Joint Doctrine for Targeting - BITS02).pdf · 2005-11-18 · PREFACE i 1. Scope This publication...

17 January 2002

Joint Doctrinefor

Targeting

Joint Publication 3-60

PREFACE

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1. Scope

This publication provides doctrinalguidance for joint targeting across the rangeof military operations. Additionally, itprovides time-sensitive target considerations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared underthe direction of the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to governthe joint activities and performance of theArmed Forces of the United States in jointoperations and provides the doctrinal basis forUS military involvement in multinational andinteragency operations. It provides militaryguidance for the exercise of authority bycombatant commanders and other jointforce commanders (JFCs) and prescribesdoctrine for joint operations and training. Itprovides military guidance for use by theArmed Forces in preparing their appropriateplans. It is not the intent of this publication torestrict the authority of the JFC fromorganizing the force and executing the missionin a manner the JFC deems most appropriateto ensure unity of effort in the accomplishmentof the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established inthis publication apply to the commandersof combatant commands, subunifiedcommands, joint task forces, and subordinatecomponents of these commands. Theseprinciples and guidance also may apply whensignificant forces of one Service are attachedto forces of another Service or whensignificant forces of one Service supportforces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine will befollowed except when, in the judgment of thecommander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrine andprocedures ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable andconsistent with US law, regulations, anddoctrine.

JOHN P. ABIZAIDLieutenant General, USADirector, Joint Staff

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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Intentionally Blank

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. v

CHAPTER IFUNDAMENTALS OF TARGETING

• Introduction .............................................................................................................. I-1• The Purpose of the Joint Targeting Process ................................................................ I-1• Targeting Defined ..................................................................................................... I-2• Target Defined .......................................................................................................... I-2• Principles of Targeting .............................................................................................. I-4• Effects-Based Targeting ............................................................................................ I-5

CHAPTER IITHE JOINT TARGETING PROCESS

• The Joint Targeting Cycle ........................................................................................ II-1• Post-Campaign and Operation Activities ................................................................ II-10

CHAPTER IIIJOINT FORCE TARGETING DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

• Joint Targeting Integration ...................................................................................... III-1• Delegation of Joint Targeting Process Authority ..................................................... III-1• Target List Development Responsibilities ............................................................... III-2• Joint Targeting Coordination Responsibilities ......................................................... III-3• Relative Division of Joint Targeting Process Responsibilities ................................. III-4• Joint Force Commander Staff Responsibilities ....................................................... III-5• Service and Functional Component Commander Responsibilities .......................... III-8• Target Nomination Procedures ............................................................................... III-8• Joint Guidance, Apportionment, and Targeting Team Functions ............................. III-9• Joint Targeting Coordination Board ....................................................................... III-10• Joint Targeting Steering Group .............................................................................. III-12• Federated Targeting Support ................................................................................. III-12• Department of Defense Organizations Supporting Joint Targeting ......................... III-12• Non-DOD Organizations Supporting Joint Targeting ............................................ III-15

APPENDIX

A International Law and Legal Considerations in Targeting .................................. A-1B Time-Sensitive Target Considerations ................................................................ B-1C Integrating Component Targeting Processes ....................................................... C-1D Common Reference Systems: Area and Point ................................................... D-1

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E References ......................................................................................................... E-1F Administrative Instructions ................................................................................ F-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................... GL-1Part II Terms and Definitions .............................................................................. GL-4

FIGURE

I-1 General Target Categories and Subcategories .................................................. I-3I-2 Time-Sensitive Target Categories .................................................................... I-5II-1 Joint Targeting Cycle Phases .......................................................................... II-2II-2 The Combat Assessment Process .................................................................... II-8III-1 Notional Relative Division of Joint Targeting Process Responsibilities ......... III-5B-1 Time-Sensitive Targeting Process ................................................................... B-3C-1 Joint Targeting: Input to Joint Operations Planning and Execution ................ C-1C-2 Four-Phase Land and Maritime Targeting Process .......................................... C-3C-3 Six-Phase Air Targeting Process ..................................................................... C-5C-4 Joint Air Tasking Cycle .................................................................................. C-7

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

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Within military operations, targeting must be focused oncreating specific effects to achieve the joint force commander’s(JFC’s) objectives or the subordinate component commander’ssupporting objectives. Targeting proceeds from the definitionof the problem to an assessment of the results achieved by theexecuted courses of action. The process allows for the testingof multiple solution paths, a thorough understanding of theproblem, and the refinement of proposed solutions. The jointtargeting process is flexible and adaptable to a wide range ofcircumstances.

Targets fall into two general categories: planned and immediate.Planned targets are those known to exist in an operational areawith actions scheduled against them to generate the effectsdesired to achieve JFC objectives. Immediate targets are thosethat have been identified too late to be included in the normaltargeting process, and therefore have not been scheduled.Immediate targets have two subcategories: unplanned andunanticipated.

Effective targeting is distinguished by the ability to generatethe type and extent of effects necessary to facilitate therealization of the commander’s objectives. Identification ofcenters of gravity and decisive points is essential to achievingthe JFC’s objectives, guidance, and intent through joint forceeffects. Joint forces typically require the ability to attack centersof gravity throughout the area of responsibility and/or jointoperations area. Joint forces detect and attack targets or target

The purpose of targeting isto provide a logicalprogression in thedevelopment ofwarfighting solutions tomeet the joint forcecommander’s (JFC’s)objectives.

Targeting matches theJFC’s objectives,guidance, and intent withinputs from eachcomponent and staffelement to identify theforces and effectsnecessary to achieve theobjectives.

A joint force component’sassigned targets anddesired effects are directlyrelated to the JFC’sobjectives.

Fundamentals of Targeting

Discusses the Fundamental Principles of Targeting

Describes the Joint Targeting Process

Outlines Joint Force Targeting Duties and Responsibilities

Provides Time-Sensitive Target Considerations

Discusses Integration of Component Targeting Processes

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sets to achieve specific desired effects. However, unintendedcollateral damage from target attacks must be taken intoconsideration throughout the targeting process.

The six phases of the joint targeting cycle are built upon theprinciples of effective joint targeting. The cycle focusestargeting options on the JFC objectives for combat operations,while diminishing the likelihood of undesirable consequences.

• Phase 1 — Commander’s Objectives, Guidance, andIntent.

• Phase 2 — Target Development, Validation,Nomination, and Prioritization.

• Phase 3 — Capabilities Analysis.

• Phase 4 — Commander’s Decision and ForceAssignment.

• Phase 5 — Mission Planning and Force Execution.

• Phase 6 — Combat Assessment.

With the advice of subordinate component commanders, JFCsset priorities, provide clear targeting guidance, and determinethe weight of effort to be provided to various operations.Subordinate component commanders identify high-value andhigh-payoff targets for acquisition and attack, employing theirforces in accordance with the JFC’s guidance to achievemissions and objectives assigned by the JFC. The JFCestablishes the joint targeting process within an organizationalframework optimized for targeting operations. A primaryconsideration in organizing this framework is the jointforce’s ability to coordinate, deconflict, prioritize, synchronize,integrate, and assess joint targeting operations.

The Joint Targeting Cycle

Joint Force Targeting Duties and Responsibilities

There are six phases in thejoint targeting cycle.

JFCs establish broadtargeting guidance duringtheater campaigns andmajor operations.

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Executive Summary

The JFC is responsible for all aspects of the targeting process,from establishing objectives, coordination and deconflictionbetween component commanders, through to combatassessment. Component commanders conduct executionplanning and achieve JFC objectives through the applicationof land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces capabilities.All components are normally involved in targeting and shouldestablish procedures and mechanisms to manage the jointtargeting functions. The JFC may prohibit or restrict jointforce attacks on specific targets or objects without specificapproval based on political considerations, military risk,collateral damage risk, the law of armed conflict, and rules ofengagement. The JFC normally appoints the deputy JFC or acomponent commander to chair the joint targetingcoordination board (JTCB). When a JTCB is not establishedand the JFC decides not to delegate targeting oversightauthority to a deputy or subordinate commander, the JFC mayperform this function at the joint force headquarters, with theassistance of the operations directorate. The JFC ensures thatthis process is also a joint effort involving applicablesubordinate commands. The joint targeting process is a highlyiterative process that needs close coordination during combatoperations. To ensure the widest flexibility and greatest reactionto the adversary, the joint targeting process should be closelylinked to the component commander with the preponderanceof assets to strike joint targets and the staff to adequately plan,control, and coordinate these missions. Normally the majorityof joint targets are attacked with joint air assets.

A time-sensitive target (TST) is described as a target ofsuch high priority to friendly forces that the JFC designatesit as requiring immediate response because it poses (orwill soon pose) a danger to friendly forces, or it is a highlylucrative, fleeting target of opportunity. TSTs may beplanned or immediate. TSTs such as airborne aircraft andmissiles and submarines may be handled by separatecomponents, but others may require detailed inter-Serviceand/or functional component planning and coordination.The JFC provides specific guidance and prioritization forTSTs within the operational area.

Time-Sensitive Targets

Targeting occurs at alllevels of command withina joint force and is appliedby component-level forcescapable of attackingtargets with both lethaland nonlethal means toachieve the desired effect.

Time-sensitive targetsrequire detailed planningand coordination.

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Planners perform a targeting capability assessment usingcurrently available weapons and weapon systems during bothdeliberate and crisis action planning. Space-based and in-theater reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisitioncapabilities can provide the JFC and component commanderstargeting information on adversary locations, dispositions, andintentions. Surface force commanders normally use a four-phase process (decide, detect, deliver, and assess) to enhancejoint fire support planning and interface with the joint targetingprocess. The joint air tasking cycle applies targeting to air-specific operations via a six-phase air targeting process:objectives and guidance, target development, weaponeering,force application, execution planning and/or force execution,and combat assessment. Special operations forces normallyuse a similar deliberate six-phase targeting and mission planningprocess for specific targets or mission assignments.Information operations capabilities can be used to attackadversarial human decision processes, information andinformation systems, and nodes used to process informationand implement decisions.

Component coordination and communication are especiallycritical for TSTs. A JFC or component commander normallyconsiders weight of effort when an emerging target is ofsufficient priority to direct diversion of committed assets.Operations center directors should normally have access to acommon operational picture to support targeting in a dynamicenvironment. Common reference systems can provide auniversal, joint perspective to define specific areas of thebattlespace, enabling the JFC and component commanders toefficiently coordinate, deconflict, integrate, and synchronizeTST attacks. The JFC must integrate targeting effortsthroughout the joint force to ensure the effectiveaccomplishment of theater campaign or major operationobjectives.

This publication provides doctrinal guidance for joint targetingacross the range of military operations. Additionally, itprovides TST considerations.

CONCLUSION

Integrating the componenttargeting processessupports joint operationplanning and execution.

Joint awareness of targetplanning and target statusis vital to all JFCs.

Integrating Component Targeting

CHAPTER IFUNDAMENTALS OF TARGETING

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1. Introduction

Warfare will continue to be an act offorce to compel an adversary to complywith specific requirements. Targeting,within military operations, must be focusedon creating specific effects to achieve thejoint force commander’s (JFC’s) campaignobjectives or the subordinate componentcommander’s supporting objectives.Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) fortargeting span the full range of lethal andnonlethal application of force, includinginformation, space, and special operationscapabilities. Additionally, principles oftargeting can be applied to multinationaloperations and throughout the range ofmilitary operations, from major theater warsto complex contingency operations.

“It is not the object of war to annihilate those who have given provocation forit, but to cause them to mend their ways.”

Polybius, History (2nd century B.C.)

2. The Purpose of the JointTargeting Process

a. The purpose of the joint targetingprocess is to provide the commander with amethodology linking objectives with effectsthroughout the battlespace. The targetingprocess provides a logical progression as anaid to decisionmaking and ensures consistencywith the commander’s objectives.

b. The joint targeting process is flexibleenough to affect situations ranging from quickreaction tactical operations to broadcampaigns. However, its primary focus is toassist the commander to most effectivelyemploy military resources to achieve the JFC’sobjectives.

Principles of targeting can apply to both joint and multinational operations.

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c. Joint forces require a common jointtargeting process in order to minimize thelikelihood of conflicting or duplicative actionsduring military operations, as well as tomitigate potentially undesirable consequencesresulting from the outcome of thoseoperations. Consequently, components mustunderstand the joint targeting process if theyare to achieve the effects necessary toaccomplish the commander’s objectives. Acommon understanding of the joint targetingprocess and adherence to its principles amongjoint force components will ensure thefollowing.

• Compliance with JFC objectives,guidance, and intent.

• Focus on adversary’s centers of gravity(COGs) and decisive points (DPs).

• Coordination, synchronization, anddeconfliction of attacks.

• Rapid response to time-sensitive targets(TSTs) that present limited opportunitiesfor action.

• Minimal duplication of effort.

• Expeditious assessment of executedoperations.

• A common perspective on all targetingefforts performed in support of thecommander.

• Full integration of all capabilities,including lethal and nonlethal means.

3. Targeting Defined

Targeting is “the process of selecting andprioritizing targets and matching theappropriate response to them, takingaccount of operational requirements andcapabilities.” Targeting is both a joint- andcomponent-level command function that

determines desired effects necessary toaccomplish JFC objectives; selects targets thatachieve those effects; and selects or tasks themeans to best engage those targets.

4. Target Defined

a. A target is an area, complex, installation,force, equipment, capability, function, orbehavior identified for possible action tosupport the commander’s objectives,guidance, and intent. Targets fall into twogeneral categories: planned and immediate.One important aspect to remember is that atarget is not critical in and of itself. Rather,its importance is derived from its potentialcontribution to achieving the commander’smilitary objective(s). The JFC establishesthese objectives, consistent with NationalCommand Authorities (NCA) direction, tocompel an adversary to comply with specificrequirements.

b. Joint forces attack targets for thepurposes of capture, destruction, disruption,delay, degradation, neutralization, deception,or exploitation, commensurate with thecommander’s objective. The desired effectof an action against a target should contributeto the attainment of a commander’s specificobjective.

c. Targets include the wide array of mobileand stationary forces, equipment, and othermilitary resources that an adversarycommander can use to conduct operations atany level — strategic, operational, or tactical.From a commander’s planning and executionperspective, targets fall into two generalcategories: planned and immediate (seeFigure I-1).

• Planned targets are those known to existin an operational area with actionsscheduled against them to generate theeffects desired to achieve JFC objectives.Examples range from targets on jointtarget lists in the applicable campaign

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plan, to targets detected in sufficient timeto list in the air tasking order (ATO),mission-type orders, or fire support plans.Planned targets have two subcategories:scheduled or on-call.

•• Scheduled targets are planned targetsupon which fires are to be delivered at aspecific time.

•• On-call targets are those that do nothave fires scheduled to be delivered at aspecific time, are known to exist in anoperational area, and are located insufficient time for deliberate planningto meet emerging situations specific tocampaign objectives.

• Immediate targets are those that havebeen identified too late, or not selectedfor action in time to be included in thenormal targeting process, and therefore

have not been scheduled. Immediatetargets have two subcategories:unplanned and unanticipated.

•• Unplanned immediate targets arethose that are known to exist in anoperational area but are not detected,located, or selected for action in sufficienttime to be included in the normaltargeting process.

•• Unanticipated immediate targets arethose that are unknown or unexpected toexist in an operational area but, whendetected or located, meet criteria specificto campaign objectives.

d. TSTs are those targets requiringimmediate response because they pose (or willsoon pose) a danger to friendly forces or arehighly lucrative, fleeting targets ofopportunity. TSTs may be planned or

Figure I-1. General Target Categories and Subcategories

GENERAL TARGET CATEGORIESAND SUBCATEGORIES

IMMEDIATE TARGETSPLANNEDTARGETSPLANNEDTARGETS

ScheduledTargets

UnplannedImmediate

Targets

UnanticipatedImmediate

TargetsOn-Call

Targets

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immediate (see Figure I-2). They may alsobe fixed or mobile. The JFC provides specificguidance and prioritization for TSTs withinthe operational area. TSTs such as airborneaircraft and missiles and submarines may behandled by separate components, but othersmay require detailed inter-Service and/orfunctional component planning andcoordination. Fleeting TSTs may be difficultto detect or identify with current intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)sensors because of the adversary’s use ofmobility and/or camouflage, concealment, anddeception (CC&D) techniques. Hence thetarget must be rapidly engaged before theadversary can employ mobility and/or CC&D,and disrupt effective targeting efforts.

See Appendix B, “Time-Sensitive TargetConsiderations,” for details on TTP for TSTs.

5. Principles of Targeting

The joint targeting process is designed toprovide a means to achieve the JFC’soperational objectives. Adherence to theseprinciples throughout the targeting cycleshould ensure that desired effects are achievedwhile diminishing undesired or collateralconsequences.

a. Focused. The targeting process isfocused on achieving the JFC’s objective.It is the function of targeting to efficientlyachieve those objectives within the parametersset by the operation plan (OPLAN), the rulesof engagement (ROE), and the law of armedconflict (LOAC). Every target nominatedshould in some way contribute to attainingthe JFC’s objectives.

b. Effects-based. In achieving the JFC’sobjectives, targeting is concerned withproducing specific effects. Targeting analysisconsiders all possible means to achieve desiredeffects, drawing from any available forces,weapons, and platforms. The art of targetingseeks to achieve desired effects with the leastrisk, time, and expenditure of resources.

c. Interdisciplinary. Joint targetingrequires the efforts of many functionaldisciplines. The targeting process relies uponcontributions from a wide range of personnelfrom many disciplines. For example, operatorsbring experience gained from the executionof combat operations, while intelligencepersonnel provide analysis of adversarystrengths and vulnerabilities. Legal personnelprovide expertise in the application of LOACand interpretation of ROE, while geospatial

The JFC prioritizes specific TSTs for immediate response.

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experts provide data vital for mission planningand weapons delivery.

d. Systematic. In supporting the JFC’scampaign objectives, the targeting processseeks to achieve effects in a systematicmanner. The targeting cycle is a rational anditerative process that methodically analyzes,prioritizes, and assigns forces againstadversary targets systematically to achieve theappropriate effects needed to meet the JFC’sobjectives. If the desired effects are notachieved, targets are recycled through theprocess.

6. Effects-Based Targeting

a. The four principles of effective jointtargeting (paragraph 5) emphasize that thefocus of the targeting process is on achievingthe JFC’s objectives. Thus, effectivetargeting is distinguished by the ability toidentify the targeting options, both lethaland nonlethal, to achieve the desired effects

that will support the commander’sobjectives.

b. It is pivotal to the success of effects-based targeting to link sensors, deliverysystems, and desired outcomes. The abilityto rapidly collect, share, access, andmanipulate information is an enabler inachieving information superiority over USadversaries. Achieving this informationsuperiority is important for conducting effects-based targeting. Understanding theadversary’s operational objectives, intentionsand decision cycle, expectations, and needsthrough observations and analysis enable theuse of varied joint and multinational meansto produce effects against the enemy’s criticalvulnerabilities. When choosing targets, thecommander must be focused on the purposeof the fires striking chosen targets. Targetingeffects are more than the results of the fires.Targeting effects are the cumulative resultsof actions taken to engage geographical areas,complexes, installations, forces, equipment,

Figure I-2. Time-Sensitive Target Categories

TIME SENSITIVETARGET CATEGORIES

PLANNED TARGETS(KNOWN)

IMMEDIATE TARGETS

Scheduled UnplannedTargets(Known)

On-Call UnanticipatedTargets

(Unknown)

Time-Sensitive TargetsTime-Sensitive Targets

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functions, perception, or information by lethaland nonlethal means. Targeting effects aredesigned to influence the outcomes ofindividual battles or engagements, operations,or campaigns. Once the action is taken, thecommander must evaluate the effectivenessof the operation. If the desired effect was notachieved, the target may need to be re-engagedor another method selected to achieve theeffect.

c. Targeting effects can be categorized intwo forms: direct or indirect.

• Direct effects are the immediate, first-order consequence of a military action(weapons employment results, etc.),unaltered by intervening events ormechanisms. They are usuallyimmediate and easily recognizable. (Forexample, a parked aircraft is destroyedeither by a direct hit from a bomb, or it issufficiently close to the point ofdetonation that it receives the brunt ofthe weapon’s blast and fragments.)

• Indirect effects are the delayed and/ordisplaced second- and third-orderconsequences of military action. They

are often accentuated by intermediateevents or mechanisms to produce desiredoutcomes that may be physical orpsychological in nature. Indirect effectsare often difficult to recognize, due tosubtle changes in adversary behavior thatmay hide their extent. (For example, theplane destroyed as a direct effect of anattack on an airfield, combined withsimilar attacks on all the assets of anadversary’s air defense system, over timemay ultimately degrade the legitimacy ofthe regime by portraying them asincapable of protecting the populace.)

• Direct and indirect effects possess threefundamental characteristics thatqualitatively impact the influence theyexert on adversary capabilities.

•• Cumulative Nature of Effects.Effects tend to compound, such that theultimate result of a finite number of directeffects is greater than the sum of theirimmediate consequences. Likewise,indirect effects often synergisticallycombine to produce greater changes thanthe sum of their individual consequences.This may occur at the same or at different

TSTs can be either mobile or fixed air-, land-, or sea-based targets.

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Cumulative effects result from the aggregate of many direct or indirect effects.

levels of war as the contributing lower-order effects are achieved.

•• Cascading Nature of Effects.Indirect effects can ripple through anadversary target system, ofteninfluencing other target systems as well;most typically through nodes that arecommon and critical to related targetsystems. The cascading of indirecteffects, as the name implies, usually flowsfrom higher to lower levels of war. Asan example, destruction of a headquarters

element will result in the loss ofcommand and control (C2) and synergyof subordinate units.

•• Collateral and Additional Nature ofEffects. Effects often spill over to createunintended consequences, usually in theform of injury or damage to persons orobjects unrelated to the objectives. Soundplanning should allow for considerationof the risks of unintended second- andthird-order consequences.

