Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment (JRFSNA) II€¦ · Provide emergency crop and livestock...

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment (JRFSNA) II

Report

December 2012

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ...................................................................................................................... 3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................... 4

1. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................................ 6

2. OBJECTIVES ..................................................................................................................................................... 7

3. LIMITATIONS .................................................................................................................................................. 7

4. METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................................................. 8

5. MAIN FINDINGS ............................................................................................................................................ 10

5.1 Food availability .......................................................................................................................................... 10

5.1.1 Factors affecting crop production ................................................................................................................ 10

5.1.1.1 Agro‐meteorological conditions ....................................................................................................... 10

5.1.1.2 Farming inputs .................................................................................................................................. 10

5.1.1.3 Irrigation ........................................................................................................................................... 11

5.1.1.4 Availability of casual labour and displacement ................................................................................. 12

5.1.2 Estimate of crop production in 2011/12 ...................................................................................................... 12

5.1.3 Estimate of crop production 2012/13 .......................................................................................................... 14

5.1.4 Livestock and fodder productions ................................................................................................................ 14

5.2 Food market, trade and prices ................................................................................................................... 16

5.3 Impact on livelihoods .................................................................................................................................. 18

5.4 Consumption and coping strategies .......................................................................................................... 19

5.5 Humanitarian assistance ............................................................................................................................ 21

6. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................................. 22

7. RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................................. 23

ANNEXES .............................................................................................................................................................. 25

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FG Focus Group

FGD Focus Group Discussion

GDP Gross domestic product

GIEWS Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (FAO)

JRFSNA Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment

MAAR Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform

NGO Non‐governmental Organization

SARC Syrian Arab Red Crescent

SHARP Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan

UN United Nations

WFP World Food Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The events in Syria since March 2011 have resulted in significant humanitarian needs. Violence has escalated in scale and scope, with increasing levels of displacement and outflows of refugees, destruction of homes and infrastructure, and disruption of essential services. Between March and December 2012, the number of people in need of assistance increased from 1 to 4 million people.

The December 2012 Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment (JRFSNA II) was conducted to update and increase understanding of the most urgent food security and livelihood support needs of people affected by the crisis. The findings of the JRFSNA II, highlighted in this report, build on a first round of assessment undertaken in June 2012 (JRFSNA I). Both assessments were carried out by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Food Programme, in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. Despite access problems to some areas due to security restrictions, the JRFSNA II covered 13 (out of 14) governorates of Syria. Qualitative information was collected using rapid appraisal techniques, including Key Informant interviews and over 170 Focus Group (FG) discussions. JRFSNA II findings indicate that the capacity of the rural farming population to generate income and to access food has been reduced significantly. There has been a clear decline in the availability of agricultural inputs, with diesel, fertilizer and spare parts for irrigation registering the highest percentage of FG responses, followed by other key items such as seeds and farming equipment. Together with reduced availability, there has been a rise in the price of agricultural inputs and labour. Most notably, price rises of 100 percent or more were reported by the majority of respondents for diesel, fertilizers and rented equipment. Increases in the price of seeds by 25 to 100 percent were also reported by over 85 percent of those surveyed. Similarly, a shortage of labour force and an increase in daily wages were noted by the majority of the respondents, owing to insecurity, displacement and difficulties in moving to and from insecure areas. The assessment also indicates reduced functionality of irrigation schemes resulting from damage to infrastructure, lack of fuel and electricity, and lack of spare parts for water pumps, as well as the scarcity and high cost of water for irrigation. Reduced water availability will also have very negative consequences on upcoming spring/summer crops and fodder production. The JRFSNA II confirms the reduced output of the 2011/12 farming season – a situation worsened by the reduced surface area planted during the 2012/13 winter cereal season. Notwithstanding relatively favourable climatic conditions, only 52 percent of FGs reported to have fully harvested their wheat crop during summer 2012. The losses in barley were similarly low, with only 45 percent reporting a full harvest. These figures complement information provided by Key Informants, indicating a 30 to 40 percent decrease in wheat and barley production. The quantities of cash crops harvested were also low, especially for olive production. Livestock losses are increasing, as is the sale of livestock at below market prices due to reduced animal feed availability and lack of access to veterinary supplies and care. Such losses are a serious concern as animals provide an important source of livelihood in Syria, particularly in drier regions of the country and especially among women. Around 60 percent of FGs reported a reduction in herd sizes and poultry and 10 percent indicated pastoralists opting to sell all of their animals, thus abandoning their way of life. Major chicken farms have been closed due to the high market price of inputs, while the price of chicken meat and eggs (traditionally the cheaper sources of animal protein) more than doubled in most markets since the same period of the previous year according to 97 percent of respondents. The same proportion reported increased market prices for all livestock products, from various forms of meat and milk to ghee.

Similarly, the prices of staple commodities – such as wheat flour, bread and sugar – have risen by over 100 percent in several governorates (in particular, Aleppo and Damascus) due to reduced local supply, rise in fuel prices, international sanctions and suspension of trade with neighbouring countries, together with a dramatic rise in inflation. Market disruption together with transportation difficulties and problems all along

the value chain – from production to consumers’ physical access to stores – are contributing to a decline in the offer of basic food commodities. Around 60 percent of respondents reported that markets have been heavily or totally disrupted, and 75 percent stated that availability of basic food items in markets and shops has further declined compared to the same period of the previous year. The combination of price increases and reduction of income generating opportunities is resulting in reduced access to and consumption of food for the most vulnerable segments of the population. The average household is spending more than 50 percent of its total expenditures on food. Moreover, at least half of the population is unable to meet basic food needs with its own resources. The most common coping mechanisms adopted by families are to reduce food consumption and substitute lower quality cheaper food. Such low quality diets combined with reduced access to health services increase the population’s vulnerability to illness and disease. Rising unemployment and a clear reduction in income was reported by 75 percent of FG respondents. Furthermore, fewer households are able to maintain food stocks, with just 67 percent of FGs reporting that people are stocking food versus 91 percent before the crisis. At the same time, the size of food stock is significantly smaller and for many lasts less than one week. Furthermore, households are increasingly incurring debt to maintain minimal food consumption. As prices rise and livelihoods continue to erode, vulnerability levels are expected to increase sharply during winter and early spring, when households face additional expenses for heating and shelter. Overall, the JRFSNA II results suggest that vulnerability to food insecurity at household level has increased dramatically over the past six months. Currently, 4 million people are estimated to be food insecure – an increase of 1 million people since the first JRFSNA in June 2012. Households at risk are mainly composed of subsistence farmers, small‐scale herders, casual labourers and internally displaced families. Between 5 and 10 percent of these households are headed by women and considered highly vulnerable.

