to 2.32

15 to 25

33 to 49 10 to 15 1.22 240

LoS D 1.08 to 0.72

0.93 to 1.39

10 to 15

49 to 66 13 to 20 1.14 225

LoS E 2.17 to 1.08

0.46 to 1.39 5 to 10

66 to 82 20 to 25 0.76 150

LoS F > 2.17 < 0.46 < 5 variable variable < 0.76 < 150

Table 3. Highways Capacity Data – the speed/density/flow relationships [38

At a fundamental level the travel distance is just one function of egress time and, in that respect, capable of modeling and design optimization. Modeling techniques that are based on the travel distance and involve assessing the capacity of routes and optimization of the egress rates serve our general evacuation needs very well – but do NOT provide the actual time to egress and hence we should NOT treat these as absolute values.


For example, how a crowd may react to a specific event (such as the Cessna incident on May 11th in Washington DC) can depend on the time of day, nature of the information (blackberry information and rate of communication – reports of several minutes delay to transmit, receive, understanding, time to react) all add significantly to the overall evacuation time [39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44]. One element of evacuation is the „cry wolf‟ element too many false alarms and the effective evacuation time would increase for the next evacuation alert. Again this element of evacuation simulation is often neglected with obvious consequences.

Scenario planning

Prior to 9/11, the majority of evacuation considerations were jokingly referred to as the GTFOT principle. In the event of an emergency (typically a fire) then the occupants were advised to Get Out of The building as quickly as possible. Sadly human behavior in fire is often complex and confusing. Given that the rate of the incident may develop in seconds the initial reaction time is critical to life safety. Post 9/11, we need to take into consideration the possibility of chemical, biological or nuclear/radiological threats. This leads to a very different type of scenario planning and one in which modeling and simulation can serve a useful purpose. There are four main categories of evacuation which can be served by a variety of the modeling/simulation/animation techniques. Total This is the process in which all occupants leave by the nearest available exit and assemble at a place of safety. We need to consider the location of a place of safety as, unlike fire, simply being away from the threat is a function of the nature of the threat. The assembly points may be in a danger zone in the event of a bomb threat. Directed This is the range of scenarios in which it becomes necessary to evacuate a building or place of public assembly in a specific direction. So again assessing the place of safety, this may be a cordon, a range away from a threatened area or upwind from some contaminant (natural or terrorist activity). Phased The problems of internal contamination, such as anthrax, in which most of the building can be evacuated but certain areas need to be contained until decontamination procedures are implemented. Also in the event of fire in tall buildings the floors immediately above and below the seat of the fire will be evacuated BEFORE the other floors. This is the typical process and procedures where sufficient fire suppressing systems are functional. The policy of phased evacuation has come under criticism as; again, human behavior and therefore behavioral based safety may conflict with the building design, operation and evacuation strategy. Stay Put Events during the bombing in London from the IRA have demonstrated, in numerous cases, that the policy of “stay put” can be very effective in life preservation. The building can absorb the blast while the occupants are contained in a place of relative safety inside the structure. Consider a simple thought experiment in the recent Cessna incident (May 11th). Were the


building occupants at greater risk running through the streets or within the building? Clearly this depends on what payload the plane was carrying and its intended target. To consider an effective evacuation strategy you must model the risk assessment to the people.

Risk assessment for places of public assembly There are a number of risk assessment techniques available and we have a selection of these on our website [45]. The basic principle is to create a table of the likelihood against the consequences. We illustrate this below (table 4).

Consequence

Likelihood Minor Medium Major Critical Extreme

Almost Certain Moderate Substantial Substantial Intolerable Intolerable

Likely Tolerable Moderate Substantial Substantial Intolerable

Possible Tolerable Tolerable Moderate Substantial Substantial

Unlikely Trivial Tolerable Tolerable Moderate Substantial

Rare Trivial Trivial Tolerable Tolerable Moderate

Table 4 – Risk Analysis Matrix (Likelihood vs Consequences)

Using a matrix for risk assessment Risk assessment for an evacuation can be assessed considering the target and the payload of a small aircraft – therefore if the target was people and the people were on the streets then the consequences would be extreme. This is a simple application of a game theory model to assess relative risk and develop a strategy that is appropriate for the scenarios. By comparison of the numerical values of likelihood and consequences we can develop a site specific threat scenario analysis and appropriate evacuation strategy (see table 5). We use a colour coded method to make these tables easier to read – you can download the excel spreadsheet from the website (www.crowddynamics.com).

Level of Risk Defined

1 Trivial

2 Tolerable

3 Moderate

4 Substantial

5 Intolerable

Table 5 – Level of Risk - Numerical definitions

Each threat scenario, likelihood against consequences, and tabulated provides a relative measure of threat/risk assessment. To expand on this theme we can assign actions to the various threat levels as follows (table 6):


Threat level Action

Trivial No further action and no record required

Tolerable A risk that has been reduced to a level that can be endured

Moderate The risk needs to be evaluated carefully and reduced to being a „tolerable risk'

Substantial A high level of monitoring and record keeping will be required, until the risk is reduced or eliminated

Intolerable This level is not acceptable and change is required until the risk has been reduced to one of the above

Table 6 – Risk Action Planning Matrix

Finally we can apply an action list to the above and develop an approach to both modeling the threat and developing a strategy. Elimination of the risk (if possible). Specialists should possibly be used to carry out assessment profiles and suggest risk reduction methods. This would include security and screening processes to eliminate the potential of a security alert (bomb threat). Reducing the risk (if possible)., Organizations should adopt processes to suit the situation or circumstances, take protective measures that cater for everyone in the area, improve controls and procedures, manage the care and safety of the occupants and maintain procedures to the required standards. Fortification falls into this category of risk mitigation. Manage the risk. If risks cannot be eliminated or reduced sufficiently, personnel need to be deployed to minimise the risk. During evacuation the deployment of security staff, assignment and designation of places of safe assembly can be a dynamic process and effective crowd management is often the practical solution. Planning around the risk. Emergency procedures should be explained and practiced so that everybody knows what to do. Alarm systems and indicators should be thoroughly tested on a regular basis and should take into account any special needs, noisy environments, and others.

Conclusions

Presently, there is a growing concern about the use of modeling and simulation. We have been running education and awareness, training and application workshops around the world for the last decade and the problems of misuse, misunderstanding and „snake-oil‟ salesmanship are all too common. In life critical application we need to be cautious of computer simulation and their limitations. We can make the following general observations about the simulation approach to decision making.

1. Simulation is most appropriate when the problem is too complex or difficult to solve

using another method.


2. A model must be developed to represent the various relationships existing in the problem situation.

3. A process such as random-number procedures must be employed to generate values

for the probabilistic components of the model.

4. A bookkeeping procedure must be developed to keep track of what is happening in the simulation process.

5. The simulation process must be conducted for many periods in order to establish the

long-run averages for the decision alternatives or other changes in the system. Ergodic analysis (long term averages) should be the purpose of the simulation system.

6. Local transient effects can skew simulation results - as can bad model building - it is

essential that simulation builders be scrutinised in the same way one would scrutinise the simulation system.

7. A decision support simulation needs to be validated and open to scrutiny. Good third

party validation is essential to be confident of any simulation system.

To summarize the situation, you should go through the following checklist with the vendor (and consultant) who proposes a simulation system for evacuation strategies.

What third party validation do you offer?

Is this a black-box or an open source model?

How long does it take to build a model?

How can we test/validate the underlying assumptions in the model?

How brittle is the model - if I make a small change to my basic assumptions how long does it take to change the model?

What is the cost of building and modifying a model – both in time to change and training required to make these changes?

The potential user of pedestrian or evacuation model should also pay specific attention to the appropriateness of the model to the application. For example, an agent based model with multiple parameters is probably not the best way to model 100,000 people in a mass gathering. Similarly, a flow model (macroscopic) is not going to provide accurate results for a complex space involving many turns and congestion points. These questions are easily answered by asking the vendor specific questions relating to previous use and applications of their software, tools, models or simulations. Ask about validation; ask about the safety factors built into their models and the types of outputs. If the system produces a single value as an output (say 8 ½ minutes for evacuation) rather than a


mean time with a standard distribution and a statement about the assumptions used, then be suspicious of the models quality. Ask about the assumptions built into the „start to move‟ process and how that affects the overall results. If you are not satisfied with the answers to the above questions then - caveat emptor – buyer beware. In general good simulation systems follow four simple principles: simple to build, simple to modify, simple to understand, and simple to communicate its output. At all times a model should adhere to the BATNEEC principle – best available technology not entailing excessive cost.

