Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-41643 July 31, 1935B.H. BERKENKOTTER,plaintiff-appellant,vs.CU UNJIENG E HIJOS, YEK TONG LIN FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, MABALACAT SUGAR COMPANY and THE PROVINCE SHERIFF OF PAMPANGA,defendants-appellees.Briones and Martinez for appellant.Araneta, Zaragoza and Araneta for appellees Cu Unjieng e Hijos.No appearance for the other appellees.VILLA-REAL,J.:This is an appeal taken by the plaintiff, B.H. Berkenkotter, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing said plaintiff's complaint against Cu Unjiengs e Hijos et al., with costs.In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns six alleged errors as committed by the trial court in its decision in question which will be discussed in the course of this decision.The first question to be decided in this appeal, which is raised in the first assignment of alleged error, is whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the additional machinery and equipment, as improvement incorporated with the central are subject to the mortgage deed executed in favor of the defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos.It is admitted by the parties that on April 26, 1926, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., owner of the sugar central situated in Mabalacat, Pampanga, obtained from the defendants, Cu Unjieng e Hijos, a loan secured by a first mortgage constituted on two parcels and land "with all its buildings, improvements, sugar-cane mill, steel railway, telephone line, apparatus, utensils and whatever forms part or is necessary complement of said sugar-cane mill, steel railway, telephone line, now existing or that may in the future exist is said lots."On October 5, 1926, shortly after said mortgage had been constituted, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., decided to increase the capacity of its sugar central by buying additional machinery and equipment, so that instead of milling 150 tons daily, it could produce 250. The estimated cost of said additional machinery and equipment was approximately P100,000. In order to carry out this plan, B.A. Green, president of said corporation, proposed to the plaintiff, B.H. Berkenkotter, to advance the necessary amount for the purchase of said machinery and equipment, promising to reimburse him as soon as he could obtain an additional loan from the mortgagees, the herein defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos. Having agreed to said proposition made in a letter dated October 5, 1926 (Exhibit E), B.H. Berkenkotter, on October 9th of the same year, delivered the sum of P1,710 to B.A. Green, president of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., the total amount supplied by him to said B.A. Green having been P25,750. Furthermore, B.H. Berkenkotter had a credit of P22,000 against said corporation for unpaid salary. With the loan of P25,750 and said credit of P22,000, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., purchased the additional machinery and equipment now in litigation.On June 10, 1927, B.A. Green, president of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., applied to Cu Unjieng e Hijos for an additional loan of P75,000 offering as security the additional machinery and equipment acquired by said B.A. Green and installed in the sugar central after the execution of the original mortgage deed, on April 27, 1927, together with whatever additional equipment acquired with said loan. B.A. Green failed to obtain said loan.Article 1877 of the Civil Code provides as follows.ART. 1877. A mortgage includes all natural accessions, improvements, growing fruits, and rents not collected when the obligation falls due, and the amount of any indemnities paid or due the owner by the insurers of the mortgaged property or by virtue of the exercise of the power of eminent domain, with the declarations, amplifications, and limitations established by law, whether the estate continues in the possession of the person who mortgaged it or whether it passes into the hands of a third person.In the case ofBischoff vs. Pomar and Compaia General de Tabacos(12 Phil., 690), cited with approval in the case ofCea vs. Villanueva(18 Phil., 538), this court laid shown the following doctrine:1. REALTY; MORTGAGE OF REAL ESTATE INCLUDES IMPROVEMENTS AND FIXTURES. It is a rule, established by the Civil Code and also by the Mortgage Law, with which the decisions of the courts of the United States are in accord, that in a mortgage of real estate, the improvements on the same are included; therefore, all objects permanently attached to a mortgaged building or land, although they may have been placed there after the mortgage was constituted, are also included. (Arts. 110 and 111 of the Mortgage Law, and 1877 of the Civil Code; decision of U.S. Supreme Court in the matter of Royal Insurance Co.vs. R. Miller, liquidator, and Amadeo [26 Sup. Ct. Rep., 46; 199 U.S., 353].)2.ID.;ID.; INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION OF MACHINERY, ETC. In order that it may be understood that the machinery and other objects placed upon and used in connection with a mortgaged estate are excluded from the mortgage, when it was stated in the mortgage that the improvements, buildings, and machinery that existed thereon were also comprehended, it is indispensable that the exclusion thereof be stipulated between the contracting parties.The appellant contends that the installation of the machinery and equipment claimed by him in the sugar central of the Mabalacat Sugar Company, Inc., was not permanent in character inasmuch as B.A. Green, in proposing to him to advance the money for the purchase thereof, made it appear in the letter, Exhibit E, that in case B.A. Green should fail to obtain an additional loan from the defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos, said machinery and equipment would become security therefor, said B.A. Green binding himself not to mortgage nor encumber them to anybody until said plaintiff be fully reimbursed for the corporation's indebtedness to him.Upon acquiring the machinery and equipment in question with money obtained as loan from the plaintiff-appellant by B.A. Green, as president of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., the latter became owner of said machinery and equipment, otherwise B.A. Green, as such president, could not have offered them to the plaintiff as security for the payment of his credit.Article 334, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code gives the character of real property to "machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements intended by the owner of any building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade or industry.If the installation of the machinery and equipment in question in the central of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., in lieu of the other of less capacity existing therein, for its sugar industry, converted them into real property by reason of their purpose, it cannot be said that their incorporation therewith was not permanent in character because, as essential and principal elements of a sugar central, without them the sugar central would be unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established. Inasmuch as the central is permanent in character, the necessary machinery and equipment installed for carrying on the sugar industry for which it has been established must necessarily be permanent.Furthermore, the fact that B.A. Green bound himself to the plaintiff B.H. Berkenkotter to hold said machinery and equipment as security for the payment of the latter's credit and to refrain from mortgaging or otherwise encumbering them until Berkenkotter has been fully reimbursed therefor, is not incompatible with the permanent character of the incorporation of said machinery and equipment with the sugar central of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., as nothing could prevent B.A. Green from giving them as security at least under a second mortgage.As to the alleged sale of said machinery and equipment to the plaintiff and appellant after they had been permanently incorporated with sugar central of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., and while the mortgage constituted on said sugar central to Cu Unjieng e Hijos remained in force, only the right of redemption of the vendor Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., in the sugar central with which said machinery and equipment had been incorporated, was transferred thereby, subject to the right of the defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos under the first mortgage.For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That the installation of a machinery and equipment in a mortgaged sugar central, in lieu of another of less capacity, for the purpose of carrying out the industrial functions of the latter and increasing production, constitutes a permanent improvement on said sugar central and subjects said machinery and equipment to the mortgage constituted thereon (article 1877, Civil Code); (2) that the fact that the purchaser of the new machinery and equipment has bound himself to the person supplying him the purchase money to hold them as security for the payment of the latter's credit, and to refrain from mortgaging or otherwise encumbering them does not alter the permanent character of the incorporation of said machinery and equipment with the central; and (3) that the sale of the machinery and equipment in question by the purchaser who was supplied the purchase money, as a loan, to the person who supplied the money, after the incorporation thereof with the mortgaged sugar central, does not vest the creditor with ownership of said machinery and equipment but simply with the right of redemption.Wherefore, finding no error in the appealed judgment, it is affirmed in all its parts, with costs to the appellant. So ordered.Malcolm, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 175485 July 27, 2011CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,Petitioner,vs.RENATO L. MATEO,Respondent.D E C I S I O NBERSAMIN,J.:The focus of this appeal is the faith that should be accorded to the Torrens title that the seller holds at the time of the sale.In its decision promulgated on August 31, 2006,1the Court of Appeals (CA) declared that the respondent and his three brothers were the rightful owners of the land in litis, and directed the Office of the Register of Deeds of Las Pias City to cancel the transfer certificate of title (TCT) registered under the name of petitioner Casimiro