0

— t

TheW

ashingtonStar

.,* E

dito

rials C

hissified

SE

CT

ION

D

SUN

DA

Y, A

UG

US

T 4

, 1978

jewels?'

by

In• 1975, u

nd

er the d

irectorsh

ip o

f W

illiam C

olb

y, the C

IA fo

un

d itself in

state o

f un

preced

ented

crisis. Its en

tire role h

ad u

nd

ergo

ne a d

ramatic

;lun

ge:, fro

m b

eing

a secret investi-

jative agen

cy it had

beco

me a targ

et o

f pu

blic In

vestigatio

n, w

ith no few

erl an

fou

r,go

vernm

ent bodies scrutiry:77

Wog its p

ast activities. • • -44

• -t Th

e imp

act of th

ese investig

ation

's! O

n th

e no

rmal activities o

f the C

IA'

liat"devastatin

g." A

ccord

ing

to fo

r ;p

ier executives o

f the C

IA, th

e mu

lti-: ' le

inv

estig

atio

ns

did

mu

ch

; mo

re

an

mere

ly p

ara

lyze

the C

IA te

rn-'

• r,

Con

fessor? -..,

uilt-R

idd

en?. ,

Mole? •

• p

ererily, Th

ey resulted

In co

mp

letely, d

emo

ralizing

its 'staff, disru

ptin

g Its',

relation

s with

oth

er Western

intelli-

gen

ce services on

wh

om

it dep

end

ed

for in

form

ation

, discred

iting

it with

th

e pu

blic, an

d, fo

r all practical p

ut.*

po

lies, wreckin

g it as a viab

le intern

gence service. .

The , pro

xim

ate

ca

us

e o

f the

se

, Investigations w

as 'efront-page story.. In

the N

ew Y

ork T

imes o

n D

ec. 22,- 974, b

y S

eym

ou

r Hers

h w

hic

h re

-v

ea

led

tha

t the

CIA

ha

d b

ee

n e

n-

daged for som

e 20 years'in the sort of o

mestic serves lan

ce that h

ad p

eep, ap

eelfically pro

icribed

by th

e CIA

's S

eeder.. T

he H

ersh sto

ry was based

01100,0y-held

C14 rep

ort d

on

e the

previtoof ...year b

y its

insp

ecto

r g

eneral; w

hich

was a co

mp

ilation

of

11114111LOA

'i geeitioeable acJiviliea

prio

r to 1973 an

d w

hich

was term

ed

by C

olb

y the "fam

ily jewels."

,

With

in ill h

ou

rs of p

ub

lication

of

the Times 'expose . ; C

olb

y effectively confirm

ed 7 thilt v era

city cill'. the sto

ry b

y ann

otin

elne

r; .the resig

natio

n •Ilti

ji

James ' JeN

s - An

gletq

lf;"th. : C

IA's,

Chief

Ch

ief o

f 1 ,1n

tvitite

liig7re

i, - • tio had

;?''1: •

.,z i ' ;'•'; ';':

.... I • ; . i •,, yo;:. '4.4

'.1,

11

- .A

ci46 m

ovest recent book by w

riter-'critic dw

ard Jay. Epstein

is Legepd.: The Se-cret

World

of;' L

e H

arv

ey Q

sa

■ ad

(hftGraw

11111.1,1978).-1 1 1

• R

eprinted, by perin

issibn, from

Com

. 'm

eniary sn

agazine, C

opyright _i9 JO

by g

litZtrig

illiblililiP

M (1

1i1

11

1..i

been

men

tion

ed in

Hersh

's repo

rt, all w

ell as An

gleto

n's th

ree top

; dep

uties

on the ;cpunterinteillgence staff.; and C

olby'h

and

-delivered

',It flen

ga

re"

port of hli'o

wn

tO S

e'crereitY'rd S

tate H

enry Kissinger'. Though' w

ritten In a' less sensational (O

ne than 4,0114.4 ex! p

ose, th

is,

th is, rep

ort c leg

el y,y ib

eta

nirl

ate

d.C

te1act, iIt1

I* th

.l co

un

terinteilleeke , staff iteit'w

ell 'as! o

ther elem

ents:o

f •the'cj6lu

ict been,

involved' in qUestIsinable.angY

postibly; illeg

al aCtivitlea:co

llpy 1010 K

issin-ger that he had C

leansed 11141epigt Ot

agen

ts' nam

es and

secret ePetatio

nu

so

that th

e'presid

ent co

ulO

nah

e it availab

le tO th

e 'press. co

llipilso

hp

-: p

end

ed to

; the

rep

ort .'inf

ttrmatitio

Hersh

had

no

t dIvu

lged

;',ieClu

din

g a'

list,Of alleged 'aisessinatioit ettem

ptit b

y . the. C

IA': ; C

on

fron

ted w

ith W

itt docunient, P

resid

en

t Fo

rd h

ad

little choice but;to ipi

a an Jet.).it4ingatiep

Ot th

e C

lkiih

r • L

:,;!jh

,1 ;1.A?

