Understanding the intensity of UK commitments to new

nuclear power

Phil Johnstone

Based on: Cox, Emily. Johnstone, Phil. Stirling, Andy (2016) Intensity of UK nuclear commitments (SPRU Working Paper series)

SPRU

School of Business Management and Economics

University of Sussex

Brighton

Introduction

1. Why undertake this study?

2. What Conditioned the Radical Reversal of UK Nuclear Policy in the Critical Juncture 2003-2006?

3. Overview of the Main Hypotheses Framing this Analysis

4. Is There a ‘Deep Incumbency Complex’ Around UK Civil and Military Nuclear Power?

Intensity of English & Welsh commitments

• The English & Welsh Government has long been planning to build up to 16 GWe of new nuclear power – a proportional level of support unparalleled in other liberalised energy markets

• "[investing in nuclear is what this Government is all about for the next twenty years" (Rudd, quoted on the BBC Today Programme, 2016).

• The present Energy Minister, Greg Clarke has said in the past that there is “no limit” on how much new nuclear capacity the Conservative Party would be prepared to build in the UK (Greg Clarke quoted in Collins 2010)

• FoI’s in 2012 reveal DECC seriously considering scenarios as 50GW + of nuclear.

Intensity of English & Welsh nuclear commitments (2)

• EPRs

• ABWRs

• AP1000s

• CP1000s

• SMRs of potentially various kinds

• PRISM

• Apart from the ABWR, which operates in Japan, non of these Gen III reactors have been completed and are all incurring substantial cost-overruns or are not being commercially developed anywhere in the world in the case of SMRs.

In Europe the UK’s level of commitment to new build is unique

“The UK’s love affair with nuclear…. Apart from South Korea, which has a thriving home-grown nuclear industry, only in nations such as China and Russia − where the government can ride roughshod over local objections − is the nuclear industry still expanding” (Paul Brown Guardian Journalist, 2016)

New build agendas Country

Ambitious nuclear new build UK

Moderate new build plans (1 or 2 reactors planned)

Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Finland

Uncertain/ obfuscation France, Sweden

Phase-out/ discontinuation Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Scotland

Abandonment of new build plans Italy

INVESTMENT IN POWER CAPACITY – RENEWABLE, FOSSIL-FUEL AND NUCLEAR, 2008-2015, $BN

Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance

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Production: GWh

criterion DEPENDENCY ON NUCLEAR ELECTRICITY(DNE)

Held (2012)

criterion

case

RENEWABLE RESOURCE ENDOWMENTS(RRE)

Cost Resource Curve, Wind

Summary of Key Patterns

criterion

case

STATUS: NUCLEAR ENGINEERING INDUSTRY(SNI)

Share of Global

Nuclear Patents

1970-2010

(Berthélemy, 2012)

Germany & the UK: something doesn’t make sense here.

• Germany is considered to host one of the best performing nuclear engineering industries in the world (Bruninx et al., 2013). This is in strong contrast to the UK, where, the UK performs strikingly poorly overall on most international comparisons related to plant performance.

• Siemens one of the most successful reactor vendors in world. Decades-long reactor sales experience.

• No nuclear reactor vending since the 1960s when UKAEA sold a total of 2 reactors to Japan.

• RWE, E.ON, EnBW, all international nuclear operators headquartered in Germany

• There is no UK headquartered company that is a major nuclear power utility company.

