Jonas Practical Uses of Theory

7/29/2019 Jonas Practical Uses of Theory

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T H EP H E N O M E N O NO F L I F ETowardPhi losophicalio logy

HansonasWitha foreword yLawrenceogel

NorthwesternniversitvressEvanston,l l inois


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Northwestern University PressEvanston, llinois 60208-41 0Originally published in 1966 by Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.' New York.Copyright @ 1966 by HansJonas. Northwestern University Press paperback edi-tion published 2001 by arrangement with Eleanore Jonas. Foreword byLawrence Vogel copyright @ 2001 by Northwestern University Press.All rightsreserved.Printed in the United States of America1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3ISBN 0-8101-1749-5

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataJonas, Hans, 190&-

The phenomenon of life : toward a philosophical biology ,/ Hans Jonas ;with a foreword by Lawrence Vogel.p. cm. - (Northwestern University studies n phenomenology and

existential philosophy)Originally published: NewYork : Harper & Row, 1966.Includes bibliographical referencesand index.ISBN 0-8101-1749-5 pbk. : alk. paper)1. Life. 2. Existentialism. I. Title. II. Northwestern University studies in

phenomenology & existential philosophy.B3279J663482ooo113'.8-dc2l 00-064570

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of theAmerican National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paperfor Printed Library Materials,ANSI 2.39.48-1992


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E I G H T H E S S AY

ThePracticalUsesof TheoryI

In his commentary to Aristotle's On the Soul, Thomas Aquinas wroteas follows:"All knowledge s obviously good because he good of any thing is thatwhich belongs to the fulness of being which all thinp seek after anddesire;and man as man reaches ulnessof being through knowledge.Nowof good things someare just valuable, namely, thosewhich are useful inview of ssps sad-1s we value a good horsebecause t runs well; whilstother good things are also honourable: namely, tlose that exist for theirown sake, or we givehonour to ends,not to means.Of the sciences omeare practical, others speculative; he difierence being that the former arefor the sakeof some work to be done, while the latter are for their ownsake. The speculativesciencesare therefore honourable as well as good,but the practicalare only valuable."l

About tlrree and a half centuries later, Francis Bacon wrote in TheGreat Instauration asfollows:

1. A. M. Pirotta, ed., Sancti Thomae Aquinatis in Aristotelis Librumde Anima Commentarium, Lectio I, 3. The above English quotation isfrom the translation by K. Foster and S. Humphries, Aristotle's DeAnima in the Version of William ol Moerbeke and the Commentary olSt. Thomas Aquinas, p. 45.1 1 8 8 1


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Tlrs PRAcrrcer,Usss or TnEony t 189"I would addressone generaladmonition to all: that they considerwhat are the true ends of knowledge,and that they seek it not either forpleasureof the mind, or for contention, or for superiority to others . . .but for the benefit and useof life, and that they perfect and govern it incharity. . . . [From the marriage of the Mind and the Universe] theremay spring helps o man, and a line and race of inventions hat may insomedegree ubdueandovercome he necessitiesnd miseriesof human-ity. . . . For the matter in hand is no mere felicity of speculation, ut thereal business nd fortunesof the humanrace, and all power of operation.. . . And so those win objects,human knowledgeand.human power,doreallymeet n one."2Here are two opposing statements of the aim and very meaning ofknowledge and, consequently, of its relation to possible use, or to"works." On this old theme the present discourse attempts to offersome comments unavailable to the original contestants but availableto us in the light of the new "necessitiesand miseries of humanity,,'which are besettingus, so it seems,precisely as a concomitant of thatuse of knowledge which Bacon envisaged as the remedy for human-ity's old necessities nd miseries.Aquinas and Bacon obviously speak of two different things. Inassigning difierent ends to knowledge, they speak in fact of difierentkinds of knowledge, having also different kinds of things for theirsubject. Taking Aquinas first, who of course speaksfor Aristotle, tle"speculative" (that is, theoretical) sciences of his statement are

glo$ things unchangeable and eternal-the first causesand intelligi-ble forms of Being-which, being unchangeable,can be contemplatidonly, not involved in action: theirs is theoria in the strict Aristoteliansense.The "practical sciences,"on the other hand, are ..arts," not"theory"-4 knowledge concerning the planned changing of thechangeable. Such knowledge springs from experience, not fromtheory or speculative reason. The guidance that theory can provide2. From the Preface of Francis Bacon to The Great Instauration. Thefour sentencesof the quotation occur in the text in that order, but widelyscattered.An additional quotation from the Preface may instance Bacon,sdirect criticism of classical theory: "And for its value and utility it mustbe plainly avowed that that wisdom which we have derived piincipallyfrom the Greeks is but the boyhood of knowledge, and has the character-istic property of boys: it can talk, but it cannot generate; for it is fruitfulof controversiesbut barren of works."


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190 TnB PnBNorrleNox or Lrrswith regardto the arts consistsnot in promotingtheir invention andinforming their procedures, ut in ioforming their user (if he partakesin the theoretical life) with the wisdom to use those arts, like altthings,wisely, that is, in proper measureand for proper ends.Thismay be called a practical benefitof theory through the enlighteningeftect which it has on the whole pe$on of its votariesbeyonditsimmediateactuality.But this benefit is not in the nature of a ..use',madeof theory as a means,and is anyway a secondbest n responseto the necessitiesf man: the best s the sustained ctivity of purethought tself,whereman s most ree.So far Aristotle and Aquinas. It is the "necessitiesof humanity''which assumeirst place n Bacon'sscheme:and sinceart is man'sway of meetingand conqueringnecessity,but has not hitherto en-joyedthe benefitof speculativeeason mainlyby the latter's ault),Baconurges hat the two be brought into a new relationship n whichtheir former separations overcome.This involvesa revisionof both,but first, in causalorder, of spec.ulativecience,which has so longbeen"barren of works." Theory must be so revised hat it yields"designationsand directions or works," even has "ttre inventionofarts" for its very end, and thus becomestself an art of invention.Theory t is nonetheless,s t is discovery ndrationalaccountof firstcausesand universal aws (forms). It thus agreeswith classicaltheory in that it hasthe natureof thingsand the totality of natureforits object;but it is sucha scienceof causesand laws, or a scienceofsuchcausesandlaws, as then makes t possible to commandnaturein action." It makes his possiblebecauserom the outset it looks atnahrrequa asting,and achieves nowledgeof nature's aws of actionby itself engagingnature n action-that is, in experiment,and there-fore on terms set by man himself. It yields directions or worksbecauset first catches ature at work."A scienceof "nature at work" is a mechanics,or dynamics,ofnature.For sucha scienceGalileoand Descartesprovided the specu-lativepremisesand the methodof analysisand synthesis.Giving birthto a theory with inherently technologicalpotential, they set on itsactualcourse hat fusion of theory and practicewhich Baconwasdreamingof. Before I say somethingmore of that kind of theorywhich lends itself to technicalapplication, and indeedhas intrinsicreference o this kind of use, I must say somethingabout use assuch.