Target attacks can inflict unintended collateral or additional damage.

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While estimating their outcomes can neverbe an exact process, it becomes increasinglydifficult as effects continue to compound andcascade through targets and target systems.In addition, the impact of a single event canoften be magnified over time and distance thatgreatly exceeds the span of the direct effectassociated with that one event.

d. Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs).MOEs in military operations are defined astools used to measure results achieved in theoverall mission and execution of assigned

tasks. MOEs are a prerequisite to theperformance of combat assessment.Assessment of such indicators normally takesplace at the tactical, operational, and evenstrategic levels of war, and goes beyondcounting craters or vehicles destroyed. Thekey is to determine when the predeterminedconditions have been met that affect adversaryoperational employment or overall strategyand whether or not the anticipated effects areoccurring. The continuing intelligenceanalysis process helps to ensure that propercombat assessment measurements take place.

CHAPTER IITHE JOINT TARGETING PROCESS

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1. The Joint Targeting Cycle

The six phases of the joint targeting cyclefollow (see Figure II-1). The targeting cycleis not time-dependent, and steps may occurconcurrently, but it provides a helpful metricto describe the steps that must be satisfied tosuccessfully conduct targeting.

a. Phase 1 — Commander’s Objectives,Guidance, and Intent.

• The commander’s objectives support theNCA’s desired end state for the conductof military actions, while the guidanceprovided with the objectives stipulatesparticular conditions related to theexecution of operations (e.g., limitationson collateral damage). Taken together,the objectives and guidance embody thecommander’s intent for militaryoperations, and their scope can rangefrom very near term tactical situations tofar-reaching campaigns in thegeopolitical arena. The focus of thecommander’s intent is always to create achange in the adversary’s behavior thatturns both the tactical situation and,ultimately, the strategic outcomes to a USadvantage. The conditions that establishthis strategic advantage are defined bynational security strategy and policy,made relevant to the particular situationby amplifying direction from the NCA,and subsequently expressed in nationalmilitary objectives.

“The general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple beforethe battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculationsbeforehand. Thus many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations todefeat. It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win orlose.”

Sun TzuThe Art of War (c. 500 B.C.)

• Commander’s guidance drives thesubsequent phases of the targeting cycle.Clear, quantifiable, and achievableobjectives lead to the successfulrealization of national security goalsthrough a targeting solution. Understandingthe commander’s objectives, guidance,and intent is the most important part ofthe joint targeting process, because theyencapsulate all the national-levelguidance in a set of outcomes relevant tothe present warfighting situation and setthe course for all that follows. However,national security strategy, nationalmilitary objectives, NCA direction and,in most instances, even the JFC’sobjectives, guidance, and intent expressdesired end states for the conclusion ofhostilities that are too vast and complexto be achieved by a single event or effort.

• Centers of Gravity and DecisivePoints. Effective targeting isdistinguished by the ability to generatethe type and extent of effects necessaryto achieve the commander’s objectives.Identification of COGs and DPs isessential to achieving the commander’sobjectives in accordance with guidanceand intent through joint force efforts. Bycorrectly identifying and controlling DPs,a commander can gain a markedadvantage over the adversary and greatlyinfluence the outcome of an action. DPsare the keys to attacking protected COGs.There normally will be more DPs in an

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operational area than the commander cancontrol, destroy, or neutralize withavailable resources. Accordingly,planners must analyze potential DPs anddetermine which points enable eventualattack of the adversary’s COGs. Thecommander designates the mostimportant DPs as objectives and allocatesresources to control, destroy, or neutralizethem.

For more information on COGs and DPs,see Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrinefor Joint Operations.

• The first activity of the joint targetingprocess at this phase in the cycle is totranslate strategy to discrete tasks, each

logically and directly related to theoverall desired outcome. Following thisinitial breakdown, it is then necessary tofurther break these supporting tasks intoelements of manageable size, where eachelement is of sufficient clarity andrequires a weight of effort that is withinjoint force capabilities to sustain duringa protracted cycle of planning andexecution. The net result of thissuccessive devolution from over-archingstrategy to highly discrete task elementsis to construct a synergistic structure ofinterrelated actions that will progress theoverall effort to the desired conclusion.Furthermore, it will maximize effectiveuse of joint force capabilities whileminimizing the likelihood of unintended,

Figure II-1. Joint Targeting Cycle Phases

JOINT TARGETING CYCLE PHASES

JOINT TARGETINGCYCLEPHASES

Commander’sDecision and Force

Assignment

Target Development,Validation,

Nomination, andPrioritization

Commander’sObjectives,

Guidance, and Intent

Mission Planning andForce Execution

CombatAssessment

CapabilitiesAnalysis

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and potentially undesired, consequences(e.g., unnecessary adversary noncombatantcasualties and/or unwarranted risk tofriendly forces).

• Since the underlying purpose of militaryoperations is to create change inadversary behavior, the other criticalactivity of this phase in the joint targetingprocess is the development of MOEs (asdiscussed in Chapter I, “Fundamentalsof Targeting”) to assess whetherobjectives have been attained. TheseMOEs will be the critical ingredientwhen the joint targeting process turns tothe task of identifying specific targets andmeans for attacking them, and assessingthe degree of success achieved inexecuted operations and attempts to assistthe JFC with recommendations forfollow-on military actions.

b. Phase 2 — Target Development,Validation, Nomination, and Prioritization.

• The JFC’s objectives are normallydirected against adversary capabilities.These capabilities are themselves enabledby physical and virtual infrastructures.For example, an electric power system

provides energy through the physicalgeneration and distribution processes,under the virtual energy systemmanagement process.

• Critical to the success of the entiretargeting process is the establishment ofintelligence requirements. Targeteersmust work closely with collectionmanagers to ensure that targetdevelopment, pre-strike and post-strikerequirements, and any changes thatoccur throughout the targeting cycleare integrated into the collection plan.This intelligence support is vital forthe analysis performed in targetdevelopment, as well as to prepare forfuture targeting during the execution ofoperations (e.g., to pretask real-time ISRassets) and to support post-attackassessment of success.

• It is vitally important to understand targetdevelopment always approachesadversary capabilities from theperspective of their support from targetsystems. A target system is most oftenconsidered as a collection of assetsdirected to performing a specific function(e.g., production of electric power) and

Course of action development takes place at the tactical, operational,and even strategic levels of war.

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being broadly geographically bounded.While target systems are intradependentto perform a specific function, they arealso interdependent in support ofadversary capabilities (e.g., the electricpower system may provide energy to runthe adversary’s railroads that are a keycomponent of their military logisticsystem). Target development links thesemultiple target systems and theircomponents (targets) in matrices thatreflect both their intra- and inter-dependency with elements of tasks that,in the aggregate, contribute to theaccomplishment of objectives.

• The analysis performed in targetdevelopment must be conceived of asproceeding through successively greaterlevels of detail, flowing from the macro(broad scope) level to the micro(narrowly focused) level. Thiswinnowing approach to the selection ofcandidate targets is essential to preservethe linkage between the JFC’s objectives(in terms of the desired effects) and thespecific action that is taken against aparticular target. Furthermore, itdetermines the necessary type and

duration of the action that must be exertedon each target to generate an effect thatis consistent with the commander’sobjective.

• Target development is made mosteffective by accessing the greatestpossible breadth of subject matterexpertise and information regarding thefunctioning of the systems that supportadversary behaviors. This research isimproved by expanded contact beyondthat normally available within a JFC’splanning staff, to include nationalinteragency groups. The ultimate goalof this expansive research is to locateexploitable vulnerabilities in theadversary’s warfighting and/or war-sustaining resources and to prepare forthe process of matching joint forcecapabilities against those criticalvulnerabilities.

• Integral to target development is targetvalidation. Target validation determineswhether a target remains a viable elementof the target system. Equally importantin the validation of the target isdetermining whether it is a lawful target

Detailed target development, validation, and mission planning are criticalto special operations forces success.

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under the LOAC, as well as anypromulgated ROE. For example,attacking a national religious shrine inan attempt to demoralize an adversary’spopulace and diminish their will tosupport continued hostilities isconsidered an illegal act under theprovisions of the LOAC.

• Once potential targets are identified andvalidated, they are nominated through theproper channels for approval, generallyinvolving their deliberation in acoordinating body such as the jointtargeting coordination board (JTCB), thatrepresents the interests of all major jointforce components. In some cases targetapproval may be required from the NCAor geographic combatant commander ordeputy commander levels, depending onpolitical considerations. Targets areprioritized based on the JFC’s objectivesand guidance and the mutual supportrequired between joint force componentsas they strive to achieve the JFC’sobjectives.

• The net result of target development isto produce from the approved targets a

target nomination list (TNL) thatidentifies those elements within anadversary’s power base (e.g., forces,infrastructure, and political support) thatmost closely support the JFC’sobjectives, and that has been vettedthrough all joint force component andinteragency concerns. In addition toenumerating these candidate targets, thenomination list also includes specificfunctional outcomes that must be createdat each target to achieve the JFC’sobjectives as well as any stipulations thatmay affect how those functionaloutcomes may be created (e.g., nearbycollateral damage risks). This supportingdocumentation is critical in order to framethe force estimation performed in the nextphase and to facilitate the assessment ofsuccess achieved at the conclusion ofoperations.

c. Phase 3 — Capabilities Analysis.

• Coincident with the determination oftargets and desired outcomes for thosetargets, it is necessary to select the mostpromising forces for application againstthose targets.

Joint forces normally examine the systemic and physical vulnerability of a targetor target system to the effects of lethal and nonlethal capabilities available.

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• This phase of the joint targeting cycleinvolves estimating the effects of lethalor nonlethal attacks against specifictargets. Its purpose is to weigh therelative efficacy of the available forcesas an aid to achieving the objectives setforth by the JFC and subordinatecommanders. These estimates build uponthe analysis performed in targetdevelopment, both for information thatcharacterizes the physical, functional, andpsychological vulnerability of the targetand for a connecting thread of logic tothe JFC’s objectives and guidance.Consequently, the modeled results offorces resulting from this phase must becongruous with the JFC’s intent for theprosecution of combat operations.

• Estimates may be generated usingmathematical models that take intoaccount the target’s critical vulnerabilities,performance data on the weaponscontemplated for application against thetarget, and delivery parameters associatedwith the delivery of those weapons.

• It is critically important to stress that allestimates generated during this phase aresituation-specific, reflecting the pairingof particular forces against particular

targets, under particular conditions ofemployment. As such, users of thisinformation are cautioned againstassuming that the estimated effectivenessof a force capability under one set ofcircumstances is broadly applicable toother circumstances. Relatively minortargeting variations may have anexaggerated effect impact on effectsestimates. It is equally important to stressthat these estimates of performance arenot designed to take into accountconsiderations outside of the realm ofweapon-target interaction (e.g., they donot address whether or not the deliverysystem will survive to reach the target).Estimates of consequences beyond theweapon-target interaction are deemed fartoo speculative and are subject to extremebounds of uncertainty to prove of anyvalue in quantitative analyses ofcapability performance.

• The joint targeting process allows allcomponents access to information andmethodologies used in determiningwhich type and level of force has a greaterlikelihood of generating the desiredeffect. The methodologies and data usedfor capability analyses are also capableof producing estimations of collateral

Vulnerability is not only an assessment of susceptibility to weapons effects,but also a measure of the ability to detect or locate the target.

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damage risk to noncombatants andnontargeted facilities.

• Once the capabilities analysis phase iscompleted, the results can be merged withthe individual component targetnominations to create the targetrecommendations for the JFC. Thecritical element of the joint targetingcycle is to link anticipated effects to theJFC’s objectives.

d. Phase 4 — Commander’s Decisionand Force Assignment.

• TNLs and associated forces are vetted,through the appropriate coordinatingbodies representing the joint forcecomponents, to ensure compliance withcommander’s objectives, guidance, andintent and the synergistic application ofeffort with minimal operational conflict.This l i s t compr ises ta rge t ingrecommendations compiled by the JFC’sdesignated targeting representative.

• Once the JFC has approved the jointintegrated prioritized target list (JIPTL),or elements thereof, tasking orders areprepared and released to the executingcomponents and forces. The jointtargeting process facilitates thepublication of tasking orders byproviding amplifying informationnecessary for detailed force-levelplanning of operations.

• The joint targeting process is alsoresponsible for providing thedocumentation that maintains the logicallinkage between objectives and guidanceand the operations being undertaken.This documentation traces the analyticalreasoning that supported the nominatedtargets and the details of the capabilityeffectiveness estimates. The work ofoperations planners is significantlyenhanced when they are furnished with

detailed insights into the reasoning thatresulted in their tasking. Furthermore,because the pairings of capabilitiesagainst targets are made using nominalweapon and weapon system performancedata, there may be divergences with morecurrent and/or specific data used by force-level planners. Making the factors usedin joint force planning available to theoperations planners, and providing themreal-time collaboration capability withother component and joint force-leveltargeting specialists, enables adjustmentand fine-tuning of operational planning.It also provides a channel to discussmitigation of risk for the attacking force,since variations in tactics may be requiredthat could affect the results achieved atthe target; the joint targeting process mustbe aware of these variations and adjustexpectations accordingly. This is acritical path of information flow thatreduces the likelihood of confusionbetween what was expected at the jointforce level and what was actuallyachieved during execution. Ultimately,the exchange of information at this phaseand the reconciliation of a commonoperating picture are critical elements inthe last phase of the joint targetingprocess where outcomes are analyzed andfuture actions are determined.

• Thus, at the conclusion of this phase, thestage is set for the planning and executionof operations that perform discrete tasksin synergistic support of over-archingobjectives.

e. Phase 5 — Mission Planning andForce Execution.

• Upon receipt of tasking orders, detailedplanning must be performed for theexecution of operations. The jointtargeting process supports this planningby providing tactical-level planners withdirect access to detailed information on

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the targets, supported by the nominatingcomponent’s analytical reasoning thatlinked the target with the desired effect(Phase 2). This will provide thebackground information necessary forthe warfighter to focus on the JFC’sobjectives as the battle unfolds.

• Combat operations are dynamic. Duringexecution, the battlespace changes as theadversary responds and deviates fromfriendly force assumptions. The jointtargeting process monitors these changesin order to allow commanders to maintainthe initiative through flexibility.

f. Phase 6 — Combat Assessment (seeFigure II-2).

• Combat assessment (CA) is a crucial partof operations. The joint targeting processprovides short-term assistance forimmediate decisions. This is essential inorder to provide to the JFC a fullydeveloped picture of the battlefield. Acritical ingredient for effective CA is anunderstanding of all aspects of targetdevelopment and its link to the JFC’sobjectives and guidance.

• CA is performed at all levels. At the JFClevel, the CA process should normallybe an all source joint program supportedby all components and designed todetermine if the required effects on theadversary envisioned in the campaignplan are being achieved. CA addresses

Figure II-2. The Combat Assessment Process

THE COMBAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Combat Assessment

Reattack Recommendation(Or Future Targeting Development)

MunitionsEffectivenessAssessment

Battle DamageAssessment

Physical DamageAssessment

Functional DamageAssessment

Target SystemAssessment

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the effectiveness of operations. Thisdi rec t ly impacts the JFC ’s a i rapportionment decision. The end productof CA at the operational and/or strategiclevel is a campaign assessment that isincorporated into strategy and guidancedevelopment. (Note: Simply attackingtargets on the JIPTL does not representthe total effectiveness of the operations.)

• CA is composed of three interrelatedcomponents: battle damage assessment(BDA); munitions effectivenessassessment (MEA); and future targetingor reattack recommendations.

• BDA is the complementary activity tothe selection of targets performed intarget development. It takes a three-phased approach to proceed from amicro-level examination of the damageor effect inflicted on a specific target, toultimately arriving at macro-levelconclusions regarding the functionaloutcomes created in the target system,retracing the macro-to-micro path ofanalysis in target development. Inaddition, to conduct BDA in the three-phased approach, a baseline set of targetsystem damage criteria and MOEs must

be established. These criteria andmeasures are invaluable to maintaininga standard measure of targetingeffectiveness. They help drive theconduct of military operations againsttarget systems in a more effectivesystematic fashion — achieving resultsat a greatly reduced effort, risk, and cost.The first phase examines the outcomesat the specific targeted elements; thesecond phase estimates the functionalconsequences for the target systemcomponents; and the third phase projectsresults on the overall functioning of thetarget system and the consequent changesin the adversary’s behavior. The purposeof BDA is to compare what was actuallyaccomplished to what target developmentdetermined should be accomplishedwhen the targeting options were beingformulated. Consequently, a criticalingredient for effective BDA is detailedfamiliarity with all aspects of the analysisperformed in the target development thatjustified the chosen targets and theirlinkage to the JFC’s objectives andguidance.

• MEA is the corresponding activity toBDA, and directs its assessments to after-

Aircraft cockpit video or weapon system video recorded media canserve as sources of BDA and MEA.

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the-fact studies of how capabilities wereperformed and the method in which theywere applied. It complements theestimative analyses of capabilityassessment by examining the forensicevidence after attacks to determinewhether weapons and weapon systemsperformed as expected. The purpose ofMEA is to compare the actualeffectiveness of the means employed totheir anticipated effectiveness calculatedduring the capability assessment phaseof the joint targeting process. The resultsof MEA support both near-termimprovement in force employmenttactics and techniques and long-termimprovements in lethal and nonlethalcapabilities. Consequently, a criticalingredient for effective MEA is detailedfamiliarity with all inputs to thecalculations performed in capabilityassessment that resulted in weaponsystem selection.

• Future target nominations and reattackrecommendations merge the picture ofwhat was done (BDA) with how it wasdone (MEA) and compares the resultwith predetermined MOEs that weredeveloped at the start of the joint targeting

process. The purposes of this phase inthe process are to determine degree ofsuccess in achieving objectives and toformulate any required follow-up actions,or to indicate readiness to move on tonew tasks in the path to achieving theoverall JFC objectives. This last activityin the final phase both completes andbegins the joint targeting process anewby linking the achieved outcomes withstated objectives that began the cycle.

For information on combat assessment,refer to JP 2-01.1, Intelligence Supportto Targeting.

2. Post-Campaign andOperation Activities

a. The joint targeting process does not endwhen hostilities cease. During the transitionphase of postconflict operations there isnormally a critical need to collect all availableinformation that feeds both BDA and MEAanalysis. This data collection effort is essentialto:

• Evaluate the full extent of target physicaland functional damage;

The joint targeting process does not end when hostilities cease.

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• Determine the true effectiveness ofemployed delivery systems andmunitions; and

• Critique and improve the BDA analysisand reporting process.

b. Although there are many different typesof data to collect for follow-on analyses,generally they can be grouped into the areasof operational data, intelligence information,and MEA exploitation. Collection ofoperational or mission-specific data includesall executed mission type orders (to includeall executed ATOs), all mission reports, andcopies of aircraft cockpit video or weaponsystem video at a minimum. Information to

collect includes both national and tacticalintelligence gathered during the operations,as well as continued postconflict damageassessment and analysis of reconstructionactivities. Finally, the optimal method toanalyze munitions effects is to deploy MEAexploitation teams (engineers, tacticians, andintelligence analysts) to conduct on-siteanalyses of the damage from the ground-levelperspective. The goal of these “ground truth”operations is to bridge the gap of knowledgethat exists between the level of damage theBDA collection assets have shown duringhostilities and what actual physical andfunctional damage was done to the adversarytargets and systems.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIIJOINT FORCE TARGETING DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

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1. Joint Targeting Integration

a. The joint targeting process integratesmilitary force to achieve the JFC’s objectives,guidance, and intent. With the advice ofsubordinate component commanders,JFCs set priorities, provide clear targetingguidance, and determine the weight ofeffort to be provided to various operations.Subordinate component commandersidentify high-value targets (HVTs) andhigh-payoff targets (HPTs) for acquisitionand attack, employing their forces inaccordance with the JFC’s guidance toachieve missions and objectives assigned bythe JFC.

b. The JFC establishes the jointtargeting process within an organizationalframework optimized for targetingoperations. A primary consideration inorganizing this framework is the jointforce’s ability to coordinate, deconflict,prioritize, integrate, synchronize, andassess joint targeting operations. Thestructure established by the JFC must be ableto facilitate the joint targeting processthroughout the entire spectrum of anticipatedtargeting timelines from long-term to rapidlychanging time-sensitive situations. The JFCdefines this structure based upon assigned,attached, and supporting forces, as well as thethreat, mission, and operational area. Thistargeting structure is established to eitherdirectly or indirectly achieve JFC-establishedobjectives in order to expedite campaignsuccess. It must also be able to identify thosecritical vulnerabilities that directly orindirectly lead to the desired effect on the

“Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to attack a lion.Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability andconsequently of their mutual aid, will attack resolutely.”

Colonel Charles Ardnant du Picq, 1880

adversary COGs. In addition, it must beresponsive enough to react to rapidly changingevents. Likewise, it should be able to executeall phases of the joint targeting processefficiently and continuously.

c. The joint targeting process cuts acrosstraditional functional and organizationalboundaries. Operations, plans, andintelligence are the primary participants, butother functional areas such as logistics,weather, legal, and communications alsosupport the joint targeting process.Close coordination, cooperation, andcommunication among the participants areessential for the best use of JFC andcomponent resources.

