Joint and Operations Analysis Division Defence Science and … · 2014-09-11 · UNCLASSIFIED...

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Pre-Deployment Handbook: Afghanistan (post 2014)

David Matthews and Raspal Khosa

Joint and Operations Analysis Division

Defence Science and Technology Organisation

DSTO-GD-0809

ABSTRACT

This Handbook provides information that will assist in understanding the complex environment that is Afghanistan in 2014 and beyond. The research and analysis supports Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel operating in Afghanistan as part of the post 2014 NATO mission Op RESOLUTE SUPPORT.

Approved for public release

RELEASE LIMITATION

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Published by Joint and Operations Analysis Division DSTO Defence Science and Technology Organisation 506 Lorimer St Fishermans Bend Victoria 3207 Australia Telephone: 1300 333 362 Fax: (08) 7389 6567 © Commonwealth of Australia 2014 AR-015906 May 2014 APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

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Pre-Deployment Handbook: Afghanistan (post 2014)

Executive Summary While the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) mission in Uruzgan concluded on 16 Dec 2013, Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan continues through a range of activities designed to build the institutional capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The ADF provides instructors, advisors, support staff and force protection elements to the Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAO) and the Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG) in Kabul; ongoing support to to the ANA’s 205 Corps Divisional Headquarters in Kandahar through the Coalition Advisory Team (205 CAT); advisors to the Logistics Training and Advisory Team (LTAT) and a continuation of embedded staff within a range of roles in ISAF Headquarters. Furthermore, at a meeting in Brussels in June 2013 NATO Defence Ministers, with counterparts from other ISAF troop contributing states, endorsed the concept for RESOLUTE SUPPORT – a non-combat train, advise and assist mission beginning in 2015. Around 10 states, including Australia, have expressed interest in contributing to Op RESOLUTE SUPPORT, with assistance targeted at the crucial areas of C2, logistics, ISR, Special Forces and developing a capable Afghan Air Force. The concept of operations for Op RESOLUTE SUPPORT is to have Coalition Advisory Teams (CATs) plugged-in at regional ANSF Corps level headquarters, with the ability for mobile teams to reach a Brigade in the provinces if necessary. This Handbook combines recent ADF experience and lessons, with DSTO research and analysis for the purpose of preparing individuals and force elements for the new ADF mission following the end of the ISAF mandate. It contains updated analysis on Afghanistan’s history, geography, culture, society, government and internal stability as well as providing information on the nature of Australia’s whole-of-government assistance to the country. The Handbook has been developed at the request of the Commander 1st Division and forms part of the material provided to all Australians prior to their deployment or posting to the country.

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Pre-Deployment Handbook

Afghanistan

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Acknowledgements

The following Departments and Agencies contributed information for this handbook:

Defence:

• HQ1stDivision

• HQJointOperationsCommand

• JointTaskForce633

• DSTOOperationsSupportCentre

AusAID

AustralianFederalPolice

DFAT

Special thanksgo toDavidMatthewsandRaspalKhosa of DSTO's Conflict & Stabilisation StudiesTeamwho provided the bulk of the research andanalysis in support of the handbook.

DSTO-GD-0809

Contact:

Mr Iain Cruickshank

ManagerAdaptiveWarfareBranch

Headquarters1stDivision

GallipoliBarracks

EnoggeraQLD4051

Phone0733322792

Email:[email protected],au

Dr David Matthews

Director,Conflict&Stabilisation

DSTOOperationsSupportCentre

Joint&OperationsAnalysisDivision(JOAD)

DSTOEdinburghSA5111

Phone:0873897298

Email:[email protected]

This guide is available electronically at:

http://legacy/TeamWeb2010/ARMY/1div/HQ%201%20Div%20Directory/awc/Pages/AWB-Welcome.aspx

Updates, observations or feedback to maintain the utility, accuracy and relevance of this handbook [email protected]

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Foreword

i

ThepurposeofthisHandbookistoproviderelevantcontemporaryinformationfortheADF’smission in Afghanistan.

WhiletheADF’smilitarymissioninUruzganhascompleted,Australia’sengagementinAfghanistancontinues through a contribution to national programsthatsupporttheAfghanNationalArmyincludingtrainingandmilitaryadvisers.WehavelearntmuchfromourevolvedmilitaryroleinAfghanistanbutsuccessonoperationsfavoursthose who adapt fastest. The culture of a learning organisation is fundamental to our success as an AdaptiveArmy.TheADFhasextensiveexperienceandknowledgeharnessedthroughitsexperiencesinAfghanistanandtoremainadaptivewemustnotonlyapplythelessonslearntfromtherecentpast,butcomprehensivelyandrapidlypassobservationsandexperiencestoforceelementsandindividualsin Australia preparing for deployment.

ThisHandbookisacompilationoftheatrerelevant,practicalhard-learnedlessons,andofrigorousacademicallysoundstudiesbyDSTO.Itcontainsgeneralinformationabouttheenvironment,culture,history,peopleandcombatants–essentialinformationthateveryoneneedsregardlessoftheir role in the operational area.

IaskthatyouviewthishandbookasastarttothepreparationsrequiredforyourdeploymentandcommendtheReadingListtoyou.

S.L. SMITH,DSC,AM MajorGeneral Commander1stDivision

©CommonwealthofAustralia2014

This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be produced by any process without prior written permission from the Department of Defence.

Requests and inquiries concerning reproduction and rights should be addressed to the AdaptiveWarfareBranch,Headquarters1stDivision,EnoggeraQLD4051AUSTRALIA.

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Afghanistan Administrative Divisions

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Table of Contents

iii

PART 1 - AFGHANISTAN ............................ 1

Chapter 1 - Geography .........................................2

Location ....................................................................2

PhysicalTerrain.........................................................2

Climate ......................................................................3

MajorCities ..............................................................3

Waterways ...............................................................5

Chapter 2 - History ................................................7

Pre-ColonialHistory .................................................7

TheFormationoftheAfghanState .........................7

AfghanistanDuringtheColdWar ............................9

TheSovietEpisode .................................................10

CivilWar .................................................................13

TheRiseandFalloftheTaliban .............................14

ANewBeginning ....................................................19

Chapter 3 - Society ............................................ 32

Ethnicity ..................................................................32

Language ................................................................34

Tribal Afghans .........................................................34

AfghanCustoms&Culture ....................................37

Religion ...................................................................40

Chapter 4 - Insurgency ..................................... 43

Origins&Evolution .................................................43

StructureoftheInsurgency ...................................47

PakistaniExtremistGroups ....................................51

TalibanStrategy .....................................................54

EnablersandVulnerabilities ..................................55

Chapter 5 - Counterinsurgency ....................... 60

Legacy(2001-2009) ................................................60

TheTroopSurge(2010-2013)..................................62

AssessmentofProgress(circa2014) .....................68

Transition,WithdrawalandOpRESOLUTE SUPPORT(2014+) ....................................................84

Chapter 6 - Afghan National Security Forces .86

DevelopmentoftheANSF .................................... 86

AfghanNationalArmy ............................................87

TheAfghanNationalPolice ..................................91

TheAfghanAirForce ..............................................98

WorkingwiththeANSF .........................................99

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PART 2 - AUSTRALIAN ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN ....................................... 103

Chapter 7 - Australia’s Contributions in Afghanistan, 2001-2014 .................................. 104

Background ...........................................................104

TheInternationalCoalitionAgainstTerrorism (ICAT) .....................................................................105

ArmedReconstruction .........................................106

Stabilisation&CapacityBuilding ........................108

TransitionandWithdrawal .................................. 114

Chapter 8 - Australian Force Elements in Afghanistan 2014 onwards .............................116

CommandandControl ..........................................116

Mentors&Advisors .............................................116

ComponentContributions .................................... 117

Enablers ................................................................118

OtherADFElementstoAfghanistan ....................119

FURTHER READING .....................................121

LIST OF ACRONYMS ...................................127

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Part 1

Afghanistan

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AFGHANISTAN Unc lass i f ied

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Chapter 1 – Geography

• Location

• PhysicalTerrain

• Climate

• MajorCities

• Waterways

LOCATION101 Afghanistan occupies a landlocked position in central Asia wedged between Shi’a Iran andSunniPakistan.ItsnorthernborderabutstheformerSoviet republics of Turkmenistan,Uzbekistan, andTajikistan,alargesectionofwhichisformedbytheAmuDaryaRiveranditstributary,thePanj. Inthenortheast,AfghanistansharesashortborderwithChinaattheendoftheWakhanCorridor(a.k.atheAfghan panhandle). The nearest coast lies on theArabian Sea, some 482 km to the south beyondPakistan’sBaluchistanProvince.

Topographic map of Afghanistan.

PHYSICAL TERRAIN102 The country can be divided into threedistinct geographic regions: the Northern Plains,the Central Highlands of the Hindu Kush and theSouthernPlateau.

Northern Plains

103 TherollinghillsandplainsnorthoftheHinduKush form the southern boundary of the central Asian steppe.These fertileplainshave longbeenhome to Turkic peoples such asUzbeks, Turkmen,Kazakhsandothers.MuchofAfghanistan’swealthis generated from this region. The plains are the bread basket of the country, producing most ofAfghanistan’s food. They are also rich in mineraland natural gas deposits. The main urban centres includeMazar-e-SharifandKunduz.

Central Highlands

104 The central highlands are dominated by the rugged and inhospitable Hindu Kush whichconstitutes the western edge of the Himalayanmountain system and runs diagonally across the country from northeast to southwest. In addition to the strategically important peaks and high mountainpasses, thehighlands consistofnarrowgorges, wide valleys, deserts and meadows.Control of the passes (such as the Khyber Passleading to Pakistan) and deep valleys (such asthe PanjsheerValley northeast of the capital) haslong been a prerequisite for military dominationof the country. These mountains are home to the indomitablePashtuntribesofmilitaryfolklore,theyalso purportedly support the residue of GenghisKhan’s marauding armies, the Hazara community,whoconverted to theShi’abranchof IslamunderPersian influence during the Safavid period.Withanelevationofover1,800mabovesealevelKabul,sitting on the edge of the ranges, is one of thehighestcapitalcitiesintheworld.Othersignificantpopulation centres in the highlands include the HazaracityofBamiyanatanaltitudeof2,800m,themultiethnic cityofGhazniatover2,200mand thePashtuncentreofJalalabadontheeasternedgeofthe range.

PAKISTANAFGHANISTAN

TURKMENISTAN

IRAN

INDIA

TAJIKISTANUZBEKISTAN

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The Hindu Kush.

Southern Plateau

105 South of the Hindu Kush, the SouthernPlateauconsistsofarid saltflats, stonyexpansesand sandy deserts. With the exception of theHelmand and Hari Rud River systems and theirvariousirrigated'green zone'tributaries,thesoilofmuch of the region is infertile. The southern plateau and its principal city, Kandahar, is the traditionalPashtun heartland and formed the centre of theDurraniEmpireinthe18thand19thcentury.TowardthewesternedgeoftheplateauPersianinfluenceincreasesandPashtunpreponderancegiveswaytoDari(Persian)speakingAimaqs,TajiksandIranians.The main urban centre at the western edge of theplateauisHerat,athoroughly IraniancityandUNESCOWorldHeritageSite.

CLIMATE106 Typical of central Asia, Afghanistanexperiences extremes of climate. Winters arebitterly cold,withheavy snowacross the ranges.Summersaregenerallyhotanddryandsubjecttosand or dust storms known as the “simoom”(poisonwind)or“wind of 120 days”.

Northern Plains

• Wintertemperaturesrangefrombelowfreezingatnighttolessthan10°Cduringtheday.

• Summer temperatures range from around 15°Cto40°C.

Central Highlands

• Athigherelevationswinter lowsmayplummettoaslowas-40°C.

• Summertemperaturesatlowerelevationsmayriseashighas40°C.

Southern Plateau

• Wintertemperaturesrangefrombelowfreezingtoamaximumof15°C.

• In the summer the overnight low rarely fallsbelow 20 °C,whilst themaximum can rise ashighas50°C.Occasionally,monsoonalsystemswill blow across from the Indian subcontinent duringsummer,bringingtropicalrainfalls.

MAJOR CITIESNorthern Plains

107 Mazar-e-Sharif (pop. 300,000+). Mazar-e-Sharif (Tomb of the Chosen One) isnamed for its prinicipal attraction, the shrine ofHazratAli, founderof theShi’abranchof Islam. Itis Afghanistan’s fourth largest city and the maineconomic hub of the North. Although Mazar-e-Sharif has a predominance of Dari speakingTajiks, the city is multicultural with most ofAfghanistan’sethnolinguisticgroupsrepresented.Itis strategically sited on the Afghan ring road at the junctionofthemainroadandraillinktoUzbekistan.

The Hazrat Ali Mosque, Mazar-e-Sharif.

108 Kunduz (pop. 250,000+). Kunduz isAfghanistan’sfifthlargestcityafterMazar-e-Sharifand is linked to the latter by road. Although situated intheUzbekandTajikdominatednorth,KunduzhasasizeablePashtunpopulationasaresultofAbdurRahmanKhan’s19thcenturypolicyofestablishingPashtunsettlementsnorthoftheranges.

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109 Taloqan (pop. approx 200,000). Sitedinthefarnortheastofthecountry,theTajikcityofTaloqanwasthe lastofAfghanistan’smajorcitiestofalltotheTaliban,holdingoutuntilJanuary2001.ItremainsaTajikstrongholdtothisday.

Central Highlands

110 Kabul (pop. 3,000,000+). Kabul is Afghanistan’s largest city in addition to itsadministrative and legislative capital. Situated inanarrowvalleyoftheHinduKushalongthetraderoutes to south and central Asia, Kabul has longbeenfoughtoverbyCentralAsianEmpires,manyofwhomhavemadethecityitscapital.Inmorerecenttimes,thecityhassufferedconsiderablehardship.DuringtheAfghanCivilWar(1992-1996)Kabulwasdepopulated and much of its city centre reduced to rubble. As a major cultural centre and seat oflearning,theTalibanconsideredKabulirredeemablysecular and corrupt and instituted repressivemeasures against the city’s largely progressiveinhabitants. Since the US-led intervention Kabulhasexperiencedsomethingofaconstructionboomas reconstruction and aidmoney has flooded intothecapitaland itspopulationhasboomed.Whilstthe dominant ethnic group are the Dari-speakingTajiks, Kabul may be described as a multiethnic,multi-faith and multicultural city. Regardless ofethnic or religious background, residents of KabulareknownasKabulis(evenifPashtun).

Kabul as seen from Wazir Akbar Khan Hill.

111 Jalalabad (pop. 200,000+). Afghanistan’s sixth largest city is sited in awidevalley of the Hindu Kush on the Kabul-Peshawarhighway. Due to its location on the Afghan side of the Khyber Pass, Jalalabad has seen a largeinflux of refugees returning after years of asylumin the sprawling Shamshatoo refugee camp nearPeshawar,Pakistan.WhilsttraditionallyhometoathrivingSikhcommunity,thepopulationofthecityisnowoverwhelminglyPashtun.

112 Ghazni (pop. 150,000+). Situated at analtitudeofover2,200matthesouth-easternedgeof theHinduKushwhere themountainsmeet thesouthern plateau,Ghazni is an ancient citywhichretains a multicultural and multiethnic populace. The city is home toTajiks, Pashtuns,HazarasandevenasmallHinducommunity.

113 Bamiyan (pop. 60,000+). Whilst not apopulous city, Bamiyan is nevertheless importantas the largest population centre of theHazarajat.Situated on the ancient Silk Road, Bamiyan hasseen traders, migrating peoples and invadingarmies since time immemorial. It was the capital of theBuddhistKushanEmpireandlatertheKingdomof theWhiteHuns.Longsupportedby IranduetoitsShi’iteresidents,Bamiyanwasoneofthemaincentres of resistance to the Taliban during their rise to power. As a result, its residents sufferedgreatly under Taliban rule with reports of mass exterminations of the city’s Shi’a during the late1990s.

Southern Plateau114 Kandahar (pop. 500,000+).Afghanistan’sformer capital (until 1776) was founded byAlexander the Great in the 4th century BCE.Kandahar has been contested by Empires emerging fromPersia in thewest, India in theEastand theCentralAsiansteppeinthenorthbeforeemergingas the capital of the Durrani Empire in the 18thcentury. It is a city of numerous bazaars andmosques, chief ofwhich is theKhirka Sharif, oneoftheholiestplacesinAfghanistan,andshrineofthe founder of the Durrani dynasty, Ahmad ShahAbdali. The shrine is also said to house the cloak ofMohammed.Alongwith Peshawar in Pakistan,

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KandaharistheurbancentreofthePashtunpeople.InAugust1994theTalibancapturedKandaharandturnedthecityintotheircapital.Followingthefallof the Taliban in 2001 the city became their lastredoubt before they escaped across the border to neighbouring Quetta. Today Kandahar remainssubject to significant Taliban infiltration despitethe presence of ISAF troops based at KandaharAirField (KAF) justoutsidethecityandsignificantnumbers of ANSF in the city centre. The city hasextensiveroadlinkswithHerattothewest,GhazniandKabultothenortheast,TarinKowttothenorth,andQuetta,inPakistan,tothesouth.

Kandahar City.

115 Herat (pop. approx 400,000). Situatedin a fertile valley carved by the Hari Rud River,Afghanistan’s third largest city is the gateway toIran and the centre of Persian culture in CentralAsia. Known as the Pearl of Khorasan,thecityisfullofhistoricbuildings,althoughmanyhavesuffereddamage during the past 30 years of conflict.BecausethemaintraderouteintoAfghanistanfromthewestpassesthroughthecity,therulersofHerathavelongexactedtollsonpassingtraders.Duringthe CivilWar, Herat fell into the hands of IsmaelKhan who ran a largely peaceful fiefdom whilstthe rest of the country descended into anarchy. Khan ran Herat like a traditional Persian Emir:sitting resplendent amidst Persian finery whilstreceiving poor supplicant peasants and resolvinglocal disputes. Today the city enjoys considerableaidfromIran,particularlyforelectricity,roadsandthe construction of a railway link. It remains an overwhelmingly Persian-speaking Tajik centre andcontinues to collect the highest amount of customs revenueforthecentralAfghangovernment.

116 Lashkar Gah (pop. 200,000+). SituatedonthebanksoftheHelmandRiver,LashkarGahhastheambienceofanattractiveandgenteelriversidetown. The city was built as a headquarters forAmericanengineersworkingontheHelmandValleyAuthority irrigation project in the 1950s. It wasdesignedtosuitAmericanpreferences,withbroadtree-lined boulevards and brick houses with nowallsseparatingthemfromthestreet.However,inthewakeoftheSovietoccupationandAfghancivilwar, the treesmostlycamedownandwallswentup. Notwithstanding this, the massive irrigationprojectcreatedthemostextensivefarmingzoneinsouthernAfghanistan,openingupmanythousandsof hectares of desert to cultivation. In recenttimes the irrigated valleys of the Helmand Riverhaveseenanexplosioninpoppyfarmingand,asaconsequence, Helmand has become the centre ofAfghanistan’snarcoticsindustry.WiththearrivalofUK forces in2006,LashkarGahstarted toattractsignificantamountsofmigrantsfromneighbouringvillages as the Brits, pursuing an “expanding ink spot” strategy, poured thousands of pounds ofdevelopmentfundingintothecity,distributedlandto locals, stimulated the economy and generallybeautifiedthetown.

WATERWAYS117 Over 80% of the country’s fresh wateroriginates from the central highlands. Although the ranges provide year round runoff from bothwinter rains and summer snowmelts, the riversare characterised by marked seasonal variations.Flooding is common, particularly when the snowbegins tomelt in the spring. Despite the relativeabundance of fresh water, residents suffer fromchronicshortagesasaresultofinadequatestorage,management and distribution infrastructure.

118 ThefourmainriversystemsinAfghanistanaretheAmuDaryabasinwhichservesthepeoplesofthenorthernprovinces,theHariRudbasininthewest,theHelmandRiverbasininthesouthandtheKabul basin in the east.

Chapter1-Geography

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119 Amu Darya River. The Amu Darya (theRiverOxusofantiquity)isoneofthelongestriversincentralAsia,flowingforover2,500km.Itrisesfromthenorth-easternPamirMountains,runseastalongthenorthernborderofAfghanistanbeforeflowinginto the Turkmenistan steppe and dissipating into the desert prior to reaching its historic terminus in theAralSea.MostofthewaterwaysnorthoftheHinduKushdrain into theAmuDaryabasinwhichissubjecttoannualflooding–displacingresidentsand damaging agriculture.

120 Hari Rud River. TheHariRudoriginatesinthenorth-westernHinduKushandflowsduewestuntil it reaches the Iranian border where it turns north, forming part of the Afghan-Iranian border,and then dissipates into the Turkmenistan desert.

121 Helmand River.TheHelmandRiverrisesfrom the central Hindu Kush some 80kmwest ofKabulandflowssouth-westintotheSistanbasininIran.ManyofthewaterwaysinRegionalCommandSouth form part of this single drainage basin,includingtheArghandabandFarahRivers.

122 Kabul River. TheKabulRiver isthemainriverintheeast.Aswithmanyofthewaterwaysintheeasternprovinces,theKabulRiverformspartofPakistan’s IndusRivercatchment,passing throughKabul, Jalalabad and Peshawar before emptyinginto the Indus. The river exhibits significantseasonal variations, flowing at little more than atrickle during the autumn and winter months before swelling in spring as a result of melting snows.

Herat

Farah

Kandahar

Kabul

Mazar-e-Sharif

Ghazni

Peshawar

Quetta

Jalalabad

Taloqan

Kunduz

Bamyan

PAKISTAN

TAJIKISTAN

TURKMENISTAN

IRAN

UZBEKISTAN

AFGHANISTAN0 Kilometres

100 200 250

Amu Darya

Hari

FarahHelmand

Kabul

IndusRiverBasin

Helm

and

Helmand

Hari

Morghab

Khash

Farah

Arghandab

Tarnak

Kabul River

Indus

Rowd-L

urah

Afghan River Basins.

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Chapter 2 – History

• Pre-ColonialHistory

• TheFormationoftheAfghanState

• AfghanistanDuringtheColdWar

• TheSovietEpisode

• CivilWar

• TheRiseandFalloftheTaliban

• ANewBeginning

PRE-COLONIAL HISTORY201 Afghanistan’s history, politicaldevelopment,foreignrelations,andexistenceasanindependent state, have been largely determinedbyitslocationatthecrossroadsofAsia.Commonly,known as the ‘Central Asian roundabout’, wavesof migrating peoples and traders have pouredthrough the region since ancient times, leavinga diverse range of ethnic and linguistic groups.Afghanistan has also been incorporated into greatEmpireswithlargestandingarmies,manyofwhom have established temporary local control,but few of whom have succeeded in occupyingthe country for any length of time. The territory of today’s Afghanistan has over the centuries beenoccupiedbyPersians,Greeks,Mauryans,Kushans,Hepthalites(WhiteHuns),Arabs,Mongols,Turks,Hotaks,Durranis,BritishandRussians.

202 In1738acombined forceofNadirShah’sPersians and Ahmed Shah’s Durrani-PashtunsdefeatedtheGhilzaiatKandahar,thusestablishingmore than300 yearsof conflict between the twogreatPashtun tribalconfederations.Following thedeathofthePersianKingin1747,a loya jirga(grandassembly)washeldwhichappointedAhmedShahDurraniKingofthePashtunsandbestowedonhimthe title Durr-e Dawran(PearloftheAge).Overthenext twodecadesAhmedShah’s army conquered

and united a territory encompassing the entire present-day Afghanistan and Pakistan, furtherextending the Empire east into the Indian PunjabandwestintoPersianKohistan.

THE FORMATION OF THE AFGHAN STATE

203 The modern boundary of Afghanistan,however,only tookshape in the late19thcenturyas Britain and Russia sought to transform theDurrani Empire into a buffer State between thetwoEuropeancolonies.Both theBritishEmpire inIndiaand theRussians inCentralAsia confrontedtwo threats: (i) theadvanceof eachother and (ii)incursions from ‘lawless tribes’ on their fringes.Thesesecurityconcernsgaverisetoacontestforinfluence thatbecameknownas theGreatGame,the two Anglo-Afghan wars of the 19th centuryand, ultimately, the formation of the modern,independent,stateofAfghanistan.

204 Following the second Anglo-Afghanwar (1878-1880), Afghanistan was effectivelytransformedintoaBritishprotectorate.InreturnforthepaymentofalargeannualsubsidybytheBritish,AbdurRahmanKhan acceded to the demand thathe conduct all foreign affairs through the Britishadministration in India. At the same time, BritainandRussia jointlydemarcated the territoryof thenewstate,sometimeswithoutevenconsultingtheAmir. Because Afghanistan fulfilled the needs ofbothBritainandRussia,itwassustainedbyboth–regardlessofitscapacitytofulfilthecorefunctionstypicallyassociatedwithstatesurvival.

205 The British, in particular, provided AbdurRahman with weapons and cash, making it aborderline ‘rentier-state’ (see box ‘Taxation &State-building’ page 9). As a result of British aidAbdur Rahman was able to subdue more thanfortyrevoltsandbeginerectingcentralinstitutionscapable of administering his territory. The resulting state consisted of a Pashtun ruler using externalresourcestosubdue,andredistributeamongst,anethnicallydiversesociety.ThisbasicstatestructureendureduntilthefallofNajibullahin1992andtheoutbreakoftheAfghancivilwar.

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206 In 1919 Abdur Rahman’s grandson,Amanullah, initiated the third Anglo-Afghan warand won the right to conduct his own foreign affairs. However, as a result, Amanullah forfeited theBritishsubsidybringingintosharpreliefthefailureof the Afghan government to penetrate societyin order to derive revenue from the productivecapacity of its people. Rather than transformingtheir client networks into nascent institutions,AbdurRahmanhaddevotedhiseffortstoco-optingand subduing local power brokers with the help of externalmilitary aid. Recognising this, Amanullahattempted to transform the Afghan state,introducing modernising reforms in taxation, landtenure, education (including women’s education)and enabling infrastructure. However, with thewithdrawal of the subsidy he found himself unable to fund the large standing army of his forebears and,asaconsequence,defencelesswhenthetribesroseagainsthimin1928.FollowingabriefinterludewhenfirstaTajikwarlord(HabibullahKalakani)andthenaformerPrince(NadirShah)ruled,ZahirShahacceded to the throne where he reigned for 40yearsoveraremarkableperiodofstability.

THE DURAND LINEAnglo-Russiancooperationinthelate19thcenturyeffectivelydelimitedtheterritoryofthemodernstateofAfghanistan.The1893DurandLineAgreement(namedafterSirHenryMortimerDurandwhodemarcatedtheline)establishedtheeasternborderofAfghanistan,cuttingthroughthePashtuntribalareasandresultinginthecreationoftwonewPashtunterritorieswithinBritishIndia(theNorth-WestFrontierProvince(NWFP)andFederallyAdministeredTribalAreas(FATA)).AlthoughBritainclaimedsuzeraintyoverthePashtunareasonthewesternsideofthelinetheyeffectivelyremainedanun-administeredbufferbetweenAfghanistanandtheBritishRaj.

FollowingtheformationofPakistanasasuccessorstatetotheRaj,aloyajirgawasheldinAfghanistanwhichofficiallydeclaredtheDurandlineasnullandvoid,claimingthatithadbeenimposedonthePashtunsunderduress.Afghanistanarguedthat,uponpartitionofBritishIndia,thetribalareasshouldhavehadtheoptionofdeclaringindependenceasthenationofPashtunistan(whichpresumablywouldhavebeensubsequentlyintegratedintoAfghanistan).Accordingly,AfghanistanwastheonlymemberstatetovoteagainstPakistan’sadmissiontotheUNin1947.NosubsequentAfghangovernmenthasrecognisedthelineandthemovementofpeopleacrosstheborderhasremainedlargelyuncheckedbygovernmentsonbothsidesformorethanhalfacentury.

PAKISTAN

Kabul

Kandahar

Herat

Durand Line

“Pashtunistan”(disputed area

of Pakistan)

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

INDIA

IRAN

CENTRAL ASIA

The Durand Line and disputed area within Pakistan.


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AFGHANISTAN DURING THE COLD WAR207 DuringtheColdWar,theSovietUnionandUnited States, inmanyways Imperial successorsto Tsarist Russia and British India, competed forinfluence in Afghanistan thus re-establishing aGreatGameofsorts.TheUSSRbecametheleadingdonor, providing Afghanistan with $1.27 billionin economic aid and $1.25 billion in military aidin the period from1956 to 1978. In response, theUSprovided$533millionineconomicaidoverthesameperiod. Crucially, in each of the 20 years to1978,foreignincomeconstitutedmorethanathirdofstateexpenditures,risingashighas60%in1962.External revenues of this magnitude enabled thestatetoexpanditsbureaucraticapparatuscentredin Kabul without bargaining with, or being heldaccountable to, its citizens or directly confrontingrural elites. As a consequence, the stability ofthe40yearShahmonarchymaskedanunderlyingfragilityinthestate’spoliticalsettlement.

208 After 40 years of stability in whichAfghanistan had established itself as a rentier of bothColdWarprotagonists,PrimeMinisterDaoudoverthrewhiscousinZahirShahinacoup,abolishedthemonarchy, nullified the 1964 constitution, andproclaimedhimselfPresident.ThecoupusheredinaperiodofcrisisinwhichNationalists,IslamistsandCommunistscompetedforascendancy.

209 TheSoviet-sponsoredPeople’sDemocraticParty of Afghanistan (PDPA) consisted of twodistinct factions:Khalq (themasses)andParcham(the flag). In what was to become an importantdistinction, Khalq recruited mainly from Pashtunsof rural background whereas Parcham attractedmembers from the Dari-speaking urban elite.Around the same time an Islamic movement,Jamiat-i-Islami(JI),begantogaininfluence.In1973the movement formed a leadership shura underthe chairmanship of BurhanuddinRabbani, deputyleadershipofAbuSayyafandstudentleadershipofGulbuddinHekmatyar,allofwhomwentontoplaymajorrolesinthesubsequent30yearsofwarfarethat was to grip the state. Daoud proceeded to repressJI, forcingRabbaniandHekmatyar tofleetoPakistanwheretheylinkedupwiththePakistani

Islamic Society, the Saudi-based and fundedMuslim World League (Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami)and Egyptian-basedMuslim Brotherhood (Jamaatal-Ikhwanal-Muslimin).

TAXATION AND STATE-BUILDINGHistorically,bargainingbetweengovernmentsandtaxpayershasplayedacentralroleinstateformation.Whengovernmentsdependonalargenumberoftaxpayersforrevenuetheyhaveincentivestopromotebroadprosperity,andtodevelopbureaucraciescapableofcollectingandadministeringtaxeseffectively.Thisnotonlyhelpsbuildstatecapacitybutengagescitizenspolitically.Inexchangeforcompliancewithtaxation,taxpayersdemandsomeformofinfluenceovertheuseofrevenueand,assuch,aredrawnintopublicpolicy–makinggovernmentsmoreresponsivetotheirexpectations.

However,thenegativepropositionisalsotrue.Wherethestateislessdependentoncitizensforrevenuetherearefewincentivestopromotebroadeconomicdevelopmentortodeliverontheexpectationsofthepopulation.Thisisparticularlythecasein‘rentier’statessufferingfromthe‘resourcecurse’wherelargerevenuesareobtaineddirectlyfromextractionindustries.However,whilsttheresourcecurseiswell-documented,thesamelessonsapplytostateswhoserevenuesrelyheavilyonforeignaidorthepresenceofinternationaltroopsbothofwhichmakeitdifficulttodevelopasocialcontractwiththebroadersociety.

Ofthefiftydevelopingcountriessurveyedinthe1970sAfghanistanhadthesecondlowesttaxeffort(theratioofactualtaxrevenuestoestimatedtaxablecapacity).

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210 On 27 April 1978 the Communistsousted Daoud in a military coup, establishingthe Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).Howeverwithinafewmonthsinternecinefightingbetween the Khalq and Parcham factions ledto widespread instability and a breakdown of governanceovermuchofthecountry.TheIslamists,in their Pakistani exile, declared jihad against thegoverning Communists and began to infiltratetheirlocaldistrictstoinciterevolt.Facedwiththepossiblefailureoftheirbufferstate,theUSSRsentin a ‘limited contingent’ of troops to stabilise thecountry.TheSovietselaboratedanewprogramofcounterinsurgencyagainsttheIslamist‘mujahideen’and governance reform in support of the PDPA.However, by 1981 the ‘limited’ intervention hadgrowntoover100,000troopsandwastoremainatsimilarlevelsfortherestofthe1980s.Inresponse,the US steadily increased its military aid to themujahideen (matched dollar for dollar by SaudiArabia)fromalowof$50millionin1981toahighof$630millionby1987.Throughouttherestofthe1980sthetwosuperpowers,engagedinwhatwasto become the endgame of the ColdWar, pouredsophisticatedweapons andmassive quantities ofcashintoeverysocialnetworktheycouldrecruitinAfghanistan.As a consequence, actors frombothsidesoftheColdWarpenetratedandsubsequentlydevastatedAfghansociety.

Afghanistan has now been the site of continuous violent conflict for the past 35

years and it is against this backdrop that the present war must be understood.

THE SOVIET EPISODE211 Like the British 100 years before, thegoal of protecting their Empire by stabilising the rentierstateontheirbordersdrewtheSovietsintoAfghanistan.TheRedArmyinstalledBabrakKarmal,aParchami,asgeneralsecretaryof thePDPAandpresident of Afghanistan and began to moderate the revolutionary programs of the Khalqis whichhadpushedthecountryintoopenrevolt.TheSovietstate-building program was predicated on the

attempt to establish a centralised state apparatus in Kabul. Rather than penetrate the countrysidewithnewsocialstructures,theSovietsenactedthelong-established Afghan state-building strategyof ‘encapsulation’, relyingonpatronage tovariousqawms,whichretainedtheiruniqueidentities.

“We’ve proved it again and again, that if once you have paid him the Dane-geld you never

get rid of the Dane.”

- Rudyard Kipling

ENCAPSULATION VS PENETRATIONSuccessfulstate-buildingtypicallyinvolvesaprocessofadministrativeandpoliticalpenetrationofsocietyatalllevelsinordertoregulatebehaviour,extractresources(i.e.taxation),establishamonopolyonthelegitimateuseofviolenceandstrengthenstate-societyrelations.Penetrationis,therefore,theprocessofestablishingthecontrol,presence,authorityandvisibilityoftheStatewithinruralorotherwiseisolatedcommunitiesattheperipheryofformalpoliticalprocesses.

However,thehistory,geographyandethnicdiversityofAfghanistanhasconsistentlyservedtohampertheprocessofStatepenetration,withsuccessivegovernmentsconfinedlargelytothemainurbancentres.ThefailuretoextendtheapparatusoftheStatetolocallevelsanddisplaceolder,traditional,formsofadministrationcanthreatenthesurvivaloftheState.Asaconsequence,Afghanleadershavetypicallypursuedaprocessofencapsulationoflocalsourcesofauthorityandlegitimacy.Inthepast,thisinvolvedtheco-optionofthetribesthroughpatronagetothemalaksandkhans.


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212 In addition to governance and securitysector reform, the Soviets instituted a wide-ranging economic program aimed at increasing theefficiencyandprofitabilityofstateenterprises.Notwithstanding this, profitability declined andso too the tax base. Agriculture remained themajor productive activity yet, due to the lack ofstate penetration of the countryside, contributedvirtually nothing to thefiscal base. In fact, duringtheoccupation, statefinancesbecameevenmoredependentonexternalsupportandtaxesprovidedlessthanaquarteroftotalgovernmentexpenditure.Rentier income (now almost exclusively fromcommunist-bloc states), increased from 40% ofgovernmentexpenditurepriortothePDPAcouptoabove60%aftertheSovietinvasion.

213 AnoverridingconcernofboththeSovietsand the PDPA was the attempt to establish theIslamic bonafides of the government.Governmentdecrees increasingly invoked Allah. Aid wasdirected to theconstructionofmosques, religiouseducation andevena subsidy for theannual hajj.However,theseeffortsmetwithlittlesuccess.Farfrom stabilising the situation, the reliance of thePDPA on an avowedly atheist regime helped turnlocal uprisings against the new domestic order into anationwidejihadattractingsignificantamountsofforeign support.

214 Whilst the Soviets financed their PDPAclients, the US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia usedaidtothemujahideentoblockthem.However,theissueofwhatkindofgovernmentshouldreplacethePDPAwouldhavesplinteredtheanti-Sovietalliancesothealliancedidnotdevelopapoliticalstrategy,preferring to focus on the tactical objectiveof imposing costs on the Russians. The US, inparticular, was indifferent about which groupsmighthavemorepopularsupportorbemorelikelytoformastablegovernmentshouldthejihadsucceed.Pakistan took advantage of the latitude affordedthem by the US and systematically weakenedmoderate,nationalistsgroupswhilstfavouringthemost radical Islamist ones. Pakistani authoritieschose to officially recognise only six mujahideen

groupsoutofthedozenscompetingforaid(knownasthe‘PeshawarSeven’afteraseventhwasaddedat the insistence of Saudi Arabia), all of whichwere religious,asopposed toPashtun-nationalist,in orientation. Of these, themost radical Islamistparties(inparticular,theISI-preferredHezb-i-IslamiGulbuddin (HIG) founded by Hekmatyar in 1976after falling out with the JI leadership) benefiteddisproportionately,receivingthelargestquantitiesof aid and weapons. Significantly, the PakistaniDirectorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)deliberately marginalised traditionalist Pashtungroups, especially the Durrani, who had longclaimed sovereignty over Pashtun homelandson the Pakistani side of theDurand Line (none ofthe sevenofficialmujahideenpartieswere ledbyDurrani Pashtuns). In addition, the ISI providedtraininginbothconventionalandirregularwarfaretoover80,000mujahideenduringthecourseofthe Sovietoccupation.

215 The relationship between mujahideencommanders and traditional social structures varied greatly according to both local conditions

QAWMThepast30yearsofwarfare,however,hasunderminedtheauthorityoftraditionaltriballeadersinmanydistricts,replacingtheoncedominantformofsocialorganisationwithapatchworkofgroupsallcompetingfortheallegianceofthelocalpopulation.Increasingly,thetermqawm(aPashtuwordreferringtoanyformofsocialsolidarity)isused,ratherthantribetodescribeapersonsgroupaffiliation.Affiliationmaybebasedonimmediatekinshipbonds,widertribalidentity,village,occupationorsharedhistory.Astrongsocialbondintoday’sAfghanistanisthatofsharedmembershipofaparticularmujahideenpartyduringtheSovietoccupation.

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and the availability of external resources to thecommander.Atoneextreme,HIGoperatedinvirtualautonomy refusing to consult with local leaders unlesstheywerealsoHIGpartymembers.DuetoHIG’s preponderance in the Pashtun heartland ofthe south-east, the jihad saw the circumventionand gradual erosion of traditional Pashtun tribalpower.Ontheotherhand,Massoud,ensconcedinthePanjsherValleynorthofKabul,institutionalisedcouncils of both elders and ulema (religiousscholars), creating a significant regional disparityin the degree of social penetration between the northern and the southern jihad. The mujahideeninthenorthernTajikareas,inparticular,developedextensive local organisations culminating in theSupervisory Council of the North, whereas thesouth and east remained fragmented amongst several smallermujahideen groupsmost ofwhichremained autonomous from traditional leaders.

Ahmad Shah Massoud. Photo: Source unknown.

216 Despite massive Soviet offensives,a military stalemate quickly developed. ThegovernmentcontrolledKabulandothermajortownswhilst themujahideen operated freely inmuch ofthe countryside. Whilst the insurgency did notposeanexistential threat to thePDPA, theabilityof the resistance to restrict government accessto rural areas hindered the state-building effort.As a consequence, the governmentwas leftwithno option but to pursue a process of patronage towhatever sources of authority and power theycouldfindatalocallevel.

THE EROSION OF TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURESFollowingthecommunisttake-over,thegoverningKhalqifactionofthePDPAceasedtousethekhansasintermediaries,choosingtotreatthemasfeudalclassenemies.Manywerekilledorarrestedandthosewhichescapedthepurgelostasignificantamountoftheirtraditionalpower.AstheSovietoccupationgotunderway,flowsofaidtoradicalIslamistgroupsfromtheanti-Sovietalliancefurthererodedthesetraditions.By1992,fifteenyearsofpenetrationbybothsidesoftheColdWaralliancesystemhadreplacedtheancientregimeofkhansandulemawithapatchworkofradicalmujahideen,warlords,druglords,ethnicnationalistsandtrans-nationalcriminalgroups.

217 Despite the success of the insurgency,(especially after the US began supplying themujahideen with FIM-92 ‘Stinger’ surface-to-airmissiles),theSoviet’sdecidedtowithdrawlargelyfor domestic political reasons as opposed to military defeat. This follows a standard pattern of insurgentvictories,whereguerrillasavoiddecisiveconfrontationinordertodrawouttheconflictandsapthepoliticalwillofcounterinsurgents(seeboxonpage13).Thewithdrawalbeganon15May1988culminatingsomeninemonthslateron15February1989. During the decade–long Soviet occupationa million of Afghanistan’s 15 million pre-warinhabitantswerekilled.5millionhadsoughtasylumin neighbouring countries and a further 2 millionwere internally displaced within the country’sborders.OncetheSovietsleft,asituationofroughequivalenceprevailed–bothColdWarprotagonistsaided and armed their clients (positive symmetry)untiltheendof1991whentheUSandnowdefunctUSSRagreedtoceaseallmilitaryaidtothecountry(negativesymmetry).

AFGHANISTAN


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218 WiththewithdrawaloftheSovietmilitaryfrom the countryside, agriculture began to revive.Muchofthistooktheformofopiumgrowing,heroinrefining and smuggling, organised by mujahideenand Pakistani drug syndicates. Commanders inthesouth,flushwithopiumrevenues, increasinglybehaved like traditional khans or, moredescriptively, warlords. Under a system knownasSalaam,opiumwarlordsbeganpayingcashforthe crop at the time of sowing and collecting the harvestedproductdirectlyfromthe‘farmgate’.Assuch,opiumbegantosubstituteforcreditaswellasincomeandreducedsignificantlyarangeofrisksincurred by the farmer – risks from crop failure,from the threat of eradication and risks incurred whilst transporting the product along insecure publicroads.Whilefarmer’sprofitmarginsonillicitcropswere broadly similar to conventional crops,thelatterwereoftenstolenbycriminalsor‘taxed’bymujahideen,warlords, or corrupt policemen onthe way to market.

THE ROLE OF PROTRACTION IN INSURGENT STRATEGYOn25April1975,5daysbeforethefallofSaigon,USColonelHarrySummerswasinHanoileadingaUSdelegationtotheNorthVietnamesecapital.DuringthevisitheremarkedtohisNorthVietnamesecounterpart,ColonelNguyenDonTu,‘you know, you never beat us on the battlefield’.TheNorthVietnameseofficerthoughtforamoment,thenreplied: ‘That may be so, but it is also irrelevant’.

219 After the Soviets left, the PDPA soughtnottodislodgeordestroymujahideencommandersand local warlords but, where possible, to co-opt and incorporate them. In short Najibullah(Presidentfrom1988-1992)pursuedthestrategyofencapsulation that had been the modus operandii ofgovernmentssincetheformationoftheAfghanstate. And just like them, he was successful solong as the external resources continued to flow.

Howeverwiththe loss ofSovietaidin1991,aStatethat had been reliant on external resources sinceits inception in the 19th century suddenly facedthe realisation that it had few additional sources ofrevenueand,assuch,littlecapacitytocontinueits program of patronage and redistribution in the countryside.ThesubsequentcollapseoftheAfghanState and outbreak of civil war left Afghanistanan ungoverned land in which regional powers (inparticular, Pakistan, India, Iran and Saudi Arabia)sponsored different warring factions in order to pursue a policy of strategic depth against each other. Once again, Afghanistan became the siteof violent conflict in which external powers usedproxiesfortheirrivalry.

THE CIVIL WAR

220 The collapse of the Soviet Union inDecember1991 led to the cessationof aid to thePDPA. Almost immediately, the Uzbek-dominatednorthern army led by General Dostum mutiniedagainstNajibullahandalliedwithMassoud’sTajik-dominated mujahideen, seizing Mazar-e-Sharifand gaining control of most military installations between Mazar and Kabul. Rivalry betweenMassoud in the north andHekmatyar in the eastbecameassociatedwith theKhalqi-Parchamisplitin thePDPAandbegan to takeon thedimensionsof an ethnic conflict between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns.

221 Oncethestatedissolved,thearmedforceswere absorbed into the ethnic conflict with Dari-speakingParchamiunitscomingunderthecommandof Dostum orMassoud in the north, and Pashtu-speakingKhalqiUnitscrossingovertoHekmatyar.After a decade in which religion and resistance were the dominant themes of the war, ethnicityre-emerged as a powerful driver of conflict. Thestruggle for power came to be associated with four regional-ethnicforces:

• Uzbeks–centredaroundMazar-e-Sharif,underDostum.