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Tnr Pnrcrtcer. Usss or Tneonv [ 1 9 1I I

What is use or? The ultimate endof all use s the sameas the end ofall activity, and this is twofold: preservationof life, andbettermentofIife, that is, promotion of the good life. Put negativell, as suggestedby Bacon'spair "necessitiesandmiseries," he twofoldend s to wardoff extinction andto overcomemisery. We note the emergency sPectthat Bacon gives o humanendeavor, nd thusto knowledge sPartof that endeavor.He speaksof lifting or lesseningan adverse andpressing ondition,whereas homas,with Aristotle,speaks ositivelysf sttaining"fulnessof being," or perfection.Bacon'snegativeem-phasis investsthe task of knowledge with a kind of physical andmoral urgency altogetherstrangeand novel in the history of theory,but increasinglyamiliar sincehis time.The differencen emphasis dmits,however,of commonground:assumingmere preservationwhich takesprecedencen both cases)to be assuredn its basicconditions,miserymeansdenialof a goodlife; its removal then means betterment, and thereforeby both ac-counts, that of Aristotle and that of Bacon, the ultimate aim of alldoingbeyond hat minimum necessaryor survival is the good ife orhumanhappiness. eaving he term "happiness"in all the ambiguityit must have until we determinewhat happinessmay consist n, wemay thus stateas the ground corlmon to Bacon and Aristotle that then'whatfor" of all use,ncluding hat of knowledge,s happiness.

Whose happiness?f, as Bacon holds, knowledges to do awaywith the miseriesof mankind, t is the happiness f mankindwhichthepursuitof knowledge as or its aim. If, asAristotleholds,man asman reachesullnessof being hrough, or rather in, knowledge,t isthe happiness f the knowerwhich the pursuit of pure knowledgeachieves. n both caseshereis, then, a supreme use" to theoreticalknowledge. o Aristotle it consistsn the good hat knowledgeworksin the soulof the knower, hat is, in theconditionof knowing tselfasthe perfection f the knower'sbeing.Now, to claim this ennoblingeftect for knowledgemakessenseonly whentheory is knowledge f the noblest, hat is, mostperfect,objects.There being such objects s indeed the condition of therebeing "theoryo'in the classicalsenseof the word; and conversely,failing such objects he contemplativedeal of classicalphilosophybecomes ointless.Assuminghe conditionas given, hen theory, as


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r92 TrrB PneNorvreNowr Ltrgintellectualcommunionwith those objects-and through such com-munion modifying the subject's own condition-doei not merelypromotebut in its actualrtyconstitutehappiness:a happinessermed"divine," and thereforebut bri"fly obtainabte n the livis of mortals.Hence n this casepossessionnduseof theoryarethe same.f thereis a further "use" of it beyond its own aciivity-and tlerefore acontribution to happinessof a more "human'; (as distinct from"divine") kind-it consists,aswe haveseen,n the wisdom t conferson the person or the conductof his life in general,and in the com-prehensionwhich, from the summit of speculation,transfuseshisunderstandingof all things, including co--on things. But althoughtheory through wisdom may deliver its possessotio- the spell -ofcommon hings,and thereby ncrease iJ moral freedom rom theirnecessity,t doesnot increasehis physicalcontrol over and use ofthem (rather ends o limit the lattei), and eaveshe realmof neces-sity itself unaftected.

since Bacon'stime it has beenthe other alternativethat matters.fs him and those after him, the use of knowledgeconsists n the"tuits" it bears n our dealingwith the commonai"gr To bear thatl-tl ft.r knowledgetself mustbe knowledgeof comion things-not$envafvely so,aswasclassicalheory,but primarily and .o"ibrfo*-uecgming lu.tio"l. This is indeed hb case: he the-oryhat is thus tobe fruitful is knowledgeof a universewhich, in the absenceof ahierar-chyf being,consists f common hingsentirely.since reedomql thel no longerbe rocated n a cognitiverelation to the ,,noblestobjects,"knowledgemustdeliver-uo-fro- the yoke of necessity yp.rgg necessityon its own ground, and achievesreedomfor himby-deliveringhe things nto his power.A new visionof nature,notonly of knowledge,s implied if Bacon's nsistence1141(t[s mindmay exerciseover th1 natuqe-ojthios the authority which proper$belongso it." The natureof things s-left with no oignity oi ii, o*o.t3. "For as all works do show forth the power and skill of the work-man, and not his_nqage; o it is of the works of God, wnict ao-snow leo.mnlpotelcy and wisdom of the maker, but not nis iinage: ;d tneretoretherein the heathen opinion differeth from rhe ,""r"j truth; for theysupposedhe world tote the imageof God, and man to ue "n'"ii"ct o,compendiougmage of th9 worrd; but the scriptures tr"u.t uo,r"ilafe toattribute o the world that honour,as o be the image"iGA,';; o:nly tte


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TnBPnecrrcer-Usssor Tnnonv [ 193All digptty belongs o man: what commands o reverence an becommanded,nd all thingsare for use.To be the masterof nature sthe right of man as the sole possessor f mind, and knowledge,byfittiog him to exercisehis right, will at last bring man into his own.His own s "the kingdomof man," and t consistsn his sovereign seof things. Sovereignuse means more use-not merely potential butactual and, strange o say, even necessary se. Control, by makingever more things available for more kinds of uses, enmeshes heuser's ife in ever more dependencies n external objects.There is nootler way of exercising he powerthan by making oneselfavailable othe useof the thingsasthey becomeavailable.Whereuse s forgonethe power must lapse,but there is no limit to the extensionof either.And soonemaster s exchangedor another.Even the laying hold of power in the first place s not quite so freeas the appeal o man's egitimateauthority suggests. or not only isman'srelation to natureone of power, but nature herself s conceivedin terms of power. Thus it is a questionof either ruling or beingruled; andto be ruledby a nature not nobleor kindks6or wisemeansslavery and hencemisery.The exerciseof man's inherentrigbt isthereforealso the response o a basic and continuousemergency: heemergencyof a contest decreedby man's condition. The attack ofknowledge,being a defenseagainst necessity,s itself a function ofnecessityand retains this aspect tlroughout its career, which is acontinuous responseto the new necessitiescreated by its veryprogress.

