Jim Parry - The Power of Sport in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping

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The power of sport in peacemaking and

peacekeepingJim Parry

a

aFaculty of Physical Education and Sport, Charles University inPrague, Czech Republic

Version of record first published: 27 Jul 2012

To cite this article:Jim Parry (2012): The power of sport in peacemaking and peacekeeping, Sport

in Society: Cultures, Commerce, Media, Politics, DOI:10.1080/17430437.2012.708280

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The power of sport in peacemaking and peacekeeping

Jim Parry*

Faculty of Physical Education and Sport, Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic

This paper argues that sport is not about conflict but competition; not about violencebut controlled aggression; neither is it amoral and value-free but is itself a moralenterprise. The paper provides an analysis of the internal values and the internal logicof sport, which combine to make peace via their isomorphism with politicalliberalism, especially the liberal idea of the contract to contest, and its emphasis onequality, respect, mutuality and other human rights values.It is not only just sportspopularity, but also this peacemaking capacity of sport, which informs its peacekeeping

potential.

Introduction

This paper provides an analysis of the internal values and the internal logic of sport, which

combine to make peace via their isomorphism with political liberalism, especially the

liberal idea of the contract to contest, and its emphasis on equality, respect, mutuality and

other human rights values. It is this peacemaking capacity of sport that informs its

peacekeeping potential. In doing so, I will be taking a contrary view to those who think

that sport itself is a form of violent conflict, and so is antithetical to peace promotion; and

those who think that sport has no (intrinsic) values. So, to begin with, we must clear theground by identifying and rectifying three important mistakes, all expressed in the

previous sentence, which have led to confusion and obstructed our vision of the nature of

sport.

Three important mistakes

Conflict and competition

The first mistake is the failure to distinguish between conflict and competition. Kvalsund

draws attention to what he sees as the dangers of using sport for peace-building purposes.

He says:

Sport, in its traditional form, is not a conflict preventative instrument. On the contrary, thenature of sport is exactly the opposite: a physical contest between people or teams withdifferent goals.1

To begin with, this description of sport is contentious. Contestants do not have different

goals (if this means aims). Because of the rule-structures of sport, we all have the same

aims otherwise we could not compete. Of course, I am trying to score at this end, and

you at that end but we both are trying to score under the same rules. The important point

here is that Kvalsunds misleading definition leads him to confuse competition with

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*Email: [email protected]

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conflict and they are very different, as I explain below. Furthermore, Kvalsund believes

that we shall need highly trained operatives in the field to make good the moral

shortcomings of traditional sport.

On this account of sport, its very nature provides two massive problems for

peacekeepers: they take the risk of pouring oil on the flames of conflict, by imitating wargames, and they must accept the huge expense of compensatory provision. This leaves it

totally unexplained as to why international agencies would think to employ such a flawed

and inappropriate instrument to the task of peace building. Why choose sport, when its

nature, according to Kvalsund, is exactly the opposite to the task? Why choose sport,

when it therefore requires such a level of externally provided resources to mitigate its

shortcomings? The answer, of course, is that those agencies understand that sporting

competition is something quite different from conflict.

The historical transition from conflict to sporting competition may be illustrated with

the example of the mythical origins of the Olympic Games. The myth of Pelops, one of the

many myths that seek to explain the origin of the Olympic Games, tells the story of the fall

of Oenomaus, King of Pisa, who challenged all suitors for his daughter Hippodamea to a

chariot race. During the race, he would kill each of his adversaries and then place their

heads among his trophies. Naturally, this discouraged young men from seeking his

daughters hand, until the arrival of Pelops. He was both fortunate, because Hippodamea

fell in love with him at first sight, and also clever, because he realized what was going on.

He conspired with Oenomaus charioteer, Myrtilus, and during the race managed to throw

Oenomaus from his chariot to his death. Pelops won both Hippodamea and the kingdom,

but he killed Myrtilus for his treason. To appease the Gods for his murderous wrongdoing,

so the myth goes, Pelops established the Olympic Games.2

The myth of Pelops echoes down to the twentieth century, when George Orwell

described modern sport as war minus the shooting,3

and Chris Chataway, an Olympicathlete, co-authored a book calledWar Without Weapons.4 The earlier form of contest was

that of mortal combat, in which the triumph of the victor meant the death of the adversary.

