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JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENTHARVARD UNIVERSITY

DPI-230: LEGITIMACY AND RESISTANCE

FALL 2014

Tuesdays, 1:10 – 3:10Taubman 401

Arthur Applbaum Faculty Assistant: Adams Professor of Democratic Values Jennifer ValoisRubenstein 217 Littauer [email protected] [email protected]

This course examines theories of political legitimacy and of justified dissent and resistance from the French Wars of Religion in the 16th century to the Arab Spring today. Readings are drawn from the Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and John Rawls.

Prerequisite: one course in ethics, moral philosophy, political philosophy, or political theory.

GETTING STARTED

Come prepared for the first session on Tuesday, September 9. A short written quiz is due before class.

REQUIREMENTS AND EVALUATION

Class ParticipationAttendance in all classes is mandatory. You are expected to come to each session prepared to discuss the week’s readings and examples, and to make thoughtful contributions to the learning of your classmates. Class participation counts for 25% of your grade.

Weekly Written AssignmentsBefore the first class meeting on Tuesday, September 9, you are to complete a quiz, “Puzzles of Legitimacy,” that is available on the course webpage. The quiz should be submitted online at the KNet course webpage in the “Class Discussions” box, and will be graded Complete/Incomplete.

Before each subsequent class meeting, you are to complete a brief three-question written assignment. The first question will be specific to that week’s topic. The second question always will be, “In what you read for today, what did you find most illuminating? Why?” The third

10/7/2014 Copyright © 2014 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. 1

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question always will be “In what you read for today, what did you find most puzzling? Why?”, Answers should be no longer than 300 words in total, and will be graded Complete/Incomplete.

Assignments are due in the “Class Discussions” box on the course webpage by 8:00 p.m. each Monday, the day before the class meets. All assignments submitted through the Class Discussions box should be posted with a subject line that adheres to the following format: “Last Name, First Name – Assignment for Class X.” You are expected to read your classmates’ answers before the start of class on Tuesday.

You are permitted to skip one week’s written assignment over the course of the semester. Late assignments will not be accepted. The written assignments count for 25% of your course grade.

Term PaperThe major work of this seminar is the writing of a term paper between 5,000 and 6,000 words in length on an approved topic. In the paper, you are to analyze a current or past episode of contested political legitimacy somewhere in the world after 1980, using ideas and arguments drawn from the readings and class discussions.

A number of mandatory, interim assignments are designed to help you write this paper:

500-word proposal due Friday, October 17, at 4:00 p.m.500-word propositional outline due Friday, October 31, at 4:00 p.m.Rough draft due Friday, November 21. At 4:00 p.m.Final draft due Friday, December 12, at 4:00 p.m.

The term paper and its interim assignments count for 50% of the course grade. Your work is to be submitted online at the KNet course webpage in the “Assignments for Online Submission” section.

READINGS

Five books required for purchase are available at the COOP:

Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos (1579). Edited by George Garnett. Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan (1651). Edited by Richard Tuck. Cambridge University Press, 1996.

John Locke. Two Treatises of Government (1690). Edited by Peter Laslett. Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Immanuel Kant. The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). Edited by Mary Gregor. Cambridge University Press, 1996.


John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). Harvard University Press, revised edition, 1999.

All other readings for the course are available on the course webpage. The syllabus indicates where each reading can be found.

CLASS SCHEDULE

1. Puzzles of Legitimacy Tuesday, September 9

Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos (1579), pp. 3, 5; "Who Tyrants Are," pp. 140-148. [book]

Mack P. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562-1629, second edition (Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. xi-xiii, 76-98, 223-224. [on-line]

2. Resistance and the French Wars of Religion Tuesday, September 16

Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos, pp. 21-22 (“This should be … destroyed”), 35-50, 59-63, 67-78, 96-104, 129-160 (“to protect”), 164 (“Come then”) -172. [book]

Arthur Isak Applbaum, “Legitimacy’s Baggage,” DRAFT [on-line]

3. Hobbes and Social Contract Tuesday, September 23

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge University Press, 1996), “Introduction,” pp. ix-xlv; chaps. 13-18 (pp. 86-129). [book]

4. Hobbes and the English Civil War Tuesday, September 30

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge University Press, 1996), chaps. 19-21 (pp. 129-154); chap. 29 (pp. 221-230); “A Review and Conclusion,” pp. 483-487 (“… this Discourse.”), 490 (“There is nothing …) -491. [book]


5. Locke and Social Contract Tuesday, October 7

John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1690), ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge University Press, 1988), “Locke the man and Locke the writer,” pp. 16-44; Second Treatise, §§ 1-51, 95-101, 113-131 (pp. 267-302, 330-334, 344-353). [book]

6. Locke and the Revolution of 1688

Tuesday, October 14

John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1690), ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge University Press, 1988), Second Treatise, sects. 169-243 (pp. 380-428). [book]

PAPER PROPOSAL DUE FRIDAY, OCTOBER 17, AT 4:00 P.M.