• Tajiks–centredinthePanjshirValleyandthenorth-east,underMassoud.

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• Hazaras–oftheHizb-e-Wahdat,underMazari,centredinthecentralHazarajatandsupportedby Iran.

• Pashtuns–ofthesouthandeast,largelyunderGulbuddin Hekmatyar’s and Maulawi Khalis’srivalHezb-i-Islamifactions,aswellasavarietyof local leaders.

Hazara Fighters (Hezb-e-Wahdat). Photo: Source unknown.

222 Inwhatwastobecometheopeningsalvosof a four year civil war, the forces of Massoud,Dostum and Mazari (i.e. the United Islamic Frontfor the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIP) or, morecommonly,NorthernAlliance)expelledHekmatyar’sPashtunsfromthecapital.Thewarwasparticularlyvicious.Hekmatyar’sforces,supportedbyPakistan,unleashed violent bombardments of Kabul whichhad been virtually untouched during the Sovietoccupation. Kabul’s city centre was reduced torubble and its population which numbered more than 2 million in 1992 was reduced to less than500,000 by 1996. Nonetheless, Hekmatyar wasultimately too weak to seize the capital and astalemate ensued. Rabbani, supported by theNorthernAllianceproclaimedtheestablishmentofthe IslamicStateofAfghanistan.However,whilstthis entitymayhavebeen Islamic itwashardlyaState.Ithadnoincomeandlittlecontrolovermostofthecountry–mostoftherankandfilemujahideenremained in their villageswhere their powerwasonly disputed by local rivals and, crucially, not bythecentralgovernment.

223 No one had any reason to secede fromsuch an impotent state and, as a consequence,

regional-ethnic forces continued to operate invirtual autonomyand collect for themselvesmostoftherevenue-generatingcapacityofthecountry.Inthevillages,competitionamongstwarlords,druglords and criminal groups contributed to the anarchy andtheunravellingofanancienttribalsociety.

Kabul during the Civil War (1992-1996). Photo: Source unknown.

224 Both the Soviet occupation and thesubsequent CivilWar shattered the social norms,national institutions and local leadership structures of traditional Afghan society. In the wake of the devastation, the madrassa (Islamic schools)networks were left as the only institutions capable ofgeneratingtiesamongstsignificanteliteswhilstsimultaneously penetrating the countryside. However, these had become radicalised bydecades of interference from Pakistanwhich hadpursued a policy of raising a generation of Islamist fighterstoserveonthebattlefieldsofAfghanistanand Kashmir. It was from these newly radicalised madrassas that the next chapter in the Afghanconflictwastoemergewiththeriseofapreviouslyunknown group of students (talebs) and mullahsthatweretocallthemselvestheTaliban.

THE RISE & FALL OF THE TALIBAN

225 Seeking proxies for his conflicts inAfghanistan and Kashmir, Pakistan’s General Zia(1977-1988) financed the constructionof hundredsof madrassas in order to train a generation of youngPashtuns in thepreceptsofan increasinglyradicalised form of Deobandism and prepare them

AFGHANISTAN


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forjihad.TheTalibanfirstemergedasanidentifiablemovement from within these madrassas and thevarious Afghan refugee camps within Pakistan.Theirprimaryobjectivesweretorestorepeaceandenforceshari’a lawinanAfghanistan increasinglyfracturedbycivilwar.

SALAFISM, WAHHABISM & DEOBANDISMSalafism

SalafismisanIslamicrevivalistmovementwhichadvocatesareturntothefundamentalvaluesandpracticesofthefirstthreegenerations:theSahaba(companions),theTabi‘un(followers)andtheTabi‘al-Tabi‘in(thoseafterthefollowers).InthesamewaythatChristianfundamentalistmovementsvalorisethebeliefsandpracticesoftheearlychurch,SalafistsbelievethatIslamwasperfectandcompleteduringthedaysofMuhammad,butthatundesirableinnovationshavebeenaddedoverthecenturiesduetosecularculturalinfluences.Forexample,theSufiandShiapracticeofveneratingsaintsandconstructingtombsoverprophet’sgravesareseenasheretical‘polytheistic’innovationsbySalafists.

InrecenttimesSalafismhasenjoyedare-emergenceespeciallywithinmarginalisedimmigrantgroupsinEuropeandIslamicfightersinAfghanistan,Kashmir,thePhilippinesandelsewherelookingforaunifyingcause.Salafismhasprovedattractivetothesegroupsbecauseofitsclaimtoauthenticityandmoralsuperiorityanditsofferofanemotionalattachmenttoapan-Islamicidentity.

ThepopularityofSalafismamongyoungmenhasresultedinaphenomenon

knownasSalafiBurnout,wherebyyoungmilitantsorextremistsgraduallyloseinterestinthefanaticismoftheiryouthbecomingonlyminimallyobservantinmiddleage.

Wahhabism

Althoughpre-datingtheSalafimovement,Wahhabismcouldbeconsidereda(narrow)formofSalafismpracticedinSaudiArabiaandexportedfromthereintothewiderIslamicdiaspora.Thenamederivesfromthefounderofthemovement,MuhammadIbnabd-al-Wahhab(1703-1792).AfterhisdeathWahhab’steachingsreceivedStatesponsorshipunderthehouseofSaudwhichhelpedtransformhisideasfirstintoaStatereligionandthenaworldwidemovement.

Deobandism

DeobandismemergedasareactionbyorthodoxMuslimscholarstoBritishcolonialisminthewakeoftheIndianMutinyinthemid-19thcentury.Whilsttherearemanysimilarities,scholarsdisagreeastowhethertheDeobandimovementconstitutesaformofSalafism(mostofthestricterSalafigroupscriticiseDeobandismascontaininghereticalinnovations).FollowingthepartitionofBritishIndia,theDeobandimovementestablishedseveralmadrassasinPakistan,trainingacorpsofulemacapableofissuingfatwasonallaspectsofdailylifeandmonitoringsociety’sconformitywiththeirprescriptions.DuringtheSovietoccupationofAfghanistan,DeobandimadrassaswithinPakistanbecameincreasinglyradicalisedbyexposuretoArabWahhabifighters.

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226 Largely as a consequence of Pakistanisupport, Taliban forces advanced rapidly throughsouthern andeasternAfghanistan, capturingSpinBoldakandKandaharinlate1994beforeadvancingonthecapital.Inearly1995theTalibanmettherearelementsofHekmatyar’sforcesbesiegingKabulandwereabletodefeatthemlargelybecauseMassoudkept the HIG front lines pinned down. FollowingthedefeatofHIG,Talibanrankswerebolsteredbythe recruitment of many of Hekmatyar’s Pashtunfightersas,onceagain, theadvanceofa regionalforce on the capital brought ethnic loyalties into play. Over the course of the next four years theTalibangraduallyconqueredmoreofthecountryasfirstHerat,thenKabul,Bamiyan,Mazar-e-SharifandfinallyTaloqanfell.ByJanuary2001amemorandumfromNationalSecurityAdvisor,RichardClarke, toCondoleezza Rice stated: “the Northern Alliance may be effectively taken out this spring when fighting resumes after the winter thaw”.

227 Theearly Taliban rodeawaveof popularsupport as they began to articulate the war-weariness of the Afghan public. Deeply disillusioned with the factionalism, criminality and personalambitions of the mujahideen leaders, the Talibanpromoted itself as a new force for honesty, unityand a return to fundamental Islamic values. Theirpublic relations campaign consisted of:

1. Denouncing the failure of the mujahideento establish security in the provinces whilstprovidingsecurityinTaliban-administeredareasthrough disarming the warlords and much of the populationofheavyweapons.

2. Re-establishing a justice system andimmediately charging a number of high-profileformer mujahideen commanders with crimessuch as theft and rape.

3. Imposing a conservative interpretation ofshari’a law, particularly regarding dresscodes (both men and women), entertainment(cinemas, music, TV, sport, etc), adultery(punishedbystoning todeath), theft (punishedbytheamputationofhandsandfeet)andmurder

(punishedbypublicexecution).

4. Removing checkpoints which had long beenextortingmoneyfromtravellersandrefusingtotakebribesthemselves.

5. Denouncing the drugs trade and (at leastinitially)banningthecultivationofpoppy.

228 Despite the harshness of the measures,locals continued to support themovement as theproviders of a long-awaited security and stabilityandareturntotraditionalvalues.Inparticular,themovement attracted support fromgroups seekingelevated status in a new Taliban-administeredAfghanistan.Assuch,theTalibanattractedsupportfrom Pashtuns (vice the Tajiks who held nominalpower in Kabul during the civil war). Of these,traditionallymarginalised Pashtun groups such asthe Ghilzai confederation and the Panjpai Durranisub-confederation constituted the core of theirleadership.Notably,therewerefewZirakDurranisin key Taliban command positions and the Taliban failedtoattractpopularsupportamongstthe‘royal’Popalzai and Barakzai tribes, who favoured moremoderate,traditionalformsofgovernance.

WHAT’S IN A NAME: THE TALIBAN?Ataleb(Arabicfor‘student’)isastudentwhoseeksknowledge,asopposedtoanulemaormullahwhogivesknowledge.Thenamereflectstherootsofthemovementwithinrural,displaced,impoverishedandotherwisemarginalisedmadrassastudentswithinsouthernAfghanistanandrefugeecampsinPakistan

229 Once established, the Taliban quicklyswitched from popular measures designed to generatesupporttorepressivemeasuresdesignedtoenforceastrictobservancewith their religiousdecrees. The central instrument in their repression was the brutal religious police Amr Bil Maroof Wa Nahi An al-Munkar (Ministry for the Promotionof Virtue and Suppression of Vice) who wereresponsible for the monitoring of society and the enforcement of shari’a. Groups who came in for

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particularly close scrutiny included Hazaras (whosuffered ethnic cleansing at the hands of the Taliban),women (whowere banned fromwork oreven leaving the house without male relatives),Kabulis (who were thought to be irredeemablysecular and corrupt), Tajiks and Uzbeks (whoconstitutedtherankandfileoftheNorthernAlliance)andZirakDurranis(inparticularthe‘royal’PopalzaiandBarakzaitribeswhowerethetraditional‘classenemies’ of theGhilzai confederation fromwhomtheTalibanattractedmostoftheirsupport).

230 PerhapsasaresultofthelackofscholarlyinputintoearlyTalibanideology(MohammedOmarwasapoorvillagemullahwithlittleeducationandnoprestigioustriballineage),themovementquicklycame under the influence of outside forces suchas the ISI and Wahhabi Arabs left behind aftertheSovietwar.Chief of theseexternal influenceswasthealQaedamovement.WiththeriseoftheTaliban,OsamabinLadenreturnedtoAfghanistanand immediately began organising old Arab fighters, recruiting new ones and re-invigoratingthe network of jihadist training camps near thePakistaniborder.InbinLaden’snetworktheTalibanreceived a sizable, experienced and competentfightingforceorganisedintoaspecialunit,Brigade55. which supported them in several of theirbloodiestoffensivesagainsttheNorthernAlliance.ThroughsupportingtheTaliban,binLadenreceivedan entire country as a base of operations for global jihadandtolaunchattacksagainsttheUSanditsallies(between1996and2001,AlQaedatrainedanestimated 30,000 militants). The nexus betweenlocal Pashtun Deobandism and global Wahhabiterrorism finally began to attract the securityconcerns of the US and the wider internationalcommunity.

231 In 2000 the UN Security Council passedResolution 1333 imposing a complete arms banon the Taliban, the closing of terrorist trainingcamps and the seizure of Taliban assets outsideAfghanistan. As international pressure against the Taliban mounted, exiled leaders such as Dostum,Ismail Khan and others returned to take up arms under the leadership of Massoud. September2001 proved the turning point. On 4 September,WashingtonhostedthefirstPrincipals-levelmeetingacross relevant departments to discuss terrorismin which it was agreed to begin supplying arms to

EARLY TALIBAN PROPAGANDA: The Shroud of Muhammud

InApril1996,MullahMuhammadOmarorchestratedapropagandacoupthatrippledacrossthemujahideencommunity.InordertoestablishhisIslamiccredentialsandattractnewrecruits,Omarturnedtothelegendoftheprophet’scloak.ThecloakwashousedinKandahar’sKhirkaSharif,oneoftheholiestplacesinAfghanistan,andtheshrineofthefounderoftheDurranidynasty,AhmadShahDurrani.AnAfghanlegendheldthatwhoeverretrievedthecloakfromtheshrinewouldbeAmiral-Mu’minin(commanderofthefaithful).Omarremovedthecloakfromtheshrineand,perchinghimselfatoponeofthebuildingsinKandaharCity,proceededtowrapandunwrapthecloakfromaroundhimselfinfrontofalargecrowdofonlookers.ThecloakceremonyendedwithadeclarationofjihadagainsttheNorthernAlliance,andthosepresentsworebayat(allegiance)toOmar.

ADDENDUM: Missed Opportunity for ISAF

Unfortunately,in2007therewaslittlecoverageofthedecisionbytheeldersofKandahartoformallystripMullahOmarofthecloakandthecorresponding

AFGHANISTAN

titleAmiral-Mu’mininforhisun-Islamicactions.ThisconstitutedalostopportunityforamajorpropagandavictoryovertheTaliban.


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Massoud’sNorthernAlliance.Some5dayslater,onSeptember 9, two al Qaeda operatives posing asTunisian television journalistsblewthemselvesupwhilstinterviewingMassoud,therebystrippingtheUSofitsgreatestpotentialallyinAfghanistanpriorto al Qaeda’s attack in the US homeland. Finally,barelytwoweeksfollowingthe9/11attacks,HamidKarzai, the exiled Popalzai tribal leader, togetherwith a few friends and supporters, headed intoAfghanistan, thus beginning a newchapter in thecountry’s30yearconflict.

The attacks on the World Trade Centre, 11 September 2001. Photo: Source unknown.

A NEW BEGINNINGThe Collapse of the Taliban

232 TheUSwaragainst theTalibanbeganonOctober 7 2001. Despite amassing over 60,000men, including approximately 9,000 Pakistanis,the Taliban collapsed within a matter of days. Following significant bombardment in the weekspreceding the attack, CIA and Northern Allianceforces captured the strategically important city of Mazar-e-Sharif on November 10. Within threedaysofthefallofMazar,NorthernAllianceforceshad taken most of the significant urban centresin northern, western and central Afghanistan,includingBamiyan(November11),Herat(November12)andKabul(November13).

233 Inthesouth,Karzai,withonlyafewdozenfighters was attempting to rally support amongthe Pashtuns in Uruzgan when he found himselfsurroundedbyTalibanfighters.UnwillingtoriskthedeathoftheonlysignificantPashtunleaderresistingtheTaliban,aUSSpecialForcesteamextractedhimforafewdayswhilsthismentookTarinKowt.Fromthere,KarzainegotiatedthesurrenderofKandaharwhere the Taliban senior leadership had retreated. For his part,Mullah Omar prolonged negotiationslong enough for the majority of Taliban fighters

THE CO-OPTION OF THE TALIBAN“Like so many mujahideen I believed in the Taliban when they first appeared in 1994 and promised to end warlordism, establish law and order and then call a Loya Jirga to decide who should rule Afghanistan. The first Taliban I met told me that the jihad had become a disgrace and the civil war was destroying the country. After the Taliban captured Kandahar, I gave them $50,000 to help them out, and then handed them a cache of weapons I had hidden near Kandahar … they were good people initially, but the tragedy was that very soon after they were taken over by the ISI and became a proxy … I realised what was happening when I was called into the Pakistani Foreign Office to discuss the modalities for my becoming the Taliban envoy at the UN. Can you imagine it? Pakistan was setting up the Taliban’s diplomatic corps. I refused and walked out. Later the Taliban were to come under the influence of al Qaeda. That is when I began to organise against them. In 1998 I warned the Americans and the British many, many times that Osama bin Laden was now playing a leadership role within the Taliban, but who was listening? Nobody”

- Hamid Karzai, September 2001


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holed up in the city to escape across the border to Pakistan,backtotherefugeecampsandmadrassasfromwherethemovementfirstarose.

Interim Government

234 As the Taliban collapsed, internationalattention turned to state-building. Kofi Annanappointed one of the UN’s most experiencedenvoys,LakhdarBrahimi,asSpecialRepresentativeof the Secretary General (SRSG) and tasked himtodevelopa transitionalplan for thecountry.Theplan called for a meeting of Afghan leaders and international negotiators to appoint an interim governmentassoonaspossible.Themeetingtookplace in Bonn, Germany. Amidst unprecedentedregionalcooperationbetweenIran,Russia,Pakistan,India,theUSandEurope,internationalnegotiatorseventuallyforcedanagreementbetweencompetingAfghanfactions.TheBonnAgreementcalledfora“broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic, fully representative government”. It also developed aroadmap for the establishment of the structures of amodern,democraticstate,includingafunctioningbureaucracy, legal system and security forces.Key milestones included the convening of a loyajirga to ratify the interim government, followedbydemocraticelectionsandasecondloyajirgatodevelopanewAfghanconstitution.

235 Despite the appointment of Karzai (asouthern Pashtun) as interim President, BonnrepresentedavictoryfortheNorthernAlliancewhoemerged from the conference holding the crucial ministries of defence, interior, intelligence andforeign affairs. Ethnic representation in the interim cabinet consisted of 11 Pashtuns (mainly fromthenorth),8Tajiks,5Hazaraand3Uzbeks.Apartfrom Karzai himself, no southern Pashtuns wererepresented.Crucially,theBonnAgreementdidnotconstitutea formalpeaceaccordbetweenvictorsandvanquished.TheTalibanwerenotrepresentedat the conference as they had not accepted defeat. SafelyensconcedintheirnewPakistanisanctuary,theoustedregimebeganregrouping,raisingfunds,re-arming and planning the next phase in theconflict.

Afghanistan conference in Bonn, Germany. Photo: Source unknown.

236 The Emergency Loya Jirga envisaged bythe Bonn Agreement was held in Kabul in 2002.Zahir Shah, the 87 year old exiled King, returnedto Afghanistan to open proceedings. Some 1000electedand500appointeddelegatesattendedwhatturned out to be themost broadly representativebodytogatherinthecountry’shistory.Afghansfrompracticallyeveryethnicgroup,tribeandcommunity(including several women) were represented.Despite several days of debate, Karzai was re-appointed and his cabinet returned with only minor changes. Following the success of the loya jirga,anotherassemblywasconvenedinDecember2003to draft a new constitution. Once again the jirgarepresentedabroadcrosssectionofAfghanistan’sethnic groups and political factions. The assembly decided to adopt a presidential system with a highly centralisedexecutive (rather thanaparliamentarysystem inwhichpowerwouldbedevolved to theregionsthroughtheirrepresentatives).TheresultingconstitutionwasbasedlargelyonZahirShah’s1964versionwiththeofficeofPresidentsubstitutingforthat of the King.

“Our country is nothing but a ruined land. Oh God! The journey is long and I am a novice.

I need your help”.

- Hamid Karzai’s Inauguration Speech



237 For their part, international donorsagreed to fund the establishment of a new Afghan National Army and to facilitate the restructuringoftheMinistryofDefencetoachieveproportionalrepresentationofethnicgroupsinkeyposts(priortothejirga30outof33directorateswerecontrolledby Panjsheeri Tajiks). However, around the sametime, the US began funding and arming localmilitiasinordertoprotectbasesandsupplyroutes,creatingovernightmillionairesandparallelsecuritystructures which threatened to undermine the developmentofstatesecurity forces.Against thisbackdroptheUNAssistanceMissioninAfghanistan(UNAMA)intervened,holdingaconferenceinTokyoatwhichtheydevelopedacomprehensiveplanforthe disarming, demobilisation and reintegration(DDR) of the militia, entitled Afghanistan’s New Beginning’s Program. The UNAMA plan, whichbegan in October 2003, called for the banning ofallmilitiaandprovidedforUS$200,foodpackagesand alternative livelihoods (agricultural products,jobs, skills training etc) for every militiaman whosurrenderedhisweapons.By theendof2004 theUNAMA program had succeeded in disarmingover 60,000 of Afghanistan’s estimated 100,000militiamen. In addition, several warlords runningtheirownprivatearmieshadhandedintheirtanksandartilleryorbeensackedfromseniorgovernmentposts.

238 The high point of Afghanistan’s newevolution came with the country’s first everpresidential election in 2004 in which Afghansturnedoutinlargenumbers(includingmanywomen).While 18 candidates qualified for the ballot, only4 constituted serious contenders. In addition toKarzai, these includedYunusQanuni (aPanjsheeriTajikwho fought underMassoud), RashidDostum(theUzbekwarlordwhocontrolledMazarduringtheCivilWar)andtheHazaraleaderHajjiMohammadMohaqiq. The election was successful in that itwas not marred by significant violence, deemedrelatively credible by international observers andproducedaclearwinner,HamidKarzai,with55%oftheapproximately8millionvotescast.

The Inauguration of President Karzai. Photo: Source unknown.

239 Legislative elections were held thefollowing year. As a result of President Karzai’sdecision to disallow the listing of political parties on ballot papers, candidates were forced to runas individuals. Many voters knew little aboutthe candidates they were asked to vote for andturnout proved to be substantially lower thanthe presidential elections the previous year. Theresulting legislature quickly became the centre ofopposition to the Karzai administration (similar tothe relationship between the White House andCongress in the US system), refusing to ratify anumber of executive appointments and criticisingtheadministration’srecordofachievement.

Reconstruction & Development

240 Next the government and internationalcommunity began to focus on the reconstruction and long-term development of Afghanistan. HamidKarzai, Kofi Annan and Tony Blair co-chaired aninternational conference in London in which 66Statesand15internationalorganisationspledgedtosupport anAfghanNationalDevelopment Strategy(an interim draft of which was presented at theconference)withUS$10.5billionoverthecourseoffiveyears.Theagreement(knownastheAfghanistanCompact) established a number of benchmarksacross three critical and inter-dependent areas ofactivity: (i)security, (ii)governance, ruleof lawandhumanrights,(iii)economicandsocialdevelopment.The Compact also provided for the creation of a

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Joint Coordination&MonitoringBoard (JCMB) tomonitorprogresstowardthegoalsandevaluatetheeffectivenessoftheaidbeingprovided.

241 Following the London conference theAfghan government drafted the Afghan NationalDevelopment Strategy (ANDS) 2008-2013. Thisstrategy was completed after two years of extensive consultations around the country andrepresented a comprehensive five year planfor meeting the benchmarks articulated in the Compact. In addition, it served as the country’sPoverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) helpingsecuredebtrelieffromtheIMFandloansfromtheWorldBank.

Counterinsurgency & Stabilisation

242 In the years following the publication of the ANDS, progress in the country was slow.Development in the south was hampered bythe rise of a virulent insurgencywhich led to thewithdrawal of many development agencies andnon-governmentorganisations(NGO’s)fromremotedistricts.PoliticaltransformationstalledasaresultofaconsciousdecisionbyPresidentKarzaitobeginforginganAnti-Talibanallianceofregionalpower-brokers capable of resisting the insurgency. As a consequence,anti-corruptionmeasures,institutionbuildingandservicedeliveryallsuffered.

Dr Abdullah Abdullah, runner up in the 2009 Presidential Election and candidate for 2014. Photo: Source unknown.

243 In a demonstration of flexible alignmentpolitics,bythetimeofthe2009elections,PresidentKarzaihadsecuredashisVicePresidentialrunning

mates some of his principal opponents and ardent criticsduringhisfirstterm,includingoneofhismainrivals in the previous election. The election teamconsisting ofMohammed Fahim and Karim Khalilliconstituted a who’s who of former warlords. TomakemattersworseSherMohammedAkhundzada,a notorious drug baron who had been caught with 9 tonnes of opium in his officewhilst Governor ofHelmand,wasappointedcampaignmanager.Despitepulling together a ‘dream team’ of Tajik (Fahim),Hazara (Khalili) and Pashtun (Karzai, Akhundzada)regional power-brokers, in the weeks leading upto the election former foreign affairs minister, DrAbdullahAbdullah,emergedasaseriouschallengerandpossiblevictorwerehetosucceedinforcingasecondroundrun-offbetweenthetwocandidates.Knowing this, some of Karzai’s supporters weredeterminedtowinafirstroundmajorityandengagedin massive electoral fraud. The subsequent fracasresulted in the disqualification of thousands ofballot boxes by Afghanistan’s Electoral ComplaintsCommissionandascheduledsecondroundelection.However,unconvincedthatthesecondroundwouldprovelessfraudulentthanthefirst,DrAbdullahchosenottoparticipateinthe2ndround,allowingKarzaitobereturnedtopower.Whilstultimatelysuccessful,Karzai’svictorycameatthecostofamassivelossoflegitimacybothinternallyandexternally.

244 AroundthesametimeanewUSPresident,BarackObama,embarkedonanewstrategywhichhadas itsgoal to ‘disrupt,dismantleanddefeatalQaeda in its safe havens in Pakistan, and preventtheir return tobothPakistanandAfghanistan’. Theso-called ‘Af-Pak’ strategy emerged after a seriesof exhaustive reviews of US policy in the regionconducted earlier in 2009. The strategy calledfor increased military and civilian resources forAfghanistan, revitalised regional diplomacy anda significant expansion in the drone program inPakistan. Inherent in the new approach was therecognitionthattheconjoinedstatesofAfghanistanand Pakistan constituted one strategic entity,withinstability in either country undermining security in the other.



President Obama appoints GEN Stanley McChrystal as the new COMISAF with a mandate to implement a new Strategy in Afghanistan. Photo: Source unknown.

245 Whilst President Obama set a date forISAF to begin transitioning responsibility to localsecurity forces, most analysts recognised that asignificant international troop presence would berequiredformanyyearstocome.Intheabsenceofeffectivegovernance,withdrawalwouldbehighlyrisky, not only to the fledglingAfghan democracy,but thewider region,which remained susceptibletoterrorism,insurgencyandIslamicrevolution.

The coalition campaign plan was revised undernewly appointed Commander of ISAF (COMISAF),GEN Stanley McChrystal. The focus became‘population-centric’ counterinsurgency and,ultimately,thetransferofsecurityresponsibilitytoacapableAfghanNationalSecurityForce (ANSF).To implement the new concept of operations the US increased its troop commitment bymore than30,000 personnel (the West Point ‘surge’) for alimited period to regain the initiative against arising insurgency and provide security to roughly100keyterraindistricts—essentiallyAfghanistan’smajorpopulation,economicandtransportcorridors.

246 ISAF security operations now sought toseparate the local population from insurgents,andprovidethetimeandspaceinwhichimprovedgovernanceanddevelopmentcouldtakehold.Thistask was assisted by an almost threefold increase in thenumberofdeployedcivilians.Increasedpressure

was exerted on both the Afghan and Pakistanigovernments—to eliminate official corruption inAfghanistan, and cease support for the Talibanfromwithin Pakistan.Meanwhile, theUS rampedup its drone program targeting key insurgent leaders inPakistan’sFederallyAdministeredTribalAreas (FATA). Finally, training and mentoring theANSF,previouslyaperipheralactivity,becametheprincipal focus of the ISAF mission. New targetsforbothANA(171,600)andANP(134,000)weresetfortheendof2011tocoincidewithaplannedUSdrawdown.

Transition, Withdrawal & Decade of Transformation

247 Leadersof the48 ISAF troopcontributingstates and theAfghanGovernment agreed at theNovember2010NATOSummit inLisbon,Portugal,that the ANSF would have full responsibility forsecurity across all 34 of Afghanistan’s provincesby the end of 2014. The summit closed with theDeclaration of Enduring Partnership and theadoptionofInteqal(‘transition’inDariandPashtu)as the process by which security responsibility was tobeprogressivelytransferredfromISAFtoAfghanleadership.InMarch2011ISAFbegananewchapterinitsmission,withtheannouncementbyPresidentKarzaiofthefirsttrancheofmunicipalities,districtsandprovincestoentertheinteqalprocess.

248 On2May2011theUSattainedasignificantmilestone in its counter-terrorism campaignwhenOsamabinLadenwaskilledintheOpNEPTUNE’SSPEAR raid on his compound in Abbottabad,Pakistan. The following month President Obamaannouncedaphasedtroopreduction,arguingthatsubstantial progress in thefight against alQaedain theAf-Pak regionallowed fora recoveryofUSsurge forces. The timeline allowed for a thinning ofUSforcesinAfghanistan,withtheentiresurgeforceof33,000troopsscheduledtobewithdrawnby September 2012 and most of the remaining68,000USpersonneltobedrawndownatasteadypaceuntiltheendoftheISAFmandateinDecember2014.


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249 2011 saw a significant deterioration inUS-Pakistan relations. The year began with theRaymond Davis incident (in which a US embassyofficialshotandkilledtwomeninLahore,wasjailed,and thensubsequently releasedafter theUSpaidthefamiliesofthedeceasedatotalof$2.4million).TheAbbottabad raid on Bin Laden’s compound inMayseriouslyembarrassedthePakistaniMilitary,who were in the process of attempting to restore their reputation when they were effectivelylabelledsponsorsof terrorismby theChairmanoftheUSJointChief’sofStaff,AdmiralMikeMullen,who declaring that the insurgent group known as theHaqqaniNetwork,wasa“veritable arm of the [Pakistani] Inter-Services Intelligence Agency”. The crunch came in November when a US air strikeresultedinthedeathof24PakistanArmypersonnelin theMohmandAgencyofPakistan. In response,PakistanclosedISAFgroundlinesofcommunication(GLOCs)throughitsterritorytoNATOconvoys.Theresultantstand-offhamperedANSFequippingandfielding efforts by back-logging thousands of tonsofequipment.ThePakistanGLOCsremainedclosedto ISAF resupply convoys until July 2012, placingincreased demands on the coalition air bridge and the Northern Distribution Network as ISAFretrogradeactivitygotunderway.

250 Continued military pressure throughpartnered ISAF and ANSF operations throughout2011 and into 2012 widened the gap betweeninsurgents and the population in key centers in southern Afghanistan; limiting insurgent freedom of movement, disrupting internal safe havens,degrading Taliban command and control (C2), anddiminishing insurgent funding by targeting the drug trade. As insurgent capacity to challenge Afghansecurityforceswereeroded,theyresortedincreasingly to asymmetric means to reassert influenceand regain the initiative.These includedhigh profile attacks, assassinations, kidnappings,intimidation tactics, and strategic messagingcampaigns leveragingpopulardissatisfactionwithAfghanistan’sendemiccorruption.

251 Adisturbingdevelopmentwas the rise ininsiderattacksfrom2010onwards.InsiderattacksoccurwhenANSFmembersknowinglyattackand/or helped facilitate an attack against their coalition partners. Whilst statistically small in number,insider attacks have now become a definingcharacteristic of the Afghanwar and have had asignificantnegativeimpactontheISAFmission.AsofOctober2013therehadbeenover107reportedincidentsresultingin153coalitionforceskilledanda further222wounded. 2012, inparticular, sawasubstantial rise in attacks generating alarm within NATO troop contributing nations and threateningthe success of the transition process.

252 Regardless of whether directly involvedornot, insiderattackshavebeenexploitedby theinsurgency. Perpetrators who manage to escapewill often link up with local insurgents who facilitate their evacuation across the border toPakistan.Here theirexploitsare incorporated intopropaganda videos aimed at summoning supportand inspiring other sympathetic Afghans to conduct similarattacks. In thisway theTalibanhavebeenable to capitalise on the phenomenon regardless ofwhether theywere involved in the planning orconduct of the incident.

253 InDecember2011,theAfghanGovernmentchaired the second Bonn Conference, whichdiscussed civil aspects of transition and the longterm engagement of the international community. ThiswasfollowedbytheJuly2012TokyoConferenceonAfghanistan,whererepresentativesfromaround70donorcountriesandinternationalorganisationsdiscussed ongoing development assistance.Facinganalmostcertaineconomicdown-turnasaresult of the looming absence of large numbers of international forcesandagencies,donorspledgedUS$16.0billioninaidtoAfghanistanoverfouryearsundertheTokyoMutualAccountabilityFramework(TMAF) to help mitigate the anticipated fundinggap after transition. Up to 50 per cent of thisassistanceisearmarkedforon-budgetassistance,providedthat theAfghanGovernment implementspolitical and economic reforms necessary to


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Chapter2-History

improvegovernance,holdcredibleelections,makepublic institutions more accountable, and tacklecorruption.

ECONOMIC DRIVERS

MilitaryandcivilianaidtoAfghanistanin2010-11totaledUS$15.7billion.Afghanistan’sGDP,excludingopiumproduction,overthesameperiodwasonlymarginallyhigheratUS$15.9billion.

Afghanistan Economic Update (World Bank, Washington DC, 2012).

254 The May 2012 NATO Summit in Chicagosaw leaders of all ISAF troop contributingstates announce a vision for a new NATO-ledmission to train, advise and assist the ANSF, atthe invitation of the Afghan Government, and apolitical commitment to provide ongoing fundingfor local forces. The various parties also agreedto an accelerated transition timetable. According to thenewlyendorsedschema theANSFwere tobe in the lead for security throughout Afghanistan bymid-2013,withtheISAFmissionbythenhavingshiftedeffectivelyfromcombattoasecurityforceassistanceconstruct.On thesidelinesofChicago,Afghanistan also concluded multi-dimensionalbilateral partnership agreements with NATO, theUSandotheralliancemembers,andpartnerstates(includingAustralia).Theaimofthesepartnershipsis to support Afghanistan’s development, securityand governance, and to promote regionalcooperation through the so-called ‘decade oftransformation’(2015-2024)thatfollowstheLisbonSummitgoaloffulltransitionbytheendof2014.

255 In his February 2013 State of the UnionAddress,PresidentObamaannouncedthat34,000US troops (froma forceof66,000)are toexit thetheatrebyFebruary2014.Theresidualnumberwillreduce to a much smaller enduring force which is to remain behind after 2014; in roles possiblyranging from institutional capacity building to counter-terrorism. The UK, among other major

ISAF members followed suit drawing down its9,000-strong force in Afghanistan to 5,200 inDecember 2013. Similarly in November 2013 theAustralian Government announced the closure ofMulti-NationalBase–TarinKot (MNB-TK) and thewithdrawalofover1,000ADFpersonnel fromthecountry.

256 At a meeting in Brussels in June 2013NATO DefenceMinisters, with counterparts fromotherISAFtroopcontributingstates,endorsedtheconcept for RESOLUTE SUPPORT—a non-combattrain,adviseandassistmissionbeginningin2015.Thiswas followed by the 18 June announcementbyPresidentKarzaiofTransitionTranche5thathasAfghan forces in the operational lead for security nationwide.

257 A joint NATO-Afghan Governmentceremony heralding these achievements in Kabul,however,isalmostupstagedbytheinaugurationofaTalibanpoliticalbureauinDoha,Qatar.PresidentKarzai immediately objected to the portrayal ofthe Taliban mission as an embassy of an Afghan government in exile, and pulled out of theUS-ledpeacetalks.NegotiationsovertheUS-AfghanistanBilateralSecurityAgreement(BSA),whichhadbeenunderway since November 2012, are also brieflystalledduetotheabortiveDohapeaceprocessandHamid Karzai’s reluctance to sign the document.TheBSA is to serveasa legal framework for thepresence of US forces after 2014, dictating thescopeandjurisdictionoftheiractivities.However,progress throughout 2013 is slow due to hurdlessuch as whether US personnel will be allowedimmunity from prosecution by local authorities. Thego-ahead for theproposednon-combatNATOfollow-on mission (Op RESOLUTE SUPPORT)however is contingent upon the successfulnegotiationoftheUS-AfghanBSA.



AFGHANISTAN

258 In preparation for the 5 April 2014Presidential elections, Afghanistan’s IndependentElectoral Commission opened candidatenominations from 16 September to 6 October2013. The next electoral cycle, including nationalassembly elections in 2015, will be a key test ofthe country’s transition to a stable polity sincethe tainted elections of 2009 and 2010. The 2014presidential poll is to be Afghanistan’s first everdemocratic transfer of power as President Karzaicompletes his second and final constitutionalterm as head of state. Whereas the Taliban arevehemently against the election and will notparticipate, the past year has seen Afghanistan’svariouspoliticalgroupingsnegotiateoverpossibleconsensus candidates and coalitions to contest the elections.Needless to say, the electionsmust bedeemedcredibleifAfghanistanistoreceivecriticalongoing support from the international community.

Tranche 1

Tranche 2

Tranche 3

Tranche 4

Tranche 5

Legend

BadakhshanTakharKunduz

Baghlan

NuristanPanjshir

KapisaLaghman

NangarharLogar

Paktiya

Paktika

Khost

Kabul

Parwan

Wardak

Ghazni

Bamyan

Daykundi

Uruzgan

Zabul

Kandahar

Helmand

Farah

Herat Ghor

Badghis

Faryab

Jowzjan

Sar-ePul

Balkh

Samangan

Nimroz

Kunar


Baghlan

NuristanPanjshir

KapisaLaghman

NangarharLogar

Paktiya

Paktika

Khost

Kabul

Parwan

Wardak

Ghazni

Bamyan

Daykundi

Uruzgan

Zabul

Kandahar

Helmand

Farah

Herat Ghor

Badghis

Faryab

Jowzjan

Sar-ePul

Balkh

Samangan

Nimroz

Kunar

Afghanistan Transition Map.



CHRONOLOGY

Aryan Settlement

2000 BCE-VedicAryanscrosstheKabulRiverfromIndiaandsettleintheareaofpresent-dayAfghanistan.

Persian Expansion

550 BCE-CyrusIIconquersAfghanistan.DariustheGreatconsolidatesPersianpower.

Hellenistic Period

327 BCE-AlexanderdefeatsDariusIIIandconquersAfghanistan.ThecountryissubsequentlyincorporatedintosuccessiveHellenisticempires(SeleucidEmpireandGraeco-BactrianKingdom).

Buddhist Kingdom

127-MostofAfghanistanincorporatedintotheBuddhistKushanEmpireunderKingKanishka.BamiyanBuddhistcoloniesestablished.

Hepthalite Invasion

400-Hepthalites(WhiteHuns)invadefromthecentralAsiansteppeanddestroymostofAfghanBuddhistculture.HepthalitesarethoughttobeancestorsofmoderndayPashtuns,accordingtosometheorists.

Persian Control

550-PersianSassanidsdefeatHepthalitesandtakecontrolofthearea.

Arab Expansion

637-ArabMuslimsdefeatSassanidsatbattleofQadisiya.HeratfallstoArabsin651andKandaharin700.UmmayadcaliphsintroduceIslamtoAfghanistaninsubsequentyears.

Ghaznavid Dynasty

962-FormerTurkicslave,Alptigin,seizesGhazniandestablishestheGhaznavid

dynasty,thefirstMuslimdynastyinAfghanistan.

Ghorid Dynasty

1140-GhoridsfromcentralAfghanistan(GhorProvince)razeGhazniandconquernorthernIndia.

Mongols and Mughals

1221-GenghisKhanlaunchesadevastatingattackonAfghanistan,destroyingirrigationsystems,causingfamine,desertificationandamassivelossofcivilianlife.MongolsthoughttobeancestorsofmoderndayHazaras.

1361-Tamerlane,adescendantofMongolsettlersandTurkiclocals,establishesanEmpirefromIndiatoTurkeywithhiscapitalinHerat.

1526-Babur,adescendentofGenghisKhanandTamerlane,establishestheMughalEmpireontheIndiansub-continentafterdefeatingtheDelhiSultanateattheBattleofPanipat.

Persian Restoration

1560-PersianSafavidsconquerwesternAfghanistanandgraduallyextendcontroloverPashtunterritories.Safavidhegemonylastsfor200years,buttheirpowerintheareaisalwaystenuous.

Afghan Rule

1708-TheHotakidynasty,centredonKandahar,isfoundedbyMirWaisKhanHotak,chiefoftheGhilzaiPashtunsafterthedefeatoftwoPersianarmies.MirWais’son,Mahmud,invadesPersiaandsacksitscapital,Isfahan.

1738-PersiansretakeKandaharfromtheGhilzaiswiththesupportofAhmedShahAbdaliandover4,000Durranifighters.AhmedShahAbdalisubsequentlyestablishestheDurraniEmpire(1747),theprecursortothemodernstateofAfghanistan.


28

AFGHANISTAN


1773-CapitalofDurraniEmpiremovedfromKandahartoKabul.

British Incursions

1839-1842 - FirstAnglo-AfghanWar.

1878-1880 - SecondAnglo-AfghanWar.

1880-AdurRahmansucceedstothethroneandbeginsbuildingacentralisedStatewiththesupportoftheBritish.

1887-BritishandRussiansestablishtheNorthernboundaryofAfghanistanattheAmuDaryaRiver.

1893-DurandLineAgreementestablishesthesouth-easternborderofAfghanistan,separatingthecountryfromBritishIndia.

1919-ThirdAnglo-AfghanWar.August19becomesAfghanIndependenceDay.

Modernising Period

1919-AmanullahKhanembarksuponsubstantialmodernisingreforms.

1929-KingAmanullahabdicatesduetocivilunrestoverhismodernisationprogram.NadirKhanassumesthethroneandreducesthepaceofreform.

1933-ZahirShahascendsthroneafterdeathofhisfather.Introducesconstitutionalanddemocraticreformsandreignsfor40years.

1947-BritainwithdrawsfromIndia.PakistancarvedoutofmajorityMuslimareasinBritishIndia.Afghanistan’sParliamentdenouncestheDurandTreatyandrefusestorecogniseboundarybetweenPakistanandAfghanistan.SomePashtunsinPakistanproclaimanindependentPashtunistan

1961-AfghanistanandPakistanclosetoWaroverPashtunistanquestion.

1964-ZahirShahcreatesanewAfghanconstitutionprovidingforfreeelections,

civilrights,women’semancipationanduniversalsuffrage.

Instability, Occupation and Civil War

1973-MohammedDaoudKhanseizespowerincoupwhichisimmediatelyfollowedbyaperiodofinstability.

1978-PDPAseizecontroloftheStateduringtheSaurRevolution.

1979-SovietUnioninvadesAfghanistanandinstallsBabrakKarmalasPrimeMinister.Themujahideenresisttheoccupation.

1982-Mujahideengaincontrolofruralareasasnearly5millionAfghansfleethewar.

1989-TheSovietUnioncompletesitstroopwithdrawal.HoweverdespiteallpredictionstheNajibullahregimeremainsinpowerforafurtherthreeyears.

1992-NajibullahregimefailsandAfghanistandescendsintocivilwar.

Taliban, al Qaeda and US Invasion

1994-TheTalibanemergesfromwithinKandahariandPakistanimadrassasandrefugeecampsneartheAfghan-Pakistanborder.

1996-TheTalibantakeKabulwithsupportfromPakistanifightersandmilitaryadvisors.OsamabinLadenleavesSudanandarrivesinAfghanistan.

1998-TheTalibancontrolstwo-thirdsofAfghanistan.AlQaedabombsUSembassiesinAfrica.

2000-TheUNadoptsresolution1333enforcingsanctionsontheTalibanwhicharelargelyignoredbyneighbouringPakistanasitcontinuestosupportitsPashtunclients.

Sept 2001-AhmadShahMassoud,commanderoftheNorthernAlliance,isassassinatedbyalQaedasuicide



bomberstwodayspriortothealQaedaattackontheUShomeland.

Oct 2001-TheUSanditsallieslaunchairstrikesagainsttheTalibaninsupportofamajorNorthernAllianceoffensive.

Nov 2001-AlliedforcestakeMazar-e-Sharif,Bamiyan,HeratandKabul.TalibanretreattoKandahar.

A New Beginning

Dec 2001-BonnConferenceestablishestheAfghanInterimAuthority.HamidKarzaisworninasHeadofInterimGovernment.TalibanescapefromKandaharandreconstituteinQuetta,Pakistan.

Jan 2002-TokyoConference.Over50countriespledgeassistanceforthereconstructionofAfghanistan.

June 2002-KarzaielectedInterimPresidentbyEmergencyLoyaJirga.

Mar 2003-US-ledinvasionofIraq.

Aug 2003-NATOassumesleadershipofISAF.

Dec 2003-ISAFexpandsoutsideofKabul,beginningintheNorth(completedOct2004),followedbytheWest(completedSept2005),South(July2006)andEast(Oct2006).

Jan 2004-TheConstitutionalLoyaJirgapassthe160-articleAfghanConstitution.

Oct 2004-KarzaiwinsAfghanistan’sfirstdemocraticelection.

Sept 2005-FirstNationalAssemblyelectionsinthreedecades(WolesiJirga).

Jan 2006-LondonConferenceproducestheAfghanistanCompact.DonorspledgeoverUS$10billioninincreasedaidandestablishtheJointCoordinationandMonitoringBoardtomonitoraideffectiveness.

2006-2007-Intensificationofthe

insurgency.

Aug 2006-DutchandAustralianforcesenterUruzganProvinceaspartoftheNATO-ledISAFStage3expansionintosouthernAfghanistan.TheNetherlandsTaskForceUruzganassumescommandofthePRT.

May 2007-TheTaliban’smostseniormilitarycommander,MullahDadullahiskilledduringfightingwithUSandAfghanforces.