2. Delegation of Joint TargetingProcess Authority

a. The JFC is responsible for all aspects ofthe targeting process, from establishingobjectives, coordination and deconflictionbetween component commanders, through toCA. The targeting process is complicated bythe requirement to deconflict duplicativeefforts, to prevent fratricide, and tosynchronize and integrate the attack of thosetargets with other activities of the joint force.The JFC’s primary targeting responsibilitylies in establishing the objectives thatcomponent commanders will achievethrough application of air, land, sea, space,and special operations forces capabilities.

b. The JFC also has the responsibilityto conduct planning, coordination, anddeconfliction associated with joint

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targeting. The JFC normally appoints thedeputy JFC or a component commander tochair the JTCB. When a JTCB is notestablished and the JFC decides not to delegatetargeting oversight authority to a deputy orsubordinate commander, the JFC may performthis task at the joint force headquarters, withthe assistance of the joint staff OperationsDirectorate (J-3). The JFC ensures that thisprocess is also a joint effort involvingapplicable subordinate commands. The jointtargeting process is a highly iterative processthat needs close coordination during combatoperations. To ensure the widest flexibility andgreatest reaction to the adversary, the jointtargeting process should be closely linked tothe component commander with thepreponderance of assets to strike joint targetsand the staff to adequately plan, control, andcoordinate these missions. Normally themajority of joint targets are attacked with jointair assets. Whomever the JFC delegates jointtargeting planning, coordination, anddeconfliction authority to must possess orhave access to a sufficient C2 infrastructure,adequate facilities, and ready availability ofjoint planning expertise. Should a specificagency be charged with joint functionalcommand responsibilities, a joint targetingmechanism may also be needed to facilitatethis task at the component level. Allcomponents are normally involved intargeting and should establish procedures andmechanisms to manage the joint targeting task.

c. The JFC may prohibit or restrict jointforce attacks on specific targets or objectswithout specific approval based on politicalconsiderations, military risk, the LOAC, andROE. Targeting limitations fall into twocategories.

• Items on the no-strike list are thosedesignated by the appropriate authorityupon which attacks are prohibited toavoid violating international law,conventions, or agreements or damagingrelations with the indigenous population.

• Restricted targets are legitimate targetsthat have specific restrictions imposed toavoid interfering with militaryoperations, and any actions that exceedthose restrictions are prohibited untilcoordinated with the establishingheadquarters. Attacking restricted targetsmay interfere with or hamper projectedfriendly operations. Targets may havecertain restriction caveats associated withthem that should be clearly documentedin the restricted target list (for example,do not strike during daytime; strike onlya certain weapon, etc.). Some requirespecial precautions (e.g., chemical,biological, or nuclear facilities, proximityto no-strike facilities).

For additional information see AppendixA, “International Law and LegalConsiderations in Targeting.”

3. Target List DevelopmentResponsibilities

Various target lists may be identified for useby the JFC. It is imperative that proceduresbe in place for additions or deletions to thelists and that those procedures are responsiveand verifiable. Commanders should be awareof the larger impact when individual targetsare removed from the target list. The removalof one seemingly isolated target may causean entire target set to be invalid and require adifferent set of targets to create the same effect.

a. A joint target list (JTL) is aconsolidated list of all targets considered tohave military significance in a combatantcommander’s area of responsibility (AOR).National agencies, the combatantcommander’s staff, joint forces subordinateto the combatant commander, supportingunified commands, and components allnominate targets to the combatant commanderfor validation and inclusion.

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b. A target nomination list is a list oftargets nominated by component commanders,national agencies, supporting commands, orthe JFC staff for inclusion on the JIPTL tosupport JFC objectives and priorities.

c. Derived from the integration of TNLs,the JIPTL is a list of targets prioritized basedupon the effects their attacks will have uponachieving JFC objectives. This list usuallycontains more targets than there are resourcesavailable to attack them due to competingconcerns. Exactly how many targets are to beattacked is determined once attack resourcesare matched to targets on the JIPTL. Anestimate of how many targets may be attackedcan be provided to components in the JIPTLprocess by estimating the total number ofdesired mean points of impact that can beattacked with projected resources available.

• Once projected strike assets aredetermined, this prioritized listing oftargets often contains a “cut line”showing which targets may not be struckdue to competing concerns, assetlimitations, or a missing intelligencerequirement.

• It must be clearly understood that this isjust an estimate and does not insure thata target will be attacked. This estimatewill not inhibit planners from usingresources in the most efficient mannerpossible. This prioritized list of targetsprovides components as well as the JFCwith the proper feedback on how theirspecific target nominations fit intoachieving the effects desired.

d. A no-strike list (NSL) is a list ofgeographic areas, complexes, or installationsnot planned for capture or destruction.Attacking these may violate the LOAC (e.g.,cultural and religious sites, embassiesbelonging to noncombatant countries,hospitals, schools) or interfere with friendly

relations with indigenous personnel orgovernments.

e. A restricted target list (RTL) includesrestricted targets nominated by elements ofthe joint force and approved by the JFC. Thislist also includes restricted targets directed byhigher authorities. When targets are restrictedfrom lethal attacks, commanders shouldconsider nonlethal options as a means toachieve or support the commander’s desiredobjectives.

f. Components, supporting commands,national intelligence agencies, and JFC staffselect targets from the JTL to compile theirrespective TNLs. The TNLs are combined,validated, and prioritized to form the JIPTL.Targets are vetted against the NSL and theRTL at each successive level. Relief may berequested from the JFC for targets nominatedto the JIPTL that are also on the RTL. Thesetargets can only be attacked with JFCapproval.

4. Joint Targeting CoordinationResponsibilities

a. Joint targeting coordinationresponsibilities for the JFC are as follows.

• Establishes parameters for successfultargeting operations within the JFC’sAOR or joint operations area (JOA) bypromulgating guidance and priorities.

• Retains authority and responsibility todirect target priorities, relative levels ofeffort, and the sequence of those effortsto components of the joint force.

• Provides guidance and objectives foroperational planning and targeting.

• Influences targeting apportionmentdecisions.

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• Conducts combat assessment.

• Updates mission planning guidance,intent, and priority intelligencerequirements (PIR) throughout the jointtargeting process.

• Directs the formation, composition, andspecific responsibilities of a JTCB.

• Approves or delegates approval of theJIPTL developed from component andstaff nominations.

• Provides broad targeting guidance tocomponents based on the campaignplanning guidance and priorities.

• Addresses functions and responsibilitiesfor prosecuting TSTs in the operationalarea.

For more detailed information on TSTs,see Appendix B, “Time-Sensitive TargetConsiderations.”

b. The targeting representative delegatedjoint target planning, coordination, anddeconfliction authority is responsible asfollows.

• Reviews with the components the JFC’sjoint targeting guidance andapportionment.

• Reviews the JFC’s campaign plans inadvance and acts in an advisory capacityto anticipate future joint targetingrequirements.

• Compiles component targetingrequirements and prioritizes targets basedon JFC guidance. Develops the JIPTL.

• Provides JTCB results and approvedJIPTL to each component and supportingforces.

5. Relative Division of JointTargeting ProcessResponsibilities

a. A relevant aspect pertaining to theexecution of the joint targeting process is thecollaboration between joint force stafftargeting specialists and component leveloperations and targeting planners. It shouldbe obvious that collaboration is a criticalelement of the execution of the targetingprocess at all levels of joint forces. The fourthphase of the joint targeting process is wherethe interaction between the joint force level(primarily concerned with overall planning)and the component level (primarily concernedwith operational planning and execution)comes most sharply into focus. This providesan excellent opportunity to graphically portraya notional model for the division of functionalresponsibility between the JFC and thecomponents for execution of the targetingprocess in Figure III-1. However the JFCestablishes the targeting process, the processshould have access to secure facilities, receivesupport from targeting specialists, and have amechanism in place to ensure that allsubordinate commanders have the ability tonominate targets for joint targetingconsideration.

NOTE: The targeting process will occur atmany levels. Subordinate commanders,functional and Service, will have their owntargeting process that will complement andsupport the JFC’s targeting process.

b. It is incumbent upon the JFC todetermine the relative burden sharing for thejoint targeting process between the JFC staffand those of the component commanders.

The JFC develops guidance that directs andfocuses operation planning and targeting tosupport the concept of operations.

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6. Joint Force Commander StaffResponsibilities

a. Operations Directorate. The J-3 assiststhe commander in the discharge of assignedresponsibility for the direction and control ofoperations, beginning with initial planning,follow-through, and completion of specificoperations. In this capacity, the directorateplans, coordinates, and integrates operations.The flexibility and range of modern forcesrequire close coordination and integration foreffective unity of effort. If a JTCB isestablished by the JFC, the J-3 will normallyorganize the JTCB and serves as a member.(This may not apply if the JFC delegates broad

targeting oversight functions to a subordinatecommander.)

• At the joint force level, the jointoperations center (JOC) is the focal pointfor synchronizing and integrating jointoperations at the macro level. Jointtargeting related duties are normallyperformed by the J-3 as follows.

•• Provides current operationalassessment.

•• Publishes JFC’s targeting guidanceand objectives. Publishes JFC’s dailyguidance letter in coordination with

NOTIONAL RELATIVE DIVISION OF JOINTTARGETING PROCESS RESPONSIBILITIES

JOINT FORCE COMMANDER LEVEL

Phase 1: Commander’s Objectives,Guidance, and Intent

Phase 2: Target Development, Validation,Nomination, and Prioritization

Phase 3: Capabilities Analysis

Phase 4: Commander’s Decision andForce Assignment

Phase 5: Mission Planning and Force Execution

COMPONENT LEVEL

Phase 6: Combat Assessment

AttackResults

Feedback

Figure III-1. Notional Relative Division of Joint Targeting Process Responsibilities

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Intelligence Directorate of a joint staff(J-2), Logistics Directorate of a joint staff(J-4), Plans Directorate of a joint staff(J-5), special staff to include legal (i.e.,Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for reviewof ROE) and public and civil affairs (e.g.,for post-attack media coordinationrequirements), and components.

•• The JIPTL, RTL, and NSL arereviewed at the JTCB with inputs fromthe components and in coordination withrepresentatives from J-2, J-5, and theSJA. The J-3 forwards these lists to theJFC or a designated representative forapproval. Following approval, they areused in the joint targeting planningprocess.

•• Provides for JFC’s approval thetheater fire support coordinatingmeasures and other appropriate measuressubmitted by components.

•• In coordination with the componentcommanders, develops proposedplacement of the land and maritime forceboundaries.

•• Provides the JTCB with targetingoptions, boundary, and fire supportcoordinating measure (FSCM) changesfor future operations to assist in thedevelopment of future targetingrequirements.

•• Recommends targets for inclusion inthe JIPTL as part of the JFC’s planningstaff.

•• Monitors, and integrates as appropriate,targets in support of informationoperations (IO) objectives.

•• Nominates targets in support of thetheater deception plan.

•• Serves as executive agent for overallcoordination and direction of the JFC CAcell.

• Additionally, if directed by the JFC, theJ-3 acts as executive agent for the JTCB.

• The JFC may approve the formationwithin the J-3 of a joint fires element(JFE). The JFE is an optional staffelement that provides recommendationsto the J-3 to accomplish fires planningand coordination. The JFE assists theJ-3 to accomplish responsibilities andtasks as a staff advisor to the J-3 withapproval by the JFC and may include anyor all of the J-3’s tasks. In addition, theJFE may perform the following functionsrelated to joint targeting.

•• Coordinates the drafting of the JFC’sJIPTL with the J-2.

•• Assists the joint intelligence center(JIC) in developing HVTs and HPTs.

•• Prepares and disseminates targetbulletins.

•• Monitors for the J-3 TST attackoperations and makes recommendationsfor deconfliction.

•• Deconflicts and validates targetnominations originating at the JFC leveland higher, then prioritizes and forwardsto the J-3 for review and eventualtransmission to the joint force aircomponent commander’s (JFACC’s)joint air operations center (JAOC) forinclusion in the JIPTL.

•• Identifies potential conflicts inpreparation for the JTCB.

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•• Organizes a strategy team to addressintermediate targeting efforts to bridgethe gap between current operations andfuture plans being developed.

b. Intelligence Directorate. The J-2 hasthe primary responsibility for prioritization ofintelligence collection efforts, analysis,validation, and BDA for all joint operations.In addition, the J-2 provides a major input tothe J-3 and/or J-5 in the form of adversarycourse of action (COA) assessments criticalto the joint target prioritization process andidentification of HVTs and HPTs. Jointtargeting related duties that are normallyperformed by the J-2 are as follows.

• Assists J-3 and J-5 in developingtargeting guidance, priorities, andobjectives for inclusion in the JFC’splanning guidance, planning directives,and daily guidance letter.

• Nominates targets for immediate attackbased on inputs using all-source fusionanalysis in the JIC or joint intelligencesupport element.

• Recommends targets for inclusion in theJIPTL as part of the JFC’s planning staff.

• Supports target development forcomponents via the JOC.

• Assists the J-3 in development of the JFCRTL and/or NSL.

• Manages theater collection priorities viathe daily aerial reconnaissance andsurveillance conference and maintainsappropriate collection operationsmanagement liaison with the componentsand national intelligence agencies duringexecution.

• Manages JFC’s PIR.

• Serves as executive agent for overallcoordination and direction of BDAwithin the JIC or joint intelligencesupport element in support of the J-3’sCA.

• Provides the theater and/or JOAintelligence assessment.

For more detailed information, see JP2-01.1, Intelligence Support to Targeting.

c. Logistics Directorate. The J-4identifies logistic issues unique or specific totargeting. Of particular interest, the J-4compares the operational logistic plans todeveloping target lists to ensure protection ofinfrastructure and/or supplies required tosupport current and future operations.

d. Plans Directorate. When the joint staffincludes a J-5, it also performs the long-rangeor fu ture jo in t ta rget ing p lanningresponsibilities. Planning is conducted byvarious organizations in conjunction with J-3.Joint targeting related duties are normallyperformed by the J-5 as follows.

• Publishes JFC’s planning guidance andplanning directives.

• Identifies possible branches and sequelsto the theater campaign plan.

• Develops, analyzes, compares, andrecommends COAs for JFC approval.

e. Staff Judge Advocate Responsibilities.The SJA advises the JFC on applicableinternational and domestic laws, LOACissues, and other pertinent issues involved injoint target recommendations and decisionsprocesses and reviews target selection for,among other issues, domestic laws, LOACrequirements, harmful environmental impacts,and compliance with published ROE.

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For additional information see Appendix A,“International Law and Legal Considerationsin Targeting.”

7. Service and FunctionalComponent CommanderResponsibilities

With regard to joint targeting, the Serviceand functional components’ responsibilitiesnormally include the following.

a. Conduct target development.

b. Provide appropriate representation to theJTCB process.

c. For joint targeting, consolidate andnominate deconflicted and prioritized targetsfor inclusion in the JIPTL.

d. Provide BDA to the JFC forincorporation into JFC BDA and CA efforts.

e. Coordinate component targeting forimmediate targets via component liaisons orother established procedures. Examplesinclude the liaison elements to the JAOC —battlefield coordination detachment, Marineliaison officer, naval and amphibious liaisonelement, Air Force liaison element, andspecial operations liaison element (SOLE).

8. Target NominationProcedures

a. Timing and Duration. The recurringtarget nomination process supporting theJFC’s joint targeting effort can be from 72 to96 hours in duration (from target nominationto complete execution). Shorter durations of48 hours or less are possible with propercoordination between the appropriatesupporting and supported commanders.

b. Target Nomination Procedures. Thesequential steps below explain the majorfunctions that normally occur.

• The Service or functional componentssubmit prioritized target nominations tothe JFC. At the same time, copies of thenominations are normally submitted tothe JAOC. Submissions should be inUnited States message text format, targetinformation report format, or by othermeans as designated by the JFC.

• If a JFACC is established, componentspass their target nominations to theJFACC at the same time they pass theirlist to the JFC or designated representative.A targeting team will draw up a draft listof targets for the JTCB. The jointguidance, apportionment, and targeting(JGAT) team will apply available forcesin compliance with the JFC apportionmentguidance. This integration allows theJFACC to attack more targets andproduce more responsive ATOs.

• Component representatives at the JTCBalso receive copies of their component’starget nominations. It is essential that thecomponent representatives at the JTCBare fully attuned to the priorities,objectives, and supporting rationalebehind their commander’s targetingeffort. Failure to receive timely targetinginformation will result in an inability ofcomponent representatives to properlyrepresent their commander’s interests atthe JTCB.

• The JFC targeting representative reviewsall Service or functional componenttarget nominations in preparation for eachJTCB. The intent is to comparenominations with JFC target guidanceand priorities in order to identify potentialconflicts or problems and prevent theJTCB from becoming bogged down inworking detailed coordination.

• Some targets are often developed byhigher headquarters (NCA, combatantcommander) and forwarded to the

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subordinate JFC. Mostly, they are criticalHPTs of strategic military or politicalimportance. These targets will normallybe forwarded from the combatantcommander to the subordinate JFC bydirect tasking order.

• Some targeting is normally controlled atthe combatant commander level,including release authority for use ofnational asset capabilities and/orweapons.

• The draft JIPTL is submitted to the JFCor designated representative for approval.Once approved, this list is transmitted tothe components as the daily JIPTL. TheJIPTL is a listing of all approved targets(including those to be attacked by air andsurface weapons systems) that prioritizesthose targets most critical to the jointeffort. Some targets may indicate whichcomponent is tasked to attack that target.The JIPTL also identifies those targetsthat likely will not be attacked due tocompeting concerns and asset limitations.This prioritized listing of targets isessential in order to give Service orfunctional components as well as theJFC staff feedback on how theirspecific target nominations areprojected for attack.

9. Joint Guidance,Apportionment, andTargeting Team Functions

a. The JGAT Team. The JFACC mayorganize a JGAT team. The JGAT team maybe a separate section where componentrepresentatives reside to provide input to thetargeting process or it may be a meeting thatconvenes on a periodic basis (normally daily).The JGAT team responsibilities are varied butkey to the targeting process. The JGAT teamlinks targets to be attacked by aviation assetsto commander’s (JFC and component)

guidance, deconflicts and coordinates targetnominations based on estimates of how manytargets can be attacked, makes arecommendation for the air apportionment,and provides other targeting support requiringcomponent input at the JFACC level. If theJFC delegates joint targeting coordinationauthority to the JFACC, the JGAT team alsoreceives all target nominations and prioritizesthem into the draft JIPTL. Commonorganizational guidelines of the JGAT teaminclude the following.

• Chaired by the deputy JFACC or thedesignated representative.

• Senior component liaison officers andkey JFACC staff members comprise theJGAT team membership.

• The Combat Plans Division provides thestaff support to the JGAT team duringthe air-tasking planning and executionprocess.

b. Draft JIPTL Construction. The draftJIPTL is formed from a prioritized listing oftargets based on component and JFC targetpriorities. Members consider the estimatedavailable air capabilities and their ability toeffect the targets on the list. A draft JIPTL“cut line” is normally established. The draftJIPTL “cut line” should reflect which targetswill most likely be attacked (barring technicalproblems with aircraft, weather, retasking forhigher priority targets, or other operationalcircumstances) with the projectedapportionment of air assets assigned or madeavailable to the JFACC. The “cut line” is animportant concept since targets below the linemay not be tasked in that day’s targeting cycle.Component liaison officers (LNOs) should beready to justify and/or prioritize targetnominations among all the priorities of thejoint operation. The JFACC may alsorecommend that other component assets beused against targets on the draft JIPTL.

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c. T h e A i r A p p o r t i o n m e n tRecommendation. The JGAT team formulatesair apportionment recommendations that theJFACC submits to the JFC for upcomingtargeting cycles. The JGAT team provides auseful forum for component input into the airapportionment recommendation process.With the air capabilities required to attacktargets on the draft JIPTL as a benchmark,the JGAT can recommend the level of air effortto be applied to counterair, close air support(CAS), air interdiction, strategic attack, andother air missions. The way that the level ofeffort is presented may vary. Regardless ofthe format for presentation, the end result isthe draft JIPTL and apportionmentrecommendation. These products arenormally forwarded to the JTCB forcoordination and final approval by the JFC.Common formats for presentation of the airapportionment recommendation may include:

• Percentages of available sorties to betasked against mission types;

• Mission types prioritized by weight ofair effort; and/or

• Prioritized mission tasks to be addressedby available air assets.

10. Joint Targeting CoordinationBoard

a. Typically, JFCs organize a JTCB. If theJFC so designates, the JTCB may be anintegrating center for the targeting oversighteffort or a JFC-level review mechanism. Ineither case, it must be a joint activitycomprised of representatives from the jointforce staff, all components and, if deemednecessary, their subordinate units.

b. The JFC defines the role of the JTCB.The JTCB provides a forum in which allcomponents can articulate strategies andpriorities for future operations to ensure thatthey are synchronized and integrated. TheJTCB normally facilitates and coordinatesthe targeting activities of the componentsto ensure that the JFC’s priorities are met.The JTCB and/or JFC typically addressspecific target issues not previously resolved.The JTCB normally refines the draft JIPTLfor approval by the JFC.

c. In multinational operations, theJTCB may be subordinate to amultinational targeting coordinationboard, with JFCs or their agents representingthe joint force on the multinational board.

JFC approves and directs execution of the joint integrated prioritized targetlist developed from component and staff nominations.

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d. Directorship of the JTCB will bedetermined by the JFC. (See JP 5-00.2,Joint Task Force Planning Guidance andProcedures.) The JTCB is often led by thedeputy JFC or designated representative toprovide the appropriate level of rank,experience, and focus. Component and JFCstaff representation on the JTCB should alsopossess the necessary rank, experience, andknowledge to speak authoritatively for theirrespective components and staff elements.According to JP 5-00.2, Joint Task ForcePlanning Guidance and Procedures, theJTCB is typically responsible for thefollowing.

• Reviews targeting information.

• Develops targeting guidance andpriorities.

• Refines the draft JIPTL (thisresponsibility may be delegated).

• Maintains a complete list of restrictedtargets and areas where special operationsforces (SOF) or component reconnaissanceunits are operating to avoid fratricide andconflicts with other current or futureoperations.

• Maintains a macro-level view of the JOAand ensures that targeting nominationsare consistent with the JFC’s concept ofoperations.