I I IFor knowledgeo be beneficialo man'sestatet mustbe "perfectedand governed n charity." This is to say that whoever administershecourseand the use of theorymusttake the necessities nd miseriesofwork ol his hands; neither do they speak of any other image of God, butman" (Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, Book ll: Works, ed,. J.Spedding and R. L. Ellis, III, pp. 349 f. [:The Philosophical Works, ed.J. M. Robertson, p.911). Leo Strauss adduces tlis passage n support ofthe statement: "The division of philosophy into natural and human phi-losophy is based on the systematic distinction between man and world,which Bacon makes in express controversy against ancient philosophy"(The Political Philosophy of Hobbes, p. 91, n. 1).


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r94) Tne PHnNorvrnNoNr Lrrehumanity to heart. The blessingsof knowledgeare not in the fintplace for the knower but for his not-knowing fellow men-and forhimself only insofar as he is one of them. Untike the magician,thescientistdoesnot acquire in his own personthe power that springsfrom his art. He hardly evenacquires,andcertainlydoesnot own, tieknowledgetself in his own person: since his knowledges a collec-tive enteqprise, is fractional contribution goes into the commonstock,of which the scientificcommuaily is the depositoryandsocietyasa wholeshouldbe the beneficiary.Among the benefits hat knowi-edgegrants hroughpowerover tlings is relief from toil: leisure hen,but not the scientist'sown, is here a fruit of knowledge.The classicalpattern was the opposite: leisurewas a condition of theory, antece-dentlyassuredo make heorypossible, ot somethingo bj achievedby its exertions.Modern theoreticalactivity, far from beinguse ofleisure, is itsef a toil_and part of the cornmon toil of humanity,howevergratifyingto the toiler. This aloneshows hat moderntheorydoesnot, n human erms, ake heplaceof classicalheory.Furthermore, the need for charity or benevolencen the use oftheory stems rom the fact that pow-ercan be for evil as well as forgood.Now, charity is not itself amongthe fruits of theory in themodernsense. s a qualfying conditionof its use-which use heoryitselfdoesnot specify,et aloneassure-it mustspring rom a sourcetranscendento the knowledgehatthe theorysuppties._.kt:

a comparisonwith the crassicarase i-instructive. ThoughPlatodoesnot call it by that name, he responsibility hat compelshephilosopher-toeturn to the "cave" and helphis fellow men'impris-onedthere s an analogueo Bacon'scharity or pity. But alsohowdifferent! rn the first place,sinceof theory in trre piatonic senseheactivity as well as the object is noble, it ;il itself be the sourceofbenevolencen its adeptsfor whateverpart they may take in theactive ife. Nonbenevolentactionwould b-e nconsistentwith the lighttley-patake of throughthehighestknowledge.No suchcontradictionobtainsbetweenhe insightsof scienceand tLeir potentialnonbenevo-lent use.second, hough in plato's scheme hd ..descent,'into theactive life is no1!y inclination .but by dury, and this duty is proxi-ryatelyenforcedby the state, ts ultimate sanctionemaiatesfromthe.object9f .contgmplationtself,namely, .thegood,',which is notenviousand impels its own communication; hui no additional and


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Tne PRAcrrcer, srs or Tneonv [ 195heterogenicprinciple is required to provide the ground of responsi-bility. Finally, the returning philosopher'saction in the cave is con-cerned,not with themanagingof things,but with the ordering of lives;in otherwords, t is not technicalbut political, informedby the visionof order in the intelligible world. Thus it is an "application" thatderives ts motive, ts model, and its standardof what is beneficialfrom the one and self-sufficientheory. Such "application" can beexercised nly in personby the authenticadeptsof theory; t cannotbe delegated, s canand must be the applicationof the "know-how"of technical cience.By contrast,modern heory s not self-sufficientlyhe sourceof thehumanquallty hat makest beneficial. hat its resultsare detachablefrom it and handedover for use to those who had no part in thetheoreticalprocesss only one aspectof the matter. The scientisthimself s by his science o more qualified han others o discern,noreven s he more disposedo carefor, the good of mankind.Benevo-lencemustbe called n from the outsideo supplementhe knowledgeacquired hrough heory: t doesnot flowfrom theory tself.Why is this so? One answer s commonlyexpressedn the state-ment that sciences "value-free" (werttrei), with the corollary thatvaluesare not objectsof knowledge,or at any rate of scientificknowledge.But why is sciencedivorced from value, and value con-siderednonrational?Can it be because he validation of value re-quiresa transcendence hence o derive it? Relation to an objectivetranscendence ies today outside theory by its rules of evidence,whereasormerly it was he very life of theory."Transcendence"(whateverelse he term comprises) mplies objectshigher han man,and about suchwas classicalheory.Moderntheory is aboutobjects ower tlan man: even stars,being commonthings,are lower than man. No guidancaas to endscan be derivedfrom them. The phrase"lower than man," implying a valuation,seemso contradict he assertedvalue-freedom"of science.But thisvalue-freedommeansa neutralityas much of the objects as of thescience:of the objects, heir neutrality (indifference) oward what-evervaluemay be "given" them. And that which acks ntrinsicvalueof its own is lower than that by reference o which alone it mayreceive alue,namely,man andhuman ife, the only remaining ourceand referentof value.