'

• 'NY

: .' „

'l' je

wel;

:.-.:

Ho

w h

ad th.e.;

tv in

nt,, t

he

first lea

ked

to .g

le N

el.sY

er Im

es its Te

first place/ T

his 11(44,0*. P

ositio

n p

ut

to . Colb

y; In ri 925 ' b

y,. R

ichard , 11. lielin

s, him

self a form

er directo

r of

the C

IA. A

ccording 'to Held

s's recol-

lection of th

eir con

versation

, 'Co

lby

114Rghalailtiltsaall

k

He

rsh

," A(th

e'tim

e, H

elm

s d

id n

ot

fully co

mp

rehen

d w

hat. Co

lby m

eant

by th

is adm

ission

. It seeme

d•a

lmo

st

inco

nceivab

le to h

im th

at the d

Ireq

for o

f the C

IA, w

ho

m h

e had

alwayl,

fou

nd

to b

e an in

telligen

t, discreet;

and

com

pletely resp

on

sible o

fficer, and w

ho had sworn an oath to protect

the n

ation

's secrets, cou

ld h

ave re. vealed

such

critical info

rmetio

n fo

r. P

ub

lication

:-Yet th

e next tim

e Helm

s saw

Colby, he again asked him

about th

e leak, and

Co

lby reiterated

that h

e had confirm

ed the story to Hersh and

the H

ew Y

ork T

imes.

;1 •

Th

at it was C

olb

y him

self wh

o h

ad

'eng

ineered

the leak o

leo b

ecame

clear in th

e mean

time to

mem

bers o

f th

e CIA

'e cou

nterin

telligen

ce clad

who had been forced to resign oq eci

fount or it. In his autobiography, C

olby gives a som

ewhat m

ore circumspect account

of th

e incid

ent. H

e claims th

at Hersh

telep

ho

ned

him

'excititili, saying

int w

as investig

ating

1110gal P

A actIvb

ties, an

d:req

uestin

g - on

,Ilnk

ervievi; C

olb

y explain

s that sin

ce Hersh, had

coo

perated

with

him

a few m

on

ths

earlier in suppressing the story of the C

ilum

aelpiorm

a10,141,9Esth

im

the interview he requested and could

trust h

is respo

nsib

ility. . . " ti

In th

e interview

. Co

lby asserts, h

e 'attem

pted

to "p

ut in

pro

per p

erspec.

tive" bo

th th

e CIA

's investig

ation

of

the an

ti-war m

ovem

ent in

the U

nited

S

tates and

the C

IA's su

rveillance o

f

mAma

it filtaen—citiz e ns_.

H

e a

ckn

ow

led

ges 'c

on

firmin

g to

H

ersh that the CIA

had, in the case of th

e mail in

tercepts, s

om

etim

es

vio

-la

ted

its c

harte

r (an

d th

e la

w). H

p

pro

vided

Hersh

' with

incrim

inatin

g

details ab

ou

t oth

er hig

hly classified

and illegal surveillance activities.

t' ,•••

Co

lby sayS

that h

e did

no

t realize ?the public release of this inform

atiop w

oeld

have th

e "traum

atic con

se-q

uen

ces" it did

. Th

e on

ly reason

he to

ld H

ersh ab

ou

t it, he w

rites, was to

lay to

rest rum

ors w

hich

Hersh

had

,h

eard o

f even m

ore in

crimin

ating

a divities on the part of the C

IA. ; •;-;

,Th

is explan

ation

, ho

wever, is n

ot

entirel,y .'convincing..) W

hatever th

e 'M

eal': Co

lby m

ay have h

ad • w

ith.

