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Journal of Contemporary Studies A Publication of Faculty of Contemporary Studies

EDIT OR I AL BOAR D

Patron-in-Chief Lieutenant General, Agha Muhammad Umar Farooq, President, National Defence University, Islamabad.

Chairman Prof. Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Dean, Faculty of Contemporary Studies National Defence University, Islamabad.

Editor-in-Chief Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan, Head of the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.

Editor Ms. Nargis Zahra, Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.

EDIT OR I AL ADV I SOR Y BOAR D

Lawrence Ziring, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science,

Western Michigan University, USA.

Hassan Askari Rizvi, Political and Defence Analyst. Dr. Rashid Ahmad Khan, Dean, Social Sciences, University of

Sargodha. Nishchal N. Pandey, Director, Centre for South Asian Studies,

Kathmandu, Nepal. Dr. Ying Rong, Senior Research Fellow, China Institute of

International Studies (CIIS)

Dr. Moonis Ahmar, Chairman, Department of International Relations, University of Karachi and Director Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution.

Dr. Zulfqar Khan, Senior Visiting Research Fellow, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Islamabad.

S. Gülden Ayman, Associate Professor, Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey.

Richard Bonney, Emeritus Professor of Modern History at the University of Leicester, United Kingdom.

Tim Edmunds, Director of Teaching and Learning School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies (SPAIS), University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom.

Journal of Contemporary Studies Faculty of Contemporary Studies

2012

All rights reserved. No portion of the contents may be reproduced or reprinted in any form without the written permission of the Editor/Publisher. Opinions expressed in the articles published in Journal of Contemporary

Studies are those of authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of NDU. The editors are responsible for the selection and acceptance of articles. However, the responsibility for accuracy of the statements made therein rests with the authors.

Summer 2012

Volume I, Number 1

JOURNAL OF

Editor-in-Chief

Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan

Editor

Ms Nargis Zahra

Faculty of Contemporary Studies National Defence University

Islamabad, Pakistan

CONTENTS

1. Strategic Stability in South Asia: The Role of USA

Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema

1

2. Kashmir Issue: The Soft Approach

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Syed Athar Ali

16

3. Afghanistan: Peace through Reconciliation

Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan

31

4. EU Integration and Accession: Implications for

West Balkan Sovereignty and Process of

Democratization

Bakar-e-Najmdeen

54

5. De-radicalization and Disengagement from

Extremism: Available Policy Options for Pakistan

Muhammad Nawaz Verdag

67

BOOK REVIEWS

1. The Future of Pakistan

Stephen P. Cohen (ed.)

88

2. Great Ancestors – Women Asserting

Rights in Muslim Contexts

Farida Shaheed and Aisha Lee Shaheed

90

3. Words of Conflict, Words of War:

How the Language We Use in Political

Processes Sparks Fighting

Fathali Moghaddam and Rom Harre (Eds.)

92

4. Electoral Malpractices during the 2008

Elections in Pakistan

Iffat Humayun Khan

95

5. In Search of School Effectiveness:

A Research Study Oriented Book

Dr. Syed Qaim Mehdi Zaidi

98

DOCUMENTS

1 Joint Statement of Trilateral Summit Islamic

Republic of Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of Iran

and Islamic Republic of Pakistan on “Enhancing

Trilateral Cooperation”

100

2. Twentieth Amendment Act 2012 103

3. The United Nations in Global Governance 107

4. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2017

(2011) Adopted by the Security Council at its

6644th meeting, on 31 October 2011

109

5. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1999


6582nd meeting, on 13 July 2011

112

6. United Nations Security Council resolution 1990


6567th meeting, on 27 June 2011

113

7. Eighteenth Amendment Act 2011 117

Strategic Stability in South Asia 1

STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA:

THE ROLE OF USA

Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema∗

Abstract

The main focus of this paper revolves around the strategic

stability of South Asia along with the US contributions in

stabilizing the South Asian environment. It also highlights

the Kashmir issue that is the constant source of conflict

between the two leading countries of South Asia i.e., India

and Pakistan. Post 9/11 era has seen many important

developments impacting upon the existing contours of

strategic stability in South Asia with U.S waging a war

against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and coercing Pakistan to

participate in it. Whereas relations between Pakistan and

US worsened over time, this decade has seen a more

strengthened US-India relationship. The current

partnership between the two has far reaching implications

for Pakistan's position and interests in the region. Some

light has also been shed on the efficacy of Confidence

Building Measures in dealing with regional conflicts and

the involvement of great powers in South Asia. It is

imperative that US being an influential power should

continue to play a balanced and judicious role for the

peace and stability of this region.

Introduction

trategic stability implies a situation in which the chances of war eruption and emergence of a major crisis are deemed to be at minimum. While such a situation is a product of multiple factors and

the concept itself is viewed as extremely complex; there are four elements that regularly contribute towards the sustainability of the situation and are considered relatively more significant than the others. They include; the absence of any ongoing major dispute, the absence of pronounced asymmetry in forces, existence of a large network of both conventional

∗ Professor Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema is Dean at Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence Unviersity, Islamabad.

S

2 Journal of Contemporary Studies, Vol. I, No.1, Summer 2012

and military confidence building measures (CBMs) and an active but judicious role of the great powers in conflict prevention.

While South Asia is a region that has been experiencing periodic upheavals ever since the British departed and the countries of the region attained an independent status. Conflict and tension arose in South Asia mainly because of the hasty departure of the British who left many complicated and potentially explosive issues unresolved. The situation further complicated and exacerbated the existing sense of insecurity when the leading states of the region i.e., India and Pakistan, opted for divergent policy pursuits. In addition, the early linkage of regional interest with global developments not only cemented the adopted policies within the region but also periodically caused certain amount of adjustments among the involved powers like the USA, Soviet Union and China.

It needs to be mentioned here that the post 9/11 era has seen many important developments impacting upon the existing contours of strategic stability in South Asia. Not only did the US start a war against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan but it also managed to coerce Pakistan to participate in what is commonly referred in Pakistan as ‘American War on Terror’. Equally significant development that radically influenced South Asian stability was the advent of Indo-US nuclear deal. The deal critically impacted upon the NPT regime on one hand and damaged the existing stability in South Asia on the other.

Regional Conflicts

Admittedly, there are many sources of tensions which have considerably contributed towards the perception formulation of South Asian states but perhaps the major contributions have come from the ongoing regional conflicts - more specifically from the Kashmir conflict. The ongoing Kashmir dispute is not only the major impediment on the road to normalization between India and Pakistan, but also the peace of South Asia is heavily dependent upon its resolution. No other dispute has generated so much ill will between the two countries as the Kashmir dispute. In addition, periodic pressures emanating from internal dynamics confronted them with ugly realities of realpolitik influencing them either to accelerate efforts to seek resolutions of the outstanding issues or face multiple complex problems. The externalization of internal problems periodically did provide temporary relief, but in essence it further complicated the existing complex problems requiring even more careful handling.

Even after the passage of 64 years, not only does the Kashmir dispute still continue to occupy a paramount position in Indo-Pak relations but it has also become abundantly clear that without its resolution, the peace of South Asia would continue to remain an elusivecommodity. To comprehend properly the impact of unresolved Kashmir dispute upon the


peace of South Asia, one needs to understand all shades of the ongoing Kashmir dispute, including the approaches, dialogue, multilateral and bilateral efforts, factors causing slow or lack of progress on this core issue and impact on regional peace.

The seeds of the Kashmir dispute were sown at the time of the partition of the subcontinent and British Viceroy Louis Mountbatten's role in securing accession of most of the princely states to India, where he blatantly disregarded his self-asserted principles governing the process of partition. Technically, the power to accede to one or the other of the new dominions was vested in the personal decision of the ruler but it was also recognized that the decision of the ruler should be governed by considerations of geographic contiguity to one of the dominions, composition of the population and above all, by the wishes of the people. India insisted upon grabbing Junagadh and Hyderabad, because of the Hindu majority population in these states, despite the fact that the ruler of Junagadh opted for Pakistan and the ruler of Hyderabad preferred independent status. By this criterion, Kashmir should have automatically joined Pakistan. But in the case of Kashmir, India applied a different criterion and managed to secure accession letter signed by the ruler. Once the Maharajah had supposedly signed the instrument of accession, India relegated the principles of self-determination and geographic contiguity to a secondary position and pushed the legalistic approach to the forefront.

Compared to India, Pakistan has been extremely consistent in its Kashmir policy. With the passage of time, India has changed its tactics. For both sides, Kashmir dispute is a complex issue that has exercised overwhelming influence over their policies since partition. For India, the intensified freedom struggle of the Kashmiris is often termed as a Pakistani-inspired pursuit rather than a genuine expression of Kashmiris’ desire for self-determination. For Pakistan, Kashmir has become a symbol of Indian highhandedness and broken pledges. All Pakistan wants and insists is that the people of Kashmir are allowed to exercise their right of self-determination under a UN supervised plebiscite in accordance with the resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949. The uprising in the 1990’s and the current struggle are not only viewed as the expression of extreme discontentment of the Kashmiri people but also a renewed assertion to secure their legitimate and promised right of' self-determination.

It is intriguing that many Pakistanis and Azad Kashmiris accuse the Pakistani leadership, for not doing even the basic minimum in the area of supplying weapons or providing the training, whereas the Indians tend to over-credit the Pakistanis for this.


Compared to India, which has systematically eroded the special status of Kashmir it gave to the State under the Article 370 of its constitution, Pakistan did not absorb either the Northern Areas or the Azad Kashmir. However, it needs to be mentioned here that Northern Areas have recently been given a special status and are now called the Gilgit-Baltistan region. Determined not to allow Kashmir's possible accession to Pakistan and to retain it as a part of the Indian Union, India undertook series of well-calculated moves to initially erode the special status it gave to Kashmir and then merge the state completely into the Indian Union.1 British surrender of their impartial role in partition processes facilitated the Indians to gain the necessary foothold, initially.2 Over the last 20 years, Pakistan has successfully managed to internationalize the Kashmir dispute. A three pronged approach adopted by Pakistan facilitated the process of internationalization. To begin with, Pakistan allowed the local as well as the international press including the Indian media to cover the consequences of the crisis on the Pakistani side of the LoC. All interested visitors and human right activists are still allowed to visit AJK and interview the unfortunate victims of the crisis. The second aspect of this approach revolved around the Pakistani government’s efforts to place and highlight the dispute before a number of international organizations including NAM, OIC, and UNHCR etc. The third aspect was to send delegations consisting of' parliamentarians, thinkers, analysts and journalists to various countries with a view to educate those governments. The establishment of Kashmir Committee was another development, which did contribute enormously towards Pakistan’s Kashmir policy.

Five other factors somewhat inadvertently facilitated the process of internationalization of the dispute. First, many research organizations, foundations, institutes and universities all over the world began to hold seminars and conferences on the Kashmir crisis. Second, many Kashmiri people living outside South Asia began to step- up their efforts to educate the public in those countries. Third, many marches were organized to cross the LOC over the last 20 years, which in turn, accelerated the process of internationalization. Fourth, the negative attitude of the Indian government with regard to opening up Kashmir for all journalists and representatives of various human rights groups further facilitated the process of' internationalization of the dispute. It needs to be stressed here that the Indian government has adopted a policy under which a select group of journalists and other representatives are allowed to visit

1 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “India’s Kashmir Policy”, Perspectives on Kashmir

(Islamabad: Pakistan Forum, 1994): 97-118. 2 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “The Politics of the Punjab Boundary Award”,

Heidelberg paper No.1 (Heidelberg: South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg, Germany): September 2000.


Kashmir. Fifth, and perhaps the most important development that made inadvertent contributions towards the internationalization of the dispute, was the acquisition of nuclear weapon status by both India and Pakistan. Soon after Indian nuclear tests on 11th and 13th May, 1998, the Indian leaders such as Advani began to issue threatening statements.

Compared to Pakistan's successful pursuit of internationalization of the dispute, India tried to paint Pakistani pursuits as efforts directed to highlight the Islamic character of the dispute. Indeed, these were crude attempts to divert the attention from the real issues by employing terms like International Islamic Mujahideen to generate the impression of some kind of Islamic conspiracy continuously working against the established order.

Two set of approaches towards Kashmir exist; first is the military and political approach and second entails bilateral and multilateral routes. The Kashmir dispute is essentially a political dispute requiring a political approach if the parties involved are genuinely interested in resolving it. Until the advent of recent peace process in 2004, India opted to employ a military approach. While the freedom fighters claim that they have been compelled to take up arms by the state governments’ and India's policies, the Indian government opted for military approach right from the outset of' the crisis. Not only had Kashmir remained under Governor's/President's rule for quite sometimes, half-hearted attempts to introduce political approach were also made periodically. Whenever Indian efforts to employ political approach failed, they immediately accused Pakistan rather than looking inward.

The government of Pakistan has frequently expressed its willingness for a dialogue focused on Kashmir exclusively. The Kashmiri umbrella organization, All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) also repeatedly expressed its willingness to talk to the Indian government but India's negativism effectively impeded any progress in this direction. During the earlier periods of the dispute, US actively made substantive contributions towards its resolution. Dr. Frank P. Graham, a former US senator from North Carolina, worked as a United Nations representative after Sir Owen Dixon, and submitted no less than five reports to the UN reflecting his endeavors to find a satisfactory formula for the demilitarization of Kashmir.3 With the passage of few more years not only US began to drift away from the dispute but also the UN began to lose interest, though on the UN records it is still one of the oldest unresolved disputes.

3 Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1946-1990(Karachi: Oxford

University Press, Third Edition 2001), 175-176 and Josef Korbel, Danger in

Kashmir (Karachi: Oxford University Press, Second Edition 2005), 182-189.


Following the acquisition of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan in 1998 and the subsequent emergence of Kargil episode, President Clinton demonstrated interest in resolving the dispute but did not make any significant effort. The 21st Century saw the strengthening of US-India relations. In its efforts to woo India and make it a bulwark against China, it even went to the extent of recognizing India as a nuclear weapons state indirectly. It signed a nuclear deal with India disregarding its own preventive laws and influenced Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to pass an India-specific amendment in order to accommodate Indian interests. President Obama, during his electioneering campaign, also recognized the need to resolve the dispute, but once elected as President he totally ignored the plight of the people of Kashmir.

Growing Force Asymmetry

Undoubtedly, the South Asians’ regional perceptions have always been and still are greatly influenced by the imbalanced and asymmetric power structure that emerged after the departure of the British. The tyranny of geography manifested itself in such a way that while almost all the regional states acquired common border with India, they do not enjoy physical proximity among themselves. India is situated right in the middle of the region, blessed with large territory, massive population, endowed with enormous resources, and over the years it has built an impressive military machine. The towering Indian position in the region, coupled with India’s assertion to secure recognition and respect for its policies and its desire to establish a natural hierarchy; or as many often refer to it as hegemony, within the region generate apprehensions among the regional neighbours.4

Despite having accorded high priority to defense sector in terms of resource allocation, Pakistan continued to face the undesired level of asymmetry in defense forces right from the beginning. While the resource allocation in terms of a percentage of the GDP to defense sector in Pakistan has been always higher than the allocation in India, the asymmetry in actual number of troops and weapons continue to grow primarily because of India’s large economy and its desire to play a role of major power in international politics. The high priority to defense in Pakistan was the product of three factors; perceived threats from India, inabilities of

4 Almost all Pakistani governments have opposed Indian policies aimed at the

establishment of its regional hegemony. Recently the current Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina RabbaniKhar, in response to US Secretary of State Hillery Clinton’s assertion that India should lead Asia, have once again assterted that Pakistan won’t accept Indian hegemony and stressed that “Pakistan’s role in the region is by no means inferior to India”,The

News(Lahore),July 25, 2011.


resources managers to suggest alternatives, and the high level of influence the armed forces enjoyed.5

Asymmetry has been on the rise, especially during the last two decades. Already India has built a huge military machine with the ‘world’s third largest army, fourth largest air force and fifth largest navy’.6 India, as compared to Pakistan, maintains more than double the armed forces but has also been indulging in a shopping spree of sophisticated weaponry (total armed forces of India and Pakistan are respectively 1,325,000 and 617,000).7 Pakistan’s Army consists of 550,000 personnel, Navy 22000, Air Force 45000 whereas India maintains 1,129,900 strong Army, Navy 58,350, and Air Force 127,200.8

Realistic analysis reveals that the asymmetry appears to be more pronounced in navy and air force than in armies. Indian quest for a blue water navy with a large fleet of high performance submarines along with anti-submarines frigates, guided missiles and short-range ballistic and cruise missiles have generated apprehensions for Pakistan. The danger of naval blockade of Karachi; Pakistan’s main port, is viewed with utmost concern. Pakistan’s long neglect of navy and India’s concerted and continuous efforts to build its navy has widened the existing gap in naval capabilities. Recent reports suggest that India plans to spend around US $100 billion on the planned acquisition of sophisticated weapons over the next few years.

Similarly, the growing superiority of Indian Air Force has invoked concerns among the Pakistanis though Pakistan’s possession of wide range of sophisticated missiles, which can effectively engage Indian Air Force, has injected an element of confidence among the Pakistanis. But India’s continuous efforts to procure advanced combat aircraft, deep surveillance capabilities and supersonic cruise missiles consistently invoke concerns in Pakistan, especially if viewed within the context of India’s intentions of waging a limited war.9 Recently pronounced Indian doctrine of ‘Cold Start’ lends credibility to Pakistan’s perception of Indian intentions.10

5 For details see RCSS Policy Studies 10 entiltled Defence Expenditure in South

Asia: An Overview, by Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Jasjit Singh, (Regional Centre for Strategic Studies,Colombo, 2000), 44-45.

6 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Indian Nuclear Deterrence (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 437-451.

7 See The Military Balance 2010 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010), 359-364 and 367-370.

8 Ibid. 9 Michael Kripon, Rodney Jones and Zaid Haider (eds), Limited War, Escalation

Control and the Nuclear Options in South Asia (Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004), 10.

10 Cold Start is viewed as modification of the pre-emptive air strikes against Pakistan’s air force or nuclear facilities. ‘Cold Start focuses on Indian

integrated battle groupsw with elements of army, navy and IAF as thrust


Given the existence of a major dispute and a rapidly increasing asymmetry in the armed forces, it is not too difficult to assume that the greater the conventional military asymmetry between India and Pakistan, the lower will be the nuclear threshold. While India has every right to acquire whatever it deems fit to strengthen its armed forces, the growing asymmetry is extremely prone to inject instability in South Asia and could encourage an undesired arms race. Invariably, increase in Indian defense allocation provides sufficient justification for most Pakistanis to seek a raise in defense allocations.11

Undoubtedly, the main reason that influenced the Pakistani decision makers to opt for the acquisition of nuclear weapons’ capability was to enable Pakistan to effectively ward off threats emanating from India.12 Following the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 by India, Pakistan started thinking seriously about acquiring nuclear weapon capability. Deterring India from embarking upon another major military adventure appears to be the main motivating factor for acquiring nuclear weapons. In some ways, ‘Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence could also be classified as an instrument for deterring the conventional war’.13 Since there is great asymmetry in conventional capability between the two countries, it is not too farfetched to assume that a large scale conventional attack by India may force Pakistan to employ the nuclear weapons.

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

The Confidence Building Measures imply ‘any action, any development, any measure, any arrangement, any understanding, any agreement or any treaty that generates confidence between the adversaries’ and enables them to initiate negotiations and resolve the issue/dispute amicably.14 While there are many categories of the CBMs; communication, transparency, consultation, goodwill, and advance notification measures are relatively better known than the others. Sometimes CBMs are classified into military and non-military terms. The

formations undertaking deep strikes against Pakistan, yet limed enough not to

invite any nuclear retaliation’. See Zafar Iqbal Cheema, Ibid.460. 11 Ibid , Defense Expenditure in South Asia: An Overview, 45. 12 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema , Anatomizing Psakistan’s Motivation for Nuclear

Weapons, Pakistan Horizon, (Karachi: April , 2011, Vol. 64, No.2): 5-19. 13 Tariq Mahmud Ashraf , Nuclearization and the External Dimensions of South

Asian Strategic Stability,Pakistan Security Research Unit, Brief Number 26, (Department of Peace Studies,University of Bradford), January 24, 2008.

14 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “CBMs and South Asia”, Confidence Building Measures in

South Asia edited by Dipankar Banerjee, (Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka), 1999, 29-40.


CBMs exist in almost all regions of the world and South Asia is one of those regions that have a substantive number of CBMs in place.

The existence of a large network of CBMs invariably helps in reducing tensions and facilitating the estranged parties towards constructive engagement. Confidence building is not really a new phenomenon in South Asia particularly between India and Pakistan. Since the partition of the subcontinent till today, both India and Pakistan have signed many agreements aimed at generating confidence and reducing tensions. Among them, perhaps the most notable arethe Liaquat Nehru Pact-1951 (dealing with minorities), the Indus Waters Treaty-1960, the Tashkent Agreement-1966, the Rann of Kutch Agreement-1968, the Simla Accord-1972, the Salal Dam Agreement-1978, the Joint Commission-1983, the Lahore Declaration-1999 and the Joint Statement following the 12th SAARC Summit 2004. It is important to note that with the exception of the Joint Commission, Lahore Declaration and the Joint Statement of 2004, all of them were the product of either a crisis or a war that necessitated a logical end to the preceding developments.15

Undoubtedly, the advent of CBMs have improved and ameliorated the overall situation but they have not paid the expected level of dividends. Many reasons account for this less than satisfactory situation. Many factors exist that are continuously applying breaks to the efficacy of the existing CBMs. Some of them are; the on-going Kashmir dispute along with the recently emerging water-related issues, existence of distrust continuously enforced by mutual perceptions and negative images, too much weight attached to military related CBMs, and the inability of both to fully adhere to the spirit of the CBMs. After all, they did work effectively in Europe but failed to pay similar contributions in South Asia. Admittedly the track record of the CBMs in South Asia is not very impressive but this does not mean that they made no contributions at all.

No student of South Asia is likely to underestimatethe negative contributions made by the on-going Kashmir dispute and they all stress that peace in South Asia cannot be achieved without resolving this dispute. The Kashmir dispute has effectively prevented progress on many other solvable issues. Unless the Kashmir dispute is resolved; either by using the old framework of UN or arriving at bilaterally - negotiated settlement as suggested in the Shimla Agreement of 1972 or evolving a new framework in which the Kashmiri representatives are also made party to the process, the negative attitudes would continue to effectively impede any substantive progress towards its resolution.

It is sometimes stressed in some quarters that ‘according to maximum respect to agreed principles and agreement does not seem very common in South Asia’ and in consequence one finds many divergent

15 Ibid.


interpretations which, in many ways, ‘facilitates strengthening of non-compliance and non-adherence’.16

Different opinions over the efficacy of CBMs exist in South Asia with some crediting them with success while otherswith failure. The advocates of CBMs who over-credited the efficacy and expected CBMs to resolve all the complex problems of South Asia must have been disappointed. But those having a realistic view saw them merely as means of improving the atmosphere in order to open all channels of communication and provide various options to their respective governments.

In case of South Asia, nuclear weapons are linked with the on-going bitter regional disputes exacerbating the chances for instability. However, perhaps the most redeeming feature is that in many cases the outsiders’ involvement has been extremely helpful especially that of the US.

Great Powers’ Involvement in South Asia

A great powers’ involvement in any region of the world is primarily influenced by two major reasons; either to meet its global responsibilities or to serve its own interests in a given region. The involvement of the great powers during the Cold War was primarily the product of their global objectives. During the Cold War, the Americans perceived threats from the Communist world and were feverishly engaged in enlisting players, friends and supporters for their own team. Similarly, the Soviets were also busy in efforts to strengthen their side

Both the Americans and the Soviets were introduced to South Asia by Pakistan and India respectively, each seeking to satisfy its perceived security requirements. Pakistan’ssense of insecurity brought the Americans to South Asia and quick Indian reaction to this development provided an opportunity to the Soviets to step into South Asia. Both the superpowers got themselves quickly involved in the South Asian cobweb and did not pay any attention to the existing level of mutual hostilities and nature of conflict relationship between India and Pakistan. The presence of superpowers thus introduced the Cold War to South Asia.

Both the American and the Soviets offered all kinds of incentives to lure countries to their side including alliance partnership and military aid to many countries. The major countries of South Asia, India and Pakistan were also offered military assistance. Apprehensive of Indian intentions to undo Pakistan and lacking in military hardware, the Pakistanis accepted the American offer. The Indians, on the other hand, refused. Prior to its

16 Ibid. and Michael Krepon, “A Time of Trouble, A Time of Need” in Crisis

Prevention, Confidence Building and Reconstruction in South Asia, (ed). Michael Krepon ansa Amit Sevak, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 1-10.


refusal, India vehemently condemned American military aid offer to Pakistan and even requested ‘many friendly governments to intercede with Washington in order to stop the proposed military aid’.17 The Indian Prime Minister ‘Nehru even went to the extent of suggesting, in exchanges with representatives of Commonwealth countries, that if the USA persisted in its policy of arming Pakistan, India might be forced to look towards the Soviet Union for arms’.18 Reacting hastily the Indians did not waste much time and invited the Soviet leaders to visit India in 1955. The Soviet leaders not only visited India in 1955 but also delivered speeches that were reflective of biting criticism of Pakistan for having joined American sponsored defense alliance.

Throughout 1950s, both the superpowers continued to strengthen their relationships with the South Asian states. It was not until the advent of 1960s that dramatic changes such as the introduction of intercontinental missiles, thaw in the Cold War and Sino-Indian war of 1962 influenced the regional states to review their policies. Despite warnings and protests of the Pakistani leaders, the West (US and UK) rushed arms aid in response to Indian request following the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Pakistan, disenchanted with West, began to drift away and started searching for new friends in order to maintain balance vis-à-vis India. China responded positively to Pakistan’s search for new friends and allies. The Soviet Union, realizing that Pakistan’s sense of insecurity might push them too deeply into the Chinese lap, began to seek ways to impede Pakistan’s growing friendship with China and simultaneously weaken its pro-West policy. While the Soviets began to cautiously smile at Pakistan, they continued to strengthen their ties with India. Towards the end of the 1960s the Soviet cautious smile also vanished following the rejection of Brezhnev’s proposal of an Asian Collective security system by the Pakistani President. While Pakistan’s relations with China continued to strengthen, the relations with US continued to deteriorate especially after the American arms embargo in 1965.

Following the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, the Pakistani leaders refrained from overtly criticizing the Soviet role in the separation of East Pakistan and began to mend fences with the Soviets. Initially the Soviets

17 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan’s Defence Policy, 1947-58,(London: The

Macmillan Press Ltd,1990),127-28. James W. Spain, MilitaryAssistance for Pakistan,American Political Science Review, (September , 1954, Vol.xlvii 1948, No. 30), 738-51.During the last week of December 1953 India circulated a memorandum to friendly governments in the Middle East and Commonwealth setting forth its objections to American military assistance for Pakistan.

18 Cheema, ibid. The New York Times (New York), December 15, 1953 issue reported that ‘the Soviet Ambassador in Delhi at the time discussed with Nehru

the possibility of tht sale of military equipment to India if the USA remained

determined to arm Pakistan.’


were somewhat cool towards Pakistani overtures but gradually began to open up and by late 1970s, relations with the Soviets considerably improved. Disenchanted with the Americans especially after 1962, 1965 and 1971 let-downs, Pakistan decided to gradually withdraw from western alliances.19

It is not too far-fetched to assume that over the years significant developments could disillusion the alliance partners, and in consequence some may even decide to withdraw from the alliance and begin to revise their foreign policy pursuits or may decide to continue to retain membership with some expressed concerns and reservations. Some even decided to continue without any reservations, depending upon the interpretation and requirement of the prevailing situation. Modification and revision of policies is somewhat inevitable after the advent of some major developments both at the international and regional levels.

Many dramatic changes have taken place over the last twenty years which have radically altered world scene. Not only did the end of the Cold War plunge the great powers to adjust to new situation and to evolve policies to meet the emerging realities but also the developments of September 11 (2001) gave birth to a new form of groupings such as international coalition to combat terrorism.

The departure of the Cold War gave birth to prominent trends: integrative and disintegrative trend and second was the ascendancy of economic imperatives. Not only did the European Union and ASEAN gradually evolved into a larger grouping of states but countries like Soviet Union and Yugoslavia disintegrated. However an even more important trend was the ascendancy of economic factors. During the Cold War, the political imperatives were governing the relations between the nations while the economic imperatives were relegated to a secondary position. The new post-Cold War era has seen the reversal of governing imperatives. However in the case of South Asia, the policy seems to be a combination of both economic and political imperatives. The post 9/11 era has been gradually witnessing transformation in U.S’s South Asian policy. The new American South Asian policy is also the product of radical transformation in the global environment. The Bush administration’s South Asian policy revolved around ‘India First’ approach. The US nuclear deal with India and subsequent efforts to secure

19 Following the Sino-Indian war of 1962, US rushing aid to India without

consulting Pakistan despite having promised to Pakistan that before sending aid it would consult Pakistan was viewed by many Pakistanis as a let down. Second let down was when US imposed arms embargo on both India and Pakistan in 1965 in pursuit of what it called an even-handed policy. Since Pakistan was heavily dependent upon US arms and Indian arms dependence was extremely limited, many Pakistanis interpreted it as another let down. Third let down was when US failed to come to Pakistan’s assistance in 1971 war despite Soviet involvement in 1971 Indo-Pak war.


India-specific amendment in the NSG rules is indeed reflective of US’s new approach to South Asia. While many in Pakistan view it as a major break from the past in which India was a dependable friend of the Soviets whereas Pakistan was a loyal American ally, it needs to be recalled that even during the Cold War the American efforts to befriend India never ceased. Some analysts even believe that the Americans were using the Pakistanis to lure India out of the lap of the Soviets. A comparative analysis of the economic assistance given to India during the Cold War era and the total assistance extended to Pakistan in the same period clearly point towards ‘option retention’ policy. This is not surprising as all nations tend to work out a long list of favorable options.

Each nation has a right to adjust its policies in congruence with the dictates of its own national interests but the global powers also have responsibilities to promote peace and stability in conflict prone areas. No global power would be in a position to contribute towards peace unless it opts for a neutral and balanced approach. Perhaps that is why Americans have not been successful in securing peace in the Middle East or South Asia. Just as many supporters of India described the American policy during the Cold War as unbalanced, there is no reason to believe that the current policy is balanced.

Conclusion

While there is no doubt that growing asymmetry in conventional capability could easily impinge upon the incumbent fragile stability, two other factors also need to be mentioned; India’s aggressive posturing, and the American tilt towards India. India’s aggressive posturing has manifested in two pronounced developments; India’s notion of limited war, and its Cold Start doctrine. Similarly, the American role in South Asia has also generated many concerns. Essentially the US has been playing the role of a conflict manager and has not devoted much effort towards the conflict resolution. Hopes were raised by President Obama’s statements regarding the India-Pakistan conflict-resolution prior to his election but the subsequent change in his policy towards South Asia clearly reflected his main electioneering slogan - Change. The American dilemma is how to strengthen and maintain strategic partnership with India and also keep Pakistan on its right side as it is viewed as the most important country in the War on Terror, especially within the Afghanistan context. Viewed from the American perspective, both are regarded important partners as both could facilitate the attainment of different objectives.

While the Indo-US nuclear deal and subsequent India-specific amendment in the NSG rules merely reflect US efforts to facilitate and strengthen India, it has not seriously looked at the adverse implications of the US policies for Pakistan. India has not only become arrogant in recentyears, but hasalso become much more intransigent in its attitude


towards regional neighbours and has been dictating terms. May be it is the lure of its large market along with its strong economy that has effectively influenced the policies of many industrialized countries. But the role of a great power entails judicious approaches towards the regional actors. The US needs to balance its role in the region incongruence with its global responsibilities.