References

[1] Galea E.R. Use of mathematical modeling in fire safety engineering, Paper No 97/IM/25. CMS Press. The Fire Safety Engineering group. Centre for Numerical Modelling and Process Analysis, University of Greenwich. Wellington Street. London SE18 6PF.

[2] Galea E.R. The numerical simulation of aircraft evacuation and it's application to aircraft design and certification. Paper No. 97/IM/28. CMS Press. The Fire Safety Engineering group. Centre for Numerical Modelling and Process Analysis, University of Greenwich. Wellington Street. London SE18 6PF.

[3] Paulsen, T with Soma, H., Schneider, V. Wilklund, J. and Lovas, G. Evaluation of simulation models of evacuation from complex spaces. SINTEF Report STf75 A95020 June 1995 (ISBN 82-595-8583-9)

[4] Thompson, P. Marchant. EW. Modelling Techniques for Evacuation. Engineering for Crowd Safety (Ed Smith RA, Dickie J) Elsevier. (1993) ISBN 0 444 899200.

[5] Thompson,P.A. and Marchant,E.W. (1995a) A Computer Model the Evacuation of Large Building Populations. Fire Safety Journal 24, pp. 131-148.

[6] Thompson,P.A. and Marchant,E.W. (1995b) Testing and Application of the Computer Model 'SIMULEX'. Fire Safety Journal 24, pp. 149-166.

[7] Ketchell, N, Cole, S. et. al. The EGRESS code for human movement and behaviour in emergency evacuations in Engineering for Crowd Safety 1993 Elsevier. (Ed Smith RA, Dickie J) ISBN 0 444 899200.

[8] Canter (Editor). (1980) Fires and human behavior. ISBN 1-85346-105-9

[9] www.crowddynamics.com/main/crowddisasters.html list of recent crowd disasters from around the world.

[10] Pauls, J. Calculating Evacuation Times for Tall Buildings. Fire Safety Journal 12 (1987). National Council of Canada and BUSI Building Safety Institute.

[11] Pauls, J. Movement of People. SFPE Handbook of fire Protection Engineering. (1988). National Council of Canada and BUSI Building Safety Institute.

http://www.crowddynamics.com/main/crowddisasters.html


[12] Proceedings from the 2nd International Symposium on Human Behavior in Fire – Understanding Human Behavior for better Fire Safety Design. (2001) ISBN 0953231267

[13] Proceedings from the 3rd International Symposium on Human Behavior in Fire – Public Fire Safety – Professionals in Partnership. (2001) ISBN 09541216-6-X

[14] M. Schreckenberg and S.D. Sharma (Editors). Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics. (2001). ISBN 3-540-42690-6

[15] E.R. Galea (Editor). Pedestrian and Evacuation Dynamics. (2003). ISBN 1904521088

[16] Melinek. SJ, Booth, S. An analysis of evacuation times and the movement of crowds in buildings. Fire Research Station. CP 96/75 (1975).

[17] Still G. K. New Computer system can predict human behaviour response to building fires. Fire 84 (January 1993), 40-41

[18] Still G. K. Towering Inferno New Scientist (Supplement April 1993).

[19] Still G. K. Simulating Egress using Virtual Reality - a perspective view of simulation and design. IMAS Fire Safety on Ships symposium (May 1994).

[20] Still G. K. New Insights into Crowd Behaviour - It's Fractal. Focus November (1994).

[21] Still G. K. The Secret Life of crowds. Focus (June 1996)

[22] Still G. K. Last word, mind the gap. New Scientist (March 20th 1999).

[23] Still G. K PhD Thesis, Crowd Dynamics, Warwick University 2000

[24] Sime J. Crowd Safety Management and Communications in Disasters. MoSHE. 1992 Available from the Building Research Establishment. Borehamwood or from JSA Research Consultants, Goldalming, Surrey.

[25] Sarkar, S. (1995) Evaluation of Safety for Pedestrians at Macro- and Microlevels in Urban Areas, Transportation Research Record 1502, 105-118.

[26] Proulx, G. and Sime, J.D., "To Prevent Panic in an Underground Emergency : Why Not Tell People the Truth? Fire Safety Science", Proceedings of the Third International Symposium, Elesevier Applied Science, New York, 1991, pp 843-852.

[27] Kimura M and Sime J D (1989) Exit choice behavior during the evacuation of two lecture theatres. Presented at the Second International Symposium of the IAFSS (International Association of Fire Safety Science) 13-17 June 1988. Tokyo, Japan. Fire Safety Science. Proceedings of the Second International Symposium. Washington DC: Hemisphere Publishing Corporation.


[28] Penn, A.Vaughan. L. Pedestrian movement and Spacial Design. Passenger Terminal (1995). Print available from Bartlett School of Architecture, University College of London. London. UK. http://www.casa.ucl.ac.uk/

[29] Henderson L. F. The Statistics of Crowd Fluids. Nature 229 (1971) pg 381.

[30] Henderson L. F. Sexual differences in human crowd motion. Nature 240 (1972) pg 252.

[31] Proulx, G. et. al. Evacuation Times and Movement in Office Buildings National Research Council of Canada, Internal report 711 (1996)

[32] Proulx, G. Review of Evacuation Strategies for Occupants with Disabilities. National Research Council of Canada. Internal Report 712 (1996)

[33] AlGadhi,S.A.H. and Mahmassani,H.S. Modelling Crowd Behavior And Movement: Application to Makkah Pilgrimage. Proc. 11th International Symposium on Transportation and Traffic Theory. M. Koshi(ed.), Yokohama, Japan July 1990. pp 59-78.

[34] AlGadhi,S.A.H. and Mahmassani,H.S. (1991) Simulation Of Crowd Behavior And Movement: Fundamental Relations And Applications. Transportation Research Record 1320, pp. 260-268.

[35] Blue, V.J. and Adler, J.L. (2000) Cellular Automata Microsimulation of Bidirectional Pedestrian Flows. Transportation Research Board 1678,135-141.

[36] Blue, V.J. and Adler, J. L., (1998). Emergent Fundamental Pedestrian Flows From Cellular Automata Microsimulation, Transportation Research Record 1644, 29-36.

[37] Blue, V.J. and Adler, J.L., (1999) Using Cellular Automata. Microsimulation to Model Pedestrian Movements. Proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Transportation and Traffic Theory, A. Ceder (ed.) Elsevier Science Ltd. July 1999, pp. 235-254

[38] Fruin, J. Pedestrian and Planning Design. Metropolitan Association of Urban Designers and Environmental Planners.1971. Library of Congress catalogue number 70-159312 (Elevator World Inc. Educational Services Division. PO Box 6507, 354 Morgan Avenue, Mobile, Alabama 36606))

[39] Okazaki, S (1979) A Study of Pedestrian Movement in Architectural Space, Part 1: Pedestrian Movement by the Application on of Magnetic Models. Trans. of A.I.J., No.283, pp.111-119.

[40] Okazaki, S (1979) A Study of Pedestrian Movement in Architectural Space Part 2: Concentrated Pedestrian Movement. Trans. of A.I.J., No.284, pp. 101-110.

[41] Okazaki, S (1979) A Study of Pedestrian Movement in Architectural Space Part 3: Along the Shortest Path, Taking Fire, Congestion and Unrecognized Space into Account. Journal of Architecture, Planning. Environment Engineering. AIJ, No.285, pp. 137-147.

http://www.casa.ucl.ac.uk/


[42] Okazaki, S and Yamamoto, C. (1981) A Study of Pedestrian Movement in Architectural Space Part 4: Pedestrian Movement Represented in Perspective. Journal of Architecture, Planning. Environment Engineering. AIJ, No.299, pp.105-113.

[43] Okazaki, S and Matsushita S. (1981) A Study of Pedestrian Movement in Architectural Space Part 5: A Probing walk and a guide walk by a guideboard. Journal of Architecture Planning. Environment Engineering. AIJ, No.302, pp.87-93.

[44] Okazaki, S. and Matsushita, S. (1993) A study of simulation model for pedestrian movement with evacuation and queuing, Proceeding of the International Conference on Engineering for Crowd Safety, pp.271-280.