Apr 2008-AfghanGovernmentreleasestheAfghanNationalDevelopmentStrategy(ANDS)2008-2013.MorethanUS$15billioninforeignaidispledgedtoAfghanistan.

Apr 2009-TheAustralianGovernmentstepsupsupportfortheISAFmissionbyincreasingitsmilitarycommitmentby40percenttoanewauthorisedceilingof1,550ADFpersonnelinAfghanistan.

May 2009-UStroopuplift.Over14,000extratroopsbeginarriving.

Aug 2009 - AfghanPresidentialandProvincialCouncilelections.Karzaiwinsasecondtermdespitewidespreadallegationofelectoralfraudandonlyfollowingthewithdrawalofhismainrival,DrAbdullahAbdullah,priortoascheduledsecondroundrun-offelection.

Dec 2009 - PresidentObamaannouncesthe‘Westpointsurge’ofanextra30,000troopsandintroducesatimelinefortheUSdrawdowntocommence.

Feb 2010-OpMOSHTARAKbegins.DutchGovernmentcollapsesoverthecontinuingpresenceofitstroopsinAfghanistan.

June 2010-PresidentObamaremovesGENStanleyMcChrystalasCommanderofNATOForcesinAfghanistanandannouncesGENDavidPetraeusassuccessor.

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30

AFGHANISTAN

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Aug 2010-DutchtroopswithdrawfromUruzganProvince.USforcesentertheProvinceunderCOLJimCreightonandestablishtheISAF-flaggedCombinedTeamUruzgan(CTU)withAustralia,Slovakia,SingaporeandNewZealand.AustraliaassumestheleadofPRTUruzgan.

Sept 2010-NationalAssemblyelections(WolesiJirga).

Nov 2010-NATOsummitinLisbon,Portugal,andtheadoptionofInteqal(transition)wherebyAfghanforceswillgraduallyassumeresponsibilityforsecurity.Theprocessisscheduledtobeginin2011incertaindistrictsandprovincesand,basedonconditions,willgraduallyexpandthroughoutthecountryinfivetranches.TheaimisforAfghanforcestobeintheleadcountry-widebytheendof2014.

Mar 2011-PhasedimplementationoftransitioncommenceswiththeannouncementofTransitionTranche1.

Apr 2011-BurningoftheQu’ranbyapastorintheUSsparksviolentprotestsacrossAfghanistan.UNstaffarekilledwhenriotersoverruntheUNAMAfacilityinMazar-e-Sharif.

Mar 2011-OsamabinLadeniskilledintheOpNEPTUNE’SSPEARraidonhiscompoundinAbbottabad,Pakistan.

Jun 2011-PresidentObamaordersarecoveryofsurgeforces,with33,000UStroopstobewithdrawnbySeptember2012.Mostoftheremaining68,000USpersonnelaretobedrawndownbytheendof2014.

Jul 2011-InsurgentsconductaseriesofcomplexattacksagainstAfghanGovernmenttargetsinTarinKot.

Sep 2011-AssassinationofformerPresidentofAfghanistanandChairmanoftheHighPeaceCouncil,Burhanuddin

Rabbani.

Nov 2011-ClosureofNATOgroundlinesofcommunicationthroughPakistan.TheyremaincloseduntilJuly2012.

Dec2011-InternationalConferenceonAfghanistan(BonnIIConference).

May 2012-NATOChicagoSummit.TheAustralianGovernmentconcludestheComprehensiveLongTermPartnershipAgreementBetweenAustraliaandAfghanistan.ThewholeofUruzganProvinceandtheassociatedGizabDistrictinDaykundiProvinceareincludedinTransitionTranche3,referredtoasa‘stretchtranche’asitincludedcontestedareasandassumedgreaterriskthanprevioustranches.

Jun 2012-TokyoConferenceonAfghanistan.ConferenceparticipantspledgeUS$16billioninaidtoAfghanistanundertheTokyoMutualAccountabilityFramework.

Nov 2012-WashingtonandKabulbeginnegotiationstowardaBilateralSecurityAgreement(BSA)thataretoconcludewithayear.

Mar 2013-PrimeMinisterJuliaGillardandMINDEFStephenSmithjointlyannouncetheclosureofMulti-NationalBaseTarinKot(MNBTK)andthewithdrawalofatleast1,000ADFpersonnelfromAfghanistanbytheendof2013.

Jun 2013-TransitionTranche5and‘Milestone2013’.ISAFofficiallyshiftsitsmaineffortfromfightingtheinsurgencytosupportingtheANSF,nowintheoperationalleadforsecuritythroughoutAfghanistan.

Oct 2013-USSecretaryofState,JohnKerry,andPresidentKarzaiagreetoapartialBSAthatwillenterintoforcein2015subjecttoratificationbyaLoyaJirgaandtheAfghanNationalAssembly.

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TheissueoflegalimmunityforUSpersonnelinAfghanistan,however,remainsunresolved.NeitherwilltheUSagreetoAfghanGovernmentdemandsforsecurityguaranteesagainstexternalattack.

PrimeMinisterTonyAbbottandtheLeaderoftheOpposition,BillShorten,attendaRecognitionCeremonyatMNBTKaheadofthewithdrawalofcoalitionforcesfromUruzganandthehandoverofthebasetoAfghanauthorities.ThePrimeMinisterstates:‘Australia’slongestwarisending,notwithvictory,notwithdefeat,butwith,wehope,anAfghanistanthat’sbetterforourpresencehere’.

Nov 2013-Morethan2,000seniorAfghanrepresentativesparticipateinafour-dayLoyaJirgaendorsingtheBSA,whichincludesimmunityfromAfghancourtsforUSpersonnel,allowingthemtoremaininAfghanistanbeyond2014.PresidentKarzai,however,deferssigningthedocument(evenafterratificationfromtheNationalAssembly)untilaftertheApril2014PresidentialandProvincialCouncilelections.



AFGHANISTAN

Chapter 3 – Society

• Ethnicity

• Language

• TribalAfghans

• AfghanCustoms&Culture

• Religion

ETHNICITY301 Reflecting its location astride historictrade, migration and invasion routes, modernAfghanistan has emerged from its tumultuous historyasamulti-ethnicandmulti-lingualsociety.Most of its 30million people trace their ancestrytoPersian,TurkicorMongolinvaders–manyamixthereof.

302 Pashtuns. The Pashtuns are the largestsingle ethnic group and have been the dominantpolitical force since the formation of the Afghan State. Approximately 44% of Afghanistan’sestimated30millionpeoplearePashtun.Ofthese,half belong to the Durrani tribal confederation (whichpredominates in thesouthernplateau)andtheotherhalf,theirhistoricalrivals,theGhilzai(ofthe easternmountains near the Pakistani border).Whilst concentrated in the south and east,manyPashtuncommunitieshavebeenestablishednorthof the Hindu Kush as a result of resettlement

programs during the 19th and 20th century.PashtunsmayspeakeitherPashtuorDari(Persian),with the majority of the urban educated elitespeaking Dari whilst rural communities rely almost exclusivelyonPashtu.

303 Tajiks comprise the second largest ethnic group,numberingsome8million,or27%.TheTajikslay claim to the longest continuous habitation of the area and trace their ancestry back to the Persian Empire in the 4th Century BCE (prior toAlexandertheGreat).OfPersiandescent,theylivepredominantlyintwoenclaves:onebetweenKabuland the Tajikistan border; the other in the west,centredonthecityofHerat.UnlikethelargelyruralPashtuns, Tajiks are city dwellers and dominatemost of Afghanistan’s major urban centres,includingKabul,Herat,Mazar-e-Sharif,TaloqanandGhazni. Typically, Tajikswill identifywith locationoverethnicity,preferringtorefertothemselvesasPanjsheeri,Kabuli,Herati,etc.Becausetheymakeup the bulk of Afghanistan’s educated elite, theyhave considerable wealth and political influence.Tajiks are also the principal inhabitants of therepublicofTajikistanacrossthenorthernborder.

304 Hazaras are the third largest ethnic group comprising around 10% of the population. Theirnamemeans “thousand” in Persian and refers totheir possible descent fromGenghis Khan’s army,whichmarchedintotheareaduringthe12thcenturyandwasorganisedintogroupsof1000men.Afterthe Mongol Empire dissolved, soldiers and theirfamilies settled in the area and began to adopt

Persian customs, such asconverting to Islam (Shi’a)and adopting Persian astheir spoken language. Though intermixing withindigenous Afghans has occurred since, Hazarasretain many of the facial features of their Mongolforebears. As a result of Pashtun expansionismduring theDurrani period,

Pashtun: 44%Origin: Claim descent from ancient HebrewsLanguage: PashtuReligion: Sunni Muslim

Talik: 27%Origin: Persian descentLanguage: Persian (Dari)Religion: Sunni Muslim

Uzbek: 9%Origin: TurkicLanguage: UzbekReligion: Sunni Muslim

Hazara:10%Origin: MongolLanguage: Persian (Hazaragi)Religion: Shia Muslim

Others Turkmen, Nuristani, Baluch, Aimaq.....10%

Population: 30 millionMain Language: Pashtu and Persian (Dari)Religion: Islam (majority Sunni)

Hazara Elder. Photo: Source unknown.



Chapter3-Society

theHazarasweredriven to thebarrendrycentralhighlandswestofKabul(knownastheHazarajat).TheyspeakaformofPersiancalledHazaragi,whichisdifferentiatedfromDaribyitswordsofMongolorigin.

305 Uzbeks are the most populous of Afghanistan’sTurkicpeoples,constitutingsome9%of the total population. They are found predominantly in thenorth-westernpartsof thecountryandaredescended from Turks who frequently raided thearea from their base in theCentralAsianSteppe.Over time these Turkic peoples intermingledwithlocalPersianstobecomethedistinctethnicgrouptheyaretoday.MostUzbeksareSunniMuslimandareclosely related to theTurkmen.TheUzbeksofAfghanistanareusuallybilingual,fluentinbothDariandUzbek.Theyarealsotheprincipal inhabitantsofUzbekistanacrossthenorthernborder.

306 Others. There are several smaller ethnicgroups scattered around the country. These include:

• Turkmen of the north-west border areas(adjacent Turkmenistan) who constitute about3% of the population and whose origins andcustomsaresimilartothatoftheUzbeks.

• Nuristanis, who constitute around 1% ofthe population and who live in the remotemountains on the Pakistani border north-eastof Kabul. Nuristanis claim to be descendantsof Alexander the Great and were the last ofAfghanistan’smainethnicgroupstoconverttoIslam(in1896).

• Baluch who constitute less than 1% of thepopulationandwhodrive theirflocksbetweengrazing grounds on either side of the DurandLine.

Baluchi

PERSIAN TURKIC

OTHER

Aimaq

Hazara

Pashtun(Durrani,Ghilzai)

Tajik

Kyrghiz

Turkmen

Uzbek

Nuristani

Herat

Kandahar

Kabul

Mazar-e-Sharif

Peshawar

Jalalabad

Kunduz

TAJIKISTAN

INDIA

IRAN

CHINA

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

Quetta

0 Kilometres

100 200 250

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

Afghan Ethno-Linguistic Groups.

AFGHANISTAN

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• Nomadic and semi-nomadic Aimaqs, whoseorigin is vague, but generally inhabit themountainswestoftheHazarajat.

LANGUAGE307 ThetwoofficiallanguagesofAfghanistanare Dari (50%) and Pashtu (35%). Other widelyspokenlanguagesincludeTurkicdialects(11%)suchasUzbekandTurkmen.MosteducatedAfghansarebilingual.

TRIBAL AFGHANISTAN308 Tribe. The concept of ‘tribe’ and itsrelationship to both ‘ethnicity’ and ‘modernity’ ishotly contested. Initially anthropologists used the notionof ‘tribal societies’ todenotea transitionalphaseinsocialevolutionfrompre-modern ‘bands’of hunter-gatherers to modern ‘states’. However,fewanthropologiststodayacceptthislinearviewofsocietalevolutionand,asaconsequence,theterm‘tribe’hasfallenoutof favour.Where it isused itis generally considered to describe a form of social organisation which is:

• Structuredlargelyonthebasisofkinshipand,asgenerationspass,familiesondifferentbranchesofthetreegrowintodistinctsub-tribes.

• Not governed through standing formalinstitutions, but ad hoc councils of heads offamilies and other leaders.

309 Accordingtothisdefinition,mostAfghansarenottribal.OfAfghanistan’smainethnicgroups,thePashtunsaretheonlyoneswhicharestructuredtribally and, of these, most urban Pashtuns havelong ceased organising themselves in a tribalmanner.RuralPashtuns,ontheotherhand,remaindeeply rooted in several tribal customs andinstitutions–manyofwhichhavebeenpracticedfor centuries. Ranging from codes of honour andresponsibility to institutionsgoverningvillage life,thesecustomsmakethePashtunsaconservative,traditional society.

310 Family Life. The family is the mainstay of Pashtun tribal society. Extremely close bondsexist within the family, which consists of severalgenerations. Honour, pride, and respect towardother family members are important, especiallytoward the oldest man, or patriarch, who usuallyheads the family unit. Each family generally occupies either one mud-brick house or a walledcompound containing mud-brick or stonewalledhouses. Extended families tend to be co-located,although it is becoming more common in larger towns for families to be more dispersed. Traditional marriage preferences are with paternal cousins (father’s brother’s sons or daughters), althoughother forms of marriage are becoming more widespread.Genderrolesarestrictlydefined,withmenrepresentingthe‘publicface’ofthehouseholdinitsdealingswiththeoutsideworld,whilewomenare largely confined to thedomesticenvironment,being influential in the upbringing of children andthe determination of marriage partners.

311 Village Life. Traditionally, each villagehasfoursourcesofauthority,the:

• Malik–villageheadman.

• Mirab–masterofwaterdistribution.

• Mullah(or Imam)–mosqueleaderandteacherof Islamic law.

• Khan–wealthylandowner.

312 Insmaller,moreisolated,villagestheKhanwillcontrolthewholevillagebyalsoassumingtheroleofbothMalikandMirab.

313 Men work in the fields, joined by thewomenduringtheharvest.Olderchildrentendtheflocksandlookafterthesmallerchildren.Thevillagemosque is thecentreof religious lifeand isoftenusedasthevillageguesthouse.Almostalldecisionsaremadeatjirga:agatheringofthevillage’seldersand influential personalities. Interaction betweenCoalitionForcesandkeyleadersoftentakesplaceat these informal gatherings and their importance cannot be underestimated. Decisions made here willbebindingandengagementwithvillagejirgas

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35

isanopportunitytodemonstratebothGIRoA’sandISAF’scommitmenttothedistrict.

PASHTUNWALI: The Way Of The Pashtun

Pashtunwaliisacomplexmixofunwrittencodes,customsandinformalinstitutionswhichPashtunshavelivedbyforcenturies.ManyoftheprincipalelementsofPashtunwalipredateIslamandhavefewrootsineitherArabcultureorShariaLaw.TheaveragePashtunlooksmoretoPashtunwalithanShariaasaguideforbehaviour.AmongthemoreimportantelementsofPashtunwaliare:

Hospitality (Melmastia)

Pashtunsconsiderthisoneoftheirfinestvirtues.APashtundoesnotdiscriminateongroundsofethnicity,religion,socialstatusorqawminrespecttoMelmastiaandhospitalityisgivenfreefromreciprocalobligations.

Shelter (Nanawati)

Nanawatiinvolvestherighttoshelterorasylum.Itcanalsobeusedasaformofforgivenesswhenadefeatedpartyispreparedtogointothehouseofhisenemyandaskfornanawati.Nanawatimayinvolveguaranteesofsafepassagethroughtheuseofarmedescorts(badragha).

Justice(Badal)

Itisconsideredhonourabletorespondtoslightswithreciprocation(‘eyeforaneye’).Thiscansometimesgetoutofcontrol,spawningviciousbloodfeudswhichlastseveralgenerationsandresultinsubstantiallossoflifeonbothsides.Failuretotakerevengeisseenasshameful.However,nanawati and punishmentsleviedbyjirga,suchassaz (compensation)canabsolveanaggrievedpersonfromtheobligationoftakingbadal.

Thecessationofabloodfeudisknownasteega.

Bravery (Tureh)

Pashtunsarecapableofactsofextremebraveryagainstvastlysuperiorforces.Conductingasurprise,hitandrun-attackagainstasuperiorforce,andothersimilaractsofbravado,bringshonourtothefighterandhistribe.

Tribal Decision Making (Jirga)

Ajirgaisanassemblyofelders.Jirgasareusedfortakingcollectivedecisionsandresolvingdisputes.Typicallyajirgawillonlybeconvenedinresponsetoanimmediateneedanditscompositionwillbebasedontheavailabilityofkeyleaders.Atvillagelevelthisisusuallytheheadofeachfamily.

Whereasajirgaisapre-IslamicPashtuninstitution,theshura(Arabicfor‘consultation’)isintimatelyconnectedtoIslamandArabculture.ShuraswereintroducedtoAfghanistanwiththeriseofArabinfluenceduringthemujahideenyearsareoftenassociatedwithreligiousdecisionmaking.

Tribal Policing (Arbakai)

Decisionstakenatjirgaareenforcedbyaninformaltribalpolicesystem,knownasarbakai.Thearbakai are highlyprotectedwithinvillagelifeandifanyinflictsharmonthem,theywillbeseverelypunished.Strongarbakai institutionsarelimitedtothemorehomogenoustribalareasinRC(E)andtheFederallyAdministeredTribalAreasonthePakistanisideoftheDurandLine.


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314 Tribal Conflict. Pashtun tribalorganisation gives rise to three enduring conflictsituations:

• Durrani-Ghilzaianimosity.

• Panjpaidispossession.

• Firstcousinhostility.

315 Durrani-Ghilzai Animosity. The two main tribal confederations – the Durrani and theGhilzaihavealonghistoryofanimositydatingbackto the formation of the Afghan State.Whilst theGhilzaiHotakitribe,underMirWaisHotak,initiallydrove the Persians out of Afghanistan in 1708,within a few decades the Durrani (with Persiansupport)haddefeatedtheGhilzaiatKandaharandestablishedthemodernStateofAfghanistan.SincethentheDurranihaveprovidedallofAfghanistan’skings until the overthrow of the last monarch in1973.

BACK TO THE FUTURE:Hotaki-Popalzai Rivalry

Durrani-GhilzaianimosityfindsitsoriginsinthedefeatoftheHotakidynastyatthehandsofthePersians,supportedbymorethan4000Durranifighters.TheprotagonistsinthisdramawereaGhilzaifromtheHotakitribe(MirWaisHotak)andaDurranifromthePopalzaitribe(AhmadShahAbdali).EchoesofthishistoricalrivalryaretobefoundtodaywiththereplacementofMullahMuhammadOmar(aHotakiGhilzai)withHamidKarzai(aPopalzaiDurrani).

316 Panjpai Dispossession. Within theDurrani confederation, there are two dominantsub-confederations – the Zirak and the Panjpai.The Zirak consist of the large, stable, tribes suchas the Barakzai, Achakzai and Popalzai. Thesetribes have provided all of Afghanistan’s leaderssincetheinceptionoftheAfghanStatein1747andhavedominated themoreproductivearable landssouthoftheHinduKush.Thesmaller,weakertribes

of the Panjpai confederation, on the other hand,have been restricted to the less fertile territoriesawarded them by Ahmad Shad Adbadi followingthedefeatoftheGhilzai.

317 During their rise and subsequent yearsin power, the Taliban struggled to attract broad-based support from the Zirak Durranis who havelong favoured the more traditional governancearrangementsof theOldRegime. In response, theTaliban tended to rely on Panjpai support in thesouth, establishing the once marginalised sub-confederation as preferred clients. During the years 1996-2001, Panjpai tribal leaders ranmany of theseniorTalibanpostsinFarah,Helmand,UruzganandKandahar,inadditiontodominatingthemuchmoreimportantopiumtrade.However,since2001powerand wealth in the south has reverted to historicnormsasZiraktribeshavesoughttodispossessthePanjpaiof their recentlyacquired lands, titlesanddrugnetworks.Panjpai-Zirakconflictovercontrolofdrugrevenues,governmentposts,farminglandandwaterhasbeenthesourceofconsiderableviolenceand instability in RC(S) and RC(SW) in the yearsfollowing the defeat of the Taliban.

318 First Cousin Hostility (Taborwali). Firstcousin hostility is a defining feature of Pashtunsociety. Hostility generally arises as a resultof disputes over the inheritance of land from acommon ancestor. Given that suitable arableland is limited, conflict over inheritance is fierce.Complicatingmatters, Islamallowsmultiplewiveswhich results in numerous sons and cousins desiring aninheritancefromasinglepatriarch. Inaddition,cousins tend to inherit adjacent allotments and,intheabsenceofanysurveyingsystem,boundarydisputes are common. In this, almost unique,cultural situation, rural Pashtuns rarely trust (andoften violently clash with) their closest kinsmen,allofwhomhaveanequalambitiontopossessasmuchoftheirsharedgrandfather’slandaspossible.

319 LocalconflictssuchasthesearetheonesthatruralPashtunsaremostheavilyinvolvedin(asopposedtoconflictswiththeGovernmentorISAF).

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Where conflict leads to violence, the requirementfor revenge (badal) serves to deepen animositiesbetween opposing sides as each revenge attackbringswithittheculturalrequirementforadditionalbadal leading to potentially endless blood feuds.

The Pashtu word for ‘cousin’ is tarbar, which is also one of the words for ‘enemy’.

LOCAL CONFLICTSOnlyabout20%oflocalconflictoccursbetweentribes.Thevastmajoritytakesplacewithinthetribe,mostbeingwithinorbetweenfamilies.Land,wateranddebtarethemostfrequentdriversoflocalconflict.

Significantly,theTalibanhavebecomeadeptatusinglocalconflicttocementtheirpositionwithinruralcommunities.TravellingTalibanjudgesprovidequick,predictablejusticetherebyresolvingdisputesandsavingcommunitiesfromthepotentiallydisastrouseffectsofbadal-drivenbloodfeuds.Alternatively,theTalibanmaybecomeapartytotheconflict,providingweaponsorfightersinsupportofoneoftheprotagonists.This,inturn,forcestheoppositesidetoseeksupportwithISAForGIRoAforcesasentirefamilies,clansandsub-tribesbecomepoliticised.

320 Tribal Integrity. Though tribe is a factor inPashtunsociety,other formsofsocial influenceare routinely more important than tribe. Chief ofthese is the ‘patronagenetwork’,whichhasbeenthe preferred rural engagement strategy of Afghan state-builders since Ahmed Shah Abdali firstforgedtheAfghanState.SincethenAfghanistan’stribes have been split, manipulated and forcedinto internal migrations that has left them both fragmented and scattered. The process began when Ahmed Shah ordered the large Barazkaitribe to split, creating a new Durrani tribe – the

Achakzai. Later, Abdur Rahman ordered massinternal migrations that dispersed tribesmen into scattered enclaves with little military or politicalpower.Morerecently,thepast30yearsofwarhaveseentheriseofmujahideencommanders,warlordsand opium barons. These local powerbrokers formed followings based not on family or clan but on a system of patronage made possible only by thehugeinfluxofexternalresourcesfromtheAnti-Sovietallianceinthe1980’s,theopiumtradeinthe1990’sandISAFinthepresentday.

AFGHAN CUSTOMS & CULTURE321 Greetings. A smile, a nod, and a wordof greeting are appropriate ways of greeting any Afghan.TheusualformofverbalgreetingisSalaamalay-kum (“peace be upon you”),which elicits theresponseAlay-kumsalaam(“anduponyoupeace”).

322 Afghansofthesamesexhugandkisseachotheronthecheekasasignofaffection.Hugginggenerally demonstrates concern and sympathy toward the other person. It is common to see Afghan men walking hand in hand; this is simply an act of friendship.

323 Handshake. This is customary in Afghanistan when arriving and leaving.Handshakesbetweenmenaresoftandgentle,nota test of strength. Afghans may place their right hands over their hearts after shaking hands. Thisgesture simply means that the handshake is from theheart. It is appropriateandexpected that thereceiver reciprocate.Whatever the situation, oneshouldneverattempttoinitiateahandshakewitha woman.

324 Eye Contact.Breakingeyecontactisnotseenasimpoliteorindicativeofdishonesty.Rather,it is a function of modesty. Afghans consider the act of looking someone straight in the eye as a sign of aggression. Members of the opposite sex donot look each other in the eye and male foreigners should avoid making eye contact with Afghanwomen,sinceitwillgiveseriousoffense.

AFGHANISTAN


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ALIZ

AISu

btrib

es

Adoz

aiAl

ekza

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erza

iHa

biza

iHa

sanz

aiKh

atoz

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iet

c

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QZAI

Subt

ribes

Idza

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anda

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ri Kh

elTe

roza

iet

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DU

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NI

PAN

JPA

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TARK

AN

I NOO

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Trib

eAL

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AITr

ibe

KHUG

YAN

ITr

ibe

SARB

AN

I

KASI

GH

ORI

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BARA

KZAI

Subt

ribes

Bale

ilzai

Guru

jzai

Moh

amm

edza

iN

asra

tzai

Sher

zai

etc

ALIK

OZAI

Subt

ribes

Dado

zai

Karo

zai

Sark

ani

etc

POPA

LZAI

Subt

ribes

Ayub

zai

Bado

zai

Bam

ezai

Hasa

nzai

Mad

ozai

Sado

zai

etc

ACHA

KZAI

Subt

ribes

Adoz

aiAs

heza

iBa

deza

iHu

senz

aiJu

lizai

Kako

zai

Kam

olza

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aliza

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man

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etc

SULE

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Ahm

adza

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man

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iser

Khe

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kahr

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etc

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Adi K

hel

Saro

bi K

hel

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a Kh

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kho

Khel

etc

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Baka

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Kish

iani

Mira

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iet

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Spin

Tor

etc

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Babo

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etc


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USEFUL PHRASES: DARI & PASHTOGOOD MORNINGDari:SobBakhayrPashto:SaharMoPehayr

GOOD EVENINGDari:ShabBakhayrPashto:SpamoPehayr

HOW ARE YOU?Dari:HubastiPashto:CengaYi?

FINE, VERY WELLDari:KhoobHastemPashto:Sama

HELLO GOODBYE Dari:Saläm Dari:KhodaHafeezPashto:Saläm Pashto:KhodaypaAmaan

THANKYOU PLEASEDari:Tashakur Dari:LotfanPashto:MananaPashto:Lotfan

MY NAME ISDari:NaamEManPashto:ZmäNum

I'M FROM AUSTRALIADari:MaAzAustraliaAstumPashto:ZeAustraliYayiYum

YES NODari:Baley Dari:NayPashto:Ho Pashto:Na

325 Personal Space. Afghans typically stand closer to other people during conversationthan Australians. When observing a foreigner inconversationwithanAfghan, it iscommontoseethe foreigner move away as the Afghan inchescloser. This continual shifting may go unnoticed bytheindividuals,butcanstillleadtoeachfeelinguncomfortable with the encounter.

326 Photographs. It is considered extremelyrude to photograph someone without first askingtheir permission. Cultural norms also prohibit thephotographing of women in Afghanistan.

TIPS FOR ENGAGING LOCALSDOShakehandsfirmlybutgentlyingreetinganddeparture.Alwaysusetherighthand.

Removefootwearbeforeenteringahomeormosque.Shoesareregardedasdefiling.

Afghansusuallysitonthefloorintheirownhomes.Crossyourlegsratherthanstretchthemoutaspointingyourfeettowardssomeoneelsemaycause offense.

Standupwhensomeoneentersaroom.

Tryallfoodoffered.Thisacknowledgesthehospitalityofthehost.Itemsmayhavebeendifficulttoacquireandregardlessoftheirwealth/status,theofferingallowsthehosttomaintainhonour.

Useapplicableprofessionaloracademictitles(i.e.Engineer,Doctor,andProfessoretc).Thisconfershonourontheindividual,hisfamilyandqawm.

Expecttospendmuchofthevisitsocialisinganddrinkingteabeforediscussingbusiness.Afghanshaveadifferentsenseoftimeandpunctuality.Focusmoreonbuildingtrustedrelation-shipsthandeliveringmessages.

Giveagiftinreturnforonereceived,Giftsacknowledgeorinitiaterelationships.

DON’T

Usethelefthandforphysicalcontactwithothers,toeatortogesture:itisconsideredunclean.Sitwiththesolesofyourfeetfacingsomeone.Itindicatesthatyoubelievethepersonisbeneathyou.Showawomanattentionbyaddressing,touching,orstaringather.


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RELIGION327 ReligionisanimportantpartofdailylifeformostAfghans,regardlessoftheirethnicityortribe.The overwhelming majority of Afghans (around99%) areMuslims. Of these 84% are Sunnis and15%Shi’a(mostlyHazaraandHerati-Tajiks).

328 The word Islam means “submission” [to God]. Like Christianity and Judaism, Islam is amonotheistic religion.Muslims recognise parts ofthe Bible (the Torah, Pentateuch and Gospel) and

believethatJesuswasagreatprophetofthefaith.However, they hold that the final and culminatingrevelationsweremadetoMuhammad,thelastandgreatestoftheprophets.TheQur’anisconsideredto be the verbatim word of God as revealed toMuhammadthroughtheArchangelGabriel.

329 Muslimsalsobelieveinadayofjudgement (Qiyãmah)andthebodilyresurrectionofthedead.MuchliketheNewTestament,theQur’andescribesthe last days preceding Qiyãmah as encompassing varioustrialsandtribulations.

Sunnis and Shi’a

330 SunniandShi’aarethetwomainbrancheswithin Islam. The division occurred as a resultof a succession debate following the death of Muhammad.Somebelievedthat leadershipof theMuslimUmmah(faithful)shouldbebasedonmeritasdeterminedbyashura(councilofelders).Othersthought that it should be vested inMuhammad’slineage through his son-in-law Ali Ibn Abi Talib.Those who believed that Ali was the rightfulsuccessor to Muhammad and that future Imamsshould descent from this line were called Shi’a-t-Ali (PartyofAli),orsimplyShi’a.

331 Sunni. Sunnis possess no clericalhierarchyorcentralisedinstitutions.WhilstImamsandMullahsare importantfigures inreligious life,Sunnis approach God directly without the needfor a central hierarchy. The absence of a central hierarchy has been a source of strength that has permitted Sunnis to adapt to local conditions allovertheworld.However,ithasalsomadeitdifficultforSunnis toachieveconsensusand,assuch, thebranch has split into at least four schools of Islamic jurisprudence (of which Hanafi predominates inAfghanistan)andsupportedahostoffundamentalistandrevivalistmovements.SignificantSunniStatesinclude Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan andIndonesia.WiththenotableexceptionoftheHazaramostofAfghanistan’smainethnicgroupspracticetheSunnifaith.

332 Shi’a. In the Shi’a community, Imamsact as intermediaries between worshippers and

Askmendirectquestionsabouttheirfemalerelatives.

Walkawayfromsomeonewhoisspeakingtoyou.

Tellsomeoneheiswrongifhegivesincorrectinformation.Itisconsideredaslight.

ExpectAfghanstobeabletoread,especiallyinruralareas.

Beckonorpointwithafinger.Itisconsideredrudeandmaybemistakenforachallenge.

WearsunglasseswhenspeakingtoanAfghan.

OfferfoodordrinkduringRamazan.

Time spent sharing tea with locals is always time well spent. Photo: Source unknown.

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Allah and are all descendent from Ali Ibn Abi Talib.Althoughnotdivine, Imamsarevestedwithsignificant religious authority and are consideredinfallibleonmattersoffaithandmorals.Iran,aShi’atheocracy,hasestablisheditselfasthechampionofShi’itesworldwide.Similarly,post-Ba’athist IraqisanemergingShi’aStateandmayintimechallengeIran's hegemony over the global Shi’a movement.WithinAfghanistantheShi’afaithisrepresentedbytheHazaraandpilgrimsareattractedtoMazar-e-Sharif’sBlueMosque(HazratAli)whichisbelievedto be the final resting place of Ali after he wasexhumedfromhisinitialburialsiteinNajaf,Iraq.

Hazrat Ali Shrine, Mazar-e-Sharif.

The Five Pillars of Islam

333 A (Sunni) Muslim’s duties form the fivepillars of the faith (Shi’ites have a similar set ofpractices):

• Shahadat. Literally ‘testimony’ or ‘witness’, isthe central creed of Islam: “There is no god but God(Allah),andMohammedisHisProphet”.Thisprofession of faith is repeated often, and itssincererecitaldesignatesoneasaMuslim.

• Salãt. Ritual prayer is conducted five times aday.Muslimsprayinaprescribedmannerafterpurificationthroughritualablutionsatdawn,midday, mid afternoon, sunset, and nightfall.Worshippers recite the prayers while facingMecca and where possible congregate in amosqueunderaprayerleader(imam).

• Sawm entails a period of obligatory fasting during daylight hours in the ninth month (Ramazan) of the Muslim (lunar) calendar.Muslims are forbidden to eat, drink, smoke, or havesexfromsunrisetosunsetduringthistime.

• Zakat is the act of giving alms to the poor. Inthe early days of Islam, governing authoritiesimposed Zakat as a tax on personal property.Now, Zakat may be collected at mosques orbygovernment fordistribution to thepoor. It isconsideredareligiousobligation(asopposedtovoluntarycharity).

• Hajj. Once in their lifetimes, Muslims arerequired,ifphysicallyandfinanciallyable,tomakeapilgrimage,orHajj, to theholy cityofMeccaduringthe12thmonthofthelunarcalendar.Dueto theextremepovertywithinAfghanistan fewpeoplehaveundertakentheHajjandthosewhohave sometimes change their name or title toHajiinrecognitionoftheirpilgrimage.

Shari’a

334 Muslims view Shari’a as God’s lawconstituting his blueprint for life. The authority of Shari’a is drawn from two primary and twosecondary sources. The primary sources are specificguidance laiddown in theQur’anand thesayings and example of the ProphetMuhammad.The secondary sources are consensus (Ijma) andextensionof existingShari’a tonewsituationsbyanalogy(Qiyas).

335 All Muslims believe in Shari’a, but theydifferastoexactlywhatitentails,withmodernists,traditionalists and fundamentalists all holding differentviews.DifferentinterpretationsofShari’aare often the cause of conflict between Muslimcommunities.Here,theroleofulema(i.e.scholars)iscriticalforresolvingdisputesandinterpretingthelaw.


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336 Shari’a has only emerged as a politicalforce inAfghansociety in recentdecades, largelyduetoexposuretoArabinfluencesduringtheSovietoccupation. Pashtuns, in particular, look more toPashtunwalithanShari’aasaguidetobehaviour.

JIHADSometimesreferredtoasthe‘sixthpillarofIslam’,jihadisanimportantreligiousdutyforallMuslims.Thetermisbesttranslatedas“struggle”andistypicallyusedtorefertostrugglesindefenceofthefaith.Thiscouldbeaninternalstruggletoimprovethefaithful(Ummah)oranexternalstruggletodefendthefaithfulfromthenon-faithful(infidel). Apersonengagedinjihadisknownasamujahid,thepluralismujahideen.

Theconceptofjihadhasbeenco-optedbyviolentextremistgroupsinrecentdecadesandusedtojustifyastateofpermanentarmedconflictagainstMuslimsandnon-Muslimsalike.Notwithstandingthis,thevastmajorityofMuslimspracticejihadasapeacefulstruggletomaintainpersonalfaith.InPashtunsociety,jihadcanbeastruggleforhonouraswellasfaith.

Scholars, Teachers & Students337 Ulema. Ulems areMuslim legal scholarsandthearbitersofshari‘alaw.InAfghanistan,theulemaareinfluentialinboththeformalandinformaljusticesystem.TheHeadof theUlemaCouncilofAfghanistan, Fazl Hadi Shinwari, was also theChief Justice of the Supreme Court from 2001 to2006.DuringhistenureasChiefJustice,Shinwarireinstated the hated ex-Taliban Ministry For The Promotion Of Virtue And Prevention Of Vice and was widelyseenassympathetictotheSalafi-influencedviewsofAbdulRasulSayyaf.

338 Mullah. An important figure in Afghanvillage life is the mullah. Whilst generally lesseducatedthantheulema,mullahsfulfilarangeof

roles at the local level, including that of teacher,sheik (elder), marriage celebrant, undertaker andimam (prayer leader). Mullahs deliver the Fridaysermonatthemosque,arbitratelocaldisputesandprovide advice on social and personal problems.Howeverthemullahmaynotnecessaryunderstandeither thewordsor theirmeaning, since thebookis written in Arabic. The leader of the Taliban movement,MullahMuhammadOmarwasavillagemullah near Kandahar prior to establishing the Taliban.

339 Madrassa.After the9/11attacksontheUnitedStates,Americantelevisioncommentators,and analysts worldwide, began associatingmadrassas with terrorism. This association is only partly correct. Most madrassas are simplyschools providing religious education to boys(and sometimes girls) that would probably notget any education otherwise. Some madrassas,however, are associated with providing fighters- especially themadrassasestablishedby theZiamilitary dictatorship during the Soviet occupationof Afghanistan. These schools were financed bythe Pakistanis in order to train a generation ofyoungPashtuns in thepreceptsofan increasinglyradicalised form of Deobandism and prepare them forjihadinAfghanistan.WiththeriseoftheTalibansome of these madrassas became associated with AraborganisationssuchasAlQaeda.

340 A 2008 estimate suggests that there areabout40,000madrassasinAfghanistan.Tanzeem-ul-Madaris (Berailvi school of thought) representsthe greatest number, followed by Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Arabia (Deobandi school of thought).ThethreeremainingschoolsareWafaqulMadarisAl-Shia(Shiaschoolofthought),Rabita-ul-MadarisAl Islamia (Jamiate-i- Islami school of thoughtfoundedbySyedMaudoodi)andWafaq-ul-MadarisAl-Salfia(Ahl-eHadithschoolofthought).

341 Taleb. A taleb is a student. Typically someonestudyingatareligiousschool(madrassa).The plural is Taliban (literally, ‘students’). MullahOmar’s Taliban movement is so named to reflectitsrootswithintherefugeecampsinPakistanandmadrassas on both sides of the border during the AfghanCivilWar.

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Chapter 4 – Insurgency

• Origins&Evolution

• StructureoftheInsurgency

• PakistaniExtremistGroups

• TalibanStrategy

• Enablers&Vulnerabilities

• StateoftheInsurgencyin2014

401 Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001,Afghanistan has become an arena for factional,criminal,ethnic,localandregionalconflicts.Criminalgroupsinvolvedinillicitopium,timber,mineralsandgem trading have flourished. Ethnic and factionalrivalry over control of valuable government postswithin the ministries of Defence, Interior, JusticeandFinancehasspilled into thewider communityresultingininstabilityandviolence.Localconflictshave festered as a result of the failure of thestatetoinstituteaviablejudicialsystem.Mostofthese have taken the form of conflict over scareresourcessuchas landandwater,andhavebeenexacerbated by the return ofmillions of refugeesto the villages, homes and farms they abandoneddecades previously. Old mujahideen commandershavereturnedtoraiseprivatemilitiasandre-assertcontrol over their traditional territories and newpower-brokers have entered the scene, flushedwith newly found wealth from lucrative securitycontracts with international forces.

402 However, whilst these processes havecontributedtowidespreadviolenceandinstability,the insurgency remains the greatest challenge facingtheAfghangovernment.

ORIGINS & EVOLUTION OF THE INSURGENCYThe Retreat to Pakistan

403 Following their defeat, senior Talibanleaders and as many as 10,000 fighters escaped

into neighbouring Pakistan, back to the refugeecamps andmadrassas fromwhere themovementfirst arose. Rather than detain them, Pakistaniauthorities provided refuge within the largesprawlingsuburbofPashtunabadon theoutskirtsofQuetta.FromheretheTalibanwereabletorelyon well-established relationships with Pakistan-basedextremistorganisationsandreligiousparties,in particular Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islami, and began to planthere-infiltrationofAfghanistan.ForthenextfiveyearsnotasingleTalibancommanderwouldbehandedovertoISAFforcesbythePakistanis.

INDIA

IRAN

TAJIKISTAN CHINA

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

Kandahar

HeratBamiyan

Ghazni

Kabul

Jala

laba

d

Mazar-e-sharif

NWFP

Peshawar

Miranshah

BALUCHISTAN

Quetta

PAKISTAN

FATA

AF-PAK border region.

404 Further north, several hundred foreignfighters (Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens, Pakistanis,etc) escorted by Ghilzai, Kakar and Zadran guidesescapedacrosstheborder intoPakistan’sFederallyAdministered Tribal Areas (FATA), with Osama binLaden,reportedlyamongstthem.Manytookrefugewith Jalaluddin Haqqani near Miranshah in NorthWaziristan. Despite occasional Pakistani militaryoperations, the FATA provided an ideal sanctuaryfromwheretheywereabletoregroup,recruit,raisefunds, re-arm, establish new training camps andplan, support and foster successful mass casualtyattacksinMadrid,LondonandwithinPakistanitself.


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405 Around the same time GulbuddinHekmatyar,whohadopenlypledged tocooperatewiththeTalibaninordertoresisttheUSoccupation,was expelled from Iran. Hekmatyar immediatelybegan reactivating old Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) networks and sought refuge in Pakistan’sNorthWestFrontierProvince (NWFP, laterKhyberPakhtunkhwaProvince(KPK)).

The Collapse of Governance

406. Ratherthanturningtotheoneroustaskofrebuilding the Afghan state and restoring security in the countryside, US forces under ‘OperationEnduringFreedom’maintainedalightfootprintandweretaskedwithtrackingdownalQaedaremnantsin the Pakistani border regions. The responsibilityforsecuringKabulfelltoanewlyestablished,UN-mandated,InternationalSecurityAssistanceForce(ISAF),initiallycomposedofonly5,000troopswhowere unable to patrol outside of the city.

FORCE RATIOS

Thedeploymentofcoalitionforcesinordertoprovidesecurityandstabilityinpost-conflictAfghanistanrepresentedthelowestpercapitacommitmentofmilitarypersonneltoanypost-conflictenvironmentsincetheformationoftheUN.

ExtantUSArmycounterinsurgencyguidanceinFM 3-24statesthat1:50(counterinsurgentstolocalpopulation)

isoftenconsideredtheminimumforcedensityrequiredforeffectiveoperations.

Recentpost-conflictstabilisationoperationssuchasBosnia(1:48)andKosovo(1:58)wereaffordedfarmoretroopsperpopulationthanthatsuppliedtoAfghanistan(1:2000).

407 The newly installed interim Governmentlacked the capacity to establish its authority in theprovincesandwasunabletoprovideessentialservicestotheruralpopulation.Asaconsequence,security outside of Kabul deteriorated markedly as opportunistic groups engaged in extortion,intimidation,cropseizures,landtheftandtargetedkillings.

The Return of the Warlords

408 The failure to commit sufficient troopnumbers for the purposes of stabilising the situation in the countryside, and the focus of USSpecial Forces on hunting al Qaeda in the borderregions,createdapowervacuumintheprovinces.Asaconsequence,oldcivilwarcommanderssuchasDostum,Khalili,Mohaqiq,Fahim,AttaandIsmaelKhan began to reappear in the north, centre andwestofthecountry.ThePashtunbeltinthesouthand eastwas left largely ungoverned resulting inacocktailofminorwarlords,opiumbarons,formerTaliban commanders and criminal opportunists emerging tofill the vacuumandfight oneanotherovercontroloftolls,drugsandweaponscaches.

409 With a new warlord State beingestablished, Karzai and the interim governmentcould not compete. The light footprint strategy left Karzai weak, impoverished and irrelevant inKabul whilst the warlords ran the remainder of the country.Tobesure,severalseniorUSadministratorsandlegislatorsrecognisedthedanger,includingUSAmbassador to Afghanistan, Ryan Crocker, andSenator (now Vice President) Joseph Biden whowarned:

“America has replaced the Taliban with warlords. Warlords are still on the US payrole but that hasn’t bought a cessation of violence.

Not only is the US failing to reign in the warlords, we are actually making them the

centrepiece of our strategy”.

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Chapter4-Insurgency

PAKISTAN

TAJIKISTAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

INDIA

0 Kilometres 100

Kabul

Quetta

KANDAHAR

KANDAHAR CITY

HELMAND

NIMROZ

FARAH

DEY KUNDI

URUZGAN

ZABUL PAKTIKA

GHAZNI

LOGAR

KUNAR

PAKTIAKHOST

Miranshah

BALOCHISTAN

FATA

NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

PUNJAB

SINDH

NURISTAN

Islamabad

NANGARHAR

KAPISA

LAGHMAN

Peshawar

NORTH-EASTERN FRONTHIG, al Qaeda & affiliates

Exploit area for safe havens

CENTRAL FRONTHaqqani Network

Consolidate influence andfreedom of movement

IOT conduct high-profile attacks in Kabul

SOUTHERN FRONTTaliban

Regain lost safehavens and influence

NORTHERN FRONTTaliban

undermine GIRoA with opportunistic attacks

Structure of Insurgency.