• Ensures that IO considerations areadequately addressed.

e. JTCB Scope and Focus. The focus ofthe JTCB is on the operational level of war.The primary focus of the JTCB is to developtarget priorities and other targeting guidancein accordance with the JFC’s objectives. TheJTCB must be flexible enough to adjust itsattention to whatever scope or fidelity it needsto address targeting issues. Briefingsconducted at the JTCB should focus on

ensuring that intelligence, operations (by allcomponents and applicable staff elements),and fires are on track, coordinated, andsynchronized. In order to function aseffectively and efficiently as possible, theJTCB requires a focused agenda to guide thedaily conduct of business. An establishedagenda assists the board members inpreparation of briefings and keeps the boardfocused on the important recurring issues. Apossible JTCB agenda is outlined below. Bybreaking the meeting into three parts, theJTCB may address at least three joint planningcycles that are either being planned or areabout to be executed. A three-part possibleagenda follows.

• Review. The first section is a review ofprevious assumptions, plans, anddecisions that will be executed within thenext 24-48 hours. This is a final reviewof the next day’s targeting plan(s) toensure that it is still valid. The plan isbalanced against the latest CA and theprojected adversary and friendlysituations. This review is the JTCB’sfinal chance to modify the approvedtargeting priorities before it is executed.It should be noted that the JTCB isconcerned with future operations, not thecurrent battle. The operators alreadyhave the current day’s targeting plan(s)in hand and are preparing to execute.Changing priorities on the day ofexecution is possible, but that willnormally be handled through the J-3rather than the JTCB. Moreover,component commanders are normallyauthorized to make execution daychanges compelled by current conditionsconsistent with the JFC’s intent andmission objectives.

• Plan. The second portion of the agendacovers the main focus of the daily JTCB;i.e., approving or validating the joint firesplan to be executed 48-72 hours out. Theboard will review the proposed JIPTL

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and apportionment recommendation. Ifnecessary, the board may recommend atarget or target set be handled by aspecific component. The planning phaseof the JTCB ensures that operations (toinclude SOF), IO, fires, and intelligenceare fully integrated and coordinated in acomplementary effort throughout thedepth of the battlespace.

• Guidance. The third section of the JTCBagenda will focus on anticipating whatthe targeting effort should be 72-96 hoursout. The targeting guidance and prioritiesapproved for the 72 to 96 hour windowwill guide the components targetingeffort for the upcoming joint targetingcycle. The approval of the JFC ordesignated representative is usuallysought immediately upon adjournment ofthe JTCB. The targeting-relateddecisions are then promulgated inmessage format throughout the jointforce.

11. Joint Targeting SteeringGroup

To assist the combatant commander indeveloping targeting guidance and reconcilingcompeting requests for assets (within acombatant commander’s AOR), a jointtargeting steering group (JTSG) may beestablished. If a combatant commander hasmore than one joint task force (JTF) operatingin the theater requiring targeting support orresources, the JTSG can assist the combatantcommander and the J-3 and/or J-5 in decidinghow limited assets and resources will bedeployed (e.g., missiles, aircraft, andpersonnel). The JTSG should haveappropriate Service and functionalcomponent, national agency, multinational,and (combatant commander-level) joint staffrepresentatives (as appropriate) to makerecommendations regarding theater strategicand/or operational issues.

12. Federated Targeting Support

A federated target development and BDAprocess can provide reachback support to theJFC and component commanders during thejoint targeting process. Under a federated jointtargeting process architecture, the supportedcombatant commander works in conjunctionwith the Joint Staff to establish federatedtargeting support partners and BDA reportingresponsibilities between unified commands inaccordance with the supported combatantcommander’s requirements. The supportedcombatant commander may request that theJoint Staff facilitate in identifying targetingsupport and BDA federated partners or workdirectly with other unified commands toprovide information to the Joint Staffregarding any inter-command targetingcoordination. The Joint Staff normallyensures that federated targeting supportrequirements are addressed in the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff orders and willassist in the dissemination of targetingsupport-related information between thefederated partners and the supportedcombatant commander.

For more detailed information on federatedtargeting support, see JP 2-01.1, IntelligenceSupport to Targeting.

13. Department of DefenseOrganizations SupportingJoint Targeting

Many organizations provide critical supportto joint targeting efforts at the national andcombatant command levels. The mostimportant organizations within theDepartment of Defense (DOD) include theJoint Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency(DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), andNational Imagery and Mapping Agency(NIMA) as well as the combatant commands.Besides these organizations, there are alsoother hybrid entities within the Department of

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Defense, including the joint space supportteam (JSST), joint information operationscenter (JIOC), and the joint warfare analysiscenter (JWAC), which provide importanttargeting data.

a. Joint Staff J-2. The Joint Staff J-2 is aunique organization in that it is a majorcomponent of the DIA, which is a combatsupport agency, as well as a fully integratedelement of the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff J-2is the primary coordination element fornational-level intelligence support to jointtargeting. The J-2 Deputy Directorate forTargets functions as the lead agent forproviding and coordinating national-levelintelligence support to joint targeting. SpecificJ-2 responsibilities include providing theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and JointStaff J-3 with joint crisis and contingencytargeting, BDA, and technical planningsupport; providing the combatant commands,if requested, with intelligence communitytarget development and analytic supportthrough all phases of the targeting cycle; andmanaging the National Military JointIntelligence Center (NMJIC).

For additional details see JP 2-0, Doctrinefor Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

b. National Military Joint IntelligenceCenter. The NMJIC is the primary conduitthrough which national-level targetintelligence support is provided to thecombatant commands and subordinate jointforces. The NMJIC provides the combatantcommanders and subordinate JFCs with directaccess to national intelligence support througha national intelligence support team (NIST).

For additional details see JP 2-02, NationalIntelligence Support to Joint Operations.

c. Defense Intelligence Agency. DIA isresponsible for providing finished targetintelligence to the NCA and JFCs in supportof joint worldwide operations. DIA’s

Contingency Support Division directlysupports Joint Staff J-2 targeting efforts byconsolidating all-source target developmentand material production. Another importantDIA contributor to targeting support is theagency’s Defense Human Intelligence(HUMINT) Service (DHS). DHS provides adedicated DOD HUMINT capability. Thesemilitary intelligence professionals play animportant role in collecting target intelligencein support of combatant commands across therange of military operations.


d. National Security Agency. NSA’sInformation Warfare Support Center (IWSC)serves as the agency’s primary point of contactfor organizations seeking specific targeting ortargeting-related analytical information. Inthis capacity, the IWSC directly assists withthe preparation of IO and/or informationwarfare (IW) strategies as well as all-sourcetargeting studies for the Department ofDefense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,combatant commands, and JTFs. SpecificNSA contributions to these targeting studiesinclude detailed analyses of adversaryleadership and communications nodes. Otherimportant NSA contributions to targetingsupport include the intelligence gain and/orloss assessment (used to evaluate the quantityand quality of intelligence data lost when aparticular target is attacked), as well as signalsintelligence analysis in support of BDA.


e. National Imagery and MappingAgency. NIMA, a DOD combat supportagency, provides targeting support withtailored imagery and geospatial products andservices to the Department of Defense,Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,combatant commands, and JTFs. Targetingsupport products use geodetically-controlled

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source material and refined mensurationtechniques and data. Major targetingassistance is provided by NIMA’s databaseof 125,000 mensurated point targets and itsproduction of the digital point positioningdatabase. NIMA also provides seamlessmanagement of national imagery programsand procedures across national, theater, andtactical lines. NIMA is the central authorityresponsible for managing the imageryintelligence community support center (CSC).The CSC validates all national imagerynomination requests, deconflicts multiplerequirements, and implements tasking ofnational imagery assets. For this reasonNIMA plays a critical role in providingcollection support to target intelligence efforts.To support targeting during crisis operations,NIMA may deploy imagery and/or geospatialequipment and personnel knowledgeable inimagery and geospatial capabilities to acombatant commander or a deployed JTF.This capability may deploy at the combatantcommander’s request or as part of the NIST.

For more on NIMA target support productsand services, see JP 2-03, Joint Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for GeospatialInformation and Services Support to JointOperations.

f. United States Space Command(USSPACECOM).

• Joint Space Support Team. The JSSTprovides the JFCs and subordinatecomponent commanders staffs withdirect access to space and missileintelligence and operations support.USSPACECOM is the primary sourcefor space-related targeting and deploys aJSST upon request from a combatantcommander. The JSST is task-organizedand consists of, at a minimum, operationsand intelligence personnel, withcommunications and warning specialistsadded if required. The JSST provides a

link to USSPACECOM products,databases, and services, giving JFCs andsubordinate component commandersaccess to information beyond organiccommand resources. The JSSTcoordinates with NISTs to avoidduplication of effort and providesynergistic support to the warfighter.

For additional details see JP 3-14, JointDoctrine for Space Operations.

• Joint Information Operations Center.As part of USSPACECOM, the JIOCprovides direct IO support to combatantcommanders. This support is focused onthe planning and execution of the IOportion of joint operations. JIOCpersonnel work through the supportedcombatant commander and JTF IOorganization to ensure that the portion ofthe IO plan that must be addressedthrough the targeting process is given anappropriate priority in the overalltargeting effort. JIOC personnel,representing the supported combatantcommander or JTF IO officer, often workdirectly with the supported command’stargeting personnel from the earlieststages of the targeting process to ensurethat IO considerations are fully integratedinto the targeting process.

For additional details see JP 3-13, JointDoctrine for Information Operations.

g. Joint Warfare Analysis Center. JWACprovides the Joint Staff, combatantcommands, and other DOD and non-DODagencies with effects-based, precisiontargeting and deterrent options for selectednetworks and nodes. JWAC conductsengineering and modeling analysis, fused withscientific and intelligence data, to produceoptimized target sets that support thecombatant commander’s objectives.

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14. Non-DOD OrganizationsSupporting Joint Targeting

Non-DOD organizations providesignificant intelligence and operationalsupport to joint targeting. The principal non-DOD organizations supporting joint targetingare the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) andDepartment of State (DOS) as well as theDepartments of Justice, Transportation,Health and Human Services, and Energy.

a. Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA,through its Target Support Group, worksclosely with the Department of Defense onmany issues relating to every phase of thetargeting cycle. The target support groupmakes a variety of CIA resources available tomilitary target planners. Additionally, inpeacetime, applicable requests for information

are routed to the CIA for addressal by theagency’s Office of Military Affairs.

b. Department of State. Because of theDOS worldwide network of diplomaticmissions and posts staffed with representativesof numerous national agencies, the DOS is akey source of information during war or crises.The central point of contact within the DOSfor intelligence, analysis, and research is theBureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).INR produces intelligence studies andanalyses, which have provided valuableinformation in support to targeting.Additionally, all-source reporting via ForeignService channels at American Embassy orconsular posts has also proven useful,particularly during the objectives andguidance, target development, and CA phasesof the targeting cycle.

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX AINTERNATIONAL LAW AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

IN TARGETING

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1. Introduction

It is the policy of the Department of Defensethat the armed forces of the United States willcomply with the LOAC during all armedconflicts, however such conflicts arecharacterized, and, unless otherwise directedby competent authorities, will comply withthe principles and spirit of the LOAC duringall other operations. International lawconsiderations will directly affect all phasesof the joint targeting process. Targetplanners must understand and be able to applythe basic principles of international law as theyrelate to targeting. This appendix supportsthe joint targeting process by providing adiscussion of those aspects of international lawthat impact targeting decisions; in particular,issues related to the basic principles of LOAC,ROE, general restrictions, precautions inattack, separation of military activities,special protections, and environmentalconsiderations.

2. International Law and theLaw of Armed Conflict

The LOAC is defined as that part ofinternational law that regulates the conductof armed hostilities. It encompasses allinternational law for the conduct of hostilitiesbinding on the United States or its individualcitizens, including treaties and internationalagreements to which the United States is aparty, and applicable customary internationallaw. The LOAC rests on fundamentalprinciples of military necessity, unnecessarysuffering, proportionality, and distinction(discrimination) which will apply to targetingdecisions.

a. Military Necessity. This principlejustifies those measures not forbidden by

international law, and which are indispensablefor securing the complete submission of theenemy as soon as possible. While militarynecessity gives commanders great latitude inconducting military operations, it does notauthorize all military action and destruction.For instance, under no circumstance wouldmilitary necessity authorize actionsspecifically prohibited by LOAC, such as themurder of prisoners of war or the deliberatetargeting of innocent civilians.

b. Unnecessary Suffering. This principleforbids the employment of arms, projectiles,or material calculated to cause unnecessarysuffering. This concept also extends tounnecessary destruction of property.Combatants may not use arms that are per secalculated to cause unnecessary suffering, e.g.,projectiles filled with glass, and may not useotherwise lawful weapons in a manner thatcauses unnecessary suffering, i.e., with theintent to cause unnecessary suffering.

c. Proportionality. The principle ofproportionality prohibits occurrence ofcollateral civilian casualties so excessive innature when compared to the expectedmilitary advantage to be gained as to betantamount to the intentional attack ofcivilians, or to a wanton disregard for thesafety of the civilian population. The principleof proportionality is weighed by a commanderin determining whether, in engaging inoffensive or defensive operations, thecommander’s actions may be expected tocause incidental loss of civilian life, injury tocivilians, damage to civilian objects, or acombination thereof, that would be excessivein relation to the concrete and direct militaryadvantage anticipated by those actions. Themilitary advantage anticipated is intended torefer to the advantage anticipated from those

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actions considered as a whole, and not onlyfrom isolated or particular parts thereof.Generally, “military advantage” is notrestricted to tactical gains, but is linked to thefull context of a war strategy.

d. Distinction (Discrimination). This isthe customary international law obligation ofparties to a conflict to engage only in militaryoperations the effects of which distinguishbetween the civilian population (or individualcivilians not taking a direct part in thehostilities) and combatant forces, directing theapplication of force solely against the latter.Similarly, military force may be directed onlyagainst military objects or objectives, and notagainst civilian objects.

3. Rules of Engagement

ROE are defined in JP 1-02, Departmentof Defense Dictionary of Military andAssociated Terms, as “directives . . . thatdelineate the circumstances and limitationsunder which United States forces will initiateand/or continue combat engagement withother forces encountered.”

a. ROE are the means by which the NCAand operational commanders regulate the useof armed force in the context of applicablepolitical and military policy, and domestic andinternational law. ROE provide a frameworkthat encompasses national policy goals,mission requirements, and the rule of law. Alltargeting decisions must be made in light ofthe applicable ROE. Supplemental measuresenable a commander to obtain or grant thoseadditional authorities necessary to accomplishan assigned mission.

b. Standing Rules of Engagement(SROE). The SROE provide implementationguidance on the inherent right of self-defense,and the application of force for missionaccomplishment. The SROE apply to all USforces responding to military attacks withinthe United States, and to all military operations

outside the United States, with limitedexceptions; the most noteworthy being formultinational force operations. The SROE isdesigned to provide a common template fordevelopment and implementation of ROE forthe full range of operations, from peace to war.

c. Combatant Commanders’ Theater-Specific ROE. These special ROE addressspecific strategic and political sensitivities ofthe combatant commander’s AOR and mustbe approved by the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff. They can be found inEnclosure K to the SROE.

4. General Restrictions onTargeting

a. Protection of the Civilian Populationand Civilian Objects. Civilian populationsand objects as such may not be intentionallytargeted for attack. Civilian objects consistof all civilian property and activities other thanthose used to support or sustain the adversary’swarfighting capability. Acts of violenceintended to spread terror among the civilianpopulation are prohibited.

• Nonparticipation in Hostilities. Theprotection offered civilians carries a strictobligation on the part of civilians not toparticipate directly in armed combat,become combatants, or engage in acts ofwar. Civilians engaging in fighting orotherwise participating in combatoperations, singularly or as a group,become unlawful combatants and losetheir protected civilian status.

• Requirement to Distinguish BetweenMilitary Targets and Civilian Objects.It is necessary to distinguish betweenmilitary targets and civilian objectsregardless of the legal status of theterritory on or over which combat occurs.Civilians may not be used as humanshields in an attempt to protect, conceal,or render military objects immune from

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International Law and Legal Considerations in Targeting

military operations. Neither maycivilians be forced to leave their homesor shelters to disrupt the movement ofan adversary. Joint force responsibilitiesduring such situations are driven by theprinciple of proportionality as mentionedabove. When an adversary employsillegal means to shield legitimate targets,the decision to attack should be reviewedby higher authority in light of militaryconsiderations, international law, andprecedent.

b. Lawful Military Attacks. Militaryattacks will be directed only at militarytargets. Only a military target is a lawfulobject of direct attack. By their nature,location, purpose, or use, military targets arethose objects whose total or partial destruction,capture, or neutralization offer a militaryadvantage.

• Many objects are clearly militarytargets, such as military barracks,military airfields, armaments, aircraft,tanks, antiaircraft emplacements, ortroops. Economic targets (i.e., factories,workshops, and plants) that make aneffective contribution to adversarymilitary capability are consideredlegitimate military targets. Dual-useobjects, those serving both a military anda civilian purpose, may be lawful targetsas determined by the application of theLOAC and, in large measure, theprinciple of proportionality. This mayinclude economic targets that indirectlybut effectively support and sustain theadversary’s warfighting capability.Attacks on objects such as dikes anddams are prohibited if their breach ordestruction would result in the loss ofcivilian lives disproportionate to themilitary advantage to be gained.Traditionally, modern transportation andcommunications systems wereconsidered military targets because of

heavy use by the military duringconflicts. Similarly, some civilianinfrastructure (such as radio or televisiontransmitters) may be a legitimate targetif used by their government to supportmilitary operations.

• An object’s normal use does notautomatically determine its status.Even a traditionally civilian object suchas a house can be a military target if it isoccupied and used by military forces.

• The key factor is whether its capture,destruction, or neutralization offers amilitary advantage in the prevailingcircumstances without excessivecollateral damage.

5. Precautions in Attack

a. When conducting military operations,positive steps and precautions must be takento avoid or minimize incidental civiliancasualties and damage to civilian property.The extent of danger to the civilian populationvaries with the type of military target attacked,terrain, weapons used, weather, and civilianproximity.

b. Threats to civilians depend onengagement techniques, weapons used, natureof conflict, commingling of civilian andmilitary objects, and armed resistanceencountered. Precautions include thefollowing.

• Military Objectives. Attack plannersshould ensure that military targets, andnot civilian objects, are directly attacked.Sound target intelligence enhancesmilitary effectiveness and target validity.

• Minimization of Civilian Casualties.Attacks are not prohibited againstmilitary targets even if they causeincidental injury or damage to civilians

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or civilian objects. In spite ofprecautions, such incidental casualties areinevitable during armed conflict.

•• Incidental civilian injury or collateraldamage to civilian objects must not beexcessive in relation to the expectedmilitary advantage to be gained. If theattack is directed against dual-useobjects that might be legitimate militarytargets but also serve a legitimate civilianneed (e.g. , electrical power ortelecommunications), then this factormust be carefully balanced against themilitary benefits when making aproportionality determination.

•• Required precautionary measures arereinforced by traditional tenets of militarydoctrine, such as surprise, economy offorce, and concentration of effort.Warnings should be considered if nomilitary advantage would be lost.

• Cancellation or Suspension of Attacksin Case of Mistake. Target intelligencemay be found to be faulty before an attackis started or completed. If it becomesapparent that a target is no longer a lawfulmilitary objective, the attack must becanceled or suspended.

6. Separation of MilitaryActivities

a. General Information. The LOACgives civilians protection from attack duringarmed conflict. Civilians may lose thisprotection based upon specific warlike acts.Once civilians become combatants, theybecome lawful targets.

• The parties to a conflict are obligated toremove their own civilian population,individual civilians, and civilian objectsfrom areas or locations where militaryobjects are located.

• Under the LOAC, safety zones ordemilitarized zones may be created byor between the warring parties. Whilethe creation of such zones rarely occurs,if created, they must only be used for theirintended purposes. Examples are opencities, civilians, prisoner of war (POW)camps, hospitals, etc.

• Similarly, the LOAC requires thatcombatants wear uniforms, insignia, orother clearly identifiable markings.Facilities such as hospitals and POWcamps must be clearly marked as requiredby the Geneva Conventions. To themaximum extent feasible, the LOACrequires combatants to locate militaryfacilities away from protected civilianobjects, such as hospitals and schools.

b. Result of Failure to Separate MilitaryActivities. When an adversary places militaryobjectives in or near a populated area, thisfailure will weaken effective protection oftheir nearby civilian population andconstitutes a breach of the LOAC.

7. Special Protection

Direct attacks on civilians or civilian objectsare prohibited. However, the incidental injuryor death of civilian personnel or damage tocivilian objects at or near a military target isnot cause for redress. Special protections arediscussed below.

a. Wounded and Sick Personnel,Medical Units, Hospitals, and MedicalTransport. Under the LOAC, the followingare protected.

• Fixed hospitals and mobile medicalestablishments.

• Medical personnel and chaplains.

• Medical transports.

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International Law and Legal Considerations in Targeting

• Medical aircraft.

• Hospital ships and, where possible, sickbays of warships.

• Wounded, sick, and shipwreckedpersons, military or civilian.

b. Distinctive Medical Emblems. Since1864, the international medical emblem usedto protect medical activities in wartime hasbeen a Red Cross on a white field.Subsequently, the Red Crescent on a whitefield was also approved to indicate medicalactivities. However, some countries use otherdistinctive emblems such as a red star of Davidby Israel, a red cedar tree by Lebanon, and ared wheel by India. Although not recognizedin the Geneva Conventions, when parties tothe conflict are placed on notice that anotherparty is using a unique emblem to mark itsmedical facilities, such facilities must be givendue respect as such. The key purpose of theConventions is not the emblem per se, butrather the notice that a facility is a protectedmedical installation.

• These emblems may be used to markcivilian and military medical personnel,vehicles, and hospitals. The InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross and nationalRed Cross societies also use thesesymbols.