[45] You can download both a spreadsheet risk assessment template and the associated descriptions from www.crowddynamics.com

About the Author:

Professor Still has a PhD in “Crowd Dynamics” and has developed a wide range of crowd simulation and modeling techniques for critical infrastructures. Projects include the modeling of the Haj (annual Pilgrimage to Makkah in Saudi Arabia) and the real-time command and control system for multi-building, wide area evacuation at Canary Wharf – UK Financial District. He is a regular visiting speaker at the UK Cabinet Office Emergency Planning College (Easingwold) where he runs workshops on crowd dynamics and crowd safety in the build and complex environment. He has provided testimony for the Committee on House Administration at a televised public hearing (June 9th, 2005) on the “Emergency Preparedness of the House and the Evacuation of May 11th, 2005”. His website www.crowddynamics.com is used by academic and industry based researchers around the world. He can be contacted at Crowd Dynamics Ltd. The Mill House, Staveley Mill Yard, Staveley, LA8 9LS. UK.

http://www.crowddynamics.com/

http://www.crowddynamics.com/


7 CONCERT PATRON SAFETY

Professor Gil Fried and Dr Andrew Milsten

Augus t 2011

Abstract Newspapers regularly highlight major concert disasters from the Cocoanut Grove disaster in 1942 to The Station nightclub disaster in 2004 (Perkins, 2004). While these incidents are sensational and scary and produced dramatic injuries, they are not typical for most concerts. What are the typical injuries found at concerts? Some might postulate crushing injuries from crowd surges or muscle-skeletal injuries from mosh pit dancing. Others might argue that heat exhaustion for summer concerts is the key concern. No matter what claims might be raised, the risk and types of injuries that might arise and who might be the most susceptible to such injuries, have been minimally documented. Thus, this article was conceived as a way to try and analyze real medical reports from a number of concerts in the United States and to determine what the most likely concert related risks are for patrons. It will first examine some of the initially documented concert related incidents to determine if there are any patterns. It will then look at some of the basic thoughts associated with crowd injuries from some initial studies. The article will also draw on research from 21 concerts with over 340,000 fans to analyze medical related treatments. It will end with some recommendations on how to make concerts safer for patrons.

Concert related incidents There are a number of ways people can be injured at a concert, but most people do not attend a concert anticipating possibly dying. People can die at concerts from various causes, such as; crowd surge, accidents, assaults, and even cardiac arrest. Knowing how people are injured can help create risk reduction strategies. The following represent just a sample of injuries and deaths over the years. Death – Crowd surge Eight children were trampled to deth and at least three adults crushed in a stampede to see local television celebritieas and beauty queens at a concert in Valencia, Venezuela. At least 60 people were injured when the crowd panicked after police fired warning shots to try and control the crowd. Thousands of fans had clambered over temporary barricades to enter the venue and triggered chaos when hundreds of people attempted to force their way into the already packed venue. Police estimated that 30,000 spectators were trying to squeeze into the confined space which could not hold 27,000 fans (McGirk, 2001).

The crowd at Germany‟s 2010 Love Parade was expected to be around 800,000 but quickly rose to 1.4 million. A second venue was opened at the last minute to accommodate the concert-goers. The crowd was funneled through a single highway underpass to transfer between venues. Concert security officers became concerned about crowding in the tunnel and closed it off at one end. Concert-goers were told by bull horn to turn around and go back the other way. However, those coming from the other side did not know the end was blocked and fans kept entering the tunnel. Panic ensued due to crowding and fainting and hundreds were injured trying to scramble out of the tunnel before 19 fans were trampled to death and 400 were injured (Mohr, 2010).


Death – Accident Mr. James Hoey was near an entrance to the Constellation Brands-Marvin Sands Performing Arts Center in Hopewell, NY to enjoy an Allman Brothers Concert when he tripped. He tried to put his hands up to protect himself from the fall. However, his hands did not catch his fall and he fell hitting his face against some concrete steps. The injuries caused his death. (Pierce & Bauer, 2008). Death – Assault The family of Wesley Allen Shelton, who was stabbed to death at a concert by the Rolling Stones in 1981, received a $4.7 million settlement. Most of the settlement was paid for by Pace Concerts, which promoted the show (Settlement in concert death, 1986). Cardiac arrest A 38-year-old Massachusetts man suffered a fatal heart attack at the 2009 Kelly Clarkson concert held in Agganis Arena at Boston University. The man collapsed during the pop singer's show and the on-site emergency response team responded immediately. The man was in cardiac arrest when emergency responders arrived and he did not respond to either CPR or a defibrillator (Stanelun, 2009).

Crowd injuries

The primary articles associated with concert injuries tend to focus on large mass gatherings. Several articles over the years have analyzed single concerts, but it is harder to draw solid conclusions from single concerts (Grange, Green, & Downs, 1999). There is a wide variety of concert types, but those associated with the most injuries will usually contain mosh pits, crowd surfing, large outdoor venues on hot days, events where patrons are camping out for days, events of long duration and events where large number of patrons are crowded together and mobile. The rate of injuries at any concert is typically related to several potential variables, such as; music type, concert location, average audience age, concert length, audience size, crowd density, crowd movement patterns, weather, alcohol/drug usage, and whether the facility was indoors or outdoors (Grange et al.). The most common causes of injuries have focused on crowd surge, mosh pit injuries, crowd movement injuries or heat-related injuries (Milsten et al., 2003). That doesn‟t exclude the possibility of a large number of patients at small venue events without the aforementioned variables; you can still have a fight or a riot at a small event (Grange et al.). While crowd related injuries are a major concern, there are also individually inflicted injuries at all concerts. These injuries can range from horsing around, mud-sliding, self-inflicted stabbings, food poisoning, and countless other incidents. The most common self-inflicted injuries at concert are alcohol and drug related incidents. While alcohol and drug related concerns were a major issue in the 1960s and 1970s, there is no proof that alcohol and drug use are the major cause of concert-related injuries (Grange et al.). This does not mean that alcohol or drug usage is not present at concert, as one study of five concerts identified 48% of patients treated at those concerts admitted to using drugs/alcohol (Erickson, 1996). A survey of rock concert related personal injuries was conducted in the 1970s in the San Francisco Bay Area by doctors who provided medical coverage at thirty concerts in 1977. The estimated total attendance at the 30 concerts was 521,400 concert-goers. A total of 1,006 major medical problems were reported with 696 of the incidents involving drug or

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed?term=%22Grange%20JT%22%5BAuthor%5D

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed?term=%22Green%20SM%22%5BAuthor%5D

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed?term=%22Downs%20W%22%5BAuthor%5D


alcohol-related medical issues. This represents 69% of all the major medical issues handled by the researchers (Newmeyer & Johnson, n.d.). Newmeyer and Johnson reflected on Roger Brown's (1954) comprehensive analysis of the forms of "mass phenomena", where Brown focused on concert goers as a form of "expressive crowd" rather than simply an "audience". According to Brown (1954: 863), "expressive crowds" tend to exhibit "revelrous behavior as a release from the humdrum routine of normal life". Those participating in "expressive crowds" do not radically alter their behavior. However, the presence of a crowd according to some can loosen social controls and trigger inner pathologies (Turner, 1959). Loosened social norms can possibly incite violent behavior such as fistfights, looting, lynchings, and beatings. This type of mayhem might occur among sports audiences (especially at football, hockey, and soccer events). However, the loosening of social norms in concert setting rarely results in interpersonal violence, except for unusual instances, such as, the Hells Angels at Altamont, California in 1969. (Newmeyer & Johnson). On the other hand, crowds may provoke intrapsychic turmoil, upsetting an individual's internal equilibrium. Under such a circumstance, some concert goers might find themselves in a group using a drug they have never used before as they might not have internalized the subcultural controls which successfully structure the drug experience (Newmeyer & Johnson). This does not mean that there are not concert goes who might intentionally engage in violent conduct such as intentionally fighting or being overly violent in a mosh pit, but others who would not necessarily engage in such conduct might be swept by the circumstances into participating in such activities. This subculture created a rock concert tradition where fans, especially in the 1970s expected to see significant drug use. Concert promoters hired medical staff to help assist with intoxicated and overdosed fans. Such an “endorsement” encouraged some concert goers to think that it was acceptable to use drugs without repercussion, and if there were any problems they could be taken care of by medical staff (Newmeyer & Johnson). Newmeyer and Johnson‟s study highlighted a significant number of incidents involving medical care for drug and alcohol related incidents. Table 1 highlights the break-down of the reason for the medical care given to the 696 treated concert goers. Alcohol was actually the most common cause for treatment and even when two different items were ingested (i.e. different drugs and/or alcohol), alcohol still was the number one concern, along with other drugs (Newmeyer & Johnson). Table 1. Drug Problems at 30 Concerts in 1977 Drug Total Claims Percentage Alcohol 420 60.2% Marijuana 62 8.9 LSD 41 5.9 PCP 23 3.3 Psychedelics 13 1.9 Amphetamines 7 1.0 Barbiturates 5 0.7 Opiates 3 0.4 Cocaine 1 0.1 Other 1 0.1 Multiple drugs 120 17.3 (Source: Newmeyer, J. & Johnson, G., n.d.)