During the last two decades, India and Pakistan have experienced four major crises. Apart from the first two crises (Brass-tacks in 1987, and Kashmir crisis of 1990), the Americans played an effective role in defusing the loaded situations and effectively prevented the undesired drift towards clashes. Both the Kargil crisis (1999) and Troops Confrontation (2001-2002) were viewed with utmost seriousness. In both crises, ‘the United States acted as an Umpire, called the shots as it saw them and forcing one side to back down’.20 ‘The degree of Washington’s involvement has varied across these crises, ranging from the despatch of a mission in 1990 to high level official visits to both India and Pakistan in 2001-2’.21

Compared to US, the policies of China and Soviet/Russia are viewed in relative terms as more consistent. The American policies towards South Asia have changed in accordance with the passage of time and emerging realities. They have fluctuated from decade to decade. During the 1950s, the emphasis was upon the containment of perceived Communist expansionism and 1960s saw the advent of an era of co-existence which eventually facilitated to the emergence of détente. The 1970s witnessed gradual normalization of relations between US and China but the 1980s experienced the Afghanistan crisis. Towards the end of the 1989, the global situation began to change. The ascent of Gorbachev, followed by his introduction of Perestroika and Glasnost coupled with positive Western responses not only brought an end to the Cold War but also initiated a new era of cautious cooperation. The 1990s saw adjustment of nations to a Cold War-free world. The first decade of the 21st century was dominated by the War on Terror in general and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular.

To secure a stable South Asia, it is indeed imperative that the U.S. continues to play a role of conflict manager which implies calculated support for India. Simultaneously, efforts should also be directed to arrest the widening of distrust between Pakistan and U.S. The Pakistani suspicions have been continuously multiplying since the signing of Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and by the U.S. refusal to offer a similar deal to Pakistan has further heightened the level of suspicions. In addition, the policy of Af-Pak generated the impression that Pakistan and Afghanistan are treated at

20 P.R.Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P.Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace

Process: American Engagement in South Asia, (Washington DC: Brookings Insitution Press, 2007 and Harper Collins, Delhi , 2008), 191-194.

21 Ibid.


par which did not go down well among the Pakistanis. Even the Kerry-Lugar-Burman aid package was unable to inject the desired level of confidence among Pakistanis. The inability of the U.S. to make visible efforts to resolve the Kashmir dispute and the undesired verbal exchange of accusations following the killing of Osama bin Laden between the leaders of Pakistan and the US have also taken a heavy toll of existing goodwill. The unprovoked attack on Salala check-post by the NATO helicopters further exacerbated the situation. It would be appropriate for the U.S., being an influential country to take the initiative and inject confidence building measures.

Not only are both India and Pakistan fully cognizant of American capabilities of a judicious umpire, it is imperative that the US should continue to play such a role in order to secure the desired strategic stability in South Asia. Without the US playing an active role, the stability of South Asia may become an elusive commodity.


KASHMIR ISSUE: THE SOFT APPROACH

Lt. General (Retd.) Syed Athar Ali∗

Abstract

Kashmir issue is considered as an issue which could have

far-reaching implications for the security of not only this

region but entire international community. The complexity

of this issue is unique due to its multi-dimensional

character which is rooted in the socio-economic changes

being brought about by the phenomenon of Globalization.

This article analyses facts from shifts in the international

system during the past 23 years to the increasing role of

Kashmiri diaspora. It dilates upon the disparity in the

quality of life of the Kashmiris on both sides of the Line of

Control and recent changes in the political structure of

both Azad Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian-held

Kashmir. Therefore, it is imperative that for any realistic

solution or way forward of the Kashmir issue would have

to account for the changing environment. Such a

comprehensive and broad-based approach would allow

Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy to be synergized with Pakistan’s

other vital national interests, diversify policy options and

also improve its international image.

Introduction

n the prevailing sympathetic international environment towards New Delhi, is combined with relatively compromising diplomatic standing of Pakistan and dynamic nature of the Kashmir polity, an

immediate solution of Kashmir issue (acceptable both to the Kashmiri people and Indian polity) seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Therefore, cognizant of the changing international and regional environment, Pakistan should review its traditional state-centric approach towards Kashmir accordingly should aim at pursuing a people-centric approach towards the resolution of the Kashmir imbroglio. This would

∗ Lt. General (Retd.) Syed Athar Ali is PhD scholar at Department of International Relations, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.

I

Kashmir Issue: The Soft Approach

17

bring about an immediate, long-term resolution, making it 9both feasible for Pakistan and acceptable to the Kashmiri people.

Basically from the Realist paradigm, the onus is on the state of Pakistan to reach out to the Kashmiri people and be seen as guarantor of a superior quality of life to them than the one Kashmiris are currently leading either on their own or what otherwise India could offer or promise them.

Firmly etched in history, religion, culture and geography, the Kashmiris thus far, have successfully maintained their distinct identity, based on their unique characteristics. While on one hand it is reasonable to expect that the values would not change in the foreseeable future; on the other hand, this is too ambitious to be a realistic expectation that Kashmiris will continue challenging Indian occupation indefinitely. Therefore, Pakistan should attempt to transform its traditional approach towards the Kashmiri issue by honoring its promises to the Kashmiri people.

The Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) negotiated between India and Pakistan offer the Pakistani government and its people, an unprecedented opportunity to reach out to the Kashmiri people, living under the occupation of the world’s fourth-largest armed forces, deployed by the world’s largest democracy, India. Through the CBMs, Pakistan can attempt to expand its own political, social-economic and ideological acceptability and space within IHK. It would be a ray of hope for the Kashmiris to not only improve their quality of life but also to maintain their distinct identity, in an environment of freedom and liberty, instead of suppression and coercive laws.

Ironically, India has increasingly become an important strategic ally (trading weapons and exchanging training) of U.S.A. from whom Islamabad expects diplomatic assistance in the peaceful resolution of Kashmir dispute. The US views New Delhi as its fast emerging strategic partner, and one of its largest markets for promoting both its own traditional and non-traditional security interests. As regional security paradigmdictates, managing the Kashmir dispute should be clearly in the U.S. interests due to its potential for crisis escalation with far reaching implications. But resolving it would probably not be in the U.S. economic and strategic interests, as countering Chinese rise is a greater U.S. interest as compared to resolving the Indo-Pak dispute. The sustained deficit of trust between India, Pakistan and China diversifies Washington’s options, both in terms of geo-political considerations, and of course lucrative arms sales prospects, which would otherwise not be available to the US, in case of the resolutionof the Kashmir dispute.

A Soft-Power Approach towards the Kashmir Issue:

Multi-dimensional Prospects of a Peaceful Resolution


In the backdrop of 21stcentury, there is a need to adopt a

comprehensive multi-dimensional soft-power approach towards resolution of the Kashmir issue.

The Global Dimension

Considering the prevailing structure of the international system, in the backdrop of Indo-U.S. strategic partnership, and generally unfavorable political environment towards non-state actors, a societal approach towards the Kashmiri imbroglio is essential.

This would be tantamount to retaining certain features of Pakistan’s policy and approach towards Kashmir, whilst changing some of its variables and their employment in a comprehensive reorientation of the entire strategy. This implies that Pakistan should continue to uphold its principled stand towards a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir Issue, in accordance with the wishes and rights of the Kashmiris.

This will allow Pakistan to sustain its moral position at all level of international hierarchy (such as the UN Security Council and General Assembly) at a time when the international image needs to be improved, and use of force at any rung of the escalatory ladder could lead to further international isolation. Such a scenario could even involve UNSC resolutions under Chapter 7, onerous to Pakistan’s national, regional and global interests. Even the Chinese diplomatic support should not be over-estimated beyond what they perceive as their own national interests under transformed international realpolitik. The Kargil crisis during 1999 was a case in point in this context, during which China also emphasized the need to resolve the conflict bilaterally and peacefully.1

Other factors which further constrain Pakistan’s foreign psolicy options regarding Kashmir must also be considered, which include that the Pakistani state has neither succeeded in reducing its external economic dependence on foreign aid and donations, nor has it been able to enlarge or diversify its export markets, or rectify its burgeoning energy crisis which further leads to enhanced external economic dependence.

Therefore, Islamabad should restructure its traditional approach towards Kashmir beyond the confines and scope of the policy elites of the two countries, who have traditionally focused on hard power, military deployments and formal interactions between the foreign offices Now the main thrust of Pakistan’s peace initiative must be reoriented away from the policy elite towards the Kashmiri people, pursuing a people to people based approach. The Kashmiris should be given the opportunities to develop strong family, cultural, ideological, economic, educational and trading bonds across the LoC.

1 P.R. Chari, Pervez Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crisis and a Peace

Process (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2008), 123.


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What must be realized is the fact that currently only a symbolic, very limited and controlled interaction is underway between the Kashmiris on both sides of the LoC.The major thrust of the CBM process is aimed at reducing the traditional acrimony between the Indian and Pakistani societies, which reflects a conflict management approach instead of a conflict resolution approach.

This opportunity can also be translated into greater degree of sympathy from the Kashmiri people towards the Pakistani state and nation. Under the prevailing international environment, use of force at any level of the escalatory ladder would be counter-productive in a bilateral context. Even if it is successful on the tactical level,the current international environment, Pakistan’s domestic situation and external financial dependence impose serious limitations on Islamabad’s ability to translate those tactical gains into tangible and sustainable strategic, political and diplomatic victories.

Therefore, any possible Kashmiri solution should, at this time, be approached not as a zero-sum game which is why a people-centric approach, rooted in efficient employment of Soft-power over long-term would be more result-oriented instead of a military-centric and state-centric short-term approach, towards a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue.

The Diplomatic Dimension

The U.S.-Afghanend-game and expected draw-down of the U.S. forces by the year 20142, offers enormous but time constrained opportunities for Pakistan. The sustained pressure from Washington on Islamabad vis-à-vis the Afghanend- game demonstrates its significance for the U.S. interests and highlights its political necessity to be presented as a victory before the U.S. voters for the current U.S. administration to be able to win another term in the White House.

Islamabad should also use its leverage in Afghanistan over Washington to push New Delhi towards re-invigorating and accelerating the process of composite dialogue and CBMs between Islamabad and New Delhi.3 This leverage over the U.S. is available only till U.S. is engaged in pursuing its regional interests in South Asia.

In this case, Pakistan should proactively pursue those CBMs which allow it to expand its own political and economic space in Indian-held Kashmir (IHK) by providing the Kashmiris from the IHK an opportunity to

2 Luis Peral and Ashley J. Tellis, Afghanistan 2011-2014 and Beyond: From

support operations to sustainable peace (Paris: EUISS, 2011), 11. 3 “Pakistan and India resume conventional CBM talks,” Dawn (Islamabad),

December 27, 2011, accessed 5th March, 2012, http://www.dawn.com/2011/12/27/pakistan-and-india-resume-conventional-cbm-talks.html


interact more with Azad Kashmir and Pakistani society. Therefore, the CBM process with India should also be reviewed so that it emphasizes more interactions between the Kashmiris and Pakistanis instead of only Indians and Pakistanis.

The Politico-Economic Dimension

The politico-economic factors have enormous significance for the future of Kashmir. The changing international environment, increasingly pragmatic character of the polities and societies, accelerated globalization process via social networking tools such as Facebook, Twitter and Youtube, are evident from the rapid changes taking place the world over. These changes have approached Kashmir to some extent in terms of political awareness, consciousness, mobilization and participation.

This phenomenon spearheaded by communication technology the world over, highlights the enormous potential for Pakistan to reach out to the Kashmiri people through CBMs aimed at expanding its own influence, footprint and acceptability by providing the Kashmiris living in IHK, scholarships, university education quotas and job in sectors where they have relevant potential and skills of excelling. Sectors such as embroidery, carpet industry, weaving, fruit processing, carving and furniture making etc. provide the Kashmiri people a traditional advantage and substantial market niche. This niche once explored will not only allow the Kashmiri people opportunities in Pakistan, but also expedite a gradual economic and cultural integration of Pakistani and Kashmiri people based on sustained and expandable economic interdependence.4

This could also help revive, expand and diversify the industrial base and export potential of Pakistan by increasing the exports of those products in which the Kashmiri people have an advantage of skills and specialization.

Moreover, the recent results of the AJK elections have allowed the mainstream political parties of Pakistan to be seen as acceptable to the Kashmiris and demonstrated a significant shift in the traditional politics of Kashmir. The results have indicated that the Kashmiri people whilst valuing their own identity and sensitive to the nature and history of the Kashmir dispute are not unmindful of their contemporary challenges and problems of employment, education, and health care.

The last AJK elections, in which the mainstream political parties of Pakistan made substantial gains, demonstrate a new Kashmiri thinking. This also proves that Kashmiris have now realized that the solution of these contemporary challenges lie in allowing Pakistan’s mainstream political parties to represent them both in Islamabad and Muzaffarabad.

4 Sujay Mehdudia, “Love across the border”, The Hindu(New delhi), February

22, 2012, accessed on 5th March, 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/life-and-style/metroplus/article2919795.ece


21

Additionally, this would also highlight the significance of the Kashmir issue in the mainstream politics of Pakistan and make any costly compromise by the political elite of Pakistan detrimental to the interests of Kashmiris, improbable if not impossible. This political transformation of the Kashmiri psychology reflects a pragmatic approach of future and contemporary issues with Islamabad than even with Muzaffarabad.5

The agenda of the CBMs should include prospects of offering Kashmiri people jobs, intellectual exchanges, political participation, and most importantly, a better quality of life.

This will direct their expectations not only towards Pakistan’s armed forces, but they would also see the Pakistani society as offering them the opportunities and means for improvement. The Kashmiris, this way will look forward to an integrated, better quality of life which India (the biggest democracy and one of the fastest growing economies in the world) has denied them over the past 65 years. Therefore, trade volume, social interactions and economic integration of Kashmiri people should be accelerated and expanded across both sides of the LoC on a larger and more frequent scale than across the international border between Pakistan and India.

In this manner, the Kashmiris of IHK would see not just a common affinity, identity and history but most importantly a common future with Pakistan.

The Constitutional and Legal Paradox

1. According to the Article 370 of the Indian Constitution6, the state of Jammu and Kashmir is subordinate to the legislation carried out by the Indian Parliament in case of defence, foreign policy and communication. And if the IHK State legislature so decides, also in case of other matters and issues.

2. In addition, the above Article of the Indian Constitution not only provides New Delhi its main legal basis for claiming AJK to be an integral part of the Indian dominion, but also makes Indian political leadership’s ability to achieve a national consensus on any political compromise with Pakistan over Kashmir, virtually impossible.

3. In contrast, the Article 1 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan7identifies the territorial claims of Pakistan, which

5 AJK General Election Result 2011, accessed March 6, 2012

http://www.ajk.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=414&Itemid=169

6 Constitution of India, accessed March 6, 2012 http://www.ajk.gov.pk/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=414&Itemid=169

7 The Constitution of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, accessed on March 6, 2012 http://www.mofa.gov.pk/ABF1007F-CD3C-439C-BA1E-DE5250E0A983/FinalDownload/DownloadId-


reflects the legal situation as it stood in 1973. The current text of the Constitution of Pakistan does not include the territory of Gilgit-Baltistan, which has been declared a province of Pakistan.8

4. This creates a constitutional and legal dilemma for the state of Pakistan, both in terms of its national and international legal consequences, which could be exploited by other states on various possible pretexts. The fundamental emphasis in this case is to highlight the need to accord de jure status to Gilgit-Baltistan (vide a new constitutional amendment), which in any case has already been given the de facto status of a province of Pakistan, by measures such as provincial polls, participation of mainstream political parties of Pakistan and the subsequent election of its own Chief Minister.

5. After the nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan in May 1998, The UN Security Council Resolution 1172 called upon “India and

Pakistan to resume the dialogue between them on all outstanding

issues, particularly on all matters pertaining to peace and security,

in order to remove the tensions between them, and encourages

them to find mutually acceptable solutions that address the root

causes of those tensions, including Kashmir.”9 6. The introduction of the nuclear dimension contributed to the

revival of the international community’s interest in the Kashmir dispute, which was reflected in the form of the UN Security Council resolution 1172.

7. Since the UN Resolutions on Kashmir calling for a plebiscite, are under Chapter 6 instead of Chapter 7, therefore, the international community lacks motivation and compulsion to support the implementation of these resolutions, which call for a plebiscite over Kashmir.

8. Henceforth, notwithstanding the moral strength of these resolutions and Pakistan’s principled and consistent stance over them, the probability of their implementation through international support is currently limited. Therefore, in light of the constitutional and legal constraints discussed above, a soft power and socio-economic approach towards Kashmir issue

C7811EE365894E5C61ECF5A9969D8B91/ABF1007F-CD3C-439C-BA1E-DE5250E0A983/Publications/constitution.pdf

8 Shabbir Mir, “Gilgit-Baltistan part of Pakistan, declares court,” The Express

Tribune (Islamabad), July 9, 2010, accessed March 6, 2012. http://tribune.com.pk/story/26648/gilgit-baltistan-part-of-pakistan-declares-court/

9 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172, adopted by the Security Council at its 3890th meeting on 6th June 1998, accessed on 6th March, 2012, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/158/60/ PDF/N9815860.pdf?OpenElement


23

instead of a state-centric approach would be more feasible in the contemporary international environment.

Socio-Cultural Dimension

Frequent cultural and intellectual exchanges between the civil society for example university students, scholars, writers, journalists, artists, poets etc. should take place between Pakistani and Kashmiri people living in IHK to allow them to preserve their own history, values and ideology; consolidate the common ideological and historical roots between Kashmir and the Pakistani societies and gradually enable a process of socio-cultural integration. This will also provide the Kashmiri people an opportunity to see a qualitative advantage and help them in identifying a cultural incentive in joining a state with a common value system, ideological heritage, culture and history instead of joining a society, which suppresses their historical and ideological heritage.

In addition, this would allow the Kashmiris to be in a position to review the status quo. This state of affairs is neither sustainable nor acceptable to the Kashmiri people. Free media access to IHK should be a proposal based on the universally accepted right of free expression to access to information, which should be pursued not just bilaterally and multi-laterally but also on international media and international human rights groups and organizations.

Strategic Restraint Regime

During the initial phase of the Composite Dialogue process between India and Pakistan in February 2004, Islamabad had suggested a ‘strategic restraint regime’ to New Delhi, which could help build a basic yet comprehensive framework for pursuing not only strategic restrain regime but also developing a strategic architecture based on trust, restraint and prevention of a destabilizing arms race in South Asia.

This proposal was based on the two sides agreeing on conflict resolution, conventional balance, restraint on missile race and reducing the risks of nuclear war.10 Maintaining conventional balance in South Asia is key towards reducing the risks of a nuclear arms race in this region; preventing the nuclear threshold from stooping dangerously low, destabilizing the strategic stability, particularly during crisis periods and lastly in reducing exorbitant expenditure on conventional capabilities and weapon systems, which otherwise could be allocated towards human security, socio-economic development and peace building efforts.

This expensive cycle could be contextualized in terms of the classic relevance of Security-Insecurity Paradox, in this region. More importantly, reducing defence expenditure will itself serve as a substantive CBM

10 Interview with Ambassador Masood Khan, former DG Disarmament at the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad on February 17th, 2004.


between New Delhi and Islamabad. I will also enrich confidence level of smaller states of South Asia towards the peaceful intentions of New Delhi.

Although this Pakistani proposal did not invoke a favorable response from New Delhi11, but considering its principled position, and relevance to future peace and stability in South Asia and its consistency with international non-proliferation regimes, it is imperative that Pakistan must continue to reiterate this proposal. Pakistan should also link this proposal with its contribution and co-operation in the international non-proliferation regime, which otherwise should not be open-ended. Accelerated arms race and rapidly expanding conventional asymmetries are inherently destabilizing trends, which makes it further difficult for Pakistan to be unmindful of its traditional security concerns, particularly in the absence of conflict resolution on Kashmir. Therefore, progress on Kashmir should be pursued in tandem with progress on viable and sustainable arms control mechanisms in the South Asian region, to prevent potentially harmful destabilizing trends for the peace and security of the region.

Revival of Founder’s Vision

“Our Foreign Policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards the

nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against

any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and

fair-play in national and international dealings and are prepared to

make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and

prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be

found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the

oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world, and in upholding the

principles of the United Nations Charter.”12

Foreign policy of any state is aimed to pursue its national interests, internationally. As highlighted by Pakistan’s founder in the above text, the state of Pakistan aspires to play a peaceful, positive and productive role in the international community on the basis of justice and equality. However, these long-term goals can only be pursued, if these are based on a rational and realistic policy, formulated in accordance with the dynamic nature of international politics, structure of the international political system and domestic compulsions of the state and society of Pakistan.

The prevailing international and regional environment needs to be understood in pragmatic terms, which should lead to a realistic appreciation of viable and available policy options. The Indian stance, by virtue of the growing economic and strategic interests of major powers

11 ISPR, Press release of National Command Authority Statement dated January

13, 2010, accessed on March 6, 2012, http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1110

12 Quaid-e-Azam’s radio address to the people of the USA, February 1948


25

associated with Indian economy, vibrant market and military, is gaining international currency with most of the important capitals around the world. This has also allowed New Delhi more options and greater leverage over major powers by virtue of its enhanced economic, political and strategic capital, wielded via an astute diplomacy.

In addition, the constitutional measures taken by New Delhi and limitations imposed by UN resolution on Kashmir (being under Chapter 6 instead of Chapter 7), further limits the possibility of a successful state-centric approach by Islamabad. Moreover, options relying on hard power have not yielded favorable results for any side and actually led to further complicating the issue instead of helping resolve it. Moreover, Pakistan’s domestic economic and political situation further weakened its ability to reconcile and bring all domestic political actors on the same page to allow any viable compromise to be politically acceptable to all of the stakeholders.

Over the past two decades, the growing asymmetry between India and Pakistan is not limited to conventional capabilities but also is more profound in the realm of soft power. The economic, trade, commerce, media, diaspora and growth of an information-based economy have further accentuated the strategic and political disadvantages which Islamabad is facing.

The combination and relevance of these complex factors further reduces Pakistan’s ability to influence major capitals, particularly in multi-lateral fora such as the UNSC, Commonwealth, SAARC, ASEAN Regional Forum and various others. This constrains Pakistan’s options and prevents it from employing a proactive, incentive-based diplomacy for the international community, at a time when economic interests are dominating foreign policies of major powers. Although eventually rejected as a consequence of Pakistan’s threat to quit the forum, even OIC considered India’s intention to join it.

Bilateralism in the Indo-Pakistan context is also not likely to help in conflict resolution mainly due to the nuclear deterrence, resilience of Indian state operators, political compulsions of coalition governments in both India and Pakistan and lack of interest by the international community. All these factors have converged to enhance the relative influence and interests of New Delhi and created more multi-dimensional disadvantages for Islamabad in the emerging international power structure.

The Post 9/11 scenario helped India paint the Kashmir freedom struggle as a manifestation of terrorism but a people-to- people approach based on expanded interaction between Kashmiris on both sides of the LoC would offer Islamabad far more policy options than the current approach.

A fresh perspective towards the Kashmir issue based on an efficient employment of soft power (economic, cultural, educational,


professional and intellectual exchanges), would allow Pakistan the political, diplomatic and strategic influences This could not be achieved through continued reliance over hard power during the last 65 years. Such an approach would not only be seen as be useful domestically but helpful in improving Pakistan’s international stature. Since 9/11, Pakistan’s international standing and stature has become a legacy of being seen as the epicenter of international terrorism.

Moreover, this would also help restore the credibility to the Kashmiri independence movement as genuine and based on their legitimate and internationally recognized right of self-determination. In addition, it would allow the Kashmiri freedom struggle to be gradually de-linked from the Indian allegations of being associated with terrorism. Lastly, this would also create more political and diplomatic space for Pakistan and help it in recovering from the post-9/11 legacy of terrorism-led pre-occupation of its policy and resource orientation.

The Kashmiri people, particularly their youth are expected to be more interested in serious career opportunities, socio-economic development and unification of Azad Jammu & Kashmir with more autonomy, opportunities, freedom and being part of a structure with which they share ideological, cultural and social identities. These factors would represent genuine incentives for the Kashmiri people by both India and Pakistan which could in the long-term, pay not only the Kashmiris, but also the Pakistani and Indian societies, far greater dividends.

The social networking tools such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are already providing the Kashmiri people, particularly their youth, access to the changing international political culture. This kind of exposure may result in public reactions such as those visible not only on the streets of the Middle East but also in London, Wall Street and Madrid.

This social transformation has huge potential for mobilizing and organizing political movements in future, even in societies under strict control such as Syria, Egypt and could also play an important role in mobilizing the Kashmiri youth, who are politically more vigilant than their parent generation.

Like their counterparts in the Middle East and Western Europe, the vibrant Kashmiri youth desires to participate in the globalization process by identifying themselves with the trends and changes in the international society. These trends cannot be excluded from consideration or restricted perpetually in the Indian-held Kashmir.

The Way Forward: Policy Recommendations

While maintaining our principled position on Kashmir issue, a soft power long term approach is recommended in which Kashmiris should be encouraged for greater interaction with Pakistan and between themselves (IHK and AJK).


27

Socio-Cultural Integration

- Pakistan should continue efforts towards a political solution which should be based on three prongs i.e. enhanced interaction with Kashmiris on all fronts, coupled with well-articulated exterior maneuver and ensuring our own economic and internal stability.

- A strong Pakistan will not only ensure strategic dialogue and CBMs with India from a position of strength but will also attract the people of Kashmir, who look towards Pakistan as the only international supporter, flag bearer of their cause and opportunity -provider for its future.

- A strong and united Pakistan will also deter India and its intelligence agencies from creating unrest especially in Baluchistan. Hence, concerted efforts must be made to revive the economy, build cohesion at the political front, and ensure total national integration, which are essential domestic prerequisites for pursuing, uniting and sustaining the domestic support for the Kashmir cause.

- Greater emphasis should be laid on socio-economic development and political harmony.

- Softening of border and more pronounced trade incentives to both parts of Kashmir should be assured.

A Consistent and ‘National’ Kashmir policy

- Over the past six and a half decades, Pakistan has suffered from the lack of a coherent and consistent policy on Kashmir. Most initiatives have been individual or leadership-centric. Though our principled position remains consistent, yet successive governments have adopted fluctuating stands ranging from overly aggressive, appeasement to apologetically passive, thus playing into Indian hands and undermining both our own national and international credibility and limiting our influence over the Kashmir issue.

- Within Kashmir also, preparation of the home front through internal political stability, economic revival, and consensus on the recommended policy option should be gradually, systematically and continuously developed across all segments of social strata, ideological and political interest groups and actors. Role of media in this context could be very significant and meaningful.

- Mobilizing international opinion is an obligation Pakistan cannot afford to overlook. Therefore, a soft-power-based approach should help improve Pakistan’s domestic traction, international leverage, create more option options and eventually augment its international influence and standing.


- Strong socio-political and socio-economic initiatives ought to be given to ensure systematic, visible and sustained development of AJK and Northern Areas.

- Azad Kashmir government should play a major part through whole-hearted participation, mobilization of local population, political stability, mature political leadership, and last but not the least, interaction with the people of IHK at all levels.

- The role of Kashmiris living abroad is increasingly becoming very important as people from Kashmir represent important political constituencies in important capitals, such as London and Brussels, and their growing influence over both the Houses of Westminster in the UK needs to be properly channelized and employed for highlighting the Kashmir issue. This could be very useful in creating an environment of sympathy towards the Kashmiri people, and understanding of the realities and history of the Kashmir issue on the international level.

- In addition, student unions, lobbying groups, study groups and think tanks should also be developed in international media. Publications and think tanks should encourage Pakistani and Kashmiri scholars to represent the realities of Kashmir not merely in occasional seminars and conferences, but also by maintaining a sustained presence by holding permanent faculty positions in influential and credible seats of higher learning at think tanks and leading universities.

- On important and memorable days, talk shows, documentaries, seminars, conferences and demonstrative rallies should be planned and organized in not just Pakistan but also by Kashmiri people in major cities around the world such as New York, Washington DC, London, Brussels etc.

- Various international credible human rights groups should be encouraged and facilitated to focus on the human rights violations in Indian-held Kashmir, as it has significance for the international image that India aspires to build to justify its rise as a major power, acceptable to the international community.

- A comprehensive online database should be developed, which should be accessible to researchers, scholars and students all around the world, to help facilitate their research and study by providing them updated facts and figures and HR violations record regarding IHK.

- Collection of funds for the Kashmir cause by philanthropists and internationally recognized human rights organizations.

- Offensive media strategy to support the recommended policy options should be developed in print, electronic, domestic and international media to develop support, acceptability and consensus towards national policy.


29

Lastly, Pakistan should aspire to develop a comprehensive and realistic policy towards Kashmir, based on a well-calibrated appreciation of all the instruments and elements of national power. The policy makers should carefully and unemotionally compare the relative costs and benefits, being mindful and sensitive towards the greater national interests of developing the sort of domestic and international environment. This is important to make its policy not only acceptable to the domestic and international audience but also to and stabilize its own War on Terror-ravaged economy.

Such an approach, based more on pragmatism instead of optimism, though not yielding immediate results, would eventually in the long-term, lead to favorable circumstances, which will diversify both Pakistani policy options and expand its international leverage. This would also enhance its respect and prestige internationally and thwart the longer-term and eventual Indian goal of isolating Pakistan in the international community and presenting it as part of a problem rather than a solution. This Indian strategy could limit the acceptability of Pakistan’s existing hard power capabilities by presenting them as a potential threat to international peace and security. Therefore, a fresh soft-power based long-term approach, encapsulating all dimensions of soft power, including economic, cultural, political, academic, intellectual, ideological, would eventually not only help Pakistan consolidate its capabilities and also make it more relevant to promoting international peace, security and progress. This will finally enhance its leverage and influence over international powers and also over India and Kashmiris.

This would be useful both in multi-lateral and bilateral contexts, and diversify Pakistan’s policy options, and when combined with hard power, particularly nuclear deterrent, will make its argument and position over Kashmir more influential and convincing. Merely relying on history, ideology and culture may sustain the issue but is not likely to resolve it, particularly when both hard power and soft power-based asymmetries are fast increasing to the detriment of Pakistan. Notwithstanding the economic disadvantages, the legitimacy and acceptability of the Pakistani voice on Kashmir is being singled out, owing to new international political realities and power dynamics.

Pakistan should plan to present itself as a state, which could contribute positively and meaningfully to international peace, security and at the same time, also benefit through its own economic progress by providing peaceful solutions to the prevailing challenges ad disputes. This approach is essential, especially in an environment when hard power is increasingly being viewed as a costly instrument of foreign policy.

Foreign policy is an instrument to express not only the internal aspirations but also allows a state to project all the elements of its domestic power to the outside world. Therefore, only an economically


strong, politically united and stable Pakistan can devise and employ a strong foreign policy. Our dominant international interest should be to create such a state and society, which is internally more united and economically, politically, ethnically and ideologically strong, and is viewed as a positive contributor to the international community. This will make its claim of sovereign equality to be taken more seriously by the world at large. This will also augment the strategic stability in this region by making its nuclear deterrence more credible and presenting Pakistan as a responsible nuclear power, in control of not just its nuclear arsenal but also its political system and economy.

That is why, during the transitional phase of international politics from the Atlantic Ocean-based 20th century to Pacific Ocean based 21st century, it is about time that Pakistan should attempt to recover from the legacy of 9/11 and terrorism.

This will allow Pakistan not only to regain its rightful place internationally as a state which promotes world peace by upholding the principles of the UN Charter but also build a stable, united and viable state. Such was the state, which our Founder had envisioned, which is strong and united, both internally and externally.

Afghanistan: Peace Through Reconciliation 31

AFGHANISTAN: PEACE THROUGH

RECONCILIATION

Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan∗

Abstract

Afghanistan, a crossroads of civilizations has been a victim

of global conspiracies for centuries. In recent history, the

Soviet invasion (1979 to1989) and the subsequent covert

U.S. campaign to disintegrate the former, has deeply

influenced the social, political and economic sphere of

Afghanistan, as well as neighboring Pakistan. The Soviet

withdrawal in 1989, followed by the hasty U.S. departure,

encouraged factional fighting and gave rise to a civil war-

like situation in the country. The situation paved way for

the extremist Taliban government that could attain

neither domestic public acceptance nor the recognition of

the international community. The country was further

destabilized by undesired U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in

the wake of 9/11 attacks. Despite the military invasion, the

U.S. found itself unable to subdue the opposition groups in

Afghanistan. A decade into the invasion, the Taliban have

grown stronger and more effective, and have emerged as a

challenge for both the Afghan administration and the

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Contrary to

its claims, the United States has failed to curb militants.