RECOMMENDATIONS Based on these findings, the mission is emphasizing the need for short‐term relief to access food and for support to rural livelihoods, and recommends the following actions:

Increase food assistance and rations for 2.5 million food insecure people.

Provide immediate nutrition security protection to pregnant and lactating women, and children

under five.

Provide emergency crop and livestock support to at least 480 000 people (60 000 households) by

mid‐2013 to ensure livestock survival particularly during the lean season and production of

spring/summer crops and vegetables, restoring income generation and access to nutritious foods.

Initiate livelihood protection in urban and peri‐urban areas, including cash‐based interventions,

backyard gardening and small animal breeding, and increase the outreach of relief to host

communities.

Restore the functioning and use of small‐scale irrigation systems, essential to production during

late‐spring and the dry summer.

Pre‐position seeds and fertilizers to allow strong support for 2013/14 cereal planting in autumn.

Continue efforts to gain access to vulnerable people in hotspot areas through special joint operations (food and non‐food items).

Increase partnerships with local NGOs/charities and ensure greater cohesion with relief efforts and partners in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.

Strengthen the collection, analysis and dissemination of food and nutrition security information.

Conduct a third JRFSNA exercise by mid‐2013.

Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment (JRFSNA) / December 2012

1. BACKGROUND The Syrian Arab Republic is a middle income country located in the East Mediterranean Region. In 2010, the total population was estimated at over 22 million inhabitants, with a population growth rate of 2.37 percent, and 65 percent of people under the age of 35. Syria is thus characterized by a rapidly increasing workforce, which requires the creation of around 400 000 new job opportunities a year. Agriculture and oil are considered to be the major contributors to the economy as they account for about half of the gross domestic product (GDP). Up until 2006, agriculture alone accounted for about 25 percent of GDP and employed 25 percent of the total labour force (Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessment, June 2012). However, structural constraints, poor climatic conditions and severe drought spells have negatively affected the agriculture sector, decreasing its share in the economy from 25 percent of GDP in 2006 to about 17 percent in 2008, thus reducing employment opportunities. In addition, despite an average growth rate of 5 percent in the period 2005–2008, the Syrian economy was still not growing at a sufficient pace to create the desired new job opportunities, resulting in increasing unemployment rates especially among women. Studies of the United Nations Development Programme show that overall poverty in Syria has been stagnating at around 33 percent in recent years. This situation of economic and social vulnerability was exacerbated by the crisis beginning in March 2011, with consequent insecurity, displacement, loss of assets, damage to infrastructure and disruption of market and production activities. There has been a sharp deterioration in food and livelihood security in recent months as violence has increased in scale and scope, particularly in the areas where most agricultural production takes place (see Map 1). Map 1: Agricultural production areas and conflict zones in Syria


Some 19 months into the crisis, the civilian population has limited alternatives as to where to seek refuge and many people have been displaced multiple times. Some families are staying temporarily in schools and other public buildings, while others have crossed the borders into neighbouring countries in search of safety and security. Prolonged economic decline has led to the loss of livelihoods, particularly in small businesses, agricultural production (crop and livestock), industry and tourism. Damage to public assets and insecurity are hampering access to basic services, with the health and education sectors particularly affected. Vulnerable groups, such as the rural and urban poor and Palestine refugees, are experiencing an erosion of their coping strategies and increasingly rely on subsistence activities and humanitarian assistance. Despite renewed efforts to gain access to vulnerable populations, access to assess the situation and assist people in need continues to be very problematic. In response to the situation and in agreement with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, the humanitarian community organized several humanitarian needs assessment missions to design and deliver effective, evidence‐based responses reaching people most in need. Such findings have contributed to inform the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP), launched in March 2012 and revised in December of the same year. Within this context, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP), in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform (MAAR), organized two Joint Rapid Food Security Needs Assessments (JRFSNA I and JRFSNA II). The first took place in June 2012, followed by a second round of assessment in December 2012 –the JRFSNA II – which is the object of this report.

2. OBJECTIVES

The overall objective of the JFSRNA II was to update and improve understanding of the most urgent food security and livelihood support needs of populations affected by the current events, to inform the preparation of well‐targeted sectoral response plans and programmes. More specifically, the assessment focused on the needs of the population by income group and at agro‐ecological zone level to:

assess the damages to productive infrastructure and equipment in the crop and livestock subsectors;

appraise the current production levels in the crop and livestock subsectors;

investigate the availability of income, access to food, main expenditures, and coping strategies among affected populations; and

assess the living conditions of farmers and herders, and the main constraints to their production systems.

3. LIMITATIONS The JRFSNA II – conducted from late‐November to early December 2012 – serves as an update of, and complement to, the first JRFSNA of June 2012. The JRFSNA II covered 13 (out of 14) governorates of Syria and the methodology employed allowed for good coverage of agro‐ecological zones and livelihood systems. However, it is important to note that the team faced access constraints and limited time in some areas due to security restrictions. Despite these challenges that affected data collection, the information gathered has allowed a greater definition of the level of damages, losses and needs, contributing to an improved identification of vulnerable groups at risk of food insecurity.


4. METHODOLOGY The survey was conducted in 13 governorates and qualitative information was collected using rapid appraisal techniques. These included Focus Group (FG) Discussions (FGD) and Key Informant Interviews (the latter contributing to quantitative extrapolations), which provided information on the livelihood conditions and needs of affected populations in different agro‐ecological zones and governorates. Available secondary data were also used to triangulate and enrich the analysis. The FGD semi‐structured questionnaire was filled by MAAR personnel at governorate and district levels, after FAO and WFP provided an initial training on how to conduct FGDs with Representative Groups (e.g. local authorities, village leaders and other Key Informants) in the different agro‐ecological zones. Only one supervisory field mission was conducted by WFP national staff in Al‐Hassakeh and Ar‐Raqqa. Security concerns and absence of Key Informants did not allow the assessment team to conduct joint field visits (i.e. FAO, WFP and MAAR) in all governorates. In total, 172 FGDs were held (see Map 2). The data were entered into a database by WFP, then reviewed, cleaned and treated statistically by FAO and WFP. Map 2: Areas covered by Focus Group Discussion surveys

Unfortunately, security concerns and absence of Key Informants prevented the assessment teams from covering adequately all governorates (see Tables 1 and 2). Due to the low number of FGDs conducted in Aleppo and Dara’a, the information collected there must be taken only as indicative. The information can, however, be considered representative when looking at the different agro‐climatic zones (see Annex 1).