7. Kant and the Right of HumanityTuesday, October 21

Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 1-56. [on-line]

Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 23-31, 37-38, 44-46 (Ak. 229-238, 245-248, 255-257). [book]

8. Kant and the Social ContractTuesday, October 28

Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 84-98, 110-113 (Ak. 306-323, 338-342). [book]

PROPOSITIONAL OUTLINE DUE FRIDAY, OCTOBER 31, AT 4:00 P.M.


9. Kant and the French RevolutionTuesday, November 4

Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But It Is of No Use in Practice” (1793), in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 290-304 (Ak. 8:289-306). [on-line]

Christine M. Korsgaard, “Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution,” in The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 233-262. [on-line]

Tuesday, November 11 -- NO CLASS (Veteran’s Day)

10. John Rawls and JusticeTuesday, November 18

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, revised edition, 1999), §§1-4, 11, 12 (part), 13 (part), 14, 17-19, 20, 23-25, 26 (part), 39-40 (pp. 3-19, 52-58, 62 [“Now these reflections …] – 70 [“… chain connection.)”], 73-78, 86-101, 102- 105, 112-132 [“… fortunate conditions.”], 214-228). [book]

ROUGH DRAFT OF PAPER DUE FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, AT 4:00 P.M.

11. John Rawls and DissentTuesday, November 25

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, revised edition, 1999), §§51-59 (pp. 293-343). [book]

John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 3-11, 133-140, 212-222. [on-line]

12. Legitimacy and Resistance in the Arab Spring Tuesday, December 2

Duncan Pickard, “The National Transitional Council of Libya,” HKS Case Program, DRAFT [on-line]

Arthur Isak Applbaum, “All Foundings Are Forced,” DRAFT [on-line]

FINAL PAPER DUE FRIDAY, DECEMBER 12, AT 4:00 P.M.


HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENTDPI-230: LEGITIMACY AND RESISTANCE

FALL 2014

LEGITIMACY PUZZLES

Answer all questions. Think hard and have fun. The assignment will be graded COMPLETE / INCOMPLETE.

1. ConsentThe US Declaration of Independence says that governments derive “their just powers from the consent of the governed.” Ever since reading this in elementary school, Johnny has worn a sign around his neck that says, “I do not consent to be governed.” Johnny is now an adult.

Has Johnny consented to be governed? (Y/N)Why or why not?Does the US government have the “just power” to govern Johnny? (Y/N)Why or why not?

2. Tacit ConsentIn high school, Johnny read Locke, who says:

“Every man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his possession be of land, to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway.”

Ever since, before enjoying his possessions or travelling feely on the highway, he has worn a sign around his neck that says, “I do not consent to obey the laws of this government, and no one should infer from my enjoyment of my possessions or from my travelling freely on the highway that I have given my tacit consent.” Johnny is now an adult.

Has Johnny given his tacit consent? (Y/N)Why or why not?Is Johnny obligated to obey the laws of the government? (Y/N)Why or why not?

3. GodfatherIn the film “The Godfather,” Michael explains to his girlfriend Kay how his father, Don Corleone, convinced Johnny Fontane’s band leader to release him from his commitments.

MICHAEL: “My father made him an offer he couldn’t refuse.”KAY: “What was that?”


MICHAEL: “Luca Brasi held a gun to his head, and my father assured him that either his brains or his signature would be on the contract.”

Has the band leader consented to the contract? (Y/N)Does the Godfather coerce the band leader? (Y/N)Is the contract between the band leader and the Godfather morally binding? (Y/N)Should the contract be legally enforceable? (Y/N)Briefly explain your answers.

4. Drowning Locke, who is drowning in a lake, calls out to Hobbes in a nearby motorboat. Hobbes, who can easily save Locke at no risk, proposes to rescue Locke if Locke pays Hobbes $10,000. Both Hobbes and Locke know that there are no other potential rescuers. Locke, who otherwise will die, accepts Hobbes’s terms.

Has Locke consented to the agreement? (Y/N)Does Hobbes coerce Locke? (Y/N)Is the agreement between Hobbes and Locke morally binding? (Y/N)Should the agreement be legally enforceable? (Y/N)Briefly explain why your answers to Godfather and Drowning are the same or different.

5. MountaineerLocke, who is stranded on a steep mountainside in a snowstorm, radios Hobbes at the foot of the mountain for help. Hobbes, who can save Locke at considerable effort and risk, proposes to rescue Locke if Locke pays Hobbes $10,000. Both Hobbes and Locke know that there are no other potential rescuers. Locke, who otherwise will die, accepts Hobbes’s terms.