Hersh

' to su

pp

ress the G

lom

arrEs,

plo

rer story, it cou

ld ro

t have b

een,

gala

o. eg

t.1

j

tim new

y

ule

1113ir E

dward Jay E

pstein

deta

ils o

f a s

ecre

t and c

losely

held

',re

port --

so

se

cre

t, ind

ee

d, th

at (a

s

4.r-{C

olb

y

adm

its) h

e h

ad n

ot e

ven

brie

fed P

resid

ent N

ixon o

r Pre

sident

Ford

or H

enry

Kis

sin

ger a

bout its

existe

nce

. C

olb

y's

role

in th

e "fa

mily

jew

els

" a

ffair tu

rns o

ut to

ha

ve

invo

lve

d a

g

rea

t de

al m

ore

tha

n ta

lkin

g to

a re

-p

orte

r, or fa

iling

to ta

lk. to

the

pre

si-

dent. T

he "fa

mily

jew

els

" report w

as

no o

rdin

ary

CIA

do

cum

en

t. It wa

s

Colb

y w

ho d

rafte

d th

e d

irectiv

e

ord

erin

g a

ll CIA

pe

rso

nn

el to

rep

ort

an

y pa

st tran

sgre

ssion

s or q

ue

stion

-able

activity th

ey kn

ew

of; a

nd it w

as

Co

lby w

ho

from

sta

rt to fin

ish s

up

er-

inte

nd

ed

the

69

3-p

ag

e re

po

rt. It wa

s als

o C

olb

y w

ho b

riefe

d S

enato

rs

Stu

art S

ymin

gto

n a

nd Jo

hn S

tennis,

an

d C

on

gre

ssm

en

Ed

wa

rd H

eb

ert

an

d L

ucie

n N

ed

zi, a

bo

ut th

e re

po

rt, and w

hO cettiU

lted th

e Dep

artm e

st of

Justice

on

the

issue

of th

e le

ga

lity of

a n

um

be

r of th

e "je

we

ls. T

o h

e

su

re, a

ny o

ne

of th

ese

pa

rties m

ay

have

leake

d a

spects o

f the re

port, b

ut

the c

onfirm

atio

n, a

nd th

e d

eta

ils.

whic

h tu

rned it in

to a

front-p

age

story ca

me

from

Co

lby.

Why w

ould

a d

irecto

r of th

e C

IA

reve

al th

ese

, and o

ther, ske

leto

ns in

th

e C

IA's

clo

se

t? W

he

n I p

ose

d th

is

questio

n to

a fo

rmer c

olle

ague

of C

olb

y's in th

e CIA

, he sa

id th

at th

ere

Se

e C

OL

BY

, 1:1-4 w

ere•three eq

ually p

lausib

le theo

ries to

explain

Co

lby's b

ehavio

r. Th

eory

_one, Colby w

as a con

ge

nita

l "confes-so

r," wh

o sin

cere

ly be

lieve

d th

e C

IA

t hp

uld

no

t be a secret service an

d

here

fore

free

ly d

isc

los

ed

info

rm-

'Iron

to all co

rners. T

heo

ry two

, Co

lby

lid b

ecom

e overw

helm

ed w

ith g

uilt

du

ring

his lo

ng

and

gru

eling

tou

r of

'du

ly in V

ietnam

, and

to p

urg

e him

-'self o

f this g

uilt, h

e turn

ed ag

ainst

,the C

IA. T

he th

ird w

as the asto

nish

-M

g :th

eo

ry th

at C

olb

y m

igh

t be

a

:So

Viel "m

ole," o

r pen

etration

agen

t,, -w

ho

had

been

ord

ered to

wreck th

e ;intelligence service.

Th

e ve

ry fa

ct th

at su

ch th

eories,'

mid

' especially th

e third

, sho

uld

be

Me

n C

urs

esthe fero

city,

of -fe

elin

g In

the

Inte

llige

nce

ca

m-

munity

over C

olb

y's

goin

g p

ublic

. Y

et.n

one o

f these th

eories even

re- m

ote

ly fits

the

kn

ow

n fa

cts

ab

ou

t p

op

y's

care

er In

the C

IA. F

ar fro

m,

eing

i bo

rn "co

rifessor,' as th

e first theory suggests, it w

as because of his d

iscretion

and

dem

on

strated lo

yalty th

at he,w

as cho

sen to

be C

IA d

irec- A

cir,-,Th

e secon

d th

eory, tracin

g h

is rq

otlie

s to

his

ex

pe

rien

ce

in- V

iet-

nam

, also seem

s inad

equ

ate; Co

lby]

was p

rou

d o

f his acco

mp

lishm

entS

. O

w;

. there is no basis w

hatever fu

r the n

otio

n th

at Co

lby is a "m

ole."

If'Co

lby

we

re a

So

vie

t /ag

en

t, on

e

would have expected his career to be

7atiidded with intelligence successes

lAviticii th

e So

viets wo

uld

have p

ro-

Aided for purposes of his prom

otion). B

ut th

e fact is that u

p u

ntil V

ietnam

b

e h

ad

few

if an

y successes as an

;in

telligen

ce officer. N

or h

ad h

e de-.

eirsIppext any secret sources; instead, S

hia career w

as bu

ilt on

his co

mp

e-le

ney a

s a

n a

dm

inis

trato

r an

d a

'p

rob

lem

-so

lver. F

urth

erm

ore

, it :seem

s Inconceivable that the Soviets,

if they h

ad m

anag

ed to

brin

g o

ne o

f :,th

eir a

ge

nts

to th

e p

oin

t of b

ein

g

;Tracto

r of th

e CIA

, wo

uld

then

risk "tuthing his career by having him

leak ;S

ecrets to the press. S

inc

e th

es

e th

ree

the

orie

s a

re'

Ina

de

qu

ate

to e

xp

lain

Co

lby

's s

e-

-Slo

ps, it is n

ecessary to co

nsid

er a le

urth

po

ss

ibility

— th

at th

e le

ak

s

'were p

art of a m

aneu

ver inten

ded

to

)telidve C

olb

y of an

extremely vexin

g

bu

reaucratic p

rob

lem.