Table 1: FGDs conducted by governorate Table 2: FGDs conducted by zone

Governorate Number of FGDs Zone Number of FGDs

Aleppo 2 Zone 1 67

Hama 27 Zone 2 26

Homs 19 Zone 3 13

Idleb 8 Zone 4 26

Lattakia 11 Zone 5 40

Quneitra 12 Total 172

Rural Damascus 22

Tartous 8

Deir‐ez‐Zor 20

As‐Sweida 14

Dara'a 1

Al‐Hassakeh 15

Ar‐Raqqa 13

Total 172

This information was complemented by Key Informant interviews, collected through a structured questionnaire sent to MAAR decentralized structures across the country (see Annex 2). Data were collected from MAAR personnel at provincial and district levels. The information collected by MAAR officers was shared with FAO and WFP, which aggregated and analysed the data jointly with the established JRFSNA II committee. As some Key Informant questionnaires were only filled in partially, the data could not be treated statistically and was mainly used to cross‐check, verify and complement, where possible, the results of FGDs. Map 3: Areas where Key Informant data were collected


5. MAIN FINDINGS

5.1 Food availability

5.1.1 Factors affecting crop production

5.1.1.1 Agro‐meteorological conditions

Information related to climatic conditions was collected mainly using remotely sensed data, such as rainfall estimates and Normalized Difference Vegetation Index images, cross‐checked with ground observations and Key Informant interviews.

Early seasonal rainfall in autumn 2011 was beneficial in major cropping areas, resulting in favourable crop establishment. Later in the growing season, cumulative rainfall in western and north‐central parts of the country remained around normal, while in the north‐east only 50 percent of normal rainfall was received (source: FAO Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture).

Overall, the 2011/12 season was considered to be relatively favourable, supporting crop and rangeland growing conditions. The exception was the rainfed areas, where poor rainfall performance led to decreases in yields. However, the relatively favourable growing conditions alone could not play a significant role as the impact of insecurity and displacement – coupled with the lack of fuel for tractors, harvesting equipment and irrigation pumps – prevented farmers from harvesting a substantial portion of wheat and barley crops.

As far as the 2012/13 planting season is concerned, climatic conditions in the region appear generally favourable for the establishment of winter crops. The planting of wheat and barley was favoured by dry weather in October. The timely start of rains in November helped crop establishment, while above normal temperatures in late‐November facilitated additional late‐season crop growth. Moreover, abundant rains and snow in December 2012 and January 2013 (in some places some of the heaviest snow in 20 years) affected infrastructure and resulted in lowland flooding, but also increased soil moisture and improved irrigation reserves.

5.1.1.2 Farming inputs

The availability of and change in the prices of various agricultural inputs in December 2012 compared to the same month of 2011 were investigated in the FGDs. The analysis of the data, supported with qualitative information and anecdotal evidence, shows a clear decline in the availability of agricultural inputs and means of production, mainly driven by the security situation prevailing in many parts of the country affecting transportation and movement.

Reduced availability of “diesel” was reported by 97 percent of respondents, followed by “fertilizer” (89 percent) and “spare parts for pumps” (84 percent). More than two‐thirds of the FG respondents also reported reduced availability of seeds and pesticides. The availability of daily labour occupied last place, being reported as decreasing by 44.2 percent of respondents, while 53.4 percent reported either no change in availability or increased availability.

Table 3: Availability of various agricultural inputs in markets or shops (% of answers)

Agricultural input Availability in markets/shops (% of answers)

Decreased About the same Increased Not applicable

Diesel 97.0 0.6 2.4 0.0

Fertilizer 89.0 6.1 1.2 3.7

Spare parts (irrigation pumps) 84.0 5.6 1.2 9.3

Other products 83.3 0.0 16.7 0.0

Seeds 66.9 30.1 0.6 2.5

Pesticides 66.9 25.2 1.2 6.7

Herbicides 65.6 23.9 0.6 9.8

Agricultural equipment 53.7 42.0 1.2 3.1

Daily labour 44.2 26.4 27.0 2.5


In general terms, respondents stated that together with reduced availability there has been a rise in the price of different agricultural inputs. The more notable increase (by 100 percent or more) was for "diesel" reported by approximately 80 percent of the FGs, followed by "fertilizers" reported by 57.5 percent, while "rented agricultural equipment" and "daily labour" were reported by 51.2 and 39.5 percent, respectively. Daily labour rates vary depending on the geographical area and availability. Increases in the price of "seeds" varied from 25 to 100 percent and were reported by the majority of respondents, followed by the costs of "technical services", noted by 46 percent. Table 4: Change in price of various agricultural inputs (% of answers)

In addition to insecurity, the decreased availability of and sharp increases in the price of agricultural inputs have been the major constraints to the planting of 2012/13 winter cereal crops. 5.1.1.3 Irrigation

The majority of FGs (71 percent) reported that water supply was insufficient to irrigate all of their fields. The level of insufficiency varied considerably among the different agro‐ecological zones and governorates. As indicated in Figure 1, the majority of respondents in Quneitra (91 percent) stated that water was sufficient, while all FGs in Deir‐ez‐Zor and As‐Sweida reported insufficient water. However, insufficient water supply has been reported at least since the 2010 drought, with similar issues although at a lesser scale. Figure 1: Water sufficient to irrigate all fields (% of positive answers)

Note: Data for Dara’a may not be fully representative.

According to the FGs, the main constraints faced in the irrigated sector are "scarcity and high prices of fuel and/or electricity for water pumps” (47.2 percent of respondents), as well as "water scarcity due to low underground water table" and the "effects of the drought” (both accounting for 36 percent).

