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JOINT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT PROJECTFINAL REPORT

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PREPARED BY:JOINT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT PROJECT

UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMANDFORT MONROE, VIRGINIA

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Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Final Report. Executive Summary.

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Final FROM TO I Aug 86 1016. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

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FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP Unconventional Warfare, Counterinsurgency, Guerrilla Warfare,

15 06 07 Terrorism, Joint Military Activities, Civilian Population,Doctrine. (Cont'd on Reverse)

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Alexander Angelle. USA (804) 764-4659

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18. Subject Term (Cont'd). Small Unit Operations, Light Forces, Low-IntensityConflict, Joint Operations, Security Assistance.

JOINT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT PROJECT

FINAL REPORT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Much has been written about low-intensity warfare, butit remains an open question how much is understood. Ofgreater certainty is the fact that little of what isunderstood has been applied effectively.

Caspar W. WeinbergerSecretary of Defense14 January 1986

Low-intensity conflict is the prime challenge we willface, at least through the remainder of this century.

The future of peace and freedom may well depend onhow effectively we meet it.

George P. ShultzSecretary of State15 January 1986

GENERAL

This report addresses a major United States foreign policyand defense issue: how to defend threatened United Statesinterests in conflict environments short of conventional war.Increasingly, our adversaries are confronting us with politicalviolence short of conventional war to achieve their goals. Ifmost forecasts are correct, this is precisely the form ofconflict that will confront us in the years ahead.

Numerous senior leaders have expressed concern that we donot understand low-intensity conflict; that we are unable tofully use United States capabilities in this form of conflict;that we are not adequately organized to cope; and that ourcurrent efforts fall short of what is.required for a prudentnational defense. Paraphrasing former UN Ambassador Jeane - -

Kirkpatrick, we are engaged in a struggle against our will, astruggle for which we are perfectly ill-suited.

On 1 July 1985, the Army Chief of Staff directed the estab- .lishment of the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project to examinethis issue. Although the project team was primarily military,it sought and received the support and participation of theDepartment of State, the Department of Defense, the JointStaff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and numerous organiza- as

tions in and out of government. Two products resulted

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from this effort--the Joint Low-Intensity Conflicr ProjectFinal Report and the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict ProjectResource Data Base. The latter is described in the prefaceto Volume I of the final report.

The organization of the report reflects the methodologyused to address this complex issue. The initial chaptersof Volume I (Chapters 1-3) describe the factors affectingthis unique form of conflict: environment, threat, andcurrent United States policy and strategy. Within thatframework, current and historical operations were reviewed.That examination drove the development of operational conceptsfor the specific activities of insurgency/counterinsurgencyterrorism counteraction, peacetime contingency, and peace-keeping operations (Chapters 4-7). Those activities wereanalyzed in terms of eight critical functions, for example,development and tactical operations. Those functions arediscussed in Chapters 8-15, and are the basis for identifyingissues and developing recommendations. The functional issueswere integrated to form the project's findings and conclusions(Chapter 16). Specific issue papers with recommendationscomprise Volume II of the report. Findings focus on thecivil-military nature of low-intensity conflict, as well asthe military aspects of numerous issues.

Four themes prevail throughout the report: As a nation,we do not understand low-intensity conflict; we respond withoutunity of effort; we execute our activities poorly; and we lackthe ability to sustain operations. The findings of the projectare summarized within these themes.

UNDERSTANDING

Ironically, our concentration on the need to deter nuclear

and conventional war has given rite to a lack of focus on low-intensity conflicts around the globe. Our adversaries haveconsciously turned to political violence to advance theirpolitical objectives.

Examining United States involvement in insurgency or otherforms of conflict at the lower end of the conflict spectrum is

often an exercise in ambiguity. The peculiar nature of low-intensity conflict, the diversity and murkiness of the indivi-dual and collective threats, the uncertainty as to our own roleand purpose, and conflicting views and varied institutionalinterests create an atmosphere that encourages confusion andinaction at best, mistake and blunder at worst.