A later study by Grange, Green and Downs (1999) analyzed 405 concerts in the 1990s and found that alcohol and drugs was not as big of a concern at that point. Grange and his colleagues were interested in examining the patients per ten thousand spectators (PPTT) rate to help determine if certain concerts produced a higher number of injuries than other concert. Previous research showed 8 PPTT for a 48 hour concert in 1973 that attracted 35,000 fans and produced only 241 patients to a PPTT of 1,000 for three day music festival in New Zealand in 1973 that attracted 20,000 fans and produced almost 2,000 patients. Grange and his colleague analyzed 405 concerts at three outdoor and two indoor venues in Southern California. The concerts include, for example, 206 classical music, 13 country, 42 jazz, 21 easy listening, 71 rock, 17 alternative rock, seven heavy metal, and one rap concert. A total of 4,638,099 fans attended those concerts and 1,492 patrons received medical care. The average crowd for each concert was 10,999. Each of these concerts was held on a single day and lasted from four to eight hours. The median PPTT per concert was 2.1 and those who reported their age indicated that the median patient age was 29 years-old. Fifty seven percent of the patients at these concerts were female. The highest number of injuries at any one concert was 79 (including eight who had to be transported) at a Metallica concert, and 53 concerts did not have any recorded patients. The Metallica concert had a mosh pit and the resulting injuries included 16 head injuries, 21 lacerations/abrasions, 16 extremity injuries, a stabbing, and a shoulder injury. At a separate punk concert which resulted in a riot, 49 patients were recorded from a crowd of 5,768 (71 PPTT) fans. Seventy six percent of the injuries were trauma related and 49% of the patients had head injuries. The break down of injuries by music categories is highlighted in Table 2. Table 2. Patient Evaluation by Music Category

Music category Total Concerts Total Attendance Total patients PPTT Classical 206 2,096,471 402 1.7 Country 13 125,620 35 2.2 Jazz and Blues 59 675,313 224 2.0 Easy Listening 21 215,778 40 1.8 Rock 85 1,258,355 653 3.8 Other 21 251,227 137 5.8

(Source: Grange, et al., 1999)

In total, 11% (169 patients) of the patient records indicated alcohol or drug use contributed to the reason the patients requested medical assistance. The most prominent injury involved trauma 885 (59.3%) patients with 375 (42.4%) of these trauma cases arising at rock concerts. The two most common trauma cases included musculoskeletal (308) followed by head injuries (164). A majority of the head injuries 115/164 (70%) occurred at rock concerts. There were 607 medical related patients at the concerts and 127 of these patients suffered from some alcohol or drug related incident; 73.2% (93/127) of these incidents occurred at rock concerts. Interestingly, only two of the injuries involved dehydration and 26 involved heat/cold related incidents. There were four cardiac arrest incidents (all at non-rock concerts) and the highest number of injuries (12.5 PPTT) occurred at the three gospel/Christian music concerts which had the lowest median age of any of the concerts. Grange et al. (1999) concluded that music type is the best predictor of possible patient load;


and that temperature, overall attendance, and whether the concert was indoors or outdoors did not impact PPTT. Besides the typical injuries highlighted above, there always can be new issues that arise at concerts. One of these unique concerns is headbanging. Headbanging is the act of violently moving one‟s head in pace with the music and when there are fast paced songs, individuals can injure their necks. Little formal injury research had been done on this phenomenon, even though case reports indicate inherent risks, especially in head and neck injury. There are only a few documented cases, neurosurgical specialists question whether the incidence is much higher, because the symptoms are clinically silent or cause only mild headache that resolves spontaneously (Headbanging injury could be avoided, 2008). Dr. Andrew McIntosh of the University of New South Wales identified the "up-down" head banging style as the most common (others included the circular swing, the full body, or the side-to-side) by observing young people at hard-rock and heavy-metal concerts (Headbanging injury could be avoided, 2008). Other concert specific activities include mosh pit dancing, missile throwing, crowd surfing and fire jumping. A 2008 published study revealed that an average head-banging song with a tempo of 146 beats a minute (common in many hard rock songs) will likely cause mild head injury when the head's range of motion is greater than 75 degrees. At higher tempos and greater ranges of motion there is an exponential rise in the risk of neck injury. The report hypothesized that injuries might be minimized if head-bangers were advised to lessen their range of head and neck motion and head-banging to every second beat, according to Dr. McIntosh (Headbanging injury could be avoided, 2008). Other suggestions offered by the study included training concert goers to be safer, asking fans to use personal protective equipment (highly unlikely), and encouraging artist to design their sets so they can include both soft and harder songs to prevent repeated hard songs one after another. The above were the primary studies found highlighting either rate of occurrence or types of medical related incidents occurring at concert. The lack of significant research as to what are the most common causes of concert related injuries prompted this study.

Results This research study was conducted in 1998-99 by the second author, Dr. Milsten, as an attending emergency medicine physician working at mass gathering events, specifically for this study at major concerts in several different venues in the mid-Atlantic region. The data was derived from 21 concerts that attracted 343,318 concert goers. The concerts produced 1,036 patients treated for both major and minor incidents. All of the patients asked for medical assistance and a report was completed for each such patron. Thus, individuals who might have suffered an incident, but did not report the incident was not reported or recorded. All the reports were entered into a database upon which the following analysis was based. The most commonly requested assistance was for medical-related care; 602 headaches incidents (58% of all incidents) compared with 434 trauma incidents (42%). A majority of the patients were female (653), while 359 men requested medical care. There were 21 patient records where the gender was not highlighted.


Injury claims The most common injury claims are shown in Table 3. This table highlights that injury from musculoskeletal related injuries are the most common type of injuries followed by basic requests for medical care. Heat related injuries are one of the most preventable injuries (through water, shade, fans, mist, tents or air conditioning), yet represented the third most common type of injury. Table 3. Injury claims (1998-99) Injury Total Claims Percentage Musculoskeletal 230 22.2% Medical request 221 21.0% Heat exhaustion 142 14.0% Dermal injury 126 12.2% Alcohol/Drugs 59 5.7%

Method of injury The method of injury (MOI) was analyzed for each incident as shown in Table 4. Mosh pit injuries were the most common type of injuries and 50 women were injured in the pits compared with 24 men. An almost equal number of men and women suffered musculoskeletal injuries in mosh pits: 30 of the 50 women (60%) suffered such injuries and 13 of 24 men (54.2%) had musculoskeletal injuries. Crowd surfing was the forth most commonly cited incident and 40 of the 63 surfers patrons were women. Fall and trips was the fifth most cited incident and 15 of these injuries resulted in musculoskeletal injuries (35.7%). In contrast, all the fights resulted in musculoskeletal injuries. Missiles (thrown water bottles) resulted in 27 documented injuries impacting primarily women (55.5%) and most of these injuries were dermal injuries. Table 4. Method of injury Method Total claims Percentage No Record 589 56.8% Other Trauma 222 21.4 Mosh Pits 74 7.1 Crowd Surfing 63 6.1 Fall/Trip 42 4.0 Missiles 27 2.6 Fights 12 1.1 Mosh pit. Analysis of mosh pit injuries showed that the most common causes were musculoskeletal (33 incidents), followed by dermal (14), exhaustion (14), and other injuries (6). Those injured in the mosh pit area ranged from age 13-31 years, with 16 patients age 16 years, 12 age 15 years, 11 age 19 years, and 10 injured fans in both the 17 and 18 year-old categories. The high prevalence of minors in the mosh pits became an issue as these patrons sometimes required treatment and transport to hospitals, and their parents were hard to locate. In terms of where the mosh pit patrons were injured, 17 involved facial injuries, 14 were reported as no record, 12 involved head injuries, eight neck injuries, seven arm injuries


and seven ankle/feet injuries. Thus, 37 of the reported injuries in mosh pits were to the head, face, or neck; representing 50% of all mosh pit injuries. However, only 24% (18) of the mosh pit injuries required advanced care and of these only seven involved a patron suffering face or neck injuries.

