Climate, Food Security and Conflicts in Africa

Jean-François Maystadt

Lancaster University Management School 10 February 2015

Conference ““Food insecurity: what role in African conflicts?” Center for Security and Defense Studies, Royal Higher Institute for Defense

Email: j.maystadt@lancaster.ac.uk Twitter: @jfmaystadt

Global Hunger Index, IFPRI, 2014

Conflicts in 2012

Correlation is not causation

Food insecurity is certainly a consequence of conflict The economic and social costs of conflict are high

More than 1.5 billion people live in fragile and conflict-affected countries and many of them are poor/food insecure (World Bank 2011)

For each year of conflict, economic growth may fall by 2.3 percent and that it may take a total of 17 years before the country catches up with its preconflict position (Collier, 2007)

Conflict has a severe impacts on human health, education, and nutrition (Chamarbagwala and Moran, 2011; Akresh and de Walque, 2008; Shemyakina, 2011; Dagnelie et al. 2014)

But could food security also be a determinant of conflict?

Under the increasing threat of climate change

Outline of the talk

Food Security

Conflict Climate

1. How is climate likely to affect food security in Africa?

2. Is food security likely to affect conflicts in Africa?

3. The rise of climate-induced conflicts: Food security as a channel?

4. What can be done to beak the conflict trap?

1. How is climate likely to affect food security in Africa?

Climate Food Security

A note on food security

Food Security is a situation that exists when all people at all times have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (FAO 2001)

3 components: availability, accessibility, and utilization – Availability: a measure of food that is, and will be, physically available in

the relevant vicinity of a population during a given period

– Accessibility: a measure of the population’s ability to acquire available food during a given period;

– Utilization: a measure of whether a population will be able to derive sufficient nutrition during a given period.

Stability: Vulnerability (the likelihood of experiencing future loss of welfare, generally weighted by the magnitude of expected welfare loss ) and resilience (ability to recover from such a welfare loss)

Climate change threatens food availability and accessibility, through decreased crop yields

Source: Burke and Lobell (2010), chap. 2

Negative effect of 22% (maize), 17-18% (sorghum, millet, groundnuts), and 8% (Cassava) by 2050 in SSA (Lobell et al., 2011) and extended by others (Blanc 2012; Roudier et al., 2011; Berg et al., 2013, …).

Negative effect on economic growth in SSA (Barrios et al. 2010, REStat)

Particularly among poor countries (Dell et al. 2012, 2014, JEL)

Climate change threatens food accessibility, through the effect on food prices

Booming demand (population growth, income, diet change, biofuels)

Limited supply (slowdown in agricultural productivity due to lack of investment)

Food prices are expected to increase.

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Food Price IndexDairy Price IndexCereals Price Index

Source: FAO & IFPRI

Source: Burke and Lobell, 2010, chap. 2

Increased food prices: Is it a bad news?

In particular since adaptation has been (so far) limited … and even more among the poor

Source: Burke and Lobell, 2010, chap. 8. Trade is also key. On migration, see e.g. Marchiori, Maystadt, and Schumacher (2012, JEEM)

2. Is food security likely to affect conflicts in Africa?

Income & price effects

Food Security

Conflict

A note on the economics of conflict

Likelihood of conflict

• Opportunity cost to participate to violence depends on alternative income, the potential loss and rewards (poverty, youth, etc.)

• Looting/rapacity effect

Fighting is costly (illegal trade, rents, diasporas support)

The bigger the price at stake, the higher the potential loot (natural resources, etc)

• Coordination costs & Motivation (ethnicity, inequality, etc)

• State capacity & Polity : Government support (“hearts and minds”), lack of political voice

Income channel: the usual suspect

Source: Blattman and Miguel (2010, JEL)

Income channel

Methodological channel: Simultaneity

• Exogeneous shocks (rainfall shocks, commodity price shocks) in FE2SLS used to assess how economic shocks affect the likelihood of conflict in SSA

• Miguel et al. (2004, JPE): 1979-1999, a 5% decrease in income growth increases conflict by 12.5% (mean at 27)

• Bruckner and Ciccone (2010, EJ): 1981-2006, a 5% decrease in income growth increases conflict by 10%

• Debate on these papers but main conclusion remains that poverty is the most robust predictor of conflict

Price channel?

Source: Lagi, Bertrand and Bar-Yam (2011)

Price-induced food insecurity is a cause of conflict Particularly in food import dependent countries with a large share of net food

consumers, such as the Arab world, are highly vulnerable

Arab countries between 1960 and 2010: Arab league, incl. North Sudan, Somalia

2SLS-FE model points to the vulnerability of food net importers to changes in food international prices for food insecurity and in turn, to the risk of conflict

A price-induced increase by one standard deviation of the child stunting, the mortality rate, and the macroeconomic food insecurity index increase the risk of conflict by 10.19%, 11.02%, and 0.04% points.