Has Locke consented to the agreement? (Y/N)Does Hobbes coerce Locke? (Y/N)Is the agreement between Hobbes and Locke morally binding? (Y/N)Should the agreement be legally enforceable? (Y/N)Briefly explain why your answers to Drowning and Mountaineer are the same or different.

6. WellNeighbors plan to dig a new well on unowned land, tapping an abundant and unowned aquifer. They ask Jean-Jacques if he wants to join their venture, which requires a few hours of work and a small annual maintenance fee. Jean-Jacques, who has an adequate supply of water at the more distant old well, ignores the note. But every night, Jean-Jacques draws water from the new well.

Is Jean-Jacques morally prohibited from drawing water from the new well? (Y/N)Is Jean-Jacques morally obligated to join the well cooperative, do the work, and pay the fee? (Y/N)Briefly explain your answers.


7. GardenNeighbors plan to plant a flower garden in a public park. They ask Jean-Jacques if he wants to join their venture, which requires a few hours of work and a small annual maintenance fee. Jean-Jacques ignores the note. But every day, as he walks to work, Jean-Jacques must pass by the flower garden, which he admits is pleasant to look at.

Is Jean-Jacques morally required to avert his gaze as he passes the garden, so as not to enjoy the flowers? (Y/N)Is Jean-Jacques morally obligated to join the garden cooperative, do the work, and pay the fee? (Y/N)Briefly explain your answers.

8. Kant’s WalkProfessor Kant’s afternoon walk is so regular that the good citizens of Königsberg set their clocks as he passes by. When Kant reaches Frau Zucker’s pastry shop, she knows that it is precisely the correct time to take her strudel out of the oven. But on the day that Kant received his copy of Rousseau’s Emile, he read all afternoon and skipped his walk for the very first time. On that day, Frau Zucker burned the strudel. Kant knew that the townspeople had come to depend on him to keep time. Indeed, every day as he passed Frau Zucker’s pastry shop, he would greet her children sitting outside, and they would run in, shouting, “The Professor is passing, Mama. Take the strudel out of the oven!”

Did Professor Kant have a moral obligation to take his walk at his usual time that day?Did Kant have a moral obligation to send a message to Frau Zucker, warning her not to depend on him that day?Would it be reasonable for the laws of the Kingdom of Prussia to require Kant to pay Frau Zucker for the ruined strudel?How would your answers change if Kant always wore a sign around his neck that said: DO NOT DEPEND ON ME TO SET YOUR CLOCK? How would your answers change if Kant always wore a sign around his neck that said: DEPEND ON ME TO SET YOUR CLOCK?

9. Lifeboat The sole survivors of a shipwreck, Philippe, Michel, and Henri, are in a lifeboat. If they are to live, all three must paddle hard together for the next 12 hours. Henri refuses to paddle. Philippe and Michel say to him, “Henri, do you want to live?” Henri answers yes. “Then you must paddle!” his companions exclaim. “But I do not want to paddle,” Henri replies.

Is Henri acting irrationally if he does not paddle? (Y/N)Does Henri have a moral obligation to paddle? (Y/N)Are Philippe and Michel morally permitted to threaten to throw Henri overboard if he does not paddle, and to carry out the threat if he refuses? (Y/N)Briefly explain your answers.


10. Lifeboat FreeriderThe sole survivors of a shipwreck, Philippe, Michel, and Henri, are in a lifeboat. If they are to live, they must perform 24 man-hours of hard paddling in the next 12 hours. Henri refuses to paddle. Philippe and Michel say to him, “Henri, do you want to live?” Henri answers yes. “Then you must paddle!” his companions exclaim. “Not so,” Henri replies. “We all will live either if each of us paddles for 8 hours or if the two of you paddle for 12 hours, and I do not want to paddle.”

Is Henri acting irrationally if he does not paddle? (Y/N)Does Henri have a moral obligation to paddle? (Y/N)Are Philippe and Michel morally permitted to threaten to throw Henri overboard if he does not paddle, and to carry out the threat if he refuses? (Y/N)How would your answers change if the chances of survival of all decrease when Henri does not paddle, because it will take longer to get to shore?How would your answers change if the chances of survival of Philippe and Michel decrease and the chances of Henri increase when Henri does not paddle, because Philippe and Michel will dehydrate more quickly.

11. IslandPhilippa and Michele, survivors of a shipwreck, live on a tiny, uncharted, previously uninhabited island. They have signed an agreement giving Philippa the authority to make all decisions related to the procurement of food on the island and giving Michele the authority to make all decisions concerning the construction and maintenance of structures on the island. Seven years later, Henriette is washed up on the same island. Henriette has her own ideas about food and shelter. The three women discuss matters amicably. Henriette persuades Philippa and Michele on some points, but not on others. So Henriette says, “Let’s cooperate on matters where we agree and go our separate ways on matters where we disagree.” Invoking the island’s founding document, Philippa insists that she has the final say about agricultural practices on the island, and Michele insists that she has the final say about zoning regulations.