;,-,When C

olby was appointed deputy

directo

r of p

lans b

y Sch

lesing

er in

1973, and

too

k 'charg

e of th

e CIA

's clan

destin

e activities, he fo

un

d U

.S.

intellig

ence virtu

ally paralyzed

wh

en,

;it ca

me

to d

ete

rmin

ing

the

So

vie

t. U

nio

n's m

ilitary and

strategic in

ten-,

Bops, W

hile satellites and other tech.,. M

eal devices d

id p

rovid

e a con

stant

.flow of data on S

oviet economic, m

ill-. 'tarry,

and

tech

no

log

ical .ach

ievemen

ts, som

e form

of h

uin

as :in

telligen

ce — sp

ecifically. spies --1!

' was still n

eeded

in o

rder to

acqu

ire] ,ko

oveled

ge o

f ho

w th

e So

viets -te

nd

ed

to u

se

the

se

resou

rces. Fo

r:

bead

y e/ decad

ettio

wevsr, th

e CIA

;lied b

een u

nable

to re

cruit a

ny a

gent

-wills

access to

the s

ecre

ts o

f the

:krem

lin w

ho

wa

s con

side

red

relia

ble

: th

e C

IA's

counte

rinte

lligence

eva

luato

rs. T

he re

cru

itment o

f agents

insid

e

the

. So

vie

t Un

ion

ha

d a

lwa

ys

pre

sen

ted

a p

rob

lem

for U

.S. in

telli-

gence. S

ince th

e S

ovie

t Unio

n is

a

clo

sed a

nd rig

idly

com

partm

enta

l-iz

ed

society, w

ith alm

ost n

o m

ove-

ment am

ong the various sectors, the C

IA h

ad d

ecided

that it m

ade little

liaise to attem

pt to

recruit its o

wn

ag

epis am

on

g S

oviet citizen

s and

th

en m

aneu

ver them

into

po

sition

s w

here th

ey wo

uld

have access to

etate'secrets. E

ven if it succeeded in m

aking

such

recruitm

ents, an

d even

ltelie, agents escaped the detection of

1

om

nip

resen

t secu

rity fo

rces,

-there w

as no

way o

f insu

ring

that

they would ever achieve a position of

value- •

• A'-; T

he

refo

re, th

e C

IA a

ime

d a

t re-

.cruiting persons who already had ac-

Leess to Soviet s

tate

secre

ts; fo

r all

:practical p

urp

ose

s, this m

eant high-

rankin

g S

oviet in

telligen

ce officers

„dispatched to the West. O

ne program

In.th

e la

te 1

95

0s

, for e

xa

mp

le, in

-.V

olved

simp

ly teleph

on

ing

So

viet in

tellig

en

ce o

fficers

atta

ch

ed

to

emb

assies in th

e West an

d askin

g if

they h

ad an

y interest in

selling

se-crets_ T

he id

ea app

arently w

as that

even if 99 o

ut o

f 100 hu

ng

up

, a few

Contacts w

ould be made.

CIA

officers of course realized that the prospects for recruiting w

ere not g

oo

d. S

oviet o

fficers are carefully

'screened

befo

re they era allo

wed

to

attain p

ositio

ns o

f status in

the elite

Intellig

ence o

rgan

ization

s, and

be-

fore being posted to the West. M

ore-' o

ver, their fam

ilies are held

ho

stage

In th

e So

viet Un

ion

, and

any m

on

ey th

e CIA

mig

ht o

ffer for co

mm

itting

espionage w

ould be of no use to them'

ht 'h

om

e. N

evertheless, the C

IA d

id

have a

nu

mb

er o

f early

recru

iting

su

ccesses — m

ost n

otab

ly Co

lon

el P

eter Po

po

v in th

e early

1950s and C

olonel Oleg P

enkovsky in 1961. Y

et th

e re

cru

itmen

t pro

cess In

-, vO

lved conhiderable risks. Since the

- Ru

ssians kn

ow

that th

e CIA

is de

-' pendent o

n S

ovie

t inte

lligence

agents

igt .01 97flalM

tf!9/ Pan

hive ag

ents

conta

ct the C

IA a

nd fe

ed it ca

refu

lly p

rep

are

d sto

ries d

esig

ne

d to

pro

voke

.,a

nd m

isle

ad W

este

rn In

tellig

ence.