In the Olympic Games, however, contest took on the nobler form of rule-governed and

disciplined athletic competition. The lesson of the myth is that the chariot race between

Pelops and Oenomaus was to be the last deadly incident in the sacred site of Olympia. The

propensity for murder was civilised and became the drive for victory on the athletic field.

This shift from primitive mortal combat to fair and peaceful competition constitutes the

starting point of the Olympic Games.

Now, we do not have to believe in the myth to be able to appreciate its point: sport is

not war. Even in boxing, which seems to permit violence, it is only limited and carefullycircumscribed assaults that are permitted. So, for example, a boxer cannot be hit when

down, or under the belt, or with a rabbit-punch, or between rounds. He cannot be kicked or

head butted or elbowed, or hit with weighted gloves or set upon by more than one

opponent. Such considerations indicate the distinctions between boxing and street-

fighting. The crucial difference is that boxing is a rule-governed contest, and so has certain

values built into it. Boxing is a competition but not unarmed conflict, never mind

armed mortal combat.

But there is a further feature of rule-governed competition, such as in sport: the

constitutive rules of the sport prescribe modes of cooperation without which the activity

cannot proceed. And good competition arises out of the relative equality of participants.

That is to say: sport is not to be characterized as a conflict to establish superiority. The

foundational values of competitive sport include cooperation and equality, which provide

the context for competitive activity.

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Oft-quoted examples of people fighting over sport (such as hooligans outside the

stadium, or armies on the battlefield) are irrelevant to the above points. People fight over

love and religion, too but the fact that love (or religion, or sport) can be the occasionfor

conflict tells us nothing about the intrinsic character of love (or religion, or sport).

Violence and aggression

The second mistake is the failure to distinguish between violence and aggression. For

example, in a recent article on sport, peacekeeping and the prevention of violent conflict,

Schwery and Eggenberger-Argote write:

. . . aggression is defined as behavior which aims to injure or harm the opponent. There is adistinction between hostile and instrumental aggression: the former primarily aims at injuringthe opponent, whereas the latter type serves in achieving a sporting goal (e.g. winning points).Different studies have demonstrated that sports activity may very well lead to a channeling ofaggression and that there is a negative correlation between the amount of training and the

tendency to use violence.5

Here, aggression is confusingly defined as aiming to injure or harm, which is surely false.

I can be aggressive without seeking to harm. Then, the distinction between hostile and

instrumental aggression seems to concede this point, suggesting that instrumental

aggression does not seek harm. But this is false, too, for I either may or may not aim to

harm someone whilst achieving my sporting goal. Finally, the notion of violence belatedly

enters the picture from nowhere, without explanation or definition.

A simple and much clearer distinction might go as follows: aggression involves

forceful assertion in achieving ones ends, while violence involves the intention to harm or

injure.6 Thus, it is quite possible to be aggressive without being violent. A player can be

both forceful and vigorous without seeking to injure or harm anyone. Violence, however,is centrally to do with intentional harm or injury to others, as well as attempts to harm,

recklessness as to harm, and negligence. All team sports recognize this simple distinction,

and so have developed rules against violence but not (of course) against aggression. Most

team sports just are exercises in controlled aggression.

Take the example of boxing again, which seems to license violence. Certainly, it

permits aggressive assaults and attempts to hurt. But hurt is not harm. If the boxer aims to

hurt but not to cause lasting harm or injury, then he is not being violent in the sense that

warfare is. A further distinction will help us here, between violent acts and acts of

violence.7 Any action (e.g. killing or kissing someone) can be done more or less violently.

So boxing, along with most sports, is violent in the sense that it consists of many violentacts i.e. actions performed violently (vigorously). However, an act of violence is one

that intends harm or injury, whether or not it is actually performed violently (and there are

many ways of doing harm gently). Boxing as a sport, while employing violent actions,

should not permit acts of violence it should not be about trying to, or having to, put the

opponent in hospital in order to win. (This is the moral objection to some forms of

gladiatorial boxing, such as prize-fighting.8)

Nevertheless, it might well be objected that what is wrong with competitive sport is

that it encourages aggression and seeing the other as an opponent, an enemy. However,

I would rather suggest that aggression in sport presents opportunities for moral education

and moral development. When playing sport we exercise our potential for aggression, and

we may also be tempted by the attractions of violence in pursuit of our aims. I have argued

elsewhere9 that sport and games can function as laboratories for value experiments, in

which we are put in the position of having to act, time and time again, sometimes in haste,

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under pressure or provocation, either to prevent something or to achieve something, under

a structure of rules.10

I believe that the impetus and opportunity for values education here is tremendous. The

questions are: how do we come to terms with our own behaviour and dispositions,

motivations and propensities? Is there a route from the potentially risky confrontation thatsport sometimes is, to the development of a self with greater moral resolution? And, more

generally, is there a possibility for peace and the non-violent conduct of human affairs?