Do Philippa and Michele have the normative power to set agricultural and zoning regulations on the island? (Y/N)Is Henriette morally obligated to comply with Philippa and Michele’s rules? (Y/N)Are Philippa and Michele morally permitted to threaten to dig up any unauthorized garden or tear down any unauthorized tent, and carry out their threats if Henrietta does not comply? (Y/N)Briefly explain your answers.

12. Island DemocratsPhilippa and Michele are persuaded that Henrietta should have an equal say in the governance of the island. So they propose to amend the island’s founding document and create a legislative body that, henceforth, decides about food and shelter by majority rule. Philippa and Michele call a vote on the proposed revision, and both vote in favor. Philippa then proposes her agricultural regulations, and both vote in favor. Michele proposes her zoning regulations, and both vote in favor.


Does the island’s legislative body have the normative power to set agricultural and zoning regulations on the island? (Y/N)Is Henriette morally obligated to comply with the legislature’s rules? (Y/N)Is the legislature morally permitted to threaten to dig up any unauthorized garden or tear down any unauthorized tent, and carry out its threat if Henrietta does not comply? (Y/N)Briefly explain why your answers to Island and Island Democrats are the same or different.

13. Mandible & CartilageIn 1776, George, his colleague Ben, and other friends founded a club, Mandible & Cartilage, whose members pledge to sing the Mandible & Cartilage anthem when commanded to do so by another member. According to the by-laws of Mandible & Cartilage, membership is hereditary and inescapable as long as descendants remain in the country, so all of George’s and Ben’s descendants are empowered by the club rules to demand the singing of the anthem and are required to sing the anthem when commanded. The club keeps excellent records and issues membership cards so that members can identify each other. George’s great-great-great-great granddaughter, Georgina, is stopped on Cambridge Common by Benjie, the great-great-great-great grandson of Ben. Benjie pulls out his membership card and commands Georgina to sing the Mandible & Cartilage anthem.

In 1776, did George have a moral obligation to sing for Ben? (Y/N)In 2012, does Georgina have a moral obligation to sing for Benjie? (Y/N)Briefly explain why your answers are the same or different.


HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENTDPI 230: LEGITIMACY AND RESISTANCE

One-Page Written Assignment due 8:00 pm Monday, September 15, 2014

Session 2. Resistance and the French Wars of Religion Tuesday, September 16

Readings

Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos, pp. 21-22 (“This should be … destroyed”), 35-50, 59-63, 67-78, 96-104, 129-160 (“to protect”), 164 (“Come then”) -172. [book]

Question 1. The Vindiciae insists that the covenant between king and people is with the whole body of the people understood as a collective, and not as a covenant between the king and individual subjects. Why is this important for the author’s argument, and what are the implications for the author’s theory of justified resistance to tyranny?

Question 2.Comment on an argument in this week’s readings that you found to be especially illuminating.

Question 3. What aspect of this week’s readings did you find most puzzling, and why?

STUDY QUESTIONS

1. The Vindiciae distinguishes “tyrants in title” from “tyrants in practice.” What is this distinction? Which kind of tyrant is worse?

2. What is the relevance of the four questions posed by the Vindiciae (p. 5) to the concrete political issues of the French Wars of Religion? What is the relevance of the distinction between tyranny in title and tyranny in practice?

3. The Vindiciae, written after the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacres, is attributed in whole or in part to Philippe du Plessis Mornay, a notable young Huguenot and chief aide-de-camp to Henri of Navarre. Does the reading show evidence of Protestant theology? Where?

4. Find each place that the term “legitimate” or “legitimacy” is used in the reading. What does the term mean? Is it used consistently? What, if anything, is the difference between “legitimate” and “lawful,” as used? What is the difference between “legitimate” and “just”?

5. In the Vindiciae, are tyrants in practice legitimate or not?


6. How do you, upon reflection, distinguish “legitimate,” “lawful,” “right,” and “just”? On your view, are tyrants in practice legitimate or not?

7. In the Vindiciae, what is the difference between God’s role and the people’s role in kingmaking?

8. What is the difference between the King’s officers and the kingdom’s officers? Can you think of a modern parallel in the executive branch of the American government?

9. How many different checks on royal power does Mornay mention?

10. What is the connection between God’s will, the king’s will, justice, and law in the Vindiciae? What alternative possible connections are implicitly rejected?

11. What is natural law? How does your answer to the previous question depend on your answer to this question?

12. What covenants are there among God, the people, and the king? What are the terms of these covenants?

13. What work does the covenant between the king and the people do? What if there were no such covenant? What if by covenant the people accepted absolute and arbitrary rule?

14. How does Mornay argue for his position? What counts for him as good reasons to embrace his conclusions? What sorts of authorities does he appeal to?