Crowd surfing. Crowd surfing injury analysis revealed that the majority of causes were musculoskeletal (43), followed by injury (8), and dermal (7). Crowd surfing injured patrons from age 13-34, with 52 (82.5%) of the injuries suffered by patrons from 13-19. Of the teens injured in crowd surfing incidents, 35 of the 52 (67.3%) were females. The crowd surfing injuries produced 18 cases requiring advanced care. Thus, most cases required only basic care (71.4%). All but one of the advanced care incidents involved an injury to the head, face, or neck. Falls. Falls/trips often occur to the elderly, but anyone can fall, trip over items/people, or slip on various spilled items. Of the 42 total falls/trips, 12 (28.6%) of the injured were over age 32. A majority of the injuries in this category were to legs (11) or ankles (8), but as would be expected with people trying to brace their falls there were six injuries to head/face and four to hands. Age While concerts are open to a large range of fans, most injuries occurred to those under age 30. The most common age for injuries was between ages 15-18 as shown in Table 5. In total 357 patrons in that age range were injured, representing 34.5% of all the injuries. While there is no age break-down for all those attending the concert, it would be assumed that teen and those in their early 20s were the primary attendees. Some or all of the concerts served alcohol so some shows might have had a larger number of patrons over age 21. Table 5. Age of injured patron Age Number of Injuries 6 1 10 1 11 2 12 1 13 15 14 36 15 70 16 99 17 100 18 88 19 58 20 43 21 27 22 27 23 25 24 15 25 14 26 7 27 7


28 12 29 11 30 6 31 5 32 9 33 7 34 7 35 8 36 6 37 1 38 1 39 3 40 2 42 2 44 3 45 2 48 1 51 3 52 2 No Record 295 While most of the concert goers were younger, 67 of the injured people were over age 30. Of these older patrons, 44 were females. Also, 15 of the injured “seniors” required transport. Primary Diagnosis The most common primary diagnosis was musculoskeletal injuries as displayed in Table 6. These injuries can range from minor abrasions, females lacerations, contusions to fractures. The second most common diagnosis involved a request for medication (specifically, Tylenol or Motrin) mostly for headaches or other minor bodyaches. Table 6. Primary diagnosis Diagnosis Number Percentage Musculoskel 229 22.10 Medication 220 21.23 Exhaustion 141 13.61 Dermal Injury 125 12.06 Inges 58 5.6 Headaches 46 4.4 Distress 29 2.8 Epistaxis 27 2.6 Dehydration 24 2.3 Injury 21 2.0 Other Med 16 1.54 Eye injury 13 1.25 Insect Bites 12 1.16 Dizziness 11 1.06 No record 10 0.09 Syncope 10 0.09 GI Complaint 7 0.07


Alternet Loc. 4 0.04 Diabetes 4 0.04 Seizure 4 0.04 Abdominal 3 0.02 OB/GYN 3 0.02 Other Trauma 3 0.02 Band-Aid Req. 2 0.02 Foreign Body 2 0.02 Heat Exhaustion was the third most frequent primary diagnosis. Of the 141 heat exhaustion cases, 107 involved females while only 34 involved males. Of these patients, 57 were treated and released, 40 left the first-aid station without treatment (against medical advice), 24 were sent home (instead of being treated and released back to the concert), and six received other treatment. The heat exhaustion claims broken down by age are shown in Table 7. Table 7. Exhaustion injuries by age

Men Women Age Number of Cases Age Number of Cases 13 2 14 9 14 2 15 19 15 4 16 16 16 5 17 10 17 6 18 17 18 4 19 9

Dehydration was cited by 25 patients and five of these patients required advanced care. Females were more likely to suffer from dehydration (18) versus only 7 men suffered from dehydration. Half the women who suffered from dehydration were 16 years old which would tend to show that younger women were more likely to be dehydrated than any other group. Location of injury The location of the injury (LOI) can help highlight what specific issues patrons might face. Most records did not highlight the LOI as shown in Table 8. However, there are some regions where an injury was more likely to be incurred. The upper body (neck, head, and face) was highlighted 225 (21.72%) times and represented the most frequently recorded LOI. The next most frequent area of injuries was the lower extremities encompassing the feet, ankles, and legs which appeared 118 times (11.39%). Table 8. Location of injury Location Number Percentage No Record 626 60.42 Head 108 10.42 Face 93 8.97 Feet 43 4.15 Ankle 40 3.86


Legs 35 3.38 Arms 29 2.80 Neck 24 2.32 Chest 18 1.73 Back 13 1.25 Abdomen 4 0.04 Pelvis/Groin 3 0.03 Treatment Most patients were treated and released back to the concert (see Table 9). There were three treatment categories; minor, basic and advanced (minor care requiring treatment of less than 5 minutes; basic care, 5–15 minutes; and advanced care, >15 minutes). Furthermore, the minor category was assigned to patients presenting only for medication or bandage requests. Transportation was provided for 142 patrons representing 13.7% of all the injured parties. Basic care was provided in 638 incidents (61.58%). Minor care was provided in 217 cases (20.95%). Advanced care was provided in 180 incidents (17.37%). Table 9. How patron was treated Treatment Number Percentage Treat/Release 439 42.37 No Record 200 19.31 Transport 142 13.71 AMA 126 12.16 Home 74 7.14 Other 53 5.11 Of those who required transportation, the majority were injured through falls and/or trips (10 incidents). The other most common reasons for patients to be transported included crowd surfing (eight), mosh pits (six), missiles (three), and fight (two).

Recommendation

The various research studies highlighted shows that crowd surges are a concern, but not necessarily the major concern. The major concerns focus on musculoskeletal injuries, younger fans, and women. Through educating fans of appropriate behavior, utilizing more patron/crowd supervisors, and creating more room for people to move, the number of muscle-skeletal injuries could be reduced. Bumps and bruises are the most common injury and there is no way to reduce all such injuries. However, proactive risk management can help reduce the number of falls and trips, which can significantly reduce the number of injuries. The research results highlighted a large number of heat exhaustion and dehydration related injuries. Heat related incidents can be reduced through providing free or cheap water, fan education about hats and sunblock lotion, using shade structure, and providing misting areas during outdoor events. The research results also highlighted a number of musculoskeletal injuries from crowd surfing and mosh pits. These bumps and bruises were primarily minor injuries; they were followed by dermal (skin) injuries as the most likely injuries faced by those


in such environments. This is not meant to suggest that mosh pits and crowd surfing are not potentially dangerous, although, it is sometimes very difficult or impossible to stop such activities. Crowd surfing and moshing can occur even with numerous rules preventing such activities. Concert promoters and venues should try to prevent such activities as much as possible to reduce the number of head injuries. The number of thrown missiles (bottles and fruit), stabbings, and alcohol or drugs brought into the event can be reduced with thorough entrance door checks. While it is impossible to catch every item snuck into a venue, more vigilance can help reduce such attempts. If bottle tops are removed (whether at the entrance checks or when sold at concession stands) the risk of some missiles can be reduced. One of the most important recommendations to help reduce concert patron injury is to recognize the need for a planned and properly managed medical response component. The medical response component cannot be an after thought for large events. Medical response planning needs to be integrated with other event functions (such as security and communications). The National Association of EMS Physicians (NAEMSP) produced a mass gathering planning document that can help in this regard (Jaslow & Milsten, 2000). Planners need to be prepared for injuries with enough medical personnel and equipment. Grange recommends preparing for 13.7 PPTT with a rock concert and 7.1 PPTT for a non-rock concert. The research results have highlighted that the treatment of cardiac arrest (such as heart attacks) needs to be included in the mass gathering medical plans. The rate of heart attacks at mass gatherings is higher then it is for the general population. To help address the concern associated with cardiac arrest, venues and promoters should have access to AED – automatic defibrillators at concerts to help those suffering cardiac issues (Crocco, 2004). This issue is especially acute at classical music and other concerts that are likely to attract older fans.

Conclusion

Whenever you have a large number of fans at a venue there is the possibility of injuries. The type of injuries is dependent on the type of music played. Rock concerts are the most dangerous shows and produce the greatest number of injuries. Women and younger concert goers are at the greatest risk. While there are numerous injuries at concert, many of these same injuries would be seen at any type of event. Traditional injuries from falls, sun burns, dehydration, scrapes, and headaches will always occur. Through utilizing a mass gathering medical plan, a concert can help develop more effective measures to handle these injuries as they occur. One of the unique conclusions uncovered in this research is the prevalence of drug and alcohol related medical needs and how that concern has changed over the years. Drugs and alcohol related incidents are no longer the same concern they were twenty years before this study was undertaken. While 69% of the medical issues in 1977 were associated with drugs and alcohol, only 5.7% of the medical care cases in 1998-99 involved drugs or alcohol.


References

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8 SIMULATION-AIDED PLANNING FOR EVENTS

Ulrike Merz1,2, Tobias Kretz3, Markus Wiersch4, Carola Schulz1,5, Peter Vortisch1,6

1: Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), D-76128 Karlsruhe. 2: now at Daimler AG, D-71059 Sindelfingen, [email protected] 3: PTV AG, Stumpfstr. 1, D-76131 Karlsruhe, [email protected], corresponding author 4: Das Fest GmbH, Durlacher Allee 64, D-76131 Karlsruhe, [email protected] 5: now at Robert Bosch GmbH, Auf der Breit 4, D-76227 Karlsruhe.

[email protected]

6: Insitut für Verkehrswesen, Otto Ammann-Platz 9, [email protected].