As Nissiotis said:

[T]his is the ethical challenge that faces humanity: how to harness the creative and motivatingforces of aggression into the service of humanity. . . . Sport in Olympic practice is one of themost powerful events transforming aggressiveness to competition as emulation. Sports lifemoves on the demarcation line between aggressiveness and violence. It is a risky affair . . .Citius-altius-fortius is a dangerous enterprise on the threshold of power as aggression,violence and domination. But this is, precisely, the immense value of Olympic sports: theychallenge people to react, to pass the test of power. . . 11

So the claim is that the competitive sports situation challenges individuals to develop anduse their power and aggressiveness; but not, finally, to use this power to control and

subjugate the other. Sport may produce more assertive and aggressive people, but less

violent people, as it acts in society as an agent of moral change.

Intrinsic value

The third mistake is to think that, because sport can be used in the service of different

values, it has no values of its own. For example, Sugden flatly asserts: . . . it is my

considered view that in and of itself sport is of no intrinsic value.12 Instead, he thinks, the

values are inserted into it by contextual social forces. However, consider these differentclaims:

(i) sport may be used instrumentally in the service of different values;

(ii) sport may or may not be played morally;

(iii) sport is without values of its own (without intrinsic value).

My view is that neither (i) nor (ii), even if true, entails (iii). I think that there is something

special about sport in virtue of which it is an excellent tool for peace.

The moral that these writers wish to draw is that it is all in the method it ishow we

teach sport that is important, not what we teach. Now, of course method is extremely

important, but its not everything. If methods were all, and sport had no intrinsic value,why are not those methods being employed in basket-weaving for peace, instead of

football? Now, Im not against basket-weaving, which could be very useful, but I think

that sport is more so and not simply because of its popularity (see below), but because of

its ethical basis. In fact, its very popularity is also to be explained with reference to its

intrinsically moral nature.

This is a very old argument. Bailey13 argued against the traditional view that games

provide a secure avenue to value education that games are in themselves character-

building. His view that it is possible to play games effectively either morally or not is

surely incontrovertible see (ii) above. Aspins14 counter-arguments that the constitutive

rules of games enshrine moral values, and that games are collaborative enterprises which

ipso facto entail that sport offers opportunities for learning about values seem equally

sound see (iii) above. It seems to me that everyone is right here since (ii) does not

entail (iii). Games are, in part, constructed out of values, but this does not guarantee that

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they will be played morally. So I am with Meakin:15 games provide opportunitiesfor the

presentation of values. But they are only capable of presenting these opportunities because

they themselves have intrinsic values.

Why use sport?

So sport is not about conflict but competition; not about violence but controlled

aggression; neither is it amoral and value-free but is itself a moral enterprise. Only for

those who think differently (those who make one of the above three mistakes) does the

question arise: why would sport be used? If sport has bad values (violence and conflict) or

if it has no values of its own, why is it that peace activists seek to use sport (and not

something else) in the service of their aims?

An unsatisfactory answer (which is often given) might be that sport is popular

people like it. However, people also like drugs (with a 30% increase in opiate and cocaine

use in the last 10 years) and gambling (with a massive increase in sports-related gambling),

but such popularity is not necessarily a good thing. Secondly, this makes it sound asthough we could just as well use some other medium, such as art, film, dance, chess, hula-

hooping, or Pokemon-collecting so long as it was popular enough. So a larger claim gets

made, such as that of Kvalsund, who asserts: Sport is indisputably the most popular

leisure activity in the world . . . .16

However, it is not at all clear how this claim might be validated. For a start, it is an

empirical claim that would require investigation, and I have never seen any such evidence

offered. But, more importantly, it would require an operational definition of sport, which

would doubtless be highly contentious (e.g. the Council of Europe definition,17 which is

simply hopeless). If we have to play the guessing game, my own hypothesis would be that

