John Dewey - Experience and Nature (1925, 1929)

Excerptsfrom:

ExperienceandNature,1925,��

JohnDewey

Contents

0 Preface 1

1 Experience and Philosophic Method 2

2 Existence as Precarious and as Stable 3

3 Nature, Ends and Histories 5

4 Nature, Means and Knowledge 7

5 Nature, Communication and Meaning 12

6 Nature, Mind and the Subject 13

7 Nature, Life and Body-Mind 14

8 Existence, Ideas and Consciousness 15

9 Experience, Nature and Art 20

10 Experience, Value and Criticism 20

0 Preface

p. v . . . . Theofficeof physicalscienceis to discover thosepropertiesandrelationsofthingsin virtueof which they arecapableof beingusedasinstrumentalities;physicalsciencemakesclaimto disclosenot theinnernatureof thingsbut only thoseconnectionsof thingswith oneanotherthatdetermineoutcomesandhencecanbeusedasmeans.The intrinsic natureof eventsis revealedin experienceastheJohnDewey. Experience and Nature. OpenCourt,Chicago,1925. � �� (Revised):London:George

Allen & Unwin. Currentlyin print: New York: Dover, 1958.Also in: The Later Works, Volume1, Carbon-dale,1981,with an introductionby SydneyHook. Pagenumbershererefer to the 1929edition. Excerptsandremarksby G. Pate:October, November1996.�

Marginalsaddedandsetby LATEX with Hyperrefin AdobeTimesfrom DewErfNa.tex. 23 May 2000.pdf by dvipsandps2pdf.email:[email protected]

1

exerptsfrom John.Dewey: ExperienceandNature, 1925, �� 2

immediatelyfelt qualitiesof things.Theintimatecoordinationandevenfusionofthesequalitieswith theregularitiesthatform theobjectsof knowledge,in thepropersenseof thework ”knowledge,” characterizesintelligently directedexperience,asdistinctfrom merecasualanduncriticalexperience.....

p. vi . . . . Thatcharacterof everydayexperiencewhichhasbeenmostsystematicallyignoredby philosophyis theextentto which it is saturatedwith theresultsof socialintercourseandcommunication.Becausethis factorhasbeendenied,meaningshave eitherbeendeniedall objectivevalidity, or have beentreatedasmiraculousextra-naturalintrusions.If, however, language,for example,is recognizedastheinstrumentof socialcooperationandmutualparticipation,continuityisestablishedbetweennaturalevents(animalsound,cries,etc.)andtheorigin anddevelopmentof meanings.Mind is seento bea functionof socialinteractions,andtobea genuinecharacterof naturaleventswhentheseattainthestageof widestandmostcomplex interactionwith oneanother. Ability to respondto meaningsandto employthem,insteadof reactingmerelyto physicalcontacts,makesthedifferencebetweenmanandotheranimals;it is theagency for elevatingmaninto therealmof whatisusuallycalledtheidealandspiritual. In otherwords,thesocialparticipationaffectedby communication,throughlanguageandothertools,is thenaturalisticlink whichdoesaway with theoftenallegednecessityof dividing theobjectsof experienceintotwo worlds,onephysicalandoneideal.

p. viii ... Themeaningsthatform mindbecomeconsciousness,or ideas,impressions,etc.,whensomethingwithin themeaningsor in theirapplicationbecomesdubious,andthemeaningin questionneedsreconstruction.

p. ix . . . . Philosophy, then,is a generalizedtheoryof criticism. Its ultimatevaluefor life-experienceis thatit continuouslyprovidesinstrumentsfor thecriticismof thosevalues– whetherof beliefs,institutions,actionsor products– thatarefoundin all aspectsof experience.

1 Experience and Philosophic Method

p. 1a

Thetitle of this volume,ExperienceandNature,is intendedto signify thatthephilosophyherepresentedmaybetermedeitherempiricalnaturalismor naturalistic empirical

naturalismempiricism,or, .. naturalistichumanism.

p. 2a

In thenaturalsciencesthereis a unionof experienceandnature..., theinquirermustuseempiricalmethodif hisfindingsareto betreatedasgenuinelyscientific.Theinvestigatorassumesasamatterof coursethatexperience,controlledin specifiableways,is theavenuethatleadsto thefactsandlaws of nature.He usesreasonandcalculationfreely;hecouldnot getalongwithout them.But heseesto it thatventuresof this theoreticalsortstartfrom andterminatein directlyexperiencedsubject-matter.Theorymayintervenein a longcourseof reasoning,many portionsof which areremotefrom whatis directlyexperienced.But thevine of pendanttheoryis attachedatbothendsto thepillarsof observedsubject-matter. And thisexperiencedmaterialisthesamefor thescientificmanandthemanin thestreet.Thelattercannotfollow theinterveningreasoningwithoutspecialpreparation.But stars,rocks,trees,andcreepingthingsarethesamematerialof experiencefor both.


p. 4a

. . . .

. . . . It is not experiencewhich is experienced,but nature– stones,plants,animals,diseases,health,temperature,electricity, andsoon. Thingsinteractingincertainwaysareexperience;they arewhatis experienced.Linked in certainotherwayswith anothernaturalobject–thehumanorganism– they arehow thingsareexperiencedaswell. Experiencethusreachesdown into nature,it hasdepth.It alsohasbreadthandto anindefinitelyelasticextent. It stretches.Thatstretchconstitutesinference.

p. 1 . . . . Dialecticaldifficulties,perplexities dueto definitionsgivento theconceptsthatenterinto thediscussion,mayberaised.....Thevery existenceof scienceis evidencethatexperienceis suchanoccurrencethatit penetratesinto natureandexpandswithout limit throughit. .... in thecaseof naturalsciencewe habituallytreatexperienceasstarting-point, andasmethodfor dealingwith nature,andasthegoalinwhich natureis disclosedfor whatit is.

p. 2 . . . . If experienceactuallypresentsestheticandmoraltraits,thenthesetraitsmayalsobesupposedto reachdown into nature,andto testify to somethingthatbelongsto natureastruly asdoesthemechanicalstructureattributedto it in physicalscience.To rule out thatpossibilityby somegeneralreasoningis to forgetthatthevery meaningandpurportof empiricalmethodis thatthingsareto bestudiedon theirown account,soasto find outwhatis revealedwhenthey areexperienced.Thetraitspossessedby thesubject-mattersof experienceareasgenuineasthecharacteristicsofsunandelectron.They arefound, experienced,andarenot to beshovedoutof beingby sometrick of logic. ....

Thescientificinquirertalksandwritesaboutparticularobservedeventsandqualities,aboutspecificcalculationsandreasonings.He makesno allusionto noallusionto

experienceexperience;onewouldprobablyhave to searcha long time throughreportsof specialresearchesin orderto find theword. Thereasonis thateverythingdesignatedby theword”experience”is soadequatelyincorporatedinto scientificproceduresandsubject-matterthatto mentionexperiencewouldbeonly to duplicatein ageneraltermwhatis alreadycoveredin definiteterms.

p. 23 [cf. (Rorty, 1982),p. 82]

Thatthephysiologicalorganismwith its structure,whetherin manor in theloweranimals,is concernedwith makingadaptationsandusesof materialin theinterestof maintenanceof thelife-process,cannotbedenied.Thebrainandnervous maintenanceof

thelife-process,systemareprimarily organsof action-undergoing;biologically it canbeassertedwithoutcontraventionthatprimaryexperienceis of a correspondingtype.Hence,unlessthereis breachof historicandnaturalcontinuity, cognitiveexperiencemustoriginatewithin thatof a noncognitivesort.

