Johnny Rabadilla vs Court of Appeals

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334 SCRA 522 – Civil Law – Succession – Transmissible Obligations

A certain Aleja Belleza died but he instituted in his will Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee to a 511, 855 hectare land. A condition was however imposed to the effect that:

1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;

2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza, sister of Aleja, during the lifetime of said Maria Belleza;

3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza, the near descendants, shall continue delivering the fruits to Maria Belleza;

4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or sold only to a relative of Belleza.

In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by Johnny Rabadilla.

In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order to compel Johnny to reconvey the said land to the estate of Aleja Belleza because it is alleged that Johnny failed to comply with the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and that the the land was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a violation of the will.

In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near descendants” in the will of Aleja pertains to the near descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near descendants at the time of his death, no can substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the fruits of the devised land.

ISSUE: Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is not obliged to comply with the terms of the Will left by Aleja Belleza.

HELD: No. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft of merit. The “near descendants” being referred to in the will are the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla. Ownership over the devised property was already transferred to Dr. Rabadilla when Aleja died. Hence, when Dr. Rabadilla himself died, ownership over the same property was transmitted to Johnny Rabadilla by virtue of succession.

Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Rabadilla had by virtue of the Will were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Will on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. It is clear therefore, that Johnny should have continued complying with the terms of the Will. His failure to do so shall give rise to an obligation for him to reconvey the property to the estate of Aleja.

CASE NO. 77

Rosales v. Rosales

148 SCRA 69; Feb. 27, 1987

J. Gancayco:

++

Petra Rosales ♥ Fortunado

Magna Rosales Acebes +Antonio +Carterio ♥ Irenea

Macikequerox

FACTS: During the proceedings for the intestate estate of Petra, the CFI declared the following as legal heirs: Fortunato- ¼; Magna- ¼; Antonio: ¼ and Macikequerox- ¼. Irenea insisted in getting a share in her capacity as surviving spouse of the deceased son of Petra, claiming that she is a compulsory heir under Art. 887.

HELD: NO. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two:

1) those who inherit by their own right;

2) those who inherit by the right of representation.

The provisions Art. 980-982, 999 which relate to the ader of intestate succession does not include a surviving spouse of a child as an intestate heir of the mother-in-law.

Art. 887 [3] refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir but does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a 3rd person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.

8. Lapuz-Sy vs Eufemio 43 SCRA 177

FACTS:

Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil

Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD:

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.

The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

BARITUA v COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 82233, 22 March 1990

183 SCRA 565

While legitimate parents are considered as compulsory heirs of their legitimate child, the parents are secondary compulsory heirs and inherit only in default of legitimate children and decendants of the deceased. Thus, the legitimate parents have no right to demand indemnification for the death of their deceased child, and such right to indemnification properly belongs to the latter's descendants and/or spouse.

Sarmiento, J.:

In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido Nacario along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines Sur, figured in an accident with JB Bus No. 80 x x x. As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his passenger died, and the tricycle was damaged. No criminal case arising from the accident was ever instituted.

Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of the matter negotiated by the petitioner and the bus' insurer - Philippine First Insurance Company, Inc. (PFICI for brevity) - Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena vda. de Nacario, received P18,500. In

consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed on March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in favor of the petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever discharging them from all actions, claims and demands arising from the accident which resulted in her husband's death and the damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in which she formally manifested her lack of interest in instituting any case, either civil or criminal, against the petitioners.

On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of the accident on November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners with then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son, the petitioners through their representatives promised them (the private respondents) that as extra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for the funeral expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage to the tricycle the purchase price of which they (the private respondents) only loaned to the victim. The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son. The Nacario spouses prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be ordered to indemnify them in the amount of P25,000.00 for the death of their son Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and for moral damages.

After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by the defendants (herein petitioners) to the widow and her child, who are the preferred heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased Bienvenido to the exclusion of his parents, the plaintiffs (herein private respondents), extinguished any claim against the defendants (petitioners).