Development Corporation (CDC) and to issue in its place another TCT in favor of the respondent and his three brothers. Thereby, the CA reversed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered on May 9, 2000 (dismissing the respondents complaint for quieting of title and reconveyance upon a finding that CDC had been a buyer in good faith of the land in litis and that the respondents suit had already been time-barred).Aggrieved, CDC brought its petition for review on certiorari.AntecedentsThe subject of this case is a registered parcel of land (property) with an area of 6,693 square meters, more or less, located in Barrio Pulang Lupa, Las Pias City, that was originally owned by Isaias Lara,2the respondents maternal grandfather. Upon the death of Isaias Lara in 1930, the property passed on to his children, namely: Miguela, Perfecta and Felicidad, and a grandson, Rosauro (son of Perfecta who had predeceased Isaias in 1920). In 1962, the co-heirs effected the transfer of the full and exclusive ownership to Felicidad (whose married surname was Lara-Mateo) under an agreement denominated as Pagaayos Na Gawa Sa Labas Ng Hukuman.Felicidad Lara-Mateo had five children, namely: Laura, respondent Renato, Cesar, Candido, Jr. and Leonardo. With the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family, a deed of sale covering the property was executed in favor of Laura, who, in 1967, applied for land registration. After the application was granted, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 6386 was issued in Lauras sole name.In due course, the property now covered by OCT No. 6386 was used as collateral to secure a succession of loans. The first loan was obtained from Bacoor Rural Bank (Bacoor Bank). To repay the loan to Bacoor Bank and secure the release of the mortgage, Laura borrowed funds from Parmenas Perez (Perez), who, however, required that the title be meanwhile transferred to his name. Thus, OCT No. 6386 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 438959 was issued in the name of Perez. Subsequently, Laura recovered the property by repaying the obligation with the proceeds of another loan obtained from Rodolfo Pe (Pe), resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 438595, and in the issuance of TCT No. S-91595 in Lauras name. She later executed a deed of sale in favor of Pe, leading to the issuance of TCT No. S-91738 in the name of Pe, who in turn constituted a mortgage on the property in favor of China Banking Corporation (China Bank) as security for a loan. In the end, China Bank foreclosed the mortgage, and consolidated its ownership of the property in 1985 after Pe failed to redeem. Thus, TCT No. (99527) T-11749-A was issued in the name of China Bank.In 1988, CDC and China Bank negotiated and eventually came to terms on the purchase of the property, with China Bank executing a deed of conditional sale for the purpose. On March 4, 1993, CDC and China Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property. Resultantly, on March 29, 1993, CDC was issued TCT No. T-34640 in its own name.In the meanwhile, on February 28, 1991, Felicidad died intestate.On June 6, 1991, CDC brought an action for unlawful detainer in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Las Pias City against the respondents siblings, namely: Cesar, Candido, Jr., and Leonardo, and the other occupants of the property. Therein, the defendants maintained that the MeTC did not have jurisdiction over the action because the land was classified as agricultural; that the jurisdiction belonged to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); that they had been in continuous and open possession of the land even before World War II and had presumed themselves entitled to a government grant of the land; and that CDCs title was invalid, considering that the land had been registered before its being declared alienable.3On October 19, 1992, the MeTC ruled in favor of CDC, viz:The Court, after careful consideration of the facts and the laws applicable to this case[,] hereby resolves:1. On the issue of jurisdiction.The defendants alleged that the land in question is an agricultural land by presenting a Tax Declaration Certificate classifying the land as "FISHPOND." The classification of the land in a tax declaration certificate as a "fishpond" merely refers to the use of the land in question for the purpose of real property taxation. This alone would not be sufficient to bring the land in question under the operation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.2. On the issue of open and adverse possession by the defendants.It should be noted that the subject land is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest China Banking Corporation. Certificates of Title under the Torrens System is indefeasible and imprescriptible. As between two persons claiming possession, one having a [T]orrens title and the other has none, the former has a better right.3. On the issue of the nullity of the Certificate of Title.The defense of the defendants that the subject property was a forest land when the same was originally registered in 1967 and hence, the registration is void[,] is not for this Court to decide[,] for lack of jurisdiction. The certificate of title over the property must be respected by this Court until it has been nullified by a competent Court.WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff[,] ordering the defendants1. [sic] and all persons claiming right[s] under it to vacate the subject premises located at Pulang Lupa I, Las Pias, Metro Manila and surrender the possession of the same to herein plaintiff;2. to pay the plaintiff reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the subject premises hereby fixed at (P100.00) one hundred pesos a month starting November 22, 1990 (the time when the demand letter to vacate was given) until defendants actually vacate the property;No pronouncement as to costs and attorneys fees.SO ORDERED.4The decision of the MeTC was assailed in the RTC via petition for certiorari and prohibition. The RTC resolved against CDC, and held that the MeTC had acted without jurisdiction because the land, being a fishpond, was agricultural; hence, the dispute was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988).5CDC appealed to the CA, which, on January 25, 1996, found in favor of CDC, declaring that the MeTC had jurisdiction. As a result, the CA reinstated the decision of the MeTC.6On appeal (G.R. No. 128392), the Court affirmed the CAs decision in favor of CDC, ruling thusly:WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution in CA- G.R. SP No. 34039, dated January 25, 1996 and February 21, 1997 respectively, are AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.7The decision in G.R. No. 128392 became final.Nonetheless, on June 29, 1994, the respondent brought an action for quieting of title, reconveyance of four-fifths of the land, and damages against CDC and Laura in the RTC in Las Pias City entitled Renato L. Mateo v. Casimiro Development Corporation and Laura Mateo de Castro. In paragraph 4 of his complaint, he stated that he was "bringing this action to quiet title on behalf of himself and of his three (3) brothers Cesar, Leonardo, and Candido, Jr., all surnamed MATEO in his capacity as one of the co-owners of a parcel of land situated at Barrio Pulang Lupa, Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila."On May 9, 2001, the RTC held in favor of CDC, disposing:WHEREFORE, and by strong preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant Casimiro Development Corporation and against the plaintiff Renato L. Mateo by (1) Dismissing the complaint, and upholding the validity and indefeasibility of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34640 in the name of Casimiro Development Corporation; (2) Ordering the plaintiff Renato Mateo to pay defendant Casimiro Development Corporation the sum of [a]P200,000.00 as compensatory damages; [b]P200,000.00 as attorneys fees; and [c] to pay the costs.SO ORDERED.8On appeal (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 71696), the CA promulgated its decision on August 31, 2006, reversing the RTC and declaring CDC to be not a buyer in good faith due to its being charged with notice of the defects and flaws of the title at the time it acquired the property from China Bank, and decreeing:WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 9, 2001 of Branch 225, Regional Trial Court, Las Pias City in Civil Case No. 94-2045 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered:(1) Declaring appellant Renato Mateo and his brothers and co-owners Cesar, Candido, Jr., and Leonardo, all surnamed Mateo as well as his sister, Laura Mateo de Castro as the rightful owners of the parcel of land, subject of this case; and(2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Las Pias City, Metro-Manila to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34640 under the name of appellee Casimiro Development Corporation, and that a new one be issued in favor of the appellant and his co-heirs and siblings, mentioned above as co-owners pro indiviso of the said parcel.(3) No pronouncement as to cost.SO ORDERED.9The CA denied CDCs motion for reconsideration.Hence, this appeal, in which CDC urges that the CA committed serious errors of law,10as follows:(A) xxx in failing to rule that the decree of registration over the Subject Property is incontrovertible and no longer open to review or attack after the lapse of one (1) year from entry of such decree of registration in favor of Laura Mateo de Castro.(B) xxx in failing to rule that the present action is likewise barred by res judicata.(C) xxx in failing to rule that the instant action for quieting of title and reconveyance under PD No. 1529 cannot prosper because the Subject Property had already been conveyed and transferred to third parties who claimed adverse title for themselves.(D) xxx in failing to rule that the action of respondent for "quieting of title, reconveyance and damages" is barred by laches.