2 Existence as Precarious and as Stable

p. 44

. . . . Throughsciencewehave secureda degreeof powerof predictionandof science. . .powerof predictionandcontrol

control; throughtools,machineryandanaccompanying techniquewehave madetheworld moreconformableto our needs,a moresecureabode.Wehave heapedup


richesandmeansof comfortbetweenourselvesandtherisksof theworld. We haveprofessionalizedamusementasanagency of escapeandforgetfulness.But whenall issaidanddone,thefundamentallyhazardouscharacterof theworld is not seriouslymodified,muchlesseliminated.

p. 49

. . . . Kantassignsall thatis manifoldandchaoticto onerealm,thatof sense,andall thatis uniformandregularto thatof reason.

p. 53 -4

. . . .

. . . In briefestformula”reality” becomeswhatwe wish existenceto be,afterwe ”reality”

have analyzedits defectsanddecideduponwhatwould remove them;”reality” iswhatexistencewouldbeif our reasonablyjustifiedpreferencesweresocompletelyestablishedasto exhaustanddefineits entirebeingandtherebyrendersearchandstruggleunnecessary. Whatis left over, (andsincetrouble,struggle,conflict,anderrorstill empiricallyexist, somethingis left over) beingexcludedby definitionfrom fullreality is assignedto agradeor orderof beingwhich is assertedto bemetaphysicallyinferior; anordervariouslycalledapppearance,illusion, mortalmind,or themerelyempirical,againstwhatreally andtruly is. Thentheproblemof metaphysicsalters: theproblemof

metaphysicsinsteadof beingadetectionanddescriptionof thegenerictraitsof existence,itbecomesanendeavor to adjustor reconcileto eachothertwo separaterealmsof being.Empiricallywe have just whatwe startedwith: themixtureof theprecariousandproblematicwith theassuredandcomplete.

p. 66

. . . .

. . . . Thoughtlike Being,hastwo forms,onereal;theotherphenomenal.It iscompelledto takeon reflective form, it involvesdoubt,inquiry andhypothesis,becauseit setsout from a subject-matterconditionedby sense,a factwhich provesthatthought,intellect,is notpurein man,but restrictedby ananimalorganismthatisbut onepartlinkedwith otherparts,of nature.

p. 67 . . . . A philosophywhichacceptsthedenotativeor empiricalmethodsacceptsat full valuethefact thatreflective thinking transformsconfusion,ambiguityanddiscrepancy into illumination,definitenessandconsistency. But it alsopointstothecontextualsituationin which thinkingoccurs.And it notesthatthestartingpoint is theactually

problematicsituation

theactuallyproblematic, andthattheproblematicphaseresidesin someactualandspecifiablesituation.

It notesthatthemeansof convertingthedubiousinto theassured,andtheincompleteinto thedeterminate,is useof assuredandestablishedthings,which arejustasempiricalandasindicativeof thenatureof experiencedthingsasis theuncertain.It thusnotesthatthinking is nodifferentin kind from theuseof naturalmaterialsandenergies,sayfire andtools,to refine,re-order, andshapeothernaturalmaterial,sayore.....Thoughtandreasonarenot specificpowers.They consistof the Thoughtand

reasonarenotspecificpowers.

proceduresintentionallyemployedin theapplicationto eachotherof theunsatisfactorilyconfusedandindeterminateon onesideandtheregularandstableontheother. Generalizingfrom suchobservations,empiricalphilosophyperceivesthatthinking is a continuousprocessof temporalre-organizationwithin oneandthesameworld of experiencedthings,not a jumpfrom thelatterworld into oneof objectsconstitutedoncefor all by thought....


p. 68 Idealismfails to takeinto accountthespecifiedor concretecharacterof Idealismtheuncertainsituationin which thoughtoccurs;it fails to notetheempiricallyconcretenatureof thesubject-matter, acts,andtoolsby which determinationandconsistency arereached;it fails to notethattheconclusiveeventualobjectshaving thelatterpropertiesarethemselvesasmany asthesituationsdealtwith.

p. 74

. . . .

Nothingbut unfamiliaritystandsin thewayof thinking of bothmind andmatter bothmind andmatterdifferentcharactersofnaturalevents

asdifferentcharactersof naturalevents,in which matterexpressestheir sequentialorder, andmind theorderof theirmeaningsin their logicalconnectionsanddependencies.

3 Nature, Ends and Histories

p. 78

. . . .

Evenphilosopherswho have conceivedthatpleasureis thesolemotiveof manandtheattainmentof happinesshis wholeaim,have givena curiouslysober, drab,accountof theworkingof pleasureandthesearchfor happiness.Considertheutilitarianshow they toiled,spunandwove,but who never saw manarrayedin joy asthelilies of thefield. Happinesswasto thema matterof calculationandeffort, ofindustryguidedby mathematicalbook-keeping.Thehistoryof manshowshoweverthatmantakeshis enjoymentneat,andatasshortrangeaspossible. enjoymentneat

Directappropriationsandsatisfactionswereprior to anything but themostelementaryandexigentprudence.just astheusefulartsprecededthesciences.Thebodyis deckedbeforeit is clothed.While homesarestill hovels,templesandpalacesareembellished.Luxuriesprevail over necessitiesexceptwhennecessitiescanbefestallycelebrated.Men makea gameof theirfishingandhunting,andturn to theperiodicanddisciplinarylaborof agricultureonly wheninferiors,womenandslaves,cannotbehadto dothework. Usefullaboris, whenever possible,transformedbyceremonialandritual accompaniments,subordinatedto art thatyieldsimmediateenjoyment;otherwiseit is attendedto underthecompulsionof circumstanceduringabbreviatedsurrendersof leisure.

p. 80

For manis morepreoccupiedwith enhancinglife thanwith bareliving; sothatasenseof living whenit attendslaborandutility is borrowednot intrinsic,having beengeneratedin thoseperiodsof relief whenactivity wasdramatic.

To saythesethingsis only to saythatmanis naturallymoreinterestedinconsummationsthanheis in preparations;andthatconsummationshave first to behit consummations,

preparationsuponspontaneouslyandaccidentally... beforethey canbeobjectsof foresight,inventionandindustry. .... Theextensionsandtransformationsof existencegeneratedin imaginationmaycomeat lastto attendwork soasto makeit significantandagreeable....Labor, throughits structureandorder, lendsplay its patternandplot; playthenreturnstheloanwith interestto work, in giving it a senseof beginning,sequenceandclimax.

p. 82 . . . .