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Resentment to Occupation

410 Against all predictions that the invasionwould provoke a nation-wide insurgency,international forces were welcomed by most Afghans in the years following the fall of the Taliban.Afterdecadesofwar, thepopulationwaslooking for stability and saw in the occupation a chance to recover from the 30 years of conflictwhichhadsodevastatedthecountry.Duringtheseearly years optimism remained high and severalmillion refugees returnedhome. In fact, themajorcriticismof occupation forces during thefirst fewyears was that there were not enough of them.

411 However, by 2005 the goodwill andenthusiasmthatAfghansdisplayedattheexpulsionoftheTaliban,theconveningoftheConstitutionalLoyaJirgaandthe2004Presidentialelectionswasbeginning to subside. Complaints of insecurity,governmentmisconductandwidespreadcorruptionbegan to rise. This coincided with a growing dissatisfaction with the pace of the country’sreconstructionandeconomicdevelopment,inwhichfew improvements ever reached the countryside.Widespreadsuspicionthattheurbanelitehadbeentheprimebeneficiariesofinternationalaidbegantofuel jealousy and resentment against Kabulis andthere-emergenceofcenturiesoldcentre-peripheryantagonisms.

412 More ominously, locals started to turnagainst international forces that were in danger of transitioning from guest (mehman) to enemy(dushman).Criticismswereleveledattheisolationofinternationals,whorarelyspokealocallanguageandenjoyedalifestyleininternationalcompoundsin stark contrast to that of the local population. Civilian casualties (CIVCAS) through collateraldamage and rumours of torture at Bagram AirBase further fuelled the resentment. At times,international forces accelerated the process through culturally inappropriate, unnecessarilyinvasive,andoverlyviolenthouseraids.

The Rise of the Taliban Phoenix

413 The insurgency against the new domestic order being established in Afghanistan began in early 2003. Taking advantage of the diversion ofUSattentionandresourcestotheinvasionofIraq,theTalibanset themselvesupasagovernment inexile(theso-calledQuettaShura)andbegantore-infiltratethecountryside.

414 Initial infiltration was restricted to thoseareas contiguous with Pakistani Baluchistan– notably Zabul, Kandahar and Helmand. As aconsequence, by the end of 2003 the Taliban hadmanagedtoestablishthemselvesindozensofruralvillagesinthesouth,usingamixtureofpersuasionand coercion. Around the same time, the easternprovincesbegantoexperienceasharpincreaseincross-borderraidsledbyZadrantribalfightersloyalto JalaluddinHaqqani and various foreigngroups,includingalQaeda.

415 As the insurgency spread, the newlyestablished Afghan National Police (ANP) tookthe bulk of the casualties, losing more men thanthe Afghan National Army (ANA) and coalitionforces combined. Subsequently, NGO’s andmajor international development organisationsbegan to withdraw from the more remote areas,further isolating the rural population from the reconstructionanddevelopmenteffort.

416 Asaconsequence,whenUKandCanadiantroops deployed to Helmand and Kandahar aspartof ISAF’sexpansion in2006, theyconfronteda well-armed insurgency led by a reinvigoratedTalibanseniorleadershipovertheborderinQuetta.During that year alone suicide bombings increased by 400% (from 27 to 139), the use of ImprovisedExplosiveDevices (IEDs)more than doubled (from783to1677)andarmedattacksnearlytripled(from1558to4542).

417 From 2006 the insurgency grew in bothvirulenceandreach.Inboththesouthandeastofthecountryinsurgentsmanagedtobuildtrans-tribalgroupsoffighterscapableofsignificantlydisruptingbelated international efforts to establish security

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in the countryside. More importantly, they weresuccessful in killing or intimidating local leaders and government officialswho opposed them, andset themselves up as an alternative provider ofsecurityandjustice. InthemajorurbancentresofKandaharandGhaznitheyestablishedapermanentpresence and engaged in consolidating their support networks, collecting intelligence on thelocal population and assassinating key opponents.

418 The Taliban later infiltrated provincesnorthoftheHinduKush,establishingnewsupportnetworks,conductingguerrillaattacksandavoidingconcentration of forces in what amounted to a classic Maoist strategy. New networks wereestablished amongst Pashtun settlements inKunduz,Balkh,BaghlanandBadghisinparticular.

419 Finally,TalibanandHaqqanifightersweresuccessful in destabilising the provinces aroundKabul, particularly Wardak and Logar as theysought bases from which to launch attacks on the capital. Indeed,from2009Haqqanifightersbeganinfiltrating Kabul City and were responsible fornumeroushighprofileattacks.

STRUCTURE OF THE INSURGENCY420 The Afghan insurgency is largely indigenous and decentralized. Comprising of asyndicate of three largely autonomous groups: the Quetta Shura Taliban (known simply as theTaliban),HaqqaniNetwork(HQN)andHizb-i-IslamiGulbuddin (HIG), it relies on significant externalsupportfromPakistan.Theinsurgencyalsofeaturesa range of smaller militant organisations including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) andHerat Insurgency Faction (HIF) all of whom sharea common vision of Afghanistan as an Islamicemirate, owe symbolic allegiance toMullahOmarand,toalimitedextent,areunitedundertheseniorTalibanshurareportedlybasedinQuetta.

421 From their safe havens in Pakistan,senior insurgent leaders are able to providestrategic guidance to lower echelon commanders in Afghanistan and channel resources to support operational priorities. The insurgent structure

at the provincial level generally consists of twoman teams of a shadow governor and a militarycommander. These individuals often reside inPakistan,crossingthebordertoplanmajorattacks,adjudicate over disputes and motivate localfighters.Inrecentyears,however,seniorinsurgentleaders have displayed a reluctance to cross intoAfghanistan, or remain only for short periods,unwillingtobeexposedtocoalitiontargetingpriortothe2014departureofmostinternationalforces.

Insurgency by Region 422 South. SouthernAfghanistan is themaininsurgent centre of gravity due the tribal, familialand historical ties a number of key Taliban leaders maintainwiththearea(sixofthetenmostviolentdistricts in the country are in Helmand Provincealone).Themaininsurgentfocusisonmaintainingfacilitation lines in Zharay,Maiwand and PanjwaiDistricts into Kandahar City, whilst attempting toregain lost vital ground and establish freedom ofmovement. Zabul remains a significant insurgentfacilitationzoneandHelmand,inadditiontobeingthe most violent province in the country, fillsTalibancoffersannuallyasaresultoftaxesleviedagainst the lucrative opium industry. High profileattacks are a persistent threat in the lead-up toAfghanistan’sApril2014presidentialandprovincialcouncilelections.Thatsaid,overallenemyinitiatedattackshavebeenreducingsince2012.

QUETTA SHURA TALIBANBackground

TheTalibanarosefromwithintherefugeecampsinPakistanandmadrassasonbothsidesoftheborderduringtheSovietoccupationandsubsequentAfghanCivilWar.TheycametopowerattheendoftheCivilWarbyarticulatingpopulardisillusionmentwiththefactionalism,criminalityandpersonalambitionsofthemujahideenleadersandpromisingtorestorepeace,justice,honestyandareturntofundamentalIslamicvalues.TheTalibanrepresentagenuinelypan-


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423 East. Eastern Afghanistan is a volatilearea that contains the full range of Afghan insurgentgroups,mostofwhomaresupportedbyPakistan-basedmilitias.Thearea is transectedbymajorinsurgentfacilitationroutes(manyinsurgentssimplyenterthroughTorkhamandutiliseHighway1)fromadjacentsanctuariesinPakistan’sFederallyAdministered Tribal Areas (FATA). The provincesleading toKabularestagingareas forhighprofileattacks in the city, the majority of which areattributed to the Haqqani network. Al-Qaedaremnants and Pakistan-focused militias exploitungovernedspacesinnortheasternAfghanistanforsanctuary and enemy initiated attacks are on the rise.

tribalmovement.Supportisgeneratedbytailoringmessagestodifferenttargetaudiences,emphasisingjihadandshariawithintheradicalisedmadrassasandrefugeecampsofPakistan;GhilzaitriballoyaltyandambitionswithinAfghanistan’seasternprovincesandsocialdisadvantageandmarginalisationintheDurranibeltinthesouth.Inallareas,theTalibanhaveprovenadeptatusinglocaldisputesandanti-occupationsentimenttotheiradvantage.

Area of Activity

TheTalibanseniorleadershipenjoysanctuaryinPakistaniBaluchistan(andmostprobablyPunjabandSindh),fromwheretheyprovidestrategicdirectionfortheinsurgencyinAfghanistan.TheyhavesuccessfullyinfiltratedalargeproportionofAfghanistan’ssouthernprovincesandarealsoactivenorthoftheHinduKush.InrecentyearstheTalibanleadershiphavesoughtHaqqaniNetworkassistanceinconductinghighprofileattacksinKabul,butareconcernedatbeingsupplantedbythelattergroupasPakistan’s‘favouredchild’overthelongerterm.

Aim

TheTalibanaimtoregainpowerinKabulfromwheretheycanre-establishtheEmirateandintroducetheirinterpretationofSharialaw.Theyhaveeschewedthepoliticalprocess,rejectedtheAfghanconstitution,ignoredtheApril2014elections,andawaitthecoalition’sdeparture.

Taliban Supreme Leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar.

HEZB-I-ISLAMIGULBUDDINBackground

HIGistheoldestofthethreemaininsurgentgroups.Formedin1976,HIGwasarecipientofvastamountsofUSandSaudiaidduringthe1980s.HIGforcesclashedwith,andweresubsequentlydefeatedby,theTalibanduringthelatter’srisetopower.HekmatyarfledtoIranandonlyreturnedfromexilein2002inordertosupport

424 North. Traditionally a pro-Governmentregion, thedrawdownof ISAFhasseen insurgentnumbers increase in places like BadakshanProvince. That said, insurgent activity is stillminor in comparison to the south and east and is typically focusedon raids, assassinationsand theemplacement of IEDs. Enemy initiated attacks in the regionhavebeenstableoverthepasttwoyears.

425 West. Violence in western Afghanistanis a mixture of criminal and insurgent activity,with much of the west best described as “post-conflict”andonlyFarahProvinceretainingastringconnection with the wider insurgency. The rise of enemy initiated attack in the west over the pastyear is attributed to insurgent displacement from neighbouringHelmand.

426 Kabul. The capital is the primary target for high profile attacks in an attempt to drawdisproportionate media and political attention and generate a sense of insecurity. The HaqqaniNetwork are the most active insurgent group inKabul, despite the Taliban claiming credit for thebulkofinsurgentactivity.

“The Taliban and other insurgent groups have deliberate social strategies that

exacerbate the breakdown in Afghan social cohesion. They empower radical mullahs to replace local leaders …consistently support

weaker, disenfranchised or threatened tribes and groups. They erode traditional

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theresistanceagainstUSoccupation.Asaresultofitsrelianceonexternalfunding,HIGislessdeeplyrootedinlocalcommunitiesandenjoyslesspopularsupportthanotherinsurgentgroups.HIGappealsmainlytoananti-occupationnarrative.

Area of Activity

TraditionallybasedintheShamshatoorefugeecampoutsidePeshawar,HIG’slinesofinfiltrationhaveenabledthemtoestablishcontrolofisolatedmountainousvillagesinNuristanandNangahar.Inaddition,HekmatyarhasbeensuccessfulinmobilisingsupportfromkinshipnetworkswithinhisnativeKunduzprovince.

Aim

Hekmatyar’saimistocontrolthemineralandsmugglingrevenuesinthenorth-easternprovincesaswellastonegotiateasignificantroleforhimselfinafutureAfghangovernment.Tothisend,Hekmatyarhasplayedadoublegame,supportingtheTalibanbytargetingAfghanandNATOforcesintheeast,whilstmakingoccasionaloverturestotheKarzaigovernmentforapowersharingarrangement.Despitetheiranti-Karzairhetoric,aHIGoffshoot(Hezb-i-IslamiAfghanistan(HIA))haveparticipatedintheNationalAssemblyelectionsandsomemembersofthepartyhavejoinedtheKabulgovernment.TheTalibanandalQaedaaredeeplyantagonistictoHIGinvolvementinAfghanpoliticsandhaveperiodicallyreplenishedHIGcoffersinreturnfortheirdissociationfromreconciliationprocesses.

Founder & Leader of Hezb-i-Islami, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.


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social structures and capitalise on vast unemployment by empowering the young

and disenfranchised through cash payments, weapons and prestige”.

- Stanley A. McChrystal, former COMISAF

Support for the Insurgency

427 Despite the presence of a Pashtun rulerin Kabul and an attempt to generate proportional ethnic representation for important governmentposts,theinsurgencyhastakenonastrongethniccomponent. Support remains highest amongstruralPashtuncommunitiesandnetworksofvillagemullahs in the south and east of Afghanistan as well as Pashtun communities in Pakistan. In contrast,support for the insurgency is negligible within Afghanistan’sremainingethnicgroups.Inthenorth,Uzbeks, Turkmen and Tajiks typically despise theTaliban.Popularsupport in thecities remains low,

HAQQANI NETWORKBackgroundJalaluddinHaqqanirosetofameasamujahideenfighterfortheKhalisfactionofHezb-i-IslamiduringtheSovietoccupation.UnlikeHekmatyar(whoserelianceonISIfundingresultedinafailuretoestablishpopularsupportatalocallevel)Haqqani’snetworkofmadrassasandfightersisdeeplyrootedintheZadranandWazirtribesoneithersideoftheDurandLine.AlthoughnotamemberoftheTaliban,HaqqanineverthelessservedasMinisterofTribalAffairsandGovernorofPaktikaprovinceduringtheTalibaneraandisthoughttohaveprovidedrefugetoOsamabinLadenfollowingthelatter’sescapeoverthemountainsofToraBorain2001.SincethefalloftheTaliban,theHaqqanihavere-establishedanetworkofsupportstructuresinPakistan’stribalareasfromwhichtheyhaveraisedalargenumberofcommittedfighters.TheHaqqaniNetwork(HQN)isestimatedtohavemorethan10,000fightersandisregardedbythecoalitionasaninsurgentgroupwithsignificantoperationalcapability.Area of ActivityTheHaqanniNetworkiscentredinPakistan’sFederallyAdministeredTribalAreas(FATA),inparticularMiranshahandMirAliwithinNorthWaziristan.UndertheoperationalleadershipofJalaluddin’sson,Sirajuddin,tribalfightershavebeenabletoinfiltrateintoAfghanistan’seasternprovincesandestablishsignificantlocalsupportamongsttheZadrantribesofPaktia,PaktikaandKhost(P2K).TodayHaqqaniactivityextendswellbeyondits

traditionalareas,includingtheNangahar,NuristanandKunar(N2K)groupofprovincesand,significantly,districtsofLogarandWardakwhichtheyuseasstagingbasesandinfiltrationroutestoconducthighprofileattacksinKabul.AimTheHaqqaniNetworkareideologicallyalignedwiththeTaliban.TheyseektodriveinternationalforcesfromAfghanistan,re-establishtheEmirate(andShari’alaw)inKabulandregainfullcontroloftheirtraditionalbaseinAfghanistan’seasternprovinces.TheHaqqanishaveenjoyedsignificantsupportfromPakistanand,inturn,havebeenoutspokenlycriticaloftheTTPandotherinsurgentsconductingattacksagainstthePakistanistate.

Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani Network.

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evenamongstPashtuns,andsupportinthecentralHazarajatisnon-existent.

428 Within the Pashtun belt, HIG and HQNtend to prosper in areas which retain a strong tribal identity. This includes remote or mountainous regions which by virtue of their geography haveremained beyond the reach of the events whichhave destroyed tribal structures elsewhere inAfghanistan. It also includes districts on both sides of the Durand Line which have enjoyed specialtribaladministrativestatus.

429 SupportfortheTaliban,ontheotherhand,predominates inmore detribalised zones, such asthesouthernprovincesofHelmandandKandaharinAfghanistanandinPakistan’sBaluchistanprovince.Whilst Taliban ideology remains a powerfulmotivating factor in raising recruits from refugeecommunitiesinPakistan,ontheAfghansideoftheborder insurgents tend to fight because of localgrievances and in response to perceptions of riskand opportunity.

POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE INSURGENCY

Pollsindicatethat63%oftheoverallpopulationhasnosympathyforarmedoppositiongroups.Only10%havealotofsympathyforthesegroups,and20%saytheyhavesomelevelofsupport.

Source: Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of the Afghan People (Asia Foundation, Washington D.C., 2012).

PAKISTANI EXTREMIST GROUPS430 Afghanistan is the rear area for many Pakistaniextremistgroupswhoconductoperationsover the border in order to gain experience andrecruit fighters for jihad in India and, for somegroups, Pakistan itself. Many of these groupswere established either directly by, or with thetacit consent of, the Pakistani government whosought proxies for their campaigns in Soviet-

occupied Afghanistan during the 1980s andIndian-administered Kashmir in the 1990s. Inwhat amounts to a classic ‘blowback’ insurgency,the original objectives of these groups have nowexpandedto include Islamic revolution inPakistanitself, particularly following the 2007 storming oftheRedMosqueinIslamabad.

431 Lashkar-e-Tayyba (LeT). Trans. Army of the Pure. LeTisthemilitantwingofthePakistanimissionary organization Makaz-ad-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI).Formed in1990,LeTwas thefirstofmanyPakistanigroupstotrainatTaliban-controlledcamps inAfghanistan,allegedlyfightingalongsideTaliban troops against Northern Alliance forces.Initially limited tooperations inKashmir, Let haveclaimed responsibility for severalmajorattacks inIndianurbancentresinrecentyears, includingthe2008Mumbaiattacks.Althoughofficially banned,the Lahore-based group receives significantPakistanisupportandcontinuestooperateunderthealias Jamaat ud-Dawa (JuD)with several trainingcampsinPakistan.WithtiestoalQaeda,LeT’saimsare to liberate Indian-administered Kashmir andintroduce Shari’a to Pakistan. More recently, theLeT has provided trainers and other operatives toAfghanistan-focusedmilitiastargetingthecoalitionin southern and eastern Afghanistan.

2008 Mumbai Attack. Photo: Source unknown.

432 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). Trans. Army of JhangviaftertheDeobandileaderMaulanaHaqNawaz Jhangvi. LeJ has established a reputationas one of the most violent extremist groups inPakistan, claiming responsibility for a number ofviciousattacksonPakistan’sminorityShia(including


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AfghanHazara)andChristiancommunities.LeJhashad a long relationship with the Pakistani state,receiving financial support (along with a numberofothermilitantgroups) inordertobeusedasanasymmetricweaponagainstIndia.Whilstsectarianattacks in Pakistan and operations against IndiaremainLeJ’sprimaryactivity,thegrouphasrecentlybroadened its focus to target theUS presence inAfghanistan. The Pakistani government begancrackingdownonLeJinthewakeof9/11,followingwhichLeJformedanalliancewithalQaedaandtheTehrik-eTalibanPakistan (TTP)andbegantotargetPakistan itself. The group’s goals are to establishaDeobandiSunniIslamicstateinPakistanthroughtheexpulsionoreliminationofPakistan’sminoritygroupsandtheintroductionofShari’a.

433 Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Trans. The Army of Mohammed. JeM operates primarily inIndian-administered Kashmir. However, recentlyJeM’s focus has turned towards attacks againstthegovernmentinPakistanandcoalitionforcesinAfghanistan.JeMoperatesseveraltrainingcampsin Pakistan and has been implicated in the 2005London attacks and the attempted trans-Atlanticplanebombing.Thegroup’saimsaretouniteIndian-administeredKashmirwithPakistanandestablishShari’alaw.

434 Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA). JuA wasformedasHarakatul-MujahideenbythePakistanigovernmentinordertoactasaproxyforitswarsinAfghanistanandKashmirduringthe1980s.Thegroup isalignedwith thePakistanipoliticalparty,Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam Fazul (JUI-F) and hascooperated with other extremist organisationsoperating in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. On16 December 2006, leaders of JuA and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) called for a joint strategy andpledged to cooperate with Afghan insurgents to target coalition forces in Afghanistan. Since thenJuA training camps in Pakistan have providedguerrilla training for Afghan insurgents and explosives training toPakistani’s livingabroad formass casualty attacks in the homelands of coalition countries.

435 Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM). TNSMwas established in the 1990s intheMalakandDivisionofPakistan(aregionwhichincludes the Swat Valley). Due to its socialistleaningsthegroupquicklyenjoyedsupportamongthe working classes and began to push for a number ofsocialandjudicialreforms.FollowingtheUS-ledinvasionofAfghanistan,TNSMreportedlysentover10,000fightersoverthebordertoaidtheTaliban.In2009 a TNSM operation captured themajority oftheSwatValleyandinitiatedamajorconflictwithPakistani security forces, the result ofwhichwasa truce and the implementation of Shari’a in theSwat.

436 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).Trans. Student Movement of Pakistan. The PakistaniTaliban is an umbrella organisation of around 30 loosely affiliated militant student groups inPakistan.Formed in2007 in response toPakistanimilitary incursions into the tribal areas, the TTPhave largely maintained a separate identity fromtheir Afghan counterparts. Nevertheless, it hasopportunistically targeted ISAF supply convoysin Pakistan. Under the leadership of BaitullahMehsud (2007 – 2009) the TTP gained notorietyfor a growing number of mass casualty attacks in Pakistan, including the assassination of BenazirBhutto.InAugust2009Mehsudwashimselfkilledby a US UAV strike. Under Hakimullah Mehsud(2009-2013),theTTPwagedalloutwaragainstthePakistanstate,withelementslaterseekingshelterfromPakistanicounter-offensives inAfghanistan’sKunar and Nuristan provinces. The TTP is closelyaffiliatedwith al Qaeda remnants operating fromwithin Pakistan’s tribal areas, and is thoughtto have assisted in the December 2009 suicideattackagainsttheCIAatCampChapmaninKhost,Afghanistan.InNovember2013MaulanaFazlullah,a hardline militant commander from Pakistan’sSwat Valley, was appointed as the overall TTPcommander following Hakimullah’s death at thehandsofaUSdronestrike.Mehsud’sdeathcausedsignificant disquiet in Pakistan and threatens toderail Nawaz Sharif’s much vaunted peace talkswith the organisation.

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Maulana Fazlullah named as new Head of TTP in November 2013. Photo: Source unknown.

437 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The IMUaroseafter the fragmentation oftheUSSRandtheriseofseveralnewly-independentcentral Asian states. Initially composed of former Soviet soldiers, village mullahs and impoverishedfarmersfromtheFerghanaValley(wheretheUzbek,Kyrgyz,andTajikbordersconverge),thegrouphasextended its reachacrosscentralandsouthAsia.The IMU’s stated goal is to establish an IslamicCaliphate across centralAsia, incorporating all ofthepost-sovietstatesandChina’sXinjiangProvince.FollowingsevererepressionbytheGovernmentofUzbekistanandthenheavylossesduringthe2001USinvasionofAfghanistan, the IMUfledsouthtothe Afghan-Pakistan border regions, establishinglinks to other militant groups, such as al Qaeda.Despite occasional conflict with local Pashtuntribes, the IMU continues to enjoy sanctuarywithin Pakistan’s tribal areas. From here they areable to attract support from disaffected CentralAsian fighters (their numbers have swollen fromseveralhundredtoseveralthousandfighterssince2001). Recently, IMU splinter groups, such as theIslamicJihadUnion(IJU),haveemergedtoconductsuccessfulattacksonUSandIsraeliembassiesaswellaspublicbazaarsinUzbekistan.

438 Al Qaeda (AQ). Trans. The Base. Al Qaeda emerged from the mujahideen networkson the Afghan-Pakistan border during the Sovietoccupation of Afghanistan. The movement beganunder the leadership of Osama bin Laden from acore group of foreign fighters (mostly Arabs andYemenis) but quickly evolved into a worldwide

network of affiliated groups. Al-Qaeda’s goalsare to replace moderate ‘apostate’ GovernmentsinMuslim countries (the near enemy) in order tore-establish the Islamic Caliphate. US supportfor Israel, theHouseofSaudandothermoderategovernmentsintheregion(aswellastheongoingpresenceofUStroopsinIslamiclands)isperceivedtobethebiggestobstacletothere-establishmentof the Caliphate. As a consequence, al Qaeda’soriginal jihad against the near enemy has turnedintoaglobalstruggleagainsttheUSanditsallies(thefarenemy).

439 Inearly1997theTalibandiscoveredaSaudiplot to assassinate Osama bin Laden and invitedhim tomove to Kandahar for his own protection.BinLadenagreedandfosteredhisrelationshipwiththe Taliban’s senior leadership by fundingmilitarypurchases, buildingmosques and running trainingcamps for sympathetic fighters. From his base ofoperations inAfghanistan, bin Ladenwasdirectlyresponsible fora remarkableseriesofhigh-profileattacks against the US and its allies, includingthe 1998 bombing ofUS embassies in Kenya andTanzania,theattackontheUSSColeinYemenandthe 9/11 attacks in the US homeland. The visualimpact and symbolic value of these strikes hassummoned support from sympathetic communities and encouraged imitation from likeminded groups around the world. Following the US invasion ofAfghanistanandthesubsequentlossofthegroup’strainingfacilities,thecoreoftheseniorleadership,includingOsamabinLadenandAymanalZawahiri,retreated to Pakistan where they remaineddisconnected from the wider Taliban-basedinsurgency in Afghanistan. Bin Laden was latertrackedtothecityofAbbottabad,Pakistan,wherehewaskilledbyUSSpecialForceson2May2011intheOp.NEPTUNE’SSPEARraidonacompoundwherehehadbeen ‘hiding inplainsight’withhisfamilysinceatleast2006.AlZawahirisubsequentlybecamethegroup’ssymbolic leader in the region.As fewas75alQaedafightersare thought tobeinAfghanistan, largely restricted to remote areasin north-eastern Afghanistan. Nevertheless, theterrorist network seeks to expand, and the alQaeda–Talibanrelationshipremainsintact.


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Osama bin Laden, was shot dead by US Special Forces on 2 May 2011. Photo: Source unknown.

TALIBAN STRATEGY440 After a few false starts and a disastrous attempt at standing and fighting against ISAFforces in the Panjwai (south west of Kandaharcity)in2006,theTalibanhaveadoptedalongtermstrategy predicated on the belief that coalition forceswouldeventuallydisengagefromtheregion.

441 The key to their eventual success,therefore,istoensurethatthegovernmentthatisleft in the wake of departing international forces hasbeenunabletoestablishsufficientcapacityorlegitimacytosurviveaconcertedTalibanoffensive.Should coalition forces and agencies succeed infostering a host government whose capacity forservice delivery and security in the countrysideaffords it a broad-based legitimacy, it is unlikelythattheTalibanwillachievetheiraims.Assuch,theTalibanarepursuingatwo-prongedstrategy.First,and crucially, they seek to prevent the coalitionstate-buildingeffortbyunderminingsupportforthegovernment.Second,theyareattemptingtofosterthe early disengagement of international forces by drawing them into an exhausting asymmetricconflictandtherebyunderminingpublicandpoliticalsupport for the ISAFmission in troopcontributingcountries.

442 Preventing the State-Building Effort. The Taliban aim to prevent the coalition state-buildingeffortbyisolatingthegovernmentfromthepopulation,labelingthestateascorrupt,ineffectiveand apostate and demonstrating the inability of the state to provide security or deliver basic services

tothecountryside.Wherepossible,theTalibanwillcontrasttheineffectivenessofthegovernmentwitheffectiveTaliban-controlledshadowinstitutions.

443 The key target of this line of operation is the population. Insurgents wage a silent war of intimidation and persuasion throughout the year (notjustintheso-calledfightingseason)inordertoisolatethepopulationfromthegovernment.Muchof the propaganda is aimed at three key messages:

1. The inability of the government and coalitionforces to provide security in the districts andotherwiseimprovethelivesoflocals.

2. Thepresenceofaninfideloccupiersupportingacorrupt,non-Shari’aState.

3. The inevitability of their eventual victory andthe consequences of siding with the Afghangovernment.

444 The Taliban reinforce these messages by out-governing the government in many districts.They have appointed shadowgovernorswho levytaxes and conscript fighters. They have used themadrassanetworkstosubstituteforanineffectivestate-run education system. They have installedShari’acourtstoresolvedisputesanddeliverswiftand predictable justice and they claim to protectlocals from otherwise rampant warlords and criminals. Their strategy is successful where they are able to point to the establishment of peace,stability and security in the areas under their direct control.

“Insurgency can best be understood as a process of competitive state-building rather than simply an instance of collective action”.

- Stathis Kalyvas 445 Inareasundercoalitionorgovernmentcontrol,theTalibanseektocoercethepopulationfrom cooperating with or supporting the government.Talibangroupshaveseizedcontrolofvillagecentres,posted‘nightletters’,thrownacidonthefacesofschoolgirls,infiltratedAfghansecurity forces and terrorised locals by killing anysuspectedofsupportingthegovernment.Acommontacticisthere-infiltrationof‘cleared’

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areasinordertoperformexecutionsofpoliceofficers,governmentofficialsorpro-governmentlocals. Their strategy is successful where there is anatmosphereoffear,insecurityandintimidationamongstlocalcommunitieswithingovernmentcontrolled areas.

446 Exhausting International Forces & Agencies.TheTaliban’ssecondlineofoperationis aimed at international forces and agencies and seeks to foster their early disengagement by raisingthepolitical,humanandfinancialcostsofthe international presence in Afghanistan.

447 Insurgents attempt to draw out the conflict by avoiding decisive confrontation withsuperior international forces, while at the sametimeengaging in targetedattacksonbothcivilianandmilitarypersonnel.IncreasinguseofIED’shasenabled insurgents to inflict significant casualtieson international forces while preserving theirstrength for the planned offensive against theAfghangovernmentonceinternationalforceshavewithdrawn.Asymmetrictacticssuchasambushes,raidsandroadsidebombingshavebeensuccessfulin distracting and diluting international efforts by forcing coalition forces to engage in costly force protection measures that do little to progress ISAF’s counterinsurgency strategy. Such attackshaveledtothewithdrawalofseveralaidagenciesfromthemorevolatilepartsofthecountrysideandlimitedthefreedomofmovementofcoalitionforces–allofwhichfurther isolates internationalforcesand agencies from local populations.

ASYMMETRY OF INTEREST

The‘asymmetryofinterest’intheAfghanistanconflictfavourstheinsurgent.HeretheinterestoftheinsurgentintheoutcomeoftheconflictfaroutweighstheinterestoftheUSanditscoalitionpartners,whichdeclinesifthealQaeda–Afghanistannexusisnolongerdecisiveintheirstrategicconsiderations.Theinsurgentsareby-and-largenativetotheareaofoperationsand,assuch,theyhave

nowhereelsetogo.Moreover,theinsurgentsbelievetheyhavethepatienceandthewilltoexhausttheirenemy.

Theinsurgentsseektoimposecostsonthecoalitionthatgeneratepoliticalresistanceonthehome-frontofitsmemberstofurtherprosecutingthecounter-insurgencycampaign,pushingthemtoapointwherethewarisnolongerworthfighting.Additionally,thedrawnoutcounter-insurgencytimelineinAfghanistandoesnotmatchthemuchshorterpoliticaltimeframesforsuccessinmanycoalitioncapitals,especiallywhenkeyAfghanGovernmentinstitutionsmustbebuiltfromthegroundup.

Source: George Friedman, STRATFOR.

ENABLERS & VULNERABILITIES

448 TheTalibanhavedevelopedasophisticatedset of enablers for sustaining their operations. To date these have contributed to the resilience andstrength of the insurgency. However, they alsorepresentpointsofvulnerabilityasanydegradationof these capabilities would limit their ability to conduct operations in Afghanistan. Key enablers include sanctuary for their senior leadership, asteadystreamofrecruits,weapons,theconsent(oracquiescence)oflocalcommunitiesandfinance.

449 Sanctuary. Pakistan’s support forAfghanistan-focused insurgents and its failure tointerdict IED materiel and components continue to undermine the stability of Afghanistan and pose an enduring challenge to the coalition campaign. Insurgent safe havens provide a significantregenerative capacity, together with operationaland financial support, training and associatedinfrastructure. As a result insurgents remain resilient and determined, and will likely attemptto regain lost ground and influence following thedrawdown of international forces.


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450 Leadership. The Taliban and other extremist groups rely on charismatic and credibleleadership to recruit new members. A history of resistance during the Soviet occupation is almostapre-requisiteandmanyseniorleaderscontinuetorefertoatraditionofresistancetoinfideloccupiers.Jalaluddin Haqqani, in particular, is renowned forhis roleasafighter in theKhalis factionofHezb-i-Islami during the Soviet occupation. MullahOmar, on the other hand,whilst active during theresistance,derivesmuchofhisauthority fromhisstunt in 1994 when he removed the cloak of theprophetMohammedfromKandahar’sKhirkaSharifshrine and proclaimed himself Amir al-Mu’minin(commanderof the faithful).OsamabinLadenhascome to fame largely as a result of al Qaeda’ssuccess in targeting theUS in Yemen,Africa andthe American homeland.

451 AlthoughSpecialForcesoperationsagainstlocal commanders in Afghanistan can cause short term disruption to the operational capability of the insurgency,theseleadersaretypicallyreplacedbyemerging commanders from over the border. Aslong as the senior leadership enjoys sanctuary inPakistanfromwheretheycanrecruit,train,supplyand plan operations over the border it is unlikelythat there will be anything more than containment in Afghanistan. However, the insurgency remainsvulnerable to a change in Pakistani policy towardtheircontinuingpresenceinQuetta.ShouldPakistanstart directly targeting senior Taliban leaders, theinsurgentswouldbeforcedtofightontwofronts.Neutralisation of key leaders in Pakistan wouldnotonlyunderminemoralebutsignificantlyimpactontheTaliban’sabilitytoattractnewrecruitsanddirectoperationsovertheborder.

452 Recruits.TheTalibanandotherextremistorganisationshaveanalmostinexhaustiblenumberof recruits pouring out of the Deobandi madrassas and Pashtun refugee camps in Pakistan. Analystsbelievethattheinsurgencycouldsustainthousandsof casualties a year for over 20 years with littleoperational impact. These young recruits are often referredtoasneo-Taliban.Manyhavenomemoryof the Soviet occupation and little experience ingovernment during the Taliban era. Most havegrown up in Pakistan and their knowledge of

Afghanistan is largely based on the descriptions relayed to them by madrassa teachers and Taliban recruiters. With little experience of traditionalvillagelife,theseyoungAfghansareguidedlessbyPashtunwali–thecomplexmixofnorms,customs,codesand institutionswhichgovern life in typicalAfghanvillages–andmorebytheradicalversionsof Islampromulgatedby thePakistanimadrassas,which emphasise shari’a, jihad and resistanceto occupation. Dislocated from the social and normative constraints of regular community lifetheseyoungradicalshaveshownlesscompunctionaboutciviliandeathsandareresponsibleforsomeof the bloodiest attacks.

453 Becausemany of the ideologically drivenfoot soldiers of the insurgency are recruited from displaced Afghans on the Pakistani side of theborder, the Taliban remain vulnerable to Pakistaniand international efforts to reform the madrassas andresettleorrepatriaterefugees,thusemptyingthe camps which feed the insurgency.

“In order to eradicate mosquitoes it is more efficient to drain the swamp than to try and

swat every individual insect”.

454 In addition to Pakistan-based recruits,Afghanistan’s rural communities furnish theinsurgency with a host of low-level fighters anddistrict commanders. These practice flexiblealignment politics depending on the balance of threats, rewards and solidarity factors. Manyare paid to emplace roadside bombs, fire rocketsor mortars at NATO bases or participate in morecoordinated activity for a few weeks or monthseveryyear.Theselocalrecruitsaremotivatedmoreby the absence of security, government servicesor opportunity in their districts than by any real sympathy for Taliban ideology.

455 Local recruits have been motivated tosupporttheTalibanlargelyasaresultofgovernancefailure. As such, Taliban recruitment from localcommunities remains vulnerable to the extensionof Government into rural areas. This includes theprovisionofkeyservicessuchaseducation,healthand rule of law as well as enabling infrastructure suchaselectricityandroads.Improvedgovernancewill help to reduce grievances and undermine

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insurgentgroups,intentonportrayingthestateasineffective and corrupt. In addition, it is likely todemonstrate progress in the state-building effortand force the reassessment of opportunistic locals whojoinedtheTalibanonlywhenitappearedthatmomentum was swinging behind the insurgency.

“The first requirement of countering the Taliban at the village level requires good

governance”.- Afghan National Directorate of Security

456 Without the ability to maintain a flowof willing recruits, either from within the localpopulation or from across the border, the Talibanwill be vulnerable to attrition, as was the caseof the remnants of theMalayan Races LiberationArmy,whichwas reduced to a fugitive existence,isolatedandirrelevant,intheThaiborderregion.

FACTORS AFFECTING SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBANThemaindriversoflocalsupportfortheTalibaninclude:

Cronyism–thesystematicfavouringofpreferredclients,tribesorgroupswhilstleavingothersoutofkeygovernmentdecisionmakingfora.ExamplesincludetheadministrationsputtogetherbyJanMohammedKhan(Popalzai)andGulAghaSherzai(Barakzai)inUruzganandKandaharwhichlimitedkeyappointmentstomembersoftheirownrespectivetribes.Incontrast,theTalibanappealstoareligiousnarrativewhichclaimstoriseabovetribalaffiliation.

Local Conflicts–mostofthesehavetakentheformofconflictoverscareresourcessuchaslandandwaterandhavebeenexacerbatedbythereturnofmillionsofrefugeestothevillages,homesandfarmstheyabandoneddecadespreviously.Thecontinuingabsenceofafunctioningjudicialsystemorotherconflictresolutionmechanism

atalocallevelmeansthatmanyoftheseconflictsarelefttofester.Ifheardatall,theoutcomeisoftendeterminedbybribery.TheTalibanhavebecomeadeptatusinglocalconflictstotheiradvantage.

Corruption–includeslargescaleransackingofStateresources(grandcorruption)aswellasthepaymentofbribestopoliceandgovernmentofficialsinreturnforpreferentialtreatment(pettycorruption).Inthesouth,manycorruptofficialscloselylinkedtoPresidentKarzaiwereappointedduetotheirstronganti-Talibanstance.However,analystsarguethattheseofficialscreateatleastasmanyTalibansympathisersastheykillTaliban.Incontrast,theTalibanhaveestablishedanombudsmansystemtoinvestigateabusesofpowerintheirowncadres,removingthosefoundguilty.

Lack of Opportunity –unfulfilledexpectationsofapeacedividendfollowingtheoustingoftheTalibanhavecontributedtogrowingdiscontent,especiallyamongstthejoblessyouth.TheinabilitytoprovideessentialservicesandlivelihoodstoruralareashasmadepeoplemoresusceptibletoTalibanpropaganda.

457 Weapons. Small arms, heavymachineguns,mortars, rocket propelled grenades,107 mm fin stabilised rockets, IED componentryand home-made explosives are readily availablethroughouttheregion.Notablytheinsurgencyalsoreceives a steady supply of these systems fromstate sponsors.

458 Tacit Consent. The insurgency has growninbothreachandvirulencewithoutalargebaseofactivesupportfromwithinthepopulation.However, it cannot progress without at least thetacitconsent,orfearfulacquiescenceofmanylocal


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communities. Insurgents rely on locals for food,water,supplies,andintelligence.Theyseektoleverthis through amix of coercion and persuasion. Inareas where residents feel safe and secure, theinsurgency struggles to gain the consent necessary to conduct operations.

459 Finance. Each of the main insurgent groups receivesamixofexternaland internal funding tosupport their activities. External funding typicallyoriginates from supportive communities in ArabstatesorinPakistan.Itmaybedelivereddirectlyviathe hawala systemorindirectlythroughacomplexweb of connections designed to conceal the source androuteofthedonations(ofteninvolvingIslamiccharities). Internal funding is generated throughAfghanistan’snarcoticstrade,theestablishmentofprotection rackets, vehicle checkpoints (especially

58

SHABNAMAH:Night LettersShabnamah(‘nightletters’)havebeenatraditionalinstrumentofAfghanreligiousleaders,mujahideen,rebellioustribesandothersforencouragingcommunitiestoopposetheState.Thelettersappearatnight,postedtotrees,mosquesandgovernmentbuildings.Recipientsareinformedbyillustration,poetryorprosewhattheyshouldorshouldnotdoandwhatrewardsorpenaltiestheyshouldexpect.TheTalibanhaveadoptednightlettersasacost-effectivemethodofinstructionandintimidation.SomeofthelettersaredesignedtopersuadereaderstosupporttheTalibanbyappealingtoreligious,culturalandhistoricalthemesthroughthemediumoftraditionalAfghanpoetry.However,mostlettersrepresentovertintimidationandpromisedeathtoanyonewhodefiestheiredicts.LetterstypicallyinstructAfghansto:(i) OffernoassistancetoISAF(infidel

occupiers)ortheAfghangovernment(apostatepuppet).

(ii) Notdivulgetheidentitiesofmujahideen.

(iii)Ceaseparticipatinginwomen’seducationandotherun-Islamicinitiatives.

(iv)CeaseworkingonGovernmentorNGOdevelopmentprojects.

LettersalsoregularlyrefertotheinevitabilityofUSwithdrawalandTalibansuccess.Forexample:

“The Americans may stay for five years, they may stay for ten years, but eventually they will leave, and when they do, we will come back to this village and kill every family that has collaborated with the Americans or the government”Somelettersareaddressedtoindividuals,suchasteachers,governmentofficialsandlocallyemployeddevelopmentworkers.Forexample:“You [name removed] teaching at [name of girl’s school]. You should be afraid of God. We warn you to leave your job as a teacher as soon as possible otherwise we will cut the heads off your children and will set light to your daughter. This is the first and last warning”.ThetacticissuccessfulincreatinganatmosphereoffearduetotheTaliban’srecordofmakinggoodonthepromisedconsequences.Governmentofficialshavebeenassassinated,relativesmurderedanddozensofschoolsandclinicshavebeenburned.NightlettershavecontributedtothesuccessoftheTaliban’sprincipalstrategyofpreventingthestate-buildingeffort.Asaresultofthenightlettercampaign,governmentserviceshavebeeninterrupted,developmentprojectsterminated,policeofficersquitandseveralschoolsandmedicalclinicshaveshutdown.

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along key smuggling routes), kidnapping, and byextorting a proportion of the funds provided formajordevelopmentprojects.

460 Narcotics. TheTaliban-led insurgency inthe southern Afghanistan, in particular, is largelypossibleasaresultofnarcotics-derivedrevenues,which are estimated to contribute up to 60% ofinsurgent financing. Afghanistan is the world’slargest producer of illicit opium, which amountedto 3,700 tons in 2012 (UNODC). And insurgentpenetration of Afghanistan’s narcotics market isboth extensive and expanding. Funds are used topay and arm local fighters and compensate thefamilies of suicide bombers. As a result of their relianceonthenarcoticstrade,however,theTalibanremain vulnerable to effective counter-narcoticsmeasures. The Taliban has a vertically integratedopium production structure, including financing,that may be targeted on many levels. Moreover,individualsinvolvedinthetrade,includingfarmers,arecognisantthatthecultivationofpoppyisharam (forbidden).

HAWALAHawalaisalegalalternativemoneytransfersystembasedonthereputationsofaglobalnetworkofmoneybrokers(hawaladars).Acustomertypicallyapproachesahawaladarinonelocationandprovideshimwithasumofmoneytobetransferredtoarecipientinanotherlocation.Thehawaladarcallsanotherhawaladarintherecipient’scityandinstructshimtodisbursethefunds(minusacommission).Thetransfergeneratesadebtbetweenthehawaladarswhichisusuallysettledatalaterdatethroughanothertransferintheoppositedirection.

461 Propaganda. The insurgency dominates the information environment, predicated on acommon culture and religion. The Taliban theme for the past decade has been that they are fightinga foreignoccupation.Now that theANSFhas taken over the operational lead for security

and as coalition forces draw down, thismessageincreasingly lacks credibility.

462 Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS). Insurgents are responsible for the vast majorityof injuries to local people (85% of CIVCAS wascausedbyinsurgentsbetween1October2012and31March2013),largelythroughtheirindiscriminateemplacement of large numbers of IEDs.

STATE OF THE INSURGENCY IN 2014

463 The insurgency in 2014 is less of anexistential threat to the Afghan state than it hasbeen at any stage over the past five years. Thecoalition force uplift and ANSF developmenthavepushed the insurgency into themost remotecommunities and degraded its capability. In 2013,the Taliban failed to achieve the intent of OpKHALID IBNAL-WALID (theDrawnSwordofGod)whose five stated objectives were: to increaseviolence;weaken theANSF; limit ISAF’s ability tomove freely; conduct attacks aimed at garneringmedia coverage; and to promote insecuritythrough propaganda and influence.Although theirrelationship with al Qaeda remains intact, thelatter’s presence is much reduced (allegedly asfewas75fightersinAfghanistan),andisrestrictedthrough coalition pressure to isolated areas of north-easternAfghanistan.