June 2011

Abstract This study investigates how computer simulations of crowds of pedestrians can support the planning of events. It looks into documented experiences collected in past projects and enters into a dialogue with opposing, supportive and critical views, on simulations, and advances a realistic argument on how simulations as a tool fit into the toolbox of event planning. The paper starts with an incident which occurred at a stadium's entrance gates to motivate more fundamental considerations and concludes with details of a project done for the festival “Das Fest” in Karlsruhe.

Introduction

Computers have made their way to many aspects of life and to most professions, and are used for various planning tasks. Soon after the first models of vehicular dynamics had been introduced (Reuschel, 1950; ; Newell, 1961; ; Wiedemann, 1974; Gipps,1981; Nagel & Schreckenberg, 1992; Chowdhury, Santen, & Schadschneider, 2000; Helbing, 2001), models of pedestrian dynamics were also formulated (e.g. Gipps, 1986; Helbing & Molnar, 1995; Blue & Adler, 1998). The first application of crowd simulations was to enhance safety during emergency egress from buildings. Apart from evacuation and escape crowd simulations have been used to simulate passengers transferring within a station, pedestrians as participants of traffic, and people walking to, from or at an event. This paper discusses perspectives on the usage of simulations for the planning of events; as such it deals with both exaggerated expectations and also benefits that can be achieved with simulation tools but which are frequently missed, when the usage of simulations is discussed. At this point we note that simulations are elements of the planning process and therefore cannot prevent a bad implementation of best practice planning, for example if less staff was available on the day of the event than planned.

At the Gates

“Weeping and screaming children at the hands of their desperate parents, elderly people, who were gasping for air and feared to be crushed – because other spectators, who demanded admittance,



pushed and pressed from behind. This was the shocking scenario in front of the south gate of the arena. The guests of the club Hertha BSC [Berlin] were there penned up behind barriers and were only dealt with one by one at snake pace by far too few staff. Fans, who stood in front of the stadium at 2 pm, could take their seats only a few minutes before the kick off [planned for 3:30 pm].”

(Translated from Wolf, 2005)

This excerpt from a newspaper article together with the reactions it spawned in online forums is a documentation of an incident that presumably did not cause any permanent damage nor much attention outside Berlin. However, the incident and the then forthcoming soccer world championship triggered activity to address the problem. Already for the next league match more favorable feedback on the issue is documented on the web indicating that procedures were changed and for that reason ingress to the match went more relaxed. The incident made it to the newspapers as in Europe soccer, in general, receives much attention, and also the number of people involved was remarkable. However, on events of a smaller scale, similar incidents occur every day, which suggest that the problem is not one of a spectacularly large event, extreme conditions, which cause tragic casualties; rather it may be one of infrastructure and of procedures not meeting the demand, nor being able to cope with injuries, annoyed customers, and bad press. An incident like the one in Berlin, we suggest, could be triggered by different causes: bad planning or bad execution of the planning; it could also be that the number of fans who attended was unforeseeable. In the Berlin‟s event, the latter was not the case as the match was sold out. Without actually making a claim about what caused the incident, we assume in this paper that the day in Berlin went as planned, where no major organizational element that was planned for was missing or modified. In this way the incident can be used as concrete example of what would have been accessible with simulations.

Exaggerations

When simulations of pedestrians or traffic systems are discussed in the public, one sometimes gets the impression that a simulation is mistaken for a crystal bowl telling the future. This high expectation might be rooted in the nearly unlimited confidence in and expectation of technology in general and computer technology in particular. Simulation no more than a tool made to serve particular purposes. For this it only uses aspects of reality as input and is only able to reproduce aspects of reality. As the justification for any tool is to be useful and helpful, the results from using a simulation of crowds or vehicle traffic needs to be policy sensitive, as Bell (1997) described it. A good example for a non-perfect image of reality that is helpful and which offers a policy sensitive usage is that of a street map of a city. A street map is only a very imperfect image of a city; it does not contain information on the culture, language, smells, climate, kitchen,


club life, and the millions of individual daily lives the city houses. Street maps of New York, Florence, Cairo, and Tokyo may look very similar. If the differences between the real cities were actually as small as their map differences, no one would travel around the world for a visit. Satellite photos offer a better idea of possible differences, although they too are still 2D images. Yet a street map (maybe in combination with a compass) is helpful and policy sensitive for the purpose of choosing the right direction when navigating through the city; hence the lasting success of the concept of a map. In planning a public event cited in the introduction, a helpful purpose of the simulation might have been to learn about the number of fans in the queue in front of the gates, maybe, to learn about the average individual queuing time. This might have sufficiently improved the basis for decisions in the planning to trigger additional measures. With the exaggerated expectations from simulations there are two linked dangers: the first is that meeting the expectations is correctly estimated to be very difficult if not impossible. Doing simulations is then rejected as being unhelpful and simulations are removed from the planner's toolbox. As a consequence the existing realistic benefits of simulations are are ignored. The second danger is a consequence of the opposite extreme position, namely to take the results of a simulation as fulfilling the expectations ignoring the purpose of the project and the abilities of the model. From this it is only a small step to assume that simulations can be used to replace other efforts to ensure safety, even to be able to relinquish local and scene-specific organizational experience. Yet it is this experience that allows, for example, to estimate how a certain social group will react under certain circumstances, something which cannot come as a result of the simulation.

Calibration and Intended Results

To take into account the effect of various external influences a model of pedestrian dynamics has a number of parameters, which can be calibrated to produce quantitatively reliable output. This section deals with latest efforts to collect data that can be used for calibration and with limits to the precision of a pedestrian simulation model. There are numbers of factors that influence the desired as well as the maximum speed. Some of these are age, sex, environmental temperature, time of day (Weidmann, 1993; Buchmüller & Weidmann, 2006), motivation (closely linked with the walking purpose), and individual fitness. The precise impact of each factor is not easy to measure; whenever one is measuring walking speed at some spot in a city, it inevitably is at a certain temperature and a certain time of day. Each time of day implies a bias in the sample of persons being measured, i.e. in age and walking purpose. Collecting data at some spot and time therefore allows calibrating a simulation model to simulate pedestrians at that spot and time. The calibration may also be a good one for simulations at another spot and time, but not necessarily the best one. Even more discussed than the free, unrestricted walking speed at very low densities is the relation between walking speed and density and the flow volumes (number of people per time) that fit through a door or corridor of a given width. Over the decades in different realms different relations have become acknowledged that differ a lot one from the other (Schadschneider, et al., 2009). There exist, for example, two acknowledged works of which one assumes standstill at a density which is below the density of maximal flow claimed in the


other work. Part of the reason of such discrepancies may be that flow and densities have been measured with different methods (Zhang, Klingsch, Schadschneider, & Seyfried, 2011). Also, the location of measurement can lead to significantly different results; for example, in a simple and specific situation students in Germany and India are found to walk at a different pace in identical density (Chattaraj, Seyfried, & Chakroborty, 2009). Some experiments were carried out, as part of the ongoing HERMES research project (Holl & Seyfried, 2009, 2010; Klüpfel, et al., 2010), to measure bi-directional flows, flows around corners and merging flows (Klüpfel, et al., 2010). |These experiments were thought as equally important for simulation projects but which have not yet received as much attention as the one-directional flow through a door or the one-directional flow through a corridor. Only parts of the results have been published so far (Zhang, Klingsch, Schadschneider, & Seyfried, 2011). In this study, a simulation was carried out looking at the number of people queuing normally; it did not consider situations where they might panic, start shoving each other and the resulting consequences. This is because the empirical knowledge of the combined effect of crowd psychology and spatial properties on the dynamics of the crowd is not strong enough to built reliable algorithms. However, if one combines the number of people queuing as calculated by a simulation with the experience of a local crowd manager, one can often get a good idea of what would happen. The lesson of this is that simulations should supplement existing planning and not replace elements of it.

Categorization of Projects

With the thoughts of the last section, is there any hope that simulation projects can yield absolute “correct” results (numbers)? The answer is „yes‟ depending on what is meant with “correct” and which output parameters need to be “correct”.

- … if there is a possibility to measure in a very similar situation and environment and

use that data for calibration. Probably the most important input data is at what time

how many people arrive at the boundaries of the simulation (i.e. the “demand“),

- … if “correct“ is not expected to be closer to reality than the inherent variability of

reality is. For example for the simulation of the egress from a soccer stadium this

means that the simulated duration times need to be allowed to lie within that range of

observed real durations. An allowed stricter expectation is that the simulated

distribution matches the observed distribution, and

- … if the parameter that needs to be “correct“ is not a manifestly non-statistical one, as

for example individual trajectories.