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196 Tru, Pxpxor'reNoNor Lrrnwhat then about the sciencesof man, like psychologyor sociol-fgl? Stlely it cannotbe saidof them that the oblectsoi-sciencearelower than man?Their object rs man. rs it not true that with themvaluere-entershe universeof science? nd cantherenot spring romthem,-asdealingwith sourceand referenceof all value,a outio ttoryof value?But here we have to distinguish: valuation as a tact ofhumanbehavior ndeedbecomes nown in the humansciences{utnot value itself. And facgtioysas it may sound: insofar as they aresciencesheir obl'ect oo is "lower than man." How so?For a icien-Sq $"u"y of him to be possible,man, includinghis habitsof valua-tion, hasto be takenasdeterminedby causarais, asan instanceandpat of nature.The seientistdoes ake him sebut not himselfwhilehe assumes nd exercisos is fieedom of inquiry and his opennessoreason'evidence,and truth. Thus man-the-tno-wer pprehindsman-qw-lowerthan-himsel{ *d T doing so achieves nowledgeof man-qrm-lowerthan-man,sinceall scientific heory is of thingsiower tlanmanthe knower.rt is on that conditionthat they canbJsubjectedto"theory," hence o control, hence o use.Then man_low"r_t[*_-*e-xptaint' by the human ssiBgss-pan reified-+an by the instruc-tions of thesesciencesbe controlled (even ,.engineert,') and thusused.Chadty then, or even ove (as love of mankind rather than per_son), in @s to makesuchusea charitableor beneficentone,doesnot correct but rather confirm tle lower status.And as the use ofwhat is lower-than-mancan only be for what is lower and not forwhat is higler in the userhimserf,the knower and userbecomesnsuch use, if made all-inclusive,himself lower than rn"o. eoa "n_isclusive it becomeswhen it extendsover the being of ooJJt no*nen and swallowsup the island-kingdom_f tbo Srson. inevitabtythe naaipulator coures o seehimseri in the .".r'light "s-thosehistl"*y hasmademanipulable;and in the self-inclusivi solidaritywiththe generalhumanrowlinessamidst he splendor i n"i* p"*r. ni,charity is but self-eompassionnd that tirerance which ,prir1g,fro.oelf-contempt:we ar3 all -poq p*pp"ts and cannot help beingwhatweare.Benevolencehendegeneiaieso condoning "a JoJnGg.. F*n_trn of a purer andlessambiguous ind, benevolercealoaers nstrricrent to insurebeneficialuseof science.As a dispositionorefrainfrom harming, t is of courseas indispens"ui"i-tf,il"onr"*,


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Ttre PRAcrrcer,UsBs on TtrEonv I r97as it is in the fellowshipof men in general.But in its positive aspectgood will is lor thegoodandmust thereforebe informedby a concelFtion of what is the good. Whence sucha conceptioncan derive andwhether t can be raised o the 6nk of "knowledge"mustherebe leftundecided. f there is a knowledgeof it, not sciencecan supply it.Mere benevolence annot replace t-nor even love, if love withoutreverence;and whencecan reverence ome except rom a knowledgeof what is to be revered?But even f a guidingknowledgeof the good,that is, true philosophywere available, t might well find its counselto be of no avail against the self-generated ynamics of science nuse.To this theme shall return at the end. Now I must saysome-thing more about the specificallymodernpractice-theory elation it-self and he ways t works, rather than what it worksfor.

I VWe speakof.usingwhen we apply somethingas a means oward anend. As the end is distinct from the means,so normally is the meansdistinct from its application. That is to say, the meanshas a priorexistenceof its own and would continueto be what it is even f neverso applied at all. Whetherthis holds fully for theory too, or for everytheory, we have reason o doubl But in speakingof uses of theorythat much is conceded hat theory, howeverused, s also somethingby itself.Being somethingby itself is not necessarilyo be neutral to possi-ble use.Use may be essential, r it may be accidental,o that whichcan serveas a means.Somehings, houghhavinga substantive eingof their own once hey exist,do so asmeans rom the outset. A tool,for example, owes its very being to the pulpose beyond itself forwhich it was designed. f not put to such service t misses ts raisond'Atre.To other thingsusecomesas t were as an afterthoughton thepart of a user: for them,beingused s accidental, xtraneouso thebeing they have in their own independent ight. In the first categoryare mainlyman-made hings, ike hammersor chairs, n the secondmainly naturalones, ike horsesor rivers. Theory is certainlyman-made,and it hasuses;but whetheruse s essential r accidentalo itmay well dependon the kind of theoryone considers, s alsoon thekind of use. Mathematics, or example,differs in this respect rom


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198 THr PHsNoIvrBNox or LrrB,physics.My thesis s that to modern heory in general,practical use sno accidentbut is integralto it, or that "science"is technologicalbyits nature.Practical is a use which involves external action, resulting in achangen the environmentor preventinga change).Externalactionrequires he use of external,physical means,and moreoversomedegreeof information, which is an internal, nonphysical hing. Butall action which is not strictly routine, and not purely intuitive, re-quiresmore than that, namely,deliberation,and this can be as toends and as to means:as to ends-for example,whetherdesirable,and whethergenerallypossible;as to means-for example,which assuchsuitable, ndwhich hereandnow available.n all these espects,krnwledge(if not necessarilyheory) enters nto the conditionsandconductof actionand s madeuseof.Obviously t is a differentkind of knowledgehat has to do withthe desirabilityof ends, and a different kind that has to do withfeasibility,means,and execution.Again, within the latter kind, theknowledgewhich pronounceson possibility in principle is differentfrom the one which maps,still in the abstract,possibleways ofrealization, and this from the discernmentof the courseof actionmost practicablen the given circumstances.We havehere a scaledescendingrom the general o the particular, from the simpleto thecomplex,and at the same ime from theory to practice,which iscomplexity tself. The knowledgeof possibility restson the universalprinciples of the field, its constitutive laws (the terminal points ofwhat Galileocalled he "resolutivemethod"); that of typicaiwaysofcoming-to-beon more complex and more specfficcausalpattems,embodyingthe first principles and providing models for rules ofaction ("compositivemethod"); the knowledge, inally, of what to donow is entirely particular, placing the task within the context of thewhole,concretesituation.The first two stepsareboth within theory,or rather, they each cut havetheir developedheory. The theory intF ry" casewe may call science roper,suchas theoreticalphyiics;-tle-theoryn the secondcase,derivative rom it in logic, if nof aiwaysin fact, we may call technologlcalor appliedscience-which, it mustbe remembered,s still "theory" in respect o action itself, asit offersthe specific ulesof actionas partsof a reasonedwholeand withoutmaking a decision.The particularexecution tself hasno theory of its