• The Geneva Convention authorizes useof symbols to mark zones established forthe wounded and sick. Safety zones forwounded, sick, aged, expectant mothers,children under 15, and mothers withchildren under 7 are to be marked withan oblique red band on white ground.

c. Religious, Cultural, and CharitableBuildings and Monuments. As long asbuildings and monuments devoted to religion,art, charitable purposes, or historical sites arenot used for military purposes, they may notbe targets. Combatants have a duty to identify

such places with distinctive and visible signs.When these buildings are used for militarypurposes, they may qualify as military targets.Lawful military targets located near protectedbuildings are not immune from attack, butprecautions must be taken to limit collateraldamage to the protected buildings. Manyallies and potential adversaries of the UnitedStates are party to the Protection of CulturalProperty in the Event of Armed Conflicttreaty. This treaty establishes a royal blue andwhite shield as the distinctive emblem forprotected cultural property in war.

d. Prisoner of War Camps. POWs maynot be targets, be kept in a combat zone, orused to render an area immune from militaryoperations. When military considerationspermit, the letters “PW” or “PG” clearlyvisible from the air identifies POW camps.The use of POW camp markings for any otherpurpose is prohibited.

8. EnvironmentalConsiderations

a. Joint operations have the potential toadversely affect natural and cultural resources.Consistent with operational requirements,action should be taken to identify theseresources and develop plans to prevent ormitigate adverse effects. These resourcesinclude historic or archeological resources andother natural resources in the operational area.Additionally, attacks against installationscontaining dangerous natural forces —including dams, dikes, and nuclear powerfacilities — must be carefully considered forpotentially catastrophic collateral damage.

b. It is generally lawful under the LOACto cause collateral damage to the environmentduring an attack on a legitimate military target.However, the commander has an affirmativeobligation to avoid unnecessary damage to theenvironment to the extent that it is practicalto do so consistent with missionaccomplishment. To that end and as far as

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Appendix A

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military requirements dictate, methods andmeans of attack should be employed with dueregard to the protection and preservation ofthe natural environment. Destruction of theenvironment not necessitated by militarynecessity and carried out wantonly isprohibited.

9. Role of the Judge Advocate

Due to complexity and extent ofinternational law considerations involved in

the joint targeting process, a judge advocate(JA) must be immediately available at alllevels of command to provide advice aboutlaw of war compliance during planning andexecution of exercises and operations. Earlyinvolvement by the JA will improve thetargeting process and can prevent possibleviolations of international or domestic law.

For additional details see JP 1-04, JointTactics, Techniques, and Procedures for LegalSupport to Military Operations.

APPENDIX BTIME-SENSITIVE TARGET CONSIDERATIONS

B-1

1. General

TSTs are those targets of such high priorityto friendly forces that the JFC designates themas requiring immediate response because theypose (or will soon pose) a danger to friendlyforces or they are highly lucrative, fleetingtargets of opportunity. The JFC normallyprovides specific guidance and prioritizationfor TSTs within the operational area. TSTssuch as airborne aircraft and missiles andsubmerged submarines may be handled byseparate components while others, includingthose on the surface of the earth, may requiredetailed inter-Service and/or functionalcomponent planning and coordination. Thepresence of TSTs in the battlespace requiresthe JFC to address functions andresponsibilities in addition to those previouslydiscussed.

a. JFC’s Objectives and Guidance forTSTs. The JFC’s objectives and guidance setthe basic procedural framework forcomponents to expedite targeting TSTs. TheJFC specifically prioritizes TSTs forimmediate response. Additionally, the JFCestablishes guidance on procedures forcoordination, deconfliction, and synchronizationamong components in a theater and/or JOA.Once this guidance is set forth, thecomponents establish planned and reactiveprocedures for attacking the prioritized TSTs.JFC guidance on TSTs to componentcommanders supports different phases of thejoint targeting process and include thefollowing.

• Establishing planned and deconflictedFSCMs against specific TSTs.

• Defining TST engagement authoritybased on a component commander’soperational area, a component

commander’s assigned functionalmission, or a combination thereof. TheJFC should normally define thosesituations, if any, where immediatedestruction of the imminent TST threatoutweighs the potential for duplicationof effort. The JFC should carefullybalance the risk between the TST threatand the potential for fratricide.

• Identifying specific communication datalinks between component C2 elementsof the joint force to conduct rapid TSTattacks. This normally includesauthorizing direct liaison andcoordinating authority.

b. JFC’s Risk Assessment Considerationsfor TSTs

• A critical aspect of successful TSTengagement is understanding the level ofrisk acceptable to the JFC. This is acomplex task. Items to be considered inthe risk assessment include: risk tofriendly forces and noncombatants,possible collateral damage, and thedisruption of diverting attack assets fromtheir deliberately planned missions.These considerations must be balancedagainst the danger of not attacking theTST in time and thus risking missionfailure or harm to friendly forces.

• The key to accomplishing the requiredsteps quickly enough to be effectiveagainst TSTs is to do as much of thecoordination and decisionmaking aspossible ahead of time. Successfulprosecution of TSTs requires a wellorganized and well rehearsed process forsharing sensor data and targetinginformation, identifying suitable strikeassets, obtaining mission approval, and

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rapidly deconflicting weaponemployment.

• The reaction time between the sensor andshooter can be greatly accelerated if theon-scene commander knows exactlywhat the JFC desires when timecompression precludes thoroughlycoordinating all decisions and actions.For this to occur, the JFC must articulateobjectives, guidance, priorities, and intentfor TSTs before the target is evenidentified.

• The appropriate response for each TSTis often heavily dependent on the levelof conflict, the clarity of the desiredoutcome, and ROE. For example, duringa major theater war the JFC may be ableto accept a higher level of risk to friendlyforces and noncombatants whenattacking adversary weapons of massdestruction to ensure a quicker response.But during a limited contingencyoperation, the risk of collateral damagemay require more detailed and time-consuming coordination.

2. Command and Control forTST Operations

a. Focused Operations. A critical factorin prosecuting TSTs is the requirement toconduct all the steps of the joint targetingcycle in a short time. The JFC has severaloptions with which to structure C2 operationsfor attacks against TSTs. Overallresponsibility for mission execution remainswith the components in order to affectcoordination and deconfliction tasks, and theauthority to plan and engage should bedelegated to the C2 node that has the bestinformation or situational awareness toexecute the mission and direct communications(e.g., hotlines, radio net) to the operators andcrews of the weapon systems. Placing theappropriate level of battlespace awareness atsubordinate C2 nodes can streamline the C2

cycle and allow timely engagement of thesetargets. The decentralized C2 nodes canexchange sensor, status, and target informationwith a fidelity that permits them to operate asa single, integrated C2 entity. Tied togetherby wide area networks and commoninteractive displays, they can effectivelyperform decentralized, coordinated executionof time-sensitive attacks.

b. Compressed Decision Cycle. Althoughsuccessful attack of TSTs requires thetargeting process to be significantlycompressed, the individual steps still must beexecuted. To successfully compress thetargeting cycle, the joint force and componentstaffs must be thoroughly familiar with thedetails of each step of the process and withthe specific nodes or cells in the joint forceand components responsible for each portionof the process. Time is saved by conductingdetailed prior planning and coordinationbetween joint forces, a thorough intelligencepreparation of the battlespace (IPB),employment of interoperable command,control, communications, computers, andintelligence (C4I) systems, and clear guidanceon what constitutes a TST. Undefined,ambiguous TSTs can potentially direct assetsaway from prosecuting the JFC’s overall plan.Mission planning and execution activitiesmust take place simultaneously or on acompressed time line. Targeting plays a keyrole in the commander’s decision to employattack forces; this decisionmaking process isfrequently referred to as the TST missioncycle.

• There are six steps in the time-sensitivetargeting cycle: detect, locate, identify,decide, strike, and assess (see FigureB-1). Several steps of this cycle may bepre-accomplished during the normaltargeting process. For the initial attack,the outer cycle (detect, locate, identify,decide, and strike) is used. After theinitial attack, both cycles run at the sametime and interact through analysis at the

B-3

Time-Sensitive Target Considerations

decision step. The six steps of the attackmission cycle interact continuously at thedecision stage where target analysis isperformed. The attack mission cycleworks on three assumptions.

•• There normally is direction andguidance provided by commanders foreach of the steps (detection, location,identification, decision, execution, andassessment).

•• There should normally be ISR andtarget acquisition (TA) capabilities tosupport timely target detection.

•• The time to complete one entire cyclemay vary.

• Component Integration. Thesefunctions should be performed quicklyenough for component commanders toact decisively upon the information

developed during the attack missioncycle in order to direct forces against aTST. A relatively short attack missioncycle should be integrated among allcomponents to achieve JFC objectivesagainst TSTs.

c. C2 Centers. Component commanders,through their respective C2 centers, select TSTattack assets based on several factors. Thesenormally include the location of attack assets,weather conditions, ROE, operational statusof attack assets, target ranges, the number andtype of missions in progress, munitionsavailable, the adversary air defense threat, andthe accuracy of targeting acquisition data.Components should always inform the jointheadquarters and other component LNOswhen a TST is identified and when executingTST attacks, particularly when a TST mightbe engaged quicker by another component’sassets. Components must establish timelycommunications channels to select the

Figure B-1. Time-Sensitive Targeting Process

TIME SENSITIVE TARGETING PROCESS

Detect

Locate

Identify

Assess

Strike

Decide

Target

RESTRIKERESTRIKE

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appropriate force to engage each TST.Component commanders may recommenddirect sensor-to-shooter dissemination oftargeting information to meet critical timelinesassociated with TSTs.

Refer to Paragraph 4 for TST integrationoperations.

d. Special Operations. Special operationsshould be coordinated and deconflicted withTST attacks. The primary method toaccomplish this is via liaison with establishedconventional C2 agencies. The SOLE islinked with the JAOC for interface with regardto air operations. The special operationscoordination element (SOCOORD) or specialoperations command and control element(SOCCE), if established, is linked with surfaceC2 agencies (deep operations coordinationcell (DOCC), fire support element (FSE), firesupport coordination center (FSCC),supporting arms coordination center (SACC))for ground operations. The SOLE, SOCOORD,and SOCCE have situational awareness on thelocations and activities of SOF in and outsideof the operational area. Most specialoperations can be protected by restrictive fireareas, no-fire areas or, in some instances,restricted operations zones, restricted

operations areas, or the establishment of jointspecial operations areas. Clandestine and/orcovert special operations, where publishedcontrol and coordinating measures may notbe permitted, require direct coordination anddeconfliction with friendly forces by theSOLE, SOCOORD, or SOCCE. Shouldconventional force operations put SOF at risk,the SOLE, SOCOORD, or SOCCE isnormally responsible for deconfliction and/or recommending disapproval due to thepotential for fratricide.

e. TST Information Considerations.Each component will possess the ability toview the battlespace with a multitude of ISRand TA assets (organic, joint, and national).Near real time sharing of this information mayfacilitate planning among components.Sharing TST information among componentsnormally requires a common language.Sharing this information also requires systemsthat can use this common language and cancorrelate individual component requirementsand communicate them simultaneously to allcomponents. These systems, combined withjoint force targeting procedures, facilitateeffective and efficient use of all joint forcecapabilities. The critical links between thesesystems should include a robust and dedicated

Near real time sharing of TST data among components normallyrequires a common language.

B-5


component liaison organization with qualifiedpersonnel to accomplish coordination asrequired.

3. Managing Increased RiskDuring TST Operations

The keys to responsive TST prosecution arethe commander’s guidance, pre-establishedprocedures, thorough IPB, and initial riskassessment. Particular TSTs may bedetermined to be of such risk to the force orto mission accomplishment that the JFC iswilling to accept a higher level of risk in orderto attack the target immediately upon itsdetection. In its simplest form, this may meanthe difference between announcing that atarget is about to be attacked rather thanwaiting for confirmation that all necessaryspace around the target has been positivelycleared of friendly forces or fully assessed forcollateral damage. More commonly, the riskassociated with TSTs involves the possibletrade-off of diverting acquisition and/or attackassets from another mission to that of TST.Personnel involved in the prosecution of TSTsmust have a clear understanding of the risksinvolved and balance the time required forcoordination against the danger of notengaging the target in time. Often this meansthat the commander must also be willing toaccept the increased risk of redundant attacksagainst the same target, and possible attackswith non-optimum weapons.

4. TST Integration Operations

a. In examining ways to integrate joint TSTC2 efforts, it is necessary to understand thatcurrent architectures and methods have notalways proved effective in reducing orpreventing asymmetric threats from TSTs.Developing solutions to interoperabilityproblems will normally require staffs toexplore and experiment with various optionsworking to find joint solutions rather thansingle-Service remedies.

b. A joint force requires an integratedapproach to TST C2. Because multipleorganizations — national, theater, andcomponent-level — have a need for TSTrelated planning and execution data, the goalshould be to create a mutually agreed to,comprehensive, and accurate commonoperational picture (COP). This requireseffective integration of all component TSTefforts to:

• Ensure integrated IPB, ISR, and targetingeffort;

• Expedite access to decision makers fordynamic retasking of ISR and TAsensors;

• Reduce duplication of effort amongcomponents; and

• Ensure that information is being sharedrather than being stovepiped.

c. Joint doctrine acknowledges the need forinteroperable intelligence. However,currently fielded technology limits capabilitiesin terms of developing a commonly shared,near real time IPB picture. However,integration options for TST C2 are feasiblegiven the constraints of current systems. JFCsshould task their staffs to explore these optionswith the goal of creating a more cohesive TSTeffort.

d. TST prior planning and coordinationvaries by theater depending on forcesavailable and threat capabilities. The goal ofintegration is achieved when a commonpicture of relevant TST activity is established,data flows smoothly between C2 nodes, andfewer work-arounds are required to overcomeC4I architecture interoperability problems.Different options for achieving an integratedplanning and coordination effort includecollaboration, liaison, consolidation, andcollocation.

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• TST Planning Integration ThroughCollaboration. One method forachieving TST planning integrationinvolves “virtual” collaboration. Whilecurrently fielded C4I technology haslimited virtual-sharing capabilities,advances in information technologiesmake this option increasingly possibleand will normally improve intelligence,operations, and planning staff workloaddistribution. Virtual collaboration canallow all components to share datasimultaneously and keep the TST-relevant COP current. There are a varietyof possible techniques for improvingTST coordination and synchronizationusing existing systems. These caninclude but are not limited to videoteleconferencing; command, control,communications, computers, intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance systemsdedicated collaborative tools; internet-based virtual environment utilities; directhotlines; and dedicated sensor-to-shooterarchitectures.

• TST Integration Through Liaison.The most common means of coping withTST integration among components isthrough the use of direct communications

(e.g., hotlines, radio nets) and liaisonelements. When communication linksare limited or are not fully interoperable,LNOs can be critical. LNOs provideface-to-face coordination that canalleviate problems of miscommunicationand LNOs lend expertise in terms ofdeveloping a joint attack strategy and asingle TST COP. Each component LNOprovides Service-specific expertise,systems knowledge and, in some cases,additional collection support via organicISR and TA capabilities. They can alsoprovide connectivity between Servicecomponents that facilitates a cross-flowof time-sensitive information and canshorten response time.

• TST Planning Integration ThroughConsolidation and Collocation.Consolidating JFC prior planning andcoordination efforts may offer theopportunity for follow-on efficient andsafe execution of TST attacks by thecomponents. The JFC may considercollocation of component TST planningelements. While collocation can bebeneficial for a joint force from aplanning perspective, it may not alwaysbe physically feasible, given the

Once TSTs are detected, responsiveness is critical to ensure thatopportunities are not lost.

B-7


component forces assigned or attachedto a JFC within a theater and/or JOA.

5. Enhancements for ProcessingTSTs

a. Although targeting is a continuous,cyclic process, the cycle for one routinepreplanned target may take hours or evendays. Successful prosecution of a TSTrequires that this cycle be completed in amatter of minutes. To achieve this timecompression, the JFC may considerimplementing focused procedures that enablethe phases of the targeting cycle to beperformed simultaneously rather thansequentially. The joint force and componentshave numerous options to enhance theprocess.

• Preplanned target reference methods suchas kill boxes and bullseyes expedite theclearance and deconfliction process.

For more information, see Appendix D,“Common Reference Systems: Area andPoint.”

• Pre-positioned acquisition and strikesystems ensure rapid response to TSTs.Using IPB to determine the mostprobable areas where TSTs will emerge,acquisition and strike assets can be mosteffectively scheduled and positioned.

• Organizational enhancements areachieved by process streamlining and/ororganizational change. Coordination andsynchronization of TST operations areexpedited by streamlining TSTprocedures within each organization,connecting specific TST prosecutionnodes within the command into a virtualcell, collocating specific TST-relatedfunctional assets, or by a combination ofthese options.

• Communications enhancements for TSToperations include direct, dedicated, andredundant real-time links between TSTcell nodes. These communicationsmeans may be as basic as dedicatedtelephone lines between specific nodesor as elaborate as collaborative softwareand video teleconferencing linking TSTnodes into a single, virtual organization.

b. A significant benefit of theseenhancements is reduction in risk to the force.Since TSTs will be prosecuted moreefficiently and expeditiously, the probabilityof the TST inflicting damage on the force isreduced. Additionally, conducting the phasesof the targeting cycle concurrently by meansof enhanced communications andcollaborative tools provides proportionallymore time in the shortened process to ensurenecessary coordination and deconfliction.

6. Fire Support and AirspaceCoordinating Measures

Common coordinating measures employedby JFCs to facilitate effective joint operationsand expedite attacks against TSTs includeboundaries, FSCMs, and airspace controlmeasures (ACMs).

For additional information on FSCMs andACMs, see JP 3-0, Doctrine for JointOperations, JP 3-03, Doctrine for JointInterdiction Operations, JP 3-09, Doctrine forJoint Fire Support, and JP 3-56.1, Commandand Control for Joint Air Operations.

7. Considerations for Attack ofTSTs

a. Generally, a wide range of joint forcecapabilities, both lethal and nonlethal, aresuitable for attacking TSTs. Some, but notall of these may include fixed- and rotary-wingaircraft, Army Tactical Missile System

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(ATACMS), Multiple Launch Rocket System(MLRS), conventional artillery, conventionalair-launched cruise missiles, Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAMs), naval surface firesupport, computer network attack, electronicwarfare, and SOF. The JFC’s guidanceregarding the selection of assets for attackingTSTs, may be significantly influenced byfactors such as availability of a weapon systemor capability, engagement characteristics of aweapon system, weather conditions, andROE.

b. If forces within the theater and/or JOAare not significantly weighted towards oneweapon system and/or capability or the other,the JFC should consider procedures that allowmaximum flexibility in the attack of TSTs afterconsidering all joint force options. Proceduresshould allow for rapid hand over of themission tasking to another component formission execution if one component cannotattack a TST due to a constraint such asreloading, weather, or range limitations.

c. Selection of the best TST asset (such asfixed-wing, ATACMS, TLAM, etc.) beginsduring the capabilities analysis and taskingphase and continues through the missionplanning phase. Individual componentcommanders provide recommendations to theJFC highlighting the pros and cons of theiravailable weapon systems and/or capabilitiesbased upon the current situation. The JFCalso provides guidance to componentcommanders to allow them the flexibility tomake an effective selection decision foremploying the “best capable” attack asset.Component commanders may use an attackguidance matrix for this purpose, as it offersprimary and alternate weapon selectionoptions, thereby expediting executiondecisions. Determination of “best capable”normally requires the assessment of sixfactors.

• Deconfliction. Force deconfliction iscritical to prevent loss of life orunnecessary expenditure of joint forceassets. The flight path of missiles couldconflict with friendly forces transiting thearea. If a TST is attacked by multipleweapons and/or capabilities, it should bethe result of a well crafted plan, notmultiple concurrent engagements byuncoordinated elements of the joint force.

• Effectiveness. Depending on the desiredeffects, the appropriate weapons and/orcapabilities should be selected. SomeTST attack assets may be highly effectivein destroying unhardened TSTs (such asTLAM or ATACMS). Destruction ofhardened TSTs may require other attackassets such as aircraft-delivered,precision-guided munitions, or SOF

JFC’s guidance to components allows flexibilityin selection of TST-capable attack options.

B-9


direct action. Additionally, IOcapabilities may be uniquely suited toaffect a TST.

• Weapon and/or CapabilityResponsiveness. Once TSTs aredetected, responsiveness is critical toensure that the attack opportunities arenot lost. Responsiveness can bemeasured in the elapsed time requiredfrom receipt of an execution order toweapons impact or effects. Responsivenessis also measured by whether or not thechosen weapon system and/or capabilitycan operate under current environmentalconditions.

• Range. Selected weapon systems mustpossess the range capability to attack.

• Accuracy. The weapon system shouldbe able to attack the target accurately.Successful attacks on moving targetsrequire accurate predicted locations. Endgame accuracy may be accomplished bythe weapons system’s technical ability torefine the search for moving targets, ifrequired, or by the weapons systems area

coverage submunitions that maycompensate for anticipated targetmovement. Circular error of probabilitymay not be an appropriate measure ofaccuracy against a mobile target.

• Threat. TSTs may be identified andlocated in heavily defended areas.

•• The existence of a significant airdefense threat may obviate the use ofmanned nonstealth fixed-wing aircraft,rotary-wing aircraft, and cruise missilesas strike assets. The employment of navalguns, artillery, rockets, guided missiles,or stealth aircraft may be required toachieve an acceptable level of risk. Ifair-delivered munitions must beemployed against such heavily defendedTSTs, suppression of enemy air defense(SEAD) or electronic attack capabilitiesmay be required.

•• The existence of a significant air,ground, or naval threat may limit optionsfor insertion or in-place operations ofSOF.

The component commanders’ weapon systems or other capabilities mustpossess the responsiveness, range, and accuracy to effectively attack TSTs.