A station that is to be modified offers the possibility to fulfill the first condition: the passengers can be video-taped, relevant parameters (number of persons, density, walking speed, and dwell times) can be evaluated, used for the calibration of an “as is” simulation and with the calibrated parameters a “what if” simulation can be done (see Figure 1). There are many reasons why such a simulation still has uncertainty, these include: the demand forecast has


an uncertainty and the population characteristics may change24. But apart from that – if the calibration process can be done successfully – the uncertainty added by the pedestrian dynamics model for a good model should be small or at least not larger than the uncertainty from other sources of which two have been mentioned above.

Figure 1: For the simulation of North Melbourne Station considerable effort has been put to collect data for a calibration of the simulation to reproduce the situation as it is today (Laufer, 2008).

Note, however, that in Laufer (2008), the calibration was done relating to speed, density, and walking times; three basic and general parameters. It was not attempted to calibrate for the mood change induced on the passengers by the state on the platform, it was also not calibrated for the average amount of beverages bought by passengers in the station. This is one of the issues with the word “correct”. Which parameter has to be correct? A simulation that aims to give an answer to the question of the capacity of the station, the parameters that need to be correct are density, speed, and walking time. In other words, one must make oneself clear about the purpose of the model. A purpose, just as geometry and demand (Rahmatabadi, 2010), needs to be part of a simulation model. A clear statement about the purpose also implicitly defines what a simulation model ought not to answer. This is necessary as it limits the degree of precision and details which are necessary as input to the simulation and thus limits the necessary amount of work and therefore also monetary costs. The second issue with “correct” is that in real life density, walking speeds and walking times on two different days would not be exactly identical; even if on these two days the same number of people would alight from a train and board it. In real life, measurements always result in distributions; thus “correct” can only be correct with the background of these distributions.

24 If the „what if“ scenario is 20 years to the future, for example effects of the dynamics of the average BMI may take place.


The above example can be categorized in two ways: first it is a “high precision / high effort” project, and second it is a station project. The first categorization is based on a) what is the purpose, and following from that, b) how the project was done. The second categorization is the type of application; for this project it it is typically to test if capacities and transfer times to connecting trains are sufficient. If no empirical data in comparable situations is available a reliable calibration cannot be carried out. However, this does not necessarily mean that simulation cannot turn out to be a helpful tool. Even without confidence in the absolute values of the results, there still can be confidence in the policy sensitivity of the simulation project (Bell, 1997). One way – and this is the next purpose/method-related category – to carry out such a simulation project is a comparative study. For example, different variants of an infrastructure configuration or an egress organization plan or variants in any other degree of freedom of a system can be compared by making multiple simulation runs using different sets of parameters of the dynamics model. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of Kretz (2007) give an example of a project undertaken with this method for an emergency egress procedure at a sports event. The intention was to find the best planner-proposed variant according to some specific but arbitrary criteria (e.g. best LOS or smallest egress times). Success is only possible, if a vast majority of parameter sets of the dynamics model yield the same variant as the best one. This implies that there is a chance that such a simulation project fails in the sense that it might not yield a result. Another category of projects, currently unavailable, but which could generate benefit from pedestrian simulations without entailing calibration work to a simulation project, is planning for a „building fire‟. Here, it is by no means clear, how large the fire will be, which materials will be set on fire and how the combustion smoke will be composed. Obviously there is no way of calibrating the effect of a building fire. To allow fire safety engineers to develop an intuition for the interplay of fire and building, a small set of „design fires‟ are defined and integrated into regulations. These provide a common ground on which the statement “in case of the design fire the height of the smoke free volume falls below 2 meter” immediately has a meaning to fire safety engineers. The simulation of pedestrians, for example, the RiMEA initiative (Brunner, et al., 2009) (see figure Figure 3), aims to achieve a comparable state. By defining a set of standard examples which need to be simulated with model parameters such that certain „result corridors‟ are met, implicitly for different models of pedestrian dynamics parameter sets are defined that have a meaning for anyone familiar with RiMEA's guidelines. The difference to fire safety engineering is that the design fire is defined explicitly, while the parameters of the simulation models are defined implicitly with the definition of the „design scenarios‟. This includes the uncertainty if parameters obtained in this way for different simulation models yield similar results when they are used to simulate other situations. Note that although a realistic definition of the expected result corridors gives rise to the expectation that the obtained parameters lead to realistic simulation results in other situations, it is not necessary that the results come very close to the real particular situation. The benefit of this method of doing a project lies in the common ground provided by the design scenarios.


Figure 2: Snapshot of a simulation animation. From each side 25,000 pedestrians per hour walk towards the crossing. The snapshot is made before any relevant interaction between the four directions occurs, which shows that details of the underlying pedestrian dynamics model in this case are irrelevant. Already now it can be seen (even better in the animation than in the still image) that the capacity might be insufficient. A rough calculation will confirm this. However, the point is that this issue might be overseen as long as it only occurs in form of some tables in the planning process, maybe even distributed over several pages. In the form as it is shown here, the problem cannot be missed.

The three approaches to a simulation project as mentioned above implicitly assume that a simulation project is carried out because one is aware of critical elements in the planning and that simulations are used to answer the question “Does it work?“ or “Can it work?“. However, if the simulated process has some degree of complexity it may happen that a simulation initially generates awareness for possible problems. In our experience this happens frequently during the process of building up the simulation model before starting the simulation for the first time. This suggests that often a simulation project will succeed in generating awareness for possible problems correctly even if the dynamic model is calibrated for some average situation and not for the specific local conditions.


Figure 3: Snapshot from a simulation of a RiMEA test case (Brunner, et al., 2009).

A typical project, where a simulation is used with the intention of a „check list‟ to „generate awareness‟, is a large scale event in a newly built event infrastructure, where no experience exists and no preceding event could have created awareness of problems. The way how a simulation can be made use of then is to first do a classical planning, for example, with Excel sheets making use of the Predtechenskii & Milinskii‟s (1978) theory, and then use the simulation as described optionally in conjunction with the intention of a refined planning. Once awareness has been created for possible problems, a solution is often at hand following from the planners experience without further usage of elaborate methods. Planning for very large projects, e.g. first Formula 1 Race in Abu Dhabi (Figure 4) a check list mode project is suggested. First the geometry would have to be modeled precisely, including every single litter can. Precision constraints in the model are implied, if undertaking precise check list is excluded by budget or time constraints. Second it is often the case that one cannot be sure of having a precise estimate of the demand and how it varies over time. The fact that a project with this purpose and carried out in this manner often produces benefits during the creation stage of the model (geometry, population, etc) is usually overlooked and after a project is completed it is often forgotten that this actually has happened. At the same time this fact also shows that – while it is of course also desirable to have the parameters calibrated as much as possible for the local conditions – normally the purpose can be fulfilled by using average parameters for the simulation25 which are known to

25 Using average parameters for the whole simulated population regardless of social or cultural peculiarities may give the impression of doing only a “rough check” of the planning.


produce plausible results. In such a kind of project a visualization of the simulation can be

sufficient and measurements and analysis of these might not be necessary.

Figure 4: Still image from a simulation made to assist planning for the first Formula 1 Race in Abu Dhabi. This simulation was multi-modal: the visitors arrived by car, walked to the bus hubs (as one is shown in the image here), boarded the buses there, were taken by the bus to their grandstand, alighted there and passed the security check. When the simulated pedestrians reached the grandstands, they were taken out of the simulation. The results of the simulation among other effects lead to the construction of an additional tunnel for pedestrians and increased crew presence at predicted hotspots. In retrospective the simulation was acknowledged to have given the right hints and had not missed an important issue.

Simulation visualization can help to develop an intuitive understanding of large demand numbers. 3D visualizations can intuitively and immediately show where ends do not meet. The alternative method of realizing this from sequences of linked tables is arduous, takes a lot of time, and does not lead to the same degree of conviction that one has not missed a problem as a simulation with its visualization does. To accept that a project carried out in this way with this limited precision has its justification, one has to compare it to standard planning procedures and their precision which reach limits

Nevertheless as is demonstrated in (Mayer-Zawar, Schomborg, & Schroeders, 2009) such a simulation is a much more detailed level of planning than a classical planning approach based only on densities, speeds and flows as suggested by (Transportation Research Board, 2000) (Kommission Bemessung von Straßenverkehrsanlagen, 2001)).


in the size and complexity of today‟s buildings and events. One must not compare it to a high-precision measurement or simulation in physics as judged on this ground no simulation of a system that involves human actions can stand ground (Bell, 1997). The standards of the classical natural sciences nevertheless can serve as a guiding light for the direction in which models and simulations of social systems should develop.