The Arts would beat sport in the popularity stakes. Again, the problem of definitionarises, but if we think of poem, play, story, film, book, dance in all its forms, music and

song, painting and the visual arts, sculpture and the plastic arts, photography, etc., my bet

would be that more people in the world (well, probably everyone who ever lived) has

engaged in (or been touched by) the arts but not quite so many in and by sport. If popularity

was the driver, we should see a similar movement The Arts for Peace and Development. I

can see many virtues in such a movement, especially with regard to inter-cultural

understanding, but I do not think the Arts could be anywhere near as successful as sport,

and this is not because of popularity but because of the kind of thing sport is. Arts tend to

be culturally specific (hence their utility for cross-cultural understanding), but modern

sports tend to be less so. Despite their often local origins, they tend to be universalisable.

This is one of the features which makes them modern sports.18

And, anyway, some kind of popularity contest is not a good indicator of the

appropriateness of sport to the task of peacekeeping. Of course, the more popular the better,

since prior familiarity may well assist introduction and dissemination. So popularity is

useful but it cannot be ajustification. It does not explain why sport is popular, and why it can

be so effective in carrying peace-worthy meanings and potentials. We need a better account

of sport, which will explain its nature, its potential social roles and its popularity.

Fair play and the logic of sport

The moral concept of fair playFair play is fundamental to the whole enterprise of sport and to an understanding of sport

as a social practice. It is partly a moral and partly a logical notion referring to a complex set

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of features emerging from principled engagement in competitive sporting activity, and

three related moral meanings are often distinguished as follows:

(i) Fair play is primarily a virtue of rule-adherence, which is a duty upon all contestants

to abide by the rules of the competition; since, by their participation, they are deemed

to have entered into a contract to contest. This is partly a moral notion, but it is alsothe basis of the logical character of fair play (see Fair Play as a Logical

Requirement Section).

(ii) Fair play may also include a commitment to contesting in the spirit of sport, such as

may lead to supererogatory actions (i.e. good actions over and above those strictly

required by the rules).

(iii) Fair play may also sometimes refer to a general attitude towards sport (and even life

itself) involving respect for others, modesty in victory, serenity in defeat and

generosity aimed at creating warm and lasting human relations.19

Competitive sport and inclusive goods

Although there is perhaps a distinction to be drawn between recreative and competitive

sport, it is the latter with which we are here concerned, and its defining feature has often

been seen as raising problems of value. It has been argued that since competitive games are

necessarily competitive, they are merely ways of beating other people and are therefore

centrally to do with the morally dubious demonstration of superiority over others.

However, it seems to me that although competitive games are ways of testing ones

abilities against anothers they are notmerelythat. While it is true that competitive games

are contests, which entails competition with a view to establishing a winner and a loser

(i.e. superiority in respect of the games required abilities), this does not entail that we

have to have winning as our overriding concern. Rather, it is possible to play to win, whilevaluing above all, for example, the opportunity to exercise speed, strength, determination

and skill. The inescapably competitive nature of the contest does not impose upon us a

win at all costs attitude, nor a superiorist mentality.

The criticism seems to be that the nature of competitive sport commits us to the

priority of exclusive goods if I win the competition, no one else can. But this is simply

not true as a full account of what sport is. There are many inclusive goods in competitive

sports, in which we need to cooperate to produce mutual outcomes. For example, unless

we are mutually striving (both trying our best to win) it is difficult to produce a good

contest, which is what we both want.

The nature and value of a good contest

Fraleigh20 approaches this issue via an analysis of the logical requirements for a good

contest.

First, there is a presupposition of equality of opportunity to contest (equality under the

rules), without which the game could not allow the expression of those characteristic skills

and abilities called into play by the rules. Relative ability in regard to just those skills and

abilities can only be demonstrated when all other variables are strictly controlled, so as to

permit equality of opportunity to contest. Second, no contest could exist without the

opponent, which would seem to require at least the minimum respect due to a facilitator

to one whose own level of performance is a major contributor to the very possibilities for

excellence and satisfaction open to oneself in that category of endeavour chosen by both.