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Tne Pnecncer, Uses or TrreonY I r99own andcanhavenone.Though applying he theory, t is not simplyderivativeof it but involvesdecisionbasedon iudgmenf,'and there isno science f judgment as ittle as here s one of decision)-that is,judgmentcannotbe replacedby, or transformednto, science,muchasit can avail itself of the findingsand evenof the intellectualdisci-pline of science nd s itself a kind of knowledge, cognitive aculty.Judgment, aysKant, is the faculty of subsuminghe particularunderthe universal;and sincereason s the faculty of the universal,andscience he operationof that faculty, judgmentas concernedwithparticulars is necessarilyoutside scienceand strictly the bridge be-tween he abstractions f the understanding nd the concretenessflife.In the first stage, hat of pure science,he form of propositions scategorical:A is P, B is P, . . . In the applied stage, he form ishypothetical:f P is to be, then either A or B . . . mustbe provided.In the deliberationsof practical judgment,the propositional form isproblematical: particulars f, g, . . . available in the situation, doperhaps not, partially) fit the demands f universalA, or B, . . . imay thereforebe (not, more, less) suitable or bringing about P.Invention is typically sucha combinationof concrete udgmentwithabstract cience.It is in this realm of concreteudgmentand choice that the practi-cal use of theory comesabout.Whence t follows that the use oftheorydoesnot itself permit of a theory: if it is enlightened se, treceivests light from deliberation,whichmay or may not enjoythebeneflts f goodsense. ut this knowledge f use s differentnot onlyfrom the knowledge f the theoryused n the casebut from that ofany theory whatsoever, nd it is acquiredor learned n ways differentfrom those of theory. This is the reasonwhy Aristotle denied herebeinga science f politicsand practicalethics; be where,whcn, towhom . cannotbe reduced o generalprinciples.Thus there istheoryanduseof theory,but no theoryof theuseof theory.At the oppositeendof the scales the knowledge oncerning ndsrepeatedlyalluded to-of which today we do not know whether itadmitsof theory,asonce t washeld eminentlyo do. This knowledgealone would pennit the valid discriminationof worthy andunworthy,desirableand undesirable sesof science,whereas ciencetself onlypermitsdiscrimination f its corrector incorrect,adequate r inade-


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200 Tne Pffi,xorvrBNox or Lrrgquate, efiectual or ineffectualuse. But it is with this very sciencewhich is not in doubt that we must now concernourselves,askingwhat features ntrinsically fit this type of theory for use n the worldof things.

vOf theory formation one of its nineteenth-centurymasters,HeinrichHefiz, had this to say: "We form imagesor symbolsof the externalobjects; he manner n which we form them is such that the logicallynecessary onsequencesf the imagesareinvariably the imagesof thernaterially ecessaryonsequencesf the correspondingbjects."aThis is an elliptic statement.For the "imagesor slmbols" formedandusedare not of the immediateexternalobjectssuchas rocks andtrees, or even of whole classes r general ypes of such,but symbolsfor the residualproductsof a speculativeanalysisof the givenobjectsand their statesand relations-residues which admit of none butsymbolicrepresentation, et by hypothesisare presumed o underliethe objects and are thus treated as "external objects" themselvesnsubstitution or the original objects.The key term here s "analysis."Analysishas been he distinctivefeature of physical nquiry since he seventeenth entury: analysisofworking nature into its simplestdynamic factors. These factors areframed n such denticalquantitativeerms as can be entered,com-bined, and transformedn equations.The analyical methodthus im-plies a primary ontological reduction of nature, and this precedesmathematicsor other symbolism n its applicationto nature. Onceleft to deal with the residual products of this reduction, or rather,with their measured values, mathematics proceedsto reconstructfrom them the complexity of phenomena n a way which can leadbeyond the data of the initial experience o facts unobserved,or stillto come, or to be brought about. That nature ends tself to this kindof reductionwas le fundamentaldiscovery,actuallythe fundamentalanticipation,at the outsetof mechanical hysics.With this reduction, "substantialforms," that is, wholenessas an

4. H. Hertz, Prinzipien der Mechanik, p. l, taken from H. Weyl,Philosophy ol Mathematics and Natural Science,p, 162.


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Tnc Pnecrrcer, Usns or Tneonv [ 201autonomous ausewith respect o its componentparts, and thereforethe ground of its own becoming, shared he fate of final causes.nNewtonian physics he integralwholeness f form, on which classicaland medieval ontology wasbased, s brokenup into elementary ac-tors for which the parallelogramof forces s a fitting graphic symbol.The presenceof the future, formerly conceivedas potentiality of6""eming, consists ow in the calculabilityof the operationof theforces discernible n a given configuration.No longer somethingorig-inal in its own right, form is the current compromiseamong he basicactionsof aggregatemater. The falling apple s not so much elevatedto the rank of cosmicmotion as he latter is broughtdown to the levelof the falling apptre. his establishes new unity of the universe,butof a difierent complexion from the Greek one: the aristocracyofform is replaced y thedemocracy f matter.If, accordingto this "democracy," wholes are mere sums, thentheir seeminglygenuinequalities are due to the quantitativelymore orless involved combination of some simple substrata and theirdynamics.Generally complexity and degreesof complexity supplantall other ontological distinctions.Thus for pu{posesof explanationthe parts are calledupon to account or the whole, and that meansthat the primitive has o account or the morearticulated,or, in olderparlance,hc lowerfor thc higher.With no hierarchy of being but only distributions of a uniformsubstratum"all explanationhas to start from the bottom and in factnever eaves t. The higher is the lower in disguise,where the disguiseis provided by complexity: with the latter's analysis, the disguisedissolves, nd the appearance f the higheris reduced o the reality ofthe elemental.From physics this schemaof explanation has pene-trated all provincesof knowledge,and it is now asmuch at homeinpsychologyand sociology as in the natural scienceswhere it origi-nated.No longer s the realm of passioncharacterized y the absenceof reason, but reason s characterizedas a disguiseand servant ofpassion.The transcendental hilosophyof a society s but the ideo-logical superstructureo (and tbus a disguiseof) its vital interests,which reflect organicneeds,which dependon physicalconstitution.The rat in the maze ells us what we are. Always the lower explainsthe higherand n the courseof analysisemerges s ts truth.