464 Nevertheless, the insurgency remains apotent force for as long as it is able to draw upon sanctuaries and support in Pakistan. Insurgentshave maintained their influence in a number ofrural districts that serve as facilitation routesinto major urban centres, including KandaharCity and Kabul and rely upon high profile raids,assassination and intimidation of local power brokers and officials to undermine perceptions oftheAfghanGovernment’sabilitytoprovidesecurity.Theiractionsareresponsiblefor thevastmajorityof civilian casualties in Afghanistan. Insurgentsemploy mainly asymmetric means including the emplacement of large numbers of IEDs to contest the battlespace, and are inclined to avoid largeengagementswithsecurityforcestopreservetheircombat power prior to the coalition withdrawal. In somecasesinsurgentshaveenteredintoceasefiresandotherlocalaccommodationswiththeANSF.



AFGHANISTAN

Chapter 5 – Counterinsurgency

• Legacy(2001-2008)

• TheTroopSurge(2009-2013)

• AssessmentofProgress(circa2014)

• Transition,WithdrawalandOpRESOLUTESUPPORT(2014+)

“It all began so well. As the Northern Alliance, heavily supported by US Special Forces and

massive airpower, swept through Afghanistan in October and November of 2001 al Qaeda

and their Taliban allies fled to the mountains and havens of the south and east, or over the border into the Pakistani tribal areas, in seeming disarray. While a number of

questions remained about the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden, and the nature of the

post-conflict configuration of Afghanistan, the overall impression was still one of stunning

victory”

- Dr Tim Bird, Joint Services Command & Staff College, UK

LEGACY (2001-2008)500 The mission in Afghanistan was simple. A combination ofUSAir Power, small teams of CIAandSpecialForceson thegroundand the residueof the Northern Alliance toppled the Taliban in amatterofweeks.Ratherthangetboggeddowninacostlyandpotentiallyopen-endedcommitmenttorebuilding the state thatwas left in the Taliban’swake, theUSPresidentandSecretaryofDefensearticulated a light “footprint” strategy and began to turn their attention to other fronts in what was becoming known as the ‘Global War on Terror(GWOT)’.

501 In an unprecedented show of support,NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in thehistory of the alliance and sent an initial force of

5,000troopstohelpsecureKabul.FromtheoutsettheNATOplan forAfghanistanencompassed fourkey phases:

• Assessment and preparation, including initialsecurity operations in Kabul.

• Geographic expansion to encompass theremainder of the countryside.

• StabilisationofthesecuritysituationineachofAfghanistan’s34provinces.

• Transition of security responsibility to Afghansecurity forces.

502 The popularity of ISAF amongst Kabulisled to the enthusiastic expansion of the forcethroughtheestablishmentofaGerman-ledregionalcommandinthenorthernprovinces(October2004)followed by Italian, British and US led regionalcommands in the west (September 2005), south(July2006)andeast(October2006).Onceinplace,thesecommandsweretaskedwithoverseeingthestabilisation of the provinces and districts withintheir area of operation before eventual transition(toAfghanforces).

503 However, from the outset ISAF struggledto attract sufficient troops from coalition nationsto accomplish the task. At the same time as NATO began expanding its area of operations inAfghanistan, Iraqi insurgents as well as Sunniand Shia sectarian militia unleashed a bitter andincreasingly violent civil war in that country. ThesituationinIraqservedtodeflectUSresourcesandattention from Afghanistan at a crucial stage in the executionof the ISAFexpansionplan. Inaddition,cost,capacityanddomesticconsiderationsservedto limit the numbers of troops offered from other coalitionmembers, all ofwhich led to insufficientresourcing for the stabilisation phase of the ISAFstrategy.Thecombinationoflimitedsecurityforces,negligible government capacity, active promotionof informal ‘security brokers’ or ‘warlords’ inorder to secure coalition lines of communication,and rising resentment toward the slow pace of redevelopment,createdtheidealconditionsfortheTalibantoregroupandre-infiltratethecountryside.



Chapter5-Counterinsurgency

BythetimethatthesituationinIraqhadimprovedsufficiently for ISAF to substantially increasetroop numbers in Afghanistan, coalition forceswere facing a widespread and deeply entrenched insurgency.

504 The influence of the campaign in Iraq onthesituationinAfghanistaniscomplex.Initially,theconflictinIraqservedtodivertresourcesdestinedfor Afghanistan. However, as the Iraqi campaignunfolded, the war in Iraq provided an ideal test-bed for the rediscovery of counterinsurgency(COIN) doctrine, strategy and tactics amongst theUS military. Faced with a full-blown insurgencythat was beginning to take on the dimensions of a civil war, the Commander of MultinationalForces-Iraq, GEN George Casey, establishedthe COIN Center for Excellence - Iraq (a similarorganisation, the COIN Training Center, was laterestablishedinAfghanistan).In2006theUSTrainingand Doctrine Command (TRADOC) initiated twounique programs to support the COIN effort inIraq. First, a program to deploy social scientiststo Iraqasmembersof ‘human terrain teams’waslaunchedinordertoassistcommanderstodevelopanunderstandingofthepolitics,sociology,cultureandunderlyingdriversof instabilityamongst localpopulations. Second, GEN David Petreaus begantogathera teamofmilitaryofficers,developmentworkers,statedepartmentofficialsandacademicsto begin drafting a new Army Field Manual on Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24). A fewmonths afterthepublicationofthemanualPetreaussucceededGENCaseyasthenewUSCommanderinIraqandwas able to implement the theory in practice.

505 Asa resultof the rediscovery, refinementand perceived success of the new COIN strategyinIraq,manyoftheapproachesthatweredeemednecessary for combating the insurgency in Afghanistanfrom2008onwardhadbeentriedandtested by an entire generation of US forces andagencies.Facedwiththerapidadaptationoftheirsenior coalition partner, other troop contributingnations began to implement their own reforms. The UKpublishedJDP3-40The Military Contribution to

Stabilisation in 2009which took the lessons frombothIraqandAfghanistanandsituatedthemwithina broader context of societal conflict and statefragility.Similarly,French,Canadian,Dutch,GermanandseveralScandinaviancountriesbegantoadapttheir forces to the realities of COINoperations inthe21stcentury.

COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN)

COINisacomplexeffortthatintegratesthefullrangeofcivilianandmilitaryagencies.Itisoftenmorepopulation-centric(focusedonsecuringandcontrollingagivenpopulationorpopulations)thanenemy-centric(focusedondefeatingaparticularenemygroup).NotethatthisdoesnotmeanthatCOINislessviolentthananyotherconflict:onthecontrary,likeanyotherformofwarfareitalwaysinvolveslossoflife.Itisanextremelydifficultundertaking,isoftenhighlycontroversialpolitically,involvesaseriesofambiguouseventsthatareextremelydifficulttointerpret,andoftenrequiresvastlymoreresourcesandtimethaninitiallyanticipated.Inparticular,governmentsthatembarkuponCOINcampaignsoftenseverelyunderestimatetherequirementforaverylong-duration,relativelyhigh-costcommitment(intermsoffinancialcost,politicalcapital,militaryresourcesandhumanlife).ThecapabilitiesrequiredforCOINmaybeverysimilartothoserequiredforpeacekeepingoperations,humanitarianassistance,stabilizationoperations,anddevelopmentassistancemissions.However,theintentofaCOINcampaignistobuildpopularsupportforagovernmentwhilemarginalizingtheinsurgents:itisthereforefundamentallyanarmedpoliticalcompetitionwiththeinsurgents.Consequently,control(overtheenvironment,thepopulation,

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THE TROOP SURGE (2009-2013)The U.S. Strategic Review

506 On 4 November 2008, some seven yearsintothewaragainst theTalibanwhichGeorgeW.Bush initiated, the US elected its 44th President,Barack Obama. Upon taking the oath of office,thenewPresidentembarkeduponthemostwide-ranging review of the Afghan campaign to date.The review began with the mid-tour recalling ofGEN David McKiernan and the appointment ofGEN Stanley A. McChrystal—a veteran of theCOIN campaign in Iraq. It concluded in December2009withtheannouncementofanewstrategyinthe Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) region and anadditional30,000UStroopstoaccomplishthetask.

507 On 1 December 2009, at the USMilitaryAcademy at West Point, the President outlinedtheAf-Pakstrategy.Thekey ideabehind thenewapproachwastoopenupawindowof18-24monthsinwhichtheUSwouldinvestheavilyintheregionin the hope that it could degrade the insurgency onbothsidesof theborder,whilstsimultaneouslybuilding sufficient local capacity in order forAfghanstosecureandgoverntheirowncountry.

DENY, DISRUPT, DEGRADE, DEFEAT OR DISMANTLE?

ThestrategicreviewconductedbyPresidentObamaandtheNationalSecurityCommitteefocusedheavilyontheultimateobjectivesofUSeffortsinAfghanistan.Optionsrangingfromstrategiccontainment(whichinvolvedareturntoRumsfeld’s“lightfootprint”strategy)throughtofully-resourcednation-building(whichinvolvedalargetroopcommitmentformorethan10years)wereconsideredandcosted.TheresultingstrategyfocusedonDENYINGtheTalibanaccesstokeypopulationcentresandlinesofcommunication,DISRUPTINGtheTalibanoutsideoftheseareasandDEGRADINGthemtolevelsmanageablebytheAfghangovernment.Importantly,thenewstrategynolongerreferredtoDEFEATINGorDISMANTLINGtheTalibanandtheadditional30,000troops(bringingthetotalUScontributiontoaround100,000)weregenerallyconsideredinsufficientforthisbroaderobjective.

508 Accompanying the strategy, GENMcChrystalproposedfourbigchangestothewayin which ISAF had been conducting operations.First,McChrystalorderedtheaccelerationofANSFdevelopmentandtheadoptionofanew‘partnering’approachtotheirtraining.Second,hereinvigoratedtheCOINeffortwitharenewedfocusonpopulationsecurity and governance reform in an attempt toreverse Taliban penetration of local communitiesandre-connectthegovernmentwiththepopulation.Third, in recognition that the mission was nolonger to defeat and dismantle the Taliban, heenhanced existing programs for the reintegrationof reconcilable insurgent fighters. Finally, with aview tomaking demonstrable progress in the 18-24 month window afforded by the troop surge,

thelevelofsecurity,thepaceofevents,andtheenemy)isthefundamentalgoalofCOIN,agoalthatdistinguishesitfrompeaceoperationsorhumanitarianintervention.Withinthesebroadcharacteristics,thespecificnatureofanyparticularCOINcampaignarisesfromthecomplexinteractionofthreekeyfactors:thecharacteristicsoftheenvironment(physical,economic,politicalandhuman)inwhichittakesplace;thenatureoftheinsurgentgroup(orgroups);andthenatureofthecounterinsurgentgovernmentanditssecurityforces.

US Government Interagency COIN Guide, January 2009

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McChrystal ordered the geographic concentrationof ISAFeffortswithinspecifickeyterraindistrictsof strategic importance in order to regain the initiativeagainsttheinsurgency.

“Pre-occupied with the protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that

distances us – physically and psychologically – from the people we seek to protect”

- Stanley A. McChrystal, former COMISAF

ISAF Organisation

509 Almost immediately GEN McChrystalbegan simplifying ISAF command and controlarrangements in order to attain unity of effort amongst the multitude of partners and stakeholders operatinginAfghanistan.Priortohisappointment,there were two distinct command structures in operation.ISAF,aNATOheadquarters,reportedtoNATOJoint ForcesCommandatBrunssum,whilsttheUSOperationEnduringFreedom(OEF)reportedto CENTCOM. The organisation responsible for

training the ANSF (Combined Security TransitionCommand – Afghanistan) also belonged toCENTCOM who maintained responsibility for theANSFevenafter theyhadcompleted trainingandweredeployedalongsideNATOforces.Therewasno operational-level headquarters and with theexceptionofRC(E)noneoftheregionalcommandshadastandingdivisionalheadquarters.

510 Almost all of these problems were resolved over the course of 2009 and 2010. Twonew three star commands were established reporting to COMISAF. First, a new operationalcommandwas created (ISAFJointCommand) andgiven responsibility for implementing COMISAF’scampaignplanandoverseeingthedailyoperationsof all Regional Commands, PRTs and partneredANSFCOINoperations. Second, a new three startrainingestablishmentwasformed(NATOTrainingMission – Afghanistan) in recognition of theincreasing importance of the training of Afghan SecurityForceswithinthePresident’snewstrategy.

JFC-Brunssum

HQ ISAF

ISAF SOFNTM-A

RC(S)RC(SW) RC(W) RC(N) RC(C) RC(E)

TF LAFAYETTE

TF EAGLE1/101, 3/101,

173rd, 3 ID CAB,372nd, AVTF, 4/101

TF KUNDUZ4 ID CAB(-)1/4 HBCT(-)

TF NORTHSOUTH CENTRE

SOUTHEAST

AVTF(4 ID CAB)

MAGTF

TF HELMAND

86th

ISAF JointCommand

101 CAB CT URUZGAN(CTU)

CT ZABUL(CTZ)

2/101525 BFSB

TF KANDAHAR

TF Mes

BDE(-)

ISAF Command Structure During the Surge.

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With the establishment of these two subsidiarycommands, COMISAF was able to coordinateboth the COIN operations essential for Phase III(stabilisation)andtheANSFdevelopmentessentialforPhase IV (transition)of theNATOplan.Aroundthesametime,RC(South)wassplitintoRC(South)and RC (Southwest) and a complete divisionalheadquarters assigned to each – the US MarineAirGroundTaskForce (MAGTF) inRC(SW)andUSArmy 10thMountain Division in RC(S).Moreover,theactivitiesofallcoalitionSpecialForcesforthefirsttimecameunderthecontrolofCOMISAFandwere integrated into the wider campaign plan.

511 As a result of the US reinvigoration ofthe war in Afghanistan, pledges for additionaltroops began to arrive from ISAF partners. Atthe height of the coalition force uplift there were approximately 100,000 US personnel and 50,000other international military forces bringing the total numberofISAFtroopsincountrytoaround150,000.

National Caveats and National Campaigns

512 However, despite the significant increasein troop numbers during the surge, operationscontinued to be constrained by the presence of national caveats—restrictions that many troopcontributing nations placed on their forces’

Headquarters Level Mission

HQISAF Political/Military-Strategic/Operational

ISAF,inpartnershipwiththeAfghanGovernment,conductspopulation-centricCOINoperations,enablesanexpandedandeffectiveANSF,andsupportsimprovedgovernanceanddevelopmentinordertoprotecttheAfghanpeopleandprovideasecureenvironmentforsustainablestability.

IJC Operational/Tactical

Thecombinedteamandsupportingorganizations,inclosecoordination,willconductjointoperationsinkeypopulatedareastodisruptinsurgentactivities,protectthepeopleagainstenemyattacks,andmaintaintheconditionsforsocial,economic,andculturaldevelopment.

NTM-A Operational/Tactical

NTM-A,incoordinationwithkeystakeholders,generatestheANSF,developscapableministerialsystemsandinstitutions,andresourcesthefieldedforcetobuildsustainablecapacityandcapabilityinordertoenhancetheAfghanGovernment’s

ISAFSOF Tactical ISAFSpecialOperationsForces(SOF)protectthepopulation,enabletheANSFandneutralizemaligninfluenceinordertoshapeasecureenvironmentforsustainablestability.CombinedForcesSpecialOperationsComponentCommand-Afghanistan(CFSOCC-A)plansandsynchronizesdirectandindirectspecialoperationsactivitiesinsupportofCOMISAFCOINstrategybybuildingANSFcapacityinordertoprotectthepopulationanddefeat the insurgency threatening the stability of the Afghan Government.

Roles of ISAF Higher Commands.

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activities to ensure they operate in accordancewith respective national laws and policies. Thenature and extent of national caveats variedconsiderably and were informed by such things as domestic support, attitudes to risk, combatcapability and constitutional constraints. The most commoncaveatslimitedoperationstoaparticularprovinceorexcludedcertaintypesoftasking(suchasnightorcombatoperations).Fromtheoutset,thepresenceofcaveatsfrustratedISAFcommandersbyconstraining their ability to apportion forces across the battle space. This led to a situation where the ‘whole’ ISAFtroopstrengthwasconsiderably lessthan the sum of its parts.

513 In addition to national caveats theexistence of national campaign plans (typicallywithasolefocusontheprovinceinwhichthetroopcontributingnationhaddelimited itself) ledtothe

‘provincialisation’ of the ISAF mission. Thus wehadtheCanadiansinKandahar,BritishinHelmand,Italians in Herat and Australians in Uruzgan(previously Dutch) at various stages pursuingtheirownnationalagendasat theprovincial levelirrespectiveofwiderISAFprioritiesacrosstherestof the battle space. The implications of national campaignsweresignificant.TheyunderminedISAFattemptstoimplementanationalstrategy,leadingtoasignificantvariation inthelevelofassistanceprovided toeachprovinceand institutedperverseincentives by channeling development funding tothemostinsecureprovinces(wherethewealthiestdonorsarefocused)attheexpenseofsecureones.

The presence of national campaigns has led to epithets such as Canadahar and Helmandshire

to describe Canadian and British efforts in Kandahar and Helmand.

Albania 257 Greece 132 Portugal 114

Armenia 40 Hungary 483 Romania 1726

Australia 1550 Iceland 2 Singapore 48

Austria 3 Ireland 7 Slovakia 296

Azerbaijan 94 Italy 3815 Slovenia 79

Belgium 528 Jordan 0 Spain 1499

Bosnia & Herzegovina 45 Republic of Korea 426 Sweden 500

Bulgaria 608 Latvia 136 The FYROM* 163

Canada 2900 Lithuania 188 Tonga 55

Croatia 299 Luxembourg 9 Turkey 1799

Czech Republic 463 Malaysia 30 Ukraine 20

Denmark 748 Mongolia 62 United Arab Emirates 35

Estonia 158 Montenegro 36 United Kingdom 9500

Finland 165 Netherlands 197 United States 90000

France 3979 New Zealand 236

Georgia 924 Norway 413

Germany 4909 Poland 2527 Total 132,203

Note on numbers : Figures are calculated by the Force Flow tracking system at SHAPE HQ and count all troops under the Command and Control of COMISAF. Numbers of troops should be taken as indicative as they change daily.

* The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name

ISAF Troop Contributing Nations at the height of the Surge

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ISAF Campaign Design

514 The ISAF campaign plan introduced byGEN McChrystal was centred on five lines ofoperation (LOOs) that were further brigaded intoeffortsacrossthecriticalsecurity,governanceanddevelopmentsectors:

Security–(LOO1)regaintheinitiativebyprotectingthe population in densely inhabited areas where the insurgencyhasestablisheddominance; (LOO2)accelerate and expand indigenous force capacity;(LOO3)neutralisemaligninfluences.

Governance–(LOO4)separatethepopulationfromthe insurgency by supporting Afghan governmentsub-nationalstructurestoestablishruleoflawandbasicservices.

Development – (LOO5) connect contiguouseconomiccorridors,fostercommunitydevelopmentand generate employment opportunities.

ISAF Operational Framework

515 Thecampaignplanemphasisedpopulation-centricCOINoperationsfollowingthe‘shape,clear,hold, build (SCHB)’ framework advocated in USCounterinsurgencymanuals FM3-24 and JP 3-24.This approach was not possible until the troop surge as there were simply not enough forces to hold previously cleared areas. Prior to the surgeCommanders were forced to adopt a raidingapproach to COIN – an approach which tendedto reinforce the perception of coalition forces as aggressors and conflated tactical successes (intermsofnumbersof insurgentskilled)withactualmeasuresofstrategiceffectiveness.

A popular expression amongst the coalition in Afghanistan prior to the adoption of the SCHB framework was to refer to raiding operations as “mowing the lawn”. ISAF

forces would clear an area of insurgents but without sufficient troop numbers to hold the population centres previously cleared,

insurgents would simply re-infiltrate and need to be re-cleared at periodic intervals.

SHAPE, CLEAR, HOLD, BUILD

Shapeactivityidentifiesthenatureandstrengthoftheinsurgentthreatinagivenarea.Shapealsoreferstoinfluencingtheenvironmentforsubsequentorparallelcounterinsurgencyphases.Thismayincludecounter-networkoperations,oftenutilisingSpecialForces,directedagainstinsurgents’commandandcontrolstructureandlocalnetworkfacilitators.

Clearisataskthatrequiresthecommandertoremoveallguerrillaforcesandeliminateorganizedresistanceinanassignedarea.Theforcedoesthisbydestroying,capturing,orforcingthewithdrawalofguerrillacombatants.Thistaskismosteffectivelyinitiatedbyaclear-inzoneorcordon-and-searchoperation.Thisoperation’spurposeistodisruptinsurgentforcesandforceareactionbymajorinsurgentelementsinthearea.Commandersemployacombinationofoffensivesmall-unitoperations.Thesemayincludeareasaturationpatrollingthatenablestheforcetodefeatinsurgentsinthearea,interdictionambushes,andtargetedraids.Counterinsurgentsmusttakegreatcareintheclearstagetoavoiddestructionordisruptionofcivilianhomesandbusinesses.Collateraldamage,indiscriminatetargeting,ordrivingpeopleoutoftheirhomesandbusinessinordertoestablishmilitaryheadquartersinpreparationfortheholdstage,evenwhenaccompaniedbycompensation,canhavenegativesecondandthirdordereffects.

Hold.Ideallyhostnationforcesorcombinedhostnationandcoalitionforcesexecutetheholdportionoftheclear-hold-buildapproach.Establishmentofsecurityforcesinbasesamongthepopulationfurthersthecontinued

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ISAF Priorities and Sequencing

516 ISAF identified 80 priority areas (keyterrain districts) for executing SCHB operations.These districts constituted areas where the bulk of the Afghan population was concentrated or that contained key centres of economic productivity,infrastructure or commerce routes. The key terrain districts roughly mapped onto the three majorhighways,Pakistaniborderregionsandthedenselypopulated Helmand river valley. Supplementingthese 80 districts were an additional 41 'area ofinterest' districts which for a variety of reasonswere important for supporting operations in the keyterraindistricts.Ofthese121districtsidentifiedas critical to success ISAF estimated that it hadthe resources to conduct simultaneous operations in roughly one in three, thus necessitating asequencedapproachtoeventhesepriorityareas.

517 Three levels of priority were ascribed tokey terrain districts:

• Operational Main Effort: TheHelmand river

valley,KandaharCityandnearbydistrictssuchas Maiwand and Panjwai in the Arghandabgreenzonewhichconnectthetwo,constitutedISAF’smaineffortduringthesurge.Theseareashad served as Taliban safe havens and basesfor operations elsewhere in Afghanistan for a numberofyearsandsubsequentlybecamethesites of major ISAF clearing operations suchas Op MOSHTARAK (Helmand) and HAMKARI(Kandahar).

MARJAH CASE STUDY

Inmid-2010Marjahwasaninsurgentcommandcentre,abaseforIEDassemblingandanexusofillegalnarcoticsindustryactivities.However,duringthelatterhalfof2010ISAFoperationsunderOpMOSHTARAKsucceededinclearinginsurgentsafehavensinthedistrict.NowthecityiscontrolledbytheAfghanGovernment.SignsofprogressinMarjahincludevoterregistration,increasedactivityinlocalmarketplacesandthereopeningofschoolsthatwereclosedforseveralyears.

Report on Progress Toward Security & Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010.

• Shaping & Supporting Effort: Key population centres in RC(E) such as Nangahar, NuristanKunar and Laghman (N2LK) which were underthe influence of HIG networks and Paktika,PaktiaandKhost (P2K)andGhazniwhichhaveservedasfacilitationroutesforHaqqanifightersconstitutedthesecondaryeffort.Operationsinthese areas were designed to secure critical lines of communication, expand populationsecurityanddisruptHaqqanifighters’accesstoKabul.

• Economy of Force Effort:Pashtunpopulationcentres north of the Hindu Kush such asBadghis, Balkh, Baghlan and Kunduz were thefocus of ISAF’s third effort. These areas had

disruption,identification,andeliminationofthelocalinsurgentleadershipandinfrastructure.Thesuccessorfailureoftheeffortdepends,first,oneffectivelyandcontinuouslysecuringthepopulaceand,second,oneffectivelyre-establishingagovernmentpresenceatthelocallevel.Measuredoffensiveoperationscontinueagainstinsurgentsasopportunitiesarise,butthemaineffortisfocusedonthepopulation.

Build.Progressinbuildingsupportforthehostgovernmentrequiresprotectingthelocalpopulace.Peoplewhodonotbelievetheyaresecurefrominsurgentintimidation,coercion,andreprisalswillnotriskovertlysupportingCOINefforts.ThepopulacedecideswhenitfeelssecureenoughtosupportCOINefforts.

JP 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations.

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played host to a nascent insurgency which has struggled to gain any foothold outside of Pashtunsettlements.ISAFandANSFpartneredoperations focused on improving freedomof movement along the main transport route(HighwayOne)andimprovingsecurityinthekeyPashtunareas.

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS (CIRCA 2014)Security

518 ISAF’s main effort during the surge wastofacilitatetheconditionsfortheANSFtoassumefull security responsibility for Afghanistan by the end of 2014. This line of operation showed themost progress with local forces growing in both sizeandcapability.IntheleaduptotransitiontheISAFmission shifted to security force assistance,focusedon improvingANSFcapability rather thanfightingtheinsurgency.

519 ISAF Special Forces continued todegrade the insurgency as a precursor to handing over security responsibility to Afghan forces.

Increasingly, however, international forcesbecame preoccupied with redeploying personnel,retrograding equipment and realigning bases andC2 structures to enable the ANSF OPLAN 1392OQAB(eagle)andtheNATO-ledfollow-onmissionpost2014.Whereas,ISAFOperationalMentoring&LiaisonTeams(OMLTs)hadpreviouslyconcentratedonmaneuver,combatsupportandcombatservicesupport units, by 2014 coalition Security ForceAssistance Teams (SFATs) were operating mainlyat the Brigade Headquarters and Provincial andRegional Operational Coordination Centre (OCC-P/R) levels. As the end of the ISAF mandateapproaches, SFATs will refocus to higher levelsof command through Corps Advisor Teams (CATs)and capacity building in the ministries of Defence and the Interior manoeuvre, combat support andCoordinationCentres(OCC-P/R)..

520 DespitesignificantprogressitisclearthatacoalitionpresencewillberequiredtoconsolidateANSFdevelopmentuntil at least2020.Around10states,includingAustralia,haveexpressedinterest

80 Key Terrain Districts

41 Districts of Interest

Legend


Baghlan

NuristanPanjshir

KapisaLaghman

NangarharLogar

Paktiya

Paktika

Khost

Kabul

Parwan

Wardak

Ghazni

Bamyan

Daykundi

Uruzgan

Zabul

Kandahar

Helmand

Farah

Herat Ghor

Badghis

Faryab

Jowzjan

Sar-ePul

Balkh

Samangan

Nimroz

Kunar


Baghlan

NuristanPanjshir

KapisaLaghman

NangarharLogar

Paktiya

Paktika

Khost

Kabul

Parwan

Wardak

Ghazni

Bamyan

Daykundi

Uruzgan

Zabul

Kandahar

Helmand

Farah

Herat Ghor

Badghis

Faryab

Jowzjan

Sar-ePul

Balkh

Samangan

Nimroz

Kunar

Shaping and Supporting Effort

Economy of ForceEffort

OperationalMain Effort

Shaping and Supporting Effort

ISAF Key Terrain Districts.

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in contributing to the post-2014 NATO mission,aimedatC2,logistics,ISRanddevelopingacapableAfghanAirForce.

SEASONALITY

ConflictinAfghanistantendstofollowcyclicalseasonalpatterns.Springharvestsdrawlocalinsurgentsawayfromthefightandintothefields.Similarly,wintercoldmakesfreedomofmovementdifficultandisoftenusedasaperiodofrecuperationbyfighters,someofwhomspendthewinterinPakistan.Incontrast,warmerweatherpresentsopportunitiesforinsurgentstore-commenceoperationssuchastargetedassassinations,ambushesandtheemplacementofroadsidebombs.

521 Civilian casualties (CIVCAS)havebeena strategic issue with the potential to impact the success or otherwise of the ISAF mission. Overthe course of the campaign CIVCAS as a resultof the injudicious use of close air support andSpecial Forces have alienated local populationsandfuelledtheinsurgency.Tomitigatethiseffect,successive ISAF commanders have attempted tominimisethenumberandmagnitudeofCIVCASandeffectively manage the consequences when theyoccur.Despite the troop surgeandmajor clearingoperations inHelmand andKandahar, the numberof CIVCAS attributed to ISAF has fallen since theinceptionofthenewUSstrategy.

“ISAF’s declared strategy of prioritizing the safety and security of civilians is a welcome

development and, as the latter months of 2009 indicate, such policies greatly enhance the

protection of all civilians”

- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, UNAMA Report, January 2010

522 Key Security Enablers. ISAFcommanders in Afghanistan stressed the need for critical enablers to support the troop surge. Theseincludedaviation,ISR,languageandculturalcapability,Special Forcesand civilianexpertise instabilisation,developmentandgovernance.

523 Aviation was critical for both combat operations (close air support) andmobility aroundthe battlespace. Due to the forbidding terrain and prevalence of IEDs, fixed and rotarywing airassets have been a far more effective and safewaytotravelduetotheprevalenceofIEDsandthedemands for route clearance.

524 ISR continued to be chronically under-resourced during the surge, with key shortagesin UAVs to support battalion-sized task forcesand appropriately trained ‘white-cell’ intelligenceanalysts to support commander’s decisionmakingatalllevels.

POPULATION SECURITY

InCOIN,peoplehavetobelievethattheyaremoresecureandthattheyarelikelytoremainmoresecurebysupportingthegovernmentratherthantheinsurgency.Resolve,therefore,becomesaforcemultiplier,providingarangeofsignalstothepopulation,theinsurgency(anditsstatesponsors)andtheAfghangovernment.Incontrast,insurgentsattempttospreadinsecurityamongstthepopulationthroughintimidationandreprisalsandcreateasenseofinevitabilityabouttheirowneventualsuccess.

“COIN isn’t about making friends with everybody; the imperatives are protecting the people and separating the insurgents

from them to gain their support”

- Command SGT MAJ Michael T Hall, HQ ISAF

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525 Special Forces.TheroleofSpecialForces(SF) in thewar has been amuch contested topicover the past decade. Prior to the organisationalchanges brought about by GENMcChrystal mostof the Special Forces in Afghanistan operatedunderOperationEnduringFreedomandreportedtoCENTCOMratherthanHQISAF.Thisledtoahandfulof well-documented and spectacular instancesof disunity of effort which undermined the COINcampaign. In addition, the targeting of mid-levelinsurgentcommandersseemedtoconflatetacticalsuccess with actual progress as each fightingseason saw a new generation of leaders fill theposts‘vacated’bytheirforebearsthepreviousyear.

526 However, the new US strategy calledfor the degradation of the insurgency to levelsat which the ANSF could manage the problem.This saw a marked increase in the tempo of SFoperations throughout the surge period. Although opinion remains mixed, evidence suggests thatSpecialForcesoutpacedtheabilityfortheTalibanto regenerate and, more importantly, influencedTaliban morale and recruitment.

527 Language and Cultural Capability was seen as a crucial enabler for population-centricCOIN operations where troops were encouragedto‘liveamongst’thepopulation.However,servicepersonnelproficientinPashtuorDariwereinshortsupply and ISAF forces were heavily reliant onthe use of locally-employed interpreters. Duringthe surge period the human terrain system was expanded significantly andprovided socio-culturalanalysis, often down to village level, to informcommander’sengagementstrategiesandtasking.

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AFGHANISTAN

FIXING INTELLIGENCE

SignificantchangestothewayintelligencewasconductedinAfghanistanwasrequiredinordertoimplementthenewUSStrategy.Thisinvolvedashiftinfocusfrom‘theenemy’to‘thepopulation’.

“The vast intelligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate and the people they seek to persuade. Ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced, incurious about the correlations between various development projects and the levels of cooperation among villagers, and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers – whether aid workers or Afghan soldiers – U.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high-level decision-makers seeking the knowledge, analysis and information they need to wage a successful counterinsurgency … the tendency to over emphasise detailed information about the enemy at the expense of the political, economic and cultural environment that supports it becomes even more pronounced at the brigade and regional command levels”.

Inordertogeneratesufficientinformationaboutlocalcommunities,GENMcChrystalestablishedtheStabilityOperationsInformationCentres(SOICs)whowereempoweredtomovebetweenfieldelementsinordertopersonallyvisitthecollectorsofinformationatthegrassrootslevel(PRTs,

atmosphericsteams,liaisonofficers,femaleengagementteams,NGOs,developmentworkers,UNofficials,PSYOPSteams,humanterrainteams,infantrybattalions,etc)andcarrythatinformationbackintotaskforceandregionalheadquarterstoguidemajorpolicydecisions.From2010SOIC

analystsbegangeneratingperiodicDistrictNarrativeAssessmentsthatdescribedthenatureoftheeconomy,atmospherics,development,corruption,governance,insurgencyandlocaldriversofconflictinagivendistrict.

Source: MAJGEN Flynn ISAF CJ2 (2010) Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan.

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528 Civilian Expertise in examining thedrivers of conflict at a local level and facilitatingthe expansion of good governance, developmentand stability in key districts were also in short supply. In what amounted to a ‘civilian surge’ toaccompany the troop surge, several ISAFmemberstates rapidly expanded their pool of deployablecivilians.However,criticalshortagesofexpertiseinkeyareasremainedineveryregion.

THE AUSTRALIAN CIVILIAN CORPS (ACC)

TheAustralianCivilianCorps(ACC)isagroupofexperiencedcivilianspecialistswhoprovidestabilisationandrecoveryassistancetofragilestatesandcountriesexperiencingoremergingfromconflictornaturaldisaster.Formedin2011,theACCisdesignedtoprovideaflexibleandtimelyAustralianresponsethatbridgesthegapbetweenimmediatehumanitarianassistanceandemergencyreliefandlongertermdevelopmentprograms.SpecialistsdeployintoAustralian,UNorbilateralpartnerprogramsorhostgovernmentministriesattheinvitationofeachcountry’sgovernment.TheirworkcomplementstheexistingworkoftheDepartmentofForeignAffairsandTrade—AustralianAidandotherpartneragencies.

InAfghanistantheACCdeployedStabilisationAdvisers(STABADs)toworkaspartoftheProvincialReconstructionTeam.Theadvisersplayedanimportantroleinthecoordinationofdistrict-levelstabilisationanddevelopmentefforts.FocusingoncollaboratingwithlocalAfghanleaderstoidentifycommunitydevelopmentneedsaswellasunderstandingandinfluencingpoliticaldynamicsatthedistrictlevel,theadvisersalsosupportedandassistedtheAfghangovernmenttoplananddeliveressentialservicestothedistrictinthekeyareasofhealth,education,infrastructure,andagriculture.

Source: Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade

Governance

529 TheabilityoftheAfghanGovernmenttobeseentogoverninafairandresponsivemannerisapreconditionofsuccess.Regardlessofthesuccessofthetroopsurge,internationalforcesandagencieswould be unable to compensate for an Afghan Government thatwasnotseen togovern ina fairand responsive manner. The ‘governance’ line ofoperationwasdesignedtofacilitateimprovementstogovernance, reducegrievancesandmarginaliseinsurgent groups that were intent on portraying the stateasineffective,exclusionaryandcorrupt.

Success in Afghanistan ultimately depends on the Afghan government!

Members of the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House).

530 Institutional Capacity Building. Afghanistan’s putative workforce had beendecimated by years of conflict, repression,emigration and lack of a functioning education system. Available human capital generally lacksadministrative capacity and, in many cases, evenbasic literacy. In response to this, the AfghanCivil Service Commission, in partnership withinternational donors, embarked upon training anentire civil service cadre for work in national,provincialanddistrictcentres.Thebenefitsofthisprogram,however,are likely totakeseveralyearsto become apparent.

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531 Sub-National Governance. A framework forsub-nationalgovernancewascreatedduringthesurge period. However, program implementationhas been slow and requires significant legislativechange across multiple ministries, agencies anddirectorates. The main deficiencies in provincialand district level governance include corruption,lackofcapacity,lackofvisibilityandlackoffundingofsub-nationalstructures.Localofficialsgenerallylackeducation,experienceandresourcesandfacesignificantoppositionfromlocalpowerbrokers,whotend to be the real sources of power and authority at a sub-national level. Moreover, governmentservices are largely restricted to provincial anddistrictcentres,despiteeffortstoimprovecapacityandprojectservicedeliveryintoruralareas.

532 At the start of the surge period, theIndependent Directorate of Local Governance(IDLG)initiatedaprogramtofundthetrainingof180districtgovernorpositionsand14deputyprovincialgovernor positions to improve sub-nationalgovernanceacross the country.By theendof thesurge in2013, the IDLGhadannounced themerit-basedappointmentof70districtanddeputydistrictgovernors,lessthanhalfofthetargetedamount.Theoverall impactof theseappointments isstill tobeseen,butitisregardedbythecoalitionasapositivemove towards enhancing governance capacity atthe district level. Other IDLG initiatives aimed atimproving sub-national governance included theAfghanistan Stabilisation Program (ASP) which isaimedatfinancingfacilities,infrastructure,vehiclesandotherequipmentfordistrictgovernor’soffices,and the Afghanistan Social Outreach Programwhich sought to establish community councils (shuras)tofacilitatecommunicationbetweenlocalcommunitiesandprovincialgovernments.

“The Afghan government remains highly centralized, with budgeting and spending

authority held primarily by the Ministry of Finance and other central ministries in Kabul. Service delivery is implemented by

line directorates in the provinces, sometimes with little input from provincial councils

or governors. Other constraints include a continuing lack of human capacity to fill

key government and leadership positions at sub-national level, limited engagement with civil society, and poor connectivity

between national and sub-national levels of government.”

- Report to Congress on Progress Toward Security & Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013

VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS

VillageStabilityOperations(VSO)wereabottom-upprogramthatsoughttoestablishsecurityandstabilitybubblesaroundAfghanistan’sruralvillageswiththeintentionofshapingtheseareastosupportgovernanceanddevelopment.ItfocusedoncommunitiesinareasthathavelittleornoAfghanGovernmentpresencebutwhohave,nevertheless,optedtoresistTalibaninfiltrationthroughgrass-rootsinitiatives.Inadditiontogovernanceanddevelopment,theVSOprogramenableslocalcommunitiestoprovidesmall-scalecommunity-watchpolicingintheirvillagesthroughtheAfghanLocalPolice(ALP)(seeChapter6formoredetails).AttheheartoftheVSOprogramwasa12manUSSpecialForcesteam(OperationalDetachment-Alpha)thatwaslocatedinoradjacenttolocalcommunities,andengagedwiththemthroughVillageStabilityPlatforms(VSPs)thatprovidearangeofenablingsupport.COMISAF’sintentionistohaveAfghanSpecialForcestakeoverVSOactivitywiththedrawdownofUSforcesinAfghanistan.

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Elders from Gereshk listen to Haji Kaduz speak at a shura aimed at encouraging locals to take responsibility for the stabilisation of their own communities.

533 Justice & Rule of Law. The Afghan insurgency is powered by widespread perceptions ofinjusticeandimpunity–crimesgounpunishedandcourtsareunabletoadjudicateevensimplecivilcasessuch as land disputes (a primary source of conflict).While the Taliban parallel justice system is brutalandunpopular,inmanyareasitistheonlyoptionforthe resolution of disputes. Success in Afghanistandepends as much on the legitimacy, accessibilityandefficiencyofjusticeandruleoflawasitdoesonrebuildingtheANSF.

A functioning justice system is arguably the centre of gravity for stabilisation in many

districts across the country.

534 Unfortunately, the justice sector was for along time neglected by the coalition effort. As a result of lack of progress in the formal sector, during thesurge international forces and agencies began looking towardalternativedisputeresolutionmechanismsata local level. These included traditional tribal jirgas,villageshurasandVSOprograms.

535 Anti-Corruption Initiatives. Throughout thesurgeperiodISAFandCJIATF-Shafafiyat,inclosecooperationwith theAfghangovernment,continuedtheir efforts to reduce corruption. The UN OfficeofDrugs andCrime (UNODC) reported that corruptpayments amounted to US$3.9 billion in 2012,withan estimated one in two Afghans paying bribes. Current anti-corruption initiatives centre on effortsto improvefinancialoversight,build judicialcapacitytoinvestigate,prosecuteandremovecorruptofficials

andcommunicateanti-corruptiongainstotheAfghanpeople.Afghanistan’sprincipalanti-corruptionbodiesaretheHighOfficeofOversightandAnti-Corruption(HOOAC)andtheAttorneyGeneral’sOffice(AGO).

THE PATRONAGE NETWORK

TheAfghanstateisstructuredtoattractresourcesfromexternalsourcesandre-distributetheseamongstanetworkofclientsandpatronsinthecountryside.Inthiswaythestateisabletogeneraterevenueandrentlegitimacyfromlocalpowerbrokerswhilstinoculatingitselffromthesortofstate-societyinteractionswhichgiverisetodemandsforbetterservicedelivery,transparency,accountability,inclusivityandefficiency.

Thevastmajorityofthebudgetcomesfromtheinternationalcommunityandgoesdirectlyintoexecutiveinstitutionswithoutrequiringorpermittinglegislativeinvolvement.ThePresidentappointsprovincialanddistrictgovernorsathisdiscretionandnoformalbodyhastheauthoritytoremoveapresidentialappointee.Althoughprovincialanddistrictcouncilsarepopularlyelectedtheyhavenoabilitytocounterbalancetheactionsofpresidentialappointeeswhocontroltheflowofmoney,thearmedforcesandthepoliceallthewaydowntolocallevel.

Corruptionandabuseofpowerareendemicwithinthesystemofpatronagewhichtheabovestructuregivesriseto.Thisinturnreinforcesfeelingsofinjusticeandhopelessnessamongstmarginalisedcommunitiesandfuelstheinsurgency.

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Development

536 Despiteits9%realgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)growthoverthepastdecade–drivenmainlyby the high levels of development assistance andthe presence of coalition forces – Afghanistan isone of the world’s poorest countries with a percapitagrossnationalincome(GNI)ofjustUS$470.Economicgrowthisexpectedtoslowin2014,withpolitical and security uncertainties accompanying the election cycle and the coalition withdrawal impactingonbusinessconfidenceandinvestment.BasicindicatorsofhumanwelfarefindthatAfghansareamongtheworld’smosthungry,destitute,non-literate and short-lived people. Afghanistan’s UNHumanDevelopment Index (HDI) value for 2012 is0.374–inthelowhumandevelopmentcategory–placing it at 175 out of 187 states and territorieswith comparable data.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROFILE

Population 29.8million(2012)

Urban population 24.0%(2012)

Populationgrowth 2.4%(2012)

Lifeexpectancy 60years(2011)

Populationlivingbelowpovertyline

36.0%(2008)

Unemployment rate 45.0%(2008)

Adult literacy rate 28.0%(unknown)

Infant mortality rate71deaths/1,000livebirths(2012)

Childmalnutrition 32.9%(2004)

Internally displaced persons 492,777(2013)

Source: World Bank and CIA World Factbook.

537 The Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). Following two years ofextensive consultations, the ANDS was formallylaunchedattheInternationalConferenceinSupportofAfghanistaninParison12June2008.Accordingto theConferenceDeclaration, thestrategy is the

“roadmap for joint action [international donors and the Afghan government] over the next five years and sets our shared priorities”. The document constitutes the Afghan Government’s overarchingstrategy forpromotinggrowth,generatingwealthand reducing poverty and acts as the country’sPoverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), helpingtosecuredebt relief fromthe IMFand loansfromtheWorld Bank. To this end it sets out a 5 year(2008-2013)planbuilton threepillars: (i) security;(ii) governance, rule of law and human rights; (iii)economicandsocialdevelopment.

538 TheANDSissupportedbytheAfghanistanCompact (agreed earlier at the 2006 LondonConference on Afghanistan) which is a jointundertaking between theAfghanGovernment, 66states (including Australia) and 15 internationalorganisationstosupportthelongtermdevelopmentof the country. The Afghanistan Compact alsoestablished the Joint Coordination & MonitoringBoard (JCMB) to monitor progress toward thegoals and benchmarks articulated in the ANDS,and evaluate the effectiveness of the aid beingprovided.

539 Recognising the relationship betweenshorter-term stabilisation goals and longer-termdevelopment goals, the implementation plan fortheANDSsequencedprioritiesaccording to threephases: stabilisation (focused on rule of law andgovernance); consolidation (focused on basicservice delivery); and transformation (focusedon economic growth and human security). TheMinistryofFinancefurthergroupedthe16AfghanGovernment ministries involved in implementingtheANDSintothreeclusterstofocusonthepriorityareas:

• Agricultural and rural development –developing natural resources, enhancingagricultural productivity and agribusiness toimproverurallivelihoods

• Infrastructure and economic growth –creating an enabling economic environmentandinfrastructuretoattractinvestment,create

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high-value industries and connect Afghanistanto the region and the world.

• Human resource development – preparingAfghans for the labour market through technical andvocationaleducation.