Third, although it is clearly possible to break the rules, to do so alters the conditions of the

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contest, so that a range of abilities not specified by the rules comes into play. A good

contest will maintain the framework which secures the integrity of the contest, and this

requires rules adherence and fair play. Fourth, a knowledge of relative abilities is also a

necessary outcome, and this might be seen as superiorist. But Reddiford21 reminds us that

you win some, you lose some; and so to make the game the occasion for marking upsuperiorities and inferiorities is a short-term and self-defeating attitude. We play to

produce an outcome favourable to ourselves, of course, but we do not allow the actual

outcome to be of persisting importance. Humility and generosity are at least as likely an

accompaniment to a demonstration of ones relative abilities as overweening pride and

conceit.

I would add, fifth, that in games there is a simple right and wrong, easily enforceable

by a clearly identified authority. At the same time, there is some possibility of differing

interpretation and judgement. In playing games, we learn how to follow explicit rules, how

to bend them and evade them, and how to operate within a system of penalties and

consequences, both official and unofficial. Games are laboratories for value experiments.

We are put in the position of having to act, time and time again, sometimes in haste, under

pressure or provocation, either to prevent something or to achieve something, under a

structure of rules.

So, such an analysis presents us with a clear set of values which are either presupposed

by, or are necessary outcomes of, the good contest. This seems to me a clear

demonstration of the moral basis of sport.

Fair play as a logical requirement

However, it often goes unnoticed that the primary nature of fair play in sport is not as a

moral requirement as rule-adherence, acknowledgement of the spirit of sport, or tryingto be a fair-minded person in general. Rather, its main significance is as a logically

necessary feature of successful engagement.

We have already seen, in Fraleighs account, how difficult it is to state what sport is,

without relying on moral notions. Sport is institutionalized (suggesting some lawful

authority), it is a contest (suggesting a contract to contest), it is rule-governed (entailing

equality andobligation) and it requires cooperative co-facilitators (which suggest mutual

respect). Such an account may begin to indicate the logico-moral basis of sport and thus

suggest arguments that may be raised against cheating or other rule-breaking. For we may

ask how cheating relates to the practice of sport; and whether one can have a successful

sports practice in which cheatingregularlyoccurs. Obviously, the answer depends on thekindandlevelof cheating involved but the primary wrong in (say) doping or unlawful

violence lies in simple rule-breaking. This is because the rules function as a kind of pre-

competition agreement which specifies both an athletes eligibility to compete and also his

rights, duties and responsibilities under the agreed rules. What is wrong with doping, for

example, is the secretive attempt to evade or subvert such a contract to contest, which

describes the right of athletes to compete against non-dopers, describes the duties and

responsibilities of athletes not to dope and pre-determines a dopers non-eligibility to

compete.

To freely choose to be accepted into a community of practice entails an obligation to

duly respect the rules of the practice (or institution) as its lawful authority. To subvert such

a contract to contest threatens the moral basis of sport, jeopardizes the integrity of the

sporting community and erodes public support and trust. It is because it is impossible to

get a game of football going, or keep a competition going, unless the participants have

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some grasp on these notions, that sport is an excellent vehicle for the introduction and

maintenance of moral and political values. Freedom, responsibility, equality, justice and

respect all these are to be found in the rule-based practices of sport.

Liberalism and sport isomorphism

And this is not just an accident. It is often noticed that modern sport emerged at a

particular historic juncture, in the heyday of political liberalism in Europe in the last third

of the nineteenth century. This is the basis of the leftist critique of sport as a mirror of

liberal capitalism. The decreasing popularity of such analyses since 1989 has left open the

field for liberal accounts, including rights-based accounts, of both sport and politics.

Sugden22 appeals to a seemingly (and allegedly) universal agreement that validates a

human rights agenda for sport for development and peace (SDP) but this makes ethics

both contingent (on actual agreements . . . ) and opportunistic ( . . . that just happen to be in

place at the moment). There is more to human rights theory than that involving arguments

for the justification of political liberalism and, along with it, human rights theory. The

liberal state sees itself as deliberately not choosing any particular conception of the Good

Life for its citizens to follow. Rather, it sees itself as neutral between alternative

conceptions of the Good to be found in most modern liberal democracies. In this, it sharply

distinguishes itself from illiberal states, which embody and enforce one view of the Good

Life. Rather than promoting one culture over another, it sees itself as tolerant and

multicultural. Citizens can choose their own version of the Good and pursue their own

aims and values, independently of the state. In such a state, attention to multicultural ideals

such as recognition, toleration, respect and equal status for all cultures will become

increasingly important.