Modernpsychiatryaswell asanthropologyhave demonstratedtheenormousrole of symbolismin humanexperience.Thewordsymbolism,however, is aproduct symbolism

of reflectionupondirectphenomena,nota descriptionof whathappenswhenso-calledsymbolsarepotent.For thefeaturewhich characterizessymbolismispreciselythatthething which laterreflectioncallsa symbolis nota symbol,but adirectvehicle,a concreteembodiment,avital incarnation..... Symbolismin thissensedominatesnotonly all earlyartandcult but socialorganizationaswell. Rites,designs,patternsareall chargedwith a significancewhich wemaycall mystic,butwhich is immediateanddirectto thosewho have andcelebratethem.Be theorigin ofthetotemwhatit may, it is nota cold, intellectualsignof a socialorganization;it isthatorganizationmadepresentandvisible,a centerof emotionallychargedbehavior..... Suchsymbolsarenot indicativeor intellectualsigns;they arecondensedsubstitutesof actualthingsandevents,which embodyactualthingswith moredirectandenhancedimport thando thethingsthemselveswith theirdistractions,imposition,andirrelevancies.Meaningsareintellectuallydistortedanddepressed,butimmediatelythey areheightenedandconcentrated.

p. 83 Jespersenspeaksof theorigin of languagein similar terms.Hesaysthat Jespersen

many linguistic philosophersappearto ”imagineourprimitiveancestorsaftertheirown imageasseriousandwell meaningmen,endowedwith a largeshareof commonsense.... They leave you with theimpressionthatthesefirst framersof speechweresedatecitizenswith a stronginterestin thepurelybusinessandmatterof factaspectsof life.” But Jespersenfindsthattheprosaicsideof earlyculturewascapableonly ”ofcalling forth shortmonosyllabicinterjections;they arethemostimmutableportionsoflanguage,andremainnow at essentiallythesamestandpointasthousandsof yearsago.” He concludesthatthe”genesisof languageis found.... in thepoeticsideof life;thesourceof speechis not gloomyseriousness,but merryplay andyouthfulhilarity.”And no onewoulddeny, I supposethatliteratureratherthanbusinessandsciencehasdevelopedandfixedour presentlinguistic resources.

It wouldbedifficult to find a factmoresignificantof thetraitsof nature,moreinstructivefor a naturalisticmetaphysicsof existence,thanthis cleavageof thethingsof humanexperienceinto actualbut hardobjects,andenjoyedbut imaginedobjects.

p. 83-84

Onemight think thatphilosophers... might have directedtheirattentionto thisdirectphaseof experience,in which objectsarenot amatterof sensations,ideas,beliefsor knowledge,but aresomethinghadandenjoyed....the”self-evident” thingsof philosophersarereconditeandtechnical.

Theothermostself-evidentthing in experienceis usefullaborandits coercive usefullaborandits coercivenecessity

necessity. As directappreciative enjoymentexhibits thingsin theirconsummatoryphase,labormanifeststhingsin theirconnectionsof thingswith oneanother, inefficiency, productivity, furthering,hindering,generating,destroying.Fromthestandpointof enjoymenta thing is whatit directlydoesfor us.Fromthatof laborathing is whatit will do to otherthings– theonly way in whicha tool or anobstaclecanbedefined.Extraordinaryandsubtlereasonshave beenassignedfor belief in the principleof

causationprincipleof causation.Laborandtheuseof toolsseem,however, to bea sufficientuseof toolsempiricalreason:indeed,to betheonly empiricaleventsthatcanbespecifically

pointedto in this connection..... Thefirst thinkerwho proclaimedthatevery event iseffect of somethingandcauseof somethingelse,thatevery particularexistenceisbothconditionedandcondition,merelyput into wordstheprocedureof theworkman,


convertingamodeof practiceinto a formula.

p. 86 . . . . Thingsin their immediacy areunknown andunknowable,not becausethey areremoteor behindsomeimpenetrableveil of sensationof ideas,but becauseknowledgehasno concernwith them.For knowledgeis a memorandumof conditions useof tools

of theirappearance,concerned,thatis, with sequences,coexistences,relations.Immediatethingsmaybepointedto by words,but not describedor defined.Descriptionwhenit occursis but a partof a circuitousmethodof pointingor Description

denoting;index to a startingpoint .... To theempiricalthinker, immediateenjoymentandsufferingaretheconclusive exhibition andevidencethatnaturehasits finalitiesaswell asits relationships.

. . . .

. . . . Withouta basisin qualitativeevents,thecharacteristicsubject-matterofknowledgewouldbealgebraicghosts,relationsthatdo not relate.To disposeof things algebraicghosts

in which relationsterminateby calling themelements,is to discoursewithin arelationalandlogical scheme.Only if elementsaremorethanjust elementsin awhole,only if thehave somethingqualitatively their own, cana relationalsystembepreventedfrom completecollapse.

p. 96-97

. . . .

If experiencedthingsarevalid evidence,thennaturein having qualitieswithinitself haswhatin theliteral sensemustbecalledends,terminals,arrests,enclosures.

p. 97 . . . . to assertthatnatureis characterizedby ends,themostconspicuousofwhich is thelife of mind,seemslike engagingin aneulogistic,ratherthananempiricalaccountof nature.Somethingmuchmoreneutralthanany suchimplicationis, however, meant..... It is acommonplacethatno thing lastsforever. . . . .

Thegenuineimplicationsof naturalendsmaybebroughtoutby consideringbeginningsinsteadof endings.To insistthatnatureis anaffair of beginningsis to beginnings

assertthatthereis no onesingleandall-at-oncebeginningof everything.. . . .. It doesnot imply thatevery beginningmarksanadvanceor improvement.. . . Clearlythefactandideaof beginningis neutral,noteulogistic;temporal,notabsolute.And sincewherever onething beginssomethingelseends,what is trueof beginningsis trueofendings.

4 Nature, Means and Knowledge

p. 121

Theexactingconditionsimposedby nature,thathave to beobservedin orderthatwork becarriedthroughto success,arethesourceof all notingandrecordingofnature’sdoings.They supplythedisciplinethatchastensexuberantfancy into respectfor theoperationof events,andthateffect subjectionof thoughtto a pertinentorderofspaceandtime. While leisureis themotherof drama,sportandliteraryspell-binding,necessityis themotherof invention,discoveryandconsecutivereflection....Spears,snares,gins,traps,utensils,basketsandwebsmayhave theirpotency enhancedbyadherenceto ceremonialdesign,but thedesignis never acompletesubstituteforconformityto theefficaciousresistancesandadaptationsof naturalmaterials.Acumen,shrewdness,inventiveness,accumulationandtransmissionof information information

. . . thingsassigns


areproductsof thenecessityunderwhich manlaborsto turnaway from absorptionindirecthaving andenjoying,soasto considerthingsin theiractive connectionsasmeansandassigns.. . . . Everythingis doneto bedeckutilities, instrumentalities,withremindersof consummatoryeventssoasto lessentheirburden,but usefulartsinreturnsupplyceremonialartswith theirmaterials,appliancesandpatterns.