540 Delivery of Aid (Mechanisms & Modalities).Over two thirdsof the internationaldevelopment funding for Afghanistan duringthe surge was tied to specific donor-initiatedprojectsanddelivereddirectlybydonorsandtheirimplementingpartners.Thismodeofdelivery,whilstinitiallyinevitable,isultimatelyself-defeatingasitundermines rather than builds the state.

The international community and the Afghan Government agreed at the 2010 Kabul

Conference to align 80% of donor spending with Afghanistan’s 22 National Priority Programs (grouped into six categories:

Security, Infrastructure Development, Private Sector Development, Agriculture and Rural

Development, and Governance), and to channel at least 50% of external aid through

the budget – known as the Kabul Process. This commitment was reaffirmed in the 2012 Tokyo

Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF).

541 Onemodeofdeliverythatprovidesstrongincentives for theAfghan government to build itscapacity and improve its accountability is theAfghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).The ARTF was established in 2002 to coordinatefinancial support to Afghanistan in two areas: (i)meeting the recurrent costs of government suchas salaries, operations, maintenance, etc; (ii)targeted investment projects articulated in theANDS.The fund issupportedby33donorsand isadministeredby theWorldBank.AsofDecember2012, nearly US$6.2 billion had been pledged inARTFcontributions,withmorethanUS$6.1alreadypaid into the fund.

542 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are hybrid civil-military entities designedto operate as coordinating bodies for the implementation of stabilisation and developmentassistanceatprovincialanddistrictlevel.ThefirstPRTinAfghanistan(Kunduz)wasestablishedbytheGermansasabi-lateralreconstructioncellpriortothe ISAFmandate.However, on 28 June 2004, attheSummitmeeting in Istanbul,NATOannouncedits expansion from Kabul into the country sidewith theestablishmentofPRTs inMazar-e-Sharif,Meymana, Feyzabad and Baghlan as well as theincorporation of the Kunduz PRT into a new ISAFcommandstructure.FurtherPRTswereestablishedin theWest (2005), South (2006) and East (2006)of the country coinciding with the expansion ofISAF in 2005-2006. During the surge period PRTsbecame the primary vehicle for the delivery of

NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAMME

TheNationalSolidarityProgramme(NSP)wascreatedin2003bytheMinistryofRuralRehabilitationandDevelopmenttodeveloptheabilityofAfghancommunitiestoidentify,plan,manageandmonitortheirownprojects.CommunitieselecttheirNSPrepresentativestoformvoluntaryCommunityDevelopmentCouncils(CDCs).CDCsthenprepareCommunityDevelopmentPlans(CDPs),andimplementapprovedsubprojects.OncesubprojectshavebeenapprovedtheNSPprovidesdirectblockgranttransfers(withanaveragegrantof$33,000andmaximumof$60,000)forthephasedimplementationofsubprojects.

TheprogramisconsistentlyratedasthemostpopulardevelopmentprograminAfghanistanduetotherolethatlocalcommunitiesplayintheprojects.Inaddition,theprocessdevelopsimportantcommunitycapacitiesinconsensus-building,accounting,procurement,operations,maintenanceandmonitoring.

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stabilisation, development, capacity building andmentoring assistance to provincial authorities.Althoughtherole,structureandapproachofeachPRTwasdifferent,theytypicallyconsistedofamixof civilian andmilitary staff thatwere co-locatedwithISAFtaskforcesattheProvincialcapital.Asaresultofthetransitionprocess,however,allPRTsinthecountryhavebeenwounduportransferredtoAfghan authorities.

Sectoral Overviews

543 Economic Recovery.Wheninternationalforces and agencies descend on an area they generate demand for local goods and servicessuch as housing, food, interpreters and skilledlabour. Whilst donor consumption stimulates thelocaleconomy, it isunlikelytogeneratesustainedgrowth. For sustained economic developmentdonorsneedtotargetinvestmentinspecificsectors.This can range from agricultural rehabilitation to health clinics, schools and large infrastructureprojects. During the surge period the securitybubble created by the expansion of ISAF enableddevelopment agencies to invest in awide variety

•SupporttheAfghanGovernment’slegitimacythroughimprovingservicedeliveryintheareasofruleoflaw,education,health,agricultureandinfrastructuresectors,andtostabilisekeyareasofUruzganthroughsmall-scaleinfrastructureprojects.

PRTUruzganconcludeditsmissionOctober28,2013,bringingtoanendadecade-longeffortbythecoalitiontofosterdevelopment,improvegovernanceandbringabouttribalcooperationinoneofAfghanistan’spoorestprovinces.In2014,internationaldonorswillremainconnectedtoUruzganthroughasmallliaisonforcebasedinTarinKot,andthroughnationalprogramsadministeredfromKabul

Source: Department of Defence.

TheProvincialReconstructionTeamUruzgan

URUZGANPRT

TheAustralian-ledPRTinUruzgan,enabledandprotectedbyADFandUSmilitarypersonnel,sawcivilianofficialsandmilitaryengineershelpbuildafunctioningprovincialgovernment,establishhealthandeducationservices,andoverseetheconstructionofroadinfrastructuretomakeservicesaccessibletoremotecommunities.AttheheightofitsefforttheUruzganPRThadover200personnelfromthreeISAFpartners,andinvolved10differentagencies.WhilstmostofthesepersonnelworkedatMulti-NationalBase–TarinKot,therewerealsoDistrictStabilistationTeams(DSTs)basedatChoraandDehRawud,andmobileteamsthatregularlyvisitedoutlyingdistrictcentres.

ThecircumstancesinUruzgancalledforcoordinatedsecurity,developmentandpoliticalengagement,witheachlineofoperationsdependentontheothertoachievesustainedoutcomes.BythetimeAustraliaassumedtheleadofthePRTin2010,therewerethreeclearobjectives:

•Strengthenformalpoliticalandgovernanceinstitutionsinpreparationfortransition

•Promotepoliticalstabilityamongkeytribalgroupsandencourageamorepositivepoliticalclimatewhichsupportslegitimategovernanceintheprovince.

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of programs ranging from health and education to agriculture, infrastructure and, most importantly,capacitybuildingandskillsdevelopment.However,withtheapproachingtransition,thewithdrawalofinternationalagencies from theprovinces is likelyto precipitate a recession in many areas.

In 2012, domestic revenue (US$1.6 billion) covered less than 50% of total government

expenditure (US$3.7 billion) making Afghanistan one of the most aid-dependent

countries in the world and an effective ‘rentier’ of the international community, which funds

the majority of its public spending.

544 Infrastructure. Infrastructure is fundamental to economic recovery. Transportnetworks allow freedom of movement, trade andsocial interaction; telecommunications systems support every element of society from GIRoA,to the private sector, to themedia and thewiderpopulation; and power generation facilities constitute the engine room of economic production.

Soldiers from the 7th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment Task Group patrol along the Australian-funded Mirabad Valley road in Uruzgan Province.

One area for optimism is the ICT sector, and in particular Afghanistan’s mobile phone network, which is booming as a result of internally generated demand. More than

100,000 Afghans are employed in this sector which pays some of the highest wages in the country. As of July 2013, there are 19.8 million

mobile phone subscribers, and 88% of the population live in areas with cellular coverage.

545 Road construction is a significant sourceof employment for the Afghan population and is often used as ameans to involve locals in thedevelopment of their own communities. Themostsignificantroadconstructionprojectundertakenisthe rehabilitation of the 2,200km ring roadwhichisalmostcomplete.Inaddition,sevenroadslinkingtheringroadtotheneighbouringcountriesofIran,Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Pakistanareunderway,andinvariousstagesofcompletion.The National Rural Access Program (NRAP)manages the restoration of secondary and tertiary routes designed to link district centres in rural areaswithprovincial capitalsandothereconomiccentres.

Despite a several internationally-funded rail projects, Afghanistan still has very little any rail transportation infrastructure. The

country will remain dependent on road and air transport for the foreseeable future.

546 Energy. Improvements to Afghanistan’senergy generation and transmission capability area toppriority for the international community,withanumberofhydro-electricprojectscurrentlyunderway. Nevertheless, the country’s energysystem is still largely ad hoc. The grid is composed of three isolated networks and supplies electricity to only 30%of the population. Only one of thesenetworks is self-reliant (the Southeast PowerSystemsuppliedbytheKajakihydro-electricpowerstation),theothertworelyonimportspredominantlyfrom Iran and Uzbekistan. The majority of thepopulation relies on diesel generators or has no access to electric power.

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Electricity Power Grid.

Over half of Afghanistan’s electricity is sourced from neighbouring countries (predominantly Iran and Uzbekistan).

Kajaki Hydro-Electric Power Station.

547 Agriculture. Agriculture is the majorsourceofincomeforthemajorityofthepopulation,80% of whom live in rural areas. This sectorrepresents60%oftotalemploymentandtypicallyaccounts for one quarter to one third of AfghanGDP.Wheatconstitutesroughly60%ofagriculturaloutput,andisthecountry’smostimportantlicitcrop.Favourableweatherconditionsproducedabumperwheat harvest in 2012, achieving levels close toself-sufficiency.However,theagriculturalsectorinAfghanistanremainshighlyvolatileanddependenton snow melt, rainfall and the maintenance of avast network of irrigation ditches and channels.Nevertheless, agricultural development is stillAfghanistan’s best hope of achieving sustainableeconomic growth.

‘Afghanistan needs to invest heavily in irrigation systems, new production and post-harvest processing technologies – measures that could increase the country’s agricultural productivity, which is currently 50% below its

pre-war level.’

Source: Afghanistan Economic Update (The World Bank, 2013).

548 Mining. The mining sector, bothhydrocarbon and extraction, has the potentialto generate long-term employment and providesignificant future revenue for the AfghanGovernment.AssessmentsofthissectorbytheUSGeologicalSurveysuggestthatAfghanistanhasinexcessofUS$1.0 trillion inuntappedhydrocarbonandnon-fuelmineraldeposits,includingtheworld-class Aynak copper deposit and Hajigak iron oredeposit. Historically small and largely artisanal,the mining sector’s share of aggregate outputgrew from 0.6%ofGDP in 2010 to 1.8% in 2012.Full development of the sector, however, requiresa favourable legal and regulatory environmentto attract substantial foreign investment, which,in turn, is dependent on progress in security andenabling infrastructure. In the meantime, only asmall proportion of Afghanistan’s deposits are‘lootable’ by insurgent and criminal elements(largely contained to gemstones and chromitedeposits).

In 2007, a 30 year lease was granted to the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) in a deal worth US$3.0 billion to develop a copper

mine at Mes Aynak (‘ little copper well’ in Dari) in Logar Province – estimated to be the world’s second largest copper deposit. Once

fully operational the World Bank estimates this large-scale mining venture could create 4,500 direct, 7,600 indirect and 62,500 induced jobs, and generate approximately US$250 million in

annual revenue.

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549 Health. Afghanistan continues to havesomeof theworst health indicators in theworld,especiallyamongpeoplelivinginruralorinsecureareas.AccordingtotheWorldHealthOrganisation(WHO)onein10childrendiebeforetheageoffive,and one out of every 11women die from causesrelated to child birth and pregnancy. Despite these grim statistics reports suggest that access to health isimproving,with85%ofthepopulationwithinonehour of a clinic.

550 Education. Improving literacy, skillsand education is a key priority for fostering inclusive growth in Afghanistan. Only one infour Afghans aged 16 or above is able to readandwrite or has completed some formal level ofschooling. International support to the education sector is focused on implementing the NationalEducationStrategicPlan(2010-2014),withafocuson addressing shortages of qualified teachersand constructing school buildings. However,throughout the surge period insurgents continued to target the education sector which they saw as a significant threat in the propaganda war overalternative visions for theAfghan state. Teacherswere routinely intimidated or assassinated and new school buildings were either left vacant orburnt to theground inseveralkeydistrictsacrossthe country.

contractpurchasingofcropsinadvanceofplantingandarrangingfortheircollectiondirectfromthefarmgateafterharvest.Theintentionhasbeentomakefarmersperceivethatlicitagricultureiseconomicallyviableandentailslessriskthangrowingpoppy

“Eradication raises the price of opium and the value of trafficker’s inventories whilst devastating poor farmers, many of whom turn to the insurgency to find support”

- US State Department

COUNTER-NARCOTICS

TheUNestimatesthatnearly80%oftheincomefromthenarcoticsindustrygoestotraffickersandprocessorsandnotfarmers.

AcontributoryfactortotheincreaseinAfghanopiumproductionisthewayinwhichdealerspurchasethecropfromfarmers,particularlyinthemorevolatileandinsecureareas.Oftendealerswillcontracttopurchasetheentirecropandprovidesizeablecashdepositstofarmerspriortoplanting.Dealerswillalsoarrangetocollecttheharvestedproductdirectlyfromthefarmgate.Thisprocesssignificantlyreducestherisksincurredbythefarmer;fromcropfailure,thethreatoferadication,andintransportingtheproductoverinsecureroads.Whiletheprofitmarginsonconventionalandillicitcropsmaybebroadlysimilar,conventionalcropsareoftenstolenbycriminalsortaxedbycorruptpolicemenonthewaytomarket.Thiserodestheeconomicviabilityoflicitcropsandsubstantiallyincreasesthefinancialandpersonalrisksinherentinthisformofagriculture.

Accordingly,theinternationalcommunityistakingamoreeffectiveapproachtocounteringnarcoticsproductionbyofferingmorecompetitive,lessriskyalternatives,basedonanunderstandingofthevaluechainforagriculturalproductioninAfghanistan.Thisapproachidentifiesthestepsbetweengrowingthecropsandsellingtheminthemarketplace.Itsobjectiveistoreducetheriskincurredbythefarmerduringdifferentpartsoftheeconomicchain.Insomeareas this has increased the incentives forlicitcropproductionthrough

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Students attend the new Australian-funded Malalai Girls School in Tarin Kot.

Winning Hearts & Minds?

551 Development activities are aimed atreducing poverty. However, in Afghanistandevelopment funding was also used to win theconsent of the local population. The idea being that because insurgents and counterinsurgents are engaged in a contest for the support of the population, money spent improving the lives oflocalswouldtipthebalanceinfavouroftheCOINeffort.

The key assumption behind using development projects to “win hearts and

minds” is that underdevelopment is a driver of conflict. As a consequence, improvements

in living standards through employment, infrastructure or service delivery will mitigate

these drivers and help build support for the government.

552 Because development funding used insupportoftheCOINeffortwasaimedatreducingsupportfortheinsurgency,itfollowsthatthebulkof these activitieswould be directed toward thatsegmentofthepopulationmostundertheinfluenceof theTaliban. It also follows that projectswouldserve as propaganda – having an immediate andhighly visible impact. As a consequence, the vastamountof internationaldevelopment fundingwaschanneled into the insecure southern and eastern provinces andmuch of this designed to be spenton ‘quick impact projects’. Evidencehasemerged,however, that rather than undermining supportfor the insurgency, this mode of delivery actually

increasing support for the insurgency. Throughout thesurgeperiod,developmentassistancemayhave“lost”justasmanyheartsandmindsasit“won”.

THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF AID

Therelationshipbetweenaidandconflictiscomplex.Povertycanbebothacauseandeffectofconflict,andshouldthereforebeaddressedaspartofacomprehensiveapproachtotheproblemHowever,ifdeliveredinappropriately,aidcanalsoexacerbateconflict.

Aidgiveninthecontextofconflictintroducesresourcesintosituationsthatarepoliticallyandviolentlycontestedandwillinevitablybecomepartoftheconflict.

Someofthenegativeimpactsofaidinclude:

• Increasingincentivesforviolencebyintroducingaresourceworthfightingoverintoanalreadyunstablesituation.

• Exacerbatingtensionsandcreatingwinner-loserdynamicsbybenefittingsomegroupsandnotothers.

• GeneratingawareconomythatadversariessuchastheTalibancanalsobenefitfrombyappropriatingtheproceedsorbiddingforcontracts.

• Substitutingforlocalresourcesandtherebyfreeingthemupforongoinghostilities.

• Fuellingcorruptioningovernmentandunderminingconfidenceinlegitimateleaders.

“The problem of foreign aid exacerbated the situation because Popalzai (tribe) not only got all the power in government, but some also controlled and benefited from all the aid programs”

- Government Official, Uruzgan

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553 Themostoftquotedcriticismoftheroleofdevelopmentassistanceduringthesurgewasthatitisfuelledmassivecorruption,whichunderminesanyofthepositiveimpactsitmayotherwisehavehad.

“Spending too much too quickly with too little oversight in insecure environments is a recipe for fuelling corruption, de-legitimising the Afghan government and undermining the

credibility of international actors”.

- Andrew Wilder (US Institute of Peace) & Stuart Gordon (London School of Economics)

554 Other critiques included the fact that aidgenerated a war economy which malign actors such as the Taliban and corrupt governmentofficials benefiting from disproportionately.That the prioritisation of insecure areas oversecure ones led to perverse incentives wherebypeaceful communities were penalised for their stability, and that propaganda objectives wereunderminingdevelopmentbestpracticebyfocusingon immediate and direct assistance rather than buildinglocalcapacitiesforcommunitiestoprovideforthemselves.

“A minimum of 10% of the Pentagon’s logistics contracts – hundreds of millions of dollars –

consists of payments to insurgents”.

- US military official, Kabul

555 Inanyevent,populationperceptionsurveysand conflict assessments consistently highlightedthe fact that the major factors fuelling supportfor the insurgency had little to do with under-development. Instead one of the primary reasonsgiven by Afghans was the endemic corruptionwithin the government, making the Taliban anincreasingly attractive alternative. Other driversofconflict included, fearof immediate reprisals,asenseof inevitabilityaboutTalibansuccess in theyears following transition and withdrawal and lack ofaccesstoaneffectivejusticesystem(whichtheTaliban exploited by providing alternative disputeresolutionmechanisms).

“Lack of clinics, schools and roads are not the problem. The main problem is we don’t have a

good government”.

- Paktia Tribal Elder

556 Whilst roads, schools and hospitals areimportantforimprovementinthelivingstandardsofAfghans,theyrarelyservetogeneratea‘heartsandminds’effect.Instead,theinternationalcommunitywouldbebetteradvisedtochannelconsentwinningactivities toward the drivers of conflict at a locallevel.Whilsteverydistrict isdifferent, thesemayinclude projects designed to strengthen district-level governance, increase access to the justicesystem and counter Taliban intimidation tactics.

THE DISTRICT STABILITY FRAMEWORK (DSF)

TheDSFemergedduringthesurgeperiodasajointUSAID-ISAFplanning,programmingandevaluationsystemdesignedtosupport‘consentwinning’projectstargetingtheactualsourcesofinstabilityatalocallevel.TheframeworkwasfirstdevelopedandtrialedbyUSforcesandagenciesinRC(E).USAmbassadorEikenberryandGENPetreausmandatedthatallUSAIDfieldpersonnelandmilitaryunitsbetrainedintheDSFpriortoarrivalinAfghanistan.Further,USPRTswereunabletoaccessCERPfundingwithoutdemonstratingthattheirproposalsweregeneratedthroughtheapplicationoftheDSF.

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Reconciliation & Reintegration

War is a contest over the terms of an ultimate political settlement.

Reintegrationreferstothedemobilisationandassimilationoflowtomid-levelinsurgentsbackintotheircommunities.

Reconciliationreferstohigh-levelpeacetalksbetweentheAfghangovernmentandseniorTalibanleaders,oftenmediatedthroughathirdpartysuchasSaudiArabiaorQatar.

557 Reintegration. The goal of the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) is toestablish a political mechanism that facilitates insurgent removal from the battlefield. Effortsat reintegration, however, have had limitedsuccess. Initial moves were made by PresidentKarzai during his 2010 inauguration. These werefollowedbytheNationalConsultativePeaceJirga(June2010)attendedbyover1,500delegates,andthe subsequent appointment by Karzai of the 70memberHighPeaceCouncil(HPC).

558 The HPC and Joint Secretariat (JS) workwith Provincial Peace Committees (PPCs) andProvincial Joint Secretariat Teams (PJSTs) tomanagetheAPRP,whichoperates inalmostallofAfghanistan’s34provinces.AsofJuly2012,6,277formerinsurgentshadwalkedoffthebattlefieldandwereenrolledintheprogram.TheAPRPconsistsofthreestages:SocialOutreach,DemobilisationandConsolidationofPeace.

• Social Outreach. Outreach involves buildingawarenessoftheAPRPthroughsocialnetworkswith ties to insurgent groups. The aim is to beginadialoguewithlocalfighterstoovercomedistrust, scepticism and concerns about thesecurityandlivelihoodsoffighters.

• Demobilisation. When an insurgent agreesto reintegrate he commences demobilisation.

Transition involves vetting, registration,biometrics collection and the surrender of heavy weapons (reintegrees may retain theirpersonalweapons).Itmayalsoinvolvesecurityassistance and the resolution of outstanding grievances.

• ConsolidationofPeace.TheAPRPisdesignedto benefit the host community fromwhich theinsurgents belong, not just the reintegrees,throughCommunityRecoveryprojects.Whatisdeliveredtoeachcommunitydiffersdependingonneedandavailableresources.

63% of the Afghan population supports the reconciliation and reintegration process

according to The Asia Foundation 2013 survey.

558 Reconciliation. The assassination of Berhanuddin Rabbani, a former President andChairmanoftheHighPeaceCouncil,inSeptember2011 demonstrated Taliban disdain for thereconciliation process and underscored their belief thatthelongertheconflictisdrawnoutthebettertheir bargaining position will become. Rabbaniwasoneofthefewindividualswiththestaturetopersuade former Northern Alliance commandersto trust the Taliban and embark on reconciliation discussions.Hislossdealtasignificantblowtoanyhopes of a negotiated solution.

559 SinceRabbani’sassassinationnegotiationsbetween the major parties have been proposed

Stage1

Stage2

Stage3

Social Outreach• Strategic communications• Negotiations and addressing grievances• Sub-national and community outreach

Demobilisation• Biometrics, vetting, registration, assessment & transition assistance• Weapons management & community security

Consolidation of Peace• Literacy, religious and vocational education & training• Employment opportunities

The Afghan Peace & Reintegration Process.

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and subsequently stalledmultiple times. Claimingthat the country’s sovereignty had been violated,PresidentKarzairefusedtoparticipateinproposednegotiations in December 2011 after it emergedthat the US and Taliban had met secretly fourtimes to thrash out the details of a deal. Eighteen months later proposed peace negotiations between the US, Afghan government and senior Talibaninterlocutors broke down once again amid the fanfare of the opening of a Taliban political bureau inDoha,Qatar.BoththeUSandAfghangovernmentcriticisedthebureauanddemandedtheremovalofthe Taliban flag and name plaquewhich bore theinscription of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Asaprecursortoresurrectingthestalledtalks,theAfghangovernmenthasinsistedthattheofficebeused solely for negotiations with the High PeaceCouncilandthatitmustnotbecomeavenuefortheTalibantopresentthemselvesasanalternativetotheAfghangovernment oragovernment-in-exile.

Qatari Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali bin Fahd al-Hajri (right) and the Taliban's office spokesman Mohammed Naim (centre) speak during a joint press conference at the opening ceremony of the new Taliban Political Office in Doha, 18 June 2013.

560 Undoubtedly the most complex actor inthe Afghan conflict, Pakistan’s support for theHaqqani network and other Afghan insurgentgroupshasservedtoprolongthewar,nowintoitssecond decade. Preferring conflict and instabilityin Afghanistan over a stable but pro-IndianGovernment,Pakistan’sstrategy in the regionhasbeentoprovidevariablelevelsofsupporttoallsidesinanefforttoremainrelevantuntilsuchatimethat

itcansecureafriendlyregimeinKabul.Thatsaid,with the failure of the Doha process it has been PakistanthathasmadethemostsignificantmoveforwardwiththereleaseofMullahBaradarandthesubsequenthostingofmembersoftheAfghanHighPeaceCouncil.

THE MULLAH BARADAR INCIDENTFollowingabreakthroughinnegotiationsduringasummithostedbyBritishPrimeMinisterDavidCameroninOctober2013,PakistanagreedtoallowadelegationofseniorAfghanofficialstovisitTalibanco-founderandformerdeputyleaderMullahAdbulGhaniBaradar.MullahBaradar,along-timefriendofthereclusiveTalibanleaderMullahOmar,wastheTaliban’sdeputyleaderandoneoftheirmostinfluentialcommandersuntilhewasarrestedinPakistanin2010.AtthetimeofhisarrestitwasclaimedthatBaradarhadbeenholdingsecrettalkswiththeKarzaiGovernmentandthathiscapturebyPakistanservedtostopanydirectnegotiationsbetweenAfghanistanandtheTalibanthatwoulddeprivePakistaninfluenceoveraneventualpoliticalsettlement.Howeverwithtransitionapproaching,PakistanannouncedthereleaseofBaradar(heremainsinPakistanunderclosesupervision)andtheirintenttohostadelegationfromAfghanistan’sHighPeaceCouncil,includingchairmanSalahuddinRabbani,inanefforttorestartpeacetalks.

“An end to the fighting is the main aim of the Afghan people. Peace and reconciliation is at the top of our agenda. All of our countrymen

who are not affiliated with international terrorist networks, can come home. We will

welcome you home, we will help you, to stop the killing of my brothers.”

- President Karzai, inauguration speech 2010

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TRANSITION, WITHDRAWAL AND OPERATION RESOLUTE SUPPORT (2014+)

561 Transition. Phase IV (Transition) of theoriginalNATOplanwaseffectivelyaphasedplanforwithdrawal: handing over responsibility to theAfghan Government in five tranches of territorybeginning in March 2011, whilst simultaneouslybuilding institutions such as security forces and government ministries to take over from thecoalition. Successful transition required thatthe ANSF, under effective civilian control, wereoperationallyviableandcapableofhandlingsecuritychallengesonasustainableandirreversiblebasis.

562 Themodeladoptedfortransitioninvolvedathreestepprocessafterwhichagivengeographicalarea(province,districtormunicipality)wouldenterintooneoffivesuccessivetranches.Thefirststepwas a conditions-based assessment, managedby the Assessment Working Group (AWG), todetermine which districts areas meet the criteria fortransition.Second,assessmentswerereviewedby the Joint AfghanNATO Inteqal Board (JANIB),who ratify the assessment of theAWG. The finalstage was formal acceptance by the Afghan Cabinet,culminatinginaninitiationannouncementby President Karzai, detailing the areas that haveentered into transition.

563 Transition was a variable geometryprocess,withareasproceeding through transitionondifferenttimelines(orevenregressing)basedondemonstratedimprovementinsecurity,governanceand the rule or law, and increased proficiencyof the ANSF. Ranging from 12 to 18 months, theprocess consisted of four distinct stages, duringwhichtheroleofISAFprogressedfromsupportingthe ANSF at the tactical, to the operational and,finally, strategic or national level. A challenge totransition,however,remainsthetimelagbetweenthe start of transition in an area and the supporting governance and development required to ensuretheirreversibilityoftheprocess.

564 Withdrawal.On18June2013theconflictin Afghanistan moved into a fundamentally new

phase following the announcement of Transition Tranche 5 and “Milestone 2013”. Formost of thepastdecadetheUSand itscoalitionpartnershadledtheCOINcampaignagainstaninsurgencythatwasdescribedasresilientandadaptive.However,frommid2013Afghanforcestookresponsibilityforsecurity across all 34 of the country’s provinces.Accordingly ISAF’s primary focus shifted fromcombat operations to training, advising andassistingtheANSFintheireffortstoholdandbuildon the gains enabled by the 2010-13 troop surge.Coincidingwith transition, ISAF troopcontributingnationshaverecoveredmostof theirsurgeforcesandthemajorityofbaseshavebeentransferredtotheANSFordeconstructed.

565 Ongoing Assistance. Despite the success of the transition timetable, the ANSFstill lacks the ability to sustain operations and will require ongoing security force assistancewell beyond the conclusion of the ISAF mission.Around 10 states, including Australia, haveexpressed interest in contributing to a post-2014NATOmission,provisionallyentitledOpRESOLUTESUPPORT,aimedatC2,logistics,ISR,SpecialForcesanddevelopingacapableAfghanAirForce.TheUSwill be the largest contributor, with geographicresponsibility for the east and south of Afghanistan. GermanyandItalywillretainresponsibilityforthenorth and west of the country respectively. AndTurkey will retain responsibility for the capital region.TheconceptofoperationsforOpRESOLUTESUPPORT is to have Command Advisory Teams(CATs) plugged-in at regional ANSF Corps levelheadquarters,withtheability formobileteamstoreachabrigadeintheprovincesifnecessary.

566 2014-15 Elections.Inadditiontosecurity,significant economic, governance and politicalchallenges continue to cast doubts over the longterm prospects for stability in Afghanistan. The April 2014 Presidential (and Provincial Councilelectionwill beseenasacritical strategicevent.These will be followed in 2015 by NationalAssembly elections. The presidential election, inparticular,presentsanopportunity for theAfghan

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governmenttodemonstrateitsabilitytoconductapeaceful democratic transition of political power,asPresidentKarzaicompleteshissecondandfinalconstitutionaltermasheadofstate.However,theelection will also challenge Afghan Governmentinstitutions, such as the IEC and the ElectoralComplaints Commission (ECC), to conduct anelectionthatisperceivedbytheAfghanpeopleandinternationalcommunitytobecredible,transparentandinclusive.

50K

100K

150K

200K

250K

300K

350K

400K

Troo

p N

umbe

rs

Time

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2015 201720162014

Troop Surge Troop Recovery Enduring Presence

PHASE 3 OPERATIONS(STABILISATION)

PHASE 4 OPERATIONS(TRANSITION)

OPERATION RESOLUTE SUPPORT(2014+)

approx 55k

approx 85k

approx 120k

approx 135k

approx 150k

approx 130k approx

100k approx 85k approx

60k

NATO Force Levels(Notional Op Resolute Support Footprint)

ANSF Force Levels(approx 360,000 in total)

Key Assumptions• TB degraded/manageable by ANSF• ANSF capable of securing gains• Sanctuaries in PAK eliminated or severely degraded• AFG governance sufficient to stabilise country

ISAF & ANSF Troop numbers.



AFGHANISTAN

Chapter 6 – Afghan National Security Forces

• DevelopmentoftheANSF

• AfghanNationalArmy

• AfghanNationalPolice

• AfghanAirForce

• WorkingwiththeANSF

601 The Afghanistan National Security Forces(ANSF) comprises threeprincipal components: the Afghan National Army(ANA), the Afghan NationalPolice (ANP), and the

Afghan Air Force (AAF). Within these services,specialistelementsroundoutthecountry’ssecuritycapabilities.

602 The international community’s long termobjective is tobuildtheANSF intoaforceabletoprovide for Afghanistan’s internal and externalsecurity needs. To this end, the ANSF must benationally respected and ethnically balanced. It must be under civilian control, well organised,trainedandequippedtomeetthesecurityneedsofthecountry,andincreasingly,itmustbefundedbytheAfghanGovernment.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANSF603 Development of the ANSF was for along time plagued by a lack of clear direction and inadequate resourcing. Difficulties werecompounded by a failure to recognise that there wasagrowinginsurgency,andlackofclarityaboutthe role theANSFshouldplay incombating it.Asa consequence, formuch of the past decade, theANSFhasplayedasubordinateroletoISAFforces,withtheANAbeingtreatedasasourceofauxiliarytroops. Similarly, unrealistic expectations abouttheANP’sroleinCOINoperationshavehamperedthedevelopmentofthepoliceanddistractedfromefforts to address longer term systemic corruption issues.

604 In December 2009, President Obamaarticulated what he saw as a key US andNATO objective: to strengthen the capacity ofAfghanistan’s security forces and the Afghangovernment so they can take lead responsibilityfor Afghanistan’s future. Following on from thisstatementofintent,inJanuary2010responsibility

FUNDING THE ANSF

AsofAugust30,2013,theUSCongresshadappropriatednearlyUS$54.3billiontosupporttheANSF.Mostofthesefunds(US$52.8billion)areearmarkedfortheUSAfghanistanSecurityForcesFund(ASFF),whichprovidesthebulkoftheresourcestotrain,equipandsustaintheANSFandtheAfghanLocalPolice(ALP).OtherUNmemberstatesprovidefundingfortheANSFthroughtheNATO

ANATrustFundandtheLawandOrderTrustFundforAfghanistan(LOTFA).TheAfghanGovernmentandinternationaldonorsagreedatthe2012NATOChicagoSummittoanannualbudgetofUS$4.1billiontosustaintheforceafter2014.AfghanistanwillinitiallyprovideUS$500millionofthatsum,risingannuallythroughthe‘decadeoftransformation’to2024,whentheAfghanGovernmentwillhavefullresponsibilityforfundingitsownsecurityforces.

AnnualCostofFieldingIndividualANSFMembers(basedonFY2011figures):

•ALPguardian: US$8,000

•ANPpatrolman: US$33,000

•ANAsoldier: US$48,000

Source: Report on Progress Toward Security in Afghanistan, July 2013.



Chapter6-AfghanNationalSecurityForces

for developing the ANSF was placed under theoverallcommandofanewthreestarISAFsubsidiaryheadquarters,NATOTrainingMission-Afghanistan(NTM-A).

605 Since its establishment in 2010, NTM-Ahas been working towards the end-state of anenduring indigenous security sector that is capable of generating and sustaining army, police, air,medical and logistics capabilities,with continuingleader development systems that professionalisethe force. The initial focus was on the rapid growth of the ANSF, followed by the development ofenablers,andlater,professionalisationoftheforce.

606 TheANSFend-strengthatfulloperationalcapabilitywillnumber352,000;with195,000ANAand 157,000 ANP respectively. This force sizeis deemed necessary to complete transition by December2014,andtomitigatetheeffectsofthecoalition draw down.

607 ANSF Summary (circa 2014). The ANSFisintheoperationalleadforsecurityacrossAfghanistan following the announcement of TransitionTranche5inJune2013.LocalforcesarebearingthebruntoftheCOINeffortinAfghanistan,however,theylackthecriticalabilitytoself-sustain.In addition to generous budget support from the international community, the ANSF will requiresubstantial coalition security force assistance extendingwellbeyondtheendoftheISAFmandate.Moreover,theANSFarestillheavilyreliantontheISAFforcloseairsupport(CAS),medicalevacuation(MEDEVAC), airlift, logistics, medical support andintelligence,surveillanceandreconnaissance(ISR).

608 In addition to shortfalls in key combat enablers, the ANSF have significant weaknessesattheministeriallevel.ThecoalitionhasassessedthatneithertheAfghanMinistryofDefence(MoD)northeMinistryofInterior(MoI)arecapableoffullyindependent operations and are unlikely to be prior to the end of the ISAF mandate. Both ministriesexperience significant deficiencies in personnelpolicy,budgetexecutionandplanningcapabilities.Inaddition,thesehighly-centralisedbureaucracies

aretaintedbycorruption,andrivenwithethnicandpolitical factionalism.

ANA cadets practice drill on the parade grounds at the Afghan National Defence University in Kabul. The university equips and trains future ANA officers.

609 ANA and ANP Relations.Whereas theANPrepresentstheforcewhichwilleventuallybetaskedwiththeprotectionofthepopulation,theirintegration with the ANA into a coherent ANSFis currently limited. Differences in recruitment,equipment, motivation and overlappingresponsibilitieshavetendedtolimitthewillingnessoftheANAandANPtointeract.TheANSF’sabilityto conduct basic coordination and communication between its various arms is challenging, but hasimprovedwith the coalition’s focus on developingajointplanningcapabilitythroughtheOperationalCoordination Centres at both a Provincial (OCC-P)and Regional (OCC-R) level. Nevertheless,intelligence sharing between the ANA and ANPremains problematic.

AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY610 History.TheANAwascreatedbyNATOaspartofasuiteofinterimgovernancearrangementssetupfollowingtheoverthrowoftheTaliban.Theinitialgoalwastodevelopafullmilitarycapabilityby 2010, including five Army Corps and one AirCorps. This goal has been changed a number oftimes with the current aim being to develop a195,000strongmilitarybyDec2014.

611 Recruitment has been on a voluntarybasis to create a professional army. According to the Constitution of Afghanistan, the President is


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the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, butin reality he is a figurehead, dispensing generaldirection through theMoD and the ANA GeneralStaff. His real authority over the military existsin the power to appoint and retire senior military officers.

612 Unfortunately, since its inception in 2002developmentoftheANAhasbeenunder-resourced.Theexpansionoftheinsurgencyoverthistimehasfurther disrupted development and degraded theforce. Yet despite this adequate donor fundingonly began to appear in 2008, alongwith a slowincrease in the number of international troops assigned to mentoring roles. The guidance for the ANAto transition tosecurity responsibilityby theendof2014wasissuedinlate2009,whentheANAfinallybecameafullpartnertoISAF.

613 ANA Organisation. The ANA operatesfromsixregionalcommandsasfollows:

• 201stCorps–Kabul;

• 203rdCorps–Gardez;

• 205thCorps–Kandahar;

• 207thCorps–Herat;

• 209thCorps-Mazar-e-Sharif

• 215thCorps–LashkarGah

Qalat

Kandahar

Farah

Qal-E-Now

Herat

Khost

Jalalabad

Mazar-e-SarifKonduz

Ghazni

Gardez

Chaghcharan

Shindand

LashkarGah

HERAT

KANDAHAR ANA Total: Approx. 112,779

Corps 209

Corps 205

Corps 207

Corps 203

Capital Division

Corps 201

Air Corps

GARDEZ

KABUL

MAZAR-E-SHARIF

LASHKAR GAH

Corps 215*

KABUL

ANA Regional Commands.

Othermajorcomponents include the111thCapitalDivision (Kabul) and ANA Special OperationsCommand (ANASOC) (Camp Morehead, WardakProvince). Each Corps or Division is broken intobrigades whose battalions (called kandaks) formthe600manbasicunit.

MOBILE STRIKE FORCE

In2013theANAbegantofieldMobileStrikeForce(MSF)kandaks,representingasignificantimprovementincapability.Thesemotorisedcombinedarmsunitsusemobilityandfirepowertofind,contain,engageanddestroytheenemy.UnderthedirectcontroloftheMinistryofDefence,MSFkandaksserveasregionalquickreactionforcestosupportANAcorpscommanders,theANPandcivilauthorities.

614 ANA Training. NTM-A has the primaryresponsibility for training the ANA. Formaltraining for enlisted personnel takes place at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) andother affiliated training facilities. Commissionedofficers are trained atNationalMilitary AcademyofAfghanistan(NMAA),theAfghanNationalArmyOfficer Academy (ANAOA) and the Command andGeneral Staff College (CGSC). Work is underwayto co-locate these establishments within thenew Afghan National Defence University on theoutskirts of Kabul.

615 Recruit training utilises aNATO templateand consists of aneight-week (reduced fromnineweeks in March 2013) initial training program –BasicWarrior Training (BWT) – focusing on basicsoldierandinfantryskillssuchasweaponhandling,shooting, tactics,guardduty, landnavigation,firstaid,mines,andprisonerprocessing.

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ANA recruits place their hands on the Holy Koran during the oath ceremony of Basic Warrior Training.

616 Upon graduation from the BWT andsubsequentConsolidatedFieldingCentreprograms,suitablyqualifiedsoldiersgothroughtheAdvancedCombatTrainingprogram,developedbyKMTC.Thisprogram focuses on the three types of kandaks in each ANA infantry brigade: combat arms,combat support and combat service support. Thecourse lasts for six to eight weeks and focuseson such areas as heavy weapons, field artillery,logistics, reconnaissance, medical, engineeringand maintenance. NCO aspirants are selectedon the basis of leadership skills demonstrated when performing with their kandaks during fieldoperations.

617 Security Force Assistance (SFA). The operational development of fielded ANA unitsand formations is the responsibility of ISAF JointCommand (IJC). A combination of coalition forcereductions from 2012 and implementation of theSFAconcept,thatcallsforspeciallytailoredadvisorteams – known as SFATs – to train, advise andassist local forces, has shifted ISAF operationsawayfromapartneringrelationshiptoanadvisoryrole.AstheANAhasdeveloped,themainfocusofSFATactivityhasmovedfromthekandaklevel,tothe Brigade level and then Corps level. The levelofSFATsupportvariesanddependsonarangeoffactors, including: ANA unit/formation capability,local threat/security levels, impact on campaignsuccess (according to the key terrain districtstructure), and stage of security transition in thearea.Attheendof2013therewerefewerthan200ISAFSFATs.

A U.S. Army Staff Sgt. identifies the impact zone to an Afghan Brigadier during a mortar live-fire training course in Laghman Province, Nov 2013.

618 ANA Equipment. The ANA is beingequipped with NATO standard light weapons,including the M16 and C7 assault rifles. Its anti-armour capability includes SPG-9 recoilless riflesand intimate indirect fire support with 82 mmmortars.Eachbrigade isalsoequippedwitheightWarsawPactD-30howitzers.

Soldiers from the ANA 203rd Corps are trained in 60mm mortar systems.

619 ANA Manning. As the ISAF mandateentereditsfinalyearin2014,theANAhadachieved95% of its fielded end strength objective of195,000,reachingapproximately185,000members(including 6,616 Afghan Air Force personnel).However, high levels of attrition within the ANAremain a significant challenge. Monthly attritionrates for 2013 reached as high as 4.1% (January2013),andaregenerallywellinexcessoftheANSFmonthly attrition target of 1.4%. High attrition isundermining attempts to develop a trained and

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AFGHANISTAN

experiencedcadreofNCOsandsoldiersandplacessignificantstrainonrecruitingstructures.

620 Previous coalition failure to assess andassistinthedevelopmentofANArecruitmentandretention processes have resulted in significantproblems in the areas of pay, privileges, leave,medical benefits, facilities and equipment. Theseproblemshave led towidespread lowmoraleandvery lowlevelsofsoldier retention,bothofwhichunderminethedevelopmentofasustainableforcecapable of independent operations after the ISAFdrawdown.Recognising these issues,NTM-Ahasfocusedonqualitativeimprovementsinleadership,marksmanship and literacy.

ANSF LITERACY TRAINING

Literacyisthefoundationofprofessionalmilitaryandpoliceforces.AmajorcoalitionfocusisonraisingANSFliteracystandards.InJanuary2013,NTM-Ametitsgoaltohave50,000ANSFmembersachievefunctionalliteracy.AsofApril1,2013,73,727ANSFmemberswereinsomeformofliteracytraining.

• Level1.Theabilitytoreadandwriteasingleword,countupto1,000,andaddandsubtractwholenumbers.

• Level2.Anindividualcanreadandwritesentences,carryoutbasicmultiplicationanddivision,andidentifyunitsofmeasurement.

• Level3.Anindividualhasachievedfunctionalliteracyandcanidentify,understand,interpret,create,communicate,computeanduseprintedandwrittenmaterials.

621 ANA Assessment (circa 2014). ANAgrowth brings with it the associated problems of inadequate experience, particularly if new unitsare raised in the context of high attrition ratesfrom existing units. Recruitment and retentionimprovements have been partially brought aboutthrough a range of initiatives including payincreases, enhanced pay systems and mandatoryliteracy training (identified as a factor in whysomeindividualsjointheANA),butleadershipandmentorshipthroughtheearlierISAFOMLTprogramandenhancedforceprotectionmeasureshavealsoplayed a role.

622 These successes should not divertattention from addressing real problems within the ANAthatwillimpactonthelongtermeffectivenessoftheforce.Aswellastheproblemsexperiencedbyanyforcethathasexperiencedrapidexpansion,therearesoldiers’concernsaboutpay,corruption,promotion, inadequate facilities and equipment,problems in supporting families, vulnerability toinsurgent infiltration, and a lack of meaningfulcompensation in the event of death or disability.These are the issues, more than ideology ornationalism,whichwillaffecttheabilitytoachieveand then sustain the required growth in size andquality.

623 Bytheendof2014,thebulkofthecoalitionenablersupportwillhavebeenwithdrawn,leadingto capability gaps in critical areas including; C-IED, logistics, aviation support (CAS,MEDEVAC

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ANSF celebrates 100,000th graduate of the literacy training program, 28 July 2011.

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and transport), medical support and ISR. If thesedeficienciesarenotaddressedbybuildingfunctionalindigenous systemsandwill impact on theANA’scapacitytoprovidesecurityfortheAfghanpeople,countertheinsurgencyanddeterexternalthreats.

AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE624 History. During the Soviet intervention,theAfghanpolicewerebasedontheSovietmodelwith a two-track system of career officers andshort-termconscriptswhoservedfortwoyearsaspatrolmenasanalternativetojoiningthemilitary.Officers were educated at a police academy;conscripts were untrained and often mistreated by their superiors. The police were militarised and included a light infantry force. However, duringthesubsequentcivilwarandtheperiodofTalibanrule therewas no national civilian police force inAfghanistan.