Su

ch

"dis

info

rma

tion

" op

era

tion

s, if

clea

rly orch

estra

ted

, can

wo

rk disa

s- • tro

usly w

ell to

dece

ive a

n e

ne

my

=-

lion

: •

,• •

The re

sponsib

ility for w

eedin

g o

ut

?.'d

isin

form

atio

n" a

nd

frau

du

len

t e

mits

wa

s v

es

ted

in a

sm

all C

IA

cou

nterin

telligen

ce staff head

ed b

y ',Taw

s Jesus Angleton. It w

as the job

of th

e co

unte

rinte

lligence

staff to

sus-, p

ea

•eve

ry a

ge

nt re

cru

ited

by o

the

r; cliyisio

ns o

f the

CIA

as b

ein

g possibly

a "p

lan

t" or d

ou

ble

-ag

en

t, an

d to

; th

elkng

e data fro

m su

ch so

urces as

passib

le "d

isin

form

atio

n." O

gle

- - .ten

's con

stant su

spicio

ns n

atMally

tend

ed to

frustrate th

ose case o

ffi-cers w

ho believed they had recruited ifa

hla

ble

agents

and th

ose re

ports

office

rs whose

job it w

as to

produce a ,coherent picture of S

oviet activities_ The suspicions of A

ngleton and his c

ou

nte

rinte

llige

nc

e s

taff w

ere

g

reatly heig

hten

ed in

1961 wh

en -a

KG

B o

fficer, An

atoly M

. Go

litsin, d

e-tected to the C

IA and told A

ngleton in. his d

eb

riefin

gs th

at th

e K

GB

was in

th

e p

roc

es

s o

f mo

un

ting

ix m

ajo

r: deception o

pe

ratio

n w

hic

h w

ou

ld in

-. volve "disinform

ation" agents posing eith

er as d

isside

nt S

ovie

t inte

llige

nce

offic

ers

or a

s o

utrig

ht d

efe

cto

rs.'

Go

litsin

furth

er s

ug

ge

ste

d th

at th

e

So

viets h

od

pe

ne

trate

d b

oth

the

CIA

a

nd

the

FB

I — ju

st as th

ey h

ad

pe

ne

-tra

ted B

ritish in

tellig

ence w

ith K

im

Ph

ilby a

nd

We

st Ge

rma

n in

tellig

en

ce

with

He

inz F

elfe

— a

nd

tha

t the

S

ovie

t "mo

le" in

the C

IA h

ad b

een

activated in 1959.

• W

hether or not a penetration of the C

IA b

y th

e S

ov

iets

ha

d o

cc

urre

d,

An

gleto

n b

ecame fu

lly con

vinced

th

at the S

oviets w

ere invo

lved in

a "d

isinfo

rmatio

n" g

ame w

hen

a nu

m-

ber o

f oth

er So

viet intellig

ence o

ffi-cers b

egan

volu

nteerin

g h

igh

ly sus-

pect in

form

ation

to th

e CIA

and

FB

I. These included Y

uri Nosenko, w

hose 'to

ry partly co

llapsed

wh

en S

oviet

ca

ble

traffic

wa

s in

terc

ep

ted

: "F

edo

ra," as be w

as cod

e-nam

ed b

y

,114,!

CortIFE,q6

reau

cra

tic Im

passe to

the re

cru

it-m

en

t of n

ew

ag

en

ts w

as re

so

lved

. U

nd

er C

olb

y's

new

po

licy, th

e C

IA

co

uld

take h

igh

er ris

ks in

accep

ting

vo

lun

teers

am

on

g C

om

mu

nis

t offi-

cia

ls a

nd

dis

tribu

te th

e in

form

atio

n

from

them

as w

ell a

s th

e d

ata

that

had

lon

g b

een b

ottled

up

on

the su

spi-

cio

n th

at it w

as fro

m "d

isin

form

a-

tion

" a

gen

ts. B

ut w

hile

this

led

ra

pid

ly to

the p

rod

uctio

n o

f new

in

form

ation

, it did

no

t solve th

e cou

n-

terin

tellig

en

ce p

rob

lem

. Ind

eed

, it led

to n

ew crises.

• E

arly

in 1

975 o

ne o

f An

gle

ton

's

cou

nterin

telligen

ce dep

uties w

ho

had

sta

yed

on

for s

evera

l mo

nth

s to

as-

sist with

the tran

sition

was in

form

ed

that th

e a

gen

cy h

ad

just m

ad

e

a

majo

r recru

itmen

t in M

osco

w.