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8. Weapon SystemConsiderations forAttack of TSTs

Components of the joint force, andsupporting DOD agencies, have numerousorganizations and systems that provideflexible capabilities in detecting, tracking,attacking, and assessing TSTs. All systemsand their capabilities should be consideredalthough certain systems will possess obviousadvantages in particular scenarios.

A more detailed discussion of theseorganizations and systems can be found in JP3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, JP 3-33,Joint Force Capabilities, and JP 3-55, JointDoctrine for Intelligence, Surveillance,Reconnaissance, and Target Acquisition.

a. Surface-to-Surface Systems.

• The MLRS and cannon artillery areusually the most numerous TST-capablesystems in the battlespace. They providenear immediate response times, 24-houravailability, and all-weather capability.Cannons offer both precision and non-precision response, as well as highvolume and a variety of munitions.However, their limited firing rangesmake them most suitable for TSTslocated in the general area between thefire support coordination line and theforward line of their own troops.

• ATACMS possesses the responsivenessof MLRS, but with a much greater range.Although the ATACMS warhead isdesigned for attack of soft targets, itsaccuracy and all-weather capability,coupled with the extended range andquick response time, make it a formidablesystem against TSTs. The high angle oflaunch and impact, along with a very highaltitude flight path, does not require largeamounts of airspace to be deconflictedprior to firing. However, since the missile

cannot be redirected after launch, it isdifficult to employ against movingtargets.

• Naval surface fire support provides theadvantages of responsive, all-weather,and mobile gun and missile support.However, it is relatively short ranged,limited in number, and restricted to usein the littoral area when attacking land-based targets. Navy surface vessels alsohave the capability to jam shore-basedtargets.

b. Cruise Missiles. The long range andaccuracy of cruise missiles make them anexcellent weapon for use against targets inhigh threat areas, but the lead time requiredto plan and execute cruise missile missionscould be a limiting factor against TSTs.

c. Manned Aircraft. Due to their range,speed, and flexible weapon selection, mannedaircraft are well-suited to attack TSTs.Because the aircrew can provide “eyes on”during the attack, manned aircraft are ofparticular advantage when attacking mobiletargets or when exact target coordinates areunavailable. However, a permissive threatenvironment or SEAD may be required toavoid unacceptable risks to aircraft andaircrews. Rapid deconfliction of airspace canbe a challenge in a congested environment.Manned aircraft possess both day and nightcapability, but are weather-dependent.

• Fixed-Wing Aircraft. The ability offixed-wing aircraft to move longdistances in relatively short times, alongwith their component coordination andcontrol capabilities, provides the forcewith the flexibility to quickly massthroughout the battlespace. Weaponpayloads (to include nonlethal systemssuch as jammers) can be adjusted to suitthe mission, and with air-refueling theyare capable of extended loiter times. Ifneeded, these assets can be quickly

B-11


diverted in-flight to a new target as longas suitable communications links areavailable.

• Rotary-Wing Aircraft. Attackhelicopters provide excellent accuracyand the capability to search for and attacktargets. They feature an array of weaponsbut have relatively short range ifextensive loiter or search and attackoperations are called for. They are day-and night-capable, but are morevulnerable to adversary tactical airdefenses due to low altitude andrelatively slow speed. However, due totheir capability of slower, low-altitudeflight, rotary-wing aircraft can oftenoperate in poorer weather conditions thanfixed-wing aircraft.

d. SOF. SOF’s primary contributionagainst TSTs is clandestine and/or covertreconnaissance, surveillance, and terminalguidance and control of weapons systems. Ifrequired, SOF can be employed to destroy ordisable a TST, but if not planned for well inadvance of the operation, this maycompromise their primary mission and requireextraction of the team.

e. Sensors. Various sensor platforms, bothmanned and unmanned, provide to thewarfighter the capability of detecting,identifying, and tracking TSTs, as well asproviding combat assessment after an attack.These sensors are most effective when cross-cued and linked to provide multiple sourcesand types of information.

• Manned airborne sensors allow flexibleoptions and detailed informationgathering both in their ability to beredirected and their array of sensors. Alimiting consideration in theiremployment is their vulnerability in ahigh threat environment.

• Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) havemany of the same benefits as mannedairborne sensors without risking humanlife. This makes them an excellent assetto provide surveillance of heavilydefended areas. They are readilyredirected if required, possess long loitertimes, and provide real-time feedback.UAV sensor packages can be degradedby adverse weather. UAV operations arevery sensitive to icing and lower levelwinds. Coordination must take placebetween planning and weather personnelto prevent loss of a UAV due to weatherconditions.

• Space-based sensors provide long-term,large area surveillance with excellentresolution and with minimal vulnerabilityto adversary actions. Depending on orbitand positioning, they may suffer gaps insurveillance periods and may be difficultto shift to a new surveillance area. Somesensors may be degraded by adverseatmospheric weather conditions. By itsnature, satellite coverage schedules arepredictable and the adversary can adjustactivities to avoid detection. Also, theresponsiveness of information fromspace-based assets may not meet thetimelines of time-sensitive targeting.

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JP 3-60

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX CINTEGRATING COMPONENT TARGETING PROCESSES

C-1

1. Joint Targeting Process:Input to Joint OperationsPlanning and Execution

a. Joint targeting is a tailored applicationof the basic estimate process that supports jointoperations planning and execution (see FigureC-1).

b. Once targeting is understood to be anapplication of the decisionmaking processtailored to coordinate, plan, and execute joint

operations, it becomes obvious thatindividual components and staff sectionswill further tailor the decisionmakingprocess to meet their more detailed,specialized needs. This maximizes theeffectiveness of the joint force. As the myriadprocesses, sub-processes, and cyclesassociated with joint targeting areencountered, commanders should keep inmind that each has been developed over timeto allow a particular joint force function to beaccomplished as efficiently as possible. Each

Figure C-1. Joint Targeting: Input to Joint Operations Planning and Execution

JOINT TARGETING: INPUT TO JOINTOPERATIONS PLANNING AND EXECUTION

ESTIMATE PROCESSESTIMATE PROCESS

OBJECTIVES ANDGUIDANCE

FORMULATION

THREAT MODELING

PLANNING AND STRATEGYDEVELOPMENT

EXECUTION

Identify Interests

Define End State

Commander’s Intent

Identify Enemy Intent

Define Courses of Action

Joint IPB

Target Systems Analysis

Target Value Analysis

Wargaming

Capabilities Assessment/Weaponeering

Force Structuring/Apportionment/Organizing for Combat/Force Application

Dissemination of Plans/Orders

Execute Scheme of Maneuver, MAAP,SOF Plan of Execution

DETECT (Execution of Collection Plan)

DELIVER against identified HPTs or TSTs

ASSESSMENT

Strike Reporting

Effects Analysis

HPT

IPB

MAAP

SOF

TST

High-Payoff Target

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

Master Air Attack Plan

Special Operations Forces

Time-Sensitive Target

C-2

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fits into the overall accomplishment of theJFC’s targeting efforts.

c. Component commanders attacktargets within the joint targeting processand identify targets critical to theiroperations. They are instrumental in assistingthe JFC in formulating guidance, controllingmany of the collection assets, executingoperations against targets, and providingfeedback as part of combat assessment. Thesefunctions remain constant regardless of jointforce component (functional or Service).Coordination and communication betweencomponents are especially critical in regardto TSTs.

2. Four-Phase TargetingProcess: Land and MaritimeComponents

a. Land and maritime force commandersnormally use an interrelated process toenhance joint fire support planning andinterface with the joint targeting processknown as the decide, detect, deliver, andassess (D3A) methodology. D3A incorporatesthe same fundamental functions of the jointtarget process. The D3A methodology

facilitates synchronizing maneuver,intelligence, and fire support (see Figure C-2).

For additional information see JP 3-09,Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.

b. Through IPB, the commander builds apicture of the adversary, or threat model.This threat model includes an order of battle,situation map (or COP), and other products.Through these efforts, the commanderidentifies what threat capabilities theadversary may possess.

c. The commander decides upon a schemeof maneuver, organizes available collectionand fire support assets, and promulgatescommand guidance. Upon execution of thecollections plan, ISR assets detect HPTs andfiring units deliver fires on them in accordancewith the commander’s guidance. CAreporting allows the staff to continually assessadversary and friendly capabilities.

• In the decide phase, target categoriesare identified for engagement. Firesupport, intelligence, and operationspersonnel decide what targets to look for,where the targets can be found on the

Component coordination and communication are especially critical for TSTs.

C-3

Integrating Component Targeting Processes

battlefield, who can locate those targets,and how the targets should be attackedbased on the commander’s intent and thedesired end state. Together, theydetermine the available assets to beallocated and additional assets required.They also identify channels needed toprovide acquisition information on a real-time basis.

• The detect phase is designed to acquirethe targets selected in the decide phase.In this phase, target acquisition assets andagencies execute the intelligencecollection plan and focus on specificareas of interest. Targets must bemonitored after detection (especiallymobile targets). Tracking is an essentialelement of the detect function. Trackingpriorities are based on the commander’sconcept of the operation and targetingpriorities. Detection and tracking areexecuted through use of a collection plan.

However, not all targets can be trackedconstantly due to limited resources.

• The deliver phase involves attackingspecific targets in accordance with thecommander’s guidance.

• The assess phase is the estimate ofdamage resulting from the use ofmilitary force, either lethal or nonlethal,against a target. Assessment requiresextensive coordination betweenoperational and intelligence elements tobe effective, timely, and accurate. A keyelement of the assess function is to decidewhether or not the target requires reattackin order to achieve results specified bythe commander.

d. The commander and staff use adeliberate decisionmaking process to arriveat and to execute tactical decisions. Thedecisionmaking process is designed to direct

Figure C-2. Four-Phase Land and Maritime Targeting Process

FOUR PHASE LAND ANDMARITIME TARGETING PROCESS

DECIDE

DELIVER

DETECTASSESS

DECIDE, DETECT, DELIVER, AND ASSESS

C-4

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staff functions to produce a coordinatedOPLAN or operation order (OPORD) toachieve the mission in accordance with thecommander’s concept of the operation, intent,and scheme of maneuver. Fire supportplanning within the decisionmaking processincludes the decide phase in the four-phasesurface targeting cycle. The six steps in thedecisionmaking process are: missionanalysis; planning guidance; COAdevelopment; wargame and COA analysis;COA selection and commander’s estimate;and plan development and approval.

• Mission Analysis. Upon receiving themission, the commander conducts amission analysis. The fire supportcoordinator (FSCOORD) doespreliminary analysis of the fire supportmission by identifying factors pertainingto fire support.

• Planning Guidance. Once thecommander has completed the missionanalysis, the mission is restated andplanning guidance is issued to the stafffor their consideration when preparingindividual staff estimates. TheFSCOORD groups the commander’sperceptions of the most dangerous typesof targets as close support, counterfire,interdiction, SEAD, offensive counterair,etc.

• Course of Action Development. Whilethe commander develops tentativeCOAs, the FSCOORD and the staffcontinues collecting information that willaffect the provision of fire support. Akey source of information at this point isfrom the situation development processconducted using IPB.

• Wargame and COA Analysis.Proposed COAs are analyzed forfeasibility in order to make arecommendation to the commander. Inthe course of analysis, COAs become

more refined. Additionally, target valueanalysis conducted during this stepyields HVTs and, ultimately, HPTs.

• COA Selection and Commander’sEstimate. After the analysis, theoperations, intelligence, and FSCOORDcompare the advantages and disadvantagesof each COA to determine whichpromises to be most successful. Theresult of this consideration is arecommendation to the commander to beused as a basis for deciding thecommander’s concept of the operation.To better explain the COA to thecommander, the fire support conceptmust be developed sufficiently enoughto address (at a minimum) the allocationof fire support resources, fire support

Land and maritime components normally useD3A, a four-phase process, to enhance joint firesupport planning and interface with the jointtargeting process.

C-5


organization for combat, C2 relationships,and priorities of effort.

• Plan Development and Approval. TheFSCOORD expands the fire supportconcept and prepares the fire support planin detail. Key elements are summarizedin the execution paragraph of theOPORD.

3. Six-Phase Air TargetingProcess: Air Components

a. The JFACC normally uses aninterrelated process to enhance joint airtasking and planning and to interface with thejoint targeting processes known as the six-phase air targeting process (see Figure C-3).An effective and efficient target developmentprocess and air tasking cycle are essential toplan and execute joint air operations. Thissix-phase air targeting process incorporatesthe same fundamental functions of the joint

target process and facilitates integration oftargeting into the joint air tasking cycle. Eachphase in the air tasking cycle is directly linkedto each corresponding step in the overall airtargeting process. The joint air tasking cycleapplies targeting to air-specific operationsover a very compressed and cyclical timeframe.

For additional information see JP 3-01, JointDoctrine for Countering Air and MissileThreats, JP 3-03, Doctrine for JointInterdiction Operations, and JP 3-56.1,Command and Control for Joint AirOperations.

b. The commander promulgates objectivesand guidance, which focuses the targetdevelopment efforts. Once targets areselected for attack, the most effective weapon(lethal or nonlethal) is recommended for eachtarget during weaponeering. During forceapplication, a target’s overall priority and

Figure C-3. Six-Phase Air Targeting Process

SIX PHASE AIR TARGETING PROCESS

TARGETING PROCESS: AIR COMPONENTS

Objectives andGuidance

TargetDevelopment

CombatAssessment

ExecutionPlanning and Force

ExecutionWeaponeering

ForceApplication

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JP 3-60

geographical location are considered when adelivery platform is mated to the weapon andthe target. These delivery platforms are then‘packaged’ with other delivery platforms bylocation and time in order to make the mosteffective use of limited escort (jamming,defensive counterair, SEAD) assets. Themissions are planned and subsequentlyexecuted through execution planning andforce execution. Reporting the results of theattacks and subsequent analysis is coordinatedvia combat assessment. This ongoingassessment allows for timely updates to targetdevelopment products (updating the threatmodel) and for review of objectives andguidance.

• The objectives and guidance phaseestablishes or clarifies the goals fordirecting air targeting in a form that isunderstandable, requires action, isattainable, and provides measurablecriteria to assess effectiveness.

• The target development phase examinespotential adversary military, political, oreconomic target systems to identifysubcomponents or elements andinterrelationships. Target value analysisestablishes criticality of a target or targetsystem in order to select candidateaimpoints that should be attacked toachieve desired effects and accomplishesthe defined objectives. Targetdevelopment also assesses collateraldamage considerations and LOAC andROE limitations. Collection managementrequirements and target materialsproduction are derivatives of the targetdevelopment phase.

• The weaponeering phase determines thequantity of a specific type of lethal ornonlethal weapon required to achieve aspecific level of damage to a given target.Collateral damage risks are alsoevaluated in this step.

• The force application phase matches theoptimal weapon system to the specificaimpoint. Tradeoffs such as anticipatedsuccess in reaching the target, soundtactics, and collateral damage limitationsare balanced among all available aircapabilities.

• The execution planning and forceexecution phase prepares input for andsupports the construction of missions forair sorties and weapon systems within theair tasking cycle. Input includes targetidentification, description, and precisionlocation data.

• The CA phase conducts post-strikecollection, analysis, and reporting ofinformation on sorties and weaponsystem effectiveness. Post-strikeassessment measures objectiveachievement and, as necessary, supportsobjective refinement, reattackrecommendations, or new targetdevelopment requirements. CA evaluatescombat operations effectiveness inachieving objectives and recommendschanges to tactics, strategies, objectives,and guidance. It accomplishes this viathree sub-components: BDA, MEA,and future targeting and reattackrecommendations. CA compares theresults of the operation to the objectivesto determine mission success or failurewithin the guidance parameters. Moreimportant than a review, it looks forwardto determine if additional missions areneeded and/or if modification to theobjectives are necessary.

4. Joint Air Tasking Cycle andJoint ATO Phases

a. A joint air tasking cycle is used toprovide for the efficient and effectiveemployment of the available joint aircapabilities. The cycle provides a repetitive

C-7


process for the planning, coordination,allocation, and tasking of joint air missions,within the guidance of the JFC. Itaccommodates changing tactical situationsand JFC guidance, as well as requests forsupport from other component commanders.It is important to note that a timely joint ATOis critical, as other joint force componentsconduct their planning and operations basedon a prompt, executable joint ATO, and theyare dependent on its information. There areusually three joint ATOs at any given time:the joint ATO in execution (today’s plan), thejoint ATO in production (tomorrow’s plan),

and the joint ATO in planning (the followingday’s plan). The joint air tasking cycle beginswith the JFC’s air apportionment process andculminates with the CA of previous missions(see Figure C-4).

b. The joint ATO phases are related to thetargeting cycle. The approach is the same; asystematic process that matches availablecapabilities with targets to achieve operationalobjectives. However, the number of ATOphases may vary based on theater andcontingency requirements.

Figure C-4. Joint Air Tasking Cycle

JOINT AIR TASKING CYCLE

AIR TASKING CYCLE

123

456

JFC andComponent

Coordination

JFC Guidance

JIPTL

MAAP

MAAPSPINS

Master Air Attack PlanSpecial Instructions

Joint ATO and/or SPINS

Resulting Effects

Recommendations

TargetDevelopment

ForceExecution

CombatAssessment

Weaponeeringand

Allocation

Joint ATODevelopment

ATOJFCJIPTL

Air Tasking OrderJoint Force CommanderJoint Integrated Prioritized Target List

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• Phase 1 is JFACC guidance. TheJFACC provides the combat plans (orequivalent) division with broad guidancebased on the JFC’s priorities andguidance, coordination with othercomponent commanders, and theJFACC’s own objectives. This isnormally transmitted in a commander’sintent statement and guides the planningfor the duration of that ATO cycle. If aJFACC is not used, this process will beconducted for each Service componentperforming air operations.

• Phase 2 is target development. Thespecific objectives received during Phase1 are used to focus target development.Targets are nominated to support theobjectives and priorities provided by theJFC. In accordance with the JFC’sobjectives and component targetingrequirements, the JFACC (or Servicecomponent commander if a JFACC is notused) conducts daily joint air planningfor the employment of availablecapabilities and/or forces. The endproduct of the target development phaseis the draft JIPTL that supports theobjectives and conforms to guidance.

• Phase 3 is the weaponeering and/orallocation phase. The targetingpersonnel quantify the expected resultsof lethal and nonlethal weaponsemployment against prioritized targets.The JIPTL constructed during theprevious phase, provides the basis forweaponeering assessment activities. Thefinal prioritized targets are then includedinto the master air attack plan (MAAP).The resulting MAAP is the plan ofemployment that forms the foundationof the joint ATO.

• Phase 4 is joint ATO development.After the MAAP is approved by theJFACC, detailed preparations continueby the Combat Plans Division on the joint

ATO, special instructions, and theairspace control order. The airspacecontrol authority’s and area air defensecommander’s instructions must beprovided in sufficient detail to allowcomponents to plan and execute allmissions tasked in the joint ATO. TheJAOC reviews each air capablecomponent’s allocation decision and/orair allocation request message andprepares a sortie allotment message backto the components as required, inaccordance with the establishedOPLAN’s guidelines.

• Phase 5 is force execution. The JFACC(or Service component commander if aJFACC is not used) directs the executionof or deconflicts all capabilities or forcesmade available for a given joint ATO.The JFACC has the authority to redirect

The joint air tasking cycle applies targeting toair-specific operations.

C-9


those forces for which the JFAAC hasoperational or tactical control. For allothers, the affected componentcommander must approve all requests forredirection of direct support air assets.Affected component commanders will benotified by the JFACC upon redirectionof joint sorties previously allocated in thejoint ATO for support of componentoperations. Aircraft or other capabilitiesor forces not apportioned for tasking, butincluded in the joint ATO forcoordination purposes, will be redirectedonly with the approval of the respectivecomponent commander or designatedsenior JAOC liaison officer. Componentsexecute the joint ATO as tasked andrecommend changes to the JAOC asappropriate, given emerging JFC andcomponent requirements.

• Phase 6 is combat assessment. CA isconducted at all levels of the joint force.The JFC should establish a dynamicsystem, including a CA cell, to supportCA for all components. Normally, thejoint force operations officer will beresponsible for coordinating CA, assistedby the joint force intelligence officer. TheCA cell evaluates combat operationseffectiveness to achieve commandobjectives.

5. Special OperationsComponent Targeting

Special operations targeting and missionplanning are interrelated functions andprocesses. For SOF, neither is accomplishedin isolation of the other. The targeting processsupports planning by providing commandersand planners with a methodology, directaccess, and detailed information concerningtargets as expressed within the commander’sobjectives, guidance, and intent. Specialoperations targeting is accomplished in bothdeliberate planning and crisis action planning.It is founded in joint targeting principles but

has many unique and SOF-specific productsand processes.

For additional information, see JP 3-05.2,Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures forSpecial Operations Targeting and MissionPlanning Procedures.

6. Integration of InformationOperations in Joint Targeting

a. IO involve actions taken to affectadversary information and informationsystems while defending friendly informationand information systems. IW is IO conductedduring crisis or conflict. IO is divided intooffensive and defensive efforts and isaccomplished through the integration ofvarious capabilities (such as electronic warfare[EW], operations security, psychologicaloperations [PSYOP], military deception,computer network attack, and physicaldestruction) and related activities (publicaffairs and civil affairs). IO can beaccomplished across the range of militaryoperations and may be conducted at all levelsfrom strategic-national through tactical. IOplanners consider all instruments of theadversary’s national power to determine howbest to achieve stated objectives by affectinginformation and information systems. Sincedestruction is an option that may be used toaffect adversary information systems,successful integration of IO considerationsinto the targeting process is fundamental tothe success of the campaign. An IO plan maycall for “targeting” adversary human decisionprocesses (human factors), information, andinformation systems used to supportdecisionmaking or adversary morale with avariety of lethal and nonlethal means. Theselection of offensive IO objectives should beconsistent with national objectives andapplicable international conventions andROE.

b. The JFC IO cell is another source fortarget requirements and should, therefore, be

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JP 3-60

closely integrated within the joint targetingprocess in order to deconflict redundanttargeting, consider intelligence gain versusloss assessments, and provide inputs to therestricted and no-strike target lists. IOplanners will coordinate and integrate IW atall levels. Most destructive IO attacks qualifyas interdiction or strategic attack, and airapportionment decisions should take intoconsideration prospective IO targetnominations.