625 By2002,therewereanestimated50,000menworkingaspolice,buttheywereuntrainedandillequipped.Further,70-90%werenon-literate,anda significant proportion owed their allegiance towarlords and local commanders rather than to the centralgovernment.ManywereformerMujahideenwhoseexperienceofactingwithimpunitypreparedthem poorly to serve as police in a democraticsociety.Afewprofessionalpoliceofficersremainedfrom the ANP of the Soviet period, but theirtraining and experience were also inappropriatefor the new domestic order. Officials in theAfghan Interim Authority wanted to create a new professionalpolice servicewitheducatedofficersand trainedcareernon-commissionedofficersandpatrolmen. However, for the first few years aftertheBonnConferencemilitiaforceswerefrequentlytransferredintotheANP,settingtheconditionsforcriminaldominanceofdistrictandprovincialforces.

626 ANP Organisation. The ANP comprisesfour principal police pillars under the direction of theMoI,inadditiontospecialisedunits,localpoliceand security guards:

ANA SUMMARY

• TheANAisgenerallywell-equipped,trainedandled.TheprincipalstrengthoftheANAistheinfantrykandak,whichhasaprovenabilitytoclosewiththeenemyandfightattheBattalion-level.

• ANASpecialOperationsForces(ANASOF)haveattainedahighdegreeofproficiencyandarethemostcapablecomponentoftheANSF.ANASOCisaDivision-levelheadquartersfortheSpecialForces(ANASF),CommandosandtheKtahKhaskandak,andcomprisesnineSpecialOperationskandaks(SOKs)thatcombineCommandoandANASFCompanies.WhilstANASOFareheavilyreliantoncoalitionaviationsupporttheywillintegratethe777thSpecialMissionWingoverthenextfewyears.

• ThecurrentUSCombinedSecurityTransitionCommand-Afghanistan(CSTC-A)equippingstrategyfortheANAisfocusedonproviding‘move,shootandcommunicate’assets.However,theANAstillsuffersfromequipmentshortagesinthefollowingareas:medical,maintenance,mortars,nightvisiondevices,communications,counter-IED(CIED)/electroniccounter-measures(ECM)andbasicartilleryitems.

• AscoalitionforcesreducetheirfootprintinAfghanistantheANA

mustrelyincreasinglyonindigenoussystems.DevelopmentoftheANAlogisticscapabilityisahighpriorityforNTM-A,withkeyfocusareasincludingfuelsupplyandthestorageanddeliveryofequipmentparts.

AFGHANISTAN

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• Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP). The AUPare the general duties police responsible for the day-to-day policing activities at provincialand district level. The AUP is undergoingtransformation from a paramilitary force to an effective community-based policing servicethatupholds theAfghan constitution, providesinternal security and enforces the rule of law. Key challenges in the AUP are corruptionand the abuse of civilians. AUP disaster andemergency response capabilities are at an early developmentalstage.

AUP officers stand in formation at the Police Training Centre in Tarin Kot, Uruzgan Province, 4 April 2013.

• Afghan Border Police (ABP). The ABP isresponsible for securing Afghanistan’s vastborders (to50kminland)andtheairports.TheABP mission is extremely difficult due to apersistentenemythreatandasaconsequenceofAfghanistan’sextremelymountainousborderterrain. The remoteness of border posts present challenges in fielding units and keeping themsupplied. TheABP are consistently involved incorruptactivitiessuchasthecollectionofillicitborder revenues, pay-for-position schemes,smuggling and collusion with elements of the insurgency.

• Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). The ANCOPwas conceived inmid-2006asa result of the inabilityof theAUP torespond effectively to the May 2006 Kabulriots. InurbanareastheANCOPare trainedtocounter civil unrest through the provision of amobilerapidreactionforcetosupporttheAUP.ANCOPunitsarealsolocatedinhighthreatrural

areasandprovideapolicepresencetoestablishand maintain security. Although the ANCOParegenerallywellequippedtheylacksufficientC-IEDequipment.

An ANCOP Unit Practicing Crowd Control.

• Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP). The AACP are responsible for counterterrorism,counternarcotics, police intelligence, criminalinvestigations, themajor crime task force andforensics.

627 The General Directorate of Police Special Units (GDPSU) is a specialised componentoftheANPthatreportsdirectlytotheMoI. ANP Special Units are under the commandandcontroloftheGDPSU.ThreeNationalMissionUnits (NMUs) – Crisis Response Unit (CRU) 222,Commando Force (CF) 333 and Afghan TerritorialForce (ATF) 444 – have emerged over the pastdecade from ISAF SOF partnering arrangements.Theyrespondtoterrorist,insurgentandnarcotics-related threats faced by the Afghan Government.Thesearesupplementedby19ProvincialResponseCompanies(PRCs).

628 The Afghan Local Police (ALP) is a village-based security force administered by theMoI anddevelopedunder theUSVillageStabilityOperation (VSO) program as a mechanism foraddressing the shortfall of ANP personnel,particularly in remote areas. Its role is the protection of local communities through defensive actionsinsurgents and other against anti-governmentelements.

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ALP recruits take part in a training session, December 2012.

629 Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) is a state owned enterprise under the authority of the MoI that was established bypresidential decree to conduct all non-diplomatic,commercial, development, fixed site and convoysecurityservices.TheAPPFisintendedtograduallyreplace private security companies that currentlyprovidetheseservices.However,thecoalitionhasassessed the APPF requires substantial attentionto improve its core business performance. As ofDecember2013,theAPPFcomprisedalmost20,000guardsatmorethan150sites.

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COMMUNITY POLICING

Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police.

Inlate2006,theUnitedStatesauthorisedthecreationoftheAfghanNationalAuxiliaryPolice(ANAP).Thiswasgeneratedasaquick-fixefforttohelpaddressthegrowingTalibaninsurgencyinsouthernAfghanistan.Underthisplanprovincialgovernorscouldrecruit11,271menfrom124high-riskdistrictsin21provincesintotheANAPasamilitiaforceintendedtoreinforcetheANP.

ThepurposesoftheANAPweretomancheckpointsandperformcommunitypolicingfunctions,freeingtheANPforcounterinsurgencyoperations.Recruitsreceivedfivedaysofclassroom

instructionontheAfghanconstitution,ethics,andpolicetechniquesandfivedaysofweaponstraining.EachrecruitwascontractedforoneyearandgivenaKalashnikov-typeassaultrifle,astandardANPuniform,andpaidaUS$70monthlysalary.AsignificantflawintheprogramwasthatsinceANAPmemberswerelocallyrecruited,theywerevulnerabletofactionalcontrolandmanipulation.

DespiteinitialassertionsthatANAPrecruitswouldbethoroughlyvetted,manywerethoughttobeTalibanagentsandnearlyallweremembersofforcesloyaltoprovincialpowerbrokers.

ThecreationoftheANAPwaswidelycriticisedforreversingtheeffectsofthe2005DisbandIllegallyArmedGroups(DIAG)program,whichdisarmedanddemobilisedgangsthatservedlocalpowerbrokers.IneffecttheANAPservedtoreconstituteandlegitimisetribalmilitiasandgroupsloyaltopowerfulwarlords.TheANAPwasalsochallengedbyregularANPofficers,whoquestionedwhytheANAPreceivedthesamesalaryandworethesameuniformasprofessionalpolicemen,buthadfarlesstraininganddidnotoweallegiancetothenationalgovernment.Some8,300ANAPmembersreceivedtrainingbyJuly2007,butincompetenceandineffectivenessoftheforceresultedinitbeingdisbandedinMay2008.

Afghanistan Public Protection Force Program.

DespitethefailureoftheANAPprogram,theideaofcreatingvillageself-defenceforcessurfacedagaininJanuary2009intheformoftheAfghanistanPublicProtectionForceProgram.Membersof

AFGHANISTAN

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thisforcewererecruitedbytribalshuras(councils)todefendtheirvillagesagainstTalibaninsurgentsthathadinfiltratedtheirareas.TheprogrambeganasapilotprojectinWardakprovince;aprimaryrouteforinfiltratinginsurgentsandsuicidebombersintoKabul.KnownasGuardians,thefirstlocalrecruitspatrolledroadsandcommunitiesinseveraldistricts.

TheprogramwasrunbyCSTC-A,whichprovidedKalashnikovriflesandtwoweeksoftrainingbyUSSOF.Trainingincludedconceptsrelatedtotheruleoflaw,respectforhumanrights,discipline,andmilitarytactics.

GuardiansreceivedtheequivalentofUS$100permonth,plusUS$25forfood.TheyweregivenradiosandcellphonessotheycouldcallforbackupfromUStroopsifchallenged.

Theprogramhasceasedtooperateasacommunitypolicinginitiative,insteadshiftingtoaguardforcemodeladministeredbytheMoI.TodaytheAPPF’scoretasksaretoprotectkeyinfrastructure,facilities,andpersonnel,withanultimateaimtograduallyreplacingtheprivatesecuritycompaniesthathaveproliferatedinAfghanistansince2002.

Afghan Local Police.

Thelatestversionofcommunitypolicing–theAfghanLocalPolice(ALP)–wasestablishedbyPresidentKarzaiinAugust2010,andhashadmuchgreatersuccessthananyofitspredecessors.TheALParetheprincipalcomponentofthecoalitionVillageStabilityOperations(VSO)programwhichisexecutedthroughtheUSCombinedJointSpecial

OperationsTaskForce(CJSOTF).TheALPwasformedasameansofaddressingintheshort-termthedeficitinoverallANPnumbers.Itwasinitiallyenvisagedthattheprogramwillrunfortwotofiveyears,atwhichpointAUPnumberswillbesufficienttofulfilltherolesbeingundertakenbytheALP.UndertheALPprogram,small,community-basedself-defenceunitsareformedundertheauspicesoftheMoI,butaretrained,mentoredandequippedbyUSSOFOD-Ateams,toprovideprotectionforthecommunityfrominterdictionsbyanti-governmentelements.ThechainofcommandfortheALPatthedistrictlevelrunstothedistrictchiefofpolice(DCOP).

MembersoftheALP,alsoknownasguardians,arerecruitedonlyfromwithinthelocalcommunityandcanonlyoperatewithintheirhomedistrict.ALPunitsperformbasicdefensiveactions(suchasstaticcheckpoints),operateonlywithlightweapons,anddonothaveauthorisationtoactasalawenforcementagencyunlessexpresslyrequestedbytheAUP.AsISAFentersitsfinalyearin2014,theALPnumberedapproximately25,000guardiansandisexpectedtoreach30,000byDecember2015.

DeterminationoflocationsforALPunitsisbaseduponaninitialcommunityrequestandthenvalidationbytheMinistryofInteriorinconjunctionwiththecoalition.TheALPprogramisdesignedtoencouragecommunityleadersthroughthelocalshuratobeinvolvedintheselectionandvettingofguardians.IncombinationwiththerequirementsforALPpersonneltoonlyoperatewithintheirhomedistrict,thisaimstomaketheALPboth

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630 ANP Training & Mentoring. WhereasANA training has largely been a success, thesamecannotbesaidfortheANP.Corruption,poorequipment,andinfiltrationbyinsurgents,warlordsand drug traffickers, all lead to questionableeffectiveness. Further, issues of leadership,drug use and illiteracy all affect the quality andeffectiveness of the ANP. Crucially, the ANPare rarely trusted by the local population due to years of abuse at their hands. The coalition has been engaging in focused efforts to rectify these problemsforseveralyearswithvariablesuccess.

631 InitialEntryTrainingisintendedforallANPofficers and is designed to impart the necessarybasic skills to respond to the police needs of the community. This program replaced the variousentry-level training regimes which had createdsignificant problems in earlier years. There weredramatic disparities between certain branches of the ANP resulting from different approaches toinitial training. All police officers will now sharethesameinitialtraining,andafteritiscompleted,willbeeligible to takeunit-specificandadditionaladvanced courses. Current training capacity,however,isnotenoughtomeetdemandandmanyuntrained policemen remain in the force.

An ANP Colonel inspects recruits at Multinational Base - Tarin Kot in October 2013 prior to their eight week basic patrolman's course at Regional Training Centre – Kandahar.

632 The US and ISAF have employed PoliceOperationalMentoring& Liaison Teams (POMLTs)to train andmentor ANP units. Each POMLTwas

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representativeofandaccountabletotheirlocalcommunity.ThecoalitionhasinstitutedVillageStabilityCoordinationCellsatregionalandheadquarterslevelstomonitorandcoordinateALPactionsinconjunctionwithothervillageanddistrictlevelactivities.

Althoughconsideredanecessarypartofcoalitioneffortstopreventanti-governmentelementsgainingafootholdincommunities,theALPprogramneverthelesshaspotentialweaknesses.Currenttrainingforguardiansconsistsofonly2-3weeksofbasictraining.AlthoughoversightoftheALPistobeconductedbytheAUP,ALPunitsareoftenraisedinareaswherethereislimitedAUPpresence.ProblemsofcorruptionwithintheAUPhavefurtherhamperedeffectiveoversightofALPactivities.Tribalandethnicconcerns,whicharepresentinotherANSFunits,areofmoresignificantrelevancefortheALPwhichmaybecomefactionalisedbylocalconflicts.

TheALPisheavilydependentontheUSGovernmentforfunding(theUSDepartmentofDefenseestimatesthata30,000-strongALPwillcostUS$180millionayeartosustain).Moreover,thewithdrawalofUSSOFandcoalitionconventionalenablersposessignificantlogisticalproblemsfortheALP.Asaconsequence,oneoftheprimarychallengesfacingAfghanistanbeyond2014willbehowfund,demobiliseorincorporatetheALPintoothersecuritystructures.Anticipatingthis,theforcehasbeenstructuredtoenableALPpersonneltomovetoregularANSFunitsshouldtheANSFseektoexpandintoALPsites.

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composed primarily of military members who provide training support, maintenance, logistics,and administrative coaching to encourageprofessionalism,aswellasservingasliaisonswithinternationalforcesasrequired.Thepolicetrainingandmentoringobjectivewas to sendaPOMLT toeach AUP district, each provincial and regionalheadquarters,eachABPcompanyandbattalion,andeachANCOPcompanyandbattalion.ManyPOMLTssupported the Focused District Developmentprogram in training and mentoring district-levelAfghanUniformPoliceunits.NTM-AandEuropeanUnionPolice(EUPOL)advisors,mentorsandtrainersnowworkwithseniorMoI leaders tohelpbuildawell-led,professionalANP.

633 ANP Equipment.ThestandardvehicleoftheANPisthefour-wheeldriveFordRangerprovidedbythethousandfromtheUS.OthervehiclesincludedieselpoweredvariantsoftheUSconsumerNissanFrontier,Toyotaand4wheeldrivesfromThailand,aswellasYamahamotorcyclesdonatedbyJapan.TheANPalsohashundredsoftacticalambulancesdonated by the US. The weapons of the ANPinclude: Glock pistols, Smith & Wesson Sigmapistols,M9pistols,M16rifles,AK-47assaultrifles,AMD65assaultriflesandrocket-propelledgrenadesystems.

634 Uniforms and body armour remain widely mismatched and poorly distributed. Most policepersonnelareissuedatleastoneuniform;however,itiscommontofindawidearrayofblue,greenandgrey uniforms amongst the police due to different manufacturers.Somepoliceofficershaveresortedtohavingtheirownbespokeuniforms.Bodyarmourandhelmetsareonlyissuedonan‘asneeded’basis.ThecompositionofequipmentvariesbetweenUS,Russian and Chinese military-grade equipment tothird party equipment providing little to no realprotection.TypicallytheANPbadgeiswornononeshoulderandtheAfghanistanflagontheother.

635 ANP Manning. As the ISAF mandateenters its final year in 2014, the ANP had almostachieved its fielded end strength objective of

157,000,reachingapproximately155,000members.The ANP fares somewhat better than the ANAregarding attrition, with an averagemonthly rateof1.3%.However,active targetingof theANPbythe insurgency undermines morale and recruiting efforts.

636 Corruption. Widespread corruptionwithintheleadershipandranksoftheANPhaslongbeenamajorproblemincombatingtheTaliban-ledinsurgency.Insurgentsofalllevelshavebeenabletoquicklybuytheirreleasefrompolicecustodywithbribes. Drug use and defections to the insurgency is also widespread. The level of corruption hasresultedindecreasedfinancialsupportonthepartof international donors.

637 The Future of the ANP. Adequateongoingsupport iscrucial for theANPtobuildontheirprogress,and tobesuccessful in the future.This will need to be backed up by further and more sophisticated training conducted in Afghanistan and abroad through various bilateral programs toensureANPofficersaugmentandhonetheirskills.Another area to be addressed is the ethnic and tribal composition of the force. This is a factor for both the ANP’s internal dynamics and external communityengagement. A more varied mix of ethnicitiesandtribalaffiliationswillallowtheANPtodeploymore easily into certain areas and ease tensions across the spectrum. In addition, the police havefoundthemselvescarryingoutdutiesmorecloselyassociated with soldiering in the battle against the Taliban. TheANP is undergoing a transition awayfromCOIN operations tomore traditional policingroles, but this varies from region to region. Partof the transition to rule of law policing was the abandonment,inMarch2013,ofpolicezoneswhichattempted to create an ANP command structuresimilar to thatof theANA.As itstands,however,theMoIhasvery littlecontroloverprovincialanddistrictchiefsofpolice (PCOPsandDCOPs)duetopoor communications and political interference in appointments.

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A member of the ANP squats while providing security as his team meets with local villagers during a dismounted patrol in Zabul Province.

638 ANP Assessment (circa 2014). The ANP is currently meeting its growth targets, butthere are continuing concerns about the qualityof the force. To address these concerns, a seriesof programs have been instituted to improverecruiting, retention and attrition while alsoimplementing initiatives to develop the qualityof the force. These initiatives have included theestablishment of ANP Recruitment and TrainingCommands,establishingAfghan-ledPoliceTrainingTeams, improving pay and pay systems, addingliteracytrainingtothebasictrainingprogram,andembedding international partner units with the ANP.

639 Therearesharplyvaryinglevelsofliteracy,training,readinessandactivitywithintheANP,butoverallthestandardsaregenerallypoor.Tocounterthis there is now mandatory basic training for the ANP. High levels of corruption remain, althoughmuch effort is going into addressing this through enhanced leadership, professional development,and improving transparency in promotion andposting. Attrition continues to be a problem for the ANP,butisgenerallybelowthe1.4%monthlyANSFtarget.DruguseamongsttheANPisalsoacauseforconcern:marijuanauseiswidespread,anditisestimatedthat10%ofpolicerecruitsarerejectedbecause of opium use.

640 MostAfghansstillseethepoliceasoneofthe most corrupt institutions in the country. There are strong links between the high level of policecorruptionandthedrugtrade,withthedrug lordsbribing police and often putting their own men into senior police positions. Even honest police havedifficulty operating in a force that is beholden topowerbrokerinterests–especiallyattheprovincialand district level. Similar to the ANA, there areconcernsaboutinfiltrationbyinsurgentsintopoliceranks.

The damaging legacy of corruption must be overcome by the ANP in order for it

to be respected as a fair, legitimate and professional force by locals and thereby gain their respect and consent to enforce the rule

of law throughout Afghanistan.

641 NTM-A’s equipping strategy for the ANP,liketheANA,isfocusedonprovidingcritical‘move,shoot,communicate’assetsneededasitexpands.The biggest improvement will be equipping theANPwith3,500up-armouredHMMWVstoreplacethe current unarmoured pick-up trucks. Again liketheANA,mucheffort isbeingputintodevelopingthe currently weak logistics system, and whileprogress is being made, it still lacks automation,infrastructure and expertise. These shortfalls arecompounded by the lack of a national transport systemandinadequateroads,makingitdifficulttoget supplies to remote police districts

An ANP officer enters one of the gifted Humvees.

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642 ThemostseriousbrakeonthedevelopmentoftheANPistheweaknessinAfghanistan’sformalsystemofjustice.Whiletherehasbeeninvestmentmade towards reform, infrastructure and traininginthisarea,therehasbeenlittlelastingprogress.Problems includea lackofsecurity for judgesandprosecutors, an inadequate number of defencelawyers,ongoingunderstaffing,chroniccorruption,inadequatepayandthelackofacasemanagementsystem.Policingisonepartofimposingaruleoflawinwhich theAfghan people can have confidence,and the absence of an effective justice systemplacesaseverelimitonpoliceeffectiveness.

643 Despite improvements in recruitment andretentionlevelsandbetterstandardsinequipmentand logistics, overall the ANP has made onlymeasured progress in improving its capabilities.TheAfghanpopulationhas littleconfidence intheANP,andconsequentlythoseillicitnetworkswhichchallenge the central government continue tothrive.AshortageofofficersandNCOsacrosstheANP,compoundedcoalitiondrawdown, is limitingimprovementsinquality.

ANP SUMMARY

• TheANPisachievingpersonnelgrowthtargets,butsuccessinimprovingqualityislimited.TheANPisimplementinginitiativestoimproveforcequalityaswellasrecruitmentandretention,butprogressisslow.

• Trainingstandardsvarybutaregenerallylow.Initiativesaddressingpaystandardsandtraininglevelsaremakingsomedifferencetoforcequality.However,druguseandcorruptionremainveryseriousproblems.

• Equipmentisslowlyimproving,andprotectedmobilitywillbeenhancedthroughtheprovisionofHMMWVs.

• Thereisslowprogressinlogisticcapability,butitishamperedbyapoorstateinfrastructureandtransportnetworktosupplyoutlyingpolicedistricts.

• TheabsenceofeffectiveruleoflawinstitutionsisaseriousissuefortheANP.

• Overall,theANPhasmadeonlymeasuredprogresssinceitsinception.

AFGHAN AIR FORCE644 The Afghan Air Force (AAF), previouslythe ANA Air Corps, will not be mission capableuntil 2018. As ISAF enters the final year of itsmandate in 2014, the overall strength of theAAFwas approximately 6,500 personnel. Current AAFinventoryincludesthefollowingaircraft:

• 40Mi-17(multi-rolehelicopter)

• 11Mi-35(attackhelicopter)

• 6MD-530F(lighthelicopters)

• 2C-130H(mediummulti-roletransport)

• 16C-27A(tacticaltransport)

• 26C-208(lighttransport)

• 6C-182(fixed-wingtrainers)

645 The AAF provides Afghan forces withhelicopter air support and reconnaissance capabilities. However, AAF fixed wing assetsare very limited and plans to develop a Light AirSupport (LAS) capability have been delayed. TheAAF is currently being suppliedwith four C-130Htransport aircraft that should provide a nascentinter-theatreliftcapability.NATOhasindicatedtheAFF isbuilding toastrengthof8,000airmen thatwilloperateupto140fixedandrotarywingaircraftby2018.

646 TheANSFwillbeheavilyreliantonforeignairsupportbeyond2014.Moreover, recruitingandtrainingpersonneltomaintaintheAAF’smixedfleetofRussianandWestern-sourcedaircraftisamajor

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challenge.Nevertheless, progresshasbeenmadewith the AAF routinely performing autonomousMi-17 resupply, CASEVAC, human remains,and passenger transport missions throughout Afghanistan.

WORKING WITH THE ANSF647 Working alongside the ANSF can beboth a rewarding and frustrating experience.Understanding both the local and organisational cultures are critical to understanding their motivations, concerns, and intentions; time spentlearningthecultureisneverwasted.

648 SecurityForceAssistancePrinciples.ISAFhas learnt a considerable amount about training,advising and assisting the ANSF over the pastdecade.HerearesomeprinciplestoconsiderwhenworkingwiththeANSF:

• Plan as a Team. Planning should always bedoneasateameffort.EveryoperationshouldbejointlyplannedwiththeultimategoalofANSFcommandersdoingthemajorityoftheplanning.ThebestwayfortheANSFcommandertolearnisbydoing.ISAFleadersshouldallowhimtodoas much as he can on his own and accept his ‘goodenough’solution.

• Learn Each Other’s Language. Teach English to ANSF soldiers and Pashtu/Dari to ISAFsoldiers. Use the same key phrases/words that will contribute to the mission and enhance both partnering within the unit and interaction with the local populace.

• ANSF Leads Locally. ANSF should not onlybepresentforallpopulationengagements,butshouldbegiven the lead role. It shouldbe theexceptionandnottheruleforISAFtobeinthelead for any local populace engagement.

• Let ANSF Build Relationships.ANSF is thebest human terrain mapping asset the partnered force has. Use ANSF as the primary agent toconduct human terrain mapping. They havea better understanding of the environment,culture, and society. Train ANSF soldiers

regarding what information they need to acquirefromthe localpopulaceandhelpthemunderstandthevalueinconductingthismission.

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TIPS FOR CULTURALLY SENSITIVE SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

DO

• Allowyourcounterpartstobethehost.Gototheircamp,barracksortrainingbuilding.Allowthemtoopenproceedingsandofferfoodordrink.Playtheroleofguesttryingeverythingthatisofferedandpresentingasmallgiftinreturnforhospitality.Donotdishonourthehostsbyupstagingtheminthegivingandreceivingofgifts.Theimportanceofthiscannotbeoverstated.Hospitality(melmastia)isoneoftheprimaryPashtunvirtuesandconveysdignityandrespectuponyourcounterparts.Profuselythankthehostattheend.

•Allowyourcounterpartstobepartoftheinstructionprocess.Whentheyspeakexpectthemtotakelongertogettothepointthanyou.InAustraliawewantthe“bottomlineupfront”.However,inAfghanistan,contextiseverythingandstory-tellingiscommon.BepatientandlearntheAfghanwayoffighting–theywillprobablyunderstandmoreaboutlocalinsurgentTTPsthanyou.

•Useapplicabletitles(engineer,doctor,sir,professor,etc)thisconfershonouronyourcounterpart,hisfamilyandqawm.

•Focusmoreonbuildingrelationshipsthanconveyingyourmessage,especiallyininitialmeetings.Abadstartisdifficulttorecoverfrom,soprioritisetheobservanceofformalitiesandestablishingtrustbeforecovering

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AFGHANISTAN

DON’T

• Neverembarrassyourcounterpartsbytellingthemthattheyarewrong,eveniftheyareobviouslyincorrect.Thisisconsideredaslightandwillundothebuildingoftrustedrelationships.Findawayofmakingyourpointwithoutcontradictingyourcounterparts.

• Avoidtheuseofacronyms,evenbasicones.WhereasanAustralianmayaskwhatitmeansiftheydon’tknowacronym,anAfghanwouldprefertostaysilenttoavoidembarrassment.

• Minimisefingerpointing(whichisseenasunnecessarilyaggressive)anduseanopenpalm(palmdown)forgestures.Similarlydon’tpointyourfeetinthedirectionofanAfghan(whensittingonthefloorsitcrosslegged).

• Nevergiveorderstoanyofyourcounterparts,regardlessoftheirrank.Dealdirectlywiththecommandingofficerwhenprovidingadviceordirection.Alwaysmakejointdecisions.

•Neverlookattheinterpreterwhenaddressingsomeonethroughthem.Bothyouandyourinterpretershouldmaintaineyecontactwiththepersonyouareaddressing.Ifpossibleavoidwearingsunglasses.Itisbesttopositionyourinterpretertoyoursideandslightlytotherear.

• Donotschedulelonginstructionalperiods,orinstructionalperiodsafterlunchonThursdaysoratanytimeonFridays.Onlyconducthigh-prioritytrainingduringRamazan.Yourcounterpartsarelikelytobefatiguedanddistractedduringthistime.

yourinstructionalmaterial.Schedulefollowupmeetingsforinstruction.

•Expecttospendaseeminglydisproportionateamountoftimeofftopic,drinkingtea,socialisingandsharingstories.Donotshowphotographsofyourownfemalefamilymembers.

• Practicelisteningandindirectinquiryoverdirectquestioning.Usethetechniqueofregulardroppingofideasintocasualtalkratherthanlonglectures.

• Duringmulti-dayinstructionalperiodsbillettogetherwherepossibleandsharemealswitheachother.

• Useanecdotes,picturesandfilmandminimisetheuseoftext(powerpointslidesandstudenthandbooks).Manyofyourcounterpartswillbenon-literateandbyusingtextyouwillembarrassthem.Literatecounterpartscansometimesbeidentifiedbythepresenceofapen/pencilintheirshirtpockets(itisastatussymbol).

• Holdclassesofpeers.Ifyouholdclassesofmixedrank,juniorswilldefertoseniorsandyouwillnotbeabletogeneratebroadparticipation.Similarly,amixedANA/ANPclassislikelytoresultinlackofparticipationbyANPparticipants.

• Whenusinganinterpretergothroughthematerialbeforehandtominimiseinstancesofmistranslation.Ensurethattheinterpreterintroducesyoucorrectly,focusingonyourstatus(i.e.commander,professor,doctor,etc)toensurerespect.

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INSIDER ATTACKS

Understanding Insider Attacks

AlthoughthefirstinstanceofaninsiderattackoccurredinMay2007,thephenomenononlybegantoattractsignificantattentionfollowingthetroopsurgeandacorrespondingsurgeinpartneredISAF-ANSFoperations.Whilststatisticallysmallinnumber,insiderattackshavenowbecomeadefiningcharacteristicoftheAfghanwarandhavehadasignificantnegativeimpactontheISAFmission.AsofOctober2013therehadbeenover107reportedincidentsresultingin153coalitionforceskilledandafurther222wounded.2012,inparticular,sawasubstantialriseinattacks,generatingalarmwithinNATOtroopcontributingnationsandthreateningthesuccessofthetransitionprocess.

Althoughthepopularimageofanattackerinvolvesaninsurgent“sleeperagent”oranANSFmemberradicalisedbycontactwithinsurgents,officialNTM-Afiguressuggestthatthemajorityofinsiderattacksareunrelatedtotheinsurgency.Whileinsurgentsclaimcreditfornearlyallincidents,insurgentdirectedattacks(throughinfiltrationorco-option)arethoughttoaccountforlessthanoneinfour(25%).Incontrast,mostattackswithknowncausescanbelinkedtoantecedentgrievancesbuiltupovertime.Individualstendtoberadicalizedasaresultofspecific‘triggeringevents’thatturnlatentgrievanceintoaviolentimpulse.Theseincludehighlypublicisedculturalmishaps(suchastheaccidentalburningofKoransatBagramAirfield)orpersonalexperiencesofhumiliationanddisrespect.


Thatsaid,asaproportionofthetotalforce,insiderattackersareextremelyrare.If,asaconsequenceoftheactionsofafew,allANSFmembersweretreatedwithsuspiciontheISAFassistancemissionwouldbeseverelycompromised.Moreimportantlyhowever,bothADFandISAFstudieshaveshownthatoneofthemosteffectivemitigationstrategiesagainstinsiderattacksistheestablishmentofpriorbondsoftrustandfriendshipwhichtransformtheISAFmemberfrom‘stranger’to‘brother’.ANSFmembershaveoftenself-reportedsuspiciousindividualstoISAFpersonnelwhomtheyhaveestablishedtrustedrelationshipswith.

Australian Experiences

Despitebeinglargelyshieldedfromthephenomenonduringthefirst10yearsofthewar,insiderattackshavenowbecomethelargestcauseofADFservicedeathsinAfghanistaninrecentyears.SincethefirstincidentinMay2011,insiderattackshaveaccountedformorecasualtiesthanallothercategoriescombined.TomitigatetheriskposedtoADFpersonnel,DefencehaveadaptedforceprotectionmeasuresfortroopsinteractingwithAfghansecurityforcesandincreasedcounter-intelligence.TheADFalsoengagedDSTOsocialscientiststoconductmultiplefieldstudiesintoAfghanistantounderstandthenatureoftherelationshipbetweenADFforceelementsandtheirAfghancounterpartsandprovideenhancedculturalawarenesstrainingtoallADFunitspriortodeployment.Inconjunctionwithreducedpartneringandmentoringratios,thesemeasureshaveseenasignificantdeclineinattackswithnoincidentsreportedduring2013.

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AFGHANISTAN

Afghan troops feast with Australian and US soldiers whilst an Australian ‘Guardian Angel’ stands watch. One of the most effective mitigation strategies is the establishment of prior bonds of friendship through shared meals and other activities.

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Part 2

Australian Assistance to Afghanistan

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Chapter 7 – Australia’s Contributions in Afghanistan, 2001-2014

• Background

• TheInternationalCoalitionAgainstTerrorism(ICAT)

• ArmedReconstruction

• Stabilisation&CapacityBuilding

• TransitionandWithdrawal

BACKGROUND701 TheAfghanistaninterventionisAustralia’slongest ongoing military and civil-militaryengagement. More than 26,500 ADF personnelhavecontributedtoOpSLIPPER:from2001to2002,with the US-led International Coalition AgainstTerrorism (ICAT), and from 2005, supporting theNATO-led International Security Assistance Force(ISAF). In addition to the Afghanistan theatre,ADFpersonneldeployedonOpSLIPPERwerealsolocatedatHeadquartersJointTaskForce633andsupportfacilitieselsewhereintheMEAO,includingcrewsofRANfrigatesonstationinthePersianGulf.The total cost of the military operation for Australia sinceitsinceptionhasbeenA$8.3billion.

702 Besides standing by its Alliancecommitment to the United States, the statedaim of Australia’s effort is to help bring securityand stability to Afghanistan, and prevent it fromagainbecomingasafehavenforviolentextremistorganisations (VEOs) such as al Qaeda and othertransnational terrorist networks. Successivegovernments, from2001onwards, haveadvancedthepursuitoftheseobjectivesasthemainreasonforAustralia’sinvolvement.

703 AtthecoreofAustralia’sapproachwastherecognition that Afghans must take ownership of their own security. Accordingly, the key taskwas

thedevelopmentofcapableAfghansecurityforceswhilst simultaneously establishing associated institutions, systemsand enablers. In its simplestterms it was about managing the conflict andhanding over to the ANSF the responsibility forleading operations.

704 Whereas the formal transition process(inteqal) involved a security transition frominternational to indigenous forces, it had to beunderpinned by progress in governance anddevelopment if it was to be sustainable. Thisrequired the ADF and Australian Governmentofficialsfromarangeofagenciestoworktogetherinagenuinecivil-militaryapproachthataddressedthe coalition’s three major lines of operations:security,governanceanddevelopment.

AUSTRALIAN ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN

AUSTRALIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN

Australiahasbeenalong-termdevelopmentpartnerofAfghanistan,deliveringaprogramofhumanitarianassistancethroughoutthechaosofthe1990s.TheAustralianGovernment’soveralldevelopmentobjectiveinAfghanistanistobuildthecapacityoftheAfghanGovernmenttodeliverbasicservicesandprovideitspeoplewithopportunitiestoearnalivelihood.

Australia’saidprogramtoAfghanistanisakeyelementofanintegratedwholeofgovernmenteffortwithinter-linkedsecurity,diplomaticanddevelopmentobjectives.Since2001,AustraliahascommittedmorethanA$900millioninOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)toAfghanistan.ThegovernmentallocatedA$180.4millioninits2013-14aidprograminAfghanistan,makingitthefourthhighestbilateralrecipientofAustralianODA.

IndeliveringdevelopmentassistanceAustraliaseekstoworkthroughAfghanGovernmentsystems,consistent

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705 There are broadly four phases to Australia’sinvolvementinAfghanistan.Thesemaybe characterised as combat operations in support of the US-led ICAT (2001-2002 and 2005), armedreconstruction in support of the Dutch mission in Uruzganprovince(2006to2009),stabilisationandcapacity building in Uruzgan as a member of theUS-ledCombinedTeamUruzgan(CTU)(2009-2013)andtransitionandwithdrawal(2013onwards).Thetwo earlier periods were predominately military deploymentsinsupportofAustralia’swidercoalitioninterestsandobligations,whereasthemorerecentcommitmentsrepresentamovetoacomprehensiveapproach to stabilisation incorporating security,governanceanddevelopmentassistance.

Map of Afghanistan showing location of Uruzgan Province.

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN TAJIKISTAN

IRAN

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

Mazar-e-Sharif

Herat

Kandahar

JalalabadKabul

URUZGANTarin Kot

THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM (ICAT)706 Australia became involved militarilyin Afghanistan by committing the ADF to ICATin response to the 11 September 2001 attacksagainst the USA. Prime Minister John Howardwas inWashington on the day of the attack andimmediately invoked the mutual defence clausesofthe1952ANZUSTreaty—theprincipalsecurityinstrument that binds, separately, Australia, NewZealandand theUnitedStates. Thiswas thefirsttimethattheTreatyhadbeeninvokedsinceitwasenactedin1952.On17September2001thedecisionwas ratified by the Australian Parliament and byOctober a range of ADF elementswere deployed

Chapter7-Australia’sContributionsinAfghanistan,2001-2014

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withthecommitmentsundertakenbytheinternationalcommunityatthe2010LondonandKabulConferencesonAfghanistan,andthe2012TokyoConference.AustralianaidisalignedwithprioritiessetoutintheAfghanNationalDevelopmentStrategy(ANDS)2008-2013,andinaccordancewiththeTokyoMutualAccountabilityFramework(TMAF).TheAfghanReconstructionTrustFund(ARTF)servesastheprimaryvehiclefordeliveringODA.

Inordertoprovideongoingsupportinarangeofareasbeyond2014,theAustralianGovernmentconcludedaComprehensiveLongTermPartnershipAgreementinthemarginsoftheNATOChicagoSummitin2012.ThePrimeMinisterannouncedanincreaseintheAustralianaidcommitmenttoAfghanistanfromanallocationof$165millionin2011-2012upto$250millionperyearby2015-2016.SincethenAustraliahasdevelopedaroadmapfordevelopmentassistancepost-transitionfocusingoneducation,ruraldevelopmentandfinancialandelectoralmanagement.Inaddition,wehavesignedanMOUwiththeAfghanGovernmentpledgingtochannel50%ofdevelopmentfundingthroughAfghansystemsandalign80%ofassistancetoNationalPriorityPrograms.

An Australian Aid Worker meets with Dr Ajab Noor and chief Pharmacist, Mr Kikmat Ullah, at the Afghan Health & Development Service (AHDS) in Tarin Kot, Uruzgan.

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alongsideUSforcesinOperationEnduringFreedom(OEF)withthedeclaredintentofdestroyingtheal-QaedanetworkanddrivingfrompowertheTalibanregime that had hosted it.

707 ADFforceelementsdeployedinOpSlipperduring 2001 to 2002 included: an Army SpecialForces (SAS) Task Group (SASTG); RAAF F/A-18Hornetfighteraircraft,B-707tankersandP-3COrionmaritime patrol aircraft with support elements; as wellasaRANmaritimeinterceptionforcealreadyoperatingintheMEAO.

708 By late 2002, however, the US haddecisively shifted its focus from Afghanistan topreparing for a full scale invasion of Iraq as thesecond theatre in what was becoming described at the time as a globalwar on terror (GWOT).Asa result, there were insufficient combat tasks tokeep Australia’s 200-strong SASTG engaged inAfghanistanandbyNovemberthegovernmenthadwithdrawn all but two military officers attachedto the United Nations Assistance Mission toAfghanistan (UNAMA) (Op PALATE) and the UNMineActionCoordinationCentre.

709 ItwasnotuntilAugust2005thatAustraliasubstantiallyre-enteredtheconflictinAfghanistanwith another Special Forces deployment atthe request of the United States, to help thefledgling Afghan Government quell a resurgentTaliban insouthernAfghanistan.By that time, thecoalition was conducting what was effectively acontested state-building mission. Australia’s newcommitment,aspartofISAF,wasattheinvitationoftheAfghanGovernmentandoperatedasapeaceenforcementmission underChapterVII of theUNCharter,backedbysuccessiveUNSecurityCouncilResolutions.

710 The Australian Government redeployedcombatforcesintoAfghanistanin2005principallyin support of the US Alliance. Sending discretetask-oriented force packages to Afghanistan wasanefficientwayforthegovernmenttodemonstrateits ongoing commitment to the US. AustraliaderivestangiblebenefitsfromtheAlliancesuchas

intelligence sharing and access to high technology military systems that help the nation hedge against strategic risk by maintaining a capability edge in an Asia-Pacific region currently undergoingtransformational change.

711 In addition to supporting our US allies,Australia’s own security interests were alsoengaged. Afghanistan at the time was a key theatre in the so-called globalwar on terror and still hadthe potential for a regeneration of al-Qaeda aswell as the transnational terrorist threat it posed. The government highlighted the linkage betweenviolent jihadist organisations in Southeast Asiaand Afghanistan — where some terrorists hadlearnedtheirtradecraftinthe1990s.Mostinimicalto Australian interests in its near region was Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia whose members were responsible for killing and maiming scores of Australian citizens, among others, in terroristbombingsontheislandofBaliin2002and2005,andcarrying out a targeted attack against Australia’sJakartaembassyin2004.

ARMED RECONSTRUCTION712 In 2006 the ADF Special OperationsTaskGroup (SOTG), also known as Task Force 66,now deployed in Uruzgan Province, was joinedin Regional Command–South (RC-S) by an ArmyRotaryWing Group (RWG) consisting of two CH-47DChinookmediumlifthelicoptersand75supportpersonnel based at Kandahar Air Field (KAF).This detachment was followed by a 400-strongReconstructionTaskForce(RTF),whichcommencedoperations in Uruzgan in September of the sameyear.Overthenextsevenyears,Uruzgan,amajority-Pashtunprovinceinthesouth-centralhighlandsofAfghanistan,would become a household name inAustraliaas the latest ina long list ofAustralia’soverseasmilitarydeployments.


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Uruzgan’s Provincial Capital, Tarin Kot.

713 At thetime,deployingnon-SpecialForcespersonnel to an insurgent-dominated southernprovince was thought to entail significant risk.The RTF, therefore, was configured as a uniquecombination of engineers, mounted infantry andotherenablersthatallowedittodeliversoftpowerin areas where only hard power would dare tread. However,theRTFwasnotdesignedtobeastand-aloneeffort. Instead, it supported theDutchTaskForceUruzgan(TFU)basedatCampHollandoutsidetheprovincialcapital,TarinKot.

714 TheADFworkedinclosepartnershipwithTFUforfouryearsuntiltheNetherlandswithdrewinJuly2010.DuringthistimetheRTFbecametheflagshipofAustralia’scontribution inAfghanistan.Its mission was protected reconstruction operations, focussing mainly on building security,health, education and road infrastructure.Two principal models of reconstruction were implemented by the RTF: ‘delivered works’ and‘managedworks’.Theformerincludeanetworkofpatrol bases and checkpoints constructed by Army engineers,whereasthelatterinvolvedcontractorsmakinguseoflocallabouronvariouscivilbuildingprojects. The RTF also helped build indigenouscapacityinUruzganbyestablishingaTradeTrainingSchool.Theschoolconductedbasiccoursesinfixedsteel and concreting, plumbing, construction andgenerator maintenance.

Trade Training School (TTS) team members supervise carpentry student Hayatullah, during the last week of training at the school. The Australian-run TTS began during the first RTF deployment in 2006. Over the next 7 years Australian Army engineers ran more than 40 courses and graduated over 900 students. The school was formally closed on 16 March 2013.

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THE RECONSTRUCTION TASK FORCE (RTF)

TheRTFprovidedgenerallywell-consideredandmeaningfulassistance.However,usingsoldierstodeliverreconstructioninasettingasremoteandinsecureasUruzganwasenormouslyexpensive.FromSeptember2006toJune2010theADFaccountedforatotalofA$252millioninODA-eligibleexpenditure.However,onlyA$37millionofthatsumwasspentdirectlyontheextensiverangeofdevelopmentandhumanitarianprojectsundertakenbytheADFinUruzgan.TheremainderwasthenetadditionalcostofADFpersonnel,supportandotherassociatedoutlays.

TheRTFunderwentfourrotationsfromSeptember2006toOctober2008.SubsequentrotationsofADFcontingentsinUruzganwererenamedMentoringandReconstructionTaskForce(MRTF),MentoringTaskForce(MTF),andfinally,AdviserTaskForce(ATF),toreflectthechangingemphasisoftheADFmissionfromreconstructiontosecurityforceassistance.

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715 Australia’s deployment to Uruzgan wasin support of the Stage 3 expansion of ISAF intosouthern Afghanistan. As a result of the ADFdeploymenttothemostvolatilepartofthecountryAustralia gained credibility among its senior coalition partners in ISAF. Many members of theNATO alliance appeared not only to be avoidingthe southern region, but combat in general.Furthermore, the ISAF mission was impededby coalition partners having differing politicalobjectivesandnationalcaveatswhichkeptmanyoftheirforcesinthecountrybutoutofthefighting.

716 The international intervention inAfghanistanpriortoGENMcChrystal’sappointmentin 2009 remained largely an act of improvisation.The“smallfootprint”approachforcedonsuccessiveCommandersasaresultofthewarinIraqhadfailedtopreventaninsurgencyfromengulfingthesouthand east of the country. In Australia the newly elected Labor Government, led by PrimeMinisterKevinRudd,begantoexpresspubliccriticismoftheISAF strategy.Althoughhehas stronglyendorsedthe Afghanistan mission while in opposition, thePrimeMinister and other senior cabinetministersnow expressed concern at the lack of progress,describing the coalition strategy as incoherent,andquestioningtheresolveofsomeNATOmemberstatesamidrisinglevelsofinsurgentviolence.