An Example: Simulation for “Das Fest”

Introduction and Motivation “Das Fest” (Das Fest GmbH, 2012) is an annual event taking place in Karlsruhe, Germany, at a weekend mid to end July. It has a history of more than 25 years and in the course of these years has grown from an audience of a few dozens to about 200,000 during the course of the weekend. The area is one of the city's parks and has not been specifically constructed to host events. It has an elongated form (Google, 2012). One end of the area is used for the music festival part of Das Fest while at the other end Das Fest has more the character of a fair addressing and attracting families with young children and giving clubs and organizations space to present themselves. For a number of years it has become usual that at the music festival at each of the three evenings one or two of the most prominent national bands or even well-known international acts are presented to the audience (examples include Seeed and the Beatsteaks). The fair part Das Fest, on the other hand, houses activities of which some are rather common (for example activity spots for the very young, presentations of non-profit organizations, parties and clubs) others are more uncommon (e.g. finger skate boarding and volley club), but in any case activities with very limited commercial potential. In this way Das Fest attracts people from all of society; the audience is socially very heterogeneous, comprises local as well as more remotely located even people from outside Germany, and it changes constantly from Friday afternoon to Sunday night. This alone sets Das Fest apart from most other events. However, for a festival of that size and with such rather highly-ranked artists, its most special feature might be that it has been admittance-free and even without tickets until 2009. As a consequence there was never a limit on the number of visitors one could expect to show up at the area. One of the main reasons – aside tradition – why Das Fest was kept free so long, although it had grown large and attractive to the masses, is that the non-commercial fair part has no chance to survive as part of a festival with usual ticket prices. After in 2009 the audience for the top act had grown very large, it was decided that the number of visitors had to be controlled with a ticket system. The area of the festival was divided into a music area and a free area. Tickets had only to be bought to access the music area and the security checks were in place to control access for the whole area. Therefore, two spatially separated queuing systems had to be installed: one for security checks for all visitors, and one forticket checks for the music area. As this was a comparatively large re-configuration of the entrance procedure of preceding years, the desire arose to verify the capacity of the whole system and check in advance as much as possible for potential problems. The project was carried out as part of a Master's thesis in 2010. It was preceded in former years by the creation of animations which were displayed at the festival's video walls to inform the visiting crowd about the position of the emergency routes and exits (Beller & Kretz, 2010).


Project Work While it was a rather straight forward task to model the geometry of the festival area as well as the infrastructure of the public transport service, fixing the demand (the temporal distribution of fan arrival) was more difficult. As there has been no ticket system in use in preceding years, there was no data available, and even if it had been available, the relative attractiveness of the artists for the various types of fans has a major impact on when, and how pronounced the peak arrival time is to be expected. To estimate this variable is not easy and as it is an input to the simulation, the estimated uncertainty with it is a lower bound to the expected precision of the simulation result. The estimation then was done as follows: the local tram service organization (VBK) had compiled data from experience of when it is necessary to double the train services to the festival area. This information was interpreted such that at that point in time the trains at the lower frequency were fully occupied. Furthermore it was assumed that about the same number of people arrived by car, foot or bike as by tram. This information for a fixed point in time was combined with estimations about the attractiveness of the artists to the crowd and how much the audiences of the last three presenting artists overlap26. In repeated discussions (see Figure 5) which included the presentation of the current state of the simulation, the festival organizers were given the possibility to modify this theoretical estimation based on their experience.

Figure 6 shows how the estimation of arrival flows clearly deviates from later on-site counts. With this deviation it is immediately clear that the simulation cannot “show what is going to happen when” which would be the most preferable information of any planning tool. Nevertheless, as we will show presently, the conclusion that a simulation “cannot help” is not correct as well. Already, Figure 6 can indirectly be seen as a benefit of the simulation. As the simulation relies so strongly on knowing about the demand, the creation of the simulation model revealed very clearly the limited knowledge which exists and has created a desire to clarify this issue with increased efforts for visitor counting in future editions of Das Fest. Such data would be of use for any kind of planning work, apart from its use in simulations. The simulation – carried out using the software package VISSIM (PTV AG, 2010) – made immediately clear that counter flows would occur at an undesirable spot and in unacceptable numbers, see Figure 7. As a consequence the barrier locations and process configuration was modified. This issue is an example of a problem, which appears to be obvious in retrospect, once the simulation has created awareness for it. To create awareness, no arduous analysis of the simulation results is necessary, as awareness comes directly from the animated 3D visualization of the simulation. Nevertheless, it is not self-evident that such an issue comes to mind without simulations, as it is just one among hundreds of elements that need to be thought over in the planning for such an event. During the project some other issues were similarly brought up; dealing with the simulation model, for example, triggered that one staff person per ticket gate group was added to assist wheelchairs and parents with kid buggies to pass the ticket gates.

26 As an example the last artist might be by far the most prominent one, but if the two artists before him address the same audience, one can assume many people to arrive earlier and not leave until the end.


After this re-configuration the flows and queues in the simulation were considered to be acceptable. As a next step a “What if...?” scenario was investigated: it was assumed that the ticket gate right behind the security check was broken and out of service, and that all visitors had to walk first to the admittance free area to access the music area from there using one of the other ticket gates, see Figure 8. First it was simulated what would happen if a majority of these visitors would head for the nearest ticket gate (see Figure 9). The result clearly indicated that in the case of a broken ticket gate at the security check, care must be taken for a good distribution of the visitors on the remaining ticket gates – for example by having security staff advising people where to go.

Figure 5: Schematic representation of the workflow including the communication between simulation modeler and festival organizer. This process occurred when the demand was jointly determined and as well in later stages of the project. This means that modeling and result delivery were not separated, sequential stages but were interwoven.

We conclude this section with an interesting observation from the festival: at the first day with the new entrance procedure in place, the first ticket gate to the area was heavily frequented


(see Figure 10). This happened especially in the last 30 minutes before the headlining artist was announced to start. It appeared that at that time not only more visitors arrived at the area, but that they were also in a hurry and for that reason did not take the time to search for another entrance – which actually would have saved them a lot of time. To achieve a balanced usage of all the ticket gates, many more visitors would have had to follow the signs and pass the first visible ticket gate and walk to one of the others (which were not visible at the first ticket gate). In this way the queue in front of the ticket gate resembled much the simulated queue shown in Figure 9 but for another reason than the one assumed in the simulation. This behavior changed already at the second day; the ticket gate usage was much more balanced. The visitors apparently were not willing to be guided by signs, but they were willing to let themselves be guided by their own experience and knowledge. This shows that to set the route choice ratios in a simulation model one has to be very clear about the visitors' knowledge of the area and infrastructure. Signage either in general does not have much impact on the visitors' behavior or it needs to be designed and placed differently than it was at Das Fest 2010.

Figure 6 Arrival flow of visitors in persons per hour. The red dotted line gives the estimation before the event, the blue line is based on real counts.

Conclusions

Computer simulations can benefit event organization in two ways. They may investigate issues identified beforehand, but also reveal further problems to the organizers in the course of setting up and running the model. In the former case, data restrictions may often limit the precision and interpretability of results. Commonly, data specific for the event, such as: “When will the visitors choose to go where?”, or basic data which is only now being collected (i.e. the dependence of flow on density at junctions) is missing before an event. This sets a limit to the precision of the results which may be lower than desired. However, when using a simulation in the style of a check list to become aware of potential problems, the result is less dependent on such data. Here simulations can be especially helpful to set the mind on


issues which – if they would actually lead to problems – tend to be considered a posteriori as “obvious” by outsiders. The usage of a simulation tool – or any other tool now and in the future – does not guarantee or prove safety in a strict sense such that it allows a head of safety and security to just relax and enjoy the music during their festival. Yet simulations are a way to shift the identification and management of potential incidents from the time of the festival to its planning phase. Thus, simulations contribute to enhancing safety and more likely keeping an event in a manageable state. By improving the planning process they help to reduce the work load of the security staff during the festival.


Figure 7: The first simulations showed that with the assumed origins, routes, and destinations counterflows immediately in the back of the ticket gates would occur (upper image, the visitors enter from the lower right and have to pass through the half circle of security checks). This was estimated to be realistic, as it was assumed that the visitors would not automatically and also not with information and invitations align into the right queue according to where they want to go later. Therefore an additional barrier was placed behind the gates (lower image) that prevented counterflows from occurring. This had the consequence that it had to be guaranteed that all visitors aligning at S1 (the left-most security check) were ticket owners, as they only could progress through a ticket gate and access to the free area was not possible.


Figure 8: Here the ticket gate which is marked with a violet circle is assumed to be out of service. All visitors now have to follow the orange arrow.

Figure 9: If the ticket gate at the security check is broken, the second nearest ticket gate cannot alone process the crowds and a large queue will form.


Figure 10: Queue in front of the ticket gate (also depicted in Figure 9).

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