Co

lby's p

olicy o

f acceptin

g all vo

lun

-teers h

ad o

bvio

usly b

een p

ut in

to ef-

fect. T

he ag

ent w

ho

m th

e CIA

recruited

w

as San

ya L. L

ipaysky, a 42-year-o

ld

neu

rosu

rgeo

n o

f- Jewish

descen

t wh

o

was e

mp

loyed

by th

e D

rivers

' Li-

cen

se B

ure

au

in M

osco

w a

s a

m

edical exam

iner. L

lpaysky claim

ed

that h

e h

ad

pre

vio

usly

been

a s

ur-

geo

n in

Mu

rman

sk a

nd

in th

at g

rou

p,

cap

acity

had

treate

d S

ovie

t pers

on

—:, S

om

e tw

o y

ears

late

r it turn

ed

ou

t n

el a

ttach

ed

to th

e n

ucle

ar s

ub

ma- th

at th

e m

an

the C

IA s

up

po

sed

it had

rin

e b

ases in

the a

rea. W

hen

this

recru

ited

was a

ctu

ally

in th

e s

erv

ice

info

rmatio

n w

as c

on

veyed

back fro

m o

f the K

GB

, Ap

pare

ntly

he a

p-

Mo

sc

ow

to C

IA h

ea

dq

ua

rters

atp

roa

ch

ed

the

CIA

on

ly a

fter th

e K

GB

, L

an

gle

y, th

e c

ase o

fficeE

hlo

sco

/ 4 .kik

l. fa

ther

• •

from

pris

on

in e

xc

ha

ng

e fo

r wh

ich

L

ipaysky ag

reed to

act as a pro

voca-

teu

r. In M

arc

h 1

977 L

lpaysky p

ub

-lis

hed

an

acco

un

t of h

is C

IA a

ctiv

i-tie

s in

the

go

ve

rnm

en

t ne

ws

pa

pe

r izvestia,

iden

tified

the "d

ead

dro

p"

the C

IA h

ad

assig

ned

him

an

d w

en

t o

n to

den

ou

nce S

hch

ara

nsky a

nd

o

ther J

ew

ish

activ

ists

as tra

itors

, cla

imin

g th

at th

ey h

ad

co

op

era

ted

w

ith h

im in

co

llectin

g in

form

atio

n

abo

ut h

ow

techn

ical equ

ipm

ent su

p-

plied

by firm

s in th

e West w

as bein

g

used

for c

ou

nte

resp

ion

ag

e a

gain

st

dissid

ents. T

he S

oviets th

en m

oved

to

arre

st S

hch

ara

nsky a

nd

oth

er d

issi

de

nts

on

the

ch

arg

e o

f co

op

era

ting

w

ith th

e CIA

.

It qu

ickly

becam

e a

pp

are

nt in

W

ash

ing

ton

that th

e K

GB

had

p

lanted

Lip

aysky on

the C

IA in

ord

er to

co

mp

rom

ise th

e h

um

an

-righ

ts

mo

vem

en

t in R

ussia

. Th

is w

as a

lso

em

barra

ssin

g to

Pre

sid

en

t Carte

r. w

ho

, even th

ou

gh

he h

ad b

een b

riefed

on

Lip

aysky's

CIA

co

nn

ectio

n, h

ad

p

ub

licly stated th

at Sh

charan

sky was

in n

o w

ay invo

lved w

ith th

e CIA

. Th

e d

eg

ree to

wh

ich

Lip

aysky (a

nd

the

KG

B) m

igh

t have fra

med

Sh

ch

a-

ran

sky a

nd

en

trap

ped

oth

er d

issi-

den

ts by m

anip

ulatin

g th

em in

to as-

sis

ting

him

was n

ot k

no

wn

; bu

t the

. S

ovie

ts c

learly

held

the tru

mp

— a

"C

IA" a

gen

t willin

g to

imp

licate

o

ther S

oviet d

issiden

ts — an

d P

resi-d

en

t Ca

rter to

pre

clu

de

furth

er

emb

arrassmen

t as well as tp

lessen

the d

am

ag

e to

the

vic

tims

of th

e

un

fortu

nate C

IA recru

itmen

t entered

in

to secret n

ego

tiation

s with

the S

ovi-

ets

to m

ak

e th

e b

es

t de

al h

e C

ou

ld

un

der th

e circum

stances.

ti W

hate

ver m

ay b

e th

e o

utc

om

e o

f th

e secret deal, th

e action

of th

e CIA

. in

recru

iting

Lip

aysky in

the firs

t 'p

lace s

eem

s in

exp

licab

le. L

lpaysky

had

no

access to secret in

form

atiop

; h

e had

no

persu

asive mo

tive to risk

his

life fo

r the C

IA; a

nd

he w

as in

-vo

lved in

a mo

vemen

t wh

ose in

teg-

rity a

nd

cre

dib

ility w

ere

extra

or-

din

arily

imp

orta

nt to

the U

nite

d

Sta

tes

. At b

es

t he

mig

ht h

av

e b

ee

n

able to

iden

tify oth

er po

ssible targ

ets for recru

itmen

t by th

e CIA

. T

he p

oin

t of th

e exercise may h

ave b

een o

nly b

ureau

cratic: to p

rove th

at w

itho

ut in

terfe

ren

ce fro

m A

ng

leto

n

and

his co

un

terintellig

ence staff, th

e! C

IA w

as capab

le of recru

iting

agen

ts even

insid

e R

ussia

. Yet n

o m

atte

r w

hat th

e ra

tion

ale

may h

ave b

een

, th

e L

ipaysky a

ffair d

em

on

stra

tes

that th

e d

ifficu

lties in

here

nt in

A

merican

cou

nterin

telligen

ce. efforts

have n

ot b

een

so

lved

. On

the c

on

-tra

ry, it

seems

cle

ar th

at C

olb

y's

n

ew b

ureau

cratic meth

od

s no

t on

ly h

ave so far p

roved

useless b

ut h

ave g

iven

rise to

pro

ble

ms o

f an

'even

m

ore

delic

ate

an

d p

ossib

ly d

an

ger-

ous kind.