. . .By its naturetechnologyis concernedwith thingsandactsin theirinstrumentalities,not in their immediacies.Objectsandeventsfigurein work notasfulfillments, realizations,but in behalfof otherthingsof which they aremeansandpredictivesigns.....

p. 123

A tool denotesa perceptionandacknowledgmentof sequentialbondsin nature. tool

p.124

Thesocialdivision into a laboringclassanda leisureclass,betweenindustry socialdivision

andestheticcontemplation,becamea metaphysicaldivision into thingswhich are metaphysicaldivisionmeremeansandthingswhich areends.Meansaremenial,subservient,slavish;and

endsliberal andfinal; thingsasmeanstestify to inherentdefect,to dependence,whileendstestify to independentandintrinsicallyself-sufficing being.Hencetheformercannever beknown in themselvesbut only in their subordinationto objectsthatarefinal,while thelattercanbeknown in andthroughthemselvesby self-enclosedreason.Thustheidentificationof knowledgewith estheticcontemplationandtheexclusionfromscienceof trial, work, manipulationandadministrationof things,comesfull circle.

p. 125

. . . .if Greekthinkersdid not achieve science,they achievedtheideaof science. Greekthinkers. . .not science,but a realmofeternalforms

Thisaccomplishmentwasbeyondthereachof artistandartisan.For no matterhowsolid thecontentof theirown observationsandbeliefsaboutnaturalevents,thatcontentwasbounddown to occasionsof origin anduse.Therelationsthey recognizedwereof localareasin time andplace.Subject-matterunderwenta certaindistortionwhenit waslifted out of thiscontext, andplacedin a realmof eternalforms.But theideaof knowledgewastherebyliberated,andtheschemeof logical relationshipsamongexistencesheldupasanidealof inquiry. Thinkingwasuncoveredasanenterprisehaving its own objectsandprocedures;andthediscoveryof thoughtasmethodof methodsin all artsaddeda new dimensionto all subsequentexperience.Itwouldbeanacademicmatterto try to balancethecredititemsdueto thediscoveryofthoughtandof logic asa freeenterprise,againstthedebitconsequencesresultingfromthehardandfastseparationof theinstrumentalandfinal.

p. 126

. . . .

. . . . TheSophiststaughtthatmancouldlargely controlthefortunesof life by theSophists

masteryof thearts.No onehasexceededPlatoin awarenessof presentills. But sincethey aredueto ignoranceandopinion,they areremediable,heholds,by adequateknowledge.Philosophyshouldterminatein anartof socialcontrol. Plato:

Philosophyassocialcontrolp. 127

Thisperiod. . .did not endure.. . . Yet theepisode. . .manifestsanotherwayopento manin themidstof anuncertain,incompleteandprecariousuniverse....Throughinstrumentalarts,artsof controlbasedon studyof nature,objectswhich arefulfilling andgood,maybemultipliedandrenderedsecure.This roadafteralmosttwomillenniaof obscurationanddesertionwasrefoundandretaken;its rediscoverymarks


whatwe call themodernera.Considerationof thesignificanceof scienceasaresourcein aworld of mixeduncertainty, peril, andof uniformity, stability, furnishesuswith thethemeof this chapterof experience.

p. 128

. . . . Thedistinctively intellectualattitudewhich marksscientificinquiry wasgeneratedin efforts atcontrollingpersonsandthingssothatconsequences,issues,outcomeswouldbemorestableandassured..... In respondingto thingsnot in theirimmediatequalitiesaredimmed,while thosefeatureswhich aresigns,indicesofsomethingelse,aredistinguished.A thing is moresignificantlywhatit makespossiblethanwhatit immediatelyis. Thevery conceptionof cognitivemeaning,intellectualsignificance,is thatthingsin their immediacy aresubordinatedto whatthey portendandgive evidenceof. An intellectualsigndenotesthata thing is not takenimmediatelybut is referredto somethingthatmaycomein consequenceof it.Intellectualmeaningsmaythemselvesbeappropriated,enjoyedandappreciated;butthecharacterof intellectualmeaningis instrumental.

p. 128-129

Thefirst gropingstepsin definingspatialandtemporalqualities,intransformingpurelyimmediatequalitiesof local thingsinto genericrelationships,weretakenthroughthearts.Thefinger, thefoot, theunit of walkingwereusedtomeasurespace;measurementsof weightoriginatedin theartsof commercialexchangeandmanufacture.Geometry, beginningasagriculturalart, further Geometryemancipatedspacefrom beinga localizedquality of immediateextensity. But theradicallydifferentwaysof conceiving geometryfoundin ancientandin modernscienceis evidenceof theslownessof theprocessof emancipationof evengeometricalformsfrom director esthetictraits. In Greekastronomytheintrinsicqualitiesof figuresalwaysdominatedtheir instrumentalsignificancein inquiry; theywereformsto which phenomenahadto conforminsteadof meansof indirectmeasurements.Hardly till our own daydid spatialrelationsgetemancipatedfromestheticandmoralqualities,andbecomewholly intellectualandrelational,abstractedfrom immediatequalifications,andtherebygeneralizedto their limit.

. . . . In principlethestep[of recognitionof thingsin their intellectualorinstrumentalphase]is takenwhenever objectsaresoreducedfrom theirstatusof objectsreduced

to signscompleteobjectsasto betreatedassignsor indicationsof otherobjects.. . . .Abstractionis not apsychologicalincident;it is a following to its logical conclusionof interestin thosephasesof naturalexistencewhich aredependableandfruitful signsof otherthings;which aremeansof predictionby formulationin termsimplying otherterms.. . . . Genuinescienceis impossibleaslong astheobjectesteemedfor its ownintrinsicqualitiesis takenastheobjectof knowledge.Its completeness,its immanentmeaning,defeatsits useasindicatingandimplying.

p. 131

. . . .

Thenetresultof thenew scientificmethodwasconceptionof natureasa natureasamathematical-mechanicalobject.

mathematical-mechanicalobject.If modernphilosophy, reflectingthetendenciesofthenew science,abolishedfinal causesfrom nature,it wasbecauseconcernwithqualitativeends... blockedinquiry, discoveryandcontrol,andendedin barrendialecticaldisputesaboutdefinitionsandclassifications.

p. 132


. . . . Dependablematerialwith which to know wasfoundin a differentrealmofbeing;in spatialrelations,positions,masses,mathematicallydefined,andin motionaschangeof spacehaving directionandvelocity.... Theonly world which definesanddescriesandexplainswasa world of massesin motion,arrangedin a systemofCartesiancoordinates.

p. 133

. . . .

Modernsciencerepresentsageneralizedrecognitionandadoptionof thepoint Modernscience

of view of theusefularts,for it proceedsby employmentof a similar operativetechniqueof manipulationandreduction.Physicalsciencewouldbeimpossiblewithout theappliancesandproceduresof separationandcombinationsof theindustrialarts.

p. 144

Preoccupationwith elementaryunits is asmarkedin logic, biology, andpsychology, asin physicsandchemistry. Sometimesit seemsto have resultedintakingmerelydialecticalentitiesfor actualunitaryelements;but thatis not logicallynecessary. Suchanoutcomesignifiesonly thattheright unitswerenot found.Seriousobjectionholdswhentheinstrumentalcharacterof theelementsis forgotten;andtheyaretreatedasindependent,ultimate;whenthey aretreatedasmetaphysicalfinalities,insolubleepistemologicalproblemsresult.Whatever aredesignatedaselements,whetherlogical,mathematical,physicalor mental,dependespeciallyupontheexistenceof immediate,qualitatively integral objects.Searchfor elementsstartswithsuchempiricalobjectsalreadypossessed.Sensorydata,whetherthey aredesignatedpsychicor physical,arethusnotstartingpoints;they aretheproductsof analysis.Denialof theprimaryrealityof immediateempiricalobjectslogically terminatesin anabrogationof therealityof elements;for sensorydata,or sensaandsensibilia, aretheresiduaof analysisof theseprimarythings.Moreoverevery stepof analysisdependsuponcontinualreferenceto theseempiricalobjects.