Agricultural input Change in price (% of answers)

+ 25% + 50% 100%

or more About the same

‐ 25% ‐ 50% Not

available No

response

Diesel 1.7 12.8 80.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 4.7

Fertilizer 4.7 23.3 57.5 1.7 0.0 0.0 8.1 4.7

Rented agricultural equipment 6.4 27.3 51.2 4.1 0.0 0.6 5.8 4.7

Daily labour 16.9 24.4 39.5 9.3 2.3 0.6 2.3 4.7

Water 9.9 12.2 30.8 30.2 0.0 0.0 11.0 5.8

Seeds 32.0 33.7 20.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 2.3 6.4

Technical services 12.2 33.7 16.8 20.9 0.0 0.6 8.7 7.0


The scarcity and higher cost of water for irrigation have already had a very negative impact on the output of the 2011/12 harvest and are expected to have similar negative effects on the current 2012/13 farming season (see Annex 8). 5.1.1.4 Availability of casual labour and displacement

During the interviews, respondents were asked to provide an estimate of the population displacement in their areas, as presented in Figure 2 below. Figure 2: Percentage of population displaced (number of answers)

With regards to displacement, the perception of the majority of FGs was that up to one‐third of people currently living in Aleppo, Homs and Rural Damascus could be internally displaced. Overall, around 20 percent of the population (more than 4 million people) would be displaced across the country, according to FG perceptions. This estimate is nearly twice the number of displaced people indicated by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs at the end of January 2013. Insecurity, displacement and difficulties in movement to and from conflict‐affected areas have created a shortage of labour force and an increase in daily wages, as noted by the majority of respondents. Difficulties in hiring casual labourers and increases in wages have reduced the ability of farmers to cultivate and/or harvest their crops. On the other hand, the increases in wages have contributed to an improvement for the (remaining) casual labourers, resulting in a reduction in their vulnerability (although they face worsened terms of trade). 5.1.2 Estimate of crop production in 2011/12 Notwithstanding favourable climatic conditions, only 52 percent of FGs reported to have fully harvested their wheat crop during summer 2012, while the remaining 48 percent faced reductions in harvest. In absolute terms, the highest levels of losses were reported in Ar‐Raqqa, Idleb, Hama and Homs. The losses in barley were similar, with only 45 percent of FGs reporting to have achieved a full harvest. The highest levels of losses were recorded in the rice production sector (although not a major crop in Syria), owing to lack of labour, limited access to machinery and reduced irrigation capacity. The reduction in harvest reported by the FGs is consistent with information provided by Key Informants, which points to a reduction in wheat and barley production of some 30 to 40 percent. The General Establishment for Cereals (i.e. the Government institution in charge of the procurement of wheat and barley in Syria) estimated the production of wheat for the 2012 season at 1.95 million tonnes for domestic consumption, in addition to 320 000 tonnes received by the Government Office for Seed Multiplication. The total – 2.27 million tonnes – amounts to 63.4 percent of the average yearly wheat production (i.e. 3.58 million tonnes) of the period 2005–2010.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Over 75% of population

50 ‐ 75% of population

25 ‐ 50% of population

Less than 25% of population

No displacement


The quantities harvested for cash crops also declined, especially for olives, as well as pistachio, almond, tobacco and fruit – although with lower impact as they are cultivated by a smaller share of farmers. Table 5: Level of harvest in 2012 (% of answers)

Crop

Level of harvest in 2012 (% of answers)

Full harvest Less than usual

Less than 50%

Not at all Did not cultivate

Barley 45.3 11.7 4.7 14.2 24.1

Wheat 52.3 12.9 5.3 6.0 23.5

Olive 48.2 14.1 8.8 4.2 24.7

Pistachio/Almond 5.3 3.5 0.6 5.9 84.7

Cotton 21.2 4.1 0.6 5.9 68.2

Vegetables 43.5 15.3 4.1 1.8 35.3

Rice 0.6 0.6 0.0 5.9 92.9

Maize 12.9 2.9 3.5 5.4 75.3

Tobacco 5.9 1.2 1.2 4.2 87.5

Fruit 20.6 8.2 2.3 5.4 63.5

Other crops 4.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 95.3

Insecurity was the main driver of the loss of harvest by reducing farmers’ access to their fields, increasing the cost of cultivation and disrupting marketing channels. The main reasons for not harvesting reported most by FGs were "harvest costs higher than production" (35 percent) and "limited access to fields/security problems" (25 percent). Other major constraints reported by FGs included adverse climatic conditions, and the high costs of labour and equipment, as presented in Figure 3 (see also Annex 3). Figure 3: Main reason for not harvesting (% of answers)

Syria relies on food imports for almost half of its total domestic utilization. Preliminary forecasts of cereal import requirements (mainly wheat for food use, and maize and barley for feed) in the marketing year 2012/13 (July/June) is put at around 4.0 million tonnes – about 0.5 million tonnes more than the previous year. Therefore, in order to meet the population’s cereal consumption requirement, Syria will likely need to draw on existing in‐country stocks and raise commercial imports. However, considering the current economic situation of the country, it is difficult to anticipate to what extent this challenge can be met without external support. With a tighter supply and difficulties in the marketing channels, the prices of wheat flour and bread will remain at high levels thus reducing access by the most vulnerable segments of the population. While drawing from existing stocks can provide a temporary relief to the situation, it is anticipated that production problems will likely persist in 2013 given the lack of production inputs.

Harvest costs higher than production

Cost of equipment rent too high

Limited access to field/security problems

Labourers not available

Labour costs too high

Other/drought/no good production

No market for products


5.1.3 Estimate of crop production 2012/13 It is premature to forecast the 2012/13 winter cereal crop production. Although climatic conditions have been generally favourable to the sowing and establishment of crops, the actual area planted with winter crops is expected to be below average due to increased insecurity and displacement, reduced availability and high cost of inputs, lack of fuel for tractors, reduced availability of water in irrigation schemes and shortages of labour. Preliminary estimates by MAAR indicate that the area currently cultivated with wheat (1.2 million hectares) and barley (1.1 million hectares) amounts to 2.3 million hectares, which is 0.6 million hectares less than the five‐year average (i.e. 2.9 million hectares). The combination of the reduced surface area planted and reduced yields due to lack of inputs is pointing towards another year of below‐average harvest. It is expected that Syria will need to import some 4 million tonnes of cereal for the marketing year 2012/13. 5.1.4 Livestock and fodder production

Livestock is an important source of income, particularly in drier regions of the country. Overall, livestock production has dropped, with the vast majority of FG respondents stating that the size of herds in their communities has reduced. Figure 4: Size of herds (% of answers)

The pastoralist population was still suffering the effects of the 2008/09 drought, which caused high livestock losses and reduced pastoralists’ resilience to shocks. Respondents also indicated a sharp decline in poultry production, with some farms in Idleb and Homs reporting the loss of thousands of chickens, directly impacting the production of eggs. Disruption to livestock activities is particularly affecting women, who play a key role in livestock production activities from milking to poultry‐keeping and risk becoming further marginalized.