Many government departments and agencies of the UnitedStates fail to comprehend the nature of this type of conflict.They do not understand the special socioeconomic environment

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in which it occurs; the strategy employed by our adversaries;

the relationship of political violence to other forms ofviolence; and the futility of reacting with policy andinstruments developed for other forms of conflict.

Among the factors contributing to this lack of understandingare our perceptions that the nation and the world are either atwar or at peace, with the latter being the normal state; andthe existance of a well-resourced campaign by our adversariesto create and support misunderstanding of the means and ends -

of this confrontation. However, the greatest obstacle to aninstitutionalized understanding is our tendency to think andact in a manner appropriate to more traditional forms of con- Aflict. We attempt to make the various forms of low-intensityconflict fit the same successful prescriptions we use to deterconventional and nuclear war. Our reliance upon these tradi-tional structures and solutions impedes the development ofspecific policies and policy instruments.

How does one begin to bring understanding to this complexissue? Where does one start? How, in a world that is crowdedwith demands on our limited personal and national resources,a world of rival priorities, does one strike the balance thatwill provide the requisite defense? One of the project's major Vgoals was to demonstrate that this ambiguous form of warfarecan, in fact, be understood. It began by tackling the conten-tious issue of defining the term "low-intensity conflict."

During the conduct of the project, JCS approved the follow-ing definition. While the definition does not specificallymention military objectives, it does provide a foundation tofocus on both civil and military activities, to include theemployment of special forces and tailored conventional forcesin low-intensity conflict.

Low-intensity conflict is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social,economic, or psychological objectives. It isoften protracted and ranges from diplomatic,economic, and psychosocial pressures throughterrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflictis generally confined to a geographic area and isoften characterized by constraints on theweaponry, tactics, and level of violence.

Low-intensity conflict is not an operation or an activitythat one or more of the departments of the United Statesgovernment can conduct. Rather, it is, first, an environmentin which conflict occurs and, second, a series of diverse civil-military activities and operations which are conducted in that tenvironment. While low-intensity conflict may be ambiguous,

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the specific activities are not. Despite their iversity,these activities, which fall outside the realm of conventionalcombat, share significant commonalities in their operationalenvironment.

The project found that the low-intensity conflict activitiescould be identified and grouped into four distinct categories:

insurgency/counterinsurgency, terrorism counteraction, peace-time contingency, and peacekeeping operations. Through theseactivities the United States can provide the following capabili-ties: diplomatic, economic, and military support for either agovernment under attack by insurgents or an insurgent forceseeking freedom from an adversary government; in cooperationwith our allies, protection of personnel, property, and institu-tions from terrorism; military presence, humanitarian assist-ance, noncombatant emergency evacuation, limited strike, andsimilar operz.tions; and support or participation in peacekeepingoperations.

The report provides the basis for responding to variousthreats by detailing how the above categories of activity, aswell as their subordinate functions (for example, command andcontrol and intelligence), ought to be accomplished. What is ..significant to note here is that the specific categories andfunctions can be identified and conceptually developed toprovide the United States government the capability to defendinterests threatened by this political violence.

This is only a beginning. Achieving full understandingrequires serious and continuous evaluation of the peculiaritiesof the concepts and of each separate involvement. It requiressensitivity to both the political and military nature of thequestion. It also needs to incorporate the influence of thedomestic environment--United States public opinion and institu-tional orientation, role, and capability--and it must considerthe role of a variety of constraints.

In order to promote a broad understanding of the issuesinvolved, a carefully created, sophisticated, and ongoingpublic diplomacy effort is necessary. The nature of theconflict is such that its principles are not often understoodby the public or the agencies charged to deal with it. Asustained effort is needed to devise programs to teach whatlow-intensity conflict is all about.

UNITY OF EFFORT

Second only to our lack of understanding is our lack of

unity in responding to the threats to our interests. Ouradversaries combine a substantial collection of military,diplomatic, economic, and psychological forces to inspire

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and support low-intensity conflict. Therefore, we must counterideas with ideas, force with force, diplomacy with diplomacy,and all must flow from a strategy implemented through a strongnational unity of effort. Nevertheless, a degree of unityexists only at the individual country level. At the nationallevel and on a regional basis, unity is lacking.