p. 150

Whentheappliancesof a technologythathadgrown moredeliberatewereadoptedin inquiry, andthelens,pendulum,magneticneedle,lever wereusedastools lens,pendulum,

magneticneedle,leverastoolsofknowing

of knowing, andtheir functionsweretreatedasmodelsto follow in interpretingphysicalphenomena,scienceceasedto beidentifiedwith appreciativecontemplationof nobleandidealobjects,..., becameanaffair of timeandhistoryintelligentlymanaged.

p. 151

. . .many critics takean”instrumental”theoryof knowledgeto signify thatthevalueof knowing is instrumentalto theknower. This is a matterwhich is asit maybein particularcases; but certainlyin many casesthepursuitof scienceis sport,carried pursuitof science

assporton, like othersports,for its own satisfaction.But ”instrumentalism”is a theorynotaboutpersonaldispositionandsatisfactionin knowing, but abouttheproperobjectsofscience,whatis ”proper” beingdefinedin termsof physics..... thepursuitofknowledgeis oftenanimmediatelydelightful event; its attainedproductspossessestheticqualitiesof proportion,order, andsymmetry. But thesequalitiesdo notmarkoff or definethecharacteristicandappropriateobjectsof science.

p. 152

. . . . In ancientsciencetheessenceof sciencewasdemonstration;thelife blood


of modernscienceis discovery. . . . .

. . . . Whentheobjectsof knowledgearetakento befinal, perfect,complete,metaphysicalfulfillments of nature,propermethodsconsistsin definitionand definitionand

classification;classification;learningcloseswith demonstrationof therationalnecessityofrationalnecessitydefinitionsandclassifications.... Discovery wasmerelytheperceptionthatsome

particularmaterialhithertounclassifiedby thelearnercameundera universalformalreadyknown. Theuniversalis alreadyknown becausegivento thought; andtheparticularis alreadyknown, becausegivento perception; learningmerelybringsthesetwo givenformsinto connection,sothatwhatis ”discovered” is thesubsumptionof particularunderits universal.

p. 158

. . . . idealism,while it hashadanintimationof theconstructively instrumental idealism

officeof intelligence,hasmistranslatedthediscovery. ... it took re-constitutionto beconstitution; re-constructionto beconstruction....[it] hadno wayof notingthatthoughtis intermediarybetweensomeempiricalobjectsandothers....A conversionofactualimmediateobjectsinto better, into moresecureandsignificant,objectswastreatedasa movementfrom merelyapparentandphenomenalBeingto thetruly Real.In short,idealismis guilty of neglect thatthoughtandknowledgearehistories. thoughtand

knowledgearehistoriesp. 159. . . .

This theory, explicitly aboutthoughtasa conditionof science,is actuallyatheoryaboutnature.It involvesattributionto natureof threedefiningcharacteristics.In thefirst place,it is implied thatsomenaturaleventsareendingswhetherenjoyedorobnoxious,which occur, apartfrom reflective choiceandart,only casually, withoutcontrol. In thesecondplace,it impliesthatevents,beingeventsandnot rigid andlumpysubstances,areongoingandhenceassuchunfinished,incomplete,indeterminate.Consequentlythey possessa possibilityof beingsomanagedandsteeredthatendsmaybecomefulfillments not just terminal,conclusionsnot justclosings.Suspense,doubt,hypotheses,experimentwith alternativesareexponentsofthisphaseof nature.In thethird place,regulationof ongoingandincompleteprocessesin behalfof selectedconsequences,impliesthatthereareordersof sequenceandcoexistenceinvolved; theseordersor relationswhenascertainedareintellectualmeanswhich enableusto useeventsasconcretemeansof directingthecourseofaffairs to forecastconclusions.

p. 160....

Theserelationsin themselvesarehypothetical,andwhenisolatedfromapplicationaresubject-matterof mathematics.... Hencetheultimate objectsofscienceareguided processesof change.

p. 162

. . . .

. . .Prejudiceagainsttheabstract,assomethingremoteandtechnical,is often Prejudiceagainsttheabstractirrational; but thereis sensein theconviction thatin theabstractthereis something

lackingwhichshouldberecovered.Theseriousobjectto ”applied” sciencelies inlimitation of theapplication,asto privateprofit andclassadvantage.

p. 163

. . . . Thereis superstitiousawe reflectedin thecurrentestimateof science.If we superstitiousaweof sciencecouldfreeourselvesfrom a somewhatabjectemotion,it wouldbeclearenoughthat

whatmakesany propositionscientificis its power to yield understanding,insight,


intellectualat-homeness,in connectionwith any existentialstateof affairs,by fillingeventswith coherentandtestedmeanings.

....

Asidefrom mathematics,all knowledgeis historic;chemistry, geology, knowledgeishistoricphysiology, aswell asanthropologyandthosehumaneventsto which,arrogantly, we

usuallyrestrictthetitle of history. Only asscienceis seento befulfilled andbroughtto itself in intelligentmanagementof historicalprocessesin theircontinuitycanmanbeenvisagedaswithin nature,andnotasa supernaturalextrapolation.Justbecausenatureis whatit is, historyis capableof beingmoretruly known – understood,intellectuallyrealized– thanaremathematicalandphysicalobjects.Do whatwe can,therealwaysremainssomethingreconditeandremotein thelatter, until they arerestoredin thecourseof affairs from whichthey have beensequestrated.While thehumanizingof sciencecontributesto thelife of humanity, it is evenmorerequiredin humanizingof

sciencebehalfof science,in orderthatit maybeintelligible, simpleandclear;in orderthatitmayhave thatcorrespondencewith realitywhich trueknowledgeclaimsfor itself.

16Nov96

5 Nature, Communication and Meaning

p. 166

Of all affairs,communicationis themostwonderful.Thatthingsshouldbeableto passfrom theplaneof externalpushingandpulling to thatof revealingthemselvesto man,andtherebyto themselves;andthatthefruit of communicationshouldbe fruit of

communication. . .participation

participation,sharing,is awonderby thesideof which transsubstantiationpales.

Whencommunicationoccurs,all naturaleventsaresubjectto reconsiderationandrevision ; they arereadaptedto meettherequirementsof conversation,whetheritbepublicdiscourseor thatpreliminarydiscoursetermedthinking. Eventsturn intoobjects,thingswith a meaning.

p. 167

. . . . Wherecommunicationexists,thingsin acquiringmeaning,therebyacquire things,meaning,signs,implicatesrepresentatives,surrogates,signsandimplicates,which areinfinitely moreamenable

to management,morepermanentandmoreaccommodating,thaneventsin their firstestate.

....

In view of theseincrementsandtransformations,it is notsurprisingthatmeanings,underthenameof formsandessences,have oftenbeenhailedasmodesofBeingbeyondandabove spatialandtemporalexistence... nor thatthoughtastheirpossessionhasbeentreatedasa non-naturalspiritualenergy, disjoinedfrom all thatisempirical.Yet thereis anaturalbridgethatjoins thegapbetweenexistenceandessence;namelycommunication,language,discourse. communication,

language,discourse[cf. G. H. Mead,Habermas,TKH]

p. 168

... while they have discoursedsofluentlyaboutmany topics[philosophers,even... professedempiricists]have discoursedlittle aboutdiscourseitself.

....