Figure 5: Activities carried out by women

6.4

3.5

1.7

27.3

23.3

18.6

61.6

62.8

56.4

4.7

10.5

23.3

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Poultry

Large ruminants

Small ruminants

Increased About the same Decreased Not available

0.010.020.030.040.050.060.070.0

Main Second Third

% o

f w

omen

Milking Poultry-keeping Selling livestock products Other activities Beekeeping


A number of poultry farms have been burned, as highlighted in the June 2012 JRFSNA. Major chicken producing farms in Homs, Hama and Idleb have closed owing to the high price of production inputs in local markets. Nearly all respondents (97 percent) reported that the price of chicken meat and eggs (traditionally the cheaper sources of animal protein) more than doubled in most markets since the same period of the previous year. The decline in the output of the livestock sector is mainly due to lack of fodder, concentrate animal feed, veterinary drugs and vaccines. Access to veterinary services is also difficult as growing insecurity and lack of fuel is hampering the capacity of animal health workers to travel to the countryside to attend to livestock. Livestock herders are facing a serious shortage of fodder, owing to poor grazing land vegetation (especially in agro‐ecological Zone 5), coupled with low crop residues (the key source of animal feed during winter) in Zones 2 and 3. Rainfall in the 2010/11 and 2011/12 seasons were below average in Zone 5. Al Badia region reported frequent sandstorms that affected herders. Prolonged drought has also severely affected the rangeland, while high fuel prices have made it difficult for herders to transport fodder and water. The market prices of fodder and concentrate feed have doubled, further compounding the difficulty of herders in feeding their animals during winter. As a result, FGs found that pastoralist populations were not in a better position compared to farmers. Small‐scale herders are unable to adequately feed their animals. Given the high price of fodder, and the time and risks associated with feeding animals, many pastoralists are opting to sell some of their livestock at below market price to be able to afford feed for their remaining animals and food for the family. Around 10 percent of respondents reported that herders are adopting the extreme solution of selling all of their animals and thus abandoning their way of life.

Figure 6: Sale of livestock assets at below market price (% of answers)

The distress sale of animals at below market price, however, has not helped to reduce local meat prices. This is mainly because herders are selling the animals either to bigger herders or to traders/middlemen, who then resell to retailers at an increased price to compensate for their work and the risks taken.

Not at all

Yes some

More than 30%

As many as possible


Table 6: Price change at market/shops (% of answers)

Livestock products Price change at market/shops (% of answers)

Increased About the same Decreased Not available

Meat (beef) 93.6 5.2 0.0 1.2

Meat (sheep) 94.2 4.7 0.6 0.6

Meat (poultry) 99.4 0.0 0.0 0.6

Milk (cow) 97.1 0.6 0.0 2.3

Milk (sheep/goat) 95.3 0.0 0.0 4.7

Eggs 98.3 0.0 0.0 1.7

Ghee 99.4 0.0 0.0 0.6

Live cows 50.0 6.4 32.0 11.6

Live sheep/goats 50.0 8.7 36.6 4.7

Live poultry 86.6 5.8 5.2 2.3

Other products 15.1 1.2 0.6 83.1

5.2 Food market, trade and prices Availability of affordable food has been a cornerstone of Syrian domestic economic policy. However, since the start of the crisis, it was reported that reduced local supply, increased fuel prices, international sanctions and suspension of trade with neighbouring countries were contributing to a reduction in food availability in shops and markets, together with a dramatic rise in inflation. The mission, therefore, enquired about the level of market functioning, availability of main food commodities and level of prices in the different governorates. Overall, 60 percent of respondents indicated that markets have been heavily disrupted, with some 9 percent not functioning at all and the remaining 51 percent working during a limited number of days/hours, as illustrated in Figure 7 (see also Annex 7). For the 40 percent of respondents indicating that markets were still functioning, they are mainly located in areas where there is relative security (coastal districts, Sweida and government‐controlled areas). Figure 7: Market functioning (% of answers)

Market disruption together with transport difficulties and problems all along the value chain (from reduced production to consumers’ physical access to retail stores) are contributing to a reduction in the offer of basic food commodities.

As indicated in Table 7, 70 to 80 percent of FGs stated that the availability of basic food commodities in markets and shops has reduced in relation to the same period of the previous year, which was itself already affected by the crisis.

Not functioning

Alternative days only

Few hours per week

Normal, as before


Table 7: Availability of food items (% of answers)

Change of availability Increased About the same Decreased Not available

Wheat 2.9 17.5 78.9 0.6

Other cereals 1.2 21.1 77.8 0.0

Vegetables 1.8 27.5 70.8 0.0

Pulses 0.6 24.0 75.4 0.0

Dairy products 0.6 26.9 72.5 0.0

Meat 0.6 24.7 74.7 0.0

The combination of a reduced number of retailers and decreased availability of food commodities is resulting in a generalized increase in prices and inflation. The prices of staple commodities, such as wheat flour, bread and sugar, have risen by over 100 percent in several governorates (in particular, Aleppo and Damascus). In Aleppo and Damascus, the majority of the population now depends on private bakeries, where the price of 1 kg of bread, when available, has reached SYP 250 (USD 3.40) – 4 to 5 times higher than in other governorates. The prices of milk, meat and chicken have risen as much as 300 percent in some areas. In the vast majority of areas surveyed by the mission, interviewees confirmed that the prices of most essential items, especially food and fuel, rose by 200 percent, while, at the time of writing, the Syrian Pound had devalued by around 80 percent against major international currencies. Figure 8: Monthly rate of inflation

The official data on the sharp increase in food prices was confirmed by nearly all FGs. As prices are increasing, it is very likely that vulnerability levels will increase sharply during the winter and early spring seasons, when households face additional expenses for heating and shelter owing to adverse climatic conditions. Table 8: Food prices (% of answers)