15. How does justified resistance to a tyrant in practice differ from justified resistance to a tyrant in title, and how does this difference follow from Mornay's theory of legitimacy?

16. How does the justified resistance of officers of the whole kingdom differ from the resistance of regional officers? What is the practical political upshot of this distinction?

17. Mornay offers a helpful summary of his view on p. 172. Can you reconstruct his arguments for each part of the view?



Professor Arthur Applbaum


Session 3. Hobbes and the Social Contract Tuesday, September 23

ReadingThomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge University Press, 1996), “Introduction,” pp. ix-xlv; chaps. 13-18 (pp. 86-129).

Question 1. How is the social contract formed according to Hobbes? Who are the parties to the contract? What is the content of the contract? How many contracts are there?

Question 2.Comment on an argument in this week’s readings that you found to be especially illuminating.

Question 3. What aspect of this week’s readings did you find most puzzling, and why?

STUDY QUESTIONS

1. What are the causes of war of every man against every man?

2. Does morality exist in Hobbes’s state of nature? Cite passages.

3. What is the difference between the Right of Nature and the Laws of Nature?

4. Under what conditions, and why, are contracts morally binding?

5. Are forced contracts binding? Why or why not?

6. “The Foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice.” What is the Foole’s mistake? Cite passages.

7. What is an artificial person? Give examples.

8. Are groups capable of acting as a group? Explain why and how.

9. What is the Leviathan?


10. What happens to the Right of Nature once a commonwealth is formed?

11. How does Hobbes’s social contract differ from Mornay’s covenants?

12. What are the obligations of subjects to their sovereign? What are the obligations of the sovereign to his subjects?





Session 4. Hobbes and the English Civil War Tuesday, September 30

ReadingThomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge University Press, 1996), chaps. 19-21 (pp. 129-154); chap. 29 (pp. 221-230); “A Review and Conclusion,” pp. 483-487 (“… this Discourse.”), 490 (“There is nothing …) -491. [book]

Question 1. What are the limits of a subject’s obligations to the sovereign? How do these limits follow from Hobbes’s account of what an obligation is?

Question 2.In what you read for today, what did you find most illuminating, and why?

Question 3. In what you read for today, what did you find most puzzling, and why?

STUDY QUESTIONS

1. How is despotical dominion acquired? Do the subjects of conquest owe obedience to the conqueror? Why or why not?

2. How does Hobbes understand freedom of the will?

3. Is it possible for the sovereign to treat subjects unjustly? Why or why not?

4. Are there circumstances under which subjects may disobey? Which and why?

5. What leads to the weakening of the commonwealth?

6. How are commonwealths dissolved?

7. In the conclusion, Hobbes adds a law of nature. How does this additional law follow from his overall argument?


8. Hobbes witnessed almost all of England’s 17th century political upheavals. What prescriptions does Leviathan give to these parties:

Charles I in 1630sParliamentarians in 1630sBoth sides of the Civil WarParticipants in the trial of Charles IJames II in exileRoyalists under the rule of CromwellPlotters of the restoration of James II in 1660Parliamentarians during the reign of James IIParliamentarians during the Exclusion Crisis in 1679.

9. After Hobbes sent a handwritten presentation copy of Leviathan on vellum to his former student, the exiled James II, he lost favor with the court and had to return to Cromwell’s England. Why would Leviathan displease the royalists surrounding James II?

10. Reconcile these statements:

“The Foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice” (p. 101);

“[N]othing the Soveraign Representative can doe to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called Injustice” (p. 148).




One-Page Written Assignment due 8:00 pm Monday, October 6, 2014

Session 5. Locke and Social Contract Tuesday, October 7

ReadingJohn Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1690), ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge University Press, 1988), “Locke the man and Locke the writer,” pp. 16-44; Second Treatise, §§ 1-51, 95-101, 113-131 (pp. 267-302, 330-334, 344-353). [book]

Question 1. What role does majority rule play in Locke’s construction of the social contract? Is Locke’s argument about majority rule sound?