• “What constitutes the UK’s nuclear lobby?” (Steve Thomas 2015, Energy Policy)

1:0 Market Conditions In The Two Countries

2:0 Degree of penetration of nuclear in the electricity generating mix

3.0: the relative strengths of the nuclear engineering sector in terms of performance in manufacturing and operational equipment supply and associated industrial lobbies

4.0: Relative magnitudes and costs of available national renewable resource potentials

5.0: The scale of national industrial capacities and interests to address renewable energy supply

6.0 relative scales of military-related nuclear activities and associated industrial interests

7.0: Relevant characteristics of general national political institutions and elite cultures

8.0: Broader Presence and activity levels of relevant social movements

9.0 Qualities of democracy

Previous research comparing Germany & the UK

“conventional responses to the internationally-distinctive persistence and intensity of elite UK nuclear commitments, tend to take this overbearing official bias for granted. Analysts may disagree with the stated policy rationales. But so strong is the UK policy climate under which criticism of nuclear is taken to be unacceptable, that it is more expedient simply to accept these at face value, resigned to an understanding that the real motivations lie in deeper and less visible policy imperatives that simply remain a political ‘fact of life’.”

Anecdotal observations on the ‘elephant in the room’ in sustainability transitions literatures

• Minimal discussion of nuclear in this literature generally.

• It simply doesn’t ‘fit’ into discussions on ‘niches’ and ‘regimes’ – so it is often ignored.

• The tension between the ‘normative’ and ‘analytical’ strands of sustainability transitions make nuclear an extremely awkward subject that’s best left alone.

• In UK policy: The great ‘unspoken’ presence in policy. Occasional grumbling about prices but NEVER any discussion of a plan B.

• Vast gap between rhetoric and reality. Difficult to think of parallels to this gap.

• “Gov’t Official: UK Will ‘Sit In The Dark’ Due To Wind And Solar Power Crisis” (December 12th

2016)

Implicit assumption = there’s no nuclear crisis.

Power & incumbency

• ‘epistemic blinkers’ (Joseph & Roberts 2004) or ‘cognitive lock-in’ (Pestre 2007)

• “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”

• An academic answer to a policy question may simply adopt a version of the terms of the question itself

• The ‘evidence’ gathered concerning drivers behind past is decisions is often written from the assumptions of analytical present. It ‘sees’ the logic of the present.

• “double hermeneutic” assumptions about neatly-partitioned ‘levels’, ‘scales’, ‘systems’, ‘sectors’ or ‘regimes’ (Stirling 2016; Stirling & Arora 2015).

60 years of UK civil nuclear commitments

• The 1955 White Paper on Nuclear outlined the UK’s first nuclear programme for 5-6 GWe of nuclear power to be constructed by 1965

• In 1964, the UK’s ‘second nuclear programme’ (AGR) was announced on the basis that at least 5 GWe of new nuclear capacity (increased to 8 GWe in 1965)

• 1974 Fast Breeder Reactor Programme

• The third UK nuclear programme was announced in 1979 by Energy Secretary David Howell

• 2008 Fourth UK nuclear programme, 2011, plans that 16GWe would be from nuclear “by 2025”

UK electricity generation by fuel

TWh

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1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

UK R&D in energy in Million USD (2015 prices & exchange rates)

Energy efficiency Fossil fuels renewables nuclear hydrogen & fuel cells other storage cross-cutting

The ‘unexplained’ turnaround 2003-2006 (1)

• In 2002, and 2003 for the first time since 1955 UK nuclear policy was questioned. Energy White paper & PIU review, found it to be “unattractive”. This was the most independent and consultative energy paper in UK history.

• By 2005 Tony Blair had ‘changed his mind’ and a new energy White paper was produced in 2006. This was the shortest period between two Energy White papers, yet:

• Yet, a question asked by the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee:

regarding the government’s commissioning of a second energy review that would revisit the nuclear question only 2 years after the Energy Review of 2002 was “why it occurred at all” (Environmental Audit Committee 2006: 60).

The ‘unexplained’ turnaround 2003-2006 (2)

During this time:

• BNFL had become bankrupt in 2002 and been found to be producing fraudulent documents for MOX sales

• British Energy had been bailed out by tax payer with (initial) payment of £650 million (privatisation had failed).

• Costs of UK’s nuclear clearup soaring from £40 – 70 Billion.

• Scandals at Sellafield not least one of Europe’s worst nuclear accident to date with a leak of high radioactive liquor at THORP reprocessing plant, undetected for 9 months. Facility closed for 3 years costing £2 million a day.