Foreseeing a troubled future, it has finally decided to

negotiate with the Taliban for either an honourable exit or

peaceful co-existence. The idea of this political engagement

of the Taliban began a few years ago and U.S.

representatives commenced negotiations with the Taliban

at their newly established contact point in Doha, Qatar, at

the beginning of 2012. Subsequently, the Afghan President

Hamid Karzai invited the Taliban for direct talks. The war-

torn people of Afghanistan need stability and peace in

whatever form they can attain. However, for a durable

∗ Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan is Head of Depatment of International Relations,

Faculty of Contemproary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.


peace, and indigenous Afghan- led peace process, with all

stakeholders in Afghanistan on board, and with the

support of regional actors as well as the United States,

would be extremely essential.

Introduction

ocated on the Iranian Plateau in Southwest Asia, Afghanistan is a landlocked country enveloped by the Hindu Kush Mountains and Pamir. It covers a total area of 652,000 square km1 and has

common land borders of 5,529 km2 with six neighbouring countries: Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China. It shares a major portion of its border (2430 km) with Pakistan, while its geographical contiguity with China is only at 67 km of border.3 Out of its arable land, only one-third is currently irrigated, which constitutes about 12% of the cultivable land. Its total population is 30 million.4 The major ethnic groups are Pashtun comprising 42 %, (they constitute practically half of the total population), Tajik 27 %, Uzbek 9%, Hazara 9 %, Aimak 4 %, Turkmen 3 %, Baloch 2 % and others 4 %5. With a 28.1 % literacy rate, 68 % of the people of Afghanistan are of less than 25 years of age,6 forming an exceptional human resource potential.

The country has undergone a prolonged period of internal instability, foreign invasions, civil wars, and factional fighting. The U.S. invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 and is still continues to consolidate its foothold in the name of the so-called Global War on Terror. The present situation in Afghanistan is indistinct, highly tense, complex, and fluid, where uncertainty and chaos continues to prevail all around.

The on-ground security situation is extremely fragile and continues to further deteriorate day by day; the localized effects of Taliban, tribal leaders and warlords are much more pronounced than the central government in Kabul, which has desolately failed in establishing its writ in most of the country.

1 Barry Turner,(ed) The Politics, Cultures and Economies of the World, The

Statesman’s Yearbook-2011, 147th Edition, (Palgrave Macmillan England-February 2011): 12.

2 Ibid. 3 Gerald Segal, China and Afghanistan, Asian Survey, (California: University of

California Press, November 1981, Vol. 21, No. 11): 1158-1174, China Mulls Afghan border request, BBC, June 12, 2009.

4 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book, , can be accessed at; https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

5 Ibid. 6 National Joint Youth Programme, United Nations Development Programme

(UNDP), Annual Report -2008. Can be accessed at; http://www.undp.org.af/whoweare/undpinafghanistan/Projects/dcse/prj_youth.htm.

L


Poor governance, and absence of any worthwhile progress, mars the credibility of President Hamid Karzai’s government.

Charges of corruption and the alleged sponsoring of the drug trade are factors that have further declined the local populace’s acceptance for the incumbent government in Kabul.

The U.S. is the main player in Afghan affairs and has been deeply involved for the last one decade. The West and the only superpower have not been able to defeat the strength of the Taliban, despite a military campaign that has lasted for over a decade. Having failed to achieve any worthwhile success, America has decided to engage in a dialogue process with the Taliban. There has been covert engagement between U.S. officials and Taliban representatives for a positive breakthrough in negotiations since 2010. With the opening of Taliban office - indeed a Taliban’s ambassadorial house - in Doha, Qatar, there has been a steep increase in interaction, in the first two months of 2012. Although, a complete victory by the U.S. and NATO forces seems impossible, political engagement and a redressing of the Afghans’ grievances by integrating all groups and factions to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan, would be an apt way forward.

On its part, the U.S.. is wary that it may not enjoy the support of its European allies if it opts for a long-term engagement in Afghanistan. During the past one decade of joint military campaign, there have been disagreements among the troop-contributing countries on issues like; their employment, role, and level of contribution and participation. The Dutch government collapsed over the issue of sending more troops to Afghanistan in February 2010.7

Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair was dragged into a court of law8 for sending British troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. There is worry among the people of Germany and France against their governments for a prolonged engagement on a non-beneficial military campaign on account of personnel casualties and the financial drain that leaves no hope of reimbursement.

Afghan Predicaments: Regional and Global Interest Groups

Regional Countries

All of the six regional neighbours of Afghanistan have their own concerns, commitments and apprehensions about the present turmoil and

7 Dutch Government Collapses over Afghan Mission, Dawn (Islamabad,

February 20, 2010. 8 War Crime Case against Tony Blair Now Rock-solid, The First Post (Mumbai),

December 14, 2009. Can be accessed at; http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/57361,news-comment,news-politics,war-crime-case-against-tony-blair-is-now-rock-solid


the presence of extra-regional forces in the country. Each country would like to secure its own interests with regard to Afghanistan. India, geographically non-contiguous to Afghanistan, is massively involved in Afghan affairs. Under the garb of Afghan reconstruction, some of its activities are turning into security hazards for the state and society of Pakistan, as well as the future generation of Afghanistan. Militants along the Pak-Afghan border, especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and sub-nationalists in Baluchistan, are said to have links with the spy agencies of the global actors involved in Afghanistan.9

China fears that militancy and instability in Afghanistan is fuelling volatility in its semi-autonomous region; Xinjiang.10 China desires a stable Afghanistan for three reasons. Firstly, it would lead towards the pulling out of ISAF from its neighbourhood; secondly, a peaceful and stable Afghanistan would facilitate stability in the Chinese areas bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan; thirdly, because of its geographical proximity, China will be able to make economic investments in Afghanistan, which would be beneficial for Afghan economic development and for China as well.11 Besides the economic aspect, Russia and the Central Asian Republics (CARs), see NATO and the U.S. as a threat to their future. Russia feels that presence of extra-regional forces in its neighbourhood behaves as an obstacle to its resurgence and poses a serious threat to the former Soviet republics.12 Russian Foreign Minister has directly accused U.S. for current political crisis in Moscow and its surrounding areas, to stop likely election of Vladimir Putin as the next President.13 However, peace, stability and a united Afghanistan is the desire of both Russia and the CARs.

United States: The Central Player

In 1991, Iraq was the first victim to fall prey to the American agenda of global domination. This military invasion gave the U.S. an excuse to secure its long term interests in the Middle East by stationing its forces on ground and tapping huge Arab wealth, either in the form of cash or through extraction of regional hydro-carbon resources,14 as a cost of war for defeating Saddam’s Baathist Iraq. This American act provided ample

9 How can Pakistan Stop Indian Terror Against It, Dawn (Islamabad), April 22,

2010. 10 Andrew Small, ‘China’s Cautions on Afghanistan-Pakistan’, Washington

Quarterly (Washington), July 2010. 11 Ibid. 12 M K Bhadrakumar, Russia Stops US on Road to Afghanistan, Asia Times (Hong

Kong), January 27, 2009. 13 Dmitry Zaks, Russia Accuses US of Meddling ahead of Polls, Dawn

(Islamabad), March 2, 2012. 14 Paul D'Amato, “U.S. Intervention in the Middle East: Blood for Oil,”

International Socialist Review, Issue:15 (Chicago: December 2000-January 2001), http://www.isreview.org/issues/15/blood_for_oil.shtml


sense of mental and physical freedom to the fearsome Arab monarchs. Thereafter, 9/11 provided the U.S. with an open warrant to invade anywhere in the world under the guise of the so-called War on Terror. To begin with, it invaded Afghanistan, seeking to crush its former jihadists allies-turned-terrorists, including Osama Bin Laden. The war in Afghanistan has killed thousands of people, mostly innocents, ever since October 7, 2001.15 However, the U.S. Special Forces, Navy SEALs ‘managed to’ kill Osama Bin Laden only on May 2, 2011 his hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan. After this, the U.S. and NATO should not have had any excuse to stay in Afghanistan or even in the region. Many analysts and authors including Steve Coll, believe that despite announcing a draw-down plan of 2014, it seems unlikely that the U.S. will permanently leave Afghanistan.16

Perceived U.S. Objective

A long-term stay in Afghanistan and the domination of Central Asia are all corollaries to the multipurpose U.S. strategies in the region.17 It is widely believed that while anchored in Afghanistan, with a few bases in Central Asia, the United States has multiple objectives to put into practice.18 In the views of various writers and analysts, its long-term agenda includes the containment of China through multi-prong approaches,19 planned to be implemented through its allies in East Asia, Japan and South Korea, given that it already has a sizable number of its own military forces stationed there. The U.S. is moving closer to South East Asian countries (ASEAN), being part of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC).20 It has recently concluded a nuclear deal with Vietnam21 and is about to secure military bases in the Philippines.22 In South Asia, however, the natural ally of the U.S., India, is being prepared as a counter-weight to America’s peer competitor. 15 Rahul Bedi, The Afghanistan War was Planned Months Before the 9/11

Attacks, BBC (London) July, 2001. American government told other governments about Afghan invasion in July 2001. http://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/preplanned.html?q=preplanned.html.

16 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars; the Secret History of CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden

from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, (New York: Penguin Press, 2004):, 45.

17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Mark E. Manyin, Michael John Garcia, Wayne M. Morrison, U.S. Accession to

ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), Congressional Research

Service, May 5, 2009. 21 Saurav Jha, Why a US-Vietnam Nuclear Deal?, Diplomat (Tokyo) September

15, 2010. 22 Manuel Mogato, ‘U.S. Military Seeks more Access in Philippines, not Bases’,

Reuter (New York) February 9, 2012.


In global politics, the U.S. is highly conscious of a resurgent Russia and would take whatever measures it believes necessary to contest this power-balancing phobia. Certain Russian actions, such as the attack on Georgia in 2008, the test firing of long-range ICBMs and a consistent and strong opposition of the U.S. ballistic missile defence shield in the Eastern European countries, are tangible factors indicative of Russian resurgence, a fact that is of serious concern for the United States.23 Russia considers that the pre-poll political crisis in Moscow, was on the instigation of U.S.24 These protests aimed at blocking Putin’s re-election as President, who secured 63 % votes to become President of Russian Federation.

Both Russia and China desire that the U.S. should leave the region as early as possible. They have even made use of the SCO’s forum more than once to pressurize the U.S. into pulling out. Apart from these, domination, if not possession of the hydrocarbon-rich Central Asian and Caspian regions, has always been an American objective. The U.S. desires to explore and further sell these resources elsewhere in the world market while denying access to Russia, China or any third country in the region. Iran shares its borders with Afghanistan and Central Asia. The U.S. desires the neutralization of the Iranian role in regional politics as well as the bludgeoning of its nuclear programme.25 After the UN economic sanctions of 2011, the U.S. and its allies, together with Israel, appear to be searching for an excuse to attack Iran or, at the very least to neutralize its nuclear programme.

The U.S. and Energy Politics

Pipeline politics is yet another area of interest for the U.S., where it desires that neither Russian nor Iranian soil be relied upon for the future energy pipelines that will run from the CARs and the Caspian regions to Europe, and elsewhere in the world. The U.S. prefers using the route from Central Asia to Turkey and then on to Europe, as in the case of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline. This crude oil pipeline is 1768 km long and passes through Azerbaijan (Baku), Georgia (Tbilisi) and the Turkish coast (Ceyhan port) to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea.26 For the rest of the region, especially India, the U.S. desires a pipeline from Central Asia to India, via Afghanistan and Pakistan. This bypassing strategy clashes with Russian and Iranian interests in the region.

Regarding Afghanistan, “Resources will not win this war, but under-resourcing could lose it. Failure to provide adequate resources also 23 William J. Lahneman, Military Intervention: Cases in Context in Twenty-First

Century, (USA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc. 2004). 11. 24 Russia PM Vladimir Putin accuses US over poll protests, BBC News

(London)December 8, 2011. 25 Ibid. 26 Eric Watkins, BTC Pipeline Throughput Increasing in 2011, Oil and Gas

Journal, (Houston: June 4, 2010).


risks a longer conflict, greater casualties, higher overall costs and ultimately, a critical loss of political support. Any of these risks in turn, are likely to result in mission failure”.27 This was the crux of the assessment report of General Stanley McChrystal, the former commander of ISAF in Afghanistan in 2009. At that time, McChrystal predicted the failure of the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, provided political reconciliation and integration of the Taliban were not ensured.28 He was perhaps, the only military commander who gave a realistic assessment, without prejudice, that there existed a total lack of understanding of the Afghan culture and society on part of ISAF. While accusing Pakistan of supporting the Taliban,29 McChrystal declared the conventional modus operandi of dealing with the Afghan imbroglio through coalition forces under U.S. as part of the problem, rather than a way out.

Pak-Afghan Correlation

Impact of Afghan Instability on Pakistan

Pakistan has suffered the most from the instability in Afghanistan. It has a huge Pakhtun population in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which makes it the largest ethnic group, together with Southern and the Western parts of Afghanistan, all along the highly porous Pak-Afghan border. These Pakhtuns have occupied dominant positions in the country’s political and military hierarchy for centuries and this is perhaps for the first time in Afghan history that the Pakhtuns have been forced out of power in their own homeland.

Moreover, factors such as the presence of about 2.5 million Afghan refugees30 in Pakistan, the narcotics trade, a huge parallel economy, due to Afghan Transit Trade and rising Talibanization, have had telling effects on the security, economy and society of Pakistan. Pakistan wishes for a peaceful Afghanistan, where the lawful sway of decision lies in the hands of its own people. The people of Pakistan are aggrieved over the daily massacre of innocent Afghans at the hands of coalition forces. Repeated aerial raids and a number of ground operations have only been able to kill a few insurgent Taliban. The ultimate sufferer is the innocent Afghan population. The military action, “Operation Mushtarak”31 in the Marjah area of Helmand Province in mid- February 2010, fell short of deterring Taliban; however, it killed hundreds of innocent civilians. The town’s

27 General Stanley Mac Crystal, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, August 30, 2009. 28 General Calls for More U.S. Troops to Avoid Afghan Failure, New York Times

(New York), September 20, 2009. 29 Ibid. 30 Tens of thousands of Afghan refugees go back home with UN support, UN

News Centre, June 21, 2010. 31 Riz Khan, Operation Mushtarak, Aljazeera (Online), February 18, 2010.


80,000 inhabitants32 faced serious casualties and a disruption of their routine lives. Moreover, the recent desecration of the Holy Quran and urinating on the bodies of Afghan Taliban are acts of degeneracy, unprecedented in human history and Pakistan is concerned about them.

Afghan Future as Visualized by Pakistan

“We cannot wish for Afghanistan anything that we don’t wish for Pakistan.”33 This is the principle stance of Pakistan for Afghanistan. Since Pakistanis desire peace, stability, and economic prosperity for their own country, therefore, they wish similar comforts for their Afghan brethren. Furthermore, three decades of war, factional fighting, and internal instability in Afghanistan has brought us to the conclusion that, stability and peace in Pakistan is directly related to these factors in Afghanistan. The current state of instability in Pakistan is indeed an outcome of the Afghan situation that has its roots in 1979. Pakistani involvement in post-Soviet Afghanistan was reprehensively considered as an attempt of latching on to it permanently, but Pakistan neither had aspired to nor had planned to hegemonize a sovereign country.

The idea of Afghanistan providing strategic depth34 to Pakistan has been wrongly projected. Rather than a physical occupation or control of Afghanistan, Pakistan has sought assurances for the maintenance of peace along the Pak-Afghan borders, in the event of any misadventure by our eastern neighbour. Successive Afghan governments had been providing just that, as evidenced by the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars. Even President Karzai has assured Pakistan of guaranteed Afghan support in the event of any such misadventure. In the current Pak-Afghan relationship, the Indian factor has greater significance. During the Taliban era in Afghanistan, India along with some other regional countries has been constantly supporting the ethnic minorities, collectively named them as the Northern Alliance. They were given economic and even military support by India, which virtually forced division among Afghan society. Despite an ethnic Pashtun President, the Northern Alliance is the true beneficiary of the U.S. invasion in Afghanistan. The current intake into the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP) and most of the bureaucracy is mostly from the minority group of the Northern Alliance, with an insignificant strength of the majority Pashtun population. The Indian Army has undertaken the training of the ANA, ANP and Afghan intelligence agency for last few years.

Pakistan feels that Indian trained ANA and ANP could prove hostile to its neighbours, particularly Muslim countries. Apart from its

32 Ibid. 33 Imtiaz Gul, A New Understanding for the U.S. and Pakistan?, Foreign Policy

Magazine (Washington DC), February 10, 2010. 34 Ibid.


geographically contiguous neighbours, these Indian trained troops will be in conflict with the basic Muslim cultural and social values of Afghanistan itself. In addition to promoting internal clashes, these troops would conceivably be willing to maintain the current state of volatility, distrust, and enmity with Pakistan for the foreseeable future. Indeed, India and Afghanistan are two different countries, with different values, culture, and different future requirements. Therefore, the Indian trained ANA could further destabilize the region as a whole. This state of affairs would suit neither the U.S., nor Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Pakistan has been offering the Afghan Government assistance in the training of ANA and ANP. Indeed, this step would greatly reduce the current instability and hostilities along the Pak-Afghan border, by promoting harmony among the security forces of Pakistan and Afghanistan. In fact, both countries share common terrain and borders to defend. Moreover, they have similar cultural and historical values and share ideological harmony. This can only be possible if they share trainers with corresponding training parameters.

Afghan Led Political Reconciliation

It is still uncertain, as to what would be the formal response of Taliban to President Hamid Karzai’s call for direct talk and political reconciliation. Nevertheless, at President Karzai’s request, Pakistan has also formally appealed to all Afghan groups and factions, including the Taliban to be part of the intra-Afghan negotiation process. On February 24, 2012, the Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, addressing Afghan factions said, “I would like to appeal to the Taliban leadership as well as to all other Afghan groups, including Hizb-i-Islami, to participate in an intra-Afghan process for national reconciliation and peace.”35

He further elaborated by saying that, “It is our sincere hope that the Taliban leadership, Hizb-i-Islami and all other Afghan political leaders will respond positively to my appeal and agree to enter into direct negotiations in the framework of an intra-Afghan process for reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan.”36 Earlier, Karzai had repeatedly announced that his government is ready to accommodate the Taliban and other factions and invited the opposition group to a political reconciliation through dialogue process. He categorically said that, “In order to realise the objectives of the peace process, I invite the leadership of the Taliban to engage

35 Baqir Sajjad Syed, PM Urges Afghan Taliban, Other Groups to Join Peace

Process, Dawn (Islamabad), February 25, 2012. 36 Ibid.


in direct talks with the Afghan government.”37 President Karzai made a comprehensive trip to Pakistan in mid- February 2012 and requested Pakistani authorities for dedicated support. He said, “I hereby request our brotherly government of Pakistan to support and facilitate our direct negotiation efforts as part of the peace process.”38

While Pakistan promised to provide all-out assistance to the Afghan Government, it is determined not to play a leading role in this reconciliation and desires that it should be, “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-driven.”39The Pakistani Foreign Minister firmly highlighted this aspect in her address to scholars at Chatham House on February 23, 2012. She emphasized, “But we will not lead. We cannot lead ... We will only follow what our Afghan brothers and sisters decide is the course of action they will adopt.”40 This indeed is a great commitment by Pakistan, a neighbour, which suffered equally during these long years of foreign invasions and factional fighting in Afghanistan.

A Surge in the Reconciliation

The immediate enthusiasm in the Afghan administration for the reconciliation process came only after it was learnt that U.S. authorities are covertly engaged in negotiations with Taliban representatives. This process became more overt in the beginning of January 2012, and U.S. officials including Marc Grossman, President Obama’s special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, met with Taliban representatives in Doha. President Karzai and his administration experienced a sense of having been isolated in the process of negotiations. Moreover, some Taliban publicly refused to talk to the Karzai administration and demonstrated a preference for talking directly to the United States instead.

In recalling the background of these U.S-Taliban talks, the fact is that the Obama administration had previously been of the opinion that the solution of the Afghan war did not lie in the military option. It had to be resolved outside the battleground. However, the Pentagon stopped Obama from taking such a step. Following the

37 ‘Karzai invites Taliban leaders for direct talks’, News International

(Rawalpindi), February 22, 2012. 38 Ibid. 39 Estelle Shirbon and Alison Williams, ‘Pakistan vows to support not lead

Afghan peace drive’, Reuters (New York), February 22, 2012. 40 Ibid.


proclamation of the first indicator, given by President Obama on December 2, 2009, regarding a likely U.S. exit plan in July 2011, there has been much speculation within American circles and all over the world about a tussle between the White House and the Pentagon. In the following days, General Stanley McChrystal fell prey to this internal clash. Indeed, General McChrystal was strongly in favour of negotiations with Taliban for achieving durable peace in Afghanistan. In an interview with the Financial Times on January 25, 2010, the former commander of the ISAF stated, "The Taliban can contribute and help in the future to run the country."41 He further said that, "a soldier he had seen enough fighting and there is a need to find a political solution."42 As a military commander, he was familiar with the situation on the ground, to which the Pentagon is now finally conceding.

Nevertheless, Obama’s outlined exit plan gave way to the ‘London Conference on Afghanistan’ held on January 28, 2010, and jointly hosted by the British Government, the UN and Afghanistan. It provided more political space to accommodate the Taliban in the future Afghan setup. The primary objective of the conference was to transfer the security responsibilities of Afghanistan to its own security forces from ISAF and to entice the warring factions, the Taliban, to end the violence. The agreed strategy was “Instead of demonizing the Taliban, we now contemplate the possibility that some of them could become part of the solution, an Afghanistan run by the Afghans themselves.”43 A reintegration fund was established to motivate the Taliban to give up militancy and join the peace process. As per the former British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, the primary objective of the fund was to, “provide an economic alternative to those who have none other than participation in the insurgency.”44

In a way, the London Conference gave President Karzai the formal approval of the international community to start a reconciliation process with the Taliban and other warring factions in Afghanistan.45 The United States however, remained skeptical of the reconciliation and its outcome for them. The main consideration of U.S. policy makers was that if at all

41 Financial Times (Shinghai), January 25, 2010. 42 Ibid. 43 Paul Reynolds, Aims of London Conference on Afghanistan, BBC News

(London), January 28, 2010. 44 Ibid. 45 Selig S. Harrison, A Smart Pashtun Play; Why Washington Should Back

Karazai’, Newsweek (Online), July 12, 2010.


Taliban are to be reintegrated into the main stream, including Afghan Government functionaries, then what did the U.S. get by ousting them in 2001 and waging a prolonged war thereafter, spending trillions of dollars?46 Therefore, despite giving tacit approval to the Karzai Administration for the talks with Taliban, the U.S. itself continued its military offensives and night raids against the Taliban’s strongholds including a major attack conducted jointly by NATO and the Afghan Army in Marjah47 in February, 2010, which met with failure. Probably, all this was aimed putting the Taliban on the defensive, thus compelling them to negotiate from a position of weakness. It was the misfortune of the U.S. that this strategy did not work and it had to rethink its subsequent approach.

Supportive Elements

Since testing the ISAF’s military muscles against the Taliban repeatedly met with failure, therefore, at the concluding session of the G-20 Summit, held in Toronto, Canada, President Obama once again gave tacit approval to the reconciliation process. He laid emphasis on finding a political solution to the conflict in Afghanistan by declaring Pakistan’s Afghan settlement efforts as “useful”.48 President Obama said that, “conversations between the Afghan government and the Pakistani government, building trust between those two governments, are a useful step”.49 He even gave implicit approval to the inclusion of the Taliban in the reconciliation process. Indeed, Pakistan has long been emphasizing on the reconciliation of all Afghan groups, including Taliban for the establishment of a broad based government in its neighbourhood. Pakistan believes in political reconciliation as the only way forward for a durable peace.

Believing military success to be impracticable, former ISAF Commander, General David Petraeus, now Director of the CIA, also supported the reconciliation process. He even agreed to “Pakistani involvement in some form of reconciliation agreement, [deeming it] essential”.50 As he stated, Afghanistan and Pakistan “are always going to be

46 Paul Pillar, The Great Debate: Is Afghanistan the Right War, National Interest

(Online), Mar/Apr 2010. 47 Operation Marjah, Foreign Policy (Washington DC) February 17, 2010. Can be

accessed at; http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/ 17/operation_marjah

48‘ Pakistan’s Afghan settlement efforts ‘useful’, News International (Rawalpindi), June 29, 2010.

49 Ibid. 50 On General Petraeus' Confirmation, Centre for Defense Information, July 6,

2010. http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=4617&from_page=../index.cfm


neighbours. And helping them develop a constructive relationship would be an important contribution”.51 Over time, the reconciliation process has gained more support from almost all stakeholders as well as the international community. The United Kingdom is one such advocate; the British Foreign Minister William Hague has visited Pakistan and expressed appreciation of the role played by Pakistan in curbing the scourge of terrorism. He too, emphasized on the reconciliation process in Afghanistan. The British Army Chief also issued a statement to the effect that he fully backed the process. There is a growing realization among the coalition that, Afghan issue has to be resolved through political negotiations, as the decade long war could not resolve it.

Intricacies in the Reconciliation

On their part, U.S. officials have been engaged in covert talks with the Taliban since 2010. However, the opening of a formal Taliban office in Doha and confirmation by Taliban representatives as being part of this negotiation was construed as an attempt at isolation by the Karzai administration. At the first instance, President Karzai recalled the Afghan Ambassador from Qatar. He then met with the head of Hizb-i-Islami, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and engaged in detailed talks with this powerful faction of Afghanistan, that operates in the North-East part of the country. President Karzai declared the meeting as productive and said, “We are hopeful that these negotiations continue and for the sake of peace, we reach productive results.”52 As a damage control strategy, Marc Grossman met with President Karzai in Kabul, and assured the Afghan government that “The United States stands ready to assist in any way we can an Afghan-led reconciliation process to find a peaceful end to this conflict.”53 Earlier the Afghan President warned that, “The Afghan nation is the owner of the peace process and any peace talks. No other country or organization has the right to deprive the Afghan nation to this right. Afghanistan is not a place for foreigners to do their political experiments or a laboratory that every few years they test a new political system.” 54

While the Karzai administration has its reservations about the direct Taliban-U.S negotiations, their greater concern lies in the venue of

51 Ibid. 52 “Afghanistan President Karzai Meets with Insurgent Faction, Hopes it Will be

Productive,” January 21, 2012, http://www.cleveland.com/ world/index.ssf/2012/01/afghanistan_president_karzai_m.html

53 “U.S. Envoy in Kabul for talks with Karzai on Peace,” Express Tribune (Islamabad), January 21, 2012, http://tribune.com.pk/story/325024/us-envoy-in-kabul-for-talks-with-karzai-on-peace/

54 ‘US envoy in Afghanistan to discuss peace, Taliban’, CNN U.S, January 21, 2012, accessed at http://articles.cnn.com/2012-01-21/asia/ world_asia_afghanistan-grossman-talks_1_afghan-led-president-karzai-peace-talks?_s=PM:ASIA


these talks. Saudi Arabia, perhaps even Turkey, would have been more acceptable to the present government in Kabul, the U.S. chose Qatar. This act has been construed by Kabul as a deliberate attempt at its marginalization in the process which would permit the U.S. greater sway over the Taliban leadership. Karzai’s meeting with Hekmatyar appears to be a strong signal aimed at the U.S. to remind them that Taliban –albeit the strongest contender opposing the American invasion- is only one of several Afghan factions, many of whom are in contact with the government. It would not be inconceivable for Karzai to subsequently approach even the Haqqanis.

The domestic power-sharing group, the Northern Alliance appears unlikely to be open to any negotiations with the Taliban either by the U.S. or by Karzai. Fazel Sacharaki, the spokesperson of the National Coalition of Afghanistan (NCA), and a political opponent of Karzai Government, believes that “Karzai has been sidelined in peace talks with the Taliban because they don't trust the government.”55 Not only the Taliban, but also the U.S. and its NATO allies appear to distrust Karzai, who, over the years, has not quite proven himself to be a selfless leader whose primary concern is the betterment of the Afghan people. However, Karzai has stated that, “We talk to the Taliban every day. We were talking to them just a few days ago. The peace process, which envisions the return of all Afghans... including the Taliban, to peaceful lives in their country, is the surest way to peace and stability in Afghanistan.”56

Sustainability of the Afghan Peace Process

As neighbour to Afghanistan, Pakistan feels it is not unlikely that the U.S. itself is in direct talks with the Taliban and even the Haqqanis, but has incorrectly been accusing Pakistan of maintaining linkages with them. Statements to this effect are intended to keep sustained pressure on Pakistan for its gains in Afghanistan and coerce it, so that it does not contradict U.S. ordains. In a recent statement, the former Taliban Minister, Maulvi Arsala Rahmani, now a member of the High Peace Council of Afghanistan, said that the, “Taliban have decided to soften up their stance for peace in Afghanistan.”57 Today, they are ready to compromise on some of the aspects seemed inconceivable earlier. Indeed, the shift in the Taliban strategy has transformed them from “being a non-state to a state actor.” The U.S. on its part, is also negotiating with the Taliban, granting them

55 Ali Safi, Afghanistan’s Karzai met with insurgents' peace delegation, McClatchy

Newspapers (Online), February 05, 2012. 56 “Karzai Claims Contact with Mullah Omar,” Nation (Islamabad), February 22,

2012, http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/22-Feb-2012/karzai-claims-contact-with-mullah-omar.

57 Taliban ready for peace talks, to soften hard-line stance, Oman Tribune-Asia (Muscat) January 28, 2012.


recognition as a legal entity, in contrast to its previous stance of not reconciling with Taliban.

In looking for political reconciliation in Afghanistan, the U.S. will have to bring an end to its military operation and night raids that kill hundreds of innocents Afghans. The U.S. humiliation of the Afghan people has reached a level where its soldiers have been caught indulging in unfortunate acts of depravity, and this in the highly civilized world of 21st century. More recently, American soldiers have burnt the Holy Quran and other Islamic literature in Afghanistan. These are serious offences and appear to be vindictive in nature.

The Taliban consider the call for negotiations, whether led by President Karzai or the U.S., as their success, and they have rightly announced as much on January 16, 2012. Only after this declaration of success, did the Taliban officially express an interest in negotiations with Washington. The reality is that after a decade of military engagement, the White House and the Pentagon have reached the conclusion that they are losing in Afghanistan and the situation is beginning to emulate the Vietnam imbroglio. In point of fact, this realization is not entirely new; the late Richard Holbrooke has attempted to push for such negotiations, but his efforts were, unfortunately, resisted by the Pentagon.

Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski, Security Advisor in President Jimmy Carter’s administration, has asserted in his book “Strategic Vision”, that the U.St. is facing serious challenges to its very survival, if it does not take immediate remedial measures. He has pointed out many grey areas that the U.S. is faced with, owing primarily to the erroneous policies of the Pentagon and White House hawks. Brzezinski finds “alarming similarities between America today and the Soviet Union just before its fall, including a gridlocked governmental system incapable of enacting serious policy revisions, a backbreaking military budget and a failing decade-long attempt to conquer Afghanistan.”58 Therefore, the U.S. needs to be a balancing factor in global politics instead of behaving as a colonial power.

Brzezinski also feels that the U.S. must become a “responsible partner to the rising and increasingly assertive East.”59 The U.S. role should be as a “balancer and conciliator” among Asian nations. Perhaps it was on having perceived the U.S. as demonstrating all the symptoms of a dying empire, that American policy makers took the decision to engage the Taliban as a way out from this never-ending and convoluted conflict.

For peace and stability in Afghanistan, the U.S-Taliban negotiations are a welcome step. However, the peace process would remain fragile

58 David Ignatius, Coming Debate Over American ‘Strength’ Abroad, Nation

(Islamabad), January 27, 2012, http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/international/27-Jan-2012/coming-debate-over-american-%E2%80%98strength-abroad/

59 Ibid.


unless it has the support of all groups and warring factions of Afghanistan, in addition to other stakeholders in the shape of the immediate neighbours, which have been associated with the conflict for over thirty years now.