Logoshasbeencorrectlyidentifiedwith mind ; but logosandhencemindwasconceivedsupernaturally. Logic wastherebysupposedto have its basisin whatisbeyondhumanconductandrelationships,andin consequencetheseparationof thephysicalandtherational,theactualandtheideal,receivedits traditionalformulation.

p. 171

. . . .

. . . . Thingsconformednaturallyandexactly to partsof speech. . . .

Theresultingtheoryof substances,essentialproperties,accidentalqualitiesandrelations,andtheidentificationof Being(by meansof thecopula”is”) with thetensesof theverb,(sothatthehighestBeingwas,is now, andever shallbe...) controlledthewholeschemeof physicsandmetaphysics,which formedthephilosophictraditionofEurope.It wasa naturalconsequenceof theinsightthatthings,meanings,andwordscorrespond.

p. 172Theinsightwaspervertedby thenotionthatthecorrespondenceof thingsandmeaningsis prior to discourseandsocialintercourse.

Thus... thegreatestsinglediscoveryof man... becamethesourceof anartificialphysicsof nature,thebasisof ascience,philosophyandtheologyin which theuniversewasanincarnategrammaticalorderconstructedafterthemodelof discourse.

Themoderndiscoveryof innerexperience,of a realmof purelypersonaleventsthatarealwaysat theindividual’scommand... is alsoa greatandliberatingdiscovery.It impliesa new worthandsenseof dignity in humanindividuality.... It is thecounterpartof whatdistinguishesmodernscience,experimental,hypothetical;a logicof discovery ...

p. 173

. . . . Failureto recognizethatthisworld of innerexperienceis dependentuponanextensionof languagewhich is asocialproductandoperationled to thesubjectivistic, solipsisticandegotisticstrainin modernthought..... modernthinkerscomposednatureafterthemodelof personalsoliloquizing.

6 Nature, Mind and the Subject

p. 208

Personality, selfhood,subjectivity areeventualfunctionsthatemergewithcomplexly organizedinteractions,organicandsocial.Personalindividuality hasitsbasisandconditionsin simplerevents.

p. 219

. . . thewholehistoryof science,artandmoralsprovesthatthemind thatappears mind inindividualsnotindividualmind

in individualsis notassuchindividualmind. Theformeris in itself a systemof belief,recognitions,andignorances,of acceptancesandrejections,of expectanciesandappraisalsof meaningswhich have beeninstitutedundertheinfluenceof customandtradition.

. . . . Webring to thesimplestobservationa complex apparatusof habits,ofacceptedmeaningsandtechniques.Otherwiseobservationis theblankestof stares,andthenaturalobjectis a taletold by anidiot, full only of soundandfury.

p. 222


. . . . Let usadmitthecaseof theconservative; if we oncestartthinking noonecanguaranteewhereweshallcomeout,exceptthatmany objects,endsandinstitutionsaresurelydoomed.Every thinkerputssomeportionof anapparentlystableworld in peril andno onecanwholly predictwhatwill emerge in its place.

p. 225-6

. . . .

. . . . Compteseveraltimesrecursto theideathat... madnessmarksanexcessof Compte

subjectivism... thatmadnesshasto beconstruedhistoricallyandsociologically.Underprimitiveconditionsall thelargerideasaboutnaturearereveriesconstructedintheinterestof emotions.Myths werefancies,but they werenot insanitiesbecause myths

they weretheonly reply to thechallengeof naturewhichexisting instrumentalitiespermitted.Assertionof similar ideastodayis insanity, becauseavailableintellectualresourcesandagenciesmakepossibleandrequireradicallydifferentadjustments....Inability to employthemethodsof formingandcheckingbeliefswhich areavailableata giventime,whatever bethesourceof thatinability, constitutesa disorientation.

p. 230

. . . . Theroadto freedomby escapeinto theinnerlife is nomoderndiscovery; it escape

wastakenby savages,by theoppressed,by children,longbeforeit wasformulatedinphilosophicalromanticism.

7 Nature, Life and Body-Mind

p. 255

. . . .

. . . . Organizationis anempiricaltrait of someevents,no matterhow speculative organization

anddubioustheoriesaboutit maybe.... Organizationis socharacteristicof thenatureof someeventsin their sequentiallinkagesthatno theoryaboutit canbeasspeculativeor absurdasthosewhich ignoreor deny its genuineexistence.

p. 258

... ”mind” is anaddedpropertyassumedby afeelingcreature,whenit reaches ”mind” is anaddedpropertythatorganizedinteractionwith otherliving creatureswhich is language,

communication.Thenthequalitiesof feelingbecomesignificantof objectivedifferencesin externalthingsandof episodespastandto come.Thisstateof thingsinwhich qualitatively differentfeelingsarenot justhadbut aresignificantof objectivedifferences,is mind. Feelingsareno longerjust felt. They have andthey makesense:recordandprophesy.

Thatis to say, differencesin qualities(feelings)of actswhenemployedasindicationsof actsperformedandto beperformedandassignsof theirconsequences,meansomething.

p. 278

. . . .

... traditionaltheorieshave separatedlife from nature,mind from organiclife,andtherebycreatedmysteries.Restoretheconnection,andtheproblemof how a mysteries

mind canknow anexternalworld or evenknow thatthereis sucha thing, is like theproblemof how ananimaleatsthingsexternalto itself....


A creaturegeneratedin a conjunctiveunion,dependentuponothers... forperpetuationof its being,andcarryingin its own structuretheorgansandmarksof itsintimateconnectionwith otherswill know othercreaturesif it knowsitself.

p. 285

... body-mindsimply designateswhatactuallytakesplacewhena living bodyisimplicatedin situationsof discourse,communicationandparticipation.

8 Existence, Ideas and Consciousness

p. 299

. . . . Meaningsdo notcomeinto beingwithout language,andlanguageimplies meanings,languagetwo selvesinvolvedin aconjointor sharedundertaking.Thuswhile its direct

mechanismis foundin thevocalizingandauditoryapparatuses,this mechanismis inalliancewith generalorganicbehavior..... Thisalliancesupplieslanguagewith theimmediatequalitative”feel” thatmarksoff signsimmediatelyfrom oneanotherinexistence.

Thesameconsiderationsdefinethe”subconscious”of humanthinking. Apart subconscious

from language,from imputedandinferredmeaning,we continuallyengagein animmensemultitudeof immediateorganicselections,rejections,welcomings,expulsions,appropriations,withdrawals,shrinkings,expansions,elationsanddejections,attacks,wardingsoff, of themostminute,vibratinglydelicatenature.Wearenotawareof thequalitiesof many or mostof theseacts;we do notobjectivelydistinguishandidentify them.Yet they exist asfeelingqualities,andhave anenormousdirectiveeffect on ourbehavior. If for example,certainsensoryqualitiesofwhich we arenotcognitively awareceaseto exist, wecannotstandor controlourpostureandmovements.In a thoroughlynormalorganism,these”feelings” have anefficiency of operationwhich it is impossiblefor thoughtto match.Evenourmosthighly intellectualizedoperationsdependuponthemasa ”fringe” by which to guideour inferentialmovements.They giveusoursenseof rightnessandwrongness,ofwhatto selectandemphasizeandfollow up,andwhatto drop...