(E) xxx in ruling that the Subject Property must be reconveyed to respondent because petitioner Casimiro Development Corporation is not a "purchaser in good faith."CDC argues that it was a buyer in good faith; and that the CA did not rule on matters that fortified its title in the property, namely: (a) the incontrovertibility of the title of Laura; (b) the action being barred by laches and res judicata; and (c) the property having been conveyed to third parties who had then claimed adverse title.The respondent counters that CDC acquired the property from China Bank in bad faith, because it had actual knowledge of the possession of the property by the respondent and his siblings; that CDC did not actually accept delivery of the possession of the property from China Bank; and that CDC ignored the failure of China Bank to warrant its title.RulingWe grant the petition.1.Indefeasibility of title in the name of LauraAs basis for recovering the possession of the property, the respondent has assailed the title of Laura.We cannot sustain the respondent.There is no doubt that the land in question, although once a part of the public domain, has already been placed under the Torrens system of land registration. The Government is required under the Torrens system of registration to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named in the certificate is the owner of the property therein described, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves.11The objective is to obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further. The Torrens system gives the registered owner complete peace of mind, in order that he will be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land.12The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the sellers title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will not only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in the system and will force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence will be that land conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.13Yet, registration under the Torrens system, not being a mode of acquiring ownership, does not create or vest title.14The Torrens certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title in the particular property described therein.15In that sense, the issuance of the certificate of title to a particular person does not preclude the possibility that persons not named in the certificate may be co-owners of the real property therein described with the person named therein, or that the registered owner may be holding the property in trust for another person.16Nonetheless, it is essential that title registered under the Torrens system becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible.17The land in question has been covered by a Torrens certificate of title (OCT No. 6386 in the name of Laura, and its derivative certificates) before CDC became the registered owner by purchase from China Bank. In all that time, neither the respondent nor his siblings opposed the transactions causing the various transfers. In fact, the respondent admitted in his complaint that the registration of the land in the name of Laura alone had been with the knowledge and upon the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family. It is unthinkable, therefore, that the respondent, fully aware of the exclusive registration in her sister Lauras name, allowed more than 20 years to pass before asserting his claim of ownership for the first time through this case in mid-1994. Making it worse for him is that he did so only after CDC had commenced the ejectment case against his own siblings.Worthy of mention is that Candido, Jr., Leonardo, and Cesars defense in the ejectment case brought by CDC against them was not predicated on a claim of their ownership of the property, but on their being agricultural lessees or tenants of CDC. Even that defense was ultimately rejected by this Court by observing in G.R. No. 128392 as follows:With regard to the first element, the petitioners have tried to prove that they are tenants or agricultural lessees of the respondent corporation, CDC, by showing that the land was originally owned by their grandfather, Isaias Lara, who gave them permission to work the land, and that CDC is merely a successor-in-interest of their grandfather. It must be noted that the petitioners failed to adequately prove their grandfathers ownership of the land. They merely showed six tax declarations. It has been held by this Court that, as against a transfer certificate of title, tax declarations or receipts are not adequate proofs of ownership. Granting arguendo that the land was really owned by the petitioners grandfather, petitioners did not even attempt to show how the land went from the patrimony of their grandfather to that of CDC. Furthermore, petitioners did not prove, but relied on mere allegation, that they indeed had an agreement with their grandfather to use the land.As for the third element, there is apparently no consent between the parties. Petitioners were unable to show any proof of consent from CDC to work the land. For the sake of argument, if petitioners were able to prove that their grandfather owned the land, they nonetheless failed to show any proof of consent from their grandfather to work the land. Since the third element was not proven, the fourth element cannot be present since there can be no purpose to a relationship to which the parties have not consented.18The respondents attack against the title of CDC is likewise anchored on his assertion that the only purpose for having OCT No. 6386 issued in the sole name of Laura was for Laura to hold the title in trust for their mother. This assertion cannot stand, however, inasmuch as Lauras title had long ago become indefeasible.Moreover, the respondents suit is exposed as being, in reality, a collateral attack on the title in the name of Laura, and for that reason should not prosper. Registration of land under the Torrens System, aside from perfecting the title and rendering it indefeasible after the lapse of the period allowed by law, also renders the title immune from collateral attack.19A collateral attack occurs when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the present action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title. This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the judgment had been disposed of.202.CDC was an innocent purchaser for valueThe CA found that CDC acquired the property in bad faith because CDC had knowledge of defects in the title of China Bank, including the adverse possession of the respondents siblings and the supposed failure of China Bank to warrant its title by inserting an as-is, where-is clause in its contract of sale with CDC.The CA plainly erred in so finding against CDC.To start with, one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the certificate of title, but only has to rely on the certificate of title.21He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.22The pertinent law on the matter of burdens and claims is Section 44 of the Property Registration Decree,23which provides:Section 44. Statutory liens affecting title. Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the Philippines which are not by law required to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in order to be valid against subsequent purchasers or encumbrances of record.Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately preceding the acquisition of any right over the land by an innocent purchaser for value, without prejudice to the right of the government to collect taxes payable before that period from the delinquent taxpayer alone.Third. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law, or any government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, if the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been determined.Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or pursuant to, Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other law or regulations on agrarian reform.In short, considering that China Banks TCT No. 99527 was a clean title, that is, it was free from any lien or encumbrance, CDC had the right to rely, when it purchased the property, solely upon the face of the certificate of title in the name of China Bank.24The CAs ascribing of bad faith to CDC based on its knowledge of the adverse possession of the respondents siblings at the time it acquired the property from China Bank was absolutely unfounded and unwarranted. That possession did not translate to an adverse claim of ownership that should have put CDC on actual notice of a defect or flaw in the China Banks title, for the respondents siblings themselves, far from asserting ownership in their own right, even characterized their possession only as that of mere agricultural tenants. Under no law was possession grounded on tenancy a status that might create a defect or inflict a flaw in the title of the owner. Consequently, due to his own admission in his complaint that the respondents own possession was not any different from that of his siblings, there was really nothing factually or legally speaking that ought to have alerted CDC or, for that matter, China Bank and its predecessors-in-interest, about any defect or flaw in the title.The vendees notice of a defect or flaw in the title of the vendor, in order for it to amount to bad faith, should encompass facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious person to make further inquiry into the vendors title,25or facts and circumstances that would induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation.26In other words, the presence of anything that excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and to investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate.27And, secondly, the CA grossly erred in construing the as-is, where-is clause contained in the deed of sale between CDC (as vendee) and China Bank (as vendor) as proof or manifestation of any bad faith on the part of CDC. On the contrary, the as-is, where-is clause did not affect the title of China Bank because it related only to the physical condition of the property upon its purchase by CDC. The clause only placed on CDC the burden of having the occupants removed from the property. In a sale made on an as-is, where-is basis, the buyer agrees to take possession of the things sold "in the condition where they are found and from the place where they are located," because the phrase as-is, where-is pertains solely "to the physical condition of the thing sold, not to its legal situation" and is "merely descriptive of the state of the thing sold" without altering the sellers responsibility to deliver the property sold to the buyer.28What the foregoing circumstances ineluctably indicate is that CDC, having paid the full and fair price of the land, was an innocent purchaser for value, for, according to Sandoval v. Court of Appeals:29A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could convey title to the property. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari; set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 71696; dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 94-2045; and declare Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34640 in the name of Casimiro Development Corporation valid and subsisting.The respondent shall pay the costs of suit.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 200265 December 2, 2013LAURA E. PARAGUYA,Petitioner,vs.SPOUSES ALMA ESCUREL-CRUCILLO and EMETRIO CRUCILLO,*and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF SORSOGON,Respondents.R E S O L U T I O NPERLAS-BERNABE,J.:Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1are the Decision2dated June 27, 2011 and Resolution3dated January 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 94764 reversing the Decision4dated April 22, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Gubat, Sorsogon, Branch 54 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 1583 which ordered respondents-spouses Alma Escurel-Crucillo (Escurel) and Emetrio Crucillo (Sps. Crucillo) to surrender ownership and possession of certain parcels of land located at Maragadao, Villareal, Gubat, Sorsogon (subject properties) in favor of pettioner Laura E. Paraguya (Paraguya), and for respondent Register of Deeds of Sorsogon(RD) to cancel Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-177295covering the foregoing properties.The FactsOn December 19, 1990, Paraguya filed before the RTC a Complaint6against Sps. Crucillo and the RD for the annulment of OCT No. P-17729 and other related deeds, with prayer for receivership and damages, alleging that Escurel obtained the aforesaid title through fraud and deceit. Paraguya claimed that she is the lawful heir to the subject properties left by her paternal grandfather, the late Ildefonso Estabillo7(Estabillo), while Escurel was merely their administrator and hence, had no right over the same.8On January 18, 1991, the RD files its answer and denied anyinvolvment in the aforesaid fraud maintaining that its isuance of OCT No. P-17729 was his minsterial duty.9Thereafter, or on February 7, 1991, Sps. Crucillo filed their answer with motion to dismiss, averring that Paraguyas complaint had already been barred by laches and/or prescription.10They further alleged, among others, that Escurel, through her father, the late Angel Escurel, applied for a free patent over the subject properties, resulting in the issuance of Free Patent No. V-3 005844 under OCT No. P-17792 in her name.During pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following: (a) the identity of the subject propwerties which are covered by OCT No. P-17729 in the name of Escurel; (b) the fact that the subject properties were originally owned by Estabillo, the common ancestor of Paraguya and Escurel, being the formers grandfather and the latters great-grandfather; and (c) the fact that Sps. Crucillo are in actual possession of the subject properties.11During trial, Paraguya testified as to how she came about owning the subject properties, presenting a document entitled Recognition of Ownership and Possession dated December 1, 1972 executed by her siblings, as well as atitulo posesorioissued sometime in 1983 or 1985 in the name of Estabillo. A representative of the Community Environment and Naural Resources Office (CENRO), by the name of Ramon Escanilla, also testified in Paraguyas favor, stating that aside from an affidavit dated December 17, 197612executed by Escurels brother, Adonis Escurel (adonis), there were no other documents of ownership presented before the Bureau of Lands in support of Escurels application for title.13For their part, Sps. Crucillo presented several witnesses who testified that Escurel had been in possession of the subject properties in the concept of an owner as early as 1957. Escurel then admitted that her brother, Adonis, executed an affidavit dated December 17, 1976 in her favor. She likewise admitted that she executed an affidavit, entitled Ratification of Ownership (affidavit of adjudication), on the same date, in support of the free patent application with the Bureau of Lands.14The RTC RulingIn a Decision15date April 22, 2009, the RTC granted Paraguyas complaint, ordering theannulment of OCT No. P-17729. Accordingly, it directed the RD to cancel the said title and Sps. Escurillo to surrender ownership and possession of the subject propwerties to Paraguya.It found that there was a discrepancy in the area of the subject properties applied for registration, as Adoniss affidavit which was made as the basis of Escurels affidavit of adjudication stated that the actual area thereof was only 8,392 square meters (sq. m.) whereas OCT No. P-17729 indicated that the foregoing properties had an area of 30,862 sq. m. In this regard, the RTC concluded that the requisites for the application for registration were not complied with. Likewise, it observed that Escurels ownership over the subject properties was not proven, adding that the affidavit of adjudication made by her and submitted to the CENRO was self-serving. Based on its findings, it then concluded tha there was fraud in Escurels acquisition of the above-mentioned title.16On May 15, 2009, a motion for reconsideration was fixed by the Heirs of Sps. Crucillo, who had substituted the letter due to their supervening death. The said motion was, however, denbied on December 16, 2009, prompting them to elevate the case to the CA.17The CA RulingIn a Decision18dated June 27, 2011, the CA reversed the RTCs ruling and ordered the dismissal of Paraguyas complaint.Citing Section 32 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529,19otherwise known as the "Property Registration Decree." It held that OCT No. P-17729 became indefeasible and incontrovertible after the lapse of one (1) year from its issuance on August 24, 1979, thus barring Paraguyas complaint.20Moreover, it found that the express trust relationship between Escurel and Estabillo was not sufficiently established. Finally, it pointed out that Paraguya was not real-party-interest since she has not proven her title over the subject properties, stating that thetitulo posesorioshe held could no longer be used as evidence of ownership.Aggrieved Paraguya moved for reconsideration21which for reconsideration21which was however, denied on January 9, 2012.22Hence, this petition.Issue Before the CourtThe sole issue in this case is whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Paraguyas complaint for annulment of title.The Courts RulingThe petition has no merit.It is an established rule that a Torrens certificate of title is conclusive proof of ownership. Verily, a party may seek its annulment on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation. However, such action must be seasonably filed, else the same would be barred.23In this relation, Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the period to contest a decree of registration shall be one (1) year from the date of its entry and that , after the lapse of the said period, The Torrens certificate of title issued thereon becomes incontrovertible and indefeasible,viz.:Sec. 32 Review of decree of registrationl Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by the reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court by reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a pettiton for reopnening and review of the decree of registartionnot later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such deceree of resgistration,but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbracer for value.Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become inconvertible.Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)In view of the foregoing , the Ocurt is impelled to sustain the CAs dismissal of Paraguyas complaint for annulment of CT No. P-1772924since it was filed only on December 19, 1990, or more than eleven (11) years from the titles date of entry onAugust 24, 1979.25Based on Section 32 of PD 1529, aid title had become inconvertible and indefeasible after the lapse of one (1) year from the date of its entry, thus barring Paraguyas action for annulment of title.The Court likewise takes note that Paraguyas complaint is likewise in the nature of an action for reconveyance because it also prayed for the trial copurt to order Sps. Crucillo to "surrender ownership and possession of the properties in question to [Paraguya], vacating them altogether x x x.26Despite this, Paraguyas complaint remains dismissible on the same ground because the prescriptive period for actions for reconveyance is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of issuance of the certificate of title, except when the owner is in possession of the property in which case the action for reconveyance becomes imprescriptible.27Such exception is, howevee, Crucillo, and Paraguya, who are in possession of the land covered by OCT No. P-17729.As a final point, it is well to note that even if the barring effect of Section 32 and the above-stated prescriptive period for reconveyance are discounted, Paraguyas comlaint for annulment of title should be dismissed altogether since she merely relied on thetitulo posesorioissued in favor Estabillo sometime in 1983 or 1985. Based on Section 1 of PD 892, entitled "Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings," Spanish titles can no longer be used as evidence of ownership after six (6) months from the effectivity of the law, or starting August 16, 1976.28viz.:Section 1. The system of Registration under the Spanish Mortgage Las is discontinued, and all lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree.Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any registartion proceeding under the Torrens system.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)x x x xHence, since Paraguya only presented the titulo posesorio during the pendency of the instant case, or during the 1990s onwards, the CA was correct in not giving any credence to it at all.