Regional and national unity is dependent on clearly statedpolicy and well-established strategy. While there are policydocuments, except for combating terrorism, such policy iscertainly not well known. It is not fully implemented withrequisite national strategy documents, and the respectiveroles and missions for the departments and agencies are notadequately understood. A national strategy must be explicitand be understood to unify the numerous activities requiredof diverse government departments and agencies that must dealwith different aspects of this threat.

Such strategy, clearly detailed for traditional warfare,is conspicuously absent in our response to various low-intensity conflicts. Who, for example, is responsible for anational effort in Central America? Ambassadors of specificcountries? The unified commander responsible for the landmass? The unified commander responsible for the islands andoceans? The regional Assistant Secretary of State? The ad hocinterdepartmental task force? The National Security Council?Our responses to this threat are often piecemeal, disjointed,short ranged, and focused on a single event as opposed to thelarger whole.

Without national direction it is futile to expect unityof effort. Lack of unity at the national and regional levelshampers every effort to defend threatened interests in thelow-intensity conflict environment. A strong, synchronizedcivil-military effort is essential. The debilitating resultsof its absence are far-reaching: insufficient overall direc-tion; preeminence of ad hoc organizations and responses; poorinteragency/interservice coordination; inappropriate supportsystems and materiel; complex and cumbersome regulatory sys-tems; grave institutional resistance to change; few dedicatedresources; peacetime-oriented security assistance programs;inadequate national and regional coordination; and lack ofjoint doctrine and training. In sum, legitimate and dedicatedguidance and support for low-intensity conflict activities areneeded.

A comprehensive civil-military strategy must be developedto defend our interests threatened by the series of low-intensity conflicts around the globe. It must be crafted in

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comprehensivw terms, not focused on a single conf-ict or on asingle department. It must integrate all the national resourcesat our disposal, military and nonmilitary, lethal and nonlethal.

EXECUTION

Individual services and organizations lack procedures anddoctrine to guide their efforts in the low-intensity conflictenvironment as tasked by the national command authority.Organizations and forces attempting to conduct such activitiesare left to modify a body of procedures developed for othertypes of conflict. Regardless of function (for example, logis-tics, intelligence, command and control), the operationalexperience of those tasked to conduct operations in the low-intensity conflict environment shows conclusively that existingdoctrine is inadequate. More is needed than amending doctrinedeveloped for other forms of conflict. The threat, the environ-ment, and the required United States activities are oftenunique. Organizations operating in this environment needguiding principles and prescriptions.

Successful operations and activities have been conductedby the United States in various low-intensity conflicts.However, these limited successes are primarily the result ofdedicated individuals and organizations achieving success notbecause of, but in spite of, the absence of a clearly definedlow-intensity conflict strategy. While these successfulefforts merit our highest commendation, they should not beconstrued as acceptable substitutes for institutionalizedprograms that are so desperately needed. The day of reckoningfor American interests is at hand in the Philippines, inCentral America, and in the Middle East; soon it may comein Southwest Asia.

Both joint and combined doctrine are necessary to effi-ciently employ and integrate our various policy instruments.This need is as great as, if not greater than, the acknowledgedneed for joint and combined doctrine for fighting conventionaland nuclear war.

A closely related issue is the lack of training, organi-zations, and materiel specifically designed for low-intensityconflict operations. Doctrine normally drives the developmentof military training, force structure, and materiel. The focusof the report, then, is to provide the basis for that doctrineand to supplement it with numerous nondoctrinal fixes which areidentified in the sections of Volume II (for example, replacingad hoc organizations with institutionalized organizations;integrating communications among agencies and services;increasing human intelligence capability; enhancing specialoperations forces).

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SUSTAINMENT

The final theme of the report addresses two forms ofsustainment: physical and moral. Logistical and programmaticsupport is lacking for both United States forces conducting thevarious low-intensity conflict activities and for threatenedallied third world organizations and governments.

One of the major difficulties the United States has insupporting third world forces, for example, is an equipmentinventory that is ill-suited to the local government becauseit is too complex, too expensive, or inappropriate. Nowhereis this more evident than in the need for a simple reconnais-sance air platform for counterinsurgency.