[Husserl,Habermas:”Lebenswelt”;Searle:”Background”]

p. 300

. . . . Formulateddiscourseis mainly but a selectedstatementof whatwe wish to formulateddiscourseretainamongall theseincipientstarts,following upsandbreakingsoff.... The

”reasoning”personis onewho makeshis ”intuitions” morearticulate,moredeliverablein speech,asexplicit sequenceof initial premises,jointures,andconclusions.

....

p. 300-1

. . . . Thesubconsciousof a civilized adultreflectsall thehabitshehasacquired; habits

thatis to say, all theorganicmodificationshehasundergone....It is mostreliableinjust thoseactivities with respectto which it is leastspokenof, andleastreliablewithrespectto thosethingswhereit is fashionablemostto laudit.... It is surestto bewrongin connectionwith intimatemattersof self-regulationin health,morals,socialaffairs–in mattersmostcloselyconnectedwith basicneedsandrelationships.Whereits useispopularlyrecommendedit is mostdangerous.To usefeelingswhich arenot the


expressionof a rectitudeof organicaction,rectitudethatin civilized or artificialconditionsis acquiredonly by takingthought( takingthoughtis radicallydifferenttojust ”thinking”), is to actlike ananimalwithouthaving thestructuralfacilitiesofanimallife. It hasthefascinationof all easysurrenderto fatality andmaybeeulogizedasa returnto nature,spontaneity, or to thequasi-divine. It hasthecharmof lazyandcomfortableescapefrom responsibility;we die,but we die, like animals,uponthefield, defeatedandmayhapdisheartened,but withoutknowing it.

In apracticalsense,hereis theheartof themind-bodyproblem.Activitieswhich develop,appropriateandenjoymeaningsbearthesameactualizingrelationtopsycho-physicalaffairs thatthelatterbearto physicalcharacters.

p. 303

. . . .

While on thepsycho-physicallevel, consciousnessdenotesthetotality of consciousness

actualizedimmediatequalitativedifferences,or ”feelings,” it denotes,upontheplaneof mind,actualizedapprehensionsof meanings,thatis, ideas.Thereis thusan meanings,ideas

obviousdifferencebetweenmindandconsciousness;meaningandanidea.Minddenotesthewholesystemof meaningsasthey areembodiedin theworkingsoforganiclife; consciousnessin a beingwith languagedenotesawarenessor perceptionof meanings;it is theperceptionof actualevents,whetherpast,contemporaryorfuture,in theirmeanings,thehaving of actualideas.Thegreaterpartof mind is onlyimplicit in any consciousactor state;thefield of mind – of operativemeanings– isenormouslywider thanthatof consciousness.Mind is contextualandpersistent;consciousnessis focalandtransitive.Mind is, soto speak,structural,substantial;aconstantbackgroundandforeground;perceptive consciousnessis process,aseriesof perceptive

consciousnessisprocess,

heresandnows. Mind is aconstantluminosity;consciousnessintermittent,aseriesofflashedof varyingintensities.Consciousnessis, asit were,theoccasionalinterceptionof messagescontinuallytransmitted,mechanicalreceiving device selectsa few of thevibrationswith which theair is filled andrendersthemaudible.

p. 304Thenatureof awarenessof meaningscannotbeconveyed in speech.Aswith otherimmediatequalitativeexistences,wordscanonly hint, point; theindicationsucceedingwhenit evokesanactualexperienceof thething in question.Suchwordsasapparency, conspicuousness,outstandingness,vividness,clearness,includingofcoursetheiroppositesvague,dim, confused,mayassisttheevocation.To denotethecharacteristicsof mind athoroughlydifferentsetof namesmustbeused:organization,order, coherence.Therelationof mind to consciousnessmaybepartiallysuggestedby sayingthatwhile mind asasystemof meaningsis subjecttodisorganization,disequilibration, perturbation,thereis no sensein referringto aparticularstateof awarenessin its immediacy aseitherorganizedor disturbed.Anideais justwhatit is whenit occurs. . . . Emotionalconditionsdo notoccurasemotions,intrinsically definedassuch;they occuras”tertiary” qualitiesof objects.

p. 305

... meaningsexistentiallyoccurringareideas. ideas

p. 306

. . . . Indeed,theuseof suchwordsascontext andbackground,fringe,etc.,suggestssomethingtoo external.... Thelargersstemof meaningsuffuses,interpenetrates,colorswhatis now andhereuppermost;it givesthemsense,feeling,asdistinctfrom signification.


p. 307

It is impossibleto tell whatimmediateconsciousnessis – not becausethereissomemysteryin or behindit, but for thesamereasonthatwe cannottell justwhatsweetor redimmediatelyis: it is somethinghad,notcommunicatedandknown. Butwords,asmeansof directingaction,mayevokea situationin which thething inquestionis hadin someparticularlyilluminatingway.

p.308

. . . . Consciousness,anidea,is thatphaseof a systemof meaningswhich atagiventime is undergoingre-direction,transitive transformation....Consciousnessisthemeaningof eventsin courseof remaking;its ”cause”is only thefact thatthis isoneof thewaysin which naturegoeson.

....

Thereis a counterpartrealistdoctrine,accordingto which consciousnessis liketheeye runningover a field of ready-makeobjects,or a light which illuminatesnowthisandnow thatportionof a givenfield.... It postulates,eventhoughonly implicitly ,a preestablishedharmony of theknowerandthingsknown, passingover thefact thatsuchharmony is alwaysanattainedoutcomeof prior inferencesandinvestigations.....

p. 309

It is hardto believe thatsuchanamiableandoptimisticview of thenatureofmind couldhave obtainedcurrency, hadit not beenfor a theologyaccordingto which theology

Godis perfectmindandmanis createdin theimageof his makerEvenso,however, itcouldhardlyhave persistedwhensciencedisplacedtheology, hadnotscienceprovideda numberof caseswhich satisfytherequirementof thetheory, andtherebygivenit a kind of empiricalcontentandbasis.Thatis, thedevelopmentof sciencedoespresent(a) theriseof cognitionalinterestto a point of prestige,and(b) itsupplieseventuallymany casesof valid cognitiveperceptions.

p. 310

. . . . Thenwhentheexistenceof error, mistake,dreams,hallucinations,etc. is error, mistake,dreams,recognized,thesethingsaretreatedasdeviationsandexceptionsfrom thenormal....

... empiricalfactsindicatethatnoterrorbut truth is theexception,thething to not errorbut truthis theexception,thething to beaccountedfor

beaccountedfor, andthattheattainmentof truth is theoutcomeof thedevelopmentofcomplex andelaboratemethodsof searching,methodsthatwhile congenialto somemenin somerespects,in many respectsgo againstthehumangrain,sothatthey areadoptedonly afterlong disciplinein a schoolof hardknocks....Empirically ... thecharacteristicthingaboutperceptionsin their naturalestate,apartfrom subjectionto perceptions

anartof knowing, is their irrelevanceto bothtruth anderror;they exist for themostpartin anotherdimension,whosenaturemaybesuggestedby referencetoimagination,fancy, reverie,affection,love andhate,desire,happinessandmisery.This fact,morethattheerror-problem,provestheartificial characterof thespectator,search-light,notionof consciousness.

p. 314

. . . .

. . . . In completelyintegratedfunctionthereis no roomfor distinctionbetweenthingssignifying andthingssignified....Thereadiera response,thelessconsciousness,meaning,thinking it permits;division introducesmentalconfusion,butalso,in needfor redirection,opportunityfor observation,recollection,anticipation.