Food item Increased About the same Decreased

Wheat 97.1 2.4 0.6

Other cereals 98.2 1.2 0.6

Vegetables 98.8 0.6 0.6

Pulses 99.4 0.0 0.6

Dairy products 98.8 0.6 0.6

Meat 95.9 4.1 0.0


Staple food prices have increased compared to the same period in 2011 according to nearly all respondents. The main reasons reported were insecurity, difficulty in transportation/movement or increased fuel prices. The increase in food prices is naturally causing households to change their expenditure patterns, forcing families to concentrate their resources on food – which on average absorbs more than 50 percent of total household expenditures (see Figure 9 and Annex 4). Figure 9: Household expenditures (average of shares indicated by respondents)

5.3 Impact on livelihoods The civil strife is impacting all aspects of livelihoods in Syria. Economic activities are being adversely affected by numerous constraints – including water scarcity, interruption of electricity and communications and disruption to the transportation network – to which families are forced to adapt. As previously mentioned, there has been a generalized reduction in the production and availability of basic commodities in recent months, accompanied by a sharp increase in prices. On the other hand, insecurity and displacement, the involvement of young able men in the conflict, damage to infrastructure and international sanctions are contributing to a reduction in income‐generating opportunities and a rise in unemployment. The reduction in income was clearly indicated by the majority of FG respondents (see Figure 10). Figure 10: Change in income sources (% of answers)

Source of income

Staple food

Health

Education

House rent

Agricultural inputs

Animal feed

Other expenditure


Additionally, most FG respondents (115/172) reported that around 10 percent of families have lost their primary breadwinner – a particularly acute problem in governorates most affected by violence, such as Rural Damascus and Idleb.

5.4 Consumption and coping strategies The rise in prices, compounded by reduced capacity to generate income, has increased the percentage of families unable to afford a basic food basket. As clearly indicated in Figure 11, most families do not have sufficient income(s) to buy food, with the majority of respondents (101/172) indicating that at least 50 percent of the population is unable to cover basic food needs with their own resources (see also Annexes 6 and 9). Figure 11: Percentage of population without enough income to buy food (distribution of answers)

Most respondents indicated that the groups incurring most debt to survive were farmers and casual workers, as illustrated below. Figure 12: Groups incurring debt to survive (% of answers)

Farmers

Pastoralists

Pensioners

Casual workers

Petty traders

Salary workers (private business)

Salary workers (government)

Migrant workers

Relocated

Host community in general

% % % % % %


On the other hand, fewer households are able to keep food stocks, with only 67 percent of the FGs reporting that people are stocking food compared to 91 percent before the crisis. This is because most stocks have either been lost due to fighting or rotted due to long electricity cut‐offs. Not only are less people able to keep food reserves, but also the size of the stock is significantly smaller. While the majority (62 percent of FG responses) used to have food stocks for more than four weeks, 44 percent of FGs revealed that actual food stocks would last less than one week (see Annex 5). This clearly evidences the hardship of living conditions throughout the crisis, with people securing basic day‐to‐day needs, preparing themselves to move even on short notice and knowing they would not be in a position to take their herds with them. Figure 13: How long food stocks would last (% of answers)

According to FGs, the intensification of the conflict and level of violence across the country is prolonging the exposure of households to shocks and eroding their coping capacities as their assets deplete and insecurity restricts movement. At the time of the survey, households coped mainly by: reducing the quantity and quality of food intake; borrowing and/or purchasing on credit from neighbours, relatives or the shop owners; selling their remaining assets (including livestock); decreasing/cutting expenditures for health care and education; taking children out of school or sending them to work; seeking alternative or additional casual jobs in safer nearby areas; migrating in search of job opportunities in safer cities and/or seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. Only 7 percent of FGs reported not using a specific coping strategy. Table 9: Main coping strategies used (% of answers)

Coping strategy % of answers

Using cheaper food 75.6

Borrowing food 5.2

Sending family members to relatives 4.1

Selling animals 4.1

Selling non‐productive assets 4.1

Reducing the number of meals 1.7

Selling land 1.7

Other coping mechanisms 1.2

No coping mechanisms used 7.0

% of answ

ers

Before the crisisActual


As noted above, the most common coping mechanism adopted by families is to reduce food consumption, switching to lower quality, less expensive food, especially in areas where movement is minimized due to violence. Families tend to acquire local products, focusing on the main staple foods. The result is a very poor diet that includes only bread, sugar and tea, possibly accompanied by some vegetables (mainly tomato and potato) and dairy products, for those who can afford it, during the milk production season. According to field observations, families shifted from red meat to white meat as it is cheaper (one chicken a month and in case of visitors received), and others stopped eating meat entirely. This deterioration in diet is having a clear negative impact on the population’s nutritional status, reducing dietary diversity and the consumption of proteins and vitamin‐rich foods. Respondents also indicated that the security situation is preventing families from accessing local clinics and health centres. Moreover, in hotspot areas, staff is often unable to report to the clinics (available only in areas close to main villages/towns). Reduced access to primary health care is increasing the risk of anaemia, diarrhoea affecting children, feeding/nutritional problems, non‐bleeding and bleeding diarrhoea, and lowering the percentage of children being vaccinated. The latter may, in the long run, lead to stunting and chronic malnutrition. Deterioration in the quality of diet together with reduced access to health services will have an impact on the population’s nutritional status and expose them to further sickness and disease. Previous assessments have clearly indicated that the health and nutritional status of children has been deteriorating during the last three seasons.

5.5 Humanitarian assistance In the perception of the FG participants, United Nations (UN) agencies and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) are the most known providers of humanitarian assistance, followed by Non‐governmental Organizations (NGOs) and government institutions. However, when looking carefully at the data, field observations indicate that local charities are to a large extent the only active bodies on the ground that would provide relief assistance to vulnerable people when other humanitarian actors are unable to do so. Table 10: Population assisted

Governorate Population assisted (source specific1)

Government UN / SARC NGOs

Aleppo 0.0 17.5 12.5

Al‐Hassakeh 0.6 0.6 0.1

Ar‐Raqqa 0.0 1.5 0.0

As‐Sweida 0.4 5.6 2.1

Dara'a 0.0 0.0 0.0

Deir‐ez‐Zor 8.3 20.0 2.5

Hama 5.6 0.6 4.4

Homs 2.8 17.4 2.9

Idleb 0.0 13.5 10.6

Lattakia 0.9 5.5 0.0

Quneitra 0.0 6.7 1.3

Rural Damascus 0.1 20.9 20.9

Tartous 0.0 4.4 0.0

The services provided by these organizations are well considered, particularly as they have been active during the escalation of the crisis in severely affected regions.

1 *Average of percentage indicated by FG respondents.