• Load factor of UK reactors, previous new build agendas (Fast breeders, 1979 agenda) costs, construction times – point towards the opposite of a healthy industry!

’• the ‘face value’ UK nuclear policy hypothesis

-climate change- Gas supply

• the elite policy actor and networks hypothesis- David King, Sue Ion, Tony Blair.- ‘lobbying’.- EDF paying for French decommissioning through UK customers.

• the UK deep incumbency hypothesis

prima facie case for at least examining potential linkages between civil nuclear commitments on the one hand and militarynuclear aspirations on the other

Well known links

• Uranium enrichment (Brazil)

• Reprocessing (India)

• Tritium (USA)

The UK’s nuclear deterrent commitments:• Incredible technological feats: Cited as being comparable

to space travel in terms of their complexity.

• 1963 , the first British built nuclear submarine completed at Vickers Shipyard in Barrow-in-Furness in with PWR reactor of American design built by Rolls Royce

• In 1968 the first Polaris submarine set sail, beginning the UK’s strategic sea-based nuclear “deterrent” that has apparently been on patrol for every minute of every day since April 1969

• 1980 trident submarine programme to replace Polaris announced

• 1994 first Trident nuclear submarine sets sail.

• 2016 Commons vote for Trident renewal

UK linkages

Company HQ location What they do

1

Alstom France Engineering, turbines, turbogenerators2

Altran UK UK Consultancy3

Amec Foster

Wheeler

UK Technical assessment, advice, consultancy

4

Ansaldo NES UK Design, manufacture, full life-cycle5

Arc Energy

Resources

UK Welding, Cladding, tubular components

6

AREVA France Reactors7

Assystem France Engineering, consultancy, EPRs, propulsion

systems8

Atkins UK Engineering, building9

Atos France IT and control room equipment10

Balfour

Beatty

UK Civil engineering

11

Babcock London Engineering; waste; weapons-handling;

launch systems; life-cycle support12

BNM /

Tachart

UK Bolts and nuts

13

Bradken Australi

a

Cast metals, machined components

14

Cammell

Laird

UK Shipbuilding

15

Capula UK Automation, IT16

Carillion UK Construction17

Centronic UK Radiation detectors

Links noted in policy documentation

In a brief (extremely rare) discussion of exactly this point in the public domain, a major consultancy firm with a number of important government contracts in the energy sector, Oxford Economics (2013: 31), recently note that:

“The naval and civil reactor industries are often viewed as separate and to some extent unrelated from a government policy perspective. However, the timeline of the UK nuclear industry has clear interactions between the two, particularly from a supply chain development point of view.”

In evidence to the UK Parliamentary Select Committee on Innovation Universities Science and Skills, a key academic nuclear research organisation, the Dalton Institute, casts further rare light on the reasons for official obscuring of civil and military linkages

“The UK is not now in the position of having financial or personnel resources to develop both programmes in isolation. For example, reactor physicists on the military programme can develop their skills and knowledge by researching civil systems, and then only when necessary divert to classified work to follow a specialist career path. This link does however need to be carefully managed to avoid the perception that civil and military nuclear programmes are one and the same (Innovation Universities Science and Skills Committee 2008: 61-2; emphasis added).

“masking” and the benefits of a ‘vibrant’ civil sector.

• “through-life costs [of submarines] cannot be absorbed or masked by other programmes as can be the case with fast jets …” (Ireland 2007: 25).

the obstacles presented by the relatively small current scale of UK civil nuclear business and the impediments to openly realising synergies with the military activities that this author is more focally interested in.

• Vibrancy of the civil nuclear sector

“They are synergistic; the military base has always leant heavily on the fact that there are civil people around.”