Now this ontologicalanalysishas per se technological mplication


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202l Tns PHBxorlreNoNon Lrrsprior to any application n fact. The latter is possibleonly becauseofthe manipulative aspect inherent in the tleoretic constitution ofmodern scienceas such. f it is shown r6y things are made up oftheir elements,t is also shown,on principle, how they can be madeup out of such elements.Making, as distinct from generating, s es-sentially putting together pre-existing materials or rearrangingpre-existing parts. Similarly, scientific cognition is essentiallyanalysisofdistribution, that is, of the conditions in which elementsare inter-related,and is not burdenedwith the task of comprehendingheessence f thoseelements lemselves.Not what they are but how theyfunction under such specified conditions, that is, in such combi-natorial relations, s tle theme hat sciencecan and doespursue.Thisrestriction s basic o the modernconceptionof knowledge; or, un-like substantialnatures,distributionsof conditionscan be recon-structed,even reely constructed,n mental modelsand so allow ofunderstanding. gain, unlike "natures," they may be actually re-peatedor modified n human mitationof nature, hat is in technique,and so allow of manipulation.Both understanding nd making arehere concernedwith relationsand not with essences.n fact, under-standingof this sort is itself a kind of imaginarymaking or remakingof its objects, and this is the deepestcause for the technologicalapplicabilityof modern science.Early in the eighteenthcentury, Vico enunciated he principle thatman can understandonly what he has made himself. From this hereasonedhat not nature,which as madeby God standsover againstman, but history, which is of man's own making, can be understoodby man. Only a lactum-what has beenmade


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Tlrs PRAcrrcer,Usrs or TnBonv | 203it. But the latter is beyond the powerseven of nature, which, oncecreated n its substantialentities,goeson "creating" ooly by manipu-lating them, that is, by the shift of relations.Conditions and relationsare the vehicle for creatednature'snoncreativeproductions, ust asthey are the vehicle or createdman's cognitionof natureand alsoforhis technical imitation of nature'swaysof production. This was themeaningof Bacon'sfamousmaxim that nature can be commandedonly by beingobeyed.Nature's quasi-technicalmodesof making--ornature as its own artificer and artifact-is the at once knowableandimih6ls aspectof it, whereasessencesn themselves re unknowablebecauseunmakeable.The metaphor of 'hature's workshop," intowhich science s to pry in order to learn her procedures,popularlyexpresseshe point that the distinctionbetweennatural and artificial,so basic to classicalphilosophy,has lost i1s6saning. "I do not,"wrote Descartes,"recognize any difterence between the machinesmade by craftsmenand the diversebodiesput together by naturealone . . . all the rules of mechanicsbelong to physics, so that allthings which are artificial are thereby natural" (Principles fV, art.2OZ1.dn the samevein, Descartes ould say "Give me matter andmotion, and I shallmake the world once more"-a saying mpossiblein the mouth of a premodernthinker. To know a thing meansto

5. But do"all

the rules of mechanics" equal ,,all the rules of physics"?The readily conceded truth tlat the former "belong to" physics may serveto coier the very different subreption that they exhaustlhl book of rulesof physics (i.e., of nature). The complete passage n the principles, fromwhich the above quotation is taken, is of capital importance as the enun-ciation of a really new principle, which has since dominated naturalscienceand natural philosophy. Its technological implications are obvious.The new doctrine of a uniform nature, here emerging from the ruins ofthe medieval edifice, naively assumesan identity of macro- and micro-modes of operation, which more recent physics has found wanting. Buteven apart from any later discoveries, one could have objected at theoutset on logical grounds that from the fact of machines working bynatural principles entirely it does not follow that they work by the entirenatural principles, or, that nature has no other modes of operation thanthose which man can utilize in his constructions. But this very view ofnature (not the innocent one of human mechanics) was Descartes' trueconviction: its spirit alone, going far beyond a mere experiment witlOccam's razor, accounts for the supreme confidence of the next statementquoted in the text.


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2041 Tne Pnexo*rBxoN or Lrnsknow how it is or can be made and therefore meansbeing able torepeator vary or anticipate he processof meking.It doesnot matterwhetherman can always actually, with the forces at his command,providethe factorsmaking up the required conditionsand, therefore,himselfproduce heir result. Man cannotreproducea cosmicnebula,but assuminghe knows how it is produced n nature, he would onprinciple be able to produce one too if he were sufrciently large,lnwerful, andso on, and this is what to know a nebula means.To putit in the form of a slogan,the modern knowledgeof nature, veryunlike the classicalone, is a "know-how" and not a "know-what,"and on this basis t makesgoodBacon'scontention hat knowledgespower.This, however, s not the whole story of the technologcal aspectinherent in scientifictheory. Theory is an internal fact and internalaction. But its relation to external action may be not only that ofmeans o end by way of application,but also the reverse: hat is,action maybe employedn the serviceof theory as heorymay be em-ployed in the serviceof action. Somecomplementarityof thesetwoaspects uggeststself from the outset: it may be that only that theorywhich has grownout of activeexperience an be turned to the activechangingof experience;or only that th*ry can becomea means opracticewhich has practice"mong its own means.That this is thecasebecomes bvious whenwe consider he role of experimentn thescientificprocess.The alliancecontemplatedby Baconbetweenknowing and chang-ing the world is indeedmuchmore intimate than the mere delegationof theoreticalresults o practicaluse, hat is, the post lactutn applica-tion of science, ouldmake t. The procedure f sciencetself, f it isto yield practically elevant esults,has to be practical,namely,ex-perimental.We must "closewith nature" and do something o it inorder to make it yield its secrets hrough the responsewe haveelicited,"seeing,"as Baconsays, that the nature of things betraysitself more readily under the vexationsof art than in its naturalfreedom."Thus n two different espectsmodernsciences engagednthe activechangingof things: on the small scaleof the experiment teffectschangeas a necessarymeansof knowing natule, that is, itemployspracticefor the sakeof theory; the kind of theory gained nthis way lends tself to, and thus invites,the large-scale hangesof its


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Tnr Pnecrrcer, Usss or Trnony | 205technicalapplication.The latter, in turn, becomesa sourceof theo-retical insightsnot to be gained on the laboratoryscale-in additionto furnishing the tools for more effective aboratorywork itself, whichagain in turn yields new incrementsof knowledge,and so on in acontinuouscycle. In this way the fusion of theory and practicebe-comes nseparablen a way which the mereterms"pure" and "ap-plied" science ail to convey.Effectingchangesn nature as a meansand as a result of knowing it are inextricably interlocked,and oncethis combination s at work it no longer matterswhether the prag-maticdestination f theory s expressly cceptedfor example y the"pure" scientisthimself) or not. The very processof attainingknowl-edge eads hrough manipulationof the things to be known, and thisoflgln fits of itself the theoretical results for an application whosepossibility s irresistiblrcven to the theoretical nterest, et alone hepractical,whetheror not it wascontemplatedn the irst place.