Embedded Threats from Transition to Transformation

The final Communiqué of the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan, held on December 5, 2011, supported the U.S. strategy to remain engaged in Afghanistan beyond 2014. The Bonn Communiqué says that both sides “solemnly dedicated themselves to deepening and broadening their historic partnership from Transition to the Transformation Decade of 2015-2024.”60 In November, 2010, the Lisbon Summit, which was attended by the forty-eight member coalition, agreed for a troop drawdown by December 2014. In the issued statement, it was asserted that, “The Alliance approved to end its combat mission in Afghanistan and hand over full sovereignty and security responsibility to Afghan forces.”61

The Pentagon had a reservation to this deadline, as was expressed by its representative immediately after the Lisbon Summit. Then Coalition Commander in Afghanistan, General David H. Petreaus (now CIA Director), opposed a faster troop drawdown. In support of Obama’s policy on the commencement of pulling out troops from July 2011, Petreaus said, “As the President has stated, July 2011 is the point at which we will begin a transition phase in which the Afghan government will take more and more responsibility for its own security. As the President has also indicated, July 2011 is not a date when we will be rapidly withdrawing our forces and switching off the lights and closing the door behind us.”62 Later, however, the General towed the line of the Pentagon, highlighting differences with President Obama with certain aspects of the pullout plan.63

60 Afghanistan and the International Community, Conference Conclusions of the

International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, December 5, 2011. http://eeas.europa.eu/afghanistan/docs/2011_11_conclusions_bonn_en.pdf.

61 Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan, US long-term plan in Afghanistan laid bare, December 20, 2011. http://www.infowars.com/us-long-term-plan-in-afghanistan-laid-bare/Lisbon Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, 20 Nov. 2010. http://www.nato.int/cps/ en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm.

60 Josh Rogin, Petraeus: Withdrawal Timeline Does Not Mean switching off the lights, June 29, 2010, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/ posts/2010/06/29/petraeus_withdrawal_timeline_does_not_mean_switching_off_the_lights.

61 U.S. Not Completed Mission But Making Progress in Afghanistan: Defense Chief, December 15, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/ 2011-12/15/c_131306978.htm.


In mid-December-2011, during his visit of Afghanistan, the U.S. Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta said in a press conference held with President Karzai that it is a reality that the U.S. has not completely won and there is need to complete its mission. He claimed, however, that ISAF and Afghan forces “have been able to seize the momentum from the Taliban militancy and establish security in critical areas, such as the Taliban's heartland in the South. We are moving towards a stronger Afghanistan that can govern and secure itself for the future.”64 The ground realities are, in fact, contrary to Panetta’s statement. The insurgency has actually increased. During 2011, even heavily secured areas like Kabul were not exempted from Taliban attacks. The areas that have been handed over to Afghan National Army (ANA) are now very vulnerable to militant attacks. Thus, as believed by most security analysts, Panetta’s assessment is nothing more than a mere encouragement for ISAF and may be the regime in Kabul. Otherwise, being a former spy chief, Panetta knows the reality on the Afghan horizon. The Defence Secretary, however, accepted that “Ultimately, we can't win the war in Afghanistan without being able to win in our relationship with Pakistan as well.”65

The Bonn Conference also fixed an ambitious agenda for the future of Afghanistan, once it laid down a criterion that after transformation “In 2024 Afghanistan should not be a country in need of donors but also a donor country.”66 It is felt that the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan for an indefinite period would make it heavily dependent on others. It would require another two to three decades for restoring self-dependency among the Afghans. However, the question remains as to whether the U.S. really desires to leave Afghanistan.

The Defence Secretary has recently revealed that the U.S. may wind up affairs in Afghanistan, even a year before the schedule, which was laid down in the Lisbon Summit. Panetta, while in meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels said that, “Our goal is to complete all of that transition in 2013. Hopefully by mid- to the latter part of 2013 we’ll be able to make a transition from a combat role.”67 This new statement of Panetta has created yet more ambiguity about future U.S. plans in

62 Anwar Iqbal, Afghan War Cannot Be Won Without Pakistan, Says Panetta,

Dawn (Islamabad), December 14, 2011, http://www.dawn.com/ 2011/12/14/afghan-war-cannot-be-won-without-pakistan-says-panetta.html

65 Petraeus stresses Pak role in Afghan reconciliation, News International (Rawalpindi), June 30, 2010.

66 Afghanistan Pledges to Fight Corruption, Pakistan Today (Islamabad), December 6, 2011, http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/12/ afghanistan-pledges-to-fight-corruption/

67 Craig Whitlock and Karen DeYoung, U.S., NATO will seek to end Afghan combat mission next year, The Washington Post (Washington), February 2, 2012. http://www.washingtonpost.com/panetta-us-nato-will-seek-to-end-afghan-combat-mission-next-year/2010/07/28/gIQAriZJiQ_story.html.


Afghanistan and the region. Furthermore, would it be possible for the Karzai-led Kabul Administration to sustain itself without the U.S.? The capacity of the Afghan government and the ANA to sustain itself against the militants’ pressure is quite evident from some of the incidents that occurred during 2011. These events took place while there is a huge presence of ISAF troops. Then how could the ANA or ANP compete with the forces that still hold most of the Afghan territory.

It is felt that this interdependence has compelled Karzai to request the support of the participants of the Bonn Conference of 2011: “Together we have spent blood and treasure in fighting terrorism. Your continued solidarity, your commitment and support will be crucial so that we can consolidate our gains and continue to address the challenges that remain.”68 Had the U.S. been pursuing its basic objective of invading Afghanistan then it “should have used the death of Osama bin Laden in May as an excuse to immediately pull troops out of Afghanistan.”69 Nevertheless, perhaps this was not the real objective.

For the U.S., the real objectives are more global and strategic in nature. Indeed, these are more important than Afghan peace and stability. In fact, an unstable Afghanistan is instrumental to all those. If there were stability in that country, then the U.S. would have no excuse to stay there, and would miss its real objectives to counter the challenges, facing it. These challenges do indeed pose a threat to its global status as the sole superpower in the coming decades. Therefore, the U.S. is here in the region to take timely counter measures against those strategic threats. In fact, these extensions, whether through the Lisbon Summit or the Bonn Conference, till 2024 are for the pursuit of those real objectives. On one hand, it faces the economic might of a rising China, whereas on the other, there lays a resurgent Russia. The U.S. has practically been in a state of Cold War with either country since almost the entire previous decade. It is countering Chinese economic investments and expansions worldwide, by destabilizing those countries and regions where China has invested in the recent past. Its promised strategic and regional security architecture for East European countries and East Asian countries, is aimed against the threat it perceives from both these countries. Countering the Iranian nuclear programme, possession of regional hydrocarbons, and the denuclearization of Pakistan are other strategic objectives of United States in the region. 68 Alex Spillius, “World Leaders ‘Will Not Desert Afghanistan’,” Telegraph

(London), December 5, 2011. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8936896/Bonn-Conference-World-leaders-will-not-desert-Afghanistan.html.

69 Aryn Baker, For the U.S. to Leave Afghanistan, It Has to Be Ready to Stay, Time

World-Global Spin (Online), September 13, 2011. http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2011/09/13/for-the-u-s-to-leave-afghanistan-it-has-to-be-ready-to-stay/


Rational Evaluation and Way Forward

Imprecision in U.S. Policies

There exists an element of ambiguity as to whether the United States wishes to pursue a protracted stay in Afghanistan or has finally decided to leave this troubled land. Since December 2009, this superpower has changed many standpoints about its future strategy in Afghanistan. Beginning in July 2011, some U.S. troops have already left Afghanistan, under direction from the White House. The Lisbon Summit of November 2010, stipulated 2014 as the year for the drawdown of NATO forces in Afghanistan. In the International Conference on Afghanistan held in Bonn, Germany on December 5, 2011, the NATO allies decided yet another phase of their engagement in Afghanistan from 2015 to 2024, a ten years period, named ‘transition to transformation’.

This was a clear indication that this trans-Atlantic alliance would maintain its presence in Afghanistan in some form, even after 2014. This was the reinforcement of the U.S. stance, which had not fully agreed with the other NATO members for a complete drawdown by December 2014 during the Lisbon Summit. While debates on the Bonn Summit were continuing, Leon Panetta indicated that the U.S. could possibly wind up combat operations in Afghanistan by the end of the year 2013.70 This statement from the head of the Pentagon appears to indicate a new orientation in the future U.S. strategy towards Afghanistan. Parallel developments include U.S. negotiations with the Taliban, which are the principal U.S. adversary and the main opposition group in Afghanistan that has been fighting against U.S. occupation since 2001. This obscurity leaves security and political analysts in conjecture about the true motives of United States and its future line of action in Afghanistan.

Panetta’s statement can be viewed in two contexts. First, it can be seen as a pacifying effort to give more space to the political engagement of the Taliban through negotiations. The U.S. view holds that the strategy would bring for it the much needed stability in Afghanistan, substantially reduce its military losses (including personnel casualties) and ultimately pave way for its honourable exit from this marshy Afghan soil. The Taliban’s willingness to talk to the U.S. and their decision to soften the fundamental stance, that they would only negotiate with the U.S. once foreign forces leave Afghan soil, might have prompted a change of hearts at the Pentagon.

This is, in fact, a fortification of Obama’s long-awaited wishes as well, that had, earlier lacked the Pentagon’s endorsement. It was one of the election promises, Obama had made during his Presidential election-2008.

70 Afghanistan: Moving Toward a Distant Endgame, Stratfor Global Intelligence,

Retrieved on February 7, 2012. http://www.stratfor.com/ weekly/afghanistan-moving-toward-distant-endgame


He had pledged to the Americans that he would reduce the country’s overseas military engagement and would cut military expenditures to reduce the strain on the budget, thereby paving way for an economic uplift. It is worth mentioning that, on more than one occasion, the Pentagon did not agree to Obama’s policy of reduced military engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Unlike circumstances under the Bush Presidency, the White House and the Pentagon have, on many occasions, been at loggerheads and the former has often had to back track consequently.

Another group of analysts, who view it in the other context, believe that this is yet another move of the incumbent guards of the White House, to garner success for President Obama in the forthcoming elections, in his bid for a second term in office. The strategy is to signal to the American public that Obama’s earlier promises either have been fulfilled or are in the process of completion. Classical Realists, however, feel that the U.S. would be unable to sustain itself economically in overseas wars, such as the one in Afghanistan for much longer.

Perhaps, President Obama and his colleagues have been able to sell this reality to the Pentagon and the CIA. The realist’s school of thought also feels that it is high time the United States extricated itself from Afghanistan, before it turns into another Vietnam. Else, the economic meltdown, coupled with a military budget of around $693 billion71 -a figure that forms 43% of total global military expenditures - may force this superpower to meet the fate of the former Soviet Union. Incidentally, the battleground is the same, the Afghan soil, which has historically been known as the ‘graveyard of empires’.

Safety of Afghan Masses and Respecting its Traditions

Military offensives that have resulted in the killing of innocent Afghans, the humiliation of Afghan dead bodies and the desecration of the Holy Quran in an Islamic Republic, cannot go side by side with a reconciliation process. Some of the recent acts of ISAF are really a set back to the reconciliation process. Through these acts, the U.S. is creating difficulties for, and increasing animosity towards, itself. Through these acts, particularly after the desecration of the Holy Quran, there have been wide spread demonstrations throughout Afghanistan, resulting in the killing of dozens of Afghan protestors and US and NATO soldiers too. Before Afghan public sentiments transform into a national resistance movement, the U.S must bring about a change in the attitudes of the troops deployed in that country.

As tangible measures, night raids and military offensive must be stopped forthwith. There must be a restoration of respect for the Afghan masses and their traditions. A mere apology from President Obama and

71 The World's Biggest Defence Budgets Defence Budgets-Military Ranking,

The Economist (St.Louis), March 9, 2011.


the ISAF Commander in Afghanistan over the desecration of Holy Quran may not be enough. Those responsible for this act must be publically punished and the conspiracy must be investigated for the satisfaction of Afghan people. Else, it might be concluded that the U.S. is not too desirous of stability in Afghanistan and then negotiations with Taliban are another ploy to create acceptability for its long-term stay there.

A Transparent Future Course of Action

For a stable Afghanistan, the U.S. must bring clarity in its approach and attitude towards the Afghan future. In the first instance, it must have a precise position on whether or not it wishes to the reconciliation process among the various groups in Afghanistan. If the U.S. and its NATO partners want peace and stability in Afghanistan, they must encourage an Afghan-led political reconciliation process, rather than the U.S. itself engaging with a few Taliban, thousands of miles away from Afghan soil. An indigenous Afghanled political reconciliation process, taking on-board all Afghan factions including Taliban, would ensure durable peace in Afghanistan. In the subsequent process, other stakeholders like the U.S., Pakistan and geographically contiguous regional countries, should be consulted as well. However, the entire process should be Afghan-owned with Afghan people playing the lead role, and with no discriminatory policy towards any group or faction.

Adherence to the Drawdown Plan

Surely, an immediate switching-off the lights and moving out in haste from this war-torn and internally unstable country is not the solution to the Afghan imbroglio. However, the agreed drawdown schedule of December 2014, must be followed strictly by ISAF. Before moving out, as per this agreed timetable, the U.S. needs to ensure all actions necessary for the internal and external stability of Afghanistan. This includes, integration of all Afghan factions into a national government as per their share in power, in accordance with their population ratio. There should be no physical involvement of the U.S. and NATO forces during the decade of ‘transition to transformation’. Afghans must be allowed to stand on their own feet, rather than remain dependent on foreign crutches.

Curtailing Foreign Involvement

The post-U.S. era, would enable Afghans to be masters of their own destiny. No other country, thereafter, should be allowed to play politics in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan. Until now, India has had a dominant role in Afghanistan, in the garb of reconstruction and other financial assistance schemes. It is quite likely that, in post-U.S. Afghanistan, India would play its old game of fuelling the infighting between the Pashtuns


and the Northern Alliance. All extra-regional countries, including India, should be asked to give way to indigenous Afghan stakeholders. The U.S. has realised that the Indian presence in Afghanistan is a source of tension for Pakistan and gives rise to apprehensions about its security. At the same, Afghan soil must not become a centre of proxy wars between India and Pakistan.

Recognition for Pakistani Suffering

U.S. authorities and Afghans acknowledge that Pakistan has made significant contributions towards Afghanistan. General Petraeus, at times did acknowledge the Pakistani role during the entire campaign. He once said, “Pakistan is in a tough fight. One of its fights, by the way, is to keep our lines of communication open.” Indeed, Afghanistan and Pakistan are part of the same society; hence, in the Afghan endgame, Pakistani contributions should not be relegated to accommodate the interests of others. Pakistan’s solemn effort is to establish peace and stability followed by economic prosperity in Afghanistan. “Pakistan cannot wish anything for Afghanistan, which it does not wish for itself.” Indeed, the roots of the current internal instability in Pakistan can be traced to the prolonged instability in Afghanistan. Once Afghanistan stabilizes, Pakistan would be stabilized automatically.

Supremacy of Afghan National Interests

It is interesting to note that all the players involved in the affairs of Afghanistan claim that they are working to bring peace and stability in the country, nevertheless, they all keep their own interests well above the interests of the Afghan people. Foreign actors on a divergent axis further enhance the complexity of the situation, when the national interests of various countries collide with each other, and that is where Afghan people suffer the most, due to mistrust, broken promises, and ill-coordinated and disjointed efforts. However, what needs to be re-evaluated is whether an increase in the level of troops, followed by military operations, an imposition of democratic norms, alien to the Afghan people (being sharply at odds with the age-old tribal system), and western type economic reforms have brought any change in the lives of the Afghan masses.

Conclusion

Historically, Afghanistan has been a region of great turbulence, where wars and infighting have been the order of the day. This country has faced a mix of foreign invasions and infighting for more than thirty years, in recent history. Why the war-wagers of the West cannot ensure sovereignty of Afghanistan, to let its people exercise their wish and will? Apart from their safety and security, Afghans wish for their traditional and religious values and their customs and culture to be respected.


In summary, conflicts and war are no more the solution. It is only through the reconciliation and reintegration of the Taliban and other Afghan factions into the mainstream, that a sustainable solution to the issue can be found. The ISAF was unable to win over Taliban and other militants, therefore a political solution and not military action is what is required for a durable peace in Afghanistan. On their part, NATO and the U.S. can no longer afford to bring their soldiers back home in coffins. The Taliban insurgency and the infighting suit, neither the Afghan government nor the ISAF. Pakistan, visualizes a peaceful, stable, friendly and economically affluent Afghanistan. It also wishes Afghanistan to be free from foreign interference and with an ethnically cohesive society. The desire for a stable Afghanistan is the collective voice of 180 million people of Pakistan. They can no more see their Afghan brethren in a state of suffering.


EU INTEGRATION AND ACCESSION: IMPLICATIONS

FOR WEST BALKAN SOVEREIGNTY AND PROCESS

OF DEMOCRATIZATION

Bakar-e-Najmdeen∗

Abstract

This is believed in Southeast Europe that its future and

prosperity lies in the EU; the unfolding economic and socio-

political reforms in the region are based on the impulse for

EU membership. The EU continues to direct both economic

and political incentives towards making the region ripe for

integration and accession. This paper analyzes the

increasing impulse for EU membership in the Balkan;

brings forth the erosion of state sovereignty for

institutional sovereignty, for which political landscape of

the region gets changed. The trend is posing equal

challenge to the identity of the region and its people, as

influence of both domestic and foreign civil society grows.

This paper also focuses on the extent of EU inspired

reforms among the Balkan states. The intention behind

this effort is to be understood. It is to be measured that

whether or not this effort is based on state interests in the

EU only. If so, the new members can latter return to their

old ways of weak governance without democratizing their

political systems in essence. For instance, the extent to

which EU reform and membership has changed Romania

and Bulgaria is arguable.

Introduction

he European Union, indisputably holds the credit of the model for all contemporary regional organizations, giving its achievement for over half a century.1

Having a root embedded in the idea of Kant’s democratic peace;2 the European Union has displayed high level experimentation, that the

∗ Bakar-e-Najmdeen is teaching at Preston University Islamabad. 1 EU, Basic information on the European Union, http://europa.eu/about-

eu/basic-information/index_en.htm (accesses December 20, 2011).

T

EU Integration and Accession: Implications for West Balkan Sovereignty 55

idea of development and harmonious co-existence can be attained when nations decide to abandon discord for harmony. This further justifies the argument that democratic states will neither fight nor threaten other democracies, and hence increasingly becoming the rational disposition for the acknowledgment of democracy. The propensity of the Europeans to see light in market-oriented co-existence is worth applauding. This, however, does not insinuate that Europeans have altogether compromised their individual nationhood. Primordial sentiments and national integrity are forces that often haunt the decision-making process of the EU as an institution.

The creation of the union, which begun humbly with fewer number of countries (Belgium, France, Former West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) depicted a miniature association which was later consolidated by the Treaty of Rome in 1957, institutionalizing in form of the European Economic Community (EEC), or ‘Common Market’.

With the passage of time, the EEC went through three waves of enlargement. This was owing to the fact that the future of any such the community of shared economic strategy arguably does not rest on its miniature, instead a bigger community is required that can pull together wealth, diplomatic and socio-political sway of countries in the neighbourhood. Commencing with what is technically known as the western enlargement, the first opening of the community began in 1973 as Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom became formal members.3

The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, was the threshold in history of the community as Southern European countries got incorporated into the fold of this relatively -developed economic community. With the passage of time, the enlargement wave touched most of the communist gripped states of Eastern Europe and two Nordic nations.4

The dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia, as a result of humanitarian intervention drove a chisel into one of the authoritarian milieus of Europe. The aftermath of NATO-led strike on the Serbian authoritarian rule and disintegration brought forth the discussion of state building and getting the region intimated with European values to become impetus for Western Balkan enlargement.

The future aspirants and members have to grapple with varieties of changes in the EU accession region.. The underlying motive for EU integration rests on the political and economic benefits EU grants its member states. Evidently, the pattern of integration and accession for

2 Michael Edward Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, Debating the

Democratic Peace, (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), 160. 3 Jacek Rostowski, The Eastern Enlargement of the EU, (Massachusetts: Kluwer

Academic Publishers, 2001), 170. 4 John O' Brennan, The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, (New York:

Routledge, 2006), 18.


countries varies based on the socio-political and economic circumstances surrounding the aspirant country.

Premised on this, the pattern of integration for Western Balkan countries is apparently elucidated by the aforementioned circumstances. Rising from the wrath of war, haunted by enemy image of the past and state- building processes that followed; integration and accession of the Balkan creates a unique pattern. This distinctiveness cannot be discounted from Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) as the platform upon which future integration of the Balkan will be patterned.5

One will need lesser logic to fathom that the SAA was fashioned around the European Union Model (EUM). To begin with, the SAA has turned out to be a great political incentive to the region. Constructively, it has accelerated the transition from authoritarian to democratic system in the region. Though illiberal in character, the Balkans have agreed to this acceptable international norm as nations move closer to democratic principles of good governance and state responsibility towards citizens.6

From all indications and actions of the countries in the region, Western Balkan states believe their future prosperity lies with the EU, therefore the economic and socio-political reforms unfolding in the region are the result of impulse for EU membership. It is therefore not surprising to see countries in the region, susceptible to influence of external bodies, as precondition for their EU membership. Increasingly, the expansion of EU institutionalism into the Balkan, changes the political landscape of the region. The effect of this transformation is simultaneous; on one hand it is the challenge of already marginalized state sovereignty and on the other this poses challenges to the identity of the region and its people, as both domestic and foreign civil society grow in influence. The ramifications of this integration on the state sovereignty and democratization process of the Balkan should hence be deciphered by the unfurling realities in the region.

EU Enlargement

The expansion of the EU beyond the economies and socio-cultural boundaries of the founding countries, pressed the community to chalk out a manual for all future aspirants. This emphasizes need to chalk out

5 European Commission: Enlargement, The Stabilization and Association

Process, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_ process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/index_en.htm (accessed on 26 February 2012). The process allows the western Balkan countries to accustom to EU kind of market economy, promote regional cooperation after years of fragmentation and hatred and eventually holding the EU membership card.

6 Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and

Abroad, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), 16.


certain requirements for membership of the EU. Erik Jones (2005) calls this the European Union Model (EUM): This is collection of norms which include adherence to “market economy, rule of law, respect for human rights and a system of good governance … rewarded for their capability to imbibe the values, norms and principles and ultimately their ability to converge to the model.”7

Irrespective of the EUM, the European community members obviously have individual territorial and political issues to resolve; yet the nagging problem of having European constitution resonates for all before the Lisbon treaty, which became operational on 1st December, 2009.8 Some countries are yet to decide whether to accept the common norms rectified by the treaty that is likely to undermine their sovereignty.

Acceptance of a common constitution is construe to open lot of issues, among which is common immigration law and rules for enlargement. The enlargement of the union has been a serious contentious debate affecting Southeast European countries. Bulgaria and Romania would count themselves lucky enough, granted the membership of the union in 2007, while Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, Montenegro and Turkey remain in the pipeline of EU aspirants. The hope of Croatia was daunted by the last enlargement referendum held in Ireland which disapproved of enlargement and unsettled border dispute with Slovenia.9 Although, the latter two hurdles has somewhat been surmounted as Zagreb closes all chapters and is ready to become the 28th EU member.10

Reform and Integration

Enticing the Balkan countries towards good governance will not be a peculiar case having no comparison, in fact Washington and Brussels have experimented similar trend in Latin America with appreciable success.11 Countries in the Balkan have turned into reformist countries,

7 Erik Jones, Amy Verdun, The Political Economy of European Integration:

Theory and Analysis, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 143. 8 “Treaty of Lisbon: Taking Europe into the 21st century,” EUROPA (Paris),

http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm. (accessed June 4, 2011) 9 Prime minister sorry for Ireland rejecting EU reform treaty, USA Today (New

York), June 20, 2008. http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-06-20-Irelandtreaty_N.htm (accessed July 15, 2010). And Voice of America: Europe, (Washington), “Slovenia-Croatia Border Agreement,” June 11, 2010. http://www.voanews.com/policy/editorials/europe/Slovenia-Croatia-Border-Agreement-96167554.html. (accessed June 26, 2011).

10 Croatia to Become EU's 28th Member in 2013, Balkan Insight (London), June 24, 2011. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croatia-to-become-eu-s-28th-member-in-mid-2013

11 Richard Youngs, The European Union and Democracy in Latin America, Latin

American Politics and Society, Vol. 44, no. 3 (Autumn, 2002): 111-139.


trying to reform their systems in order to meet the standards and demands of the EU. The role of the EU as a force, influencing affairs within the Balkan states cannot be underestimated.

Serbia, the self-acclaimed inheritor of Yugoslavia, is at the core of EU integration and accession for many pressing reasons. On the account of making effort to adopt the EUM and ultimately joining the union, Belgrade has come to the realization that the path to Brussels is thorny. EU has been frank at making it straight to Serbian Republic that its EU membership aspiration will remain hanging, if the political uncertainty between the pro-West and radical parties persists.12 Meanwhile, Belgrade is also expected to prove its capability to apprehend Ratko Mladic, war crime fugitive, whose recent arrest came forth as a result of enormous pressure.13

The report of the former Finnish Premier, Marti Ahtisaari, played a significant role, which accorded Kosovo a monitored independence. The report refused to merit serious consideration among the stakeholders in Serbia, rather the latter promised Kosovo ninety-five percent autonomy. Serbian refusal of the Ahtisaari’s proposal was conditioned by the political tension between radical Serbs and Social Democrats. The latter wanted the accession of Serbia with the EU, while radical Serbs party do not see EU as the first priority of their country or giving in to the dictate of the West. The EU has been however particular about the issue of Kosovo as cord-tied with Serbia-EU accession.

Kosovo’s unilateral independence declaration, displays the lack of political and diplomatic unity within the EU and a disturbing issue between Belgrade and Brussels. The declaration has though become recognized by seventy-seven countries14 and approved by the ICJ as accorded to international law.15 Nonetheless, Serbia remains resolute that giving away its southern region, most populated by ethnic Muslim Albanians, would be tantamount to opening a Pandora’s Box within the region and across the globe. This view has been strongly supported by

12 EU says Serbia agreement on hold, BBC News (London), February 6, 2008. Olli

Rehn, the EU enlargement commissioner said a political deal due to be signed with Serbia remains postponed because of a political dispute in Belgrade. Meanwhile, the PM Vojislav Kostunica always wanted Serbia to maintain its integrity and Serbia-ness while Serbian President Boris Tadic has been more or less western leaning.

13 Ratko Mladic arrested: Bosnia war crimes suspect held, BBC News Europe (London), May 26, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13561407. (accessed July 14, 2011).

14 Who Recognised Kosova as an Independent State? The Kosovar People Thank

You(Kosovo). http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/. (accessed June 22, 2010.) 15 ICJ Clears Kosovo Independence, International Relations and Security Network,

July 23, 2010.http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch-Archive/Detail/?lng=en&id=119209. (accessed August 22, 2010).


Russia, Serbia’s traditional ally and certain nations with the view that Kosovo’s independence will encourage other ethnic minority to tread same route.

Belgrade sees Kosovo as politically challenging, having serious reflection on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Prior to induction of Serbia and two other countries into the Schengen free zone, Brussels desired to offer closer trade relations and relaxed visa requirements to Serbia, but scrupled by the then PM, Vojislav Kostunica, as a ploy to undermine Serbia’s sovereignty that would further strengthen the unilateral independence of Kosovo. 16

Belgrade rejection of, Kosovo as a sovereign state, has been made clear by its usual abstention from political and diplomatic events, for which Kosovo will be represented as a state.17 The fruition of this strategy remains contestable, owing to more recognition Kosovo continues to receive. The final straw that broke the camel’s back was when the UN Secretary General called on Serbia to accept Kosovo’s independence, a stance that was seriously condemned by Russia, staunchly against Kosovo’s independence and a source of encouragement for Serbia.18 Similarly, the United States maintained an unequivocal position that relations with this former Socialist nation will be straightened if Kosovo is let go. The leadership of Serbia has had their political personality stained for encouraging and supporting a parallel structure in the north of Kosovo, for which Pristina believes undermine state building.

Belgrade on this account continues to grapple with maintaining balance between saving its bid for the EU and its sovereignty. It is on the similar account that Serbia is politically troubled between the radicals and the liberals; the former sees EU accession as path towards perverse loss of sovereignty, though Belgrade believes that EU integration will further strengthen its diplomatic clout to consolidate its sovereignty.

Accession and Internal Rifts

Introducing economic reforms was not the only prerequisite for membership in the EU; rather EU requires (from all aspirants) a comprehensive transformation in shape of socio-political and judicial reforms. These requirements have been the road blocking hurdles for some countries. For instance, minority crisis across the region is not peculiar to EU aspirants only, but inclusive of Balkan countries already

16 EU says Serbia agreement on hold, BBC News (London), February 6, 2008. 17 Valentina Pop, Kosovo status issue threatens EU-Balkan summit,”EU Observer

(Brussels) April 29, 2010. http://euobserver.com/15/29974. (accessed June 22, 2010).

18 Fred Weir, Why Russia is against Kosovo plan, The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), June 28, 2007. http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0628/p06s02-woeu.html. (accessed June 21, 2010).


members of the EU. Ahmeti Ali, the leader of the ethnic Albanian minority party, Democratic Union for Integration (BDI), has been struggling to give Albania a place in Macedonian politic. Among other reasons, Macedonia is seen by its ethnic minorities as having less strength to join the EU, without ethnic consensus and respect for minority. Similarly, the political turmoil and divide in Bosnia-Herzegovina is another hurdle, obstructing the Serb-Croat-Bosniak from getting a strong point on their EU aspiration.

Albania cannot be left out from the political turmoil in the region, although ethnically Albania remains in political stalemate. Despite efforts to resolve challenges of political and electoral reform, political tug of war still characterises Albanian political landscape.19 Such bitter atmosphere is explicable for the refusal of candidate status to Tirana.20 Albanian sovereignty is challenged as the nation cannot resolve its internal political matters, rather beckoning external meddling. Brussels believes that the way Tirana follows pathway to the EU membership is a key test before joining EU.21 Nevertheless, minority crisis has become a trend in the Balkan ranging from Slovakia, Romania, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Bulgaria and others. It is this trend that determines the stance of many of these countries towards the issue of Kosovo’s independence that exacerbates the existing tension in the region. The political crisis across the region cannot be side-lined because of its role in shaping the overall domestic and foreign affairs over the years. The political uncertainty in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not make the plan of a united country realistic. The memories of the past continuously disturb the Bosniaks, resenting their Serb neighbours. The Serbs are accused of sharing radical views with Serbian Republic, which for many Bosniaks and Croats, brings back the painful memories of the past. Both the Serbs and Bosniaks have been through a political tussle over the issue of police reform and constitutional amendment. The Bosniaks want the Serb police to be incorporated into the larger federation force, while the Serb believed doing that will jeopardise their safety. Amending the constitution was another troubling issue derailing the country’s path towards Brussels. Due to the marginalisation, the Bosnian-Croats minority supported the constitutional reform in view of an aspiration to having a separate entity for the Croats as owned by the Bosniak and Serbs. The latter believed it was a planned strategy engineered by the Bosniak and if

19 Nikolaj Nielsen, Albania's bitter political stand-off intensifies, EU Observer

(Brussels), February 18, 2011. http://euobserver.com/15/31836. (accessed August 12,2011).

20 Svetlana Jovanovska and Augustin Palokaj, Albania is refused EU candidate status, EU Observer (Brussels), November, 10, 2010. http://euobserver.com/9/31237. (accessed August 12, 2011).

21 Andrew Willis, Albanian elections seen as key test before joining EU, EU

Observer, (Brussels), May, 9, 2011. http://euobserver.com/15/32285. (accessed July 29,2011)


such third entity surfaces, it will reduce the land occupied by the Serbs. Croats in the country often accused both (Bosniak and Serb) of politically marginalising them. Subsequently, the Serb entity’s accusation and claim that Bosniak politicians are devising to Islamize the country, is another salient issue. Blocking such reality of Islamizing the country, the Croat parliamentary member once asked that pork be served in parliamentary canteen, though well aware that the Bosniak do not eat pork; it was an attempt to express their political and social right as citizens of the country.

The political tension between the Serbs and Bosniak widened after the ICJ ruling on Srebrenica-genocide. The ruling absolved the Serbs of complicity in the atrocity; it failed to shoulder the blame on any country like Serbia rather blamed personalities responsible for not stopping the atrocities when committed.22 The ruling obviously angered most Bosniaks and a call for revision of the ruling was tabled. 23

The internal divide in Bosnia-Herzegovina makes matters worse for its EU integration. Political uncertainty, ethnic politics and dearth of mutual understanding among leaders across political spectrum dims quick accession with Brussels. Like their brothers in Serbia, Bosnian Serbs often recount similar fear that giving in to Brussels’ demands would undermine the country’s sovereignty.