Food prices and the subsequent deterioration on food insecurity are a driver of conflict in the Arab world (Maystadt et al. 2012)

Source: Maystadt, J.-F., J.-F. Trinh Tan and C. Breisinger. 2014. Does Food Security Matter for Transition in Arab Countries. Food Policy 46: 106-115.

Higher food prices is a cause of social unrest Similar study for SSA? But an established link with food riots

Source: Bellemare, M. 2014. Rising Food prices, price Volatility, and Social Unrest. Am. J. Agr. Economics 97(1): 1-21

Using monthly data between 1990 and 2011. OLS and 2SLS (using natural disasters)

Food prices (not volatility) increase social unrest

3. The rise of climate-induced conflicts: Food security as a channel?

Weather shocks ≠ climate change

Climate Food Security Conflict

Growing evidence that weather shocks fuel conflicts

• Burke et al. (2009, PNAS) : A 1 % increase in temperature (not rainfall) leads to 4.5 % increase in civil war. Using IPCC predictions, 54% increase in armed conflict incidence by 2030.

• Globally, intergroup conflicts (such as civil war) rose by 13.6 percent with each one standard deviation change in climate toward higher temperatures or more extreme rainfall (Hsiang et al. 2013, Science)

• Contested by H. Buhaug et al.

Weather shocks and conflict

But reduced-formed nature of analysis means

that – No clear channel

– No context-specific recommendations for national policy and development support on conflict prevention

Focus on within-country variations allows to look at one particular channel (e.g. livestock markets) :

– Maystadt and Ecker. 2014. Extreme Weather and Civil War: Does Drought Fuel Conflict in Somalia through Livestock Price Shocks? American Journal of Agricultural Economics 96(4): 1157-1182.

– Maystadt, Calderone and You (2013) Local Warming and Violent Conflict in North and South Sudan. Journal of Economic Geography

Food insecurity and conflict in Somalia Vicious cycle of violence?

Source: DFID(2012). Source: Maystadt and Ecker (2014), based on ACLED (2012).

Violence in Somalia, 1997-2009 Estimated food security conditions, 9/2011

Source: Maystadt and Ecker (2014) Extreme Weather and Civil War: Does Drought Fuel Conflict in Somalia through Livestock Price Shocks? American Journal of Agricultural Economics 96(4): 1157-1182

What is the role of droughts for conflict? Vicious cycle in Somalia

“with the frequency of droughts increasing over the last decade, it’s become increasingly difficult for people to recover from one shock before one strikes. Such shocks drive conflict over land and water, disrupt economic activity and

leave young people vulnerable to unemployment and recruitment into extremist groups, like Al-Shabaab”, Paul Weisenfeld (USAID)

“This [the drought] has been a boon for Al-Shabab’s recruitment campaign because when you don’t have purchasing power to buy the food, you will be encouraged to be recruited because then you will be saved, and you can use

that salary or you could be given food”,

Bruno Geddo (UNHCR Somalia Representative)

Drought and Violence in Somalia Quotes from practitioners

Theoretical framework Drought => Livestock Prices fall => Poverty => Conflict?

Source: Maystadt and Ecker (2014) Extreme Weather and Civil War: Does Drought Fuel Conflict in Somalia through Livestock Price Shocks? American Journal of Agricultural Economics 96(4): 1157-1182

• Drought likely to translate into sharp decrease in livestock prices: • Prices, largely supply driven (with the exception of major demand

shocks outside of Somalia) • Oversupply of thin animals, due to drought-related reduction in

water and livestock feeding resources • Liquidating process to smooth consumption over time follows a

particular order : from more to less liquid assets (small to less liquid livestocks)

• Selling productive assets, particularly livestock, is often the only remaining – but largely inefficient – strategy to smoothen consumption

• Downward price movement amplified by information asymmetry in favor of intermediary traders

Source: Maystadt and Ecker (2014) Extreme Weather and Civil War: Does Drought Fuel Conflict in Somalia through Livestock Price Shocks? American Journal of Agricultural Economics 96(4): 1157-1182

Vicious cycle in Somalia

• Method : FE 2SLS with corrected standard errors (Conley 1999) • Intuition : Estimate the drought-price-conflict using monthly variations

within each region between 1997 and 2009

• Droughts fuel civil conflicts in Somalia (62% due to one SD) • Specific channel: drought-induced economic shocks on the livestock

sector and resulting income changes

Source: Maystadt and Ecker (2014) Extreme Weather and Civil War: Does Drought Fuel Conflict in Somalia through Livestock Price Shocks? American Journal of Agricultural Economics 96(4): 1157-1182

A security threat for the future

Method: Predicted changes in conflict by 2030, based on IPCC climate models (20 models*3 scenarios) and estimated responses to drought

4. What can be done to beak the climate-conflict trap?

The limits of food aid

Counter-insurgency strategies?