V IAt the sameime thequestion s o what s the truehumanend, ruthor use, s entirely eft openby the fact of the union assuch and is inessence ot afiectedby the conspicuousreponderancef the practi-cal element.The answer s determinedby the image of man, of whichwe are uncertain.Certain it is from what we have learnedthat if"tn'th" be the end it cannotbe the truth of pure contemplation.Themodern discovery hat knowingnature requirescomingtb grips withn4fu1s-4 discovery earingbeyond he field of naturarscienCe-haspermanentlycorrected Aristotle's "contemplative,,view of theory.More, of course,was involved n the ideal of the contemplativeifethan a conceptionmerelyof theoreticalmethod:more thin the lat-ter's correctionmust alsobe involved n a legitimate arewen o theideal-a farewell the more biddenwith a heavyheart the more un-derstoodn its necessity.It wasAristotle's contention hat we act in order to intuit and notintuit in order to act-on which the favorite modern comment s thatit reflectsnothingbut the attitudeof a leisurecrassn a slavesociety.Rarely in our pragmatic climate is the troubre taken to ask whetherAristotle,sociallybiasedor not, mightnot be right. He was,afterall,not deaf o the demands f "reality." That the necessitiesf life have


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206'l Tns PneNorvreNoNr Lrrsto be takencare of first heexplicitly states,his beingthe task allottedto civilization;only he consideredhis task to be finite, not infinite, orinterminable, s t is likely to appear o modern houghton the basisof difierentattitudesand experiences.ven with these t is well toconsider he Greek reasoningn the matter, so as to put the contem-porary dynamismof the active life in its proper perspective.Somesimple considerationswill still be found pertinent. Thus Aristotle'sreasoninghat we makewar in order to havepeace s unanswerable,and the generalizationhat we toil in order to find rest is at leasteminently easonable.olearly, then, the rest to be found must notconsist n suspension f activity but must itself be a kind of life, thatis, have its content n an activity of its own-which to Aristotle was"thought." Now, when full due is given to the sanity and appealofthis classicalstance, t must be said that it implies views both ofcivilization and of thought which, rational as they are, have in thetight of modern experiencebecomequestionable oncerning civrliza-tion, anduntenableconcerninghought.

As to civilization, Aristotle takes for granted that once it hasreacheda working equilibrium between egitimate wants and meansfor their satisfaction t can devote ts surplusto making possible hephilosophicalife, the life of thought, he true goal of man. Today wehave good reason for disbelief in the very attainment of such anequilibrium. We therefore seeno better use (in fact, no choice) forthe "surplus" than to be fed back into the activeprocess or thatadjustmentof its constantlygenerated isequilibriumwhich results nprogress-a self-feedingautomatism n which even heory is of neces-sity involved asfactor andfunction at once,and to which we cannotsee let aloneset) a limit. But, if infinite, hen the process f civiliza-tion calls for the constant care of the best minds-that is: for theirconstantemployment n the "cave."And as for "thought" itself, the modern adventure of knowledgehascorrected he Greek view of it in yet another respect han that ofits possibledetachment rom practice, and for all we know as defi-nitively. To the Greeks, be it Plato or Aristotle, the numberof thetruly knowable hings s finite, and the apprehension f first principles,wheneverobtained, s definitive-subject to intermittent renewalbut

6. Nicomachean thics,X,7, ll77 b 4 f.


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Tne PRAcrrceLUsss or Tneony | 2O7not to obsolescencehroughnew discovery nd better approximation.To the modernexperienceof knowledge t is inconceivablehat anystate of theory, including the conceptualsystemof first principlesgoverningt, shouldbe more han a temporaryconstructo be super-sededby tle next vista to which it opens tself the way when all itsimplicationsare matchedagainstall the facts. In other words, thehypothetical haracter f modernsciencepso facto qualifieseachofits explanatoryand integratingattainments s settinga new problemratherthan granting he object or ultimatebeholding.

At the root of this difierence s, of course, he differencebetweenmodern nominalism,with its understandingof the tentative natureofsymbolism, sagainst lassicalealism.To the latter,concepts eflectand matchthe self-existing onns of being, and thesedo not change;to the former, they are productsof the humanmind, the endeavorofa temporalentity and thereforesubject o change.The elementofinfinity in Greek theoria concerned he potential infinity of satisfac-tion in beholding he eternal, hat which neverchanges;he elementof infinity in modern theory concernsthe interminablenessof theprocessby which its tentative hypothesesare revised and absorbedinto higher symbolical ntegrations.Thus the idea of potentially iofi-nite progress ermeateshe modern deal of knowledgewith the samenecessityas it penneateshe modern ideal of technicalcivilization;?and so, even apart from the mutual involvement of the two, theoontemplative deal has become nvalid, nay, illogical, through thesheer ack of thosepresumed ltimates,he abiding ,noblestobjects,',in whoseapprehensionnowledgewouldcome o rest and turn fromsearchnto contemplation.

V I IIt seems,hen, that practice and theory conspire o comrnit us tounceasingdynamism,and with no abiding present our life is everinto the future. What Nietzschehascalled"sovereignbecoming" supon us, and theory, far from having where to stand beyondit, is

7. And as t permeateshe modern dea of natureor reality itself: thevery doctrineof being,not merely that of knowledgeand of man, hasbecomeengulfedn the symbolismof process nd change.