STUDY QUESTIONS

1. How does Locke’s State of Nature differ from Hobbes’s?

2. What is Locke’s Law of Nature?

3. Does Locke’s political philosophy depend on belief in God?

4. What does morality look like in Locke’s state of nature?

5. What rights and powers does one have in Locke’s State of Nature?

6. What are the “inconveniences” of the State of Nature?

7. Is the State of Nature an actual historical state?

8. What is the State of War, and how does it differ from the State of Nature?

9. Can one be in a State of War with another within a political society?

10. What does Locke mean by an appeal to heaven?


11. Why can one not agree to be a slave?

12. How is the original compact formed? Who are parties to it? What is its content?

13. How, according to Locke, did actual civil societies form and governments come about in history?

14. What is the relationship between individuals, a people, and its government?

15. What is the importance of consent in Locke’s view? To what does one consent?

16. What happens if one does not consent to enter society?

17. What is tacit consent? Does it have the same normative force of express consent? Why or why not?

18. How does land fall under the jurisdiction of a commonwealth?

19. What reasons does one have for leaving the State of Nature and giving up freedoms?

20. What freedoms does one not give up in entering society?

21. What does Locke “call by the general Name, Property?”

22. In the beginning, to whom does stuff belong?

23. How is individual property in stuff appropriated?

24. What limits are there on the appropriation of property in stuff?

25. How does the invention of money change the right to appropriate property?

26. How does the introduction of the social contract change the right to appropriate property?





Session 6. Locke and the Revolution of 1688Tuesday, October 14

ReadingJohn Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1690), ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge University Press, 1988), Second Treatise, sects. 169-243 (pp. 380-428). [book]

Question 1. What is the difference between the dissolution of government and the dissolution of society, according to Locke? What are the causes of each?



STUDY QUESTIONS

1. What is despotical power? Is it ever justified?

2. What is the difference between an unjust conqueror and a just conqueror?

3. What authority does an unjust conqueror have over those who are conquered?

4. What authority does a just conqueror have over those who are conquered?

5. What is tyranny?

6. May the commands of a magistrate who acts without authority be opposed?

7. May the commands of a prince who acts without authority be opposed?

8. Who is to judge when a prince acts without authority?

9. What are Locke’s four reasons for thinking that permitting resistance to a prince will not cause danger or confusion?


10. Locke says at §204 that a prince who puts himself in a State of War with his people dissolves the government and returns the people to a State of Nature. Is this consistent with Locke at §211?

11. Why may one kill the highwayman over a 12 shilling purse but not the thief who has already stolen 100 pounds? What is the point of this comparison?

12. What is rebellion, and who is guilty of it?

13. Locke finds two incoherent claims in Barclay. What are they?

14. “Who shall be judge?” What, according to Locke, does this question mean, and what is the answer?

15. How can Society decide and act once government has dissolved?





Session 7. Kant and the Right of HumanityTuesday, October 21

Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 1-56. [on-line]

Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 23-31, 37-38, 44-46 (Ak. 229-238, 245-248, 255-257). [book]

Question 1.In the section “What Is Right?” (Ak. 229-230), Kant makes three claims about the concept of Right: that Right concerns only external relations; that Right concerns the relation of one person’s choice to another person’s choice, but not to mere wishes or needs; that Right concerns only the form of choice, not its matter. Explain these three claims.



STUDY QUESTIONS

Ripstein

1. What, according to Ripstein, is the question Kant’s political philosophy is trying to answer? What is distinctive about Kant’s question?

2. What does it mean to be one’s own master?

3. “Instead, the consistent exercise of the right to freedom by a plurality of persons cannot be conceived apart from a public legal order (Ripstein 9).” What does this mean, and with what does “instead” contrast?

4. What is a “system of equal freedom (Ripstein 16),” and with what understanding of freedom does it contrast?

5. How does Ripstein understand the innate right of humanity?


Kant

6. What does the term Right [Recht] mean in Kant?

7. What is the Universal Principle of Right?

8. What is a maxim?

9. What is coercion, and when is it right?

10. “Right and authorization to use coercion are one and the same thing (Ak. 232).” Explain.

11. What are equivocal rights?

12. What is the distinction between internal duties and external duties? Between natural Right and positive Right? Between innate right and acquired right?

13. What is the only innate right?

14. What is the distinction between duties of Right and duties of virtue?

15. What does it mean to have rightful possession of an external object (Ak. 245 ff.)? Rightful possession of another’s choice? Rightful possession of another person (Ak. 248)?

16. Has Kant told us how things are rightfully acquired? If not, what is he telling us?





Session 8. Kant and the Social ContractTuesday, October 28

Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 84-98, 110-113 (Ak. 306-323, 338-342). [book]

Question 1.“The act by which a people forms itself into a state is the original contract. Properly speaking, the original contract is only the Idea of this act, in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of the state” (Ak. 315). What does this mean? How does Kant’s original contract differ from that of Mornay, Hobbes, and Locke?



STUDY QUESTIONS

1. Why is remaining in the state of nature doing “wrong in the highest degree” (Ak. 308)?

2. Reconcile these two passages: “… one is authorized to use coercion against someone who already, by his nature, threatens him with coercion” (Ak. 307);

“It is not experience from which we learn of men’s maxim of violence ….” (Ak. 312).

3. “For since all Right proceeds from [the united will of the people], it cannot do anyone wrong by its law” (Ak. 313). What does this mean, and how can this be true?

4. What are the three attributes of a citizen? What is the difference between active and passive citizens? To what are passive citizens entitled?