Irrespective of the accuracy of this assertion, there was obvious compromise by the Serbs before Brussels could consider Sarajevo’s qualification for visa-free travel within the EU.24

Serbia’s political divide between radical Serb parties and Social Democrats is one of the country’s most disturbing issues. The country wanted to regenerate the Milosevic era in a bid to create a formidable integrity for Serbs in the region. They gave no concession for EU membership and believed strongly that Kosovo cannot be let go; equally ready to use force in obstructing any form of Kosovo independence. Meanwhile, the Democrats wanted a progressive Serbia; though many times sharing views of the radical party, they remained keenly attracted to the membership of the EU. Polls in Serbia showed divided support for the

22 Statement to the Press by H.E. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President of the

International Court of Justice on Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) International Court of Justice, February 26, 2007.http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pr= 1898&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1.(accessed March 1, 2008)

23 Martin Shaw, The International Court of Justice: Serbia, Bosnia, and genocide, Open Democracy (London) February 28, 2007. http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/ icj_bosnia_serbia_4392.jsp. (accessed March 1, 2008).

24 EU visa-free travel in sight for Albanians and Bosnians, BBC News Europe (London), October 8, 2010. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11504123. (accessed January 9, 2011).


two political ends. Serbian Republic should be understood and given the benefit of doubt; it has not been too long since it lost Montenegro as integral part, and would be shocking to see Kosovo going out of the net, even though Kosovars might see it as their rightful choice. Serbia is equally fearful that most of its religious monumental structures located in Kosovo might be ultimately lost and its ethnic minority living in Kosovo might be disproportionately represented. Thus, bringing forth the question, should Serbia forsake all reminiscence of identity?

The year 2007 turned out to be achievement year owing to the integration of Romania and Bulgaria with the EU. The accession of both countries made the others in the region to further accelerate their efforts toward the EU reforms. Most of these countries were geared towards effecting structural changes suitable for the membership of the EU.

Despite becoming an integral part of the EU, Romania and Bulgaria are still faced with numerous internal political issues. Romanian politics arguably is characterised as a tussle between the parliamentary, presidential and judicial indecisiveness. At times, the political uncertainty in both countries delineates the picture that both countries have not fully ingrained the EUM into their systems. Questionably, if both countries have done great homework and such was satisfactory for the EU accession, then the report of 2009 should be a misrepresentation of facts and realities.25 But recent rejection of the two countries into Schengen zone reiterates how accession process has not been fruitful. 26

EU Members’ Sway

The anticipation of sitting in Brussels as integral decision makers of the EU is an added incentive for the west Balkan countries: besides the political and economic benefits of the EU, the decision making role remains an implicit yet driving impulse for the western countries towards attaining European Union Model (EUM). But the actualization of such ambition has been murky.

Beginning with Serbia, letting Kosovo off its hook, accepting the reality of Pristina and abstaining from fomenting brawl in Kosovo; are all opportunity cost and alternative that forgone Belgrade has to compromise and bear with. Netherlands, one of the founding members of the EU, takes a forefront position that accession of Belgrade with Brussels will be concluded on determination level of Belgrade to arrest absconded war

25 Stephen Castle, E.U. Report Finds Bulgaria and Romania Beset with Problems,

New York Times (New York), July 22, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/ 2009/07/23/world/europe/23briefs-Brussels.html. (accessed March 22, 2010).

26 “Romania and Bulgaria bid to join the Schengen zone,” France24 (Moulineaux), March 23, 2011. http://www.france24.com/en/20110209-romania-and-bulgaria-bid-to-join-Schengen-zone. (accessed July 27, 2011).


criminals, reconcile border and mend up differences with its neighbours.27 Although bringing to book of these war criminals does not actually represent the nationalism of radical Serbs; it would not necessarily “put the European Union at ease about Serbia's membership bid in the bloc.”28 The fact, however, persists that bowing to the EU could somewhat be a premium option in view of Belgrade hoping to break the EU accession record.29 Eventually, if Serbia becomes an EU member before Kosovo, which is more likely, Belgrade should be rather expected to play a similar card against Kosovo’s accession.

Same would be true for Croatia, standing at a threshold of Brussels but getting to that junction has not been either hassle-free or stress-free.30 The border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia has played a significant role as a prospective stumbling block against Croatia’s EU integration. Basil, in his work, notes that Croatia was expected to join the EU in 2007, but that aspiration often gets daunted and smacked by tussle over border and unpaid debt by Slovenian bank to Croats.31 Slovenia maintains an obstinate position that resolution over the border should be the point of reference for negotiating Croatia’s EU integration. Such benchmark fails to go down well with Croatia wanting the debt matter as the point for table talk.32 Of recent, Croatians got relieved of Slovenia’s influence following the referendum which “some 51.5 percent of Slovenes voted in favour of the deal. A negative vote could have held up Croatia's talks with the EU, which had already stalled for almost a year in 2009, when Ljubljana opposed the opening of negotiation chapters due to the border dispute.”33

27 Marise Cremona, The Enlargement of the European Union, (New York: Oxford

University Press, 2003). 154. 28 Mladic's Arrest and Serbia's EU Accession Plans, Stratfor (Online), May 26,

2011. www.stratfor.com/.../20110526-mladics-arrest-and-serbias-eu-access.

(accessed July 22, 2011) 29 Serbia aims to beat EU entry 'speed record’, Euractiv (Online), January 4,

2010. http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/serbia-aims-beat-eu-entry-speed-record/article-188519. (accessed July 23, 2010).

30 Valentina Pop, Croatia to join EU in 2013 at the earliest, MEP says, EU

Observer (Brussels), January 27, 2011. http://euobserver.com/9/31711. (accessed March 20,2011)

31 Basil R. Jones, Europe at the Crossroads, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2008), 128.

32 James Stewart, Slovenia: Cadogan Guide Slovenia, (London: New Holland Publishers, 2006), 20.

33 Valentina Pop, EU relieved after Slovenian vote on border dispute, EU

Observer (Brussels), June 7, 2010. http://euobserver.com/15/30222. (accessed July 18, 2010)


Macedonia’s EU integration has long been tied to the name dispute with Greece. The dispute is one of the defining lines which Athens uses in undermining Skopje’s EU integration.34

The adjective 'Macedonian' has turned into a particularly

difficult stumbling block in Skopje's name dispute with its

southern neighbour. Greece is blocking Macedonia's entry into

both the EU and NATO by asking it to change its name. Greece's

Northern Province is called Macedonia and some Greeks from

this region identify themselves as 'Macedonian'. Athens desires

to make a clear distinction between the names of the Greek

region and the independent country. The dispute has continued

since 1995, when both countries signed an interim agreement

under UN auspices to search for a permanent solution to the

name issue. The agreement stipulates that Macedonia will be

referred to as the 'Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia', or

FYROM, until a definitive name is found.35

Appreciable number of Macedonians have shown their dismay over the delay in the negotiation process, disrespect for national identity, and more disturbing fact; the seemingly EU side-taking, as the European Commission no longer uses the term 'Macedonian'. Instead of mentioning a 'Macedonian language' it refers to a "state language" in its report.36 Macedonian politicians see Athens as a cause wanting to impair Skopje’s development as the dispute between the two countries is not confined to name rather stretches to border movement and obstruction to NATO accession. Thus, even when Athens displays any sign of patching the gaps, Skopje will always be chary of the move.37 Macedonia’s national cohesion has been threatened by its EU integration. The political divide across ethnic line vividly explains the reality in this Balkan state. A recent survey conducted in Macedonia shows a “vast majority of ethnic Macedonians (72 percent) do not trust the European Union's policy towards Macedonia, a

34 John Shea, Macedonia and Greece: The Struggle to Define a New Balkan

Nation, (North Carolina: McFarland Publishers, 2008), 16. 35 Svetlana Jovanovska, Mounting pressure to end Macedonian negotiations with

Greece, EU Observer (Brussels), November 16, 2010. http://euobserver.com/9/ 31276. (accessed March 23,2011).

36 Ibid. 37 Svetlana Jovanovska and Augustin Palokaj, Greece will fix dates for Balkan EU

membership, EU Observer (Brussels), November 23, 2010. http://euobserver.com/9/31326. (accessed March 23,2011).


similar proportion of Albanians (74 percent) living in the country believe the EU to be a trustworthy body.”38

Influence of Foreign NGO/Mega States

The role of the U.S. in bringing about peace during the Yugoslavia war cannot be underestimated. Washington had to shoulder the responsibility which Europe was hesitant to carry, although it was a tough policy decision. Since the collapse of Yugoslavia, Washington has remained a major player both in peace making and keeping. The extent to which American influence is felt in the region becomes more understandable during the fight for Kosovo’s independence. In one of EU Observer’s report, Ekrem Krasniqi suggested that “President Barack Obama: You should instruct your ambassadors in Kosovo to end the tragi-comedy of 'Kosovar democracy' and create an EU-US protectorate instead. US ambassador Christopher Dell should become Kosovo Prime Minister.”39

Same will be true for Russia, having its neighbours disrobe of communist attire. Russian interest in the region goes deeper than the ideological affinity; in fact the shared identity of Slavic is the only underlining factor making Russia relevant in the region. This has become glaring by the staunch support thrown behind Serbia by Moscow and the different strategy by the latter, wanting to incorporate western Balkan into its energy politics.

Turkey’s role in the region is yet another expansion of external body in the politics of Western Balkan which, one way or the other, affects state’s sovereignty. History of the region will remain indelible of the Ottoman past, that ancient time is once again rising, looking at the political, economic and diplomatic influence of Turkey in the region. The latter has been instrumental in resolving geo-strategic matters among the Balkan countries and continuously to aid commercial and economic interaction. Adding to the complex political scape of the region is the non-state actors who have their own share of influence in the region. The non-state actors are represented under the umbrella of the civil society. It is in fact part of the EU strategy that the civil society of the region must be groomed and led to maturity for active participation in the socio-political and economic development of the region.

38 Svetlana Jovanovska, Macedonians do not trust EU policy towards their

country, EU Observer (Brussels), December 3, 2010. http://euobserver.com/9/31424. (accessed March 23,2011).

39 Ekrem Krasniqi, The EU and US should take power in Kosovo, EU Observer

(Brussels), February 16, 2011. http://euobserver.com/7/31813. (accessed July 7, 2011).


Most frequently, the Freedom House reports political development in the region, which are equally contested by the stakeholders. In one of the reports, Albanian politicians are portrayed interfering in independent institutions within the country. Many of the countries in the Balkan have, in the recent times, been alleged of serious political and economic ill-practices by the Transparency International and the Freedom House. Political certainty, non-ethnic politics, dearth of corruption, independence of the judiciary and viable economy, respect of human rights are norms the EU expects of the Western Balkan to cultivate and adopt before finally joining the EU. The extent to which SAA have actualized these norms is open to discussion. The accession of Romania and Bulgaria elucidates the picture vividly. Arguably both countries have not really spelt out or delineated much outstanding characteristic of the EU that could make entirely different from the yet to be EU members in the region.

The role of the EU in the region, points to the fact that political change can be affected not just within, but external incentive can equally catalyze a similar change. However, EU attempts to draw the region more closely through the SAA arrangement is an apparent challenge to the traditional realistic state-centric stance of sovereignty. The sovereignty of the region has since been eroded from state to institution in the form of supra-state institutions and civil society.

Brussels has to reshape its policy of enlargement towards the West Balkans, it is true that West Balkan accession is not uniform, there has been certain degree of differential treatment and holdback as in the veto power of EU member to roadblock the integration of aspirants. The fact of the matter is that Brussels should derail such trend as it will further complicate accession process of a genuine state.

The Western Balkan states should rather avail the opportunity accorded to them by Brussels, to effect actual reforms, instead of patching things all for the sake of grabbing the EU card. It is double benefit for the stimulator and the stimulated that reforms be done at the right time, since the wishy-washy reforms would later become detrimental; as in the case of objection of Romania and Bulgaria into the Schengen zone.

De-Raducalization and Disengagemnt from Extremist 67

DE-RADICALIZATION AND DISENGAGEMENT FROM

EXTREMISM: AVAILABLE POLICY OPTIONS FOR

PAKISTAN

Muhammad Nawaz Verdag∗

Abstract

This research paper attempts to propose a creative and

non-conventional strategy based on ‘De-radicalization,

Disengagement, and Rehabilitation (DDR)’ initiatives to

deal with extremism victimizing Pakistan by radical

germination. Criticality of extremism-affected communities

has given birth to ingenious modes in tackling

radicalization, since solely resorting to repressive hardcore

military and muscular means may actually cause more

problems. The trends of extremism in the world commonly

identify rigid intellectual propellants behind them,

drawing a lesson that the spread of rotten intellectualism

can solely be defeated by strategic doses of vital intellect

alone and not by explosives. The DDR programming can

significantly shrink the supply and demand of the

militants. Tracing conceptual understanding of de-

radicalization and disengagement by upholding the

significance of soft power strategy through DDR

engineering, this research paper analyses contemporary

approaches to de-radicalization; identifies phenomenal

routes and roots to de-radicalization and disengagement;

presents extremism and its intricacies in Pakistan; and

finally makes policy recommendations for de-radicalizing

and demobilizing the extremist groups.

he counter-terrorism phenomena as observed in the contemporary world today, is getting complicated. There is neither a broadly accepted understanding of the challenge nor

a comprehensive long-term strategy to counter the indiscriminate violence.1 Propelled by international response in the immediate aftermath

∗ Muhammad Nawaz Khan Verdag is Assistant Research Officer at Islamabad

Policy Research institute.

T


of 9/11 attacks, the transient hard strategy of pre-emptive strike against the rogue states became a buzzword in the international media. The underlying axiom was that there were a finite number of extremists, whose elimination would blot-out the threat of further attacks. On examining cyclical structures, trends and patterns of extremism in the world, one explores intellectual theories operative behind them, Hence, any kind of putrid intellectual idea can solely be defeated by strategic doses of vital intellect and not by bullets. Moreover, the idea of combating violence with violence is preposterousness. Thus, miscalculation of the exorbitant reliance on muscular strategy to eradicate terrorists and avoid recidivism has further deteriorated the situation rather than reversing it.2 Deprogramming of a bomb or a missile is possible but how can an extremist is deprogrammed?3 As a matter of fact, counter-terrorism policies have not been chalked out to a direction involving psychologically-devised synchronic measures to reinforce the natural tendencies for terrorists to quit the violent motion. Thus, De-radicalization, Disengagement, and Rehabilitation (DDR) policies and research on extremism are being immensely recognized as core components of softer strategy in orienting peace and stability to the terrorism-torn societies. For the popularity of DDR Engineering, there is a need to develop widespread international support and discussion of its objectives for their continued development. With this realization, a turning point is spearheading toward an innovative thinking in counter-terrorism policies in countries that have directly experienced terrorism.4

Today, Pakistan stands at the most critical juncture of history and waves of violent acts - suicidal attacks, bomb blasts, sabotage,5 attacks on security personnel and state installations - are threatening the country. Military measures could cut off the main supply of terrorists by hitting the

1 Paul B. Strate & Mona Yacoubian, Unconventional Approaches to an

Unconventional Threat: A Counter-Epidemic Strategy, in Mapping the Jihadist

Threat: The War on Terror Since 9/11, ed., Kurt M. Campbell & Willow Darsie, (MaryLand: The Aspen Institute, 2006), 85-86. http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/aspen%20strategy%20group/ASGMAPPING_JIHADIST_THREAT. PDF (accessed March 18, 2009).

2 Christopher C. Harmon, Terrorism Today, Second Edition (London: Routledge, 2009), 127-129.

3 Susan Mohammad, To Deprogram a Jihadist, Macleans. CA, February 2, 2009. http://www2.macleans.ca/2009/02/02/to-deprogram-a-jihadist/ (accessed January 21, 2011).

4 Tore Bjorgo & John Horgan, ed. Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and

Collective Disengagement (London: Routledge, 2009), 1-2. 5 Kazi, “We must Fight Terrorism to Save Islam, Pakistan,” Press Release no. 311,

Press Information Department Government of Pakistan (Islamabad), July 28, 2009.


core sanctuaries of insurgents, but in the long-run this approach cannot win over hearts and minds of the affected communities, fraught with radical ideologues, which calls for softer power measures to pacify souls and bodies of the individuals and challenge the ideological narrative of extremism.

This research paper attempts to conceptualize a dynamic, soft power counter-terrorism strategy based on DDR Initiatives. This is possible only through ideological cathartic reorientation, socio-economic amelioration and political overhauling.6 Pakistan may bring forth the example of many extremism-affected contemporary countries and commission her own DDR Programmes, by pointing out programmes that suit her environment. The paper seeks modes to change and align hardcore ideological or religious beliefs that the terrorist convey to that of the civilized societal and Islamic norms. This approach focuses on the rehabilitation and re-education of extremists in Pakistan through a number of channels by reinforcing the true interpretation of ideological tenets of Islam.

Conceptual Understanding of De-Radicalization

and Disengagement

Conceptual divergence between de-radicalization and disengagement is imperative in pointing out that not only one gets rid of terrorism movement, but also one becomes de-radicalized.7 De-radicalization implies a fundamental transition in understanding. It gives a re-orientation in outlook, often due to some personal traumatic experience of the violent ideologies,8 engendering post-traumatic growth in the form of rehabilitation. It leads to the opening up of cognitive avenues, making the individual receptive to logical ideas. Disengagement envisages a transformed role for an affected individual by undergoing behavioral and social changes such as leaving a band or changing one’s role within the band by discarding the commonly shared norms, values and attitudes of the terrorist network.9 It also implies some persistent recognition of these

6 The policy option of DDR may be viable only if implemented parallel to well-

equipped security-level technical infrastructure, to check any recurrence of terrorists’ incidents in Pakistan.

7 John Horgan, De-radicalisation or Disengagement, Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 11, issue 4 (February 2008): 6,http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/articles/issues/PTv2i4.pdf (accessed June 9, 2010).

8 Naureen Chowdhury Fink & Ellie B. Hearne, “Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalisation and Disengagement from Violent Extremism,” International

Peace Institute, October 11, 2008, 3, http://www.ipacademy.org/media/pdf/publications/beter.pdf (accessed April 21, 2009).

9 John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2005): 124.


values and attitudes; concurrently engaging in some other socially germane support behavior, but no longer indulged in terrorist maneuvers.10

Islamist de-radicalization took place in several other Muslim-majority states in the late 1990s and 2000s, resulting in remarkable ideological transformations toward non-violence by removing tens of thousands of former militants from the ranks of Al-Qaida’s supporters.11 Some of the most successful DDR Programmes are commissioned in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, addressing above mentioned dimensions of behavior and social ties in very creative ways. DDR Engineering explores systematic ways to desert terrorism. It refers to a package of socio-political, legal, educational and economic programmes focused to deter disaffected individuals from joining the terrorists’ ranks.12 It is about managing the risk of individuals’ reentry into the terrorist movement and reducing new recruitments, besides exploring methods aimed at re-socializing the affected individuals into the mainstream society.

Analysis of Contemporary Practical

Approaches and Practices

In the counter-terrorism strategies, multiform of DDR Initiatives are world-wide receiving enormous concern today.13 Extremism will continue to be a socio-political problem14 and initiatives derived from socio-political and psychological principles15 are not entirely constant in all the de-radicalization programmes, but undergo multiplicity due to diverse challenges, local threat environment and political paradigms.

10 Ibid. 11 Omar Ashore, Islamist De-radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures,

The Middle East Institute, Policy Brief no. 21 (November 2008), 1, http://www.mei.edu/Portals/0/Publications/Ashour-Algeria.pdf (accessed May 27, 2009).

12 United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, “First Report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes,” UN Action to Counter Terrorism, 5, http://www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/radicalization.pdf (accessed March 24, 2010).

13 Froukje Demant & Marieke Slootman et. al. “De-radicalization of the Right-wing Radicals and Islamic Radicals,” Anne Frank (2008), http://www.annefrank.org/ond_upload/Downloads/Mon8-UK-Ch11.pdf, (accessed April 3, 2009).

14 “Terrorism is A Social Problem, Not a Mental or Criminal Problem,” Medical

News Today (London) July 4 2008, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/113876.php, (Accessed, July15, 2009).

15 John Horgan, De-radicalisation or Disengagement, 6.


Driven by their indigenous furor to develop practical programmes countering the appeal of militancy, DDR underpinnings are aimed at curbing the violent practices and changing minds by getting the repentant terrorists absorbed into society.16

This kind of terrorism-renunciation is better termed as desertion, de-mobilisation, defection, de-escalation, rehabilitation, reforming, deprogramming etc., carrying different connotations but quite varied assumptions about the way in which DDR Initiatives are developed and implemented in different settings.17 The DDR Processes are context-specific, oscillating in line with political sensitivities of the countries.18 Saudi Arabian government uses terminologies conveying sense of Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare (PRAT). Under extremist art therapy and counseling of radical prisoners in Saudi Arabia, 1500 people out of 3200 people, successfully completed the reforming process and were released from prison.19 The Saudi programme claims a success rate of 80%-90% for successful reintegration into the society.20

Yemen, Northern Ireland, Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Algeria, Jordon, Egypt, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Singapore21 – are the countries who have developed their own respective DDR approaches. Evolved in multiple ways, these strategies carry certain common features as illustrated below:-

• Re-education and Rehabilitation Programme is premised on the redressing of misguidance, through re-education and close examination of the beguiling narrative that the individual has embraced.

• Offering outlets to vent frustrations.

• Alternative lifestyle programmes.

• Engaging with civil society.

• Promoting intercultural alliances.

• Redressing socio-economic inequalities.

16 Tore Bjorgo & John Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and

Collective Disengagement, 170. 17 John Horgan, Deradicalisation or Disengagement, 6. 18 Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalisation and

Disengagement from Violent Extremism, 4. 19 Drake Bennett, “How to defuse a human bomb,” The Boston Globe (Boston),

April 13, 2008, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2008/04/13/how_to_defuse_a_human_bomb/. (accessed June 12, 2009).

20 Christopher Boucek, After Guantanamo: How Effective are the Rehabilitation

Programmes in the Muslim World? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (February 10, 2009), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/

publications/?fa=view&id=22731 (accessed April 30, 2011). 21 Drake Bennett, How to Defuse a Human Bomb.


• Countering online radicalization.

• Involving qualified agencies in implementing counter-radicalization policies.

• Amnesty programme, under which the repentant terrorists act as lead mentors.22

• Role of a psychologist, mentor etc. who can influence the terrorist - often from family or peer group.

• Ideological tools, such as counter-verdicts, dialogue with renowned clerics.

• Subsequent monitoring to avoid recidivism.

Different Muslim countries have experienced different types of DDR Initiatives, founded on their indigenous customs, political peculiarities and threat environments as outlined below:-

• Raised in August 2002, “The Yemen Committee for Dialogue”23 appeared as a dual-phased programme that gathered senior clerics, who challenged the ideological themes of militants and imprisoned jihadists, and unveiled their self-assumed religious perceptions.24 In the ultimate phase, rehabilitation of the individuals was worked out by engaging in social constructs like marriage etc.

• Heavily focused on educational and ideological aspects, since 2003, the Saudi government has launched its successful programme of countering the Al-Qaeda ideology through mass media, university curricula and repentant terrorists, who discourage potential recruits by unfolding the violent internet propaganda of terrorists.25

22 Tore Bjorgo & John Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and

Collective Disengagement, 175-176. 23 Michael Tarnby, “Yemen’s Committee for Dialogue: Can Jihadists Return to

Society?” Terrorism Monitor (Washington), July 15, 2005, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=527&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=180&no_cache=1 (accessed October 18, 2011).

24 Ane Skove Birk, “Incredible Dialogues: Religious Dialogue as a Means of Counter-Terrorism in Yemen, “The International Center for the Study of

Radicalisation and Political Violence, (April 2009), 3-4, http://www.icsr.info/publications/papers/1245345445AneSkovBirkReport.pdf (Accessed: July 30, 2009).

25 Christopher Boucek, “Saudi Arabia’s “softer” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare,” Carnegie Paper no.97, Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, (September 2008), 6. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp97_boucek_saudi_final.pdf (accessed April 3, 2011).


• Under the Parliament’s backed de-radicalization policies, core seminaries got united in Indonesia, backed by senior police officials, in February 2007, to prevent radicalization devised in the name of religious justification for terrorism. By focusing on poverty alleviation projects, efforts were channelized to deny opportunities to the radical bands, in targeting fresh recruits by marketing their venomous publicity material.26

• An extended version of such DDR Initiative, under the title of Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), is also observed in Singapore, where by counseling within prisons initially the Jemah Islamiyah (JI) detainees, their immediate families and the whole community was engaged.27 Reunion with the family proved to be a persuasive matter promoting de-radicalization. Thus, Singapore is accredited with the most successful jihadist rehabilitation programmes.

• In Algeria, between1997-2000, DDR took place with the unilateral ceasefire of armed wing of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), known as the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), included subgroups from the notorious Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).28

• During the 1990s, Egypt fought a bitter campaign against militant Islamists. Since the end of the insurgency in 1997, Egypt’s two fiercest Islamic terrorist groups, the Islamic Group (Al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyah) and Islamic Jihad, not only ceased their violent activities, but also published texts revising their religious beliefs on the use of violence.29 Al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyah successfully

26 Kristen E. Schulze, Indonesia’s Approach to Jihadist De-radicalization, CTC

Sentinel, vol.1, issue. 8, (July 2008): 8-12. http://www.artkeller.com/ uploads/CTCSentinel-Vol1Iss8.pdf. (Accessed: April 21, 2011).

27 Darcy M.E. Noricks, Disengagement and De-radicalisation: Processes and Programs, in Social Sciences for Counterterrorism Putting the Pieces Together, ed. Paul K. Davis & Kim Cragin, et.al, (Santa Monica: Rand National Defense Research Institute, 2009), 309, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG849.pdf. (accessed July 8, 2010).

28 Omar Ashore, Ending Jihadism? The Transformation of Armed Islamist Movements, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (September 9, 2009), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=show&article= 23805, (accessed October 15, 2011), see also Omar Ashore, “Islamist De-radicalization in Algeria: Successes and Failures.” The Middle East Institute,

Policy Brief no. 21 (November 2008), http://www.mei.edu/Portals/0/ Publications/Ashour-Algeria.pdf (accessed May 27, 2009).

29 Lisa Blaydes & Lawrence Rubin, Ideological Reorientation and Counterterrorism: Confronting Militant Islam in Egypt, Terrorism and Political

Violence, vol.20, issue. 4, (October 2008): 461,


dismantled its armed wings and abandoned its fiqh al-‘unf (Islamic jurisprudence justifying violence) literature, between 1997 and 2002. In 2007, Al-Jihad Organization initiated a similar de-radicalization process.30 In Europe, the Norwegian project, functioned by the local youth

workers, NGOs, indigenous municipal agencies, child welfare officers, police officials etc,31 successfully trained around 700 people to assist the programme.32 By extremist art therapy, Exit Sweden Programme ferreted to work directly with those who voluntarily contacted them; indeed, the self-proposed character of the interaction endowed great reliability on the programme.33 In Germany, manifold initiatives are made functional by civil society tiers and the government. Conspicuous among the latter is the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.34

Increasing imprisonments have raised concerns about long-term rehabilitation of imprisoned terrorists; therefore, based on strong personal ties, reintegration has surfaced, as prisons themselves become major center of radicalization and recruitment.35 One Indonesian initiative focused on prisoners involved in extremism, persuaded about two dozen members of Jemaah Islamia (JI) and a few members of other jihadi organizations to cooperate with the police.36 The two most obvious cases are the successful cooperation of two high-ranking detainees, Nasir Abbas and Ali Imran, known to have played a major role in the 2002 Bali

http://www.stanford.edu/~blaydes/Violence.pdf (accessed September 6, 2011).

30 Omar Ashore, Islamist De-radicalization in Algeria: Success and Failures, 1. 31 Tore Bjørgo &Yngve Carlsson, Early Intervention with Violent and Racist

Youth, Working Paper, no.677, (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2005), 67, http://english.nupi.no/Publications/Working-Papers/2005/Early-Intervention-with-Violent-and-Racist-Youth-Groups (accessed November 18, 2010).

32 Report by United Nation’s Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, First Report of the Working Group on Radicalization and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes, UN Action to Counter Terrorism, 20, http://www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/radicalization.pdf (accessed January 9, 2011).

33 Tore Bjørgo &Yngve Carlsson, Early Intervention with Violent and Racist

Youth, 71. 34 Ibid. 73-74. 35 Greg Hannah, Lindsay Clutterbuck, Jennifer et al., Radicalization or

Rehabilitation: Understanding the Challenge of Extremist and Radicalized Prisoners, Technical Report (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2008), ix-xi, http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR571.pdf (accessed June 30, 2009).

36 International Crisis Group, De-radicalization and Indonesian Prisons, Asia

Report, no.142 (Islamabad), November 19, 2007, i.


bombing.37 About 150 men and one woman, out of 170 people involved in jihadi crimes, have been released after serving sentences for terrorism and underwent de-radicalization in 2006-2007.38 Some programmes devise approaches to cut down the number of active terrorist participants (e.g. the Columbian Reincorporation Programme)39 and may require only a behavioral shift, repudiating violent extremism as the precondition for an individual to be released from prison.

With stark heterogeneity of these initiatives, most programmes objectify to facilitate the societal reincorporation of individual terrorists.40 This was the case with Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), wherein the members chose to disengage individually. There are also programmes that seek a more collective approach41 as experienced in the case of Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), wherein the entire movement surrenders to conclude collective disengagement.

Governments could accrue great practical benefits by exploring the drop-out phenomena. Instead of having a one-size-fits-all approach that produces marginal results, there needs to be a tailor-made, comprehensive, multifaceted and flexible programme. By comparatively analyzing case studies in different countries, we can customize de-radicalization programme matching our cultural and political horizon.

Significance of Softer Power Strategy:

DDR Engineering

During the last two decades, the phenomena of soft power have gained currency due to the relative failure of the hard strategy;42 intensifying fault lines illustrated by the ever escalating of vicious circle of extremism. Following table depicts the dynamics of hard and soft powers,

37 Paul E. Pendleton, Countering Terrorist Ideologies: A Rational Actor and Game

Theoretic and Analysis of De-radicalization Programs for Al-Jemaah Al-

Islamiyah Prisoners in Singapore and Indonesia (Postgraduate diss., Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008), 74, http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2008/Dec/08Dec_Pendleton.pdf (accessed December 27, 2010).

38 International Crises Group, De-radicalization and Indonesian Prisons, i. 39 Tore Bjorgo & John Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and

Collective Disengagement, 152-169. 40 Froukje Demant & Marieke Slootman, De-radicalization of Right-wing Radicals

and Islamic Radical, 1-2. 41 Ibid. 42 Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kashmir and Palestine exemplify the failure of the

strategic options like coercion, brinkmanship, sanctions, threats and military means to establish influence.


wherein the latter set of policy options can be employed in dealing with centrifugal forces in a befitting manner. Table-1

HARD POWER SOFT POWER

Use of force Diplomacy

Sanctions Engagement

Threats Persuasions

Coercion Incentive

Brinkmanship Dialogue

Aggression Coexistence

Containment Co-option in the power structure

Regime change Tolerance

The DDR Engineering is associated with intellectual interventions,

rectifying ideological rigidities of the extremists, as part of synchronized efforts at psychological operations to counter-terrorism,43 which would benefit greatly from a sharp observation of ‘how’ and ‘why’ of individual disengagement. Terrorism is a war for hearts and minds that cannot be won by smart bombs and missiles.44 Psychological warfare cannot be combated by high-tech weapons; but exclusively by psychological warfare. Commentaries of the clerics, who have rejected Al-Qaida, are surely positive indicators. Unless all aspects of the radicalization cycle are better understood, including those who have left the terrorists’ fold, it will be difficult to develop an effective strategy to defeat the Al-Qaida and Taliban Movement.45.

There is a crucial need to establish an evidential base for framing policies, data compilation, enhancing law enforcement and intelligence agencies’ knowledge on individual de-radicalization from extremism. An insight into the drop-outs may enable the counter-terrorism authorities to determine which terrorists are reconcilable and how the government should proceed. For this purpose, bad experiences of former terrorists, autobiographies, interviews of terrorists or their immediate family members, communiqués by the movements etc. can render as essential

43 Jerrold M. Post, The Key Role of Psychological Operations in Countering

Terrorism, in Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in 21th Century

International Perspectives, vol. 1, ed., James J. F. Forest (Westport: Prager Security International, 2007), 380-394.