The more vibrant the civil nuclear sector, the more they hope that’ll attract talented STEM-trained workers out of schools and into the nuclear industry, which would help the subs skills base by supplying UK nationals… This cross-over is good for the Navy. The Navy don’t always see this; they think that there will be skills leakage. One barrier that Rolls face is in building that trust, to make the Navy see that skills and capabilities will be additive, rather than taking away from the Navy. (Code 4, 2015).

• International standing

…when it comes to the United States looking at renewing support for Britain, Britain is required to show that it is a serious nuclear power and the question will I think arise immediately in the mind of John Bolton and his colleagues as to how can Britain be an independent nuclear state of any description if it has decided to phase out its civil nuclear industry. (HoC 2006 Strategic Context, p. EV18 (oral evidence from Mr Dan Plesch, Research Associate at SOAS)

• Small modular and submarines

Q: Is there competition or is it beneficial to have civilian & military programmes at the same time?

A: Definitely beneficial. The more civilian nuclear the better it is for us. And that is the view the MoD is increasingly taking…

Understanding this turnaround

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Number of UK publications mentioning the term "Nuclear renaissance" 1990-2015

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Gov green papers

Gov white papers

UK Policy Initiatives

2003-2006

• In April 2004 the Keep our Future Afloat Campaign (KOFAC) was formed which is constituted by Trade Unions including UNITE, GMB, local political interests including Barrow Borough Council, Cumbria County Council and industry representatives…“one of the most effective defence lobbies I have come across.” (ibid.)

• Rolls Royce, who pointed out that the depletion of skills in the civilian sector had “reduced the support network available to the military programmes” (Rolls Royce quoted in House of Commons Select Committee, 2006: 110)

• the UK “…will retain all of those capabilities unique to submarines and their Nuclear Steam Raising Plant, to enable their design, development, build, support, operation and decommissioning” (MoD 2005: 70).

• The DTI unveiled plans to preserve nuclear skills and R&D capabilities as part of a National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) and formal announcements of the formation of the National Nuclear Laboratory was announced in October 2006 (Fairhall, 2007), as well as plans for a National nuclear Skills Academy (House of Commons Select Committee, 2006).

deep incumbency complex?

• As we have publically argued at SPRU, the UK’s nuclear decisions ‘defy logic’ in terms of costs and efficacy.

• It is reasonable to not simply accept the ‘face value’ hypothesis –would we do this with any other technology?

• Two responses: “ Yes of course, that’s obvious”. “No, you’re a mad conspiracy theorist”.

• This is not the explanation. It is identifying possibly overlooked relations of power that are influencing UK decision making at elite policy levels.

Brief conclusions

• Does seem to be links acknowledged on the military side

• Many commentators now admit that the UK’s level of commitment is difficult to understand from the perspective on conventional energy policy analyses

• The linkages between military and civilian skills in UK only intensifies (recent Defence Skills review 2016)

• ‘non-energy policy’ related factors.

• The UK has a particular energy policy culture oriented around centralised technologies such as nuclear & fracking at the behest of cheaper, lower cost options, as such is out of step with global trajectories, and is, quite frankly a bit of a mystery.

• Why are some technologies not allowed to become obsolete? Why sudden concern for jobs with certain energy techs, and not others? (UK Solar Jobs, 12,000 already lost).

• Investment in Skills & Jobs key to understandings incumbency.

Recent developments

• The government’s official data in 2016 acknowledged that nuclear was more expensive than solar and wind.

• Hinkley C is already 7 years behind schedule.

• Offshore wind prices falling rapidly thought to be cheaper than Hinkley C when coming online 2025-28.

• Cuts to solar, wind, energy efficiency, coal conversion, electric vehicles, “cut the green crap” (David Cameron)

• 2016 – Fracking & Hinkley C. • “This path is more likely to leave us in the dark”

(Gordon MacKerron 2008)

“The Westminster government does not like wind, and is determined to build new nuclear. The Scottish parliament have voted in favour of the opposite. Doesn’t it make sense to allow diversity in the UK and allow devolved administrations to follow the path that works for them?” Callum McCaig (SNP Energy spokesman)