717 In2008theAustralianGovernmentbeganto place a new emphasis on security force capacity building when it announced that Australian soldiers would assume responsibility for mentoring a single AfghanNationalArmy (ANA) infantrykandak.The

ADF-mentored2ndkandakwaspartoftheANA’s,Uruzgan-based, 4th Brigade of the 205th (Hero)Corps. Up to that point RTF training of Afghanpersonnel in Uruzgan had been limited to smallgroups of around 10 engineers. The decision tostrengthen the ADF’s training and mentoring rolemarkedamajorshiftintheAustraliancommitmentto come.

PM Rudd expands Australia’s mission in Afghanistan to encompass mentoring the 4th BDE of 205 (Hero) Corps.

718 Prime Minister Rudd also attachedconsiderable importance to the need for coordinationandintegrationofmilitaryandcivilianresources in Afghanistan. By early 2008, it hadbecome clear to the Australian Government thatcivilian specialists must also become involvedin helping to progress the development line ofoperationinUruzgan.Consequently,theAustralianAgency for International Development (AusAID,now DFAT) began sending individual stabilisationand development advisors to work alongside RTFpersonnel.

STABILISATION & CAPACITY BUILDING719 In2009theGovernmentrecastitsmissionin line with President Obama’s new strategy ofdefeatingalQaedaanddenyingtheTalibanaccessto key Afghan population centres whilst disrupting anddegradingtheiroperationalcapabilitytolevelsmanageable by the ANSF. In a major speech onAustralian policy in Afghanistan, Prime MinisterRudd reiterated that the strategic denial of asanctuary to transnational terrorist organisations (TTOs) who threaten Australia, its people and itsinterests as well as the Alliance commitment to the


RTF3 security elements watch engineers construct a culvert in the Dorafshan, March 2008.

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UnitedStateswerethefundamentalissuesatstakeforhisgovernment.

MRTF1 soldiers in an overwatch position during a foot patrol near Karakak north of Tarin Kot.

720 Three main elements outlined by PrimeMinister Rudd underpinned Australia’s campaignplan:

• StrategicDenial. Firstwas the denial of thecountry as a training ground and operating base foral-QaedaandotherTTOs.

• Stabilisation.Secondwasthestabilisationofthecountry thoughcombinedcivil andmilitaryefforts in order to consolidate the primary interest of strategic denial. Here Australia’scontribution was limited to the stabilisation of UruzganProvince.

• Capacity Building. Third was the provisionof military, police and civilian training andmentoring, in concert with coalition partners,in order to hand over responsibility to Afghanauthorities within a reasonable timeframe. Again, thebulkofAustralia’s capacitybuildingcontributionwaslimitedtoUruzganProvince.

Successfulimplementationofthethirdelementofthe mission created the basis of Australia’s ‘exitstrategy’.

721 The operational requirements generatedby Australia’s new campaign plan and the 2009AfghanpresidentialelectionalteredtheADFtroop-to-taskratioinUruzgan.Asaresult,thegovernmentsent an additional 450 military personnel toAfghanistan. The additional contingent was made up of headquarters, logistics, engineering andmentoring staff, and also included a 120-strong

Election Support Force. Most of this contingentconsisted of soldiers reinforcing the now renamed Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force (MRTF)which progressively assumed responsibility forpartneringwithandmentoringall6kandaksof205Corps’Uruzgan-based4thBrigade.

The ANA leads the way during a partnered patrol with MRTF1 in the Baluch Valley, Uruzgan, March 2010.

722 By 2010, the Australian government hadincreased itsmilitary support to the ISAFmissionfrom around 1,090 to a new authorised ceiling of1,550 personnel inAfghanistan—a number thatremainedunchangeduntil2013.Themainfocusofthe ADF mission became security force capacitybuilding; an effort deemed critical to the success ofthecoalition’snewapproach.TheADFwerelaterjoined in Uruzgan by 10 Australian Federal Police(AFP) officers, from the International DeploymentGroup,attachedastrainingadvisorstotheDutch-runANPProvincialTrainingCentreatCampHollandundertheAFP’sOperationSynergy.

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POLICE TRAING IN AFGHANISTANThe Australian Federal PoliceTheAFPpresenceinAfghanistandatesfromOctober2007,andhasbeenprimarilyconcernedwithlawandordercapacitybuilding.InitiallytwoswornofficerswereattachedtotheUS-ledCSTC-AinKabul,withanothertwoengagedintrainingandmentoringtheAfghanCounter-NarcoticsPolice.Bythefollowingyearthecommitmenthaddoubledinnumber,withofficersalsodeployedtocriminalintelligenceand

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723 Significantly, the government appointedformer Secretary of Defence, Ric Smith, to theposition of Special Envoy for Afghanistan andPakistantobetterintegrateAustralia’scommitmentwith the international effort. His work wassupportedbytheDepartmentofForeignAffairsandTrade (DFAT),which had the overall responsibilityfor coordinating Australia’s whole of governmentresponse. Whereas Australia had established asmall diplomatic presence in Kabul in September2006,DFATofficerswereonlydeployedtoUruzganfromJuly2009.Theirtasksincludedengagingwithlocalpoliticalactors,mappingthe‘humanterrain’intheprovince,andreportingfrompost.

724 Combined Team Uruzgan (CTU). The DutchwithdrawalfromUruzganinJuly2010markeda critical juncture for the Australian Government,which had consistently maintained that it was not in a position to assume the lead role in the provinceduetoconcurrentcommitmentsinTimor-Leste and the Solomon Islands. Although it wasanticipated that theUSwould takeover from theDutch,the issueaddedadegreeofuncertaintytoAustralia’smilitarydeployment.NotleastofwhichontheagendawascontinuedaccesstocrucialUSenablers.

725 In April 2010, the Australian Governmentannounced a 50 per cent increase in its civiliancontribution. By the end of the year there wereroughly 50 Australian Government civilianemployees located in Afghanistan— in additionto 10 Defence public servants. This substantiallyenhancedciviliancommitmentcameaboutbecauseofthetransferofcommandon1August2010fromTFU to an ISAF-flagged multinational task force,knownasCombinedTeamUruzgan(CTU).

726 CTUwas a very different organisation toearliercoalitionarrangementsinUruzgan.Thetaskforce centered on an Australia-US partnership,with much smaller contributions from Slovakia,SingaporeandNewZealand.CTUwaseffectivelyoneoffiveBrigadeCombatTeamswithinthebattleremitofanewUSArmydivision-levelheadquartersinRegionalCommandSouth.


strategicadvisoryroleswithinRC-Sheadquarters(OperationContego).InJuly2010,thevariousAFPoperationsinAfghanistanweredrawntogetherintoOperationIlluminate,whichprovidedforthedeploymentof28officersengagedincapacitydevelopmentatthreemainlocationsinAfghanistan,withaprimaryfocusonUruzgan.

AFP Officer conducting training at the Police Training Centre in Tarin Kot.

Special Operations Task Group (SOTG)InadditiontotheMRTF,TheSpecialOperationsTaskGroup(SOTG)providedspecialisedtrainingandmentoringtoanUruzgan-basedANPunit,knownastheProvincialResponseCompany(orProvincialPoliceReserve).

PRC trainees are instructed in compound clearance operations by their SOTG mentors at a purpose built facility in MNBTK.

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727 WhereasCTUwasledbyaUSArmyColonel(untilAustraliaassumedcommandoftheformationinOctober2012)mostoftheprincipalpositionsatMulti-nationalBaseTarinKot(MNB-TK)–includingDeputyCommanderCTU,CommanderMNB-TKandDirector of the Uruzgan Provincial ReconstructionTeam(PRT)–werefilledbyAustralianmilitaryandcivilian officers. At its height, there were nearly10,000militarypersonnelandciviliansfromsevencontributing states stationed at the base.

728 Asaresult,ADFforceelementsandcivilianagencies in CTU were more integrated into theISAFcommandstructurethanhadpreviouslybeenthe case. They were able to draw on considerable coalition logistics,aviationsupport, ISRandotherenablers, as they worked to stabilise Uruzgan,target insurgent structures, conduct securityforce capacity building, extend sub-nationalgovernance and create an environment conducivetodevelopment.

2nd Mentoring Task Force (MTF2) Combat Team Charlie conduct a Community Engagement Patrol in the Tangi Valley, May 2011.

729 Successive ADF Mentoring Task Forces(MTF)guidedthedevelopmentofthe4thBrigadeatthe kandak,headquartersandprovincialOperationCoordinationCentre(OCC-P)levels.IndividualMTFrotations were based on an infantry battalion with the inclusion of elements from supporting arms. Bringing about security transition in Uruzgan byraisingthecombateffectivenessofthe4thBrigadewas described by the government as Australia’sprimary operationalobjective inAfghanistan—ataskthatwastobecompletedbymid-2013.

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COP Mashal

COPFOBMNB

PB

Combat OutpostForward Operating BaseMultinational BasePatrol Base

COP Tabar

FOBAnaconda

FOBHadrian

FOB Mirwais

FOBTinsley

FOBTycz

MNB Tarin Kot

PB Anar Juy

PB Atiq

PB Buman

PB Hamid

PB Kyber

PB MusazaiPB Qarib

PB Qudus

PB Razaq PB Samad

PB Wahab

PB Wali

Shahid-e HassasChora

Khas Uruzgan

Tarin KotDeh Rawud

Baluchi

Valley

Char Chineh

Charmestan

Garmab

Chenartu

Langhar

Patan

Chora Valley

Kush

Kadir

Dorafshan

Karmisan Valle

y

Khod

Val

ley

Taga

w Va

lley

Tangi Valley

Mirabad Valley

0

0 20 miles

40 kilometres

Map of Uruzgan Province showing all ADF bases at the height of the Troop Surge.

730 CTU had far greater success in bringingsecurity and stability to the province than itspredecessor. The number of ANSF patrol basesdoubled in the year following the Dutch withdrawal. ADF-mentored ANA elements extended theircontrolalongthecrucialrivervalleysthatconnectedUruzgan’sfivedistricts.Thisenabledtheexpansionof development zones and the incorporation ofpreviously isolated communities into the PRT-administereddevelopmentprogram.Furthermore,anumberofALPsitesoverseenbyUSSFOD-Ateamscreated secure pockets in the most isolated parts of the provincewhereCTUhad not established apermanent presence.

731 Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)UruzganwaswhereAustralia’scivilianandmilitaryefforts were drawn together in Afghanistan. The interwoven strands of security, politicsand development called for particularly closecooperationbetweentheADFandcivilianofficials,who had not previously attempted the type ofpoliticalengagementanddevelopmentactivitythattheywereundertakinginUruzgan.

732 A senior DFAT officer, who also servedas the ISAF and Australian Senior CivilianRepresentative in the province, directed PRTUruzgan. This combined joint inter-agency bodywasoneof the largestof its type inAfghanistan,staffedatitspeakbyupto200civilianandmilitarypersonnelfromAustralia,theUSandSlovakia.TheADF provided PRTUruzganwith aWorks Sectionand an organic force protection element known astheOtherGovernmentAgencies(OGA)Platoon.A US military contingent, also responsible forsecurity,facilitatedlogisticsupportandmovement.

733 Three district-based and one mobilesupport team from the PRT addressed thestabilisation and development challenge. Eachteam included four to six Australian and UScivilian specialists in governance, the rule of law,stabilisation,developmentandagribusiness.

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ADF FORCE ELEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN DURING THE SURGE

Approximately1,550ADFpersonnelweredeployedatthreemainlocationsinAfghanistan—KabulCity,UruzganProvinceandKandaharAirField(KAF).Theseincluded:HQJointTaskForce633—AfghanistanstaffstationedatKabulInternationalAirfield(KIA),avarietyofstaffembeddedinISAFHQinKabulCity,staffembeddedintheHQofCombinedTeamUruzgan(CTU),PRTUruzgansupportelements,aMentoringTaskForcecomprisingsixOperationalMentoringandLiaisonTeamsbasedatMNB-TKandvariousforwardlocations,arangeofenablers(includingCounterImprovisedExplosiveDeviceTaskForce,WeaponsIntelligenceTeam,ForceSupportUnit,ForceCommunicationsUnit,medicalpersonnelinRole2MedicalFacilityatMNB-TK,andanUnmannedAerialVehicle(UAV)Detachmentfromthe20thSurveillanceandTargetAcquisitionRegimentoperatingSCANEAGLEUAV),SpecialOperationsTaskGroupbasedatMNB-TK,ArmyRotaryWingGroupoperatingtwo

CH-47DChinookhelicoptersbasedatKAF,RAAF-ledHeronmediumaltitudelongenduranceUAVdetachmentbasedatKAF,CombatSupportUnitandaJointMovementsCoordinationCentredetachment.

AUSAID STABILISATION ADVISERS

TheAustralianCivilianCorps(ACC)deployedStabilisationAdvisers(STABADs)toworkaspartoftheProvincialReconstructionTeam.Theadvisersplayedanimportantroleinthecoordinationofdistrict-levelstabilisation

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734 Australian stabilisation (STABAD) anddevelopment (DEVAD) advisors assisted Afghanauthorities to design and monitor stabilisation and developmentactivitiesthatwerefocusedonthetwovitalareasofhealthandeducation,butwerealsoconcernedwithgrowingtheprovince’sagriculturaleconomy and building rural infrastructure. AusAID worked with international and local NGOs andmultilateral partners to support the delivery ofnational programs into the province, which hadbeen otherwise well down the list of the central government’s priorities. AusAID also mentoredprovincial government officials to improve localadministration and service delivery, and providedthem with literacy and numeracy training.

735 The preference for PRT officials was totarget their efforts to where there were credible localpartnersandresourcestoworkwith.DFAT’sresponsibility for key leader engagement was importantinthisrespect.Officialshadtonavigateacomplexwebofsocialandpoliticalrelationshipsand, in contrast to the Dutch who shunned localpowerbrokerswithadubioushumanrightsrecord,chose to engage with whomsoever was willingto work with them to extend the capacity andlegitimacyoftheAfghanGovernment.

Governor-General, Her Excellency Ms Quentin Bryce, AV CVO joins a group of students at the Australian-funded Malalai Girls School in Tarin Kot, April 2012.

TRANSITION AND WITHDRAWAL736 InMay2012,Uruzganand theassociatedGizabDistrictinDaykundiProvincewereincludedinTransitionTranche3–theso-called‘stretchtranche’.Laterthatyearthecoalitionassessedthatallfourof the 4th Brigade’s rifle kandaks were capable of operating independently of their Australian advisors. Throughout 2013 ADF Security ForceAssistanceTeams(SFATs)concentratedonbuildingfunctionalsystemstosustain the4thBrigadeanddevelopitsabilitytomountcoordinatedoperations.This activity took place parallel to the retrogradethatinvolvedthedeconstructionorhandovertotheANSF of a network of Forward Operating Bases,PatrolBasesandothersecurityinfrastructurebuiltbythecoalitioninUruzgan.

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anddevelopmentefforts.FocusingoncollaboratingwithlocalAfghanleaderstoidentifycommunitydevelopmentneedsaswellasunderstandingandinfluencingpoliticaldynamicsatthedistrictlevel,theadvisersalsosupportedandassistedtheAfghangovernmenttoplananddeliveressentialservicestothedistrictinthekeyareasofhealth,education,infrastructure,andagriculture.

Source: Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade

PRT Uruzgan hosts a meeting between the Stability In Key Areas (SIKA) regional advisors and their local Uruzgan staff counterparts (STABADS) at MNBTK, 17 July 2013. SIKA’s mission is to assist government officials at the district and provincial levels to respond to the population’s development and governance concerns.




Commander184th Security Force Assistance Team (SFAT), Uruzgan Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP), Commander Combined Team Uruzgan (CTU) and a member of the Uruzgan Operational Coordination Centre Provincial (OCC-P), during the sign-over of the Provincial Training Centre to the Afghan National Security Forces at MNBTK, October 2013.

737 Indeed for much of 2013, the AustralianGovernmentgrappledwiththelogisticalchallengeof withdrawing from Afghanistan. Besidesredeploying or otherwise disposing of 1,300accommodationmodules, 600 shipping containersand 275 vehicles, the governmentwasmindful ofreputationalissues,theimpactthelongdeploymenthashadonADFcapability,andtheongoingcareofitsmanyveterans.

738 Newly elected Prime Minister TonyAbbott’s visit toAfghanistan on28October 2013,markedtheclosureofPRTUruzgan,bringingtoanendAustralia’sefforts to fosterdevelopment,andimprove governance in one of the country’smostdisadvantaged provinces. The Prime Minister’shopeattheRecognitionCeremonyatMNB-TKwasthat local people would “remember us with pride, as we remember our work here with pride”.Australia’sadvisorysupportmissioninUruzganofficiallycameto endon15December 2013,when thefinalADFelements of CTU withdrew from the province. AjointISAF-Afghan‘independenceceremony’heldattheformerMNB-TKdeclaredtheANSFinUruzganindependentofcoalitionadvisors.

739 Nevertheless, Uruzgan is still a remoteprovince in a poor country struggling with anentrenched insurgency.Andwhereastheprovincehas seen significant human development,improvements are not evenly spread across allsectors or districts. As we approach the end of the ISAFmandate, thecoalition remainsconnected toUruzganthroughasmallliaisonforcebasedinTarinKot, and through national programs administeredfrom Kabul. Ongoing progress will be contingent,however, on the security environment and thestandardofgovernance–theresponsibilityforbothofwhichnowlieswiththeAfghanGovernment.

740 Australia’sinterventioninAfghanistansawit play the role of a cautious, though increasinglyengaged member of ISAF for a range of reasonsthatwereneverselfish,butalwaysinthenationalinterest. Nonetheless, Australia’s contributionsto the ISAF stabilisation and counterinsurgencymission relied heavily on the resources of itscoalition partners. Furthermore, it was not untillate in the intervention thatAustralia realised thepotential for, and began to implement, a wholeof government approach. In this respect UruzganmayhaveprovidedAustraliaasmuchaswehaveprovidedtheprovince.Byservingasatest-bedforanascentciv-mil-pol capacity forassisting fragileand conflict-affected societies as well as therelief,reconstructionandrecoveryofcommunitiesfollowinganaturaldisaster,thelegacyofUruzganmayliveoninAustraliaandourIndo-Pacificregionfor decades to come.

Newly elected PM Tony Abbott, Provincial Governor Amir Mohammed Akhundzada and the Director of the Uruzgan PRT at the ceremony to close MNBTK.




MAJGEN Craig Orme, Commander Joint Task Force 633, greets the last ADF personnel to leave Tarin Kot, as they disembark from a RAAF C-17A Globemaster at al Minhad Air Base (AMAB).

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Chapter 8 – Australian Force Elements in Afghanistan 2014 onwards

• CommandandControl

• Mentors&Advisors

• ComponentContributions

• Enablers

• OtherADFElementstoAfghanistan

801 Op SLIPPER involves not only militaryelementsdeployedtoAfghanistan,butalsoforcesdualassignedtoprovidecommand,communicationsandlogisticssupporttothewiderMEAO,includingthe Gulf of Aden (terrorism and anti-piracyoperations).

COMMAND AND CONTROL802 Current Manning.FromJan2011toSep2013therewereapproximately1550ADFpersonneldeployed within the borders of Afghanistan. In addition, there are approximately 800 ADFpersonnel deployed across the wider MEAO insupportofoperationsinAfghanistan,thenorthernPersian Gulf, and Counter–Piracy operations inthe Gulf of Aden. Since Sep 2013 a progressivedraw down of personnel has occurred to reach,approximately 400 personnel within Afghanistan,andafurther400supportingthewiderMEAO.

803 HQ JTF633. Headquarters Joint TaskForce 633 (HQ JTF633) provides command andcontrol of all ADF elements deployed throughoutthe MEAO. HQ JTF633 is located in UAE andprovides enabling support and assistance to theAustralian military presence. UAE support in hostingAustralia’sheadquarterscontributestotheinternationalcampaignagainstterrorism,aswellascounteringpiracyintheGulfofAden,andprovidingmaritime security in the region.

JTF 633 Headquarters.

804 HQ JTF633-A. Headquarters Joint TaskForce633–Afghanistan (HQJTF633-A), based inKabul,providesspecificcommandandcontrolofallADFelementsdeployedwithintheterritorialbordersofAfghanistanonbehalfof theCommanderJointTaskForce633(CJTF633),aswellascoordinatingJTF633’sinterfacewiththeISAFHeadquartersandother agencies.

MENTORS & ADVISORS805 Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA) Mentoring Team (MT). ThementoringtaskattheANAOAistoassistwiththe training and development of Afghan ArmyinstructorsattheANAOA.Thereareapproximately120mentorsfromtheUK,NewZealand,Australia,the Netherlands and several other Coalitionpartners, with the UK taking the role as leadframework nation.

806 The ANAOA is colloquially known byAustralianMentorsas ‘Duntroon in theDunes’,orbytheirUKcounterpartsas‘SandhurstintheSand’.Locatedona105acresiteinQarghaontheoutskirtsofKabul,itisonethreeinstitutionswhichtogetherformthenewAfghanNationalSecurityUniversity(theothertwobeingtheNationalMilitaryAcademyand theNCOAcademy). Together, the threepartsoftheUniversitywillberesponsibleforthetrainingandeducationoftheANA’sfutureleaders,ateverylevel.


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ADF personnel at the new ANA Officer Academy outside Kabul.

807 205 Corps Advisory Team (205 CAT). 205CATAdvisors,basedinCampBakerKandahar,provide advice and training to the 205th Corpscommand and leadership team.

808 Force Protection Element (FPE). The FPEconsistsof threeplatoonsof forceprotectionbased around a motorised infantry Companystructure. Two platoons will be deployed with the thirdheld inAustraliaon21daysnotice tomove.Themain task for the FPE is to conductGuardianAngel and general force protection for Australian andCoalitionmentorsandadvisorsattheANAOAand205CAT.StructuredwithintheANAOAFPEisasmallRealLifeSupportelementthatwillprovidebasic life support (supplies and maintenance andCIS)tothementorsbasedthere.

COMPONENT CONTRIBUTIONSLand Operations

809 Special Operations Assistance Group (SOAG).TheSOAG’sparticipationinOpRESOLUTESUPPORTistoprovidetrainingandmentorsattheHeadquarters General Directorate Police SpecialUnit (HQ GDPSU). In support of the mentors is aforce protection section. Australia also providesa number of Special Forces trained embeds tosupportHQISAFSpecialOperationsForce.

Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) Long Range Patrol Vehicles drive in convoy across the dasht.

Air Operations

810 JTF 633 Air Component Headquarters. The Air Component provides coordination andtaskingsupporttoHQJTF633forallaircraftandaircombatsupportelementsassigned toOpSLIPPERandOpRESOLUTESUPPORT.

811 Air Mobility Task Unit (AM TU).TheAMTUflyandmaintainC-130Jaircraftwhichprovideintra-theatre air movement for AS and coalitionforcesthroughouttheMEAOandAfghanistan.

The Last RAAF C-17A Globemaster to depart Tarin Kot for al Minhad Air Base (AMAB) on 15 December 2013.

812 Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) Detachment. A small element is co-located with the MEAO CAOC. This detachmentprovides important information and liaison dutiestoenableADFairoperationsthroughouttheMEAO.

813 Combat Support Unit (CSU).TheCSUiscomprised of combat support personnel who look

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afterthemainMEAOairbaseatAlMinhadintheU.A.E.,aswellasAirLoadTeamsinAfghanistan.

814 C-17 Support. On 10 Jul 09, a RAAFC-17 conducted the first of many C-17 missionsinto Afghanistan. C-17 aircraft from 36 SquadronprovideroutinestrategicliftsupporttoASforcesintheMEAOincludingAfghanistan.

Maritime Operations

815 RAN Major Fleet Unit (MFU).TheRANcontributes amain fleet combatant unit (MFU) tothe maritime security operations in the Arabian Sea. The mission of the MFU is to undertakecounter-piracyandmaritimeinterdictionoperationsin theArabianSeaandGulfofAden.TheMFU issupportedbyashore-basedlogisticunit.

816 Counter-Piracy Operations. In Dec 2008, Australia, along with 17 other countries,co-sponsored United Nations Security CouncilResolution1846toextendcounter-piracyoperationsoff the coast of Somalia. Australia’s contributiontotheseoperationsisachievedbybroadeningtherangeoftasksperformedbytheMFUandMaritimepatrol aircraft that are currently deployed in the MEAO under Op SLIPPER. As part of its counter-piracy duties, RAN warships provide a deterrentpresence and may escort merchant shipping in the maritimecorridorsof theGulfofAden,aswellastrack and report on piracy situations.

817 TheADFalsoprovidestwonavalofficersinsupportoftheCounter-PiracyCombinedTaskForce.Thisisamulti-nationaltaskforceheadquarteredintheMEAOaspartoftheCombinedMaritimeForces(CMF)Headquarters.Counter-piracyoperationsareconducted to detect and deter piracy in and around theGulfofAden,ArabianSea,IndianOceanandRedSea.ThetaskforceisUS-led,andwasestablishedto conduct maritime security operations.

HMAS Melbourne closes on a suspected pirate vessel in the Arabian Sea.

818 Oneofficerisinvolvedincoalitionplanningfor all maritime operations across the MEAO,including counter-piracy operations. The secondofficer is a RAN Legal Officer who assists in thedevelopmentand implementationofmaritime lawpolicy.

ENABLERS819 Heron Detachment.TheHeronUAVisamuchlargeraircraftthantheScanEagleorShadow200 Tactical UAV and is capable of providingmedium altitude reconnaissance, surveillance andmission support.

RAAF Heron Landing at Kandahar Air Fietld (KAF).

820 Force Communications Element (FCE). FCE isa jointunit responsible for theprovisionofnational command and welfare communications and information systems to JTF633, supporting


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NationalCommandandControlacrosstheMEAO.TheFCEhaselementsateverysignificantlocationtheADFisdeployedwithintheMEAO.

821 Force Support Unit (FSU).FSUisajointunitprovidinglogisticssupport,campmaintenanceatKandaharandKabul,postalsupport throughouttheMEAO and theatre induction training for ADFelements in theMEAO. Tasks of the FSU includethe management and distribution of supplies and equipmentnecessaryfortheconductofoperations,the issue of combat equipment and provisionfor regional based training through the conduct of Reception, Staging, Onward Movement andIntegration(RSO&I).AsAustralianforcesdrawdownto the levels required forOpRESOLUTESUPPORTtheFSUwillalsoundergochanges tobecometheForceSupport Element (FSE)with similar tasksastheFSU,althoughonasmallerscale.

OTHER ADF ELEMENTS DEPLOYED TO AFGHANISTAN822 Embedded Staff. ADF members arealso embedded across a number of coalition headquarters throughout Afghanistan, providingcritical, specialist staff effort in support ofoperations. These positions tend to be chosen in order for Australia to provide niche and subject-matterexpertisetotheISAFmissionatthetheatre-leveland,bysodoinghaveastrategicimpactonthecampaign in Afghanistan.

ISAF Joint Command (IJC) at Kabul International Airport (KIA).

823 OP PALATE II. Four ADF officersare attached to the UN Assistance Mission inAfghanistan to maintain contact and liaison with all military forces throughout Afghanistan.

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AFGHANISTAN

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Further Reading


PART 1 - AFGHANISTANChapter 1: Geography

Central Intelligence Agency (2007) CIA World Factbook.Available online http://www.cia/gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html

Defense Language Institute Foreign LanguageCentre (February2010) Afghanistan in Perspective: An Orientation Guide. Monterrey,USA.Available online http://fieldsupport.dliflc.edu/products/cip/Afghanistan/default.html

Chapter 2: History

Barfield,T(2010)Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History.PrincetonUniversityPress,Princeton,USA.

Department of Defence (2010) Afghanistan in Perspective: An Orientation Guide. US DefenseLanguageInstitute,ForeignLanguageCentre.

Dorronsoro(2005)Revolution Unending: Afghanistan 1979 to the Recent. Columbia. University Press,NewYork,USA.

Grau, L. (1995)The Bear Went over the Mountain. Reprinted by National Defense UniversityPublications,Washington,USA.

Jalali, A.,&Grau, L. (1995)The Other Side of the Mountain.ReprintedbyUSMCStudiesandAnalysisDivision,Quantico,USA.

Jones,S(2009)In the Graveyard of Empires.Norton,NewYork,USA.

Rashid,A(2000)Taliban.PanBooks,London.UK.

Rashid, A. (2008)Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Viking, New York,USA.

Rubin,B(1995)The Search for Peace in Afghanistan. YaleUniversityPress,NewHaven,USA.

Rubin,B (1995)The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. YaleUniversityPress,NewHaven,USA.

Saikel,A (2006)Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival.Tauris,NewYork,USA.

Tanner,S(2002)Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban. DaCapoPress,Philadelphia,USA.

Chapter 3: Society

Ansari, S. (1901) The Musalman Races Found in the Sind, Baluchistan and Afghanistan: Their Genealogical Sub-Divisions and Septs, Together

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with an Ethnological and Ethnographical Account. Commissioner’sPress,Karachi.

Dennys, C., & Zaman, I. (2009) Trends in Local Afghan Conflicts.CPAU,Kabul,Afghanistan.

DepartmentofDefense(2007) Tribal Hierarchy and Dictionary of Afghanistan: A Reference for Analysts. Prepared for Foreign Military Studies Office, USArmy and Office of Counterterrorism, NationalGeospatial-Intelligence Agency, by CourageServicesInc.

DepartmentofDefense(2009)My Cousin’s Enemy is My Friend: A Study of the Pashtun ‘Tribes’ in Afghanistan. TRADOC G2 Human Terrain System,FortLeavenworth,USA.

Department of Defense (2010) Afghanistan in Perspective: An Orientation Guide. Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center,Monterrey,USA.

Dupree, L. (1973) Afghanistan. Oxford UniversityPress,Oxford,UK.

Gant,J.,&McCallister,W.(2010)TribalEngagement: The Jirga and the Shura.SmallWarsJournal.

Girardet, E., & Walter, J. (2003) Afghanistan: Essential Field Guides to Humanitarian and Conflict Zones (Second Edition), Crosslines Ltd, Geneva,Switzerland.

Meinshausen, P., & Wheeler, S. (2010) Tribes in Afghanistan: Choosing More Appropriate Tools to Understand the Population.SmallWarsJournal.

Ministry of Defence (2008) Tribal Dynamics in Afghanistan: A Resource for Analysts.UKMoDandCourageServices,London,UK.

Poladi, H. (1989) The Hazaras.Mughal Publishing,Stockton,USA.

Rahimi, R. (2008) Afghanistan: Exploring the Dynamics of Sociopolitical Strife and the Persistence of the Insurgency. Pearson Peacekeeping CenterOccassionalPaper,Ottawa,Canada.

Tapper,R. (1983)The Conflict of Tribe and State in

Iran and Afghanistan.CroomHelm,London,UK.

Tariq, M. (2008) Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in South-East Afghanistan. Crisis States ResearchCentre.

Tribal Analysis Center (2008) The Panjpai Relationship with the Other Durranis. Williamsburg,USA.

Tribal Analysis Center (2009) Pashtun Tribal Dynamics. Williamsburg,USA.

USMarineCorps(2008)Afghanistan: Micro Mission Guide.USMCIntelligenceActivity.

Wardak,A.(2003) Jirga: A Traditional Mechanism of Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan. online at UNPAN (the United Nations Online Network inPublicAdministrationandFinance.

Chapter 4: Insurgency

Johnson, T., & Mason, C. (2007) Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan. Orbis,Winter2007:71-89.

Jones, S (2009) In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan. Norton,NewYork,USA.

Kaplan, R. (2001) Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. RandomHouse,Melbourne,Australia.

IIlias, S. (2010) Islamic Finance: Overview and Policy Concerns. Congressional Research Service,Washington,USA.

Rashid, A. (2000) Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia.Tauris,London,UK.


Zahab,M-A.,&Roy,O.(2004).Islamist Networks: the Afghan-Pakistan Connection.Hurst&Co.London,UK.

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Chapter 5: COIN

Bowman,S.,&Dale,C.(2010)War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service,Washington,USA.

Cordesman,A.(2010)The Afghan War: A Campaign Overview. Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington,USA.

Cordesman, A. (2010) Afghanistan: The Progress, Problems and Risks that Shape the New Department of Defense Report on Progress Toward Security & Stability in Afghanistan and the December Report. Center for Strategic & International Studies,Washington,USA.

Cordesman,A. (2010)The War in Afghanistan: Key Trends in the Fighting and the ANSF Development in the November 2010 1230 Report and Year-End NTM-A Reporting. Center for Strategic &InternationalStudies,Washington,USA.

Corum, J. (2008) Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency. Zenith Press,Minneapolis,USA.

Department of Defense (2009) JP3-24Counterinsurgency Operations. Joint Chief’s ofStaff,Washington,USA.

Dressler, J. (2010)Marjah’s Lessons for Kandahar. InstitutefortheStudyofWar(ISW)Backgrounder,Washington,USA.

Gompert, D. (2007)Heads We Win: The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency.RANDCounterinsurgencyStudyPaper1,NationalDefenseResearchInsitute,Arlington,USA.

Jones,S.(2008)CounterinsurgencyinAfghanistan.RANDCounterinsurgencyStudyVolume4,NationalDefenseResearchInsitute,Arlington,USA.

Flynn,M.,Pottinger,M.,&Batchelor,P.(2010)Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan. CenterforNewAmericanSecurity,Washington,USA.

Giustozzi,A.(2008)Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002-2007.Hurst&Co.,London,UK.

Gompert, D. (2007)Heads We Win: The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency.RANDCounterinsurgencyStudyPaper1,NationalDefenseResearchInsitute,Arlington,USA.

ICOS (2010) Afghanistan Transition: Missing Variables. The InternationalCouncilonSecurity&Development.

ICOS (2011) Afghanistan Transition: Dangers of a Summer Drawdown. The International Council onSecurity&Development.

InternationalCrisisGroup(2009) Afghanistan: New U.S. Administration, New Directions. Asia BriefingNo89,13Mar2009.

International Crisis Group (2010) Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary. AsiaReportNo195,17Nov2010.

International Crisis Group (2010)Afghanistan: Exit vs Engagement.AsiaBriefingNo.115,28November2010.

International Crisis Group (2011) Afghanistan’s Elections Stalemate. Asia Briefing No 117, 23 Feb2011.

ISAF(2010) COIN is a Mindset.COINCommonSenseVolume 1, Issue 1. COIN Advisory & AssistanceTeam(CAAT),Kabul,Afghanistan.

ISAF (2010) Neutralizing Malign Influences. COINCommonSenseVolume1,Issue3.COINAdvisory & Assistance Team (CAAT), Kabul,Afghanistan.

ISAF (2010) Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. Report to Congressin accordance with Section 1230 of the NationalDefense Authorization Act (Public Law 110-181).November2010.

Jones,S.(2008)Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. RANDCounterinsurgencyStudyVolume4,National

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DefenseResearchInsitute,Arlington,USA.

Kagan, F., & Kagan, K. (2011) Defining Success in Afghanistan. American Enterprise Institute,Washington,USA.

Katzman,K. (2010)Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance. CongressionalResearchService,Washington,USA.

Kilcullen,D.(2009)The Accidental Guerilla.OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,UK.

McChrystal, S (2009) Commander’s Initial Assessment. Headquarters, International SecurityAssistanceForce,Kabul,Afghanistan.

MinistryofDefence(2010) Security & Stabilisation: The Military Contribution. UK Joint DoctrinePublicationJDP3-40,Shrivenham,UK.


Roper, D. & Kiper, R. (2010) The Rediscovery of Doctrine: The US Army and Counterinsurgency. Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 2010),pp.23-42.

USArmy (2006)Counterinsurgency.USArmyFieldManualFM3-24,FtLeavenworth,USA

Chapter 6: ANSF

Cordesman,A. (2010) The War in Afghanistan: Key Trends in the Fighting and the ANSF Development in the November 2010 1230 Report and Year-End NTM-A Reporting. Center for Strategic &InternationalStudies,Washington,USA.

International Crisis Group (2010) A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army.AsiaReportNo190,12May2010.

ISAF(2010)Partnering: What You Must Know. COINCommonSenseVolume1,Issue2.COINAdvisory&AssistanceTeam(CAAT),Kabul,Afghanistan.

SIGAR (2010) Actions Needed to Improve the

Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments. Office of the Special Inspector General forAfghanistanReconstruction,Washington,USA.

PART 2 - AUSTRALIAN ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN

AusAID (2010) Comprehensive Needs Assessment for Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan. Canberra,Australia.

GIRoA(2008)Provincial Profile for Uruzgan Province. MinistryofRegionalRuralEconomicRegenerationStrategies(RRERS),Kabul,Afghanistan.

GIRoA (2008) Uruzgan Province Provincial Development Plan. Afghan National DevelopmentSecretariat,Kabul,Afghanistan.

Naval Postgraduate School (2008) Uruzgan Executive Summary. ProgramforCulture&ConflictStudies. www.nps.edu/programs/ccs <http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs>

Royal Netherlands Embassy (2006) Context Analysis: Urugzan Province.Kabul,Afghanistan.

Schmeidl,S. (2010)The Man Who Would Be King: The Challenges to Strengthening Governance in Uruzgan.TLOReport,Kabul,Afghanistan.

The Liaison Office (2009) Shahidi Hassas District Assessment. TLO District Assessment, UruzganProvince,Kabul,Afghanistan.

The Liaison Office (2009) Deh Rahwud District Assessment. TLO District Assessment, UruzganProvince,Kabul,Afghanistan.

TheLiaisonOffice(2009) Gizab District Assessment. TLO District Assessment,UruzganProvince,Kabul,Afghanistan

The Liaison Office (2009) Khas Uruzgan District Assessment. TLO District Assessment, UruzganProvince,Kabul,Afghanistan.

TheLiaisonOffice(2009)Chora District Assessment. TLODistrictAssessment,UruzganProvince,Kabul,Afghanistan.

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The Liaison Office (2009) Chenartu District Assessment. TLO District Assessment, UruzganProvince,Kabul,Afghanistan.

TheLiaisonOffice(2009) Three Years Later: A Socio-Political Assessment of Uruzgan Province from 2006 to 2009.Kabul,Afghanistan.

TheLiaisonOffice(2010)Educational Institutions in Uruzgan.Kabul,Afghanistan.

TheLiaisonOffice(2010)Uruzgan Provincial Update. April2010,Kabul,Afghanista.

TheLiaisonOffice(2010)Uruzgan Provincial Update. August2010,Kabul,Afghanistan.

TheLiaisonOffice(2011) Uruzgan Provincial Update. February2011,Kabul,Afghanistan.

Inaddition to theabove, theDefence IntelligenceOrganisation (DIO) and the Defence Science &Technology Organisation’s (DSTO) Conflict &Stabilisation Studies Team provide a number ofmoreclassifiedreportingonthenatureofpolitics,society, insurgency and ISAF efforts in Uruzganwhich are well worth a read.

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AFGHANISTAN

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List of Acronyms


AAF AfghanAirForce

ABP AfghanBorderPolice

ACBAR AgencyCoordinatingBodyforAfghanRelief

ACKU AfghanistanCentreatKabulUniversity

ACSFO Afghan Civil Society ForumOrganisation

ACSOR AfghanCentreforSocio-EconomicandOpinionResearch

ACSP AfghanistanCountryStabilityPicture

ADA AfghanDevelopmentAssociation

ADF AfghanistanDevelopmentForum

Af-Pak Afghanistan-Pakistan

AHDS Afghan Health and DevelopmentServices

AIHRC Afghan Independent Human RightsCommission

AKDN AgaKhanDevelopmentNetwork

ALP AfghanLocalPolice

ANA AfghanNationalArmy

ANAP Afghan National Auxiliary Police(disbanded2008)

ANBP Afghanistan New BeginningsProgramme

ANCB AfghanNGOCoordinationBureau

ANCC Afghan National Re-Construction Co-ordination

ANCOP AfghanNationalCivilOrderPolice

ANDS Afghanistan National DevelopmentStrategy

ANP AfghanNationalPolice

ANSF AfghanNationalSecurityForces

APRP Afghan Peace and ReintegrationProgram

AP3 AfghanPublicProtectionProgram

AQ AlQa’eda

ARDS Afghanistan ReconstructionDevelopmentServices

AREDP Afghanistan Rural EnterpriseDevelopmentProgram

AREU Afghanistan Research and EvaluationUnit

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ARTF AfghanReconstructionTrustFund

ASP AfghanStabilizationProgram

ASOP AfghanSocialOutreachProgram

AUP AfghanUniformedPolice

AusAID Australian Agency for International Development

CDC CommunityDevelopmentCouncil

CLJ ConstitutionalLoyaJirga

CN Counter-Narcotics

CNPA CounterNarcoticsPoliceAfghanistan

CNTF CounterNarcoticsTrustFund

COIN Counterinsurgency

COMISAF Commander of International SecurityAssistanceForce

DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation andReintegration

DFID Department for International Development(UK)

DIAG DisbandmentofIllegalArmedGroups

DSF DistrictStabilityFramework

ECC ElectoralComplaintsCommission

ELJ EmergencyLoyaJirga

GIRoA GovernmentoftheIslamicRepublicofAfghanistan

HIG Hezb-eIslamiGulbuddin

HQN HaqqaniNetwork

ICRC International Committee of the RedCross

IDLG Independent Directorate of LocalGovernance

IDP InternallyDisplacedPerson

IEC IndependentElectoralCommission

IED ImprovisedExplosiveDevice

IJC ISAFJointCommand

IMU IslamicMovementofUzbekistan

ISAF International Security AssistanceForce

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence(Directorate)

JANIB JointAfghan-NATOInteqalBoard

JCMB Joint Coordination and MonitoringBoard

KAU KandakAmnianteUruzgan

KLE KeyLeadershipEngagement

LDI LocalDefenceInitiative

MDGs MillenniumDevelopmentGoals

MEAO Middle-EastAreaofOperations

MISFA Microfinance Investment SupportFacilityforAfghanistan

MoE MinistryofEducation

MoI MinistryofInterior

MRRD Ministry of Rehabilitation & RuralDevelopment

NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization

NCPJ NationalConsultativePeaceJirga

NDS NationalDirectorateofSecurity

NGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisation

NHDR NationalHumanDevelopmentReport

NSC National Security Council ofAfghanistan

NSP NationalSolidarityProgramme

NTM-A NATOTrainingMission–Afghanistan

OEF OperationEnduringFreedom

AFGHANISTAN

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OHCHR United Nations Office of the HighCommissionerforHumanRights

OMLTs Operational Mentoring and LiaisonTeams

PDP ProvincialDevelopmentPlan

POMLTs Police Operational Mentoring andLiaisonTeams

PRSP PovertyReductionStrategyPaper

PRT ProvincialReconstructionTeam

QST QuettaShuraTaliban

RC RegionalCommand

SCR SeniorCivilianRepresentative(NATO)

SET SpecialElectoralTribunal

SF SpecialForces(Aus)

SOF SpecialOperationsForces

SSR SecuritySectorReform

TLO TheLiasonOffice

TTP Tactics,TechniquesandProcedures

UN UnitedNations

UNAMA UnitedNationsAssistanceMissioninAfghanistan

UNDP United Nations DevelopmentProgramme

UNOCHA United Nations Office for theCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs

USAID UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment

USFOR-A UnitedStatesForcesAfghanistan

VSO VillageStabilityOperations

WB WorldBank

WFP WorldFoodProgram

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DEFENCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA 1. DLM/CAVEAT (OF DOCUMENT)

2. TITLE Pre-Deployment Handbook: Afghanistan (post 2014)

3. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (FOR UNCLASSIFIED REPORTS THAT ARE LIMITED RELEASE USE (L) NEXT TO DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION) Document (U) Title (U) Abstract (U)

4. AUTHOR(S) David Matthews and Raspal Khosa

5. CORPORATE AUTHOR DSTO Defence Science and Technology Organisation 506 Lorimer St Fishermans Bend Victoria 3207 Australia

6a. DSTO NUMBER DSTO-GD-0809

6b. AR NUMBER AR-015-906

6c. TYPE OF REPORT General Document

7. DOCUMENT DATE May 2014

8. FILE NUMBER 2014/1023635/1

9. TASK NUMBER 07/021

10. TASK SPONSOR COMD 1 Div

11. NO. OF PAGES 128

12. NO. OF REFERENCES 0

13. DSTO Publications Repository http://dspace.dsto.defence.gov.au/dspace/

14. RELEASE AUTHORITY Chief, Joint and Operations Analysis Division

15. SECONDARY RELEASE STATEMENT OF THIS DOCUMENT

Approved for public release OVERSEAS ENQUIRIES OUTSIDE STATED LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE REFERRED THROUGH DOCUMENT EXCHANGE, PO BOX 1500, EDINBURGH, SA 5111 16. DELIBERATE ANNOUNCEMENT No Limitations 17. CITATION IN OTHER DOCUMENTS Yes 18. DSTO RESEARCH LIBRARY THESAURUS Predeployment, Afghanistan, Army operations, Planning 19. ABSTRACT This Handbook provides information that will assist in understanding the complex environment that is Afghanistan in 2014 and beyond. The research and analysis supports Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel operating in Afghanistan as part of the post 2014 NATO mission Op RESOLUTE SUPPORT.

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