6. CONCLUSIONS Economic disruption, combined with the impact of international sanctions and suspension of trade with neighbouring countries, has contributed to a sharp reduction in domestic production and loss of livelihoods, particularly in rural areas. The assessment results are clearly indicating the need for short‐term relief to access food and for support to rural livelihoods. The findings of the JRFSNA II confirm that needs are continuously rising in surveyed areas as cereal production dropped due to the effects of the crisis. The capacity of rural farming populations to generate income and access food has been significantly reduced in highly affected areas. In rural areas, farmers and herders have seen their production capacity drastically reduce due to widespread loss of assets, combined with the reduced availability and increased price of their means of production (e.g. seeds, fertilizers, fuel, water for irrigation and labour costs). The assessment confirms the reduced output and increased losses for the 2011/12 farming season – a situation worsened by the reduced surface area planted during the 2012/13 winter cereal season. The assessment also points out the reduced functionality of irrigation schemes, resulting from damages to infrastructure, lack of fuel and electricity, and lack of spare parts for water pumps. Reduced water availability will have very negative consequences for the spring/summer crops and fodder production. The increasing loss of livestock assets among pastoralist populations and the sale of livestock at below market prices due to reduced animal feed availability and lack of veterinary care are also of serious concern. The assessment indicates that food is still available in markets and shops across the country, although at reduced quality and quantity and at increased cost. The combination of price increases and reduced income opportunities is resulting in reduced access to and consumption of food for the most vulnerable segments of the population. The situation is expected to worsen during winter and early spring, with the depletion of food stocks and higher expenditures for heating and shelter, in addition to a further decline in income‐generating opportunities and increased prices for essential items, such as food, fuel, heating and electricity. The majority of FGs indicated that over 10 percent of families have lost their primary breadwinner. An increasing number of people do not have sufficient money to purchase food and are buying food on credit if and when possible, given limited the capacity of shops and food providers to sustain such practices. Overall, the JRFSNA II results suggest that the vulnerability of households to food insecurity has increased dramatically over the past six months in areas highly affected by the ongoing events, especially in Rural Damascus, Idleb, Deir‐ez‐Zor and Homs, while the situation is relatively better in terms of food availability and accessibility in coastal areas (Lattakia and Tartous) and As‐Sweida. Owing to the dynamics of the crisis and rapid changes to conditions in the field, it is necessary to continue monitoring the situation as priorities and needs can change quickly within the different governorates. The constant here is that violence is increasingly impacting the livelihoods of the population. The JRFSNA I, carried out in June 2012, concluded that the food security of 3 million people (375 000 households) was at risk. The current JRFSNA II indicates a deterioration in the situation, with approximately 4 million people (500 000 households) being food insecure – an increase of 1 million people in six months. This number coincides with the latest information shared by the UN that 4 million people (nearly one in five of the pre‐crisis population) are in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria. Roughly half of the people in need are located in the most affected governorates (SARC, January 2013)2.

2 Humanitarian Bulletin, Issue 17, January 2013.


Households at risk are mainly composed of subsistence farmers with less than 0.5 hectares of land, herders with less than 30 head of sheep or goats, casual labourers and internally displaced families living with relatives or in rented houses in urban and peri‐urban areas. Between 5 and 10 percent of these households are headed by women and considered highly vulnerable. Overall, these groups have seen their capacity to generate income and access food reduce drastically. Partnership with NGOs in all parts of the country is essential for humanitarian interventions to reach the most vulnerable populations. WFP, for example, has so far identified 28 local NGOs to implement global food distributions and submitted a request of approval to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the time this report was under finalization. If timely assistance is not provided and access to all parts of the country remains limited, food insecurity and poverty will increase while access to basic supplies and services will be reduced, leading to a further loss of lives and livelihoods.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS Based on the compilation of secondary data, FGDs and consultations carried out with officials, the JRFSNA II mission recommends increased life‐saving interventions directed at populations in hotspot areas and displaced families struggling in urban and suburban settings. Due to the protracted nature of the crisis, vulnerability to food insecurity is escalating across the country. With the depletion of household food stocks and the conditions of harsh winter, the situation is expected to deteriorate. Food security has been negatively impacted by the substantial loss of purchasing power combined with alarmingly high prices for food and non‐food items. Based on the assessment findings (and in consideration of the security situation as well as the time and capacity required for delivery), the JRFSNA II mission has identified the following priority areas of assistance/response:

An increase in the food assistance and rations for 2 500 000 food insecure people, including small‐scale farmers, herder communities and other highly vulnerable groups in rural areas, including female‐headed households and displaced people.

Immediate nutrition security protection for pregnant and lactating women, as well as children under five years of age (targeted supplementary feeding), in coordination with other humanitarian agencies.

Emergency crop and livestock support to at least 480 000 people (approximately 60 000 households) in line with the 2013 SHARP, including:

‐ 45 000 families depending on small‐scale livestock and poultry production that urgently need supplies, including feed, to ensure survival of their animals (particularly during the lean season in winter and early spring); and

‐ 15 000 families in need of farming inputs to grow crops in spring/summer and produce vegetables to restore their food production, income generation and access to nutritious foods.

Livelihood protection interventions in urban and peri‐urban areas, which could include cash‐based interventions, backyard gardening, small animal breeding and other measures to be identified in a participatory way; this will require further assessment to adjust the number of families that could be assisted under such programmes as the situation evolves.

Provision of fuel, water pumps, spare parts for irrigation and emergency rehabilitation of small‐scale irrigation systems – essential to allow production to take place during late spring and the dry summer.


Securing sufficient resources to pre‐position inputs (seeds and fertilizers) and ensure strong support for the 2013/14 cereal planting season in autumn, which will be crucial considering the low output of 2011/12 cereal production and reduced areas under cultivation during the 2012/13 planting season.

Strengthening partnerships and continuing efforts to gain access to areas controlled by both parties in order to reach vulnerable people in hotspot areas through special joint operations (including food and non‐food items).

Greater outreach of relief programmes to host communities (which often carry the main burden of assistance to displaced populations), helping host families to save assets during this very difficult period, while strengthening social cohesion and facilitating the integration of those displaced.

Continuing efforts to include more local NGOs/charities as implementation partners and support them as they have been accredited as potential partners on the ground to assist country programmes in food distributions and livelihood support activities.