Thereis thenanempiricaltruth in thecommonoppositionbetweentheoryand theoryandpracticepractice,betweenthecontemplative,reflective typeandtheexecutive type....a

contrastbetweentwo modesof practice.Oneis the... act-firstandthink-afterwardsmode,to which eventsmayyield asthey giveway to any strongforce.Theothermodeis wary, observant,sensitive to slight hintsandintimations....

p. 318

. . . .

. . . . Objectsarepreciselywhatwe areawareof. For objectsareeventswith Objectsarepreciselywhatweareawareof

meanings;tables,themilky way ... electrons,ghosts,centaurs... andall theinfinitelymultifarioussubject-matterof discoursedesignableby commonnouns,verbsandtheirqualifiers.

p. 319

. . .

... thepresentthesissticksto thecommon-sensebelief thatuniversals,relations,meanings,areof andaboutexistences,not theirexhaustive ingredients.Thesameexistentialeventsarecapableof aninfinite numberof meanings....Thus... ”paper” is”somethingto bewrittenupon”...somethingto startafire with; somethinglike snow...propertyin thelegal sense.Thereis no conceivableuniverseof discoursein which thething maynotfigurehaving in eachits own characteristicmeaning.

p. 326

. . . . Philosophyhasonly to state,to makeexplicit, thedifferencebetweeneventswhich arechallengesto thoughtandeventswhich have metthechallengeandhencepossessmeaning.It hasonly to notethatbareoccurrencein thewayof having,being,or undergoingis theprovocationandinvitationto thought– seekingandfindingunapparentconnections,sothatthinking terminateswhenanobjectis present:namely, whenachallengingevent is endowedwith stablemeaningsthroughrelationshipto somethingextrinsic but connected.

....

... sensationsarebut oneclassof meanings. sensationsarebutoneclassofmeaningsp. 327

. . . . Sensaaretheclassof irreduciblemeaningswhich areemployedinverifying andcorrectingothermeanings.....Recognition,identifiedanddistinguishedmeaning,is anindispensableconditionof effective experience.It is a prerequisiteofsuccessfulpractise....

p. 329

. . . . Acquaintanceis empiricallydistinguishedfrom knowing abouta thing,and Acquaintance

from knowing thata thing is thusandso....it involvesa judgmentasto whattheobjectof acquaintancewil do in connectionwith otherevents....

To beacquaintedwith anything is to have thekind of expectancy of itsconsequenceswhichconstitutesanimmediatereadinessto act,anadequatepreparatoryadjustmentto whatever thething in questionmaydo. To know aboutit isto have a kind of knowledgewhich doesnotpassinto directresponseuntil somefurthertermhasbeensupplied.

p. 330

To assertthatknowledgeis classificationis to assertin effect thatkind, knowledgeisclassification


character, hasoverlaidandover riddenbareoccurrenceandexistence....Thesefeatures,character, kind, sort,universal,likeness,fall within theuniverseof meaning.Hencethetheorieswhich makethemconstitutiveof knowledgeacknowledgethathaving meaningsis a prerequisitefor knowing.

p. 336

. . . .

... astimulusis notanobjectof perception,for stimulusis correlative toresponse,andis undeterminedexceptasresponseoccurs....we areawareof thestimuli only in termsof our responseto themandof theconsequencesof this response.

p. 338

. . . ..

... theword”perception”maybelimited to designateawarenessof objects ”perception”

contemporaneouslyaffectingthebodily organs....sensory-perceptualmeaningsarespecificallydiscriminatedobjectsof awareness;thediscriminationtakesplacein thecourseof inquiry into causative conditionsandconsequences;theultimateneedfortheinquiry is foundin thenecessityof discoveringwhatis to bedone,or ofdevelopinga responsesuitablyadaptedto therequirementsof a situation.

p. 339-40

. . . .

. . . the introspectivedoctrine... asin theCartesian-Spinozisticlogical realisminwhich self-evidency, clearness,adequacy, or truth,areimputedto someconceptualmeaningsor ideas;or ... themoreusualform of assigningto thingsappearingin thefield of consciousnessintrinsicpropertieswhichmaybereadoff by directinspection.... is thelastdesperatestandandfortressof theclassicdoctrinethatknowledgeisimmediategrasp,intuition, envisagement,possession.,

p. 342

. . . .

. . . theobjectsof revery-consciousnessarejust asmuchcasesof perceivedmeaningsor ideasof eventsasarethoseof sensoryperceptualconsciousness.Only –they arenotasgoodobjectswith respectto directionof subsequentconduct,includingtheconductof knowledge.

p. 345-6

... theworking logic of humanaction;thefirst, thewayof objectivetransformation,is themethodof actionin theartsandsciences;thesecond,of action themethodof

actionvs.romanticmyth-making

thatis fanciful, ”wish-fulfilling, ” romantic,myth-making.

Theimmensedifferencebetweenthetwo modesof actionhashadto belearned.Thereis no original andintrinsicdifferencein therespective modesof consciousnessaccompanying thetwo kindsof acts.In somematters,thelessonis readilyandquicklylearned.Suchmattersconstitutetheobjectsof usualevery-daysense-perception,theobjectsof common-sense.Certainorganicintegrationshave to occurif life is tocontinue....Meaningsandideasconnectedwith theseorganic-environmental meaningsand

ideassoundasfarasadjustmentsaresucccessfullymade

adjustmentsaresubstantiallysoundasfar asadjustmentsaresucccessfullymade... orlife cease.Suchgrossideasasa world of thingsandpersonsexternalto our personalwishesandfancies... aresorecurrentlyandemphaticallytaughtthatthey areneversincerelydoubted....They thusform a kind of privilegeddomain,which,althoughanislandin a seaof ideaswheregroundis not readilytouched,hasbeentakento form


theoriginal andinherentconstitutionof consciousness.In consequence... aspeciousrealistictheorywhich takestheislandfor a solidandcompletecontinent.

p. 347

. . . .

Graduallythetechniqueinvolvedin makingordinaryorganic-environmentaladjustmentsis discovered,andbecomescapableof extensionto caseswherefancy hadpreviously reigned.A largerandlargerfield of ideasbecomessusceptibleof analyticobjectivereference,with thepromiseof approximatevalidity. Thesecretof thistechniquelies in controlof thewaysin which theorganismparticipatesin thecourseof events.In thecaseof simpleneedsandsimpleenvironments,existing organicstructurespracticallyenforcecorrectparticipation;theresultis so-calledinstinctiveaction.Within this range,modificationsundergoneby theorganismform in themaineffective habits.But organicpreparationfor variedsituationhaving many factorsand effectivehabits.

wide-reachingconsequencesis not soeasilyattained.Effective participationheredependsupontheuseof extra-organicconditions,which supplementstructuralagencies;namely, toolsandotherpersons,by meansof languagespokenandrecorded.Thustheultimatebuttressof thesoundnessof all but thesimplestideasconsistsin thecumulativeobjectiveappliancesandartsof thecommunity, not in anything foundin”consciousness”itself or within theorganism.

9 Experience, Nature and Art

p. 254

10 Experience, Value and Criticism

p. 394-439

John Dewey - Experience and Nature (1925, 1929)

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Transcript of John Dewey - Experience and Nature (1925, 1929)