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals Decision dated June 27, 2011 and Resolution dated January 9, 2012 in CA-G.R. CV. No. 94764 are hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 182908 August 6, 2014HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA, SR., and HEIRS OF PETRA IMBORNAL and PEDRO FERRER, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, MRS. REMEDIOS B. NARVASA-REGACHO,Petitioners,vs.EMILIANA, VICTORIANO, FELIPE, MA TEO, RAYMUNDO, MARIA, and EDUARDO, all surnamed IMBORNAL,Respondents.D E C I S I O NPERLAS-BERNABE,J.:Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1are the Decision2dated November 28, 2006 and the Resolution3dated May 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 57618 which reversed and set aside the Decision4dated August 20, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 (RTC) in Civil Case No. D-6978, declared (a) the descendants of Ciriaco Abrio5as the exclusive owners of the Motherland covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1462,6(b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano Imbornal (respondent Victoriano) as the exclusive owners of the first accretion (First Accretion) covered by OCT No. P-318,7and (c) the descendants of Pablo Imbornal (Pablo) as the exclusive owners of the second accretion (Second Accretion) covered by OCT No. 21481,8and dismissed the complaint and counterclaim in all other respects for lack of merit.The FactsBasilia Imbornal+ (Basilia) had four (4) children, namely, Alejandra, Balbina, Catalina, and Pablo.Francisco I. Narvasa, Sr.9(Francisco) and Pedro Ferrer (Pedro) were the children10of Alejandra, while petitioner Petra Imbornal (Petra) was the daughter of Balbina.11Petitionersare the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco, Pedro, and Petra (Francisco, et al.). On the other hand, respondentsEmiliana, Victoriano, Felipe, Mateo, Raymundo, Maria, and Eduardo, all surnamed Imbornal, are the descendants of Pablo.12During her lifetime, Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at Sabangan, Barangay Nibaliw West, San Fabian, Pangasinan with an area of 4,144 square meters (sq. m.), more or less (Sabangan property), which she conveyed to her three (3) daughters Balbina, Alejandra, and Catalina (Imbornal sisters) sometime in 1920.13Meanwhile, Catalinas husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for and was granted a homestead patent over a 31,367-sq. m. riparian land (Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga River in San Fabian, Pangasinan.14He was eventually awarded Homestead Patent No. 2499115therefor, and, on December 5, 1933, OCT No. 1462 was issued in his name. Later, or on May 10, 1973, OCT No. 1462 was cancelled, and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10149516was issued in the name of Ciriacos heirs, namely: Margarita Mejia; Rodrigo Abrio, marriedto Rosita Corpuz; Antonio Abrio, married to Crisenta Corpuz; Remedios Abrio, married to Leopoldo Corpuz; Pepito Abrio; Dominador Abrio; Francisca Abrio; Violeta Abrio; and Perla Abrio (Heirs of Ciriaco).Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portionof the Motherland, while respondents occupied the southern portion.17Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq. m. in area, adjoined the southern portion of the Motherland. On August 15, 1952, OCT No. P-318 was issued in thename of respondent Victoriano, married to Esperanza Narvarte, covering the First Accretion.18Decades later, or in 1971, the Second Accretion, which had an area of 32,307 sq. m., more or less, abutted the First Accretion on its southern portion.19On November 10, 1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the names of all the respondents covering the Second Accretion.Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the children of Alejandra and Balbina, filed on February 27,1984 an Amended Complaint20for reconveyance, partition,and/or damages against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. D-6978. They anchored their claim on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of his wifeCatalina, urged Balbina and Alejandra to sell the Sabangan property, and that Ciriaco used the proceeds therefrom to fund his then-pending homestead patent application over the Motherland. In return, Ciriaco agreed that once his homestead patent is approved, he will be deemed to be holding the Motherland which now included both accretions in trust for the Imbornal sisters.21Likewise, Francisco, et al.alleged that through deceit, fraud, falsehood, and misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano, with respect to the First Accretion, and the respondents collectively, with regard to the Second Accretion, had illegally registered the said accretions in their names, notwithstanding the fact that they werenot the riparian owners (as they did not own the Motherland to which the accretions merely formed adjacent to). In this relation, Francisco, et al. explained that they did not assert their inheritance claims over the Motherland and the two (2) accretions because they respected respondents rights, until they discovered in 1983 that respondents have repudiated their (Francisco, et al.s) shares thereon.22Thus, bewailing that respondents have refused them their rights not only with respect to the Motherland, but also to the subsequent accretions, Francisco, et al. prayed for the reconveyance ofsaid properties, or, in the alternative, the payment of their value, as well as the award of moral damages in the amount ofP100,000.00, actual damages in the amount ofP150,000.00, including attorneys fees and other costs.23In their Amended Answer dated March 5, 1984,24respondents contended that: (a) the Amended Complaint statedno cause of action against them, having failed to clearly and precisely describe the disputed properties and specify the transgressions they have allegedly committed; (b) the action was barred by prescription; and (c) that the properties sought to be reconveyed and partitioned are not the properties of their predecessors-ininterest but, instead, are covered by Torrens certificates of titles, free from any encumbrance, and declared for taxation purposes in their names. In this regard, respondents prayed that the Amended Complaint be dismissed and that Francisco, et al.be held liable for the payment of moral damages, attorneys fees, and costs of suit in their favor.During trial, it was established from the testimonies of the parties that the Motherland was eventually sold bythe Heirs of Ciriaco to a certain Gregorio de Vera (de Vera), and thatsaid heirs and deVera were not impleaded as parties in this case.25The RTC RulingOn August 20, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision26in favor of Francisco, et al. and thereby directed respondents to: (a) reconvey to Francisco, et al. their respective portions in the Motherland and in the accretions thereon, or their pecuniary equivalent; and (b) pay actual damages in the amount ofP100,000.00, moral damages in the amount ofP100,000.00, and attorneys fees in the sum ofP10,000.00, as well as costs of suit.The RTC found that the factual circumstances surrounding the present case showed that an implied trust existed between Ciriaco and the Imbornal sisters with respect to the Motherland.27It gave probative weight to Francisco, et al.s allegation that the Sabangan property, inherited by the Imbornal sisters from their mother, Basilia, was sold in order to help Ciriaco raise funds for his then-pending homesteadpatent application. In exchange therefor, Ciriaco agreed that he shall hold the Motherland in trust for them once his homestead patent application had been approved. As Ciriaco was only able to acquire the Motherland subject of the homestead patent through the proceeds realized from the sale of the Sabangan property, the Imbornal sisters and, consequently, Francisco, et al. (as the children of Alejandra and Balbina) are entitled to their proportionate shares over the Motherland, notwithstanding the undisputed possession of respondents over its southern portion since 1926.28With respect to the accretions thatformed adjacent to the Motherland, the RTC ruled that the owner of the Motherland is likewise the owner of the said accretions. Considering that the Imbornal sisters have become proportionate owners of the Motherland by virtue of the implied trust created between them and Ciriaco, they (Imbornal sisters) and their heirs are also entitled to the ownership of said accretions despite the fact that respondents were able to register them in their names.Dissatisfied with the RTCs ruling, respondents elevated the matter on appeal to the CA.The CA RulingOn November 28, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision29reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision and entering a new one declaring: (a) the descendants of Ciriaco as the exclusive owners of the Motherland; (b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano asthe exclusive owners of the First Accretion; and (c) the descendants of Pablo (i.e., respondents collectively) as the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion.With respect to the Motherland, the CA found that Ciriaco alone was awarded a homestead patent, which later became the basis for the issuance of a Torrens certificate of title in his name; as such, saidcertificate of title cannot be attacked collaterally through an action for reconveyance filed by his wifes (Catalinas) relatives (i.e., Francisco, et al.being the children of Alejandra and Balbina, who, in turn, are the sisters of Catalina). The CA further observed that the homestead patent was not aninheritance of Catalina; instead, it was awarded by the government to Ciriaco after having fully satisfied the stringent requirements set forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141,30as amended,31and his title thereto had already become indefeasible.32Consequently, since the entire Motherland was titled in Ciriacos name, his descendants should be regarded as the absolute owners thereof.On the other hand, with regard to the disputed accretions, the CA ruled that respondents i.e., respondent Victoriano with respect to the First Accretion, and all the respondents withrespect to the Second Accretion need not be the owners of the Motherland in order to acquire them by acquisitive prescription. Considering that accretions are not automatically registered in the name of the riparianowner and are, therefore, subject to acquisitive prescription by third persons, any occupant may apply for their registration. In this case, the CA found that respondents have acquired title to the subject accretions by prescription,33considering that they have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the First Accretion in the concept of an owner since 1949 (when the First Accretion was formed), which resulted in the issuance of a certificate of title in the name of respondent Victoriano covering the same. Accordingly, they have also become the riparian owners of the Second Accretion, and given thatthey have caused the issuance of OCT No. 21481 in their names over the said Accretion, they have also become the absolute ownersthereof. Since Francisco, et al. took no action to protect their purported interests over the disputed accretions, the respondents titles over the same had already become