For further information see JP 3-13, JointDoctrine for Information Operations.

7. Joint Targeting ProcessWithin Deliberate and CrisisAction Planning

Deliberate planning and crisis actionplanning are the mechanisms with which aJFC translates national military objectives intoa viable COA that is supported by detailedplanning. This is the context within whichthe joint targeting process occurs. Despite theoutward differences, deliberate and crisisaction planning are essentially the sameprocesses completed under differentcircumstances. The joint targeting processremains the same within these processes, withshifting emphasis based upon the situation.

For further information see JP 3-33, JointForce Capabilities, and JP 5-0, Doctrine forPlanning Joint Operations.

8. Targeting Integration viaJoint and ComponentOperations Centers

The JOC and/or component commandcenters plan for and conduct operations.Targeting mechanisms should exist at multiplelevels. Joint force components identifyrequirements, nominate targets that are outsidetheir boundaries or exceed the capabilities oforganic or supporting assets (based on theJFC’s apportionment decision), and conduct

execution planning. After the JFC makes thetargeting and apportionment decisions,components plan and execute assignedmissions. The theater air ground system isnormally the C2 architecture through whichtargeting should be integrated. Joint airoperations are normally directed from aJAOC. The JAOC may either be an Air Forceair operations center, Marine air-ground taskforce aviation combat element tactical aircommand center, or a Navy forces (NAVFOR)tactical air control center. Land operationsare normally directed through an operationscenter, such as the Army forces (ARFOR)tactical operations center or Marine Corpsforces (MARFOR) combat operations center.Other key ARFOR agencies for groundoperations are the FSE, and DOCC. Otherkey MARFOR agencies include the force firescoordination center, the ground combatelement, FSCC, and tactical air control center.The NAVFOR supports land and navaloperations with the SACC. Key SOF agenciescan include the SOCCE, the SOCOORD, theSOLE, and the naval special warfare task unit.

For additional information see JP 3-09,Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, JP 3-56.1,Command and Control for Joint AirOperations, and JP 3-05, Doctrine for JointSpecial Operations.

9. Monitoring andCoordinating TargetExecution

a. Target Awareness. Operation centerdirectors, located at JOC and/or componentcommand centers, monitoring the executionof current operations should maintain situationawareness of planned, executed, and emerging(especially time-sensitive) targets.

• Starting with the current OPORD and theJIPTL, operation center directors mustalso have a good knowledge of eachtarget, its importance, when it isscheduled for attack, and the desired

C-11


outcome. Operation center directorsshould normally have a good idea oftarget vulnerabilities and susceptibility tovarious joint force capabilities.

• The knowledge required above enablesoperation center directors to betterunderstand the significance of a reportindicating that an attack on a particulartarget has been unsuccessful or of a reportof a newly located priority target such asa theater ballistic missile. In thissituation, operation center directorsshould be able to make recommendationsto commanders on whether to put a targeton the current OPORD at the expense ofanother one already scheduled for attack.Decisions to modify missions or directattacks that deviate from the OPORDshould be based on the commander’sguidance, the theater strategy, and thecampaign objectives to be accomplished.These decisions normally can only bemade with an understanding of prioritiesof each component’s targeting effortsthroughout the campaign.

b. Emerging Targets. Operation centerdirectors should know what forces areavailable, as well as their capabilities to attackan emerging target (e.g., on-call, immediate,or TSTs). This knowledge requires detailedinformation regarding the various forcesavailable for employment. It also requires anunderstanding of joint fires and how the jointfire support and joint air operations areintegrated. As shortfalls develop, componentcommanders normally prioritize the weightof effort, reconsider the adequacy of theconcept of operations or, if the new target ormission is of sufficient priority, request ordirect diversion of committed assets. Duringthe process outlined above, the commandersnormally depend upon the operation centerdirectors to provide recommendations as tothe most appropriate force and/or weapon aswell as the best targets to divert. For example,when the current operations center becomes

aware of a newly located tactical surface-to-air threat in the vicinity of a CAS mission,the operation center directors may determinethat an available ATACMS is the mosteffective and responsive asset to engage thattarget. To provide these inputs to thecommanders, the operation center directorsmust be familiar with weapons effects andspecific weapons support requirements.

• Weapons System Capabilities.Operation center directors monitoringongoing operations normally select thebest available joint force capability toapply against emerging targets.Operation center directors must also havean understanding of the weaponscapabilities of all joint force components,to include nonlethal assets (i.e., EW, IW,PSYOP, etc.). Operation center directorsnormally should understand thecapabilities of delivery platforms. Forexample, the B-52 may be the mostcapable aerial platform for deliveringland and sea mines, while the TLAM maybe the best weapon for attacking earlywarning sites.

• Support Requirements. In addition toknowing what constitutes the bestavailable weapons to apply against anemerging target, operation centerdirectors should appreciate the supportrequirements to deliver the fires of choiceon the target. Support requirementsinclude not only such joint forcecapabilities as SEAD and refueling, butalso how much time is required to changea direct fire mission or ordnance load.

c. Targeting in a Dynamic Environment.In order to maintain a current picture of adynamic battlespace, operations centerdirectors should normally have access to aCOP. Such awareness includes the locationof friendly forces, boundaries, variouscoordination lines, engagement zones, targetlocations, current threats, and all restricted and

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JP 3-60

prohibited areas (whether based upon ROE,legal considerations, or other restrictions).Operation center directors should normallyunderstand the relationship among the varioustargets and attack objectives.

• Effect on Operations. Beforerecommending what assets to divertagainst an emerging target, operationcenter directors should normallycomprehend what effect the change willhave on the ongoing operation. Forexample, a particular bridge may notseem as important as a strategiccommand, control, and communications(C3) site. However, if that bridge is theonly way for an adversary force tocounterattack a friendly combat unit’sflank, then diverting an attack from thebridge to the strategic C3 site may be thewrong decision. Additionally, if theobjective requires three electric powersites to be simultaneously neutralized,then diverting weapons from one site

may well render the attacks on theremaining sites useless.

• Required Coordination. If a weaponsplatform is diverted from a target,operation center directors should informthe target planners so they can nominatethe target back on the JIPTL if stillrequired.

• In this situation, intelligence collectionoperations management should also benotified so a collection mission is notwasted, and so appropriate ISR assets canbe coordinated to collect BDA on the newtarget to determine whether a reattack isrequired.

• Deconfliction. Operation centerdirectors must ensure that properdeconfliction is performed to minimizethe potential for fratricide or duplicationof effort.

APPENDIX DCOMMON REFERENCE SYSTEMS: AREA AND POINT

D-1

1. Common Reference Systems

Common reference systems provide auniversal, joint perspective with which todefine specific areas of the battlespace,enabling the commanders to efficientlycoordinate, deconflict, integrate, andsynchronize attacks. A common referencesystem is especially useful when used tocoordinate mutually accessible areas of attackand to rapidly deconflict attack operations.Common reference systems result in rapid,deconflicted attacks, enhanced probability ofmission success, and reduced potential forduplication of effort and fratricide. Also, theyallow for rapid coordination of jointengagement and the employment of combinedarms. They are flexible enough to be used fora variety of other purposes, such asgeographically identifying search andsurveillance areas, identification of restrictedzones, designation of high threat areas (suchas enemy surface-to-air missile batterylocations), and reference points navigation,deconfliction, and target guidance. Theprimary purpose of a common system is toprovide an integrated common frame ofreference for joint force situationalawareness to facilitate attack coordination,deconf l ic t ion, integrat ion, andsynchronization. There are two generalcategories of theater-established commonreference systems: area and point.

2. Area Reference Systems

An area reference system provides a three-dimensional reference, enabling timely andeffective coordination and control andfacilitates rapid attacks throughout thedesignated JOA. Once identified, these areasmay integrate control and coordinatingmeasures (in particular FSCMs and ACMs),thereby enabling unhampered precision attack

and flexibility of weapon system employment.Theater-level area reference systems are oftendescribed as “grid references,” “kill boxes”or, in the case of Operation ALLIED FORCE,“engagement zones.” Surface units havehistorically employed kill boxes andengagement zones to focus combat power, butthese tactical-level area references do notprovide the accompanying FSCMs or ACMs.Tactical-level area references require furthercoordination to ensure that adequate FSCMsand ACMs are in place. Theater-level killboxes (employed as a common area referencesystem) often combine FSCMs with ACMsas a single coordination and control measure.This combination of fire support and airspacecoordination enables the use of these areareference systems to be a reactive, timely, andsimple tool for joint force employment andcomponent integration. Missions that mightutilize an area reference include counterfire,air interdiction, combat search and rescue(CSAR), close air support, and theater missiledefense. Theater established area referencesystems often compliment normal airspaceand fire support coordination measures.

a. Area Reference System Development.

• Area Reference System Dimensions.Theater established procedures designatespecific horizontal surface areas and theirassociated volumes of airspace. Optimumarea reference size should accommodatethe most restrictive weapon systememployment tactic, yet allow flexibility(through further subdivision) so as to notoverly restrict other weapon systememployment.

• Area Reference System Layout andDesign. In order for the reference systemto be simple and easy to use, manytheaters base their “kill box” system on

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JP 3-60

lines of latitude and longitude that areprinted on the maps in use in the regionresulting in a 33 nautical mile (nm) x 30nm grid lattice. This allows maximumflexibility to rapidly coordinate anddeconflict attacks and airbornesurveillance operations against bothknown and unknown (immediate andunanticipated) targets anywhere they arelocated.

• Labeling and Identification. Areareference systems should be labeled witha simple, common, universal identifierrecognizable by each component andtheir associated C2 and attack assets.Coordination and deconfliction of attacksis simplified by procedurally communicating“kill boxes” labeled by alphanumericidentifiers rather than complicated anddetailed series of latitude and longitudecoordinates. A simple alphanumericsystem allows for a common “language”and perspective when componentscommunicate in time-critical situations(example: “Kill Box D-8”).

b. Operational Considerations. The JFCshould appoint a single component or staffagency to develop the area reference systemfor the entire AOR or JOA. Guidance fromthe JFC and inputs from other componentcommanders are critical to ensuring thereference system fits the needs of the jointforce and, more importantly, is accepted as amutual tool. Once approved, the referencesystem is passed to each component to beincorporated into operational graphics andoverlays of component C2 systems.

• Area Reference System Management.Once developed and approved, eachcomponent uses the common areareference system to rapidly coordinate,deconflict, and synchronize attackoperations with other components. In atime-sensitive situation, components maycoordinate and rapidly deconflict attack

operations via the area reference system.

• Status. The JFC should identify a singleagency or component that coordinatesand maintains the status of the theater areareference system. Under normalcircumstances, the airspace and/orsurface areas identified by an areareference system are under previouslyestablished control and coordinatingmeasure and applicable supported andsupporting commander relationshipsapply. A single coordination point tomonitor and communicate the referencestatus ensures unity of effort and reducesthe time and amount of coordinationrequired for dynamic attacks withoutnegating component commandrelationships.

c. Separate Area Reference SystemsWithin a JOA. In some cases, the JFC mayelect to establish separate area referencesystems. Reasons for doing this rely heavilyon geographic separation of the battlespace(that is, two distinct, geographically separateoperational areas) within which two distinctkill box reference systems are located.However, multiple area reference systemswithin a single theater will add friction anddegrade the effectiveness of a single,standardized area reference system.

3. Point Reference Systems

a. Point references complement areareferences by providing a multitude ofcommon surface points to expeditecoordination throughout the JOA. The pointreference system is similar to the areareference system in that it can be used toprovide components with a commonperspective of the battlespace and allow forcommon identification of mutually accessibleattack areas. In addition, it can be used toidentify the center point for the establishmentof an appropriate FSCM and/or ACM.

D-3

Common Reference Systems: Area and Point

• Bullseye and Search and Rescue DOT(SARDOT). The bullseye referencesystem is normally used duringcounterair engagements for situationalawareness on targeted and untargetedairborne threats and for othercoordination. Normally, theaters willonly establish a few bullseye referencepoints to ensure effectiveness. Bullseyesare not meant to provide detailed targetguidance, but general referenceinformation. SARDOTs, like bullseyes,are very few in number and providegeneral area reference for search andrescue operations.

• Control Points (CPs) and Initial Points(IPs). Theaters establish CPs and IPs toeffect rapid and accurate geo-locationinformation for joint operations. Asopposed to only a few bullseye points,CPs and IPs are established throughoutthe theater and their effectivenessincreases with promulgation. CPs and IPsprovide the references for operations thatrequire significant accuracy, such astargeting guidance. As such, they are thepoint reference system of choice for air-ground integration during CAS.

• US Army Terrain Index ReferenceSystem and Target Reference Point.These point reference systems aredeveloped for surface componentoperations to quickly identify a target offa known geographic point. They differfrom CPs and IPs in that they areprimarily for surface unit coordination,not component coordination. As such,they are nominated and distributed morerapidly among surface units withoutfurther promulgation and coordination ofthe joint force.

b. Point Reference System Design. TheJFC or designated representative shallestablish a CP and/or IP point system

throughout the operational area by selectinggeographic points of reference and encodingthem with code words, or alphanumeric.These geographic points will be incorporatedinto operational graphics and overlays ofcomponent C2 systems, such as AdvancedField Artillery Tactical Data System, TheaterBattle Management Core System, AirborneElement Tactical Air Control Systemdatabases, and the airspace control plan.

c. Point Reference Execution. When onlygeneral area reference is required, bullseyesmay be referenced. Examples include air-to-air threat information and SARDOTs forCSAR coordination. When accuracy isrequired for component integration, such astarget identification, CPs and IPs should bereferenced. A target’s azimuth and distancefrom a selected CP or IP can provide effectivecoordination.

4. Reference Systems Examples

The following are examples of componentdescriptions of targets while using a commonreference system.

a. An enemy aircraft identified 20 nm southof bullseye alpha should be referred to as“Bandit, Alpha, south for 20 nm.” Fighteraircraft are then assigned to search for andattack the target.

b. ATACMS attacking a TST in “kill box”AF-5 (area reference system) with minimalcoordination of other component operationsshould be referred to on US Guard frequencies(ultra-high frequency 243.0 and very highfrequency 121.5) as “ATACMS attack,southwest portion of ‘kill box’ AF-5.”

c. A CAS mission, under control of aterminal air controller, references CP 402 forenroute deconfliction and CP 543 for targetguidance: “Mako 22, proceed to and holdsouth of CP 402, 9-line brief as follows: CP

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JP 3-60

543, 020 degrees for 6 nm, . . .” (JointApplications of Firepower 9-line brief inaccordance with JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Close AirSupport (CAS).)

APPENDIX EREFERENCES

E-1

The development of JP 3-60 is based upon the following primary sources.

1. Joint Publications

a. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

b. JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.

c. JP 1-01, Joint Doctrine Development System.

d. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

e. JP 1-04, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Legal Support to MilitaryOperations.

f. JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

g. JP 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations.

h. JP 2-01.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support toTargeting.

i. JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparationof the Battlespace.

j. JP 2-02, National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

k. JP 2-03, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information andServices Support to Joint Operations.

l. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.

m. JP 3-01, Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats.

n. JP 3-01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense.

o. JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.

p. JP 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations.

q. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.

r. JP 3-05.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targetingand Mission Planning Procedures.

E-2

Appendix E

JP 3-60

s. JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.

t. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS).

u. JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations.

v. JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine; Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Space Operations.

w. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations.

x. JP 3-31, Joint Doctrine for Joint Force Land Component Commander.

y. JP 3-32, Joint Doctrine for Joint Force Maritime Component Commander.

z. JP 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities.

aa. JP 3-51, Electronic Warfare in Joint Military Operations.

bb. JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.

cc. JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

dd. JP 3-54, Joint Doctrine for Operations Security.

ee. JP 3-55, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and TargetAcquisition.

ff. JP 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception.

gg. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

hh. JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

ii. JP 5-00.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Campaign Planning.

jj. JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

2. Multi-Service Publications

a. Multi-Service Publication FM 90-36/MCRP 3-1.6/NWP 3-60 TP/AFTTP(I) 3-2.3,The Joint Targeting Process and Procedures for Targeting Time-Critical Targets.

b. Multi-Service Publication FM 90-43/MCRP 3-42.1A/NWP 3-01.13/AFTTP(I) 3-2.24,Multiservice Procedures for Joint Theater Missile Target Development.

E-3

References

3. Service Publications

a. FM 6-20-10/MCRP 3-1.6.14, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the TargetingProcess.

b. FM 100-5, Operations.

c. FM 100-7, Theater Decisive Operations.

d. NWP 3-03.1, Tomahawk Employment Manual.

e. NWP 3-03.2, TLAM Platform and Weapons Systems.

f. NWP 3-03.4, Strike Operations Against Land Targets.

g. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine.

h. AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power.

i. AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare.

j. AFDD 2-1.2, Strategic Attack.

k. AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland.

l. AFI 13-1AOC, Vol. 3, Operational Procedures –Aerospace Operations Center.

m. AFI 14-117, Air Force Targeting.

n. AFP 14-210, USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide.

o. AFPAM 14-201, USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide.

E-4

Appendix E

JP 3-60

Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX FADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

F-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100,116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should addresscontent (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Air Force. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsorfor this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: CSAF WASHINGTON DC//XOXD//INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3/J7-JDETD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and JointForce Development (J-7), JDETD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC20318-7000, with info copies to the USJFCOM JWFC.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in thispublication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as anenclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requestedto notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected inthis publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

F-2

Appendix F

JP 3-60

4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publicationcenters listed below (initial contact) or the USJFCOM JWFC in the event that the jointpublication is not available from the Service.

b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outsidethe combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified jointpublication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through thelocal embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, PO-FL,Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assignedadministrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988,Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.

Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL1655 Woodson RoadAttn: Joint PublicationsSt. Louis, MO 63114-6181

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

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Coast Guard: Commandant Coast Guard (G-OPD), US Coast Guard2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, DC 20593-0001

CommanderUSJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102Doctrine Division (Publication Distribution)116 Lake View ParkwaySuffolk, VA 23435-2697

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified jointpublications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, InformationSecurity Program.