(pre

su

mab

ly w

ork

ing

un

der d

iplo

-m

atic

co

ver) w

as a

uth

orize

d to

re-

cru

it Lip

ay

sk

y. T

he

CIA

the

n s

up

-p

lied

Lip

aysky w

ith th

e e

sp

ion

ag

e

app

aratus n

ecessary for h

im to

pass

alo

ng

info

rmatio

n h

e m

igh

t acq

uire

, an

d h

e was assig

ned

a "dead

dro

p"

— re

po

rted

ly a

ho

llow

ed

-ou

t cab

le

from

wh

ich h

is messag

es cou

ld later

be

retrie

ve

d b

y a

no

the

r co

urie

r for

the C

IA.

Co

lby's

new

man

In M

osco

w w

as

also h

eavily invo

lved w

ith a g

rou

p o

f Jew

ish d

issiden

ts wh

o w

ere leadin

g

the h

um

an-rig

hts m

ovem

ent in

Ru

s-sia

. In fa

ct, h

e s

hare

d a

roo

m w

ith

An

atoly S

hch

aransky, a yo

un

g en

gi-

neer w

ho

was th

e spo

kesman

for th

e m

ovem

en

t; an

d h

e h

ad

ing

ratia

ted

h

imself w

ith a

nu

mb

er o

f oth

er J

ew

-is

h a

ctiv

ists

, inclu

din

g V

lad

imir

Slep

ak (wh

o h

ad received

a telegram

o

f su

pp

ort fro

m J

imm

y C

arte

r du

r-in

g th

e 1976 presid

ential cam

paig

n),

Vita

ly R

ub

in a

nd

Ale

ksan

dr L

ern

er.

Du

ring

the p

erio

d o

f his

serv

ice to

th

e'CIA

, Llp

aysky con

tinu

ed to

main

- • taro

and

to in

tensify h

is con

tacts with

Jew

ish d

issiden

ts wh

o, o

f cou

rse, had

n

ot th

e s

ligh

test id

ea th

at L

ipaysky

was a

nyth

ing

bu

t a m

em

ber o

f their

the F

BI. w

ho su

pp

orted N

osenk

o on

elemen

ts of his story w

hich

Nosen

ko

adm

itted w

ere fabrication

s; and

Yu

ri L

og

ino

v, w

ho

, after co

nfirm

ing

N

osen

ko's sto

ry, red

efected fro

m

Sou

th A

frica to Ru

ssia. A

ngleton

and

his staff th

ereup

on

stiffened

their resistan

ce to inform

a-tion

from S

oviet intelligen

ce officers —

an

d to

the d

istribu

tion

of su

ch

info

rmatio

n a

mon

g o

ther W

estern

intelligen

ce services. Qu

ite abru

ptly,

the recru

itmen

t of agents grou

nd

to a h

alt. T

ensio

n a

lso d

evelo

ped

betw

een

the C

IA an

d th

e FB

I over this issu

e. T

he C

IA's cou

nterin

telligence staff,

wh

ich served

as liaison w

ith th

e FB

I, h

ad

con

clud

ed th

at a

mo

ng

So

viet

"d

isinform

ation"

agents w

ere three

officers work

ing u

nd

er UN

cover in

New

York

and

passin

g Inform

ation to

the F

BI. S

ince J. E

dgar H

oover had

b

uilt a

larg

e pa

rt of th

e FB

I's spy-

catch

ing p

rogra

m o

n w

hat th

ese S

oviet agents h

ad p

rovided

, he ch

ose n

ot to believe the cou

nterin

telligence

staff. By 1970 th

e resultin

g friction

betw

een th

e two agen

cies led H

oover virtu

ally

to b

reak

off F

BI co

nta

ct w

ith the CIA

. T

he in

telligen

ce com

mu

nity

wa

s th

us "

a hou

se divid

ed again

st itself,"

as Helm

s later pu

t it. At th

e root of th

e prob

lem w

as the q

uestion

of how

serio

usly

to a

ssess the S

oviet ca

-p

acity

for d

eceptio

n. A

ng

leton

be-

lieved th

at the S

oviets not on

ly had

su

ch a

cap

acity

bu

t used

it con

sist-en

tly to mislead

the C

IA. M

oreover, h

is co

un

terintellig

ence sta

ff at-

tribu

ted th

e CIA

's failure to recru

it w

orthw

hile S

oviet agents to th

e pres-

ence o

f a "

mole"

or to

som

e oth

er form

of pen

etration. T

hose op

posin

g th

is view argu

ed th

at An

gleton an

d

his sta

ff .ha

d o

verestim

ated

the

Soviet u

se of decep

tion, an

d th

e fail-u

re to recruit agen

ts stemm

ed from

h

is staff's u

nm

erited su

spicio

ns o

f every p

otential recru

it.