indefeasible, to the exclusion of Francisco, et al.34At odds with the CAs disposition, Francisco et al. filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however,denied by the CA in a Resolution35dated May 7, 2008, hence, this petition taken by the latters heirs as their successors-in-interest.The Issue Before the CourtThe issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA erred in declaring that: (a) the descendants of Ciriaco are the exclusive owners of the Motherland; (b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano are the exclusive owners of the First Accretion; and (c) the descendants of Pablo (respondents collectively) are the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion on the basis of the following grounds: (a) prescription of the reconveyance action, which was duly raised as anaffirmative defense in the Amended Answer, and (b) the existence of an implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco.The Courts RulingThe petition is bereft of merit.A. Procedural Matter: Issue of Prescription.At the outset, the Court finds that the causes of action pertaining to the Motherland and the First Accretion are barred by prescription.An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner.36Thus, reconveyance is a remedy granted only tothe owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in anothers name.37As the records would show, the Amended Complaint filed by petitioners predecessors-in-interest, Francisco, et al. is for the reconveyance of their purported shares or portions in the following properties: (a) the Motherland, originally covered by OCT No. 1462 in the name of Ciriaco; (b) the First Accretion, originally covered by OCT No. P-318 in the name of respondent Victoriano; and (c) the Second Accretion, covered by OCT No. 21481 in the name of all respondents. To recount, Francisco, et al. asserted co-ownership over the Motherland, alleging that Ciriaco agreed to hold the same in trustfor their predecessors-in-interest Alejandra and Balbina upon issuance of the title in his name. Likewise, they alleged that respondents acquired the First and Second Accretions by means of fraudand deceit.When property is registered in anothers name, an implied or constructive trust is created by law in favor of the true owner.38Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee ofan implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years, reckoned from the date of registration of the deed or the date ofissuance of the certificate of title over the property,39if the plaintiff is not in possession. However, if the plaintiff is in possession of the property, the action is imprescriptible. As held in the case of Lasquite v. Victory Hills, Inc.:40An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10 years. The reference point of the 10-yearprescriptive period is the date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if the plaintiff, as the realowner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.41(Emphases supplied)Based on the foregoing, Francisco, et al. had then a period of ten (10) years from the registration of the respective titles covering the disputed properties within which to file their action for reconveyance, taking into account the fact that they were never in possessionof the said properties. Hence, with respect tothe Motherland covered by OCT No. 1462 issued on December 5, 1933 in the name of Ciriaco, an action for reconveyance therefor should have been filed until December 5, 1943; with respect to the First Accretion covered by OCT No. P-318 issued on August 15, 1952in the name of respondent Victoriano, an action of the same nature should have been filed untilAugust 15, 1962; and, finally, with respect to the Second Accretion covered by OCT No. 21481 issued on November 10, 1978in the name of the respondents, a suit for reconveyance therefor should have been filed until November 10, 1988.A judicious perusal of the records, however, will show that the Amended Complaint42covering all three (3) disputed properties was filed only on February 27, 1984. As such, it was filed way beyond the 10-year reglementary period within which to seek the reconveyance of two (2) of these properties, namely, the Motherland and the First Accretion, with only the reconveyance action with respect to the Second Accretion having been seasonably filed. Thus, considering thatrespondents raised prescription as a defense in their Amended Answer,43the Amended Complaint with respect to the Motherland and the First Accretion ought to have beendismissed based on the said ground, with only the cause of action pertaining to the Second Accretion surviving. As will be, however, discussed below, the entirety of the Amended Complaint, including the aforesaid surviving cause of action, would falter on its substantive merits since the existence of the implied trust asserted in this case had not been established. In effect, the said complaint is completely dismissible.B. Substantive Matter: Existence of an Implied Trust.The main thrust of Francisco, et al.s Amended Complaint is that an implied trust had arisen between the Imbornal sisters, on the one hand, and Ciriaco, on the other, with respect to the Motherland. This implied trust is anchored on their allegation that the proceeds from the sale of the Sabangan property an inheritance of their predecessors, the Imbornal sisters were used for the then-pending homestead application filed by Ciriaco over the Motherland. As such, Francisco, et al. claim that they are, effectively, coowners of the Motherland together with Ciriacos heirs.An implied trust arises, not from any presumed intention of the parties, but by operation of law in order to satisfy the demands of justice and equity and to protect against unfair dealing or downright fraud.44To reiterate, Article 1456 of the Civil Code states that "[i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes."The burden of proving the existence ofa trust is on the party asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements.45While implied trusts may be proven by oral evidence, the evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made to rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. Trustworthy evidence is required because oral evidence can easily be fabricated.46In this case, it cannot be said, merely on the basis of the oral evidence offered by Francisco, et al., that the Motherland had been either mistakenly or fraudulently registered in favor of Ciriaco. Accordingly, it cannot be said either that he was merely a trustee of an implied trust holding the Motherland for the benefit of the Imbornal sisters or their heirs.As the CA had aptly pointed out,47a homestead patent award requires proof that the applicant meets the stringent conditions48set forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which includes actual possession, cultivation, and improvement of the homestead. It must be presumed, therefore, that Ciriaco underwent the rigid process and duly satisfied the strict conditions necessary for the grant of his homestead patent application. As such, it is highly implausible thatthe Motherland had been acquired and registered by mistake or through fraudas would create an implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco, especially considering the dearth of evidence showing that the Imbornal sisters entered into the possession of the Motherland, or a portion thereof, orasserted any right over the same at any point during their lifetime. Hence, when OCT No. 1462 covering the Motherland was issued in his name pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 24991 on December 15, 1933, Ciriacos titleto the Motherland had become indefeasible. It bears to stress that the proceedings for land registration that led to the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 24991 and eventually, OCT No. 1462 in Ciriacos name are presumptively regular and proper,49which presumption has not been overcome by the evidence presented by Francisco, et al.In this light, the Court cannot fully accept and accord evidentiary value to the oral testimony offered by Francisco, et al. on the alleged verbal agreement between their predecessors, the Imbornal sisters, and Ciriaco with respect to the Motherland. Weighed against the presumed regularity of the award of the homestead patent to Ciriaco and the lack of evidence showing that the same was acquired and registered by mistake or through fraud, the oral evidence of Francisco, et al.would not effectively establish their claims of ownership. It has been held that oral testimony as to a certain fact, depending as it does exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence,50especially since the purported agreement transpired decades ago, or in the 1920s. Hence, with respect to the Motherland, the CA did not err in holding that Ciriaco and his heirs are the owners thereof, without prejudice to the rights of any subsequent purchasers for value of the said property.Consequently, as Francisco, et al.failed to prove their ownership rights over the Motherland, their cause of action with respect to the First Accretion and, necessarily, the Second Accretion, must likewise fail. A further exposition is apropos.Article 457 of the Civil Code states the rule on accretion as follows: "[t]o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." Relative thereto, in Cantoja v. Lim,51the Court, citing paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30, 1936, in relation to Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, as well as related jurisprudence on the matter, elucidated on the preferential right of the riparian owner over the land formed by accretions, viz.:Being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or littoralowner who has preferential right to lease the foreshore area as provided under paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, dated 30 April 1936, which reads:32. Preference of Riparian Owner. The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshylands or lands covered with water bordering upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right.The Court explained in Santulan v. The Executive Secretary[170 Phil. 567; 80 SCRA 548 (1977)] the reason for such grant of preferential right to the riparian or littoral owner, thus:Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral owner the preferential right to lease the foreshore land abutting on his land?That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which provides that, while lands added to the shore by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain, such