5. Why is a separation of the powers of the legislative, executive, and judicial necessary for Kant?6. “A people should not inquire with any practical aim in view into the origin of the supreme authority to which it is subject …” (Ak. 318). Why not?


7. Is resistance to the government ever justified? Why or why not?

8. “Once a revolution has succeeded and a new constitution has been established, the lack of legitimacy with which it began and has been implemented cannot release the subjects from the obligation to comply with the new order of things as good citizens …” (Ak. 323). How can this be reconciled with Kant’s opposition to revolution?

9. “It is the formal execution of a monarch that strikes horror in a soul filled with the Idea of men’s rights” (Ak 320 n.). Why such horror?




One-Page Written Assignment due 8:00 pm Monday, November 3, 2014

Session 9. Kant and the French RevolutionTuesday, November 4

Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But It Is of No Use in Practice” (1793), in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 290-304 (Ak. 8:289-306). [on-line]

Christine M. Korsgaard, “Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution,” in The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 233-262. [on-line]

Question 1.How does Korsgaard attempt to reconcile Kant’s supportive attitude towards the French Revolution and his insistence that there is “no right to sedition, still less to rebellion, and least of all is there a right against a head of state as an individual person (the monarch), to attack his person or even his life on the pretext that he has abused his authority” (Ak. 320). Does she succeed?



STUDY QUESTIONS

Kant

1. “[S]ince people differ in their thinking about happiness and how each would have it constituted, their wills with respect to it cannot be brought under any common principle and so under any external law harmonizing with everyone’s freedom” (Ak. 8:290). How does this proposition shape the Kantian social contract?

2. In what way, according to Kant, are members of a state free as human beings?

3. In what way are they equal as subjects?


4. In what way are they independent as citizens?

5. Kant says the original contract is not to be presupposed as a fact. “It is instead only an idea of reason, which however, has its undoubted practical reality, namely to bind every legislator to give his laws in such a way that they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people” (Ak. 8:297). Why is every legislator so bound?

6. “If a public law is so constituted that a whole people could not possibly give its consent to it … it is unjust; but if it is only possible that a people could agree to it, it is a duty to consider the law just, even if the people is at present in such a situation or frame of mind that, if consulted about it, it would probably refuse its consent” (Ak. 8297). Do citizens have a duty to obey unjust laws? What does it mean to have a duty to consider a law just? Does having such a duty entail that the law under consideration actually is just?

7. “Even if an actual contract of the people with the ruler has been violated, the people cannot react as a commonwealth but only as a mob” (Ak. 8:302n*). What follows?

8. What is Kant’s disagreement with Hobbes?

Korsgaard 9. What is Korsgaard’s criticism of the dogmatist? Of skeptic?

10. Which three views of Kant does Korsgaard seek to reconcile?

11. What is the parallel Korsgaard draws between current holdings of property and existing governments?

12. What, according to Korsgaard, is the tension between procedural and substantive elements of the concept of justice?

13. Can revolutionaries ever represent the will of the people?

14. “It is the perversion of justice, and not merely its imperfection, which turns the virtue of justice against itself” (258). Explain.

15. Why do we find revolution thrilling?




One-Page Written Assignment due 8:00 pm Monday, November 17

Session 10. John Rawls and JusticeTuesday, November 18

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, revised edition, 1999), §§1-4, 11, 12 (part), 13 (part), 14, 17-19, 20, 23-25, 26 (part) (pp. 3-19, 52-58, 60 – 70 [“… chain connection.)”], 73-78, 86-101, 102- 105, 112-135 [“… are not realized.”] [book]

Question 1. Compare Rawls’s original position and Kant’s idea of a social contract. How are they similar in purpose and design? How are they different?



STUDY QUESTIONS

1. What is a well-ordered society according to Rawls, and what role does this idea play in his scheme?

2. What is the difference between a concept of justice and a conception of justice?

3. Why does Rawls claim that the basic structure of society is the primary subject of justice?

4. Why does Rawls’s theory presume that everyone shares the same conception of justice and acts justly? Isn’t that completely unrealistic?

5. Why should an agreement among persons who take no interest in each others’ interests constitute justice as fairness? Why consider the outcome of a negotiation, whatever it might be, fair?

6. How does an individual behind the veil of ignorance have any ground whatsoever on which to choose principles of justice?

7. Why does Rawls conclude that utilitarianism would not be chosen in the original position?


8. Why should a hypothetical contract have actual normative force?

9. Distinguish the Rawls’s principle of fairness from Locke’s tacit consent. What is the supposed normative force of each?

10. “By the principle of fairness it is not possible to be bound to unjust institutions.” If you take out a loan from the central bank of a despotic regime, are you not obligated to pay it back?

11. What are natural duties, and where do they come from?

12. What is the duty of justice? How, according to Rawls, does it ground a duty to obey the law?

13. Rawls distinguishes obligations from duties. What is the difference?

14. Consider Rawls’s interpretation of the elements of the initial situation on pp. 125-126. Why does Rawls favor some interpretations over others?