Multiculturalism is a fact nowadays for most Western societies, and it requires apolitical society to recognize the equal standing of all stable and viable communities

existing in a society. It outlaws discrimination against groups and individuals on the grounds

of ethnicity, race, nationality, religion, class, gender or sexual preference. However, some

of these communities may be authoritarian, illiberal and oppressive so the question arises:

does multiculturalism apply equally to all communities, or only to liberal ones?

Rawls23 attempts to draw guidelines for a Law of Peoples acceptable to members of

both liberal and illiberal cultures, by introducing the notion of reasonable societies.

These societies, though they may be illiberal, nevertheless follow certain core principles:

Peace (pursuing their ends through diplomacy and trade).

Common Good (a conception of justice).Consultation (a reasonable hierarchy thereof).

Responsibility (citizens recognize their obligations and play a part in social life).

Freedom (some freedom of conscience/thought).

Reasonable societies, even illiberal ones, could agree to a Law of Peoples based on such a

thin liberalism as this and this could be seen very positively: as offering learning

experiences both ways, as each culture learns from the other. But multiculturalism has its

limits, and those limits are drawn by the universalistic claims of thin liberalism, supported by

some form of human rightstheory. As Hollissays, liberal societies . . . must fightforat least a

minimalist, procedural thesis about freedom, justice, equality and individual rights.24

In the short term, in the interests of peace and development (or of political or economic

gain), such basic moral commitments may be temporarily diluted or shelved but they are

the inalienable bedrock of the possibility of a global multiculturalism. There are limits to

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ethical potential. Although sports are widely considered to be pleasurable, which in part

explains their popularity, their likelihood of gaining wide acceptance lies rather in their

intrinsic value, which transcends the simply hedonic or relative good. Their ability to

furnish us with pleasurable experiences depends upon our prior recognition in them of

opportunities for the development and expression of valued human excellences. They arewidely considered to present such opportunities because, even when in local instantiations,

their object is to challenge our common human propensities and abilities.

As we saw above, it is difficult even to state the characteristics of sport without relying

on terms that carry ethical import, and such meanings must apply across the world of

sports participation. Without agreement on rule-adherence, the authority of the referee and

the central shared values of the activity, there could be no sport. The first task of an

International Federation, for example, is to clarify rules and harmonize understandings so

as to facilitate the universal practice of its sport.

The thin values underpinning the rule structures of sport, acceptance of which by all

participants is a precondition of the continuing existence of sporting competition, support

at the educational and cultural levels initiatives for peace that might take a more obviously

political form. Children (and others) who are brought into sporting practices, and who are

aware of international competitions such as the Olympic Games and the World Cup, are

thereby becoming aware of the possibilities of international cooperation, mutual respect,

mutual valuing and the resolution of conflict under agreed rules.

It is not a surprise that there is an emerging relationship between sports organizations,

including the Olympic Movement and the United Nations, which are global organizations

facing similar problems in regard to universality and particularity. The general problem

faced by both is how they are to operate at a global (universal) level while there exist such

apparently intractable differences at the particular level.

Some seek to resolve such difficulties in the sports world by speaking of sport as auniversal language; but this seems to me to under-represent the case. Not just sport, but

sports organizations, including the IOC, seek to be universal in their values: mutual

recognition and respect, tolerance, solidarity, equity, anti-discrimination, peace, multi-

culturalism, etc. This is a quite specific set of values, which are at once a set of universal

general principles; but which also require differential interpretation in different cultures

statedin general terms whileinterpretedin the particular.

This search for universal representations at the interpersonal and political level of our

common humanity seems to me to be the essence of the optimism and hope of various

forms of humanism and internationalism. I believe that sport has made an enormous

contribution to modern society over the past hundred years or so, and that there is a strongcase for sport as an efficient means to these ends.

The very idea of a closed society is under threat everywhere the people are no longer

reliant on restricted and controlled forms of information. The Internet, satellite TV, and

global forms of commerce and communication are all contributing to a democratization of

information, and the extensive migration of people across continents is producing a new

cosmopolitanism. It will require increasingly high-levels of dogmatism, authoritarianism,

isolationism and extremism to sustain closed, exclusivist societies. Their life is limited.

This, at any rate, has to be our hope, and the hope of any kind of peaceful internationalism

based on the idea of individual freedom and human rights. Our engagement and

commitment to the development of global forms of cultural expression such as sport, and

through them to the development of peace and international understanding, is one way

that we as individuals can express our commitments, ideals and hopes for the future of

the world.