44 Ibid. 45 Alex Kingsburg, Why Some Terrorists Make the Choice to Leave al Qaeda, US

News (Washington), July 16, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/ news/world/articles/2008/07/16/why-some-terrorists-make-the-choice-to-leave-al-qaeda (accessed February 12, 2011).


source for DDR.46 In Indonesia, Mohammad Nasir Bin Abbas, a former member of the movement, responsible for the Bali bombing of October 2002, regularly meets the world’s press to narrate story of his disengagement from Jemah Islamiyah.47

Phenomenal Roots and Routes to

De-radicalization and Disengagement

While observing trend cycles of individual terrorist, ranging from the stages of recruitment to escalation, and de-escalation, one comes across the psychological disillusionment and physical transformations. In the chain of actions, physical change might subsequently bring psychological change, while the later acts as stimuli for the former. The expressions of both psychological and physical de-radicalization and disengagement might be either voluntary or involuntary (threats of arrest or imprisonment).48

More elaborative phrasing of physical and psychological de-radicalization and disengagement is done within the framework of Push and Pull factors. Push relates to negative social forces which make it unattractive to remain in a particular social environment.49 It is indicative of changing personal priorities and longing for a socio-psychological state that is missing in the militant network.50 Push factors consist of situation like disillusionment with group headship and repulsion from violent acts. These involve negative social sanctions: loss of faith in the ideology of the violent movement; loss of confidence, status and position within the group; becoming burned-out of illicit clandestine life style; competing loyalties between group and family obligations weaken the individuals’ commitments to fanaticism; financial disputes etc.51

46 Josh Kurlantzick, A Radical Solution, Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles), January

6, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/06/opinion/op-kurlantzick6 (accessed April 18, 2009).

47 Nick O’Brien, Interview with a Former Terrorist: Nasir Abbas Deradicalisation Work in Indonesia, CTC SENTINEL vol. 1 issue.12 (November 2008): 19-21, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ files/CTCSentinel-Vol1Iss12.pdf (accessed July 15, 2009).

48 John Horgan, Psychological Factor Related to Disengaging From Terrorism: Some Preliminary Assumptions and Assertions, in A Future for the Young

Options for Helping Middle East Youth Escape the Trap of Radicalization, Working Paper no. WR-354, ed. Cheryl Benared, (Santa Monica: RAND National Security Research Division, September 2005), 72, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2006/RAND_WR354.pdf, (accessed June 3, 2011).


Youth, 25. 50 Hrogan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 129. 51 Ibid.


The development of inceptive feelings of disillusionment or desire for some substitute ideology is a common finding of many DDR Programmes.52 It is important to identify these feelings offering an obvious basis to build on DDR, ultimately triggering individuals’ final decisions to leave the violent role and creating a new identity as an “ex”. Disillusionment may emanate from:-

• Inconsistency between initial ideas, goals and fantasies, that shaped a person’s initial involvement and his subsequent experiences with the reality that reflects mismatch between the fantasy and reality,53 thereby leading to gradual dismantling.

• Disagreement on tactical matters,54 wherein tactical and operational differences with the leadership lead loyalty erosion in the group.

• Strategic, political or ideological differences.55

The strategy of Pull refers to factors that attract a person to more rewarding alternatives,56 longing for a peaceful life outside the covey (marriage, finding a career or beginning a family), desire for freedom without stress of illegal activism, amnesty or reduced sentencing; deteriorating energy, economic support and establishing a family with new social networks. These phenomena can be triggered under increasing age, pressure from spouses or families, and desire to engage in alternative occupations having socio-economic prospects.57

Extremism Intricacies in Pakistan: Available Policy

Dimensions for De-radicalizing and Demobilizing the

Spoilers’ Groups

There is a strong convergence of views among the security critics that the challenge of terrorism is complex and deeply rooted in the evolution of political and socio-economic forces.58 The same holds true in the case of Pakistan. A common perspective in seeking the more distal origins of terrorism is that the trajectory to extremism is a dimension that begins in grievance and ends in violence. Suicide bombings during the last three

52 Darcy M.E. Noricks, Disengagement and De-radicalization: Processes and

Programs, 305-306. 53 Hrogan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 126. 54 Ibid. 129. 55 Ibid. 126-129. 56 Tore Bjørgo &Yngve Carlsson, Early Intervention with Violent and Racist

Youth, 26. 57 Ibid. 58 Luis de la Corte, Explaining Terrorism: A Psychosocial Approach, Perspectives

on Terrorism, vol. 1, issue. 2 (2007),\ http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/ pt/index.php/pot/article/view/8/html (accessed December 27, 2010).


years in Pakistan confirm that the planners are concentrating on the most precious human asset of the nation; youth ranging from 14 to 30 years of age, as the primary source of recruitment for training and indoctrination for terrorist acts.

Since 1 January, 2001 to 17 January, 2011, a total of 34814 persons were affected by the extremists’ acts and suicide attacks, injuring 7214 security personnel and 17126 civilians, while killing 2704 security personnel and 7770 civilians.59 Waves of violent acts in the form of bomb blasts, target killings, sabotage activities, and attacks on security personnel and state institutions, attacking soft targets like worship places of opponent sects to ignite ethno-sectarian strife; is the terrorists’ agenda to subjugate the entire country by imposing their harsh ideology, which has nothing to do with Islam. Terrorism is not an issue of law and order; it is a socio-political problem that requires a matching approach to solve it.60

Bad governance, erosion of order, decimation of institutions, polarization of society, bewildering administrative vacuum, absolute poverty, glaring levels of illiteracy, feelings of oppression, sense of marginalization, lack of sports and recreational facilities and the resultant alienation of the youth from society, are a few factors which drive the youth towards eccentric radicalization. In a society like Pakistan’s, territorial disputes - with India and now Afghanistan - ethnic contests, competing visions about the very basis of Pakistani state and absence of consensus on the nature and direction of political system, raise the probability of violence and mismanagement. Parallel to this, is the unchecked mushroom growth of Madaris in Pakistan during the 1st Afghan war of the Soviet era, whereby the US engineered jihad brought into Pakistan approximately 35,000 Mujahedeen, to be trained, armed and pumped back into Afghanistan to fight the US-branded jihad against the Soviets. This involved a large section of Pakistani youth – especially those belonging to the front line FATA and adjacent western highlands of Pakistan. In the years of post-Soviet withdrawal, these Mujahedeen were termed as Taliban.

Soft power humane approaches are needed to stem the tide of radicalization, particularly in the youth, who are falling prey to extremism. Political and ideological motivations are the centre-pieces in the complex terrorism phenomena, which is not a conventional crime. The dogma of terror is such that triumph in using hard power; through raids, incarceration, detention, captivity and capital punishment, are not the ideal measures. Central objective of DDR Programming is to thwart further

59 Crises Management Cell, Ministry of Interior Government of Pakistan, Yearly-

Wise Summary of Human Losses in Terrorist Acts in Pakistan 1 January 2001 to 17 January 2011” IPRI Factfile, vol. XII, no. 12 (December, 2010): 1.

60 Dr Rashid Ahmad Khan, Re-strategizing the Anti-terror War, Daily Times (Lahore), August 31, 2010.


acts of terror, whether directly by the person concerned or through his sway.

Furthermore, successfully rehabilitated individuals can provide valuable insights into the workings of terrorist organizations, and can thus be seen as contributors to the overall counter-terrorism strategy. Innovative and collaborative approaches can be successfully employed by involving strategic communities, social workers, academics, therapists, municipal employees, NGOs, and intelligence as well as law enforcement agencies pursuing counter-terrorism goals. It is largely through their commitment, together with support from families of the target demography,61 that the DDR Programmes can be commissioned. Pakistani policy-makers face a grave challenge to design a holistic approach toward the issue of extremism and terrorism.

Policy Recommendation

Presently there is no known official DDR Programmes in Pakistan. To fill in the vacuum, following recommendations are made to curb this ever-growing evil:-

Role of NGOs in Bridging the Rifts and

Vocal Support from Civil Society

To knock out the threat of recidivism, community-based homogeneous approach; deriving funding from indigenous sources (like charitable organizations, entrepreneurs, welfare organizations, local chamber of commerce etc., and integration of indigenous police, municipal agencies62 and political agents in tribal areas) is necessary for capacity-building and DDR Projects. Under private-public ventures, they can establish schools, welfare projects, training programmes etc. for repentant prisoners, by tapping community resources through national-level mass-awareness.

Citizen, Peace and Security Committees comprising notables from all walks of life, should be effectively created and operated at all levels. Community nobles and police administration can help enforcing security arrangements, keeping mosques and madrassas under check to prevent the spread of radical germination.

61 Renee Garfinkel, Personal Transformations Moving from Violence to Peace,

United States Institute of Peace (Washington), Special Report 186, (April 2007),http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr186.pdf (accessed September 27, 2010).

62 Naureen Chowdhury Fink & Ellie B. Hearne, Beyond Terrorism: De-radicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism, 5.


Psychological Counseling Programmes

Counseling Programmes, entailing sessions with psychologists and social scientists, may be designed for participants and their families, evaluating prisoners’ social standing, diagnosing psychosomatic problems and assessing the conformity rate. This provides vital insights into how an individual participant is progressing and63 determines whether or not the rehabilitation is genuine.

Familial Engagement

Familial engagement is a critical factor in the success of the Exit programmes and DDR Processes to overcome the feelings of isolation and guilt. Competing social relationships or pressure by family, friends, parents and spouses may thus use social relationships to convince a militant to return to normal life. During the aftercare, concentration is focused on the personal stature through state protection, providing skills, training and assistance; stable relationships reinforced parenting and building of new social networks, so that former extremists may establish their new lives.64 Similarly, involvement of parents-driven initiative also proves to be highly effective in extracting children from the clutches of extremism.65

Attractive Alternatives and Support

Extremist-terrorist assemblage meets certain needs of its associates, in terms of providing identity, community, shield, and exhilaration. Potential defectors from extremist religious’ identities are unlikely to take the plunge, if they see no pragmatic and reasonably secure escape channels substitute the type of life they are presently living. Those who withdraw from the terrorist band, usually do so because continued membership appears unattractive and is no longer fulfilling their socio-psychological needs (push-factors), whereas life outside the group appears more eye-catching (pull-factors).

Countering Online Radicalization

Internet’s role in shaping and sustaining global terrorism is emerging as the critical new dimension of 21st century terrorism; with websites and

63 Ari W. Kruglanski, Michele Gelfand & Rohan Gunaratan, Detainee De-

radicalization: A Challenge for Psychological Science, Association for

Psychological Science, vol. 23 no. 1 (January 2010), 1-3, http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/ICPVTRinNews/DetaineeDeradicalization-AChallengeForPsychologicalScience.pdf, (accessed December 3, 2011).


Youth, 30-32. 65 Naureen Chowdhury Fink & Ellie B. Hearne, Beyond Terrorism: De-

radicalization and Disengagement from Violent Extremism, 10.


electronic bulletin boards spreading radicalized ideological messages, perpetuating terrorist networks, recruiting disciples and providing links between operatives on cyber-space. A pervasive, public information campaign should be put in place to counter this cataclysm. To identify the most innovative and effective counter strategies, following is recommended: deterring the producers of extremist materials; empowering users to self-regulate their online communities; reducing the appeal of extremist messages through education; and awareness.66

Countering online radicalization is the first systematic effort, bringing together IT industry and national experts to capitalize upon the potential contributions of the internet companies and internet users, e.g. Saudi Arabia launched the Sakhina (tranquility) scheme,67 in which trained individuals challenged the wrong ideologues of susceptible terrorists by logging on to the internet in radical chat-rooms.

Re-education and Rehabilitation

Emphasize moderate teachings and non-violent resolutions to religious conflict through massive religious education campaigns. Enrich the curricula of religious seminaries by providing courses in history, technology and science to broaden the scientific horizons of religious clerics and their students. Massive book distribution programme, introducing persuasive and balanced studies of Islam and comparative religions through school libraries, may be an effective tool. Regional and provincial disparities in educational sector need to be overcome by raising adequate and streamlined public-private schooling ventures68 in backward regions, producing strategic doses of human capital oriented to sophisticated technical economic requirements.

Holistic Interpretation of Religion

Crafted on the premise that extremism originates from a mistaken interpretation of Islam, rather than willful inclination to terrorism, the programmes need to be constructed to re-educate individuals and promote a more holistic interpretation of religion ensuring ideological

66 Tim Stevens & Dr. Peter R. Neumann, Countering Online Radicalisation: A

Strategy for Action, The International Centre for The Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, Policy Report, (London), January 28, 2009, http://www.icsr.info/news/attachments/ 1236768445ICSROnlineRadicalisationReport.pdf (accessed July 7, 2010).

67 Hayat, Saba Noor and Shagufta, De-radicalization: Approaches and Methods, Conflict and Peace Studies, vol. 2, no.2, (Apr-Jun 2009): 50-51.

68 Andrew Coulson, Education and Indoctrination in the Muslim World: Is There a Problem? What Can We Do About It? Policy Analysis, no. 511 (March 11, 2004), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa511.pdf, (accessed December18, 2011).


immunization69 to rotten narrative. Well-respected clerics, Islamic scholars and university professors should involve in multiple modes of education, public speaking and writings using verses from the Holy Quran and Hadith that speak of peace and good conduct thus neutralizing the dangerous radical ideology.

Alternative Channels to Vent Frustration

As lack of healthy activities to express grievances or dissatisfaction may result in violent behavioral tendencies, Taliban are exploiting the class inequalities and regional disparities of the tribal areas. The tribal zone is adversely affected by high unemployment (50%) while the 15-30 year age group accounts for 75% of the population, yet there is absence of enough resources to engage this group in productive activities.70 Creating space where disaffected groups may meet, express and organize themselves through non-violent means is an underlying feature of the programme to reincorporate vulnerable individuals into society in the post disengagement period by providing them with alternative employment opportunities or subsidized vocational training skills.

Amnesty Programmes

It involves offering certain sort of forgiveness by society or certain segments of society, ensuring a new start and helping people merge into their community. Peripheral criminals, and not the diehard elements, may be granted amnesty which will alienate them from irreconcilable militants. The issues of amnesty and reconciliation in these cases exclusively depend on the magnitude of violence, cultural context and legal traditions of the concerned society. These programmes do not consider people guilty of major crimes, like mass murder, rape etc, and may not exempt people who are serving a prison sentence. A security committee, under Ministry of Interior, can evaluate prisoners for security risks and then make release recommendations, based on the input provided by the Religious, Psychological and Security Committees. Central objective of the Security Committee is to monitor detainees upon their release.

Legal Assistance Programme (LAP) is one component facilitating reduction of sentences in exchange for repentance and collaboration with authorities, as was a case with the Italian Repentance Programmes under which members of the Red Brigades and Mafia were offered amnesty, who had testified against their former colleagues of the terrorist group.71 In

69 Paul B. Strate, Unconventional Approaches to an Unconventional Threat: A

Counter-Epidemic Strategy, 91-93. 70 Tore Bjorgo, Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective

Disengagement, 232. 71 Erica Chenoweth, “Italy and the Red Brigades: The Success of Repentance

Policy in Counterterrorism” in Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in 21th


Colombia, legal and judicial matters conceived de-mobilization and disengagement not just of existing prisoners, but also of the active members of AUC, FARC and Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN). To facilitate exit process, the Colombian judiciary suspended the militants’ trial to encourage and sustain de-mobilization.72

Role of Madaris

As a result of the Afghan war, more than three million Afghans refugees brought conservatism, extremism and radicalism to Pakistan. The seminaries or Madrasah mushroomed and provided religious education to a large number of students, most of which received purely religious education to become ‘Masjid imams’ (prayer leaders) or preachers of religion.

However, seen against the backdrop of low literacy rate and low availability of quality-based public education, the role played by Madrasah in imparting education is crucial to Pakistan.73 Madrasah in Pakistan have a long history of providing religious education and free boarding-lodging to poor children, who would otherwise receive no education at all. With less than 2% of GDP spent on education;74 religious seminaries essentially fill the vacuum created by a deficient schooling system in the public sectors, and a small percentage of the Madrasah have been known to teach militant- interpretations of Islam.

Wafaq-ul-Madaris, being the federation of religious schools that regulates curricula of the majority of Islamic institutions and holds examinations throughout Pakistan, has failed to monitor what type of religious education is being taught in the Madrasah Any DDR Programme must recognize that in Pakistan, violent extremist individuals are recruited mainly from uneducated and impoverished communities, wherein the role of Madrasah in brewing militancy is relatively limited in extent.

Though, it is also a fact that there is no credible monitoring of the qualifications of Madrasah teachers and their backgrounds, and many Madrasah continue to employ teachers with sympathies to militant interpretations of Islam, therefore DDR Initiatives must recognize that teenagers are easily influenced by recruiters. Critically, Madrasah graduates can only become religious teachers as they are not imparted strategic skilled educations to join mainstream skilled employment and

Century, vol. 3, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport: Prager Security International, 2007), 359.

72 Ibid. 310-330. 73 Robert Loonney, Reforming Pakistan’s Education System: the Challenge of the

Madrassas, Journal of Social, Political Science, and Economic Studies, vol. 28, no.3, (Fall 2003), 261, http://www.uvm.edu/~envprog/madrassah/reform-edu.pdf, (accessed April 27, 2011).

74 International Crises Group, Pakistan: Reforming the Education Center, Asia

Report, no. 84, (Islamabad), October 7, 2004.


some are therefore, not surprisingly, opting to join a violent jihad. There is a need for comprehensive strategy to employ human capital of Madrasah in the development of the Pakistan along the modernized scientific lines of private and public education. Role of Wafaq-ul-Madaris needs to be expanded in modernizing the Madrasahs’ curricula, within the imperatives of worldly and religious education, besides adding importance to the innovative trainings of clerics.75 Moreover, enforcement of Madrasahs’ registration and the monitoring of religious instruction should not be overlooked.

Role of Media

While the events since the 9/11 terror attacks and the ensuing questionable war against terrorism continue to stir debates and emotions all over, it also reverberates in the media in various dimensions. One dimension is the radicalization of youth in the Muslim societies in particular. Most of the media in countries, such as Pakistan, still seems wrapped in emotional responses to the foreign policy objectives of the U.S. and its allies. This also impacts the youth in particular and there also is little conscious effort to prevent them from falling victims to the emotional debate on the causes of the existing notional gaps between the Muslim and non-Muslim societies. The media, therefore, needs to proactively intervene-logically rather than emotionally-and help the youth.

Rehabilitation of Detainees

Rehabilitation programmes, during police detention and imprisonment, would be aimed at converting former terrorists into wise members of their families76 and communities by carefully identifying those who would be cooperative and are susceptible to work with security officials. Detainees are likely to respond more positively to those who have knowledge of and respect for tribal culture.

True Interpretation of Jihad

The concept of jihad, so central to Pakistani politics over several decades, has been seen as a capture of the mind. The literal meaning of

75 Dr Manzoor H Khatana, Pak must Regulate Mosque & Madaris, Pakistan

Observer (Islamabad), September 25, 2010. 76 Ansyaad Mbai, Fighting Extremism through Cooperation an Indonesian

Perspective, a paper presented in Security in Government Conference, Australian Government Attorney-General's Department, (December 5-7, 2007), 7. http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE097801FF)~E000Fighting+Extremism+Through+Cooperation--LT+Final.pdf/$file/E000Fighting+Extremism+Through+Cooperation-LT+Final.pdf (accessed June 18, 2009).


jihad is struggle.77 Islam recognizes four major categories of Jihad that are: Jihad against one's self (Jihad al-Nafs), Jihad by tongue (Jihad al-lisan), Jihad by hand (Jihad al-yad), and Jihad by sword (Jihad as-sayf)78 or Jihad

Al-Asghar is the minor jihad, as it pre-supposes certain conditions and imposes specific limits. Jihad Al-Akber is the major Jihad and is known as Jihad al-Nafs, implying self-restraint or personal struggle.79 The misinterpretation of Jihad has been a vital tool for radicalization in Pakistan. The credible re-evaluation of jihadi ideology must take centre stage to strike at the heart of the process of recruitment into violent extremism, world-wide. The contextual true understanding of Jihad, however, can also be an essential tool for the engagement and rehabilitation of jihadis. Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, also known Dr Fadl, the founder of Egyptian Jihad, now argues that true Jihad can only be conducted by conforming to certain preconditions.80 Respected Islamic intellectuals are central to this mobilization.

Nation-wide Intellectual Debates

Open up dialogues between the liberal segments of society and Taliban sympathizers. Dialogues and peace deals could isolate hardliners from the moderate elements in the society. The current environment in Pakistan is advantageous to a nation-wide debate through public mass-awareness campaigns, displaying banners across Pakistan with verses from the Holy Quran prohibiting extremism and gratuitous acts of violence. This calls for tolerance, pluralism, and peace in academic discourses popularized through media and cultural mediums.81

Reforms in the Tribal Belt

The battle for political reforms is ventured with the issue of de-radicalization and disengagement in the tribal belt. Elected political representation in FATA will modify the economic arena of the belt, fallen deep into poverty and neglect. It will also change the socio-political arena by taking away some of the influence of the militants. The issues of

77 Sanusi Taofiq Temitope, Jihad and Terrorism: An Appraisal of Islamic

International Law, Ediaro.com, no. 06/40IL062, May 2010, http://www.ediaro.com/eLibrary/Law/Project Download/JIHAD AND TERRORISM AN APPRAISAL OF ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL LAW.pdf (accessed May 3, 2011).

78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 Michael Jacobson, Why Terrorists Quit: Gaining from Al-Qaida’s Losses, CTC

SENTINEL vol. no. 1 issue no. 8, (July 2008): 1-4, http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CTC_whyterroristsquit.pdf (accessed April 27, 2010).

81 Ansyaad Mbai, Fighting Extremism through Cooperation an Indonesian Perspective, 7-8.


political and socio-economic grievances remain concerns on the national scale, calling for developmental projects of Social Action Programme (SAP) and subsequent opportunities. On political front, it calls for the strengthening of political agents and effective restoration of the tribal systems. Tribal social structure imposes a hierarchy that forms a strong bulwark against rebellions by forcing conformity upon the clans, ultimately limiting the social space available for rebels to operate in.82 Tribes can collaborate with the security forces in taking action against belligerents, and they can also take responsibility for the good conduct of remorseful militants.

Conclusion

Facing the most acute problem of militancy and extremism, and no official DDR Programme, Pakistan is a country regarded by many as the epicenter in the fight against global terrorism. The ballooning of extremism against the backdrop of a tribal society demonstrates why a comprehensive and sustainable DDR Engineering is indispensable. A long-term strategy; backed by people from all walks of life, associated with high-level of vigilance at all official, semi-official and private ends, is need of the hour. By bringing the militants into the fold of DDR Programming, the government may kill two birds with one stone - winning trust of the tribal people who would no longer be motivated to support the left-over terrorists, and beginning the slow painful process of gradually disengaging itself from the US-led War on Terror. Undoubtedly, it appears to be an uphill task but not beyond resources to keep intact Pakistan’s sovereignty and fundamental rights of her citizenry.

Pakistan requires transformation from belief-based to knowledge-based society to meet the challenges of radicalization of youth in the county. Most people who have alienated from extremism and passed through DDR Engineering are vulnerable. To fight extremism, publicizing the peaceful rationality of Islam that teaches universal harmony and brotherhood and has no link with “-isms” derivational of terrorism, extremism, fanaticism, fundamentalism etc., is urgently required. Emphasis is to be laid on the exigency for preventing the minds of our youth from descending into mental slums, where toxic germination of radicalism is growing.

There is need to seek a pragmatic strategy that makes a bridge between hard and soft power strategies, to be employed at the state level for long-term rehabilitation and reintegration of the extremists; as extremism is related with minds and cannot be resolved by mere ammunition.

82 Kamran Bokhari, Limits to the Saudis’ jihadi Crackdown, Asia Times, Middle

East (Hong Kong), May 16, 2009, http://www.atimes.com/ atimes/Middle_East/KE16Ak01.html. (accessed September 27, 2011).


Book Reviews

The Future of Pakistan

Author: Stephen P. Cohen and others ISBN: 978-0-8157-2180-2 Publisher: Brookings Institute Press, Washington DC. 2011 Pages: 333 Price: $ 29.95

tephen P. Cohen is an established expert on politics of Pakistan. Presently, he is rendering his services as a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings Institute Washington DC. He is

currently a member of the National Academy of Science’s Committee on International Security and Arms Control. In his long career of an academician, Stephen P. Cohen has also taught at universities in India, Japan and Singapore. Dr. Cohen has more than eleven books to his credit as author, co-author and editor. Major emphasis of his scholarly work is South Asian Security and Strategic Studies.

Dr. Cohen’s recent book The Future of Pakistan is preceded by another exclusive work on Pakistan i.e. Idea of Pakistan. Cohen has got a rare intellectual skill to break down complex political phenomena of Pakistani political culture into comprehendible analysis; to which the present book is not an exception. The book has already earned applause among the scholars of politics of Pakistan, both at home and abroad. This is a timely read on future of a state that since last decade has become an ever more significant player in international politics. Dr. Cohen and his colleagues have addressed most significant responsibility of the scholars of international politics i.e. logical prediction of future scenario considering present, emerging situation. The authors in the reviewed book have presented and evaluated multiple scenarios of how and why Pakistan’s future may/will develop in the coming five to seven years (2012-2017). Their views are sweepingly tilted towards pessimism about the future of the most dynamic nation of the world.

This book a captivating read because it not only has coherent and lucid style of writing but also discusses the probable geopolitical implications of each future scenario. The specific factors such as impact of foreign and domestic Islamist and other radical groups on internal and international security; influence of the Pakistani Armed Forces, civil government, and key regions; nuclear weapons; and relationships with India, China, and the U.S. are also examined.

The book carries eighteen essays inclusive of afterword, and is the result of a workshop at the Rockefeller Conference Center in Bellagio, Italy held in May, 2010. This book takes its uniqueness from three factors: 1) its

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authors come from America, Europe, India, and Pakistan itself, giving it an international and comparative perspective, 2) the comprehensive comparative analysis is based on consideration of all internal and external factors related to the future of Pakistan, 3) the argument of the book is in logical sequence though this is contributed by seventeen people from three continents. The authors were asked to briefly set forth important variables or factors that might shape Pakistan’s future and to speculate on the likely outcomes. Every author was given same pattern i.e. a brief summary of recent developments, examination of a number of involved factors, analysis of a number of alternative futures, exploration of the methodological problems inherent in this exercise and discussion of policy options especially for the United States, Atlantic Countries, China, Japan, and India.

The book begins with Cohen's overview of Pakistan that gives vent to all concerns about Pakistan’s future, ranging from female literacy to international politics, placing it within the context of current-day geo-politics and international economics. Cohen's essay is followed by a number of more focused essays addressing more specific issues of Pakistan. They address critical factors such as ‘Radicalization, Political Violence, and Militancy’ , ‘The China Factor’, ‘Security’, ‘Soldiers and the State’, ‘Regime and System Change’, ‘Population Growth’, ‘Urbanization’, ‘Female Literacy’, and ‘Youth and the Future’. The book also breaks down relations with other international powers such as China and the United States. The all-important military and internal security apparatus come under scrutiny, as do rapidly morphing social and gender issues. Political and party developments are examined along with the often amorphous division of power between Islamabad and the nation's regions and local powers. The book emphasizes that uncertainty about Pakistan's trajectory exists.

The futuristic picture drawn is not exactly perilous but re-establishes concerns about the fate of this habitat of more than 180 million people. The Future of Pakistan facilitates understanding of not only the current circumstances, the relevant actors and their motivation, the critical issues at hand, but also the different outcomes they might produce, and above all what this all means for Pakistanis, Arabs, Indians, Americans, Europeans, Chinese, Russians and the entire world. This book has successfully established a thought that future of this region lies where future of Pakistan does.

Nargis Zahra

Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.


Great Ancestors – Women Asserting Rights in Muslim

Contexts Author: Farida Shaheed and Aisha Lee Shaheed ISBN: 978-0195476361 Publisher: Oxford University Press-USA -2012 Pages: 350 Price: $22

omen in the Muslim world, while fighting against all odds, have contributed in the social and political development of these societies. They asserted their rights, highlighted the constraints

and continued their struggle which was as indigenous as anywhere else, refuting the myth that “women rights” as an idea is alien to Muslim culture. Great Ancestors introduces us to women who defended the rights of women from Africa, Asia and the Middle East between the eighteenth century and the 1950s. As Fareeda Shaheed, the author of the book, states, “The strong and determined women… emerging from the pages of history here effectively refutes the myth of the silenced, cloistered and acquiescent women of popular imagination.” Perhaps it is the time when women of today learn something from the women of the past.

The book is a response to the apprehensions that have been expressed in many circles underestimating the role of women in the Muslim world. Questions for instance, about feminism being alien to Muslim contexts, the defense of women’s rights actually a modern invention which was introduced by thinkers in the West etc., have been part of discourse in Muslim societies.

The book highlights the lives and deeds of women from diverse Muslim countries and communities who have, in the past, engaged in the struggle for gender equality. It provides examples of women struggling for their rights from the 8th century to the 20th century, in the Arab world, Egypt, Muslim Spain, India, Pakistan, Algeria, Iran, Turkey, Central Asia, Nigeria and Indonesia.

Shaheed informs us that the research allows connecting the contemporary struggle for women’s rights with their historical past, engendering a sense of linkage with - and ownership of - both women’s assertions in the past and the contemporary movement.

Great Ancestors is a great effort to unfold indigenous feminist methods for present day generation of women rights’ activists by sharing the best methods used by our ancestors. The book opens an international dimension to the existing discourse.

The book helps us understand the women assertiveness in three different phases, at times interconnected, at times developing independently from one another: 1) The first phase, as the author states,

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consist of women asserting control over their personal lives, especially in terms of bodily integrity, including sexuality, and rights within the family, 2) The second, much less documented phase is women’s solidarity actions, that is, initiatives by women to support other women and 3) The third is women’s efforts to look beyond their lives and improve their societies.

Great Ancestors is a good combination of both physical and intellectual activism. Some women worked towards ensuring access to education and thrived on intellectual achievements or the knowledge of scriptures. Others fought to secure rights within marriage or refused the marriage institution altogether. Yet others engaged in collective solidarity projects, including anti-colonial struggles or early forms of transnational feminist networking. The combination of chronological and thematic, within the narratives, makes the various chapters easy to navigate.

Great Ancestors gives credit to some male voices as well, appreciating the men who encouraged and supported gender equality and advocated for women’s rights. Shaheed emphasizes: "The notion that all men in Muslim societies are misogynistic is as much a myth as the notion that women are only silent victims."

It is clear that the challenges women faced (and continue to face) are influenced by historical, social and political circumstances and that the strategies they designed (individually or collectively) are accordingly varied. Yet, Great Ancestors sets to demonstrate that the efforts undertaken by women towards achieving gender equality in Muslim contexts have been ongoing for centuries.

The book is more than just a compilation of women who have struggled for their rights in different Muslim countries and communities. It is a work that helps in removing the myth about women’s rights being imported from colonizing countries to the colonies. It’s this myth that de-legitimizes feminist as "Westernized" women who betray their culture or religion by opting for a "non-indigenous" strategy. The book takes us inside the Muslim societies where the women activists/scholars own the notion of women’s rights as an indigenous value that is part of their own heritage and not an alien idea.

Arshi Saleem Hashmi Assistant Professor, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies,

Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.


Words of Conflict, Words of War: How the Language We

Use in Political Processes Sparks Fighting Author: Fathali Moghaddam and Rom Harre (Eds.), ISBN: 978-0313376764 Publisher: Praeger Press: California, 2010. Pages: 220 Price: $44.95

athali Moghaddam and Rom Harre are professors at Psychology Department, Georgetown University, Washington. Some other publications, by the same authors, are Global Conflict Resolution

through Positing Analysis (2008), The Self and Others: Positing Individuals

and Groups in personal, Political and Cultural Contexts of International

Action (2003) and Positing Theory: Moral Contexts of International Action (1999). These works contributed significantly in interpreting the gravity of positioning analysis at both individual and international levels.