lands, "when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the established [sic] of special industries, or for the coast guard service, "shall be declared by the Government "to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by accretionsor alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea.1wphi1The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the riparianowner, which is that accretion compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters. So, in the case of littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession.52Accordingly, therefore, alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a river do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.53In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein petitioners,. are not the riparian owners of the Motherland to which the First Accretion had .attached, hence, they cannot assert ownership over the First Accretion. Consequently, as the Second Accretion had merely attached to the First Accretion, they also have no right over the Second Accretion. Neither were they able to show that they acquired these properties through prescription as it was not established that they were in possession of any of them. Therefore, whether through accretion or, independently, through prescription, the discernible conclusion is that Francisco et al. and/or petitioners' claim of title over the First and Second Accretions had not been substantiated, and, as a result, said properties cannot be reconveyed in their favor. This is especially so since on the other end of the fray lie respondents armed with a certificate of title in their names covering the First and Second Accretions coupled with their possession thereof, both of which give rise to the superior credibility of their own claim. Hence, petitioners' action for reconveyan.ce with respect to both accretions must altogether fail.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2006 and the Resolution dated May 7, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57618 are hereby AFFIRMED, and a new judgment is entered DISMISSING the Amended Complaint dated February 27, 1984 filed in said case.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 191090 October 13, 2014EXTRAORDINARY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,Petitioner,vs.HERMINIA F. SAMSON-BICO and ELY B. FLESTADO,Respondents.D E C I S I O NPEREZ,J.:This treats of the petition for review filed by Extraordinary Development Corporation (EDC) assailing the 31 July 2009 Decision1and 22 January 2010 Resolution2of the Court of Appeals 10th Division in CAG.R. CV. No. 91358, which affirmed with modification the Decision3of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68 in Civil Case No. 03-035, a "Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Tax Declaration No. OO-BI-030-3512 and Reconveyance of Possession with Damages."As borne by the records, the facts are as follow:Apolonio Ballesteros (Apolonio) and Maria Membrebe (Maria) were husband and wife. They begot two (2) children, namely, Juan M. Ballesteros (Juan), who married Leonarda Tambongco (Leonarda) and Irenea Ballesteros (Irenea), who married Santiago Samson (Santiago). Juan and Leonarda begot six (6) children, namely, Leonardo T. Ballesteros (Leonardo), Marcelina T. Ballesteros-Abad (Marcelina), Lydia T. Ballesteros-De Lara (Lydia), Cresencia T. Ballesteros-Lirio (Cresencia), Lourdes T. Ballesteros-Tan (Lourdes), and Juan T. Ballesteros, Jr. (Juan Jr.), while Irenea and Santiago begot two (2) children, namely, Herminia B. Samson-Bico (Herminia) and Merlita Samson Flestado, who married Ely D. Flestado (Ely).During his lifetime, Apolonio owned a parcel of land consisting of 29,748 square meters situated at BarangayPantok, Binangonan, Rizal covered by Tax Declaration No. BI-030-1509. When Apolonio and Maria died, the property was inherited by Juanand Irenea. When the latter died, the heirs of Juan and Irenea became co-owners of the property.On 16 April 2002, the heirs of Juan, without the consent of respondents, the heirs of Irenea executed in favor of petitioner EDC a Deed of Absolute Sale4covering the subject property forP2,974,800.00. Prior to the sale, respondents claimed that they learned that the property had been the subject of a contract to sell between the heirs of Juan and EDC. On 7 March 2000, respondents wrote to EDC informing it of the existence of coownership over the subject property.5EDC wrote back that it will look into the matter and asked respondents to further establish the basis of their claims.6EDC was able to cause the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Office of the Provincial Assessor Rizal and transfer the tax declaration over the subject propertyin its name. This prompted respondents to file the Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Tax Declaration No. 00-BI-030-3512 and Reconveyance of Possession with Damages.7In its Answer, EDC alleged thatit is a buyer in good faith and for value of the subject property because it was of the honest belief that the heirs of Juan are the only heirs of the late Apolonio. EDC counterclaimed for damages.8On the other hand, the heirs of Juan asserted that respondents were aware of and were parties to the contract to sell entered into by them and EDC. The heirs of Juan claimed that respondents received their share in the downpayment made by EDC but they were both unpaid of the balance on the cost of the land.9After presentation of respondents testimonial and documentary evidence, the case was called for hearing on 25 April 2007. The case for the presentation of defendants evidence was reset by the trial court to 25 June 2007 for failure of their respective lawyers to appear without any explanation.10On 25 June 2007, the case was once again reset for the same reason.11On 13 August 2007, Juan appeared and informed the court that his lawyer is sick while a certain Reggie Angulo appeared before the court and manifested that EDC has not yet hired a lawyer. The trial court reset the case to 3 October 2007 and required the parties to secure a new lawyer. The trial court warned the defendants, petitioner here, and the heirs of Juan that if they fail to do so, their right to present evidence would be waived.12On 5 November 2007, the lawyer of the heirs of Juan still failed to appear, while the counsel of the plaintiffs sent a representative to move for the resetting of the case.13Finally, on 5 December 2007, the counsel of the heirs of Juan once again failed to appear so upon motion of respondents counsel, the case was submitted for resolution.14On 3 January 2008, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 16, 2002 covering a property consisting of 29,748 square meters covered by Tax Declaration No. BI-030-1509 is hereby declared null and void to the extent of one half of the property sold or 14,874 square meters.2. That the Tax Declaration No. 00-BI-030-3512 in the name of [EDC] is hereby declared null and void and the Provincial Assessor of Rizal or defendant Municipal Assessor of Binangonan, Rizal is hereby ordered to cancel the same, and the Tax Declration covering the subject parcel of land be reinstated in the name of the heirs of Apolonio Ballesteros and Maria Membrebe.3. That the [EDC] is hereby ordered to vacate, surrender or reconvey ownership and possession of the parcel of land subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale to [respondents] or the heirs of Apolonio Ballesteros or that they be reinstated to the lawful ownership of one-half (1/2) of the property sold or 14,874 square meters.4. The defendants are hereby ordered to pay the following damages to the [respondents] jointly and severally:a. Moral damages P100,000.00b. Exemplary damages [P]100,000.00c. Attorneys fees [P]100,000.005. The defendants are hereby ordered to pay the costs of suit.15The trial court found that respondents and the heirs of Juan are coowners of the subject property; that at the time of sale, the heirs of Juan did not have the right to sell the one half share of the heirs of Irenea; that the sale did not bind the heirs of Irenea; that there was fraud in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Salewhen the heirs of Juan failed to disclose to EDC that one half of the property sold is owned by respondents; and that EDC was not a buyer in good faith because itknew that respondents were coowners of the subject property because Herminia informed EDC of such fact through a letter dated 9 March 2000.EDC appealed to the Court of Appeals and assigned the following errors:I.THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTEDGRAVE ERROR WHEN IT RENDERED A DECISION HOLDING APPELLEES THE LAWFUL OWNER OF ONE-HALF OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTYII.THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTEDGRAVE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED THE 16 APRIL 2002 DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE AND INVALIDATED THE TITLE OF THE APPELLANT CORPORATION TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY DESPITE THE COMPLETE ABSENCE OF ANY EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE APPELLEES CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP OVER ONE-HALF OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.III.THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTEDGRAVE ERROR WHEN IT AWARDED MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES DESPITE THE UTTER ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE WHICH CAN PROVE THEY ARE ENTITLED TO THE SAME.IV.THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR AND VIOLATED THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION WHEN IT SUBMITTED THE CASE FORRESOLUTION WITHOUT PROVIDING THE APPELLANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS CLAIMS AND DEFENSES.16The heirs of Juan and respondents failed to file their brief so the Court of Appeals submitted the case for resolution.On 31 July 2009, the Court of Appeals partially granted the appeal. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 03 January 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68 in Civil Case No. 03-035 is AFFIRMEDwith the following MODIFICATIONS:1. Defendants-appellants Leonardo T. Ballesteros, Marcelina T. Ballesteros-Abad, Lydia T. Ballesteros-De Lara, Cresencia T. Ballesteros-Lirio, Lourdes T. Ballesteros-Tan and Juan T. Ballesteros, Jr. are hereby ORDERED to return to defendant-appellant Extraordinary Development Corporation the amount ofP1,487,400.00 or one-half of the purchase price as stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 April 2002;2. The Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the [EDC] is valid only to the extent of one-half of the subject property or 14,874 square meters, but not as to the other half of 14,874 square meters which is co-owned by [respondents];3. The Provincial Assessor of Rizal is hereby ORDEREDto CANCELTax Declaration No. 00-BI-030-3512 in the name of [EDC] and to ISSUE a new one in the names of co-owners [EDC] (one-half of the subject property) and [respondents] (the other half); and4. The award of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees in the amount ofP100,000.00 each is hereby DELETED.No pronouncement as to costs.17The Court of Appeals ruled that respondents were able to establish their co-ownership over one-half of the subject property. The appellate court pointed out that the heirs of Juan categorically admitted in their Answer, as well as during the hearing the existence of co-ownership. The appellate court agreed with the trial courts finding that the heirs of Juan, as co-owners, could only alienate or convey to EDC their one-half portion of the subject property which may be allotted to them in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Thus, the sale will affect only their share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. The appellate court disputed the submissionof EDC that whatever admissions made by the heirs of Juan regarding the ownership of the subject property is effective only insofar as they are concerned but such do not bind or affect the defenses it raised. The appellate court declared that the execution by the heirs of Juan of the Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property which they do not exclusively own but is admittedly co-owned bythem together with respondents, was valid only to the extent of the formers undivided onehalf share thereof, as they had no title or interest to transfer the other one half portion which pertains to the appellees without the latters consent. EDCs invocation of it being a buyer in good faith was not considered by the appellate court because the subject property is an unregistered land and the defense of having purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only where registered land is involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of the registered owner. The appellate court sustained the trial courts finding that there was no denial of due process as EDC was given the opportunity to advocate its cause and defend its interest.However, the appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court that the Deed of Absolute Sale is null and void. According to the appellate court, the same is valid with respect to the transfer of the rights of the co-owners sellers heirs of Juan over the one-half portion or 14,874 square meters of the subject property, thereby making EDC a co-owner thereof. Consequently, the appellate court ordered the heirs of Ballesteros to return to EDC the amount ofP1,487,400.00 or one-half of the purchase price ofP2,974,800.00. The award of moral and exemplary damages,as well as attorneys fees, were deleted for lack of legal and factual bases.Aggrieved, EDC filed this present petition, ascribing the following errors to the Court of Appeals:43.1 The Court of Appeals committed grave error in ruling that the Respondents are entitled to of the Subject Property despite their utter failure to present evidence which can prove their claim thereto.43.2 The Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to recognize that Petitioner is an innocent party to the instant dispute and is a buyer in good faith and for value.18Interestingly, it was EDC who pursued this petition and insist that respondents failed to prove co-ownership presumably to validate in its entirety the Deed of Absolute Sale it entered into with the heirs of Juan. EDC reiterates its argument that the testimony of Herminia is insufficient to prove that respondents are entitled to inherit one-half of the subject property from Apolonio. According to EDC, respondents should have established that Irenea is a legitimate child of Apolonio; that Irenea and Juan are the only legitimate compulsory heirs of Apolonio; that Apolonio predeceased Irenea and Juan; that Hermina and Merlita are the legitimate children of Irenea; and that Irenea predeceased Herminia. EDC also maintains that it is a buyer in good faith and that it was respondents who acted in bad faith, thus it prays for damages.We deny the petition.As borne by the records, respondents were able to convincingly establish their co-ownership over one-half of the subject property.Herminia has successfully established her successional rights over the subject property through her clear testimony and admitted by the opposing counsel, viz:DIRECT EXAMINATION BY ATTY. ROGELIO SILVESTRE, JR., ON WITNESS HERMINIA BICOQ: Mrs. Bico, are you the same Herminia Bico, one of the plaintiffs in this case?A: Yes, sir.Q: Do you know the defendants Ballesteros in this case?A: I know them, sir.Q: Why do you know them?A: Because they are my relatives, sir.Q: Why did you say that they are your relatives?A: [Their] father and my motherare brother and sister, sir.Q: What is the name of your mother?A: Irenea Ballesteros, sir.Q: What is the name of the father of the defendants Ballesteros?A: Juan Ballesteros, sir.Q: So, you mean that they are brother and sister, what is the name of the mother of Irenea Ballesteros and [Juan] Ballesteros?A: Maria Membrebe, sir.Q: What about the father of Irenea Ballesteros and Juan Ballesteros?A: Apolonio Ballesteros, sir.Q: So, you are saying that Irenea Ballesteros and Juan Ballesteros being brother and sister they are the children of Maria Membrede and Apolonio Ballesteros?A: Yes, sir.Q: Do you have proof that your mother is Irenea?ATTY. CERVOI admit the relationship.ATTY. SILVESTREHowever, Your Honor, the defendant Extra-Ordinary is denying.COURTBut they are not here.ATTY. CERVOAs far as I am concernedCOURTAs far as the BallesterosATTY. CERVOAs far as the Ballesteros are concerned they are admitting the relationship.ATTY. SILVESTREBut on the next hearing the counsel for the Extra-Ordinary will appear.COURTThe admission is effective only insofar as the client of Atty. Cervo is concerned.ATTY. SILVESTREThat is the reason why I am asking these questions.COURTThey are not here. So, if they will question it later on they are not here. I think the objection will be too late. If they do not object right now the objection is waived.ATTY. SILVESTREI went over the record of the case, the complainant and the Answer filed by the defendant now when I read the Answer filed by defendant Ballesteros, defendant Ballesteros are practically admitting everything except for a few allegations.COURTAre they disputing relationship?ATTY. SILVESTRENo, Your Honor.COURTSo, if it is not disputed in the Answer, it is considered admitted.ATTY. SILVESTREOkay, Your Honor.Would counsel for the defendantstipulate that the parents, grandparents as well as the father and the mother are already dead?ATTY. CERVOYes admitted, Your Honor.COURTHow can you deny that they are already dead?ATTY. SILVESTREWe would like to proceed to the markings, Your Honor of the exhibits.COURTProceed.ATTY. SILVESTREThere being no objections, we would like to mark the Certificate of Baptism of Irenea Ballesteros, child of Apolonio Ballesteros and Maria Membrebe as Exhibit "A".COURTMark it.ATTY. SILVESTREThe name Apolonio Ballesteros and Maria Membrebebe bracketed and marked as Exhibit "A-1".COURTMark it.ATTY. SILVESTREThe Death Certificate of Irenea Samson as Exhibit "B". The name of husband Santiago Samson be bracketed and marked as Exhibit "B-1". The Certificate of Death of Santiago Samson be marked as Exhibit "C".COURTMark them.ATTY. SILVESTREThe name Herminia Bico followed by the word daughter be marked as our Exhibit "C-1".COURTMark it.ATTY. SILVESTREThe certificate of Live Birth ofHerminia Samson be marked as Exhibit "D".COURTMark it.ATTY. SILVESTREThe Certificate of Baptism of Merlita Samson as Exhibit "E".COURTMark it.ATTY. SILVESTREThe name Santiago Samson and Herminia Ballesteros be bracketed and marked as Exhbit "E-1".COURTMark it.ATTY. SILVESTREWill counsel for defendants Ballesteros stipulate that prior to the death of the sister of the witness Merlita Samson she married the other co-plaintiff Ely Flestado?ATTY. CERVOYes.ATTY. SILVESTREWe would like to mark, Your Honor, the Marriage Contract executed by and between MerlitaSamson and Ely Flestado as Exhibit "F".COURTMark it.ATTY. SILVESTREThe Certificate of Death of Merlita Flestado be marked as Exhbit "G".COURTMark it.ATTY. SILVESTREOne of the entries in the Certificate of Death, Herminia Bico followed by the name sister be bracketed and marked as Exhbit "G-1".COURTMark it.19We also took into consideration the admissions made by the heirs of Juan in their Answer to the Complaint filed by respondents before the trial court. For ready reference, we shall reproduce the pertinent portion of the Answer and the Complaint:ANSWERx x x x2. The defendants BALLESTEROS admit the allegations in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the complaint;20COMPLAINT8. [Respondents] together with defendants-Ballesteros and defendant Juan T. Ballesteros, Jr., are co-owners ofa parcel ofland measuring TWENTYNINE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT (29,748) SQUARE METERS situated at Barangay Pantok, Binangonan, Rizal by virtue of succession;9. [Herminia], defendants Ballesteros and defendant Juan T. Ballesteros are the Heirs of the late Spouses Apolonio Ballesteros and Maria Membrebe who were the parents of the late Juan M. Ballesteros and the late Irenea M. Ballesteros-Samson x x x;10. During her lifetime, Irenea M. Ballesteros married Santiago Samson, now deceased, with whom she had two (2) children, namely: [Herminia] and Merlita B. Samson x x x;11. Merlita B. Samson married [respondent] Ely and later died childless and intestate x x x;12. In his lifetime, Juan M. Ballesteros married Leonarda Tambongco, now deceased, with whom she had six (6) children, namely: defendants Ballesteros and defendant Juan T. Ballesteros, Jr.; 13. Likewise, during the lifetime of Apolonio Ballesteros, he was the owner of the parcel of land mentioned in paragraph 8 hereof and the same was declared for taxation purposes under his name x x x;21Furthermore, Juan testified during the 12 March 2007 hearing that respondents are co-owners of the subject property, to wit:COURT Asan si Ballesteros?ATTY. CERVOHe is in court, Your Honor.COURT (to Ballesteros)Q: Alam mo ba na ang may-ari ng lupa na binenta ninyo ay isa sa