GLOSSARYPART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

ACM airspace control measureAOR area of responsibilityARFOR Army forcesATACMS Army Tactical Missile SystemATO air tasking order

BDA battle damage assessment

C2 command and controlC3 command, control, and communicationsC4I command, control, communications, computers, and

intelligenceCA combat assessmentCAS close air supportCC&D camouflage, concealment, and deceptionCIA Central Intelligence AgencyCOA course of actionCOG center of gravityCOP common operational pictureCP control pointCSAR combat search and rescueCSC community support center

D3A decide, detect, deliver, and assessDHS Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) ServiceDIA Defense Intelligence AgencyDOCC deep operations coordination cellDOD Department of DefenseDOS Department of StateDP decisive point

EW electronic warfare

FSCC fire support coordination centerFSCM fire support coordinating measureFSCOORD fire support coordinatorFSE fire support element

HPT high-payoff targetHUMINT human intelligenceHVT high-value target

INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of StateIO information operations

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Glossary

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IP initial pointIPB intelligence preparation of the battlespaceISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissanceIW information warfareIWSC Information Warfare Support Center

J-2 Intelligence Directorate of a joint staffJ-3 Operations Directorate of a joint staffJ-4 Logistics Directorate of a joint staffJ-5 Plans Directorate of a joint staffJA judge advocateJAOC joint air operations centerJFACC joint force air component commanderJFC joint force commanderJFE joint fires elementJGAT joint guidance, apportionment, and targetingJIC joint intelligence centerJIOC joint information operations centerJIPTL joint integrated prioritized target listJOA joint operations areaJOC joint operations centerJP joint publicationJSST joint space support teamJTCB joint targeting coordination boardJTF joint task forceJTL joint target listJTSG joint targeting steering groupJWAC joint warfare analysis center

LNO liaison officerLOAC law of armed conflict

MAAP master air attack planMARFOR Marine Corps forcesMEA munitions effectiveness assessmentMLRS Multiple Launch Rocket SystemMOE measure of effectiveness

NAVFOR Navy forcesNCA National Command AuthoritiesNIMA National Imagery and Mapping AgencyNIST national intelligence support teamnm nautical mileNMJIC National Military Joint Intelligence CenterNSA National Security AgencyNSL no-strike list

GL-3

Glossary

OPLAN operation planOPORD operation order

PIR priority intelligence requirementsPOW prisoner of warPSYOP psychological operations

ROE rules of engagementRTL restricted target list

SACC supporting arms coordination centerSARDOT search and rescue DOTSEAD suppression of enemy air defensesSJA Staff Judge AdvocateSOCCE special operations command and control elementSOCOORD special operations coordination elementSOF special operations forcesSOLE special operations liaison elementSROE standing rules of engagement

TA target acquisitionTLAM Tomahawk land-attack missileTNL target nomination listTST time-sensitive targetTTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

UAV unmanned aerial vehicleUSSPACECOM United States Space Command

aimpoint. 1. A precise point associated with atarget and assigned for a specific weaponimpact to achieve the intended objectiveand level of destruction. May be defineddescriptively (e.g., vent in center of roof),by grid reference, or geolocation. 2. Aprominent radar-significant feature, forexample a tip of land or bridge, used to assistan aircrew in navigating and delivering theirweapons (usually in bad weather and/or atnight). Also called offset aimpoint (OAP).(This term and its definition are providedfor information and are proposed forinclusion in JP 1-02 by JP 2-01.1.)

air interdiction. Air operations conductedto destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’smilitary potential before it can be broughtto bear effectively against friendly forcesat such distance from friendly forces thatdetailed integration of each air mission withthe fire and movement of friendly forces isnot required. (JP 1-02)

air tasking order. A method used to taskand disseminate to components,subordinate units, and command andcontrol agencies projected sorties,capabilities, and/or forces to targets andspecific missions. Normally providesspecific instructions to include call signs,targets, controlling agencies, etc., as wellas general instructions. Also called ATO.(JP 1-02)

apportionment (air). The determination andassignment of the total expected effort bypercentage and/or by priority that shouldbe devoted to the various air operations fora given period of time. Also called airapportionment. (JP 1-02)

battle damage assessment. The timely andaccurate estimate of damage resulting

from the application of military force,either lethal or nonlethal, against apredetermined objective. Battle damageassessment can be applied to theemployment of all types of weapon systems(air, ground, naval, and special forcesweapons systems) throughout the rangeof military operations. Battle damageassessment is primarily an intelligenceresponsibility with required inputs andcoordination from the operators. Battledamage assessment is composed ofphysical damage assessment, functionaldamage assessment, and target systemassessment. Also called BDA. (JP 1-02)

bullseye. An established reference point fromwhich the position of an object can bereferenced. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of relatedmilitary operations aimed at accomplishinga strategic or operational objective withina given time and space. See also campaignplanning. (JP 1-02)

campaign planning. The process wherebycombatant commanders and subordinatejoint force commanders translate nationalor theater strategy into operational conceptsthrough the development of campaignplans. Campaign planning may beginduring deliberate planning when the actualthreat, national guidance, and availableresources become evident, but is normallynot completed until after the NationalCommand Authorities select the course ofaction during crisis action planning.Campaign planning is conducted whencontemplated military operations exceedthe scope of a single major joint operation.See also campaign plan. (JP 1-02)

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

GL-4 JP 3-60

centers of gravity. Those characteristics,capabilities, or sources of power from whicha military force derives its freedom of action,physical strength, or will to fight. Alsocalled COGs. (JP 1-02)

clandestine operation. An operationsponsored and conducted by governmentaldepartments or agencies in such a way asto assure secrecy or concealment. Aclandestine operation differs from a covertoperation in that emphasis is placed onconcealment of the identity of the sponsor.In special operations, an activity may beboth covert and clandestine and may focusequally on operational considerations andintelligence-related activities. (JP 1-02)

close air support. Air action by fixed- androtary-wing aircraft against hostile targetsthat are in close proximity to friendly forcesand that require detailed integration of eachair mission with the fire and movement ofthose forces. Also called CAS. See alsoair interdiction. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

collateral damage. Unintentional or incidentalinjury or damage to persons or objects thatwould not be lawful military targets in thecircumstances ruling at the time. Suchdamage is not unlawful so long as it is notexcessive in light of the overall militaryadvantage anticipated from the attack. (Thisterm and its definition are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

combat assessment. The determination of theoverall effectiveness of force employmentduring military operations. Combatassessment is composed of three majorcomponents: (a) battle damage assessment;(b) munitions effectiveness assessment;and (c) reattack recommendation. Alsocalled CA. (This term and its definition

modify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

course of action. 1. Any sequence of activitiesthat an individual or unit may follow. 2. Apossible plan open to an individual orcommander that would accomplish, or isrelated to the accomplishment of themission. 3. The scheme adopted toaccomplish a job or mission. 4. A line ofconduct in an engagement. 5. A product ofthe Joint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem concept development phase. Alsocalled COA. (JP 1-02)

covert operation. An operation that is so plannedand executed as to conceal the identity of orpermit plausible denial by the sponsor. Acovert operation differs from a clandestineoperation in that emphasis is placed onconcealment of the sponsor rather than onconcealment of the operation. (JP 1-02)

damage assessment. 1. The determination ofthe effect of attacks on targets. 2. Adetermination of the effect of a compromiseof classified information on nationalsecurity. (JP 1-02)

decisive point. A geographic place, specifickey event, critical system or function thatallows commanders to gain a markedadvantage over an enemy and greatlyinfluence the outcome of an attack. (JP1-02)

desired mean point of impact. A precisepoint, associated with a target, and assignedas the center for impact of multiple weaponsor area munitions to achieve the intendedobjective and level of destruction. May bedefined descriptively, by grid reference, orby geolocation. Also called DMPI. (Thisterm and its definition are provided forinformation and are proposed for inclusionin JP 1-02 by JP 2-01.1.)

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effective damage. That damage necessary torender a target element inoperative,unserviceable, nonproductive, oruninhabitable. (JP 1-02)

end state. The set of required conditions thatdefines achievement of the commander’sobjectives. (JP 1-02)

functional damage assessment. The estimateof the effect of military force to degrade ordestroy the functional or operationalcapability of the target to perform itsintended mission and on the level ofsuccess in achieving operational objectivesestablished against the target. Thisassessment is based upon all-sourceinformation, and includes an estimation ofthe time required for recuperation orreplacement of the target function. (Thisterm and its definition are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

grid coordinates. Coordinates of a gridcoordinate system to which numbers andletters are assigned for use in designating apoint on a gridded map, photograph, orchart. (JP 1-02)

high-payoff target. A target whose loss tothe enemy will significantly contribute tothe success of the friendly course of action.High-payoff targets are those high-valuetargets that must be acquired andsuccessfully attacked for the success of thefriendly commander’s mission. Also calledHPT. See also high-value target; target.(This term and its definition modify theexisting term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

high-payoff target list. A prioritized list ofhigh pay-off targets by phase of the jointoperation. Also called HPTL. (This termand its definition are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

high-value target. A target the enemycommander requires for the successfulcompletion of the mission. The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriouslydegrade important enemy functionsthroughout the friendly commander’s areaof interest. Also called HVT. See also highpay-off target; target. (JP 1-02)

immediate targets. Targets that have beenidentified too late, or not selected for actionin time to be included in the normaltargeting process, and therefore have notbeen scheduled. Immediate targets havetwo subcategories: unplanned andunanticipated. (This term and its definitionare approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

information operations. Actions taken toaffect adversary information andinformation systems while defending one’sown information and information systems.Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

intention. An aim or design (as distinct fromcapability) to execute a specified course ofaction. (JP 1-02)

interdiction. An action to divert, disrupt,delay, or destroy the enemy’s surfacemilitary potential before it can be usedeffectively against friendly forces. See alsoair interdiction. (JP 1-02)

joint air operations. Air operationsperformed with air capabilities and/orforces made available by components insupport of the joint force commander’soperation or campaign objectives, or insupport of other components of the jointforce. (JP 1-02)

joint air operations plan. A plan for aconnected series of joint air operations toachieve the joint force commander’sobjectives within a given time and theater

GL-7

Glossary

of operations. See also joint air operations.(JP 1-02)

joint fires element. An optional staff elementthat provides recommendations to theoperations directorate to accomplish firesplanning and synchronization. Also calledJFE. (This term and its definition modifythe existing term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

joint force. A general term applied to a forcecomposed of significant elements, assignedor attached, of two or more MilitaryDepartments operating under a single jointforce commander. See also joint forcecommander. (JP 1-02)

joint force commander. A general termapplied to a combatant commander,subunified commander, or joint task forcecommander authorized to exercisecombatant command (command authority)or operational control over a joint force.Also called JFC. See also joint force. (JP1-02)

joint guidance, apportionment, and targetingteam. A group that makesrecommendations for air apportionment toengage targets, and provides other targetingsupport requiring component input at thejoint force air component commander level.(This term and its definition are approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint integrated prioritized target list. Aprioritized list of targets and associated dataapproved by the joint force commander ordesignated representative and maintainedby a joint force. Targets and priorities arederived from the recommendations ofcomponents in conjunction with theirproposed operations supporting the jointforce commander’s objectives andguidance. Also called JIPTL. (This term

and its definition modify the existing termand its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint targeting coordination board. A groupformed by the joint force commander toaccomplish broad targeting oversightfunctions that may include but are notlimited to coordinating targetinginformation, providing targeting guidanceand priorities, and refining the jointintegrated prioritized target list. The boardis normally comprised of representativesfrom the joint force staff, all componentsand, if required, component subordinateunits. Also called JTCB. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

joint targeting steering group. A groupformed by a combatant commander to assistin developing targeting guidance andreconciling competing requests for assetsfrom multiple joint task forces. Also calledJTSG. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

joint target list. A consolidated list of selectedtargets considered to have militarysignificance in the combatant commander'sarea of responsibility. Also called JTL.(This term and its definition modify theexisting term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

joint task force. A joint force that isconstituted and so designated by theSecretary of Defense, a combatantcommander, a subunified commander, or anexisting joint task force commander. Alsocalled JTF. (JP 1-02)

kill box. A three-dimensional area referencethat enables timely, effective coordination

GL-8

Glossary

JP 3-60

and control and facilitates rapid attacks.(This term and its definition are approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

list of targets. A tabulation of confirmed orsuspect targets maintained by any echelonfor informational and fire support planningpurposes. See also target list. (JP 1-02)

master air attack plan. A plan that containskey information that forms the foundationof the joint air tasking order. Sometimesreferred to as the air employment plan orjoint air tasking order shell. Informationthat may be found in the plan includes jointforce commander guidance, joint force aircomponent commander guidance, supportplans, component requests, target updaterequests, availability of capabilities andforces, target information from target lists,aircraft allocation, etc. Also called MAAP.(This term and its definition modify theexisting term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

measures of effectiveness. Tools used tomeasure results achieved in the overallmission and execution of assigned tasks.Measures of effectiveness are a prerequisiteto the performance of combat assessment.Also called MOEs. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

military operations other than war.Operations that encompass the use ofmilitary capabilities across the range ofmilitary operations short of war. Thesemilitary actions can be applied tocomplement any combination of the otherinstruments of national power and occurbefore, during, and after war. Also calledMOOTW. (JP 1-02)

military strategy. The art and science ofemploying the armed forces of a nation tosecure the objectives of national policy by

the application of force or the threat of force.See also strategy. (JP 1-02)

mission. 1. The task, together with thepurpose, that clearly indicates the action tobe taken and the reason therefore. 2. Incommon usage, especially when applied tolower military units, a duty assigned to anindividual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatchingof one or more aircraft to accomplish oneparticular task. (JP 1-02)

mission type order. 1. Order issued to a lowerunit that includes the accomplishment ofthe total mission assigned to the higherheadquarters. 2. Order to a unit to performa mission without specifying how it is tobe accomplished. (JP 1-02)

munitions effectiveness assessment.Conducted concurrently and interactivelywith battle damage assessment, theassessment of the military force applied interms of the weapon system and munitionseffectiveness to determine and recommendany required changes to the methodology,tactics, weapon system, munitions, fusing,and/or weapon delivery parameters toincrease force effectiveness. Munitionseffects assessment is primarily theresponsibility of operations with requiredinputs and coordination from theintelligence community. Also called MEA.(This term and its definition are approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

National Command Authorities. ThePresident and the Secretary of Defense ortheir duly deputized alternates orsuccessors. Also called NCA. (JP 1-02)

no-strike list. A list of geographic areas,complexes, or installations not planned forcapture or destruction. Attacking these mayviolate the law of armed conflict or interferewith friendly relations with indigenouspersonnel or governments. Also calledNSL. (This term and its definition replace

GL-9

Glossary

the existing term “no-strike target list” andits definition and are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

objective. 1. The clearly defined, decisive,and attainable goals towards which everymilitary operation should be directed. 2.The specific target of the action taken (forexample, a definite terrain feature, theseizure or holding of which is essential tothe commander’s plan, or, an enemy forceor capability without regard to terrainfeatures). See also target. (JP 1-02)

offensive counterair. Offensive operationsto destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemyaircraft, missiles, launch platforms, andtheir supporting structures and systems bothbefore and after launch, but as close to theirsource as possible. Offensive counterairoperations range throughout enemyterritory and are generally conducted at theinitiative of friendly forces. Theseoperations include attack operations, fightersweep, escort, and suppression of enemyair defenses. Also called OCA. (JP 1-02)

on-call targets. Planned targets that areknown to exist in an operational area andare located in sufficient time for deliberateplanning to meet emerging situationsspecific to campaign objectives. (This termand its definition are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

operation. 1. A military action or the carryingout of a strategic, operational, tactical,service, training, or administrative militarymission. 2. The process of carrying oncombat, including movement, supply,attack, defense and maneuvers needed togain the objectives of any battle orcampaign. (JP 1-02)

physical damage assessment. The estimateof the quantitative extent of physicaldamage (through munitions blast,fragmentation, and/or fire damage effects)

to a target resulting from the application ofmilitary force. This assessment is basedupon observed or interpreted damage.(This term and its definition are approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

planned targets. Targets that are known toexist in an operational area, and againstwhich effects are scheduled in advance orare on-call. Examples range from targetson joint target lists in the applicablecampaign plan, to targets detected insufficient time to list in the air tasking order,mission-type orders, or fire support plans.Planned targets have two subcategories:scheduled or on-call. (This term and itsdefinition are approved for inclusion in thenext edition of JP 1-02.)

reattack recommendation. An assessment,derived from the results of battle damageassessment and munitions effectivenessassessment, providing the commandersystematic advice on reattack of targets andfurther target selection to achieveobjectives. The reattack recommendationconsiders objective achievement, target, andaimpoint selection, attack timing, tactics,and weapon system and munitionsselection. The reattack recommendation isa combined operations and intelligencefunction. Also called RR. (This term andits definition are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

restricted target. A target that has specificrestrictions imposed upon it. Actions thatexceed specified restrictions are prohibiteduntil coordinated and approved by theestablishing headquarters. (This term andits definition are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

restricted target list. A list of restrictedtargets nominated by elements of the jointforce and approved by the joint forcecommander. This list also includesrestricted targets directed by higher

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authorities. Also called RTL. (This termand its definition are approved for inclusionin the next edition of JP 1-02.)

rules of engagement. Directives issued bycompetent military authority that delineatethe circumstances and limitations underwhich United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with otherforces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP1-02)

SARDOT. A reference point on land thatserves as a pre-designated position fromwhich evaders and recovery forcesreference their current location. The airtasking order special instructions willinclude SARDOT location and specificinstructions on how to use the SARDOT.(This term and its definition are applicableonly in the context of this publication andcannot be referenced outside thispublication.)

scheduled targets. Planned targets uponwhich fires will be delivered at a specifictime. (This term and its definition modifythe existing term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

special operations. Operations conducted byspecially organized, trained, and equippedmilitary and paramilitary forces to achievemilitary, political, economic, orinformational objectives by unconventionalmilitary means in hostile, denied, orpolitically sensitive areas. These operationsare conducted across the full range ofmilitary operations, independently or incoordination with operations ofconventional, nonspecial operations forces.Political-military considerations frequentlyshape special operations, requiringclandestine, covert, or low visibilitytechniques, and oversight at the nationallevel. Special operations differ fromconventional operations in degree of

physical and political risk, operationaltechniques, mode of employment,independence from friendly support, anddependence on detailed operationalintelligence and indigenous assets. Alsocalled SO. (JP 1-02)

strategic mission. A mission directed againstone or more of a selected series of enemytargets with the purpose of progressivedestruction and disintegration of theenemy’s warmaking capacity and will tomake war. Targets include keymanufacturing systems, sources of rawmaterial, critical material, stockpiles, powersystems, transportation systems,communication facilities, and other suchtarget systems. As opposed to tacticaloperations, strategic operations aredesigned to have a long-range rather thanimmediate effect on the enemy and itsmilitary forces. (JP 1-02)

tactics. 1. The employment of units incombat. 2. The ordered arrangement andmaneuver of units in relation to each otherand/or to the enemy in order to use theirfull potentialities. (JP 1-02)

target. 1. An area, complex, installation, force,equipment, capability, function, or behavioridentified for possible action to support thecommander’s objectives, guidance, andintent. Targets fall into two generalcategories: planned and immediate. 2. Inintelligence usage, a country, area,installation, agency, or person against whichintelligence operations are directed. 3. Anarea designated and numbered for futurefiring. 4. In gunfire support usage, animpact burst that hits the target. See alsoobjective area. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

target acquisition. The detection,identification, and location of a target in

GL-11

Glossary

sufficient detail to permit the effectiveemployment of weapons. See also targetanalysis. (JP 1-02)

target analysis. An examination of potentialtargets to determine military importance,priority of attack, and weapons required toobtain a desired level of damage orcasualties. See also target acquisition. (JP1-02)

target complex. A geographically integratedseries of target concentrations. See alsotarget. (JP 1-02)

target component. A set of targets within atarget system performing a similar function.(This term and its definition modify theexisting term and its definition and areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

target concentration. A grouping ofgeographically proximate targets. See alsotarget; target complex. (JP 1-02)

target critical damage point. The part of atarget component that is most vital. Alsocalled critical node. See also target; targetcomponent. (JP 1-02)

targeting. The process of selecting andprioritizing targets and matching theappropriate response to them, takingaccount of operational requirements andcapabilities. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

targeting effects. The cumulative results ofactions taken to attack targets and targetsystems by lethal and nonlethal means.(This term and its definition are approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

target intelligence. Intelligence that portraysand locates the components of a target or

target complex and indicates its vulnerabilityand relative importance. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

target list. The listing of targets maintainedand promulgated by the senior echelonof command; it contains those targetsthat are to be engaged by supportingarms, as distinguished from a “list oftargets” that may be maintained by anyechelon as confirmed, suspected, orpossible targets for informational andplanning purposes. See also joint targetlist; list of targets. (JP 1-02)

target materials. Graphic, textual, tabular,digital, video, or other presentations oftarget intelligence, primarily designed tosupport operations against designatedtargets by one or more weapon(s) systems.Target materials are suitable for training,planning, executing, and evaluating militaryoperations. (JP 1-02)

target nomination list. A list of targetsnominated by component commanders,national agencies, or the joint forcecommander staff for potential inclusion onthe joint integrated prioritized target list tosupport joint force commander objectivesand priorities. Also called TNL. (This termand its definition modify the existing termand its definition and are approved forinclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

target of opportunity. A target visible to asurface or air sensor or observer, which iswithin range of available weapons andagainst which fire has not been scheduledor requested. (This term and its definitionmodify the existing term and its definitionand are approved for inclusion in the nextedition of JP 1-02.)

target priority. A grouping of targets withthe indicated sequence of attack. (JP 1-02)

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target signature. 1. The characteristic patternof a target displayed by detection andidentification equipment. 2. In naval minewarfare, the variation in the influence fieldproduced by the passage of a ship or sweep.(JP 1-02)

target stress point. The weakest point (mostvulnerable to damage) on the criticaldamage point. Also called vulnerable node.See also target critical damage point. (JP1-02)

target system. 1. All the targets situated in aparticular geographic area and functionallyrelated. 2. A group of targets that are sorelated that their destruction will producesome particular effect desired by the attacker.See also target complex. (This term and itsdefinition modify the existing term and itsdefinition and are approved for inclusion inthe next edition of JP 1-02.)

target system component. A set of targetsbelonging to one or more groups ofindustries and basic utilities required toproduce component parts of an end productsuch as periscopes, or one type of a seriesof interrelated commodities, such asaviation gasoline. (JP 1-02)

time-sensitive targets. Those targetsrequiring immediate response because theypose (or will soon pose) a danger to friendlyforces or are highly lucrative, fleetingtargets of opportunity. Also called TST. (JP1-02)

unanticipated immediate targets. Thoseimmediate targets that are unknown or not

expected to exist in an operational area.(This term and its definition are approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

unplanned immediate targets. Thoseimmediate targets that are known to exist inan operational area but are not detected,located, or selected for action in sufficienttime to be included in the normal targetingprocess. (This term and its definition areapproved for inclusion in the next editionof JP 1-02.)

vulnerability. 1. The susceptibility of a nationor military force to any action by any meansthrough which its war potential or combateffectiveness may be reduced or its will tofight diminished. 2. The characteristics ofa system that cause it to suffer a definitedegradation (incapability to perform thedesignated mission) as a result of havingbeen subjected to a certain level of effectsin an unnatural (manmade) hostileenvironment. 3. In information operations,a weakness in information system securitydesign, procedures, implementation, orinternal controls that could be exploited togain unauthorized access to information oran information system. See alsoinformation operations. (JP 1-02)

weaponeering. The process of determiningthe quantity of a specific type of lethal ornonlethal weapons required to achieve aspecific level of damage to a given target,considering target vulnerability, weaponseffect, munitions delivery accuracy, damagecriteria, probability of kill, and weaponreliability. (JP 1-02)

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCs

Includes scope ofproject, references,milestones, and who willdevelop drafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

The CINCs receive the JP andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7,will solicit a written report fromthe combatant commands andServices on the utility andquality of each JP and theneed for any urgent changes orearlier-than-scheduledrevisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each JP isrevised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

�

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

Submitted by Services, CINCs, or JointStaff to fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy asshown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrinepublications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Publication (JP) 3-60 Operations

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHYJOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0

PERSONNEL

JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

LOGISTICSINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS C4 SYSTEMSPLANS

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to JointStaff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub,makes required changes and prepares pubfor coordination with Services and CINCs

Joint Staff conducts formal staffing forapproval as a JP

STEP #4CJCS Approval

Lead Agent selects Primary ReviewAuthority (PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCs,Services, and Joint Staff

STEP #3Two Drafts

JP 1

JOINTWARFARE

JP 0-2

UNAAF

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Joint Doctrine for Targeting - BITS02).pdf · 2005-11-18 · PREFACE i 1. Scope This publication...

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Transcript of Joint Doctrine for Targeting - BITS02).pdf · 2005-11-18 · PREFACE i 1. Scope This publication...