In the book reviewed, the significance of positioning theory in different spheres of social strata is highlighted while analyzing the dialectical impact of words and languages on individuals and collective processes. The Positioning theory, according to this book, provides a method of analyzing the cognitive process that occurs within “local moral domains of people’s beliefs” (p.49). Positioning is a correlating relationship in which one is positioned as having right while the other is counter-positioned to oblige. In this way, the book explores the interactions of social, religious and political domains and the operationalization of positioning theory in these contexts.

This work points out the usage of different languages and multifarious words in the game of positioning and counter-positioning. According to social psychological perspective, positioning act reveals the nature of different compound words which spark conflict in social and political realms. The book comprises of twelve chapters which show not only the mutual incompatible behavior of diverse individuals, groups, associations and entities but also the consequent deflating position of one against the other, that acts as the real cause of conflict in the contemporary world.

Primarily, diverging interests and goals, which are based on observations and perceptions, shape the psychological positions of individuals. The major chunk of this scholarly publication focuses on the script of international conflicts and resultant emerging positions in order to draw conclusions based on our understanding of the impact of language and words on domestic and international systems. An inquiry into the interactive influence of psychological positions on drawing the scripts of

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international conflicts, can broaden the conceptualization of international security, which leads us towards better comprehension of existential threats and the respective positions taken on securitizing them.

In this book, the debate regarding the words of conflicts and their impact on the words of war has been laid down in three major dimensions i.e. Political, Social and Religious. Speeches of President Bush at the time of 9/11 (Chapter 3), behavior of Ian Paisley, the leader of Democratic Party of Northern Ireland (Chapter 6) and the dialect used in electoral campaign of Obama (chapter 7), present the practical evidences of positioning and counter-positioning. Diverging perceptions on the debate of rights and duties were being employed by Senator Barak Obama and Senator Hillary Clinton during their election campaign. Other contestants; including Governor of Alaska, Sarah Palin and Senator John McCain, used media for strengthening their prepositioning in public.

This book also serves to explain the social attributes of lingual positioning by highlighting the behavior of the patients of Alzheimer’s disease (Chapter 5) and the dealing of care management in Sweden (Chapter 4). The religious attributes and their impacts on positioning have been explained by the case-study of war-torn Mindanao, the southern island of Philippines where Muslims, Christians and Lumads (indigenous people), all claim that the land exclusively belongs to them (Chapter 11). The findings of the social and religious attributes of languages and words suggest that we need to focus on the impact of jargon of words and languages on the skirmish nature of humans, acting at both local and international arenas, while playing different roles.

This book also provides an interesting insight from the college life of President Obama when he was studying in Occidental College, Los Angeles (Chapter 6). The data in the aforementioned context has been acquired from Obama’s autobiography, Dreams from My Father: A Story of

Race and Inheritance. Obama’s dialogues with Regina (his classmate), concerning his

pessimism on his political activities and Regina’s retrospective optimism on his performance at the collegiate level, reflect conflicting perspectives of individuals on a similar issue, which highlights the importance of positioning theory analysis.

This book also provides an insight into the strategies of state leaders. In Chapter 10, the speeches of the former American President George W. Bush and the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are referred to as demonstrations of aggressive positioning of two world leaders against each other. The anarchical political rhetoric was being employed by both leaders to emphasize the external threat posed by each other. Such an approach might inculcate internal cohesion at the domestic level.

The categorical language of “us” against “them” pushed both leaders into the phase of mutual radicalization. At the end, the book


provides positioning analyses of conflict management between “Aboriginal people” (indigenous Canadian people) and “mainstream” Canadians (Chapter 12). The Canadian government announced an official apology to demonstrate remorse and guilt on pursuing enforced assimilation of Aboriginal people. The government took this initiative to create a more racially equal and harmonious nation.

Positioning theory acts as an effective tool to understand the roots of the conflict. This theory traces the storyline conceptions endeavored by individuals and the techniques utilized for individual positioning.

The theory best explains the interests of people who are interacting in different fields of life. The positioning theorists provide variety of routes to conduct positioning analysis. This book is helpful in understanding conflicting social phenomena, political conflicts and moral orders of daily life. It is difficult to separate positioning from the languages which the leaders use in discussion, debates, clarifications and presentations.

Positioning theory, in view of positions and counter-positions, emerging as a result of the dialectical clash of languages and words, provides an interdisciplinary platform. It helps us to realize the fact that need of the hour is to broaden the conceptualization of individual and group actions at both local and international arenas, keeping in view the impression of language and words on security. This book will act as a resourceful guide for the researches of international relations in cautiously penning down their academic views, while taking on any position in securitizing any particular issue.

This book will also escort the students of sociology to adjudicate the dialectical impact of words and languages on individual’s actions and how such actions condition society and vice versa. Besides that, this publication may serve as an insight source for the students of Linguistics to make them aware of not only the ‘words of war’, but also of the ‘war of words’. It can help students know the nature and the degree of the impact, using words in a discourse carries.

Attiq-ur-Rehman, Faculty, Lecturer, Department of International Relations,

National University of Modern Languages (NUML), Islamabad.

Book Review 95

Electoral Malpractices during the 2008 Elections in

Pakistan Author: Iffat Humayun Khan ISBN: 978-0-19-906282-9 Publisher: Oxford University press, Karachi 2011 Pages: 217 Price: RS 795

he author, Iffat Humayun Khan, is working as Research Associate in the International Islamic University, Islamabad, and is conducting research on elections from a global perspective. The book is first by

the author but has won recognition among academic circles of Pakistan Studies. This is a useful, enriching read for the observers of electoral system in Pakistan, its historical development and impact on domestic politics of the country.

The author has tilted her book in a judgmental way i.e. “Electoral Malpractices” not “Practices” that pre-sets the mind of the reader. She sets off with the comment that due to different electoral system prevailing in the world, it’s not possible to agree on one definition as to what constitutes the electoral malpractices; all the illegal ways that different parties use to influence the outcome of the elections can be termed as electoral malpractices. This book identifies two important variables: 1) Quest for Power and 2) Electoral Malpractices. The author has tried to develop the cause and effect relation between the two. Quest for power is considered an independent variable while electoral malpractices are dependent variable. The book has used systematic and theoretical approach to examine existential electoral practices in Pakistan. Iffat Hamayun has aptly explained; what is happening? The way it is happening and why it is happening? The underlying hypothesis of this book is based on deductive logic.

The author has defined the objectives well, by analyzing the electoral malpractices in the history of Pakistan in general and especially in the 2008 elections in particular. The objective of the book is to ascertain the impact of the malpractices in elections on the Pakistani society, the judiciary, the parliament and process of democratization. Its main aim is to create awareness among the electorates about the sanctity and power of their vote, to sensitize political elite to popular issues, to help the Election Commission to form new rules and make foolproof arrangements for conducting free and fair elections.

The writer elaborates her point of view with the help of historical analysis. She writes that after winning the freedom for the Muslims of subcontinent, the founding father of the country had two parallel tasks to do: 1) the nation building and 2) the state building. The weak democratic

T


traditions were inherited from the colonial masters and were evident right in the first decade of the history of the country. The never-ending political crisis in Pakistan is the product of electoral corruption so malpractices and the military takeovers are interrelated phenomena. The military takeover of October 7, 1958, known as the October Revolution, was the direct result of not conducting elections. The military regimes are transitionary in nature; the military dictators seize power on the promise of holding free and fair elections and transfer the power to the democratically elected representatives of the people. But once in power, they start legitimizing their rule by holding elections and establishing their own King’s Parties. Ayub Khan did the same by installing his version of democracy in the form of Basic Democracy (B.D) system.

The author has also related elections and democracy as interdependent variables. She is of the opinion that elections are primary source of securing democratic government. The key actors which have interests in manipulating the election results are identified as the politicians, landlords, industrialists and bureaucrats. The marriage of convenience between the military and bureaucracy has further consolidated the position of bureaucrats from policy executors to policy makers. The doctrine of necessity, used to legitimize the military rule has politicized the bureaucracy and judiciary. In the first twenty three years of this country, no free and fair elections were held.

Pervaiz Musharraf dismissed the democratically elected government after the occurrence of the Plane Conspiracy on October 12, 1999. After seizing the power, he issued provisional Constitutional Order No. 1 stating that any of the presidential orders cannot be challenged in the court of law. Then he followed the same path of his military predecessors and went for the local government elections. The Presidential Referendum of 2002 was a stark example of how a dictator used all the government machinery and money to get his power further consolidated. The Legal Framework Order, that contained 29 constitutional amendments, was aimed at increasing the power of the President. Methods like constitution tampering, judicial maneuverings, changing elections laws to get the king’s party elected were used by Musharraf in 2008 elections. The removal of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on 9th March, 2007, was a move to clear the hurdles in getting elected as President for the third time which was not allowed under the constitution is also an example of electoral malpractices. The issuance of National Reconciliation Ordinance on 5th October, 2007, was allegedly the result of a deal brokered between Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto by the USA. It depicted that to some extent the external factors also play a strong role in the elections of the country.

The caretaker setup was clearly not a neutral one. The caretaker Prime Minister Mian Muhammad Soomro and the acting president Chaudhry Amir Hussain were both from the King’s party, PML-Q. Large

Book Review 97

scale bureaucratic reshuffle was done to accommodate the desired candidates. The state resources were misused for advertising campaigns of the ruling party. There was clear involvement of the caretaker government in the development projects to support the PML-Q. The state media was used to run a propaganda campaign for the party.

The 2008 elections were marred by Election day irregularities, ghost polling stations, snatching of ballot papers, and delays in polling, vote purchasing, fake identity cards, bogus multiple votes. The violent acts like kidnapping, harassment and killing of candidates and voters went unchecked. Women were barred from voting. Many election observers were not allowed to monitor the elections. The only factor that played its role in barring PML-Q from getting the seats which it was expecting was the aloofness of the military from the elections. It seriously limited the power of the then President Musharraf to influence the outcome of elections as was planned.

In pursuit of civilian control over army and bureaucracy, and establishing a fully functional and representative democracy, the author has made recommendations of an independent judiciary, independent election commission and free media. Certain suggestions made by the author about the election procedure and polling rules are also very important, if we are to improve and instill the legitimacy in our electoral process and make a way forward for the attainment of a vibrant and a truly representative democracy. Iffat Hamayun has truly related the process of democratization in Pakistan with the nature of electoral practices.

Muhammad Adil Editorial Internee, Department of International Relations

Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.


In Search of School Effectiveness: A Research Study

Oriented Book

Author: Dr. Syed Qaim Mehdi Zaidi, ISBN: 9781458791665 Publisher: Read How You Want, USA, 2010. Pages: 106 Price: $24.29

well-known Educationist and Psychologist, Dr. Zaidi has contributed in researches of various educational organizations. His dedication has led him to achieve Quaid-e-Azam Gold medal. He was

also member of the team of Psychologist who developed psychological tests to judge mental ability in diversified field. The Author is presently heading the Examination department at National Defence University, Islamabad. This book is written as a source to improve schools and making them effective.

The objective of this book is to guide the researchers for establishing an effective and ideal institution for the coming generations. The purpose is to highlight the missing link of moral and human resource development in the educational system of the societies of the Asian subcontinent. Educational institutions are mainly based on intellectual and moral development of children but these are less cared-for, in countries of the Asian subcontinent. The success of any educational institution is dependent upon effective faculty and teaching techniques.

The first chapter deals with the importance of Secondary Education which plays a vital role in an education system and its significance in bridging primary and the higher level of education. It enables youth to enter the labour market and also helps them in making a smooth transition from adolescence to adult life.

Chapter 2 deals with the global review of the related literature which addresses the issue of school effectiveness during the last four decades. The literature is reviewed under 5 headings for convenience i.e. school effectiveness defined studies, programs, research paradigms and the findings.

The 3rd chapter is about the general critique on the related research. Specific criticism of particular studies reflects intuitive logic to the result of research. Few schools are known to be effective and the rest maintain a status quo. The history of education reform demonstrates that, no matter how well planned and systematic interventions in school are not always successful either in form or outline.

The 4th chapter is the concluding remarks by the author. An academically effective school is distinguished by its culture and climate of values and norms that channel staff and students in direction of successful

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teaching and learning. The logic of this cultural model is that it points to increase the organizational effectiveness of school. Schools effectiveness in one area tended to be effective in other area. There are many possible approaches to turning an academically inferior school into more successful one.

Chapter 5 and 6 give the statistical data about the research and is completely illustrated with the help of hypothesis and its findings.

Chapter 7 and 8, present the final conclusion and recommendations by the Author. A careful analysis of the findings reveals that some of the findings spring no surprises while others are rather surprising. The results that schools with most experienced teachers are found significantly superior to the schools with less experienced teachers in their degree of effectiveness stands to reason, because experience does make a difference. The recommendations are based on ground realities and are achievable if strived with dedication.

This book emphasizes on the importance of moral and intellectual development of children with help of state of the art teaching techniques and teaching facilities. Faculty plays an important role in the development process and is a vital asset for an institution. The book has blend of all these factors with logical reasoning and a useful source for schools to improve and make the institution more efficient and effective. The book has been written in a very systematical way with intensive research which further enhances the quality.

Mian Shahzad Rahim Kakakhel Department of International Relations

Faculty of Contemporary Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad


DOCUMENTS

DOCUMENT 1 JO INT STAT E ME NT O F T R ILA TER AL SU M M IT IS L AM IC RE PU B LI C

OF AF GHA NI STA N , IS LA MI C RE PU BL IC OF IR AN AND ISL AM IC

REPU B LI C O F PA K IS TAN ON “ENH ANC IN G TR I LA TER A L

COOP ER AT IO N”

ithin the framework of trilateral cooperation His Excellency Hamid Karzai President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, His Excellency Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of the

Islamic Republic of Iran and His Excellency Asif Ali Zardari, President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan held the Third Trilateral Summit in Islamabad on February 17, 2012. 2. The three Presidents pledged to enhance cooperation among the countries comprehensively for realizing the shared aspiration of their peoples for peace, security, stability and economic prosperity. 3. The three Presidents stressed the need for implementation of the earlier decisions taken at the Trilateral Summits held at Tehran in May 2009 and June 2011 respectively. While underscoring that the three countries were bound by ties of history, geography, culture and religion, the three sides agreed as follows:

i. To develop framework of comprehensive cooperation and to take pragmatic steps for realizing mutually beneficial cooperation to promote stability, peace and shared prosperity.

ii. Ensure respect for sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity, as enshrined in the UN Charter.

iii. To proceed on the basis of mutual interest, mutual respect, non-interference and non-intervention in internal affairs.

iv. Not to allow any threat emanating from their respective territories against each other. All parties agreed to commence trilateral consultations on an agreement in this regard.

v. Contribute to the development and reconstruction in Afghanistan.

vi. Broaden cooperation in the political, security, economic, cultural, social and educational fields and enhance people to people contacts including exchange visits of parliamentarians, academicians and journalists.

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vii. Strengthen cooperation for eradicating extremism, terrorism and militancy and to address the root causes of these menaces, condemning the killings of civilians as well as any kind of assassinations.

viii. Cooperate in combating the problems of narcotic drugs production and trafficking and in combating transnational organized crimes.

ix. Prioritize cooperation for socio-economic development.

x. Enhance three-way trade by facilitation measures, including preferential tariff and free trade arrangements as well as barter trade.

xi. Also expressed commitment to expand trade in transit and encourage the private sector to invest in the three countries.

xii. Enhance connectivity by promoting project cooperation in infrastructure, road and rail links, transport and communications.

xiii. Develop mutually beneficial cooperation in the energy, mining and minerals, agriculture and other sectors.

xiv. Cooperate for the safe, voluntary and early return of Afghan refugees to their homeland in honour and dignity.

xv. Emphasized the need for enhancing their cooperation at international level, especially within the United Nations system.

xvi. Mandated the Foreign Ministers to prepare and coordinate a Road Map for Trilateral Cooperation for submission to the next Summit.

xvii. Also mandated the Interior/Security Ministers to develop a framework of trilateral cooperation particularly in the areas of counter terrorism, counter-narcotics and border management within six months.

xviii. Further mandated the Commerce Ministers to outline steps for enhancing three-way economic cooperation.

xix. Mandated senior officials (Deputy Foreign Minister level) to meet regularly to monitor the implementation of the decisions taken by the Trilateral Summits.

xx. Decided that the Fourth Trilateral Summit shall be held in Kabul by the end of 2012. The exact dates will be communicated through diplomatic channels.


4. Presidents of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan reiterated their full support for an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned inclusive process of peace and reconciliation. They assured the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan that they would extend full cooperation and stressed that any initiative in this regard must have authentic Afghan ownership. 5. His Excellency Mahmood Ahmadinejad, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and His Excellency Hamid Karzai, President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan expressed profound gratitude to President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the warm hospitality extended to both delegations and for excellent arrangements made for the Third Trilateral Summit. 6. In witness whereof the Presidents of the three countries have signed this document. 7. Done in Islamabad on 17 February 2012 in three originals in English, Persian/Dari, and all texts being equally authentic. Hamid Karzai President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Mahmoud Ahmadinejad President of Islamic Republic of Iran Asif Ali Zardari President Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Islamabad, 17 February 2012 http://www.mofa.gov.pk/mfa/pages/article.aspx?id=1083&type=1

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DOCUMENT 2 TWEN TI ET H AM END M E NT ACT 2012

(As Passed By the National Assembly) A bill to further amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

hereas it is expedient further to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; It is hereby enacted as follows:- 1. Short title and commencement. - (1) This Act may be

called the Constitution (Twentieth Amendment) Act, 2012. (2) It shall come into force at once. 2. Amendment of Article 48 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, in Article 48, in clause (5), in paragraph (b), after the word “Cabinet”, the words, commas, figures and letter “in accordance with the provisions of Article 224 or, as the case may be, Article 224 A”, shall be added. 3. Amendment of Article 214 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 214,-

(a) In the marginal note, the word “Commissioner’s”, shall be omitted; and

(b) After the word “Pakistan”, the commas and words“, and a member of the Election Commission shall make before the Commissioner,”, shall be inserted.

4. Amendment of Article 215 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 215,-

(a) In the marginal note, after the word “Commissioner”, the words “and members”, shall be added;

(b) In clause (1),- (i) After the word “Commissioner”, the words “and a

member”, shall be inserted; and (ii) In the proviso, after the word “incumbent”, the word

“Commissioner”, shall be added; (c) In clause (2),-

(i) After the word “Commissioner”, occurring for the first time, the words “or a member”, shall be inserted; and

(ii) After the word “Commissioner”, at the end, the words and commas “or, as the case may be, a member”, shall be added; and

(d) In clause (3), after the word “Commissioner”, the words “or a member”, shall be inserted.

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(a) In the marginal note, after the word “Commissioner”, the words “and members”, shall be inserted;

(b) In clause (1), after the word “Commissioner”, the words “or a member”, shall be inserted; and

(c) In clause (2), after the word “Commissioner”, occurring for the first time, the words “or a member”, shall be inserted.

6. Amendment of Article 218 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 218, in clause (3), the words “constituted in relation to an election”, shall be omitted. 7. Amendment of Article 219 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 219, in paragraph (e), for the full stop, at the end, a colon shall be substituted and thereafter the following proviso shall be inserted, namely:- “Provided that till such time as the members of the Commission are

first appointed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (b) of clause (2) of Article 218 pursuant to the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, and enter upon their office, the Commissioner shall remain charged with the duties enumerated in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of this Article.”


(a) In clause (1A),- (i) in the first proviso, for the word “selected”, the word

“appointed”, shall be substituted; (ii) After the proviso, as amended hereinabove, the

following new proviso shall be inserted, namely:- “Provided further that if the Prime Minister or a Chief Minister and their respective Leader of the Opposition do not agree on any person to be appointed as a care-taker Prime Minister or the care-taker Chief Minister, as the case may be, the provisions of Article 224A shall be followed:”; and

(iii) In the second proviso, for the word “further”, the word “also”, shall be substituted; and

(b) In clause (6), for the full stop, at the end, a colon shall be substituted and thereafter the following proviso shall be added, namely:- “Provided that if at any time the party list is exhausted, the concerned political party may submit a name for any vacancy which may occur thereafter.”.

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9. Insertion of new Article 224A of the Constitution. In the Constitution, after Article 224, amended as aforesaid, the following new Article, shall be inserted, namely:- “224A. Resolution by Committee or Election Commission.

(1) In case the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the outgoing National Assembly do not agree on any person to be appointed as the care-taker Prime Minister, within three days of the dissolution of the National Assembly, they shall forward two nominees each to a Committee to be immediately constituted by the Speaker of the National Assembly, comprising eight members of the outgoing National Assembly, or the Senate, or both, having equal representation from the Treasury and the Opposition, to be nominated by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition respectively.

(2) In case a Chief Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the outgoing Provincial Assembly do not agree on any person to be appointed as the care-taker Chief Minister, within three days of the dissolution of that Assembly, they shall forward two nominees each to a Committee to be immediately constituted by the Speaker of the Provincial Assembly, comprising six members of the outgoing Provincial Assembly having equal representation from the Treasury and the Opposition, to be nominated by the Chief Minister and the Leader of the Opposition respectively.

(3) The Committee constituted under clause (1) or (2) shall finalize the name of the care-taker Prime Minister or care-taker Chief Minister, as the case may be, within three days of the referral of the matter to it: Provided that in case of inability of the Committee to decide the matter in the aforesaid period, the names of the nominees shall be referred to the Election Commission of Pakistan for final decision within two days.

(4) The incumbent Prime Minister and the incumbent Chief Minister shall continue to hold office till appointment of the care-taker Prime Minister and the care-taker Chief Minister, as the case may be.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in clauses (1) and (2), if the members of the Opposition are less than five in the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) and less than four in any Provincial Assembly, then all of them shall be members of the Committee mentioned in the aforesaid clauses and the Committee shall be deemed to be duly constituted.”.

10. Amendment of the Second Schedule to the Constitution. In the Constitution, in the Second Schedule,-


(a) In paragraph 1,- (i) For the words “Chief Election Commissioner”, the words

“Election Commission of Pakistan”, shall be substituted; and

(ii) after the word “and”, occurring for the second time, the words “Chief Election Commissioner”, shall be substituted; and

(b) In paragraphs 2 and 22, for the words “Chief Election Commissioner”, the words “Election Commission of Pakistan”, shall be substituted.

11. Amendment of the Third Schedule to the Constitution. In the Constitution, in the Third Schedule, in the Oath prescribed for the Chief Election Commissioner,-

(a) In the title, after the word “COMMISSIONER”, the words “OR A MEMBER OF THE ELECTION COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN”, shall be added; and

(b) After the word “Commissioner”, the words and commas “or, as the case may be, member of the Election Commission of Pakistan”, shall be inserted.

STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS

The Supreme Court of Pakistan had directed the Federation to constitute Election Commission of Pakistan in accordance with the amended provision of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and to legally cover the bye-elections conducted by the Chief Election Commissioner in the interregnum. Further it is also necessary to give due independence to the Election Commission of Pakistan and to provide for the manifestation of the Interim Cabinets. In order to achieve the aforesaid objectives it is necessary to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Moula Bakhsh Chandio, Minister for Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Member-in-Charge.

http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1329285999_409.pdf

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DOCUMENT 3 THE UNIT ED NAT ION S I N GL OBA L GOV ER NAN CE

United Nations A /66/L. 38 General Assembly Distr.: Limited 2 March 2012 Original: English 12-25060 (E) 060312 *1225060* Sixty-sixth session Agenda item 123 (b) Strengthening of the United Nations System: Central Role of the United

Nations System in Global Governance

Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay: Draft Resolution

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolution 65/94 of 8 December 2010, Reaffirming its respect for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

cknowledging the vital importance of an inclusive, transparent and effective Multilateral system in order to better address the urgent global challenges of today, recognizing the universality of the United

Nations, and reaffirming its commitment to promote and strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of the United Nations system, Reaffirming the role and authority of the General Assembly on global matters of concern to the international community, as set out in the Charter, Welcoming the informal thematic debate of the General Assembly, at its sixty-fifth session, on the theme “The United Nations in global governance”, organized by the President of the General Assembly on 28 June 2011, Welcoming also the convening of the regional seminar on the same theme, held at the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, in Santiago, on 8 and 9 August 2011,

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Taking into account the preparatory process of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, to be held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 20 to 22 June 2012, and the follow-up processes of all major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields, as appropriate,

1. Reiterates the need for inclusive, transparent and effective multilateral approaches to managing global challenges, and in this regard reaffirms the central role of the United Nations in ongoing efforts to find common solutions to such challenges;

2. Takes note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General on global economic governance and development; 1

3. Recognizes the importance and benefit of a continuing interaction between the General Assembly and international, regional and subregional forums, organizations and groups dealing with global matters of concern to the international community, as appropriate;

4 Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-seventh session, under the item entitled “Strengthening of the United Nations system”, the sub-item entitled “Central role of the United Nations system in global governance”, and in this regard requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly, by the end of February 2013, an analytical report focusing on global economic governance and development, with further concrete recommendations to be prepared in consultation with Member States and relevant organizations of the United Nations system, taking into account the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development and the follow-up processes of all major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields, as appropriate;

5. Invites, in this regard, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Economic and Social Council to consider organizing, in a coordinated manner, informal thematic debates on the subject of the present resolution;

6. Also invites the United Nations system, including the regional commissions, as well as international financial and trade institutions, civil society, academia, the private sector and other stakeholders, to contribute to these deliberations as appropriate.

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/L.38&Lang=E

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DOCUMENT 4 UNIT ED NAT IO NS SE CU R ITY C OU NC I L RE SO LU T ION 2017 (2011)

ADOPT ED B Y T HE SECU R ITY C OU NC I L AT IT S 6644 T H ME ET IN G ,

ON 31 OCT OB ER 2011

The Security Council,

ecalling its previous resolutions 1373 (2001), 1526 (2004), 1540 (2004), 1970 (2011), 1973 (2011), 1977 (2011), 1989 (2011), 2009 (2011) and 2016 (2011), and the statements of its Presidents

S/PRST/2005/7 and S/PRST/2010/6, Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty,

independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya, Stressing that national ownership and national responsibility are

key to establishing sustainable peace in Libya, Stressing also the importance of the United Nations Support Mission

in Libya, in accordance with its mandate under resolution 2009 (2011), assisting and supporting Libyan national efforts, inter alia to restore public security and order,

Recalling that, pursuant to paragraph 10 of resolution 1970 (2011), Member States are obliged to prohibit the procurement of all arms and related material from Libya by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Libya,

Expressing concern at the proliferation of all arms and related materiel of all types, in particular man-portable surface-to-air missiles, from Libya, in the region and its potential impact on regional and international peace and security,

Underlining the risk of destabilization posed by the dissemination in the Sahel region of illicit small arms and light weapons, and recalling in that regard the Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa (S/2011/388), which, inter alia calls for strengthened cooperation in the Sahel area, as well as the work of the United Nation Office for Central Africa,

Recognizing the urgent need for additional efforts to be made at the national, regional and international levels, in order to prevent the proliferation of all arms and related materiel of all types, in particular man-portable surface-to-air missiles, in the region,

Recognizing also the urgent need to secure and destroy chemical weapons stockpiles in Libya, in accordance with its international obligations,

Emphasizing that the proliferation of all arms and related materiel of all types, in particular, man-portable surface-to-air missiles, in the region

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could fuel terrorist activities, including those of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,

Reaffirming, in that regard, that terrorism constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security,

Reiterating the obligation of Member States to cooperate in order to prevent the movement of terrorist groups, and the proliferation of arms in support of terrorist activities, inter alia through effective border control,

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

1. Calls upon the Libyan authorities to take all necessary steps to prevent the proliferation of all arms and related materiel of all types, in particular man portable surface-to-air missiles, to ensure their proper custody, as well as to meet Libya’s arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation obligations under international law, through the full implementation of their plans in this regard;

2. Further calls upon the Libyan authorities to continue their close coordination with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, with the aim of destroying their stockpiles of chemical weapons, in accordance with their international obligations;

3. Calls upon States in the region to consider appropriate measures to prevent the proliferation of all arms and related materiel of all types, in particular man-portable surface-to-air missiles, in the region;

4. Calls upon Member States, international and regional organizations and entities, including relevant United Nations bodies, to provide the necessary assistance to the Libyan authorities and States in the region in order to achieve this goal;

5. Requests the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011), with assistance from its Panel of Experts, and in cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, and working with other relevant United Nations bodies including the International Civil Aviation Organization, and in consultation with international and regional organizations and entities, to assess the threats and challenges, in particular related to terrorism, posed by the proliferation of all arms and related materiel of all types, in particular man-portable surface-to-air missiles, from Libya, in the region, and to submit a report to the Council on proposals to counter this threat, and to prevent the proliferation of arms and related materiel, including, inter alia, measures to secure these arms and related materiel, to ensure that stockpiles are managed safely and

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securely, to strengthen border control and to enhance transport security;

6 Requests the Secretary-General to include in his reports pursuant to resolution 2009 (2011) to the Security Council updates on the implementation of this resolution;

7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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DOCUMENT 5 UNIT ED NAT IO NS SE CU R ITY C OU NC I L RE SO LU T ION 1999 (2011)

ADOPT ED B Y T HE SECU R ITY C OU NC I L AT I TS 6582N D ME ET IN G , ON

13 JU L Y 2011


aving examined the application of the Republic of South Sudan for admission to the United Nations (S/2011/418), Recommends to the General Assembly that the Republic of South

Sudan be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

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DOCUMENT 6

UNIT ED NAT IO NS SE CU R ITY C OU NC I L R E SO LU T ION 1990 (2011)

ADOPT ED B Y T HE SECU R ITY C OU NC I L AT I TS 6567 T H ME ET IN G , ON

27 JU N E 2011


ecalling its previous resolutions and its presidential statements on the situation in Sudan, and noting the priority it attaches to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Reaffirming

its commitment to the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity; and to peace, stability and security throughout the region, Reaffirming its previous resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 1882 (2009) on children in armed conflict, 1502 (2003) on the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel, and 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), and 1889 (2009) on women peace and security, Welcoming the Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area reached on 20 June 2011 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Commending the assistance provided to the parties by the African Union High Level Implementation Panel and its chair President Thabo Mbeki, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Haile Menkerios, Noting the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement’s request for the assistance of the Government of Ethiopia with regard to this matter, Noting the readiness of the United Nations and the international community to assist the parties in establishing and implementing mutual security arrangements in support of the objectives of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Bearing in mind the importance of coherence of United Nations assistance in the region, Deeply concerned by the current situation in the Abyei Area, and by all acts of violence committed against civilians in violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law including the killing and displacement of significant number of civilians, Reaffirming the importance of full and urgent implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by both parties, Calling on all parties involved to provide humanitarian personnel with full and unimpeded access to civilians in need of assistance and all necessary facilities for their operations, in accordance with international humanitarian law,

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Urging all parties to facilitate the rapid return of internally displaced persons, Noting the intent of the parties to establish a special unit of the Abyei Police Service which shall deal with particular issues related to nomadic migration, Welcoming and encouraging efforts by the United Nations to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases in all of its peacekeeping operations, Calling upon all parties to engage constructively in negotiations towards the final agreement on the status of Abyei, Recognizing that the current situation in Abyei demands an urgent response and constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

1. Decides to establish, for a period of 6 months, the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), taking into account the Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area, and further decides that UNISFA shall comprise a maximum of 4,200 military personnel, 50 police personnel, and appropriate civilian support;

2. Decides that UNISFA shall have the following mandate, in addition to tasks set out in paragraph 3:

(a) Monitor and verify the redeployment of any Sudan Armed Forces, Sudan People’s Liberation Army or its successor, from the Abyei Area as defined by the Permanent Court of Arbitration; henceforth, the Abyei Area shall be demilitarized from any forces other than UNISFA and the Abyei Police Service,

(b) Participate in relevant Abyei Area bodies as stipulated in the Agreement,

(c) Provide, in cooperation with other international partners in the mine action sector, de-mining assistance and technical advice,

(d) Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel in coordination with relevant Abyei Area bodies as defined by the Agreement,

(e) Strengthen the capacity of the Abyei Police Service by providing support, including the training of personnel, and coordinate with the Abyei Police Service on matters of law and order, and

(f) When necessary and in cooperation with the Abyei Police Service, provide security for oil infrastructure in the Abyei Area;

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3. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes UNISFA within its capabilities and its area of deployment to take the necessary actions to:

(a) protect UNISFA personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment,

(b) protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment,

(c) ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian personnel and members of the Joint Military Observers Committee and Joint Military Observer Teams,

(d) without prejudice to the responsibilities of the relevant authorities, to protect civilians in the Abyei Area under imminent threat of physical violence,

(e) protect the Abyei Area from incursions by unauthorized elements, as defined in the Agreement, and

(f) ensure security in the Abyei Area. 4. Requests that the Secretary-General and the Government of

Sudan, in consultation with the Government of Southern Sudan or its successor, conclude a status-of-forces agreement immediately after the adoption of this resolution, taking into consideration General Assembly resolution 64/77 on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel, and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that, until such an agreement is concluded, the status-of-forces agreement for the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) shall apply mutatis mutandis in respect of UNISFA;

5. Calls on all Member States to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from Abyei of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, which are for the exclusive and official use of UNISFA;

6. Underscores the imperative of expeditious deployment of UNISFA and urges the Secretary-General to take necessary steps to ensure rapid and efficient implementation;

7. Urges the Government of Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan or its successor to fully cooperate with each other and provide full support to UNISFA, enabling it to fully implement the mandate;

8. Stresses that improved cooperation between the Government of Sudan and Government of Southern Sudan or its successor, is also critical for peace, security and stability and the future relations between them;


9. Calls upon the Government of Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan or its successor urgently to fulfil their commitment under the CPA to resolve peacefully the final status of Abyei, and calls upon them to consider in good faith proposals the African Union High Level Implementation Panel shall make to resolve this matter;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that effective human rights monitoring is carried out, and the results included in his reports to the Council;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of the progress in implementing the Agreement and to report to the Council no later than thirty days after the adoption of this resolution and every 60 days thereafter;

12. Decides to review UNISFA’s role in the implementation of the Agreement not later than 3 months after adoption of this resolution;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance of UNISFA with the United Nations zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and to keep the Council informed if cases of such conduct occur;

14. Decides to remain actively seized of matter.

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DOCUMENT 7

EI GHT E ENT H AM EN DM E NT ACT 2011

[AS PAS S ED B Y TH E NA TIO NAL AS S E MBL Y]

A bi ll further to amend the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan

HEREAS it is expedient further to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the purposes hereinafter appearing;

AND WHEREAS the people of Pakistan have relentlessly struggled for

democracy and for attaining the ideals of a Federal, Islamic, democratic, parliamentary and modern progressive welfare State, wherein the rights of the citizens are secured and the Provinces have equitable share in the Federation;

AND WHEREAS it is necessary that the Legal Framework Order, 2002, as amended by the Chief Executive’s Order No. 29 and the Chief Executive’s Order No. 32 of 2002, be declared as having been made without lawful authority and of no legal effect, and the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 2003 (Act No. 111 of 2003), be repealed and the Constitution further amended

to achieve the aforesaid objectives; It is hereby enacted as follows: 1. Short title and, commencement: (1) This Act may be called the

Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010. (2) It shall come into force at once, save as

otherwise provided in this Act. 2. Repeal, etc.- Subject to Article 264 and the provisions of the

Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, (a) the Legal Framework Order, 2402 (Chief Executive’s Order No. 24

of 2002), the Legal Framework (Amendment) Order, 2002 (Chief Executive’s Order No. 29 of 2002) and the Legal Framework (Second Amendment) Order, 2002 (Chief Executive’s Order No. 32 of 2002), are hereby declared to have been, made without lawful authority and of no legal effect and, therefore, shall stand repealed; and

(b) the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 2003 (Act No. III of 2003), is hereby repealed.