Strengthening the collection, analysis and dissemination of food and nutrition security information on a regular basis, which requires further interagency assessment and exchange of information to develop common approaches and coherent methodologies (also highlighted by the Joint Rapid Assessment in Northern Syria [J‐RANS] undertaken in mid‐January 2013).

Ensuring more cohesion with the efforts of all stakeholders in Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan.

Conducting a third JRSNA exercise, to take place before mid‐2013 in time for updating food and nutrition security information and needs within the SHARP.


ANNEXES

Annex 1: Map of agro‐ecological zones


Annex 2: Agro‐ecological zones where FGDs took place

Governorate Agro ecological zones (in % of FGD realized)

1 2 3 4 5

Aleppo 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Hama 66.7 11.1 7.4 11.1 3.7

Homs 0.0 10.5 0.0 36.8 52.6

Idleb 50.0 37.5 12.5 0.0 0.0

Lattakia 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Quneitra 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Rural Damascus 22.7 9.1 18.2 27.3 22.7

Tartous 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Deir‐ez‐Zor 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 80.0

As‐Sweida 7.1 64.3 14.3 7.1 7.1

Dara'a 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Al‐Hassakeh 46.7 26.7 6.7 6.7 13.3

Ar‐Raqqa 0.0 7.7 23.1 30.8 38.5

Annex 3: Main reasons for not harvesting

Main reasons for not harvesting Number of answers

Main Second Third N/A

Harvest costs higher than production 31 7 11 124

Cost of equipment rent too high 6 26 16 125

Limited access to field/security problems 22 7 12 132

Labourers not available 5 17 5 146

Labour costs too high 5 14 17 137

Other/drought/no good production 12 3 8 150

No market for products 6 5 8 154

Equipment not available 0 2 1 170

Annex 4: Average household expenditure (percentage is the average of the share indicated by respondents)

Governorate Staple food

Health Education House rent

Agricultural inputs

Animal feed

Other expenditure*

Aleppo 35.0 7.5 12.5 10.0 15.0 10.0 10.0

Al‐Hassakeh 41.0 6.2 8.5 0.0 25.0 19.3 0.0

Ar‐Raqqa 27.5 7.9 7.5 0.0 30.4 16.7 10.0

As‐Sweida 48.2 8.2 7.5 0.0 12.9 13.2 10.0

Dara'a 60.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 15.0

Deir‐ez‐Zor 60.0 3.5 2.1 1.0 12.5 16.6 4.4

Hama 55.9 7.0 9.3 2.7 11.3 9.6 4.3

Homs 54.0 5.9 6.7 3.1 5.4 14.6 10.4

Idleb 45.6 9.4 9.4 5.0 9.4 10.6 10.6

Lattakia 65.0 5.9 7.1 0.2 18.6 3.2 0.0

Quneitra 65.5 7.0 4.4 5.3 4.4 7.7 5.8

Rural Damascus 58.5 8.1 7.1 8.3 10.4 4.9 2.7

Tartous 71.3 6.9 6.3 6.9 3.8 1.3 3.8

*: including energy costs


Annex 5: Food stocks (% of answers)

Governorate Actual duration of food stocks Pre‐crisis duration of food stocks

< 1 week 1‐2 weeks 2‐4 weeks > 4 weeks < 1 week 1‐2 weeks 2‐4 weeks > 4 weeks

Aleppo 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 50.0

Al‐Hassakeh 40.0 40.0 0.0 20.0 20.0 40.0 20.0 20.0

Ar‐Raqqa 14.3 0.0 71.4 14.3 45.5 18.2 27.3 9.1

As‐Sweida 7.1 35.7 57.1 0.0 0.0 14.3 35.7 50.0

Dara'a 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0

Deir‐ez‐Zor 93.8 0.0 0.0 6.3 5.0 0.0 5.0 90.0

Hama 33.3 55.6 11.1 0.0 17.6 0.0 29.4 52.9

Homs 31.6 31.6 15.8 21.1 21.1 36.8 0.0 42.1

Idleb 33.3 33.3 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 12.5 87.5

Lattakia 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.2 9.1 72.7

Quneitra 20.0 0.0 20.0 60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0

Rural Damas 33.3 26.7 33.3 6.7 4.5 13.6 9.1 72.7

Tartous 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0

Annex 6: Percentage of population without enough income to buy food (% of answers)

Governorate Percentage of population with not enough income to buy food

75% 50% 25% 15% 10% or less

Aleppo 50.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0

Al‐Hassakeh 60.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Ar‐Raqqa 0.0 11.1 11.1 22.2 55.6

As‐Sweida 7.1 42.9 35.7 0.0 14.3

Dara'a 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0

Deir‐ez‐Zor 47.4 36.8 10.5 0.0 5.3

Hama 11.1 48.1 22.2 7.4 11.1

Homs 5.3 26.3 36.8 10.5 21.1

Idleb 0.0 25.0 50.0 25.0 0.0

Lattakia 45.5 45.5 9.1 0.0 0.0

Quneitra 10.0 50.0 40.0 0.0 0.0

Rural Damascus 27.3 31.8 22.7 9.1 9.1

Tartous 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Annex 7: Market functioning (% of answers)

Governorate Not functioning Normal as before Alternate days only Few hours per week

Aleppo 0.0 50.0 0.0 50.0

Al‐Hassakeh 6.7 93.3 0.0 0.0

Ar‐Raqqa 7.7 30.8 53.8 7.7

As‐Sweida 0.0 85.7 7.1 7.1

Dara'a 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0

Deir‐ez‐Zor 5.0 0.0 45.0 50.0

Hama 0.0 11.1 48.1 40.7

Homs 0.0 68.4 21.1 10.5

Idleb 0.0 0.0 25.0 75.0

Lattakia 36.4 36.4 27.3 0.0

Quneitra 36.4 27.3 18.2 18.2

Rural Damascus 4.5 45.5 31.8 18.2

Tartous 25.0 50.0 25.0 0.0

Annex 8: Main reasons linked to lack of water supplied through irrigation

Annex 9: Loan sources

Annex 10: Most vulnerable groups according to FGDs (% of answers)

24.1%

23.5%

45.9%

6.5%

Bank Private Relatives Others

26.4%

13.6%

4.3%

21.9%

3.3%

4.3%

5.4%

2.1%11.5%

6.6%Farmers

Patoralists

Pensioners

Casual Workers

Petty traders

Salary workers (private busienss)

Salary workers (Government)

Migrants workers

Relocated

Host community in general

% of answ

ers

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