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208 I Tne PHBNoMBr.roNn LrrEchained o its chariot, in harnessbefore it or draggedn its tracks-which, it is hard to tell in the dustof the race, andsure t is onty thatnot theory s thecharioteer.There are those who cheer the surge hat sweeps hem alonganddisdainto question"whither?"; who hail change or its own sake, heendless orward thrust of life into the ever new, unknown, thedynamismas such.Yet, surely, or changeo be valuable t is relevantwlnt entity changes if not toward what), and this underlyingwhat-nessmust in someway be definableas that nature of .,manasman"which qualifies he endless onsummation f its possibilitiesn changeasa worthwhileenteqprise. omemage hen is implied in the affirma-tion of change tself. But, if an image,then a norm, and if a nonn,then alsothe freedomof negation,not only the surrenderof affirma-tion; andthis freedon itself transcendshe flux and points to anothersort of theory.That theorywould haveto take up the questionof endswhich theradicalvaguenessf the term

"happiness',liavesopen,andon whichscience, ommillsdto providethe means or happlness,annotpro-nounce.The injunction to use t in the interestof man,and to the-bestof his interest, emainsemptyas ong as t is not knownwhat the bestinterestof man s.Faced with the threat of catastrophewe may feel excused rominquiring into ends,sinceavertingcatastrophes a nondebatableirstend,-suspendingll discussion f ultimate-ends.perhapswe are des-tined to live for long with such pressingemergenciJsof our ownmakingthat what \ilean do is shoring-upand short-termremedy,notptannilg for the good ife. The formei surelyneedsno philosopfry; omeet the recurrent emergencyhat kind of knowledg6wouli seemcompetentwhichhashelped o createt-technological science,or itdid help create t in each nstanceby successfullyeeting its prede-cessor.

But if everwe entrustor resignourselveswholly to the self-correc-tive mechanicsof the inteqptayof scienceand technology,we shallhave lost the battle for man. For science,with its appilation gov-erned solelyby its own logic, doesnot really leave thi meanin! ofhapoiness pen: it hasprejudgedle issue,n spiteof its own value-freedom.The automatismof its use-insofar ai this use carriesbe-yond the recurrent meetingof the recurrent emergencycreatedby


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Trre Pnecmcer Usss or THBony | 209itself-has set the goal of happinessn principle: indulgence n theuse of things.Betweenhe two polesof emergency nd indulgence,ofresourcefulness nd hedonism,set up by the ever-expandingpowerover things, the direction of all effort and thereby the issueof thegoodtends o be predecided. ut we must not let that issuebe de-cided by default.Thus even with the pressureof emergencies pon us we need aview beyond hemto meet themon more than their own tenns.Theirvery diagnosis wherever t is not a caseof extremity) impliesat leastan idea of what would not be an emergency,as that of sicknessimpliesthe idea of health;and the anticipationof successnherent n1UstrySgteagainstdanger,misery,and injustice must face the ques-tion of what life befitsman when the emergency irtues of courage,charity, and justicehavedonetheir work.

V I I Iwhatever-the insightsof that "other" theory called philosophy,andwhateverts counsels,here s no stoppinghe useof icientific theoryyhich propelsus into the flux, for stoppingits use meansstoppingtheory itself; and the courseof knowledgemust not be stopped-itnot for its gains,hen n spiteof itscosts.Nor is a return to the classicalpositionopento honestyand logic.Theory tself hasbecomea process, nd one,as we haveeen, whichcontinuo-uslynvolvests own use;and it cannotbe "possessed"oth-erwise.science s, therefore,theory and art at once.but whereasnotherartshaving he skill andusing t aredifferent,so tlat its posses-sor s freeto use t or not, and to decidewhen, he skill of science sa collectivepropertybegetsts useby its own momentum,and so thehiatusbetween wo stages,where judgment,wisdom,freedomcanhave heir play, is heredangerouslyhrinking:the skill possessestsPossessor.Theory itself has becomea function of use as much as use afunction of theory.Tasks or theoryare setby the practical resultsof$ precedinguse, heir solutions o be turned again o use, andsoon.Thus theory s thoroughly mmersedn practice.With this mutual feedback mechanism heory has set up a newrealmof necessity, r what maybe calleda second ature rplace of


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2ro Txe PHENorvrnxox r LIpnthe first nature from whosenecessity h"ory was to liberate man. Tothis secondnature, no lessdeterminative or beingartificial, manis assubjectashe was o originalnature,and theory itself is under it whileconstantlyengagedn its further making.ff we equate he realmof necessitywith Plato's"cave," then scien-tific theory leadsnot out of the cave; nor is its practical applicationareturn to the cave: it never eft it in the first place. It is entire$ of thecaveandthereforenot "theory" at all in the Platonic sense.Yet its very possibility implies, and its actuality testifies to, a"transcendence"in man himself as the condition for it. A freedombeyond he necessitiesf the cave s manifest n the relation to truth,without which sciencecould not be. This relation-a capacity, acommitment,a quest, n short, that which makessciencehumanlypossible-is itself an extrascientific act. As much, therefore,as sci-ence s of the caveby its objectsand ts uses,by its originatingcause"in the soul" it is not. Thereis still "pure theory" as dedication o thediscoveryof truth and as devotionto Being, the contentof truth: ofthat dedicationsciences the modern orm.To philosophyas transscientiflc heory the human fact of sciencecan provide a clue for a theory of man, so that we may know againaboutthe essencef man-and through t, perhaps,evensomethingof the essence f Being.Wheneversuch knowledgewill againbe withus, it can provide a basis or the supremelyuseful and much-neededknowledgeof ends. Pending that event, unforseeable oday as towhenand if, we have o live with our poverty--comforted perhapsbythe recollection hat once before the "I know that I know not', hasprovedasabeginning f philosophy.s

8. Three comments,by professorsSolomonE. Asch, Erich Hula, andAdolph Lowe, followed the delivery of this paper at the twenty-fifthanniversarycelebration of the Graduate Faculty, New School for SocialResearch, n April, 1959.The commentswere publishedwith the paper inSocialResearch,26/2 1959), pp. 151-166, nd reprinted n M. Natan-son, Philosophy ol the Social Sciences:A Reader (New york: Random

Jonas Practical Uses of Theory

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