15. Does the difference principle simply assume extreme risk aversion?




One-Page Written Assignment due 8:00 pm Monday, November 24

Session 11. John Rawls and DissentTuesday, November 25

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, revised edition, 1999), §§51-59 (pp. 293-343). [book]

John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 3-11, 133-140, 212-222. [on-line]

Question 1.In A Theory of Justice, Rawls asks, “The contract doctrine naturally leads us to wonder how we could ever consent to a constitutional rule that would require us to comply with laws that are unjust”(TJ 311). In Political Liberalism, Rawls asks, “how is it possible that there can be a stable and just society whose free and equal citizens are deeply divided by conflicting and even incommensurable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?” (PL 133). Are these different questions, or essentially the same question? How does Rawls answer these questions? Are his answers consistent, or has he changed his view?



STUDY QUESTIONS

1. Distinguish the Rawls’s principle of fairness from Locke’s tacit consent. What is the supposed normative force of each?

2. “By the principle of fairness it is not possible to be bound to unjust institutions.” If you take out a loan from the central bank of a despotic regime, are you not obligated to pay it back?

3. What are natural duties, and where do they come from?

4. What is the duty of justice? How, according to Rawls, does it ground a duty to obey the law?

5. Rawls distinguishes obligations from duties. What is the difference?


6. Why, according to Rawls, is there at least sometimes a duty to comply with an unjust law?

7. “There is nothing to the view, then, that what the majority wills is right.” Why does Rawls hold this? Can this view be reconciled with Kant’s account of the general will? Can this view be reconciled with your own view of democracy?

8. Many forms of political resistance that, in our traditional usage, we call “civil disobedience” fall outside of Rawls’s definition of civil disobedience. Why does Rawls define civil disobedience narrowly? Is it his view that political resistance that does not fit the definition is never justified?

9. Rawls says that civil disobedience, though illegal, is “within the limits of fidelity to law.” Is this not a contradiction?

10. “Therefore it may be protested that the preceding account does not determine who is to say when circumstances are such as to justify civil disobedience.” How does Rawls respond to the “who is to say” objection?

11. Civil disobedience is framed for a nearly just society. What would Rawls say about disobedience in a very unjust society?

12. “Political liberalism applies the principle of toleration to philosophy itself” (PL 10). What does this mean?

13. What is the liberal principle of legitimacy (PL 137)?

14. Rawls argues that even if the doctrine “outside the church there is no salvation” is true (and so it is true that unbelievers are damned for eternity), it would be unreasonable for the state to require, say, the religious education of children. How can the truth be unreasonable?

15. What is the idea of public reason? What does it limit? To whom and when does it apply?

16. What is the duty of civility, and why can it not be a legal duty?

17. There is a long history of religions claiming that many of its doctrines, including belief in God, are accessible through human reason alone, quite apart from the authority of revelation. Do rational arguments for the existence of God meet the test of public reason? Why or why not?




One-Page Written Assignment due 8:00 pm Monday, December 1, 2014

Session 12. Legitimacy and Resistance in the Arab Spring Tuesday, December 2

Duncan Pickard, “The Founding Weeks of Libya’s National Transitional Council,” HKS Case Program 1993.0, DRAFT [on-line]

Arthur Isak Applbaum, “All Foundings Are Forced,” DRAFT [on-line]

Question 1.On March 5, 2011 in Benghazi, the “Transitional National Council of Libya” declared that it was “the only legitimate body representing the people of Libya and the Libyan state.” At the time it was made, did this declaration have normative force? Why or why not?

On July 4, 1776 in Philadelphia, the “Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled” declared “in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies” that the thirteen British colonies “are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States.” At the time it was made, did this declaration have normative force? Why or why not? You needn’t do research into the American Revolution to give an adequate answer.

Briefly, give an account of political legitimacy that consistently explains your answers.



STUDY QUESTIONS

1. The US Declaration of Independence says that governments derive “their just powers from the consent of the governed.” What does “the consent of the governed” mean?

2. Is the consent of the governed possible?

3. Is the consent of the governed necessary to establish a legitimate government?

4. Is the consent of the governed sufficient to establish a legitimate government?


5. What is the difference between anthropological groups and normative groups?

6. What is the difference between ab ovo and in medias res accounts of legitimacy?

7. Is a group capable of acting as a unified agent? Explain why and how.

8. Are normative group agents that have rights and duties possible?

9. In what ways are they constituted?

10. In what ways are individuals conscripted to be members?

11. Is there a right to revolution? Why or why not? What is a right to revolution a right to? If there is such a right, specify who has the right under what conditions.

12. Do you agree with Applbaum that all foundings are forced? Why or why not?


JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT - Web view500-word proposaldue ... (1579). Edited by George...

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