The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that the release executed by Alicia Baracena vda. de Nacario did not discharge the liability of petitioners because the case was instituted by the private respondents in their own capacity and not as "heirs, representatives, successors and assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could not have validly waived the damages being prayed for (by the private respondents) since she was not the one who suffered these damages arising from the death of their son. Furthermore, the appellate court said that the petitioners "failed to rebut the testimony of the appellants (private respondents) that they were the ones who bought the tricycle that was damaged in the incident. Appellants had the burden of proof of such fact, and they did establish such fact in their testimony x x x." Anent the funeral expenses, "the expenses for the funeral were likewise shouldered by the appellants (the private respondents). This was never contradicted by the appellees (petitioners). x x x Payment (for these) were made by the appellants, therefore, the reimbursement must accrue in their favor."

Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay the private respondents P10,000.00 for the damage to the tricycle, P5,000.00 for "complete" funeral services,

P450.00 for cemetery lot, P55.00 for oracion adulto, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court's decision but their motion was denied. Hence this petition.

The petition is meritorious.

Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being payment. Article 1231 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:

x x x

There is no denying that the petitioner had paid their obligations arising from the incident that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only question is whether or not Alicia, the surviving spouse and the one who received the petitioner's payment, is entitled to it.

Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to whom payment to extinguish an obligation should be made.

Art. 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it.

Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the successors in interest referred to in the law as the persons authorized to receive payment. The Civil Code states:

Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;

3. The widow or widower;

4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction;

5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.

Compulsory heirs named in nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in nos. 1 and 2. Neither do they exclude one another.

Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collateral relatives.

It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs will all classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia has been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.

Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private respondents loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims against the estate of their deceased son. Those money claims are not the liabilities of the petitioners, who, as we have said, had been released by the agreement of extra-judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release of Claim" in favor of petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 118449 February 11, 1998

LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City, and RAMON G. NICOLAS, respondents.

FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioner's wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon, and Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four children.

On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of 10,110 sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela property) covered by TCT No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P135,000.00), evidenced by a "Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT No. T-36734". 1 In view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela property was issued to Estrellita. 2 On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00). 3 In June of the same year, Estrellita bought from Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Parañaque (hereafter Parañaque property) using a portion of the proceeds of sale of the Valenzuela property. The remaining amount of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was deposited in a bank.

The following year an unfortunate event in petitioner's life occurred. Estrellita and her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991, an incident popularly known as the "Vizconde Massacre". The findings of the investigation conducted by the NBI reveal that Estrellita died ahead of her daughters. 4 Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and herein petitioner succeeded Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmela and Jennifer, petitioner was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered into an "Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares", 5 with Rafael and Salud, Estrellita's parents. The extra-judicial settlement provided for the division of the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud. The properties include bank deposits, a car and the Parañaque property. The total value of the deposits deducting the funeral and other related expenses in the burial of Estrellita, Carmela and Jennifer, amounts to Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00). 6 The settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the total amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael, except Savings Account No. 104-111211-0 under the name of Jennifer which involves a token amount. The other fifty percent (50%) was allotted to petitioner. The Parañaque property and the car and were also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their "claims, rights, ownership and participation as heirs" 7 in the said properties.

On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafael's estate, Teresita instituted an intestate estate proceeding 8 docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1679, with Branch 120 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo, and the wife (Zenaida) and children of Antonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed Special Administratrix of Rafael's estate. Additionally, she sought to be appointed as guardian ad litem of Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent brother Herein private respondent Ramon filed an opposition 9 dated March 24, 1993, praying to be appointed instead as Salud and Ricardo's guardian. Barely three weeks passed, Ramon filed another opposition 10 alleging, among others, that Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not less than Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder. Ramon pleaded for the court's intervention "to determine the legality and validity of the intervivos distribution made by deceased Rafael to his children," 11 Estrellita included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1699, entitled "In The Matter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas" and averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties distributed to his children by Rafael during his lifetime. 12 Ramon stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafael's children "by right of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita." 13

In a consolidated Order, dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed Ramon as the guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed as the Special Administratrix of Rafael's estate. The court's Order did not include petitioner in the slate of Rafael's heirs. 14 Neither was the Parañaque property listed in its list of properties to be included in the estate. 15 Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated January 5, 1994, removed Ramon as Salud and Ricardo's guardian for Selling his ward's property without the court's knowledge and permission. 16

Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner "ten (10) days . . . within which to file any appropriate petition or motion related to the pending petition insofar as the case is concerned and to file any opposition to any pending motion that has been filed by both the counsels for Ramon Nicolas and Teresita de Leon." In response, petitioner filed a Manifestation, dated January 19, 1994, stressing that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. The RTC noted said Manifestation in its Order dated February 2, 1994. 17 Despite the Manifestation, Ramon, through a motion dated February 14, 1994, moved to include petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding and asked that the Parañaque property, as well as the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property, be collated. 18 Acting on Ramon's motion, the trial court on March 10, 1994 granted the same in an Order which pertinently reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

On the Motion To Include Lauro G. Vizconde In Intestate proceedings in instant case and considering the comment on his Manifestation, the same is hereby granted. 19

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which Ramon opposed. 20 On August 12, 1994, the RTC rendered an Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. It provides:

xxx xxx xxx

The centerpoint of oppositor-applicant's argument is that spouses Vizconde were then financially incapable of having purchased or acquired for a valuable consideration the property at Valenzuela from the deceased Rafael Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living with the deceased Rafael Nicolas in the latter's ancestral home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said spouses were dependent for support on the deceased Rafael Nicolas. And, Lauro Vizconde left for the United States in, de-facto separation, from the family for sometime and returned to the Philippines only after the occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita and her two daughters.

To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financially incapable to buy the property from the late Rafael Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde claims that they have been engaged in business venture such as taxi business, canteen concessions and garment manufacturing. However, no competent evidence has been submitted to indubitably support the business undertakings adverted to.

In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the property from Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable consideration.

Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and the subject property in Parañaque which was purchased out of the proceeds of the said transfer of the property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. 21 (Emphasis added)

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court of Appeals. In its decision of December 14, 1994, respondent Court of Appeals 22 denied the petition stressing that the RTC correctly adjudicated the question on the title of the Valenzuela property as "the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate of the deceased (Cf.: Sec. 1, Rule 90, Revised Rules of Court)." 23 Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. Finding prima facie merit, the Court on December 4, 1995, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate court's Order, which respondent Court of Appeals sustained, nullifying the transfer of the Valenzuela property from Rafael to Estrellita and declaring the Parañaque property as subject to collation.

The appeal is well taken.

Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. Article 1061 of the Civil Code speaks of collation. It states:

Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property which they received from

him, so that the division may be made according to law and the will of the testator. 24 Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the decedent. 25 The purpose is to attain equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as possible for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the predecessor's will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any expression to the contrary. 26 Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject matter of collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the time it was donated, 27 the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee. 28

The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation. We find that the probate court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.

First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and ascendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.

With respect to Rafael's estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. 29 As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding, 30 which petitioner correctly argued in his manifestation. 31

Second:As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate proceedings. 32 Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve title. 33 In the case at bench, however, we note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are matters outside the probate court's jurisdiction. These issues should be ventilated in an appropriate action. We reiterate:

. . . we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased, although such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right of the interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question bearing on the ownership or existence of the right or credit. 34

Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Parañaque property to collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitime of any of Rafael's heirs has been impaired to warrant collation. We thus advert to our ruling in Udarbe v. Jurado, 59 Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:

We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In accordance with the provisions of article 1035 35 of the Civil Code, it was the duty of the plaintiffs to allege and prove that the donations received by the defendants were inofficious in whole or in part and prejudiced the legitime or hereditary portion

to which they are entitled. In the absence of evidence to that effect, the collation sought is untenable for lack of ground or basis therefor.

Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the Parañaque property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Parañaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of the Parañaque property has no statutory basis. 36 The order of the probate court presupposes that the Parañaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Parañaque property was conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00, 37 by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the present owner of the Parañaque property is not one of Rafael's heirs. Thus, the probate court's order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafael's estate. As it stands, collation of the Parañaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the Parañaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any "claims, rights, ownership and participation as heir" 38 in the Parañaque property.

Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. 39 Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.