Often the primary United States role is providing supportto an ally in his struggle. Since this means indirect UnitedStates involvement, it requires an effective program of assis-tance in the form of training, materiel, and other support.The unique requirements and the diversity of host governmentsand organizations require that a dedicated research, develop-ment, and acquisition (RDA) program be developed to enhanceour assistance efforts. Failure to provide the requisitesupport increases the probability that combat forces will beneeded to protect our threatened interests.

Current legislation greatly restricts our ability to effec-tively assist developing nations. Restrictions that requirereview include providing aid to nations which are in arrearsin debts owed to the United States; assistance to indigenouspolice and internal security forces; and military authorityto conduct civic action and humanitarian assistance programs.

Our forces are inadequately supported. Our RDA and sustain-ment efforts focus on supporting large combat formations on thebattlefields of conventional and nuclear war. This is notwrong, but it is insufficient. A similar effort is requiredfor low-intensity conflict.

In many cases, our whole sustainment philosophy of support

needs to be reversed. Our logisticians, engineers, and medicalpersonnel, for example, often become the nose, not the tail, ofany direct United States involvement. Great ingenuity andnontraditional thinking are required to develop the doctrineand capability to "attack" with our traditional sustainingorganizations.

Our involvements will often require perseverance and a long-

term commitment. We must demonstrate to ourselves and to our

allies the staying power to support those fighting for the veryfreedoms this nation was built upon and remains committed to

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today. We should approach the task of helping others help them-selves with enthusiasm, not hesitancy. In the final analysis,this nation's own freedoms, our very freedom of movement, dependupon a world that largely supports these goals. Our unwilling-ness to support others in their fight only causes us to live inan increasingly dangerous world, with fewer and fewer optionsto defend our own society.

SUMMARY

Low-intensity conflict is one of the most important chal-lenges facing the United States. Our interests are beingthreatened with alarming frequency by various forms of politicalviolence subsumed under the heading of low-intensity conflict.The national command authority will continue to task governmentdepartments and agencies to intervene, short of conventional ornuclear war, to protect those interests.

Our current defense posture reflects our inability to under-stand the form and substance of this direct challenge to ourinterests. Our lack of understanding is manifested in a lackof unity of effort; lack of doctrine, training, organizations,and materiel to execute operations; and lack of a sustainingsupport system. Short of war, we have no strategy or compre-hensive plan to address the challenges of political violence.

After a recent department-level low-intensity warfareconference, a senior Central American military officer stated,"I hope I am incorrect in my assumption that, from what I'veheard here today, the United States doesn't have a comprehen-sive strategic plan to deal with this threat that we confronttoday. If that is in fact the case...you don't have much timeleft." It is ironic that the essence of the problem can be sosuccinctly summarized by a foreign ally--an ally looking to theUnited States for help in combating insurgency and terrorismthat threaten the survival of his country and our own nationalinterests.

This report represents an initial effort at making acritical, civil-military analysis of our national capabilityto protect interests threatened by political violence associatedwith low-intensity conflict. It establishes a start point forthe joint, combined, and multiagency approach necessary tounderstand and cope with this form of conflict. It was notdesigned to examine the range of government and national acti-vity and to recommend those few relevant "fixes" that wouldsettle this bothersome problem once and for all. As such, theproject is not a blueprint but a dialogue. Its success cannotbe measured by whether or not, as a single document, it tellsus now and forever what to do. Although it contains over sixtyspecific recommendations on a range of issues, it is not the

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final chapter. The effort to respond to this conflict cannotend with these pages. If the project invites enlighteneddebate, sustained concern, and serious effort then it will,in part, have succeeded. In this sense, the project is nota prescription but an invitation.

For more than thirty years our shortcomings in low-intensity conflict have persisted. We should not expect thefindings of this ad hoc, short-term project to solve all ourproblems. But our chance at arriving at a practical answerthat capitalizes upon our political and military assets is muchgreater now that we have demonstrated our will and our abilityto directly address this difficult issue. Action must follow.We will need both the courage to depart from conventionalinstitutional norms and the vision to maintain a pragmaticdefense posture increasingly relevant to a world characterizedby neither war nor peace.

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