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I hope to have demonstrated that the requirements upon us to play fairly are not simply

requirements to play morally. They are also requirements to acknowledge the internal

logic of the practices we call sports, without which participation is just impossible. A

further suggestion is that this internal logic is founded on values that are isomorphic with

political liberalism, including the ideas of social contract, equality before the law, justice,toleration and mutual respect.

Conclusion sports peacekeeping potential

Of course, sport is not a cure-all, and if sport programmes can be useful in peace-building,

then they must be implemented as part of a wider set of peace-building strategies. I have

tried to argue that the very nature of sport lends itself to the task of interpersonal

understanding and respect, and that the nature of cooperative striving in rule-governed

competition can lead towards civilized and peaceful resolutions. I have claimed that it is

this peacemaking capacity of sport that informs its peacekeeping potential.

Potentials, however, are not always realized. Of course, it is possible to exploit and

manipulate a social institution towards vested interests. In the case of sport, for example,

this is what the amateurism/professionalism debate is all about: whether the external

interests of business and profiteering have changed the very nature of sport; or whether

they have perverted the nature of sport; or whether their aims are inimical to sport. Or take

marriage, as another example of a social institution. The ceremony (which might vary

considerably according to context) announces certain values and draws certain promises.

It thereby has the potential for principled partnerships. But of course no one claims that

marriage cannot be used for other purposes: to seal the friendship of kings, to secure access

to a familys wealth, to gain citizenship, to display a trophy wife, etc. And of course no one

claims that because people sometimes have these external interests, it follows thatmarriage has no intrinsic values.

Similarly, sport can be used to earn money, promote a nation, inflate egos, bully the

weak, vaunt victory, disparage the loser and so on. But this does not mean that sport has no

(intrinsic) values. To argue that sport has peacemaking capacity and peacekeeping

potential is to argue that it has a certain intrinsic form and intrinsic values, which lend

themselves to those tasks. This is why sport is promoted (instrumentally) by peacekeepers,

even if they do not particularly like sport themselves. A shallow appreciation of sport

would see its popularity. A deeper understanding of sport would try to explain why it is

universally popular as a mode of mutual expression of our common humanity. Only if

we can give some account of the nature and intrinsic values of sport will we be in aposition to identify and promote those values which are the bedrock of its peacekeeping

potential.

Acknowledgements

This paper was written with support from a Research Grant from the Ministry of Education, Youthand Sports MSM 0021620864, Czech Republic; and institutional support PRVOUK P39.

Notes1

Kvalsund, Sport and Peace Building, 11.2 Palaeologis, The Institution of the Truce.3 Quoted in Goodhart and Chataway,War Without Weapons, 19.4 Goodhart and Chataway,War Without Weapons.

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5 Schwery and Eggenberger-Argote, Sport as a Cure; Jarvis,Sport Psychology, 56.6 See Parry, Aggression and Violence, 2078.7 Parry, Aggression and Violence, 212; Harris,Violence and Responsibility, Chapter 1.8 Parry, Aggression and Violence, 2212.9 Parry, Values in Physical Education.

10

Parry, Values in Physical Education, 1445.11 Nissiotis, Psychological and Sociological Motives for Violence in Sport, 1068.12 Sugden, Sport Intervention in Divided Societies, 6.13 Bailey, Games, Winning and Education.14 Aspin, Games Winning and Education.15 Meakin, Moral Values and Physical Education.16 Kvalsund, Sport and Peace Building, 5.17 The Council of Europes The European Sports Charter2001 says: Sport means all forms of

physical activity which, through casual or organised participation, aim at expressing or improvingphysical fitness and well-being, forming social relationships or obtaining results in competition atall levels. Such a definition is impossibly wide, since it includes walking to work, sunbathing, sexand line-dancing as sports.

18 Whereas Guttman,From Ritual to Record, 15 55, offers seven characteristics of modern sport,I would suggest that universalisability underlies them, or is a consequence of them see Parry,The Idea of the Record, 204.

19 Borotra, Olympism and Fair Play, 84.20 Fraleigh,Right Actions in Sport, 416.21 Reddiford, Playing to Win, 115.22 Sugden, Sport Intervention in Divided Societies, 8.23 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, passim.24 Hollis, Is Universalism Ethnocentric?, 42.

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Jim Parry - The Power of Sport in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping

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