• C

olby h

ad lon

g sided

with

the tat-

ter poin

t of view. H

e resolved, even

b

efore h

e beca

me d

irector, th

at h

e "

wou

ld try to shift ou

r major effort to

con

tacts b

etween

ou

r officers a

nd

C

om

mu

nist o

fficials a

nd

tak

e the

chan

ce of mak

ing a few

mistak

es in

return

for recru

iting a

lot m

ore

1404 tItanilin

facton's) u

ltracareful

app

roach allow

ed."

In early 1973, he

note

s in h

is au

tob

iograp

hy, h

e

"recom

men

ded

to Sch

lesinger th

at A

ngleton

ough

t to be let go, reiterat-

ing m

y long-h

eld feelin

g that h

is ul-

traconsp

iratorial turn

of min

d h

ad, at

least in recen

t years, becom

e more of

a lia

bility

than

an

',asset to

the

agency."

'tot,

S

chlesin

ger refu

sed to

accep

t C

olby's ad

vice. Th

ree mon

ths later,

in th

e Watergate crisis, C

olby took

o

ver fro

m S

chlesin

ger a

s directo

r, a

nd

ag

ain

ma

neu

vered

to fo

rce A

ngleton

out b

y cuttin

g off his liaison

w

ith th

e F

pj.. B

ut, eC

olby riotes,

An

gleto

n '"

du

g in

hie •h

eels, f an

d

Colb

y then

y

ielded

, "b

ecau

se'

feared th

at An

gleton's p

rofessional

integ

rity a

nd

perso

nal in

tensity

m

igh

t have led

him

to ta

ke d

ire m

ea

sures if I fo

rced

the issu

e."

(P

resum

ab

ly, th

at 'is, A

ngleto

n

migh

t, if it came to a pow

er struggle', a

ttemp

t to g

o o

ver C

olb

y's h

ead

to

the p

residen

t.) Firin

g An

gleton w

as ob

viously goin

g to requ

ire mere th

an

a mere req

uest or even

a codk

On

ta-tion.

It was at th

is poin

t that C

oley real-ized

that S

eymou

r Hersh

willein

ter-ested

in d

oing an

expose of th

e CIA

. In

his autob

iograph

y, Colb

y gives the

followin

g chron

ology. .

• D

ecember 17, 1974: C

olby d

ecides

"to face u

p to m

y respon

sibility to re-

move Jim

An

gleton"

before th

e end

of th

e year; An

gleton again

"resists"

, C

olb

y's su

gg

estion

tha

t he retire

from cou

nterin

telligence.

• D

ecemb

er 18

: Co

lby

spea

ks tc

Ilereh o

n th

e teleph

on

e — a

call

Colb

y clams Ilersh

initiated

. •

Decem

ber 2

0: C

olb

y m

eets with

H

ersh, tells h

im a

bo

ut A

ng

leton

's role in

the m

ail-cover program m

od •, "

confirm

s" h

is expose.

• • teeeeeis. •

Decem

ber 21 (th

is particu

lar entry

does n

ot app

ear in th

e Colb

y book

):' C

olb

y tells A

ngelto

n a

bou

t the

comin

g liersh exp

ose tend

Insists o

a

his resign

ation.

•

Decem

ber 2

2: T

he liersh

exp

ose.

app

ears. •,

j

• D

ecember

23

: Co

lby

an

no

un

ces A

ngleton

'e resignation

.

ea Decem

ber 24: C

olby su

bm

its his

length

y report to the p

residen

t.

Colb

y succeed

ed in

his ob

jective of rem

ovin

g A

ngleto

n. lie a

lso fo

rced

the resign

ation of th

e three top

dep

u.

ties on th

e coun

terintelligen

ce staff a

nd

tran

sferred a

nu

mb

er of o

ther

officers o

n th

e staff,' w

hich

nev

er n

um

bered

mo

re tha

n 2

5, to

oth

er p

arts of the C

IA. T

he n

ew ap

poin

tees cam

e main

ly from th

e Far E

ast Divi-

sion

or V

ietna

m. F

or a

ll pra

ctical

pu

rposes, C

olby h

ad ob

literated th

e cou

nterin

telligence op

eration w

hich

A

ng

leton

ha

d d

evelo

ped

ov

er a 2

0-

yea

r perio

d. F

iles were sh

ifted to

o

ther d

epa

rtmen

ts an

d, in

som

e ca

ses, destro

yed

. In a

ma

tter of

week

s the in

stitution

al mem

ory was

erased.

With

the term

ination of Angleton

and

the key one oa his staff. 0(

I'

•

tti I eh

i

tr