Development strategies

The limits of food aid

Aid may limit mass starvation ...

... But recent evidence (Nunn and Qian 2014) also shows that it could do more harms than goods in conflict-prone areas

• Aid may fuel conflict, since it becomes a resource that is fought over

• Aid may fuel conflict, by undermining political accountability

• Aid organizations’ priorities in complex emergencies are often at odds with meeting needs

Counter-insurgency strategies Security = necessary (Collier 2008) but not sufficient condition

Development projects in conflict areas?

Too little evidence on efficiency with few exceptions :

- Berman et al. (2011, JPE, 2013, AER): development projects undertaken by US military in Iraq.

- Beath et al. (2012): RCT in Afghanistan

- Crost et al. (2014, AER) in Philippines

Development projects may limit the spread of violence (not necessarily deter it, on the contrary) but it largely depends on the kinds of assistance (targeted, conditional transfers)

Climate change adaptation and food security strategies contribute to conflict prevention

Building resilience through establishing effective coping mechanisms and generating and diversifying income earning opportunities is critical for both conflict prevention and climate change adaptation.

Investment in pastoralist activities:

Improved livestock resilience to drought: adoption of drought-resistant animals, veterinary health services, emergency feed, and better access to water but without disturbing the (well-functing) livestock value chain

Help de-stocking and re-stocking through improved access to markets, insurance and credit markets, weather insurance schemes

Support income diversification: Irrigation, Migration and Education

PSNP in Ethiopia, an example of resilience-enhancing interventions

Enhancing resilience through a balanced food security and development strategy

Conclusions

Key messages Food insecurity is both a consequence and a cause for

conflict – thus improving food security can reduce the risk of conflict

Somalia shows that understanding the role of food markets is key for conflict mitigation

Weather shocks increase the risk of violence. Hence, climate change adaptation measures are critical for preventing conflicts

Given the limits of food aid, many questions remain about the efficiency of external interventions in conflict zones … but seem clear that development should be part of counter-insurgency strategies

References

Policy documents

Calderone, M., D. Headey, and J.-F. Maystadt. 2014. “Resilience to Climate-Induced Conflict in the Horn of Africa.” (chapter 8) In Resilience for Food and Nutrition Security, edited by S. Fan, R. Pandya-Lorch, and S. Yosef, 65-73. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.

Breisinger, C., O. Ecker, J.-F. Maystadt, J.-F. Trinh Tan, P. Al-Riffai, K. Bouzar, A. Sma, and M. Abdelgadir. 2014. How to Build Resilience to Conflict. The Role of Food Security. IFPRI Monograph. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.

Links: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/staff/maystadt/page1/page1.html

References

Open-access academic papers

Maystadt J.-F. and O. Ecker. 2014. Extreme Weather and Civil War: Does Drought Fuel Conflict in Somalia through Livestock Price Shocks? American Journal of Agricultural Economics 96(4): 1157-1182.

Maystadt, J.-F., J.-F. Trinh Tan and C. Breisinger. 2014. Does Food Security Matter for Transition in Arab Countries. Food Policy 46: 106-115.

Maystadt, J.-F., M. Calderone and L. You. 2014. Local Warming and Violent Conflict in North and South Sudan. Journal of Economic Geography, forthcoming.

Links: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/staff/maystadt/page1/page1.html

References

Other academic papers

Blatman Chris and Edward Miguel (2010) “Civil War”, Journal of Economic Literature 48(1): 3-57.

Miguel Edward, Shanker Satyanath and Ernest Sergenti (2004) “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 112: 725-753.

Ciccone, Antonio and Markus Bruckner (2010) “International Commodity price Shocks, Growth, and the Outbreak of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Economic Journal 120: 519-534.

Hsiang, S., M. Burke and E. Miguel (2013)“Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict” Science.

Nunn, N., and N. Qian. Forthcoming. “Aiding Conflict: The Impact of U.S. Food Aid on Civil War.” American Economic Review 104(6).

References

Other academic papers

Bellemare, M. 2014. Rising Food prices, price Volatility, and Social Unrest. Am. J. Agr. Economics 97(1): 1-21.

Berman, Felter, Shapiro, and Troland. 2013. Modest, secure, and Informed: Succesful development in Conflict Zones. American Economic Review P&P, 103(3): 512-517.

Berman, Shapiro, and Felter. 2011. Can hearts and Minds be Bought? The Economics of Counter-Insurgency in Iraq. Journal of Political Economy 119(4): 766-819.

Crost, Felter, and Johnson. 2014. Aid under Fire: development projects and civil conflict. American Economic Review 104(6): 1833-1856.