3. Amendment of Article 1 of the Constitution.- In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the

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Constitution, in Article 1, in clause (2), in paragraph (a), for the word “Baluchistan” the word “Balochistan”, for the words “North West Frontier” the words “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa”, and for the word “Sind” the word “Sindh”, shall be substituted.

4. Amendment of Article 6 of the Constitution.- In the Constitution, in Article 6, (i) for clause (1), the following shall be substituted, namely: “(1) Any person who abrogates or subverts or suspends or holds in abeyance, or attempts or conspires to abrogate or subvert or suspend or hold in abeyance, the Constitution by use of force or show of force or by any other unconstitutional means shall be guilty of high treason. (ii) in clause (2), after the word “abetting” the word “or collaborating” shall be inserted; and (iii) after clause (2) amended as aforesaid, the following new clause shall be inserted, namely:- “(2A). An act of high treason mentioned in clause (1) or clause (2) shall not be validated by any court including the Supreme Court and a High Court.”

5. Insertion of new Article in the Constitution: In the Constitution, after Article 10, the following new Article shall be inserted, namely: “10A. Right to fair trial.- For the determination of his civil rights and obligations or in any criminal charge against him a person shall be entitled to a fair trial and due process.”

6. Substitution of Article 17 of the Constitution.- In the Constitution, for Article 17, the following shall be substituted, namely: “17. Freedom of association. (1) Every citizen shall have the right to form associations or unions, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, public order or morality. (2) Every citizen, not being in the service of Pakistan, shall have the right to form or ,be a member of a political party, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan and such law shall provide that where the Federal Government declares that any political party has been formed or is operating in a manner prejudicial to the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, the Federal Government shall, within fifteen days of such declaration, refer the matter to the Supreme Court whose decision on such reference shall be final. (3) Every political party shall account for the source of its funds in accordance with law.”.

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7. Insertion of new Article in the Constitution.- In the Constitution, after Article 19, the following new Article shall be inserted, namely: “19A. Right to information.- Every citizen shall have the right to have access to information in all matters of public importance subject to regulation and reasonable restrictions imposed by law”.

8. Amendment of Article 25 of the Constitution.- In the Constitution, in Article 25, in clause (2), the word “alone” occurring at the end shall be omitted

9. Insertion of new Article in the Constitution.- In the Constitution, after Article 25, the following new Article shall be inserted, namely: “25A. Right to education.-The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of five to sixteen years in such manner as may be determined by law.”

10. Amendment of Article 27 of the Constitution.- In the Constitution, in Article 27, in clause (1), in the second proviso, for the full stop at the end a colon shall be substituted and thereafter the following proviso shall be inserted, namely: “Provided-also that under-representation of any class or area in the service of Pakistan may be redressed in such manner as may be determined by an Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)”.

11. Amendment of Article 29 of the Constitution.- In the Constitution, in Article 29, in clause (3), for the word “the National Assembly” occurring for the first time the wards and brackets, “each House of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)” shall be substituted and after the word “National Assembly” occurring for the second time the words “and the Senate” shall be inserted.

12. Amendment of Article 38 of the Constitution,- In the Constitution, in Article 38,-

(i) in paragraph (e), the world “and” at the end shall be omitted; (ii) in paragraph (f), for the full stop at the end a semicolon and the word “;and” shall be added and after paragraph (f) amended as aforesaid, the following new paragraph shall be added, namely:-

“(g) the shares of the Provinces in all federal services, including autonomous bodies and corporations established by, or under the control of, the Federal Government, shall be secured and any omission in the allocation of the shares of the Provinces in the past shall be rectified.”


13. Amendment of Article 41 of the Constitution.- In the Constitution, in Article 41,-

(i) in clause (3), the words, brackets and figure “to be elected after the term specified in clause (7)” shall be omitted; and (ii) clauses (7), (8) and (9) shall be omitted.

14. Substitution of Article 46 of the Constitution.- In the Constitution, for Article 46, the following shall be substituted namely:- “46. President to be kept informed.- The Prime Minister shall keep the President informed on all matters of internal and foreign policy and on all legislative proposals the Federal Government intends to bring before Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)”.


(i) In clause (1),- (a) after the word “act” the words “on and” shall be inserted; and (b) in the proviso, after the word “that” the words “within fifteen

days” shall be inserted and after the word “shall” the commas and words“, within ten days,” shall be inserted; and

(ii) for clause (5) the following shall be substituted, namely: - “(5) Where the President dissolves the National Assembly, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1), he shall,- (a) appoint a date, not later than ninety days from the date of the

dissolution, for the holding of a general election to the Assembly; and

(b) appoint a care-taker Cabinet.”. (iii) for clause (6) the following shall be substituted, namely: - “(6). If

at any time the Prime Minister considers it necessary to hold a referendum on any matter of national importance, he may refer the matter to a joint sitting of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) and if it is approved in a joint sitting, the Prime Minister may cause such matter to be referred to a referendum in the form of a question that is capable of being answered by either “Yes” or “No”.

16. Substitution of Article 51 of the Constitution.- In the Constitution, for Article 51, the following shall be substituted and shall be deemed always to have been so substituted with effect from the 21st day of August, 2002, namely:-

“51. National Assembly.-(1) There shall be three hundred and forty-two seats for members in the National Assembly, including seats reserved for women and non-Muslims.

(2) A person shall be entitled to vote if-

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(a) he is a citizen of Pakistan; (b) he is not less than eighteen years of age; (c) his name appears on the electoral roll; and (d) he is not declared by a competent court to be of unsound mind. (3) The seats in the National Assembly referred to in clause (1), except as provided in clause (4), shall be allocated to each Province, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Federal Capital as under:-

General Seats Women Total

Balochistan 14 3 17 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 35 8 43 Punjab 148 35 183 Sindh 61 14 75 Federally Administered 12 - 12 Tribal Areas Federal Capital 2 - 2 Total 272 60 332 (4) In addition to the number of seats referred to in clause (3), there shall be, in the National Assembly, ten seats reserved for

non-Muslims. (5) The seats in the National Assembly shall be allocated to each

Province, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Federal Capital on the basis of population in accordance with the last preceding census officially published.

(6) For the purpose of election to the National Assembly,- (a) the constituencies for the general seats shall be single member

territorial constituencies and the members to fill such seats shall be elected by direct and free vote in accordance with law,

(b) each Province shall be a single constituency for all seats reserved for women which are allocated to the respective Provinces under clause (3);

(c) the constituency for all seats reserved for non-Muslims shall be the whole country;

(d) members to the-seats reserved for women which are allocated to a Province under clause (3) shall be elected in accordance with law through proportional representation system of political parties’ lists of candidates on the basis of total number of general seats secured by each political party from the Province concerned in the National Assembly:


Provided that for the purpose of this paragraph the total number of general seats won by a political party shall include the independent returned candidate or candidates who may duly join such political party within three days of the publication in the official Gazette of the names of the returned candidates;

(e) members to the seats reserved for non-Muslims shall be elected in accordance with law through proportional representation system of political parties’ lists of candidates on the basis of total number of general seats won by each political party in the National Assembly:

Provided that for the purpose of this paragraph the total number of general seats won by a political party shall include the independent returned candidate or candidates who may duly join such political party within three days of the publication in the official Gazette of the names of the returned candidates.”

17. Substitution of Article 58 of the Constitution.- In the Constitution, for Article 58, the following shall be substituted, namely:- “58. Dissolution of the National Assembly.- (1) The President shall dissolve the National Assembly if so advised by the Prime Minister; and the National Assembly shall, unless sooner dissolved, stand dissolved at the expiration of forty-eight hours after the Prime Minister has so advised.

Explanation.- Reference in this Article to “Prime Minister”, shall not be construed to include reference to a Prime Minister against whom a notice of a resolution for a vote of no-confidence has been given in the National Assembly but has not been voted upon or against whom such a resolution has been passed or who is continuing in office after his resignation or after the dissolution of the National Assembly.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (2) of Article 48, the President may also dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion where, a vote of no-confidence having been passed against the Prime Minister, no other member of the National Assembly commands the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, as ascertained in a session of the National Assembly summoned for the purpose.”.

18. Substitution of Article 59 of the Constitution.- In the Constitution, for Article 59, the following shall be substituted, namely:

“59. The Senate.- (1) The Senate shall consist of one-hundred and four members, of whom,-

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(a) fourteen shall be elected by the members of each Provincial Assembly;

(b) eight shall be elected from the Federally, Administered Tribal Areas, in such manner as the President may, by Order, prescribe;

(c) two on general seats, and one woman and one technocrat including aalim shall be elected from the Federal Capital in such manner as the President may, by Order, prescribe;

(d) four women shall be elected by the members of each Provincial Assembly;

(e) four technocrats including ulema shall be elected by the members of each Provincial Assembly; and

(f) four non-Muslims, one from each Province, shall be elected by the members of each Provincial Assembly:

Provided that paragraph (f) shall be effective from the next Senate election after the commencement of the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010.

(2) Election to fill seats in the Senate allocated to each Province shall be held in accordance with the system of proportional

representation by means of the single transferable vote. (3) The Senate shall not be subject to dissolution but the term of its

members, who shall retire as follows, shall be six years:- (a) of the members referred to in paragraph (a) of clause (1), seven

shall retire after the expiration of the first three years and seven shall retire after the expiration of the next three years;

(b) of the members referred to in paragraph (b) of the aforesaid clause, four shall retire after the expiration of the first three years and four shall retire after the expiration of the next three years;

(c) of the members referred to in paragraph © of the aforesaid clause,-

(i) one elected on general seat shall retire after the expiration of the first three years and the other one shall retire after the expiration of the next three years; and

(ii) one elected on the seat reserved for technocrat shall retire after first three years and the one elected on the seat reserved for women shall retire after the expiration of the next three years;

(d) of the members referred to in paragraph (d) of the aforesaid clause, two shall retire after the expiration of the first three years and two shall retire after the expiration of the next three years;


(e) of the members referred to in paragraph (e) of the aforesaid clause, two shall retire after the expiration of the first three years and two shall retire after the expiration of the next three years; and (f) of the members referred to in paragraph (f) of the aforesaid clause, two shall retire after the expiration of first three years and two shall retire after the expiration of next three years:

Provided that the Election Commission for the first term of seats for non-Muslims shall draw a lot as to which two members shall retire after the first three years.

(4) The term of office of a person elected to fill a casual vacancy shall be the unexpired term of the member whose vacancy he has filled.

19. Amendment of Article 61 of the Constitution.- In the Constitution, in Article 61, for the word “ninety” the words “one hundred and ten” shall be substituted.

20. Substitution of Article 62 of the Constitution.- In the Constitution, for Article 62, the following shall be substituted,namely: -

“62. Qualifications for membership of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament).- (1)A person shall not be qualified to be elected or chosen as a member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) unless-

(a) he is a citizen of Pakistan; (b) he is, in the case of the National Assembly, not less than twenty-

five years of age and is enrolled as a voter in any electoral roll in-

(i) any part of Pakistan, for election to a general seat or a . seat reserved for a non-Muslims; and (ii) any area in a Province from which she seeks membership for election to a seat reserved for women.

(c) he is, in the case of the Senate, not less than thirty years of age and is enrolled as a voter in any area in a Province or, as

the case may be, the Federal Capital or the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, from where he seeks membership; (d) he is of good character and is not commonly known as one who

violates Islamic Injunctions; (e) he has adequate knowledge of Islamic teachings and practices

obligatory duties prescribed by Islam as well as well abstains from major sins;

(f) he is sagacious, righteous, non-profligate, honest and ameen, there being no declaration to the contrary by a court of law;

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(g) he has not, after the establishment of Pakistan, worked against the integrity of the country or opposed the ideology of Pakistan:

(2) The disqualifications specified in paragraphs (d) and (e) shall not apply to a person who is a non-Muslim, but such a person shall have good moral reputation;”.

21. Substitution of Article 63 of the Constitution.- In the Constitution, for Article 63, the following shall be substituted,namely,-

“63. Disqualifications for membership of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament). (1) A person shall be disqualified from being elected or chosen as, and from being, a member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament),(a) he is of unsound mind and has been so declared by a competent court; or (b) he is an undischarged insolvent; or (c) he ceases to be a citizen of Pakistan, or acquires the citizenship of a foreign State; or

(d) he holds an office of profit in the service of Pakistan other than an office declared by law not to disqualify its holder; or

(e) he is in the service of any statutory body or anybody which is owned or controlled by the Government or in which the Government has a controlling share or interest; or (f) being a citizen of Pakistan by virtue of section 14B of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 (II of 1951), he is for the time being disqualified under any law in force in Azad Jammu and Kashmir from being elected as a member of the Legislative Assembly of Azad Jammu and Kashmir; or

(g) he has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction for propagating any opinion, or acting in any manner, prejudicial to the ideology of Pakistan, or the sovereignty, integrity or security of Pakistan, or the integrity or independence of the judiciary of Pakistan, or which defames or brings into ridicule the judiciary or the Armed Forces of Pakistan, unless a period of five years has elapsed since his release; or

(h) he has been, on conviction for any offence involving moral turpitude, sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than two years, unless a period of five years has elapsed since his release; or

(i) he has been dismissed from the service of Pakistan or service of a corporation or office set up or, controlled, by the Federal Government, Provincial Government or a Local Government on the ground of misconduct, unless a period of five years has elapsed since his dismissal; or


(j) he has been removed or compulsorily retired from the service of Pakistan or service of a corporation or office set up or controlled by the Federal Government, Provincial Government or a Local Government on the ground of misconduct, unless a period of three years has elapsed since his removal or compulsory retirement; or

(k) he has been in the service of Pakistan or of any statutory body or anybody which is owned or controlled by the Government or in which the Government has a controlling share or interest, unless a period of two years has elapsed since he ceased to be in such service; or

(I) he, whether by himself or by any person or body of persons in trust for him or for his benefit or on his account or as a member of a Hindu undivided family, has any share or interest in a contract, not being a contract between a cooperative society and Government, for the supply of goods to, or for the execution of any contract or for the performance of any service undertaken by, Government:

Provided that the disqualification under this paragraph shall not apply to a person-

(i) where the share or interest in the contract devolves on him by inheritance or succession or as a legatee, executor or administrator, until the expiration of six months after it has so devolved on him;

(ii) where the contract has been entered into by or on behalf of a public company as defined in the Companies Ordinance, 1984 ¦ (XLVII of 1984), of which he is a shareholder but is not a director holding an office of profit under the company; or

(iii) where he is a member of a Hindu undivided family and the contract has been entered into by any other member of that family in the course of carrying on a separate business in which he has no share or interest; or

Explanation. -In this Article “goods” does not include agricultural produce or commodity grown or produced by him or such goods as he is, under any directive of Government or any law for the time being in force, under a duty or obligation to supply.

(m) he holds any office of profit in the service of Pakistan other than the following offices, namely:-

(i) an office which is not whole time office remunerated either by salary or by fee;

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(ii) the office of Lumbardar, whether called by this or any other title; (iii) the Qaumi Razakars; (iv) any office the holder whereof, by virtue

of such office, is liable to be called up for military training or military service under any law providing for the constitution or raising of a

Force; or (n) he has obtained a loan for an amount of two million rupees or

more, from any bank, financial institution, cooperative society or cooperative body in his own name or in the name of his spouse or any of his dependents, which remains unpaid for more than one year from the due date, or has got such loan written off; or

(o) he or his spouse or any of his dependents has defaulted in payment of government dues and utility expenses, including .telephone, electricity, gas and water charges in excess of ten thousand rupees, for over six months, at the time of filing his nomination papers; or

(p) he is for the time being disqualified from being elected or chosen as a member of a Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) or of Provincial Assembly under any law for the time being inforce.

Explanation.-For the purposes of this paragraph “law” shall not include an Ordinance promulgated under Article 89 or Article 128.

(2) If any question arises whether a member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) has become disqualified from being a member, the Speaker or, as the case may be, the Chairman, shall, unless he decides that no such question has arisen, refer the question to the Election Commission within thirty days and should he fail to do so within the aforesaid period it shall be deemed to have been referred to the Election Commission.

(3) The Election Commission shall decide the question within ninety days from its receipt or deemed to have been received and if it is of the opinion that the member has become disqualified, he shall cease to be a member and his seat shall become vacant.”

22. Substitution of Article 63A of the Constitution.- In the Constitution, for Article 63A, the following shall be substituted, namely:-

“63A. Disqualification on grounds of defection, etc.-(l) If a member of a Parliamentary Party composed of a single political party in a House-


(a) resigns from membership of his political party or joins another Parliamentary Party; or

(b) votes or abstains from voting in the House contrary to any direction issued by the Parliamentary Party to which he belongs, in relation to-

(i) election of the Prime Minister or the Chief Minister; or (ii) a vote of confidence or a vote of no-confidence; or (iii) a Money Bill or a Constitution (Amendment) Bill; he may be

declared in writing by the Party Head to have defected from the political party, and the Party Head may forward a copy of the declaration to the Presiding Officer and the Chief Election Commissioner and shall similarly forward a copy thereof to the member concerned:

Provided that before making the declaration, the Party Head shall provide such member with an opportunity to show cause as to why such declaration may not be made against him.

Explanation.- “Party Head” means any person, by whatever name called, declared as such by the Party.

(2) A member of a House shall be deemed to be a member of a Parliamentary Party if he, having been elected as a candidate or nominee of a political party which constitutes the Parliamentary Party in the House or, having been elected otherwise than as a candidate or nominee of a political party, has become a member of such Parliamentary Party after such election by means of a declaration in writing. (3) Upon receipt of the declaration under clause (1), the Presiding Officer of the House shall within two days refer, and in case he fails to do so it shall be deemed that he has referred,the declaration to the Chief Election Commissioner who shall lay the declaration before the Election Commission for its decision thereon confirming the declaration or otherwise within thirty days of its receipt by the Chief Election Commissioner.

(4) Where the Election Commission confirms the declaration, the member referred to in clause (1) shall cease to be a member of the House and his seat shall become vacant.

(5) Any party aggrieved by the decision of the Election Commission may, within thirty days, prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court which shall decide the matter within ninety days from the date of the filing of the appeal.

(6) Nothing contained in this Article shall apply to the Chairman or Speaker of a House.

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(7) For the purpose of this Article,- (a) “House” means the National Assembly or the Senate, in relation to

the Federation; and a Provincial Assembly in relation to the Province, as the case may be;

(b) “Presiding Officer” means the Speaker of the National Assembly, the Chairman of the Senate or the Speaker of the Provincial Assembly, as the case may be.

(8) Article 63A substituted as aforesaid shall come into effect from the next general elections to be held after the commencement of the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010:

Provided that till Article 63A substituted as aforesaid comes into effect the provisions of existing Article 63A shall remain operative.”.

23. Substitution of Article 70 of the Constitution.- In the Constitution, for Article 70, the following shall be substituted, namely:-

“70. Introduction and passing of Bills. (1) A Bill with respect to any matter in the Federal Legislative List may originate in either House and shall, if it is passed by the House in which it originated, be transmitted to the other House; and, if the Bill is passed without amendment by the other House also, it shall be presented to the President for assent.

(2) If a Bill transmitted to a House under clause (1) is passed with amendments it shall be sent back to the House in which it originated and if that House passes the Bill with those amendments it shall be presented to the President for assent.

(3) If a Bill transmitted to a House under clause (1) is rejected or is not passed within ninety days of its laying in the House or a Bill sent to a House under clause (2) with amendments is not passed by that House with such amendments, the Bill, at the request of the House in which it originated, shall be considered in a joint sitting and if passed by the votes of the majority of the members present and voting in the joint sitting it shall be presented to the President for assent.

(4) In this Article and the succeeding provisions of the Constitution, “Federal Legislative List” means the Federal Legislative List in the Fourth Schedule.”.

24. Omission of Article 71 of the Constitution.- In the Constitution, Article 71 shall be omitted.

25. Amendment of Article 73 of the Constitution.- In the Constitution, in Article 73, -


(i) For clause (1) the following shall be substituted, namely:-“(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 70,, a Money Bill shall originate in the National Assembly:

Provided that simultaneously when a Money Bill, including the Finance Bill containing the Annual Budget Statement, is presented in the National Assembly,a copy thereof shall be transmitted to the Senate which may, within fourteen days, make recommendations thereon to the National Assembly.”; and

(ii) after clause (1) substituted as aforesaid, the following new clause shall be inserted, namely:-

“(1A) The National Assembly shall, consider the recommendations of the Senate and after the Bill has been’ passed by the Assembly with or without incorporating the recommendations of the Senate, it shall be presented to the President for assent.”.


(i) in clause (1), for the word “thirty”, the word “ten” shall be substituted;

(ii) for clause (2), the following shall be substituted,namely:-“(2) When the President has returned a Bill to the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), it shall be reconsidered by the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) in joint sitting and, if it is again passed, with or without amendment, by the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), by the votes of the majority of the members of both Houses present and voting, it shall be deemed for the purposes of the Constitution to have been passed by both Houses and shall be presented to the President, and the President shall give his assent within ten days, failing which such assent shall be deemed to have been given.” ; and (iii) in clause (3), after the word “assented”, the words “or is deemed to have assented”, shall be inserted.

27. Amendment of Article 89 of the Constitution.- In the Constitution,in Article 89,-

(i) in clause (1), before the words “National Assembly” the words “Senate or” shall be inserted; (ii) in clause (2), in paragraph (a),-

(a) in sub-paragraph (i), for the words “four months” the words “one hundred and twenty days” shall be substituted; and for the semi-colon at the end a colon shall be substituted and thereafter the following proviso shall be inserted, namely:-

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“Provided that the National Assembly may, .by a resolution extend the Ordinance for a further period of one hundred and twenty days and it shall stand repealed at the expiration of the extended period, or if before the expiration of that period a resolution disapproving it is passed by the Assembly, upon the passing of that resolution:

Provided further that extension for further period may be made only once.”;and (b) in sub-paragraph (ii), for the words “four months” the words “one hundred and twenty days” shall be substituted and for the semi-colon and the word “;and “ at the end a colon shall be substituted and thereafter the following provisos shall be inserted , namely:-

Provided that either House may by a resolution extend it for a further period of one hundred and twenty days and it shall stand repealed at the expiration of the extended period, or if before the expiration of that period a resolution disapproving it is passed by a House, upon the passing of that resolution:

Provided further that extension for a further period may be made only once.

(iii) for clause (3), the following shall be substituted, namely: - “(3) without prejudice to the provisions of clause

(2),-“ (a) an Ordinance laid before the National Assembly under sub-

paragraph (i) of paragraph (a) of clause (2) shall be deemed to be a Bill introduced in the National Assembly; and

(b) an Ordinance laid before both Houses under sub-paragraph(ii) of paragraph (a) of clause (2) shall be deemed to be a Bill introduced in the House where it was first laid.”

28. Substitution of Article 90 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, for Article 90, the following shall be substituted, namely:-“90. The Federal Government. (1) Subject to the Constitution, the executive authority of the Federation shall be exercised in the name of the

President by the Federal Government, consisting of the Prime Minister and the Federal Ministers, which shall act through the Prime Minister, who shall be the chief executive of the Federation. (2) In the performance of his functions under the Constitution, the Prime Minster may act either directly or through the Federal Ministers.”.

29. Substitution of Article 91 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, for Article 91, the following shall be substituted, namely: - “91.


The Cabinet- (1) There shall be a Cabinet of Ministers, with the Prime Minister at its head, to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions.

(2) The National Assembly shall meet on the twenty-first day following the day on which a general election to the Assembly is held, unless sooner summoned by the President. t

(3) After the election of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker, the National Assembly shall, to the exclusion of any other business, proceed to elect without debate one of its Muslim members to be the Prime Minister.

(4) The Prime Minister shall be elected by the votes of the majority of the total membership of the National Assembly:

Provided that, if no member secures such majority in the first poll, a second poll shall be held between the members who secure the two highest numbers of votes in the first poll and the member who secures a majority of votes of the members present and voting shall be declared to have been elected as Prime Minister:

Provided further that, if the number of votes secured by two or more members securing the highest number of votes is equal, further poll shall be held between them until one of them secures a majority of votes of the members present and voting.

(5) The member elected under clause (4) shall be called upon by the President to assume the office of Prime Minister and he shall, before entering upon the office, make before the President oath in the form set out in the Third Schedule:

Provided that there shall be no restriction on the number of terms for the office of the Prime Minister.

(6) The Cabinet, together with the Ministers of State, shall be collectively responsible to the Senate and the National Assembly.

(7) The Prime Minister shall hold office during the pleasure of the President, but the President shall not exercise his powers under this clause unless he is satisfied that the Prime Minister does not command the confidence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly, in which case he shall summon the National Assembly and require the Prime Minister to obtain a vote of confidence from the Assembly.

(8) The Prime Minister may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office.

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(9) A Minister who for any period of six consecutive months is not a member of the National Assembly shall, at the expiration of that period, cease to be a Minister and shall not before the dissolution of that Assembly be again appointed a Minister unless he is elected a member of that Assembly:

Provided that nothing contained in this clause shall apply to a Minister who is member of the Senate.

(10) Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed as disqualifying the Prime Minister or any other Minister or a Minister of State for continuing in office during any period during which the National Assembly stands dissolved, or as preventing the appointment of any person as Prime Minister or other Minister or a Minister of State during any such period.”

30. Amendment of Article 92 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 92, in clause (1),-

(i) for the brackets and figures “(7) and (8)” the brackets and figures “(9) and (10)” shall be substituted;

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GUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTORS Journal of Contemporary Studies is published bi-annually in Winter and Summer by the Faculty of Contemporary Studies, NDU. Research Scholars who wish to contribute their original, unpublished articles and book reviews to the Journal may submit these by the end of March for the Summer and by end of September for the Winter editions. Papers/articles should not be longer than 7000 words or less than 3500 words with an abstract of about 150-200 words. Reviews of recent books by scholars of standing in field may comprise 1100-1500 words. Authors are required to submit both soft and hard copies, along with their brief introduction, in MS Word format to the editor at following address:

Postal Address: Editor in Chief, Journal of Contemporary Studies, Faculty of Contemporary Studies National Defence University, Sector E-9, Islamabad Ph: (92-51-92620664 ; Fax: 92-51-2853655

Email: [email protected] Deadline for Submission: March 31st for Summer Issue & 30 September

for Winter Issue. Referencing: Footnotes should be based on The Chicago

Manual of Style, e.g. observe the following examples before submitting your paper:

Reference to a Book: S.M. Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An

Historical Analysis (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988), 118.

Reference to a Journal: Ali A. Mazrui, “Has a Clash of Civilization Begun? From the Cold War of Ideology to a Hot War of Religion,” NDU Journal VI, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 17-27.

Reference to a Newspaper

Article:

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “London Moot & the Kashmir Dispute,” Pakistan Observer (Islamabad), December 4, 2007.

Reference to a Newspaper: Dawn (Islamabad), July 30, 2007. Reference to an Internet

Source:

Hamid Hussain, “The Tale of a Love Affair that Never Was: United States-Pakistan Defence Relations,” Defence Journal June, 2002, www.defencejournal.com/ 2002/june/loveaffair.html. (accessed September 2, 2009)

For reference already cited in full, use Ibid. For reference cited already elsewhere, use short title form (i.e., Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 118.) instead of op.cit or loc.cit. Give page number or date, if different from the one already cited. Avoid citing too many references. Cite only the most authentic reference.

Writing Style:

1. British spellings should be used. 2. Date should be written as December 7, 2007. 3. Abbreviations should be written in brackets after writing within bracket after

spelling the acronym in full at first use, e.g., the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Subsequently only SAARC should be used without bracket.

4. Word “per cent” should be used instead of sign “%”.

Submissions not based on Guidelines for Contributors will not be accepted.

Faculty of Contemporary Studies

The Faculty of Contemporary Studies (FCS) was formally inaugurated on 3rd September, 2008. National Defence University (NDU) Islamabad, Faculty of Contemporary Studies (FCS) aims to become a world class hub of education. In addition to its existing professional development programmes, NDU – FCS aspires to evolve as an academic center of excellence in the interdisciplinary fields of Social Sciences. Our Vision is to enhance, nurture and develop intellectual and professional capabilities of nation in the fields of Security & Contemporary Studies. Faculty of Contemporary Studies has been established to provide goal oriented programmes in selected fields of contemporary studies, and an environment conducive for academic, professional and intellectual development; provide advocacy and services to public sector and the civil society through its research endeavors and seminars; be an academic institution for producing effective human resource base and become a center of excellence not only for educating and training of student, researchers and the faculty but also for providing internationally recognized tools to conduct applied research and foster national consciousness and human compassion for the development of an enlightened society. The Journal of Contemporary Studies is a bi-annual English Journal (Summer and Winter issues), consisting of researched articles by reputed scholars, book reviews and non-classified official documents.

For further information and inquiries, please contact:

Editor Journal of Contemporary Studies Department of International Relations Faculty of Contemporary Studies National Defence University, Sector E-9, Islamabad, Pakistan Ph: (92-51-9262064-6) Fax: (92-51-2853655) Website: www.ndu.edu.pk Email: [email protected] or [email